Federal Appeals Court Overturns Hate Crime Convictions of Amish Beard Cutters

Today a federal appeals court
overturned the hate-crime convictions of 16 people who were
charged in connection with a series of hair-cutting and
beard-shaving attacks on Amish men and women in Ohio.
Counterintuitively, the perpetrators were also Amish. But federal
prosecutors
argued that Bishop Samuel Mullet Sr. and his followers were
motivated by doctrinal disagreements with their targets and
therefore inflicted bodily injury “because of” their victims’
religion, a felony under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr.
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009. In today’s
ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit does not
question that violence arising from intrareligious disputes can
qualify as a hate crime, but it concludes that the jury
instructions in this case defined the motive element of the crime
too loosely:

The district court instructed the jury that the motive element
could be satisfied by showing that “a person’s actual or perceived
religion was a significant motivating factor for a [d]efendant’s
action” “even if he or she had other reasons for doing what he or
she did as well.” In taking issue with this instruction, the
defendants argue that the phrase “because of” requires but-for
causation—a showing that they would not have acted but for the
victim’s actual or perceived religious beliefs. The defendants have
the better of the argument.

In reaching that conclusion, the 6th Circuit relies on common
usage, its own decisions, and Supreme Court precedents, including a

2014 case involving a heroin dealer’s culpability for
a customer’s death. It adds that a looser definition would be
constitutionally problematic (citations omitted):

Any standard that requires less than but-for causality…treads
uncomfortably close to the line separating constitutional
regulation of conduct and unconstitutional regulation of beliefs.
The government may punish “bias-inspired conduct” without offending
the First Amendment because bigoted conduct “inflict[s] greater
individual and societal harm.” But punishment of a defendant’s
“abstract beliefs,” no matter how “morally reprehensible” they may
be, violates the First Amendment. Requiring a causal connection
between a defendant’s biased attitudes and his impermissible
actions ensures that the criminal law targets conduct, not bigoted
beliefs that have little connection to the crime.

To my mind, even the relatively narrow reading of the statute
endorsed by the 6th Circuit “treads uncomfortably close to the line
separating constitutional regulation of conduct and
unconstitutional regulation of beliefs.” The bottom line is that
Mullet and his followers would not have been charged with these
crimes but for their religious beliefs. They could
have been (and in fact were) prosecuted in state court for assault,
but the hate crime charges hinge on the doctrinal differences that
supposedly motivated them. When they are retried, they can win
acquittal by arguing that they were mainly motivated by family
disputes or interpersonal friction, as opposed to religious
beliefs. But they cannot win acquittal by arguing that their
religious beliefs should not matter.

The appeals court mentions another constitutional issue it does
not address (since the defective jury instructions were enough to
invalidate the convictions): “whether the federal hate-crime
statute exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause powers as applied to the
facts of this case.” That is a reference to U.S. Attorney Steven M.
Dettelbach’s
argument for making a federal case out of these seemingly local
crimes. Among other things, that argument hinged on the provenance
of the electric hair trimmers, horse shears, and disposable camera
used by the defendants. Since these instruments of crime originated
outside of Ohio, Dettelbach reasoned, the offenses implicated
interstate commerce. In case that was not enough, he also mentioned
the defendants’ use of a highway and the U.S. Postal Service.

If arguments as frivolous as these can establish an “interstate
nexus,” the Justice Department has the power to transform any act
of violence into a federal hate crime by arguing that the
perpetrator is a bigot or even, as in this case, that he disagreed
with his victim about religious matters. With that power comes the
ability to punish people more severely than state law allows, to
impose extra punishment on people already convicted and sentenced
under state law, and even to retry people who are acquitted in
state court. And that power is to be exercised by federal
prosecutors with a strong interest in making statements and
advancing their political careers, so you know it will be used with
the utmost caution.

[Thanks to John K. Ross for the tip.]