The Defense Argues That Derek Chauvin’s Fear of George Floyd’s ‘Superhuman Strength’ Justified His Deadly Use of Force


Steve-Schleicher-Newscom

During his closing argument in Derek Chauvin’s murder trial today, prosecutor Steve Schleicher urged jurors to focus on the “nine minutes and 29 seconds” during which the former Minneapolis police officer kept a handcuffed George Floyd pinned facedown to the pavement. “Force must be reasonable,” he said. “It must be reasonable at the point it starts, at the point it ends, and at all points in between.” And during his prolonged prone restraint, Schleicher said, Floyd “was not a threat to anyone.”

A thorough consideration of the evidence, Schleicher said, only confirms the impression left by the bystander video that appalled people across the country. “You can believe your own eyes,” he said. “This case is exactly what you thought when you saw it first, when you saw that video.”

Defense attorney Eric Nelson, by contrast, asked the jurors to consider “the totality of the circumstances,” including what Chauvin heard, witnessed, and experienced before pinning Floyd to the ground on May 25. “The use of force is an incredibly difficult analysis,” he said. “You can’t limit it to nine minutes and 29 seconds, [because] it started nearly 17 minutes earlier.”

Schleicher also talked about the broader context of Floyd’s encounter with the police, which began after a convenience store employee called 911 to report that Floyd had used a phony $20 bill to buy cigarettes. When Officers J. Alexander Kueng and Thomas Lane approached Floyd as he sat in his car near the store, Schleicher noted, they were immediately aggressive. “Within seconds,” Lane was holding his gun “inches from George Floyd’s face”; the officer was screaming and cursing at Floyd, who looked “terrified.”

Floyd nevertheless initially complied with all of the officers’ instructions: He put his hands on the steering wheel, got out of the car, did not resist as he was handcuffed (even though the cuffs were not double-locked and therefore continued to ratchet and squeeze his wrists), walked over to a Chinese restaurant and sat down on the sidewalk, got up again, and walked across the street. But when Kueng and Lane tried to put him in their patrol car, Floyd seemed to have an anxiety attack. He said he was claustrophobic, complained that he could not breathe, and asked to ride in the front seat.

From Floyd’s perspective, Schleicher said, the back of the squad car looked “like a little cage.” Still, he said, Floyd’s statements suggest that he “was trying to work up the courage” to get into the car. Kueng and Lane lost patience and tried to force Floyd into the car, a decision that even Nelson has criticized. “If Kueng and Lane had chosen to de-escalate instead of struggle, Mr. Floyd may have survived,” he said in a pretrial motion. Schleicher likewise faulted Kueng and Lane for escalating the situation instead of trying to calm Floyd.

According to Nelson, the struggle inside the car, which lasted about a minute, made a strong impression on Chauvin, who was trying to assist Kueng and Lane. The car was “rocking back and forth,” he said, and “a reasonable police officer understands the intensity of the struggle,” having seen that “Mr. Floyd was able to overcome the efforts of three police officers while handcuffed, [using] his legs and his body strength.”

Once the cops pulled Floyd out of the car, however, he stopped struggling and thanked them repeatedly, which in Schleicher’s view confirmed that “the problem was the back of the car.” At this point, Floyd was handcuffed and kneeling on the street. “He is handcuffed,” Schleicher said. “He is on his knees. He is not going anywhere. There are four officers there….It could have been over there.”

But Chauvin, Kueng, and Lane “pushed him down on the ground,” Schleicher said, even though they “didn’t need to.” Floyd was briefly lying in the “side recovery position,” which makes it relatively easy to breathe. “Incredibly,” Schleicher said, “they take him out of the recovery position and prone him on the ground.” That position, he said, is supposed to be used only prior to handcuffing an arrestee, after which Minneapolis police are trained to put him on his side or let him sit up to avoid the risk of “positional asphyxia.”

Chauvin had one knee on Floyd’s neck and the other on his back, while Kueng applied pressure to his back and Lane held his legs. They kept him pinned in that position for nine and a half minutes, despite Floyd’s repeated complaints that he was in pain and could not breathe, despite Lane’s suggestion that Floyd should be rolled onto his side, and despite concerned bystanders’ warnings that his life was in danger. Chauvin continued kneeling on Floyd even after he stopped talking and moving, became unresponsive, appeared to lose consciousness, and no longer had a detectable pulse.

“George Floyd begged until he could speak no more, and the defendant continued this assault,” Schleicher said. “When he was unable to speak, the defendant continued. When he was unable to breathe, the defendant continued, beyond the point that he had a pulse…When the ambulance arrived…the defendant continued. He stayed on top of him. He would not get up. He would not let up. He stayed on him, grinding into him, continuing to twist his fingers, to hold him down. He had no pulse. He was not breathing. He was not responsive. And the defendant had to know what was right beneath him.”

In Nelson’s view, that prolonged prone restraint has to be understood in light of Chauvin’s reasonable fears. He knew that Floyd was a big guy, suspected that he was under the influence of drugs, had experienced his strength and “active resistance” in the patrol car, and understood that an arrestee’s behavior “can change in an instant” from compliance to resistance or aggression. “It’s a dynamic situation,” he said. “A reasonable police officer tries to predict, or is at least cognizant and concerned about, future behavior, based upon past behavior….Human behavior is unpredictable, and no one knows it better than a police officer.”

At the same time, Nelson implicitly acknowledged that Chauvin’s choices were at least questionable. “The standard is not what should the officer have done in these circumstances,” he said. “Officers are human beings capable of making mistakes in highly stressful situations.” He also called Floyd’s death “tragic” and conceded that Chauvin’s treatment of him was “unattractive.”

While Nelson emphasized Floyd’s size and apparent intoxication, Schleicher noted that such factors do not on their own constitute a threat that justifies the use of force. The defense’s use-of-force expert, Barry Brodd, claimed that Floyd was “somewhat resisting” even after he was pinned to the ground, although his definition of resistance seemed to include writhing in pain and struggling to breathe. But even by Brodd’s account, the prone restraint continued for more than seven minutes after Floyd was no longer resisting.

Regardless of what Chauvin worried might happen, it is clear that he kept kneeling on Floyd long after Floyd posed no conceivable threat. “I think he’s passing out,” Lane said after several minutes, and soon afterward Kueng reported that he could not find a pulse. “How can you justify the continued use of force against this man when he has no pulse?” Schleicher wondered. “It was not necessary. It was gratuitous. It was disproportionate.”

Brodd nevertheless concluded that Chauvin’s use of force was justified in the circumstances. That contradicted the testimony of the city’s police chiefother supervisors, and other use-of-force experts, who said Chauvin’s actions violated his training, department policy, and the Fourth Amendment, which according to the Supreme Court requires that force be “objectively reasonable,” meaning a “reasonable officer” would have done the same thing in the same situation.

Nelson today dismissed those conclusions as “opinions.” But the only countervailing testimony he offered on this point came from Brodd, who raised many eyebrows by arguing that pinning Floyd to the pavement did not even qualify as a use of force because it was not likely to cause pain. Brodd also claimed that “drug-influenced” suspects “don’t feel pain” and “may have superhuman strength”—an old canard with racist roots that police tend to drag out when they are accused of using excessive force.

Schleicher took aim at all three assertions during his closing argument. Aside from the fact that the Minneapolis Police Department’s definition of force (like most people’s) does not require the infliction of pain, he said, Floyd was clearly experiencing pain under Chauvin’s knee, as reflected in his repeated complaints to that effect. Schleicher showed photos of lacerations on Floyd’s face, knuckles, and shoulder, which he said were evidence of his desperate struggle to “create breathing space” by pushing against the pavement. He also noted that Chauvin used “pain compliance” techniques on Floyd’s fingers and hands, even though at that point there was no more that Floyd could do to comply.

So much for the insensitivity to pain that Brodd described. Schleicher also noted that “there is no such thing as superhuman strength because there is no such thing as superhumans,” who exist only “in comic books.” Far from demonstrating superhuman strength while three cops had him pinned to the ground, Schleicher said, Floyd “was so desperate to breathe [that] he pushed with his face…to lift himself, to open his chest, to give his lungs room to breathe, the pavement tearing into his skin.”

As he has throughout the trial, Nelson dismissed the prosecution’s claim that Floyd died because the prone restraint made it impossible for him to breathe properly. He said Chicago pulmonologist Martin Tobin, who explained in detail how that position would have impeded Floyd’s breathing and concluded that he died from “a low level of oxygen,” offered nothing but “theory, speculation, and assumption.” Yet even Brodd conceded that the risk of positional asphyxia has long been widely understood by police.

Nelson noted that Hennepin County Medical Examiner Andrew Baker said nothing about asphyxia in his autopsy report. The prosecution “did not like Dr. Baker’s conclusions,” he said. Yet Baker, who concluded that the use of force against Floyd fatally interacted with his “very severe underlying heart disease,” classified the death as a homicide. And in his testimony, he did not rule out the possibility that impeded breathing played a role in Floyd’s “cardiopulmonary arrest,” saying, “I would defer to a pulmonologist.”

The defense’s sole medical witness, David Fowler, concluded that Floyd died from “a sudden cardiac arrhythmia” rather than asphyxia. But he said an important factor in that arrhythmia was the “very stressful situation” created by Floyd’s prone restraint, which hardly lets Chauvin off the hook. As Schleicher noted, it would be an “amazing coincidence” if, after Floyd was pressed against the pavement for nine and a half minutes, “he chose that moment to die of heart disease.”

The defense also has argued that Floyd’s consumption of fentanyl contributed to his death. But the level of fentanyl in Floyd’s blood, 11 nanograms per milliliter, was near the low end of the concentrations seen in fatal overdoses, and Floyd, as a regular user, would have developed tolerance. A toxicologist testified that the ratio of fentanyl to the metabolite norfentanyl was much lower than what is typically seen in fentanyl-related deaths, and medical experts noted that Floyd was not displaying signs of an opioid overdose, such as drowsiness, slow breathing, or constricted pupils.

Nelson today implied that other possible contributing factors mean that Chauvin did not cause Floyd’s death. But as Schleicher noted, “the fact that other causes may have contributed to George Floyd’s death does not relieve the defendant of any criminal liability.” If Chauvin’s actions were “a substantial causal factor,” that makes him legally responsible, assuming that his use of force was objectively unreasonable.

If the jurors agree that Chauvin caused Floyd’s death by using excessive force, they still will have to decide which of the charges against him fit the facts of the case. The second-degree murder charge alleges that Chauvin killed Floyd while committing felony assault, which means he “intentionally applied unlawful force” and thereby inflicted “substantial bodily harm.” The third-degree murder charge says Chauvin killed Floyd by “perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life.” The second-degree manslaughter charge alleges that Chauvin caused Floyd’s death “by his culpable negligence, creating an unreasonable risk and consciously [taking] the chances of causing great bodily harm.”

Nelson argued that the prosecution had failed to prove the predicate felony underlying the second-degree murder charge. “There is absolutely no evidence that Officer Chauvin intentionally, purposefully applied an unlawful force,” he said. He maintained that the prosecution had not proved the other charges beyond a reasonable doubt either.

It seems to me that Chauvin’s actions easily qualify as second-degree manslaughter, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a presumptive sentence of four years. I have reservations about the felony murder charge, which thanks to a quirk of Minnesota’s law allows prosecutors to treat pretty much any deliberate assault that unintentionally causes someone’s death as murder rather than manslaughter.

The third-degree murder charge carries a lower maximum penalty than felony murder (25 vs. 40 years) but the same presumptive sentence: 12.5 years. Schleicher made a persuasive case that Chauvin’s actions reflected a “depraved mind,” meaning that he showed “reckless and wanton unconcern and indifference.”

Nelson has suggested that Chauvin’s use of force and his failure to perform CPR are mitigated by the distracting presence of horrified bystanders who criticized the way he was treating Floyd. To the contrary, Schleicher argued, those objections should have alerted Chauvin to the danger of positional asphyxia, especially when combined with his training and Lane’s suggestion that Floyd should be rolled off his stomach.

Schleicher suggested that Chauvin “chose pride over policing,” seeing the onlookers’ criticism as an ego-threatening challenge to his authority. “The defendant was not going to be told what to do,” he said. “He was not going to let these bystanders tell him what to do. He was going to do what he wanted, how he wanted, for as long as he wanted, and there was nothing they could do about it, because he had the authority. He had the power of the badge.”

Whatever distraction the bystanders caused, Chauvin clearly was aware that Floyd was in distress. When Floyd said he was in pain, Chauvin repeatedly responded with a flat “uh-huh.” When Floyd said, over and over again (27 times, by the prosecution’s count), that he could not breathe, Chauvin replied that “it takes a lot of oxygen” to complain. “The defendant heard it, he acknowledged it, and all he did was mock him,” Schleicher said.

Schleicher emphasized that convicting Chauvin would not be an indictment of police generally, noting all the officers who testified against him. “This wasn’t policing; it was murder,” he said. “He betrayed the badge and everything it stood for. It’s not how they’re trained. It’s not following the rules….This is not an anti-police prosecution. It’s a pro-police prosecution.”

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The Defense Argues That Derek Chauvin’s Fear of George Floyd’s ‘Superhuman Strength’ Justified His Deadly Use of Force


Steve-Schleicher-Newscom

During his closing argument in Derek Chauvin’s murder trial today, prosecutor Steve Schleicher urged jurors to focus on the “nine minutes and 29 seconds” during which the former Minneapolis police officer kept a handcuffed George Floyd pinned facedown to the pavement. “Force must be reasonable,” he said. “It must be reasonable at the point it starts, at the point it ends, and at all points in between.” And during his prolonged prone restraint, Schleicher said, Floyd “was not a threat to anyone.”

A thorough consideration of the evidence, Schleicher said, only confirms the impression left by the bystander video that appalled people across the country. “You can believe your own eyes,” he said. “This case is exactly what you thought when you saw it first, when you saw that video.”

Defense attorney Eric Nelson, by contrast, asked the jurors to consider “the totality of the circumstances,” including what Chauvin heard, witnessed, and experienced before pinning Floyd to the ground on May 25. “The use of force is an incredibly difficult analysis,” he said. “You can’t limit it to nine minutes and 29 seconds, [because] it started nearly 17 minutes earlier.”

Schleicher also talked about the broader context of Floyd’s encounter with the police, which began after a convenience store employee called 911 to report that Floyd had used a phony $20 bill to buy cigarettes. When Officers J. Alexander Kueng and Thomas Lane approached Floyd as he sat in his car near the store, Schleicher noted, they were immediately aggressive. “Within seconds,” Lane was holding his gun “inches from George Floyd’s face”; the officer was screaming and cursing at Floyd, who looked “terrified.”

Floyd nevertheless initially complied with all of the officers’ instructions: He put his hands on the steering wheel, got out of the car, did not resist as he was handcuffed (even though the cuffs were not double-locked and therefore continued to ratchet and squeeze his wrists), walked over to a Chinese restaurant and sat down on the sidewalk, got up again, and walked across the street. But when Kueng and Lane tried to put him in their patrol car, Floyd seemed to have an anxiety attack. He said he was claustrophobic, complained that he could not breathe, and asked to ride in the front seat.

From Floyd’s perspective, Schleicher said, the back of the squad car looked “like a little cage.” Still, he said, Floyd’s statements suggest that he “was trying to work up the courage” to get into the car. Kueng and Lane lost patience and tried to force Floyd into the car, a decision that even Nelson has criticized. “If Kueng and Lane had chosen to de-escalate instead of struggle, Mr. Floyd may have survived,” he said in a pretrial motion. Schleicher likewise faulted Kueng and Lane for escalating the situation instead of trying to calm Floyd.

According to Nelson, the struggle inside the car, which lasted about a minute, made a strong impression on Chauvin, who was trying to assist Kueng and Lane. The car was “rocking back and forth,” he said, and “a reasonable police officer understands the intensity of the struggle,” having seen that “Mr. Floyd was able to overcome the efforts of three police officers while handcuffed, [using] his legs and his body strength.”

Once the cops pulled Floyd out of the car, however, he stopped struggling and thanked them repeatedly, which in Schleicher’s view confirmed that “the problem was the back of the car.” At this point, Floyd was handcuffed and kneeling on the street. “He is handcuffed,” Schleicher said. “He is on his knees. He is not going anywhere. There are four officers there….It could have been over there.”

But Chauvin, Kueng, and Lane “pushed him down on the ground,” Schleicher said, even though they “didn’t need to.” Floyd was briefly lying in the “side recovery position,” which makes it relatively easy to breathe. “Incredibly,” Schleicher said, “they take him out of the recovery position and prone him on the ground.” That position, he said, is supposed to be used only prior to handcuffing an arrestee, after which Minneapolis police are trained to put him on his side or let him sit up to avoid the risk of “positional asphyxia.”

Chauvin had one knee on Floyd’s neck and the other on his back, while Kueng applied pressure to his back and Lane held his legs. They kept him pinned in that position for nine and a half minutes, despite Floyd’s repeated complaints that he was in pain and could not breathe, despite Lane’s suggestion that Floyd should be rolled onto his side, and despite concerned bystanders’ warnings that his life was in danger. Chauvin continued kneeling on Floyd even after he stopped talking and moving, became unresponsive, appeared to lose consciousness, and no longer had a detectable pulse.

“George Floyd begged until he could speak no more, and the defendant continued this assault,” Schleicher said. “When he was unable to speak, the defendant continued. When he was unable to breathe, the defendant continued, beyond the point that he had a pulse…When the ambulance arrived…the defendant continued. He stayed on top of him. He would not get up. He would not let up. He stayed on him, grinding into him, continuing to twist his fingers, to hold him down. He had no pulse. He was not breathing. He was not responsive. And the defendant had to know what was right beneath him.”

In Nelson’s view, that prolonged prone restraint has to be understood in light of Chauvin’s reasonable fears. He knew that Floyd was a big guy, suspected that he was under the influence of drugs, had experienced his strength and “active resistance” in the patrol car, and understood that an arrestee’s behavior “can change in an instant” from compliance to resistance or aggression. “It’s a dynamic situation,” he said. “A reasonable police officer tries to predict, or is at least cognizant and concerned about, future behavior, based upon past behavior….Human behavior is unpredictable, and no one knows it better than a police officer.”

At the same time, Nelson implicitly acknowledged that Chauvin’s choices were at least questionable. “The standard is not what should the officer have done in these circumstances,” he said. “Officers are human beings capable of making mistakes in highly stressful situations.” He also called Floyd’s death “tragic” and conceded that Chauvin’s treatment of him was “unattractive.”

While Nelson emphasized Floyd’s size and apparent intoxication, Schleicher noted that such factors do not on their own constitute a threat that justifies the use of force. The defense’s use-of-force expert, Barry Brodd, claimed that Floyd was “somewhat resisting” even after he was pinned to the ground, although his definition of resistance seemed to include writhing in pain and struggling to breathe. But even by Brodd’s account, the prone restraint continued for more than seven minutes after Floyd was no longer resisting.

Regardless of what Chauvin worried might happen, it is clear that he kept kneeling on Floyd long after Floyd posed no conceivable threat. “I think he’s passing out,” Lane said after several minutes, and soon afterward Kueng reported that he could not find a pulse. “How can you justify the continued use of force against this man when he has no pulse?” Schleicher wondered. “It was not necessary. It was gratuitous. It was disproportionate.”

Brodd nevertheless concluded that Chauvin’s use of force was justified in the circumstances. That contradicted the testimony of the city’s police chiefother supervisors, and other use-of-force experts, who said Chauvin’s actions violated his training, department policy, and the Fourth Amendment, which according to the Supreme Court requires that force be “objectively reasonable,” meaning a “reasonable officer” would have done the same thing in the same situation.

Nelson today dismissed those conclusions as “opinions.” But the only countervailing testimony he offered on this point came from Brodd, who raised many eyebrows by arguing that pinning Floyd to the pavement did not even qualify as a use of force because it was not likely to cause pain. Brodd also claimed that “drug-influenced” suspects “don’t feel pain” and “may have superhuman strength”—an old canard with racist roots that police tend to drag out when they are accused of using excessive force.

Schleicher took aim at all three assertions during his closing argument. Aside from the fact that the Minneapolis Police Department’s definition of force (like most people’s) does not require the infliction of pain, he said, Floyd was clearly experiencing pain under Chauvin’s knee, as reflected in his repeated complaints to that effect. Schleicher showed photos of lacerations on Floyd’s face, knuckles, and shoulder, which he said were evidence of his desperate struggle to “create breathing space” by pushing against the pavement. He also noted that Chauvin used “pain compliance” techniques on Floyd’s fingers and hands, even though at that point there was no more that Floyd could do to comply.

So much for the insensitivity to pain that Brodd described. Schleicher also noted that “there is no such thing as superhuman strength because there is no such thing as superhumans,” who exist only “in comic books.” Far from demonstrating superhuman strength while three cops had him pinned to the ground, Schleicher said, Floyd “was so desperate to breathe [that] he pushed with his face…to lift himself, to open his chest, to give his lungs room to breathe, the pavement tearing into his skin.”

As he has throughout the trial, Nelson dismissed the prosecution’s claim that Floyd died because the prone restraint made it impossible for him to breathe properly. He said Chicago pulmonologist Martin Tobin, who explained in detail how that position would have impeded Floyd’s breathing and concluded that he died from “a low level of oxygen,” offered nothing but “theory, speculation, and assumption.” Yet even Brodd conceded that the risk of positional asphyxia has long been widely understood by police.

Nelson noted that Hennepin County Medical Examiner Andrew Baker said nothing about asphyxia in his autopsy report. The prosecution “did not like Dr. Baker’s conclusions,” he said. Yet Baker, who concluded that the use of force against Floyd fatally interacted with his “very severe underlying heart disease,” classified the death as a homicide. And in his testimony, he did not rule out the possibility that impeded breathing played a role in Floyd’s “cardiopulmonary arrest,” saying, “I would defer to a pulmonologist.”

The defense’s sole medical witness, David Fowler, concluded that Floyd died from “a sudden cardiac arrhythmia” rather than asphyxia. But he said an important factor in that arrhythmia was the “very stressful situation” created by Floyd’s prone restraint, which hardly lets Chauvin off the hook. As Schleicher noted, it would be an “amazing coincidence” if, after Floyd was pressed against the pavement for nine and a half minutes, “he chose that moment to die of heart disease.”

The defense also has argued that Floyd’s consumption of fentanyl contributed to his death. But the level of fentanyl in Floyd’s blood, 11 nanograms per milliliter, was near the low end of the concentrations seen in fatal overdoses, and Floyd, as a regular user, would have developed tolerance. A toxicologist testified that the ratio of fentanyl to the metabolite norfentanyl was much lower than what is typically seen in fentanyl-related deaths, and medical experts noted that Floyd was not displaying signs of an opioid overdose, such as drowsiness, slow breathing, or constricted pupils.

Nelson today implied that other possible contributing factors mean that Chauvin did not cause Floyd’s death. But as Schleicher noted, “the fact that other causes may have contributed to George Floyd’s death does not relieve the defendant of any criminal liability.” If Chauvin’s actions were “a substantial causal factor,” that makes him legally responsible, assuming that his use of force was objectively unreasonable.

If the jurors agree that Chauvin caused Floyd’s death by using excessive force, they still will have to decide which of the charges against him fit the facts of the case. The second-degree murder charge alleges that Chauvin killed Floyd while committing felony assault, which means he “intentionally applied unlawful force” and thereby inflicted “substantial bodily harm.” The third-degree murder charge says Chauvin killed Floyd by “perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life.” The second-degree manslaughter charge alleges that Chauvin caused Floyd’s death “by his culpable negligence, creating an unreasonable risk and consciously [taking] the chances of causing great bodily harm.”

Nelson argued that the prosecution had failed to prove the predicate felony underlying the second-degree murder charge. “There is absolutely no evidence that Officer Chauvin intentionally, purposefully applied an unlawful force,” he said. He maintained that the prosecution had not proved the other charges beyond a reasonable doubt either.

It seems to me that Chauvin’s actions easily qualify as second-degree manslaughter, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a presumptive sentence of four years. I have reservations about the felony murder charge, which thanks to a quirk of Minnesota’s law allows prosecutors to treat pretty much any deliberate assault that unintentionally causes someone’s death as murder rather than manslaughter.

The third-degree murder charge carries a lower maximum penalty than felony murder (25 vs. 40 years) but the same presumptive sentence: 12.5 years. Schleicher made a persuasive case that Chauvin’s actions reflected a “depraved mind,” meaning that he showed “reckless and wanton unconcern and indifference.”

Nelson has suggested that Chauvin’s use of force and his failure to perform CPR are mitigated by the distracting presence of horrified bystanders who criticized the way he was treating Floyd. To the contrary, Schleicher argued, those objections should have alerted Chauvin to the danger of positional asphyxia, especially when combined with his training and Lane’s suggestion that Floyd should be rolled off his stomach.

Schleicher suggested that Chauvin “chose pride over policing,” seeing the onlookers’ criticism as an ego-threatening challenge to his authority. “The defendant was not going to be told what to do,” he said. “He was not going to let these bystanders tell him what to do. He was going to do what he wanted, how he wanted, for as long as he wanted, and there was nothing they could do about it, because he had the authority. He had the power of the badge.”

Whatever distraction the bystanders caused, Chauvin clearly was aware that Floyd was in distress. When Floyd said he was in pain, Chauvin repeatedly responded with a flat “uh-huh.” When Floyd said, over and over again (27 times, by the prosecution’s count), that he could not breathe, Chauvin replied that “it takes a lot of oxygen” to complain. “The defendant heard it, he acknowledged it, and all he did was mock him,” Schleicher said.

Schleicher emphasized that convicting Chauvin would not be an indictment of police generally, noting all the officers who testified against him. “This wasn’t policing; it was murder,” he said. “He betrayed the badge and everything it stood for. It’s not how they’re trained. It’s not following the rules….This is not an anti-police prosecution. It’s a pro-police prosecution.”

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Congress’s 2021 cybersecurity agenda

Our interview is with Mark Montgomery and John Costello, both staff to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.  The Commission, which issued its main report more than a year ago, is swinging through the pitch, following up with new white papers, draft legislative language, and enthusiastic advocacy for its legislative recommendations, many of which were adopted last year. That makes it the most successful of the many cybersecurity commissions that have come and gone in Washington. And it’s not done yet. Mark and John review several of the most important legislative proposals the Commission will be pursuing this year. I don’t agree with all of them, but they are all serious ideas and it’s a good bet that a dozen or more could be adopted in this Congress.

In the news roundup, David Kris and I cover the FBI’s use of a single search warrant to remove a large number of web shells from computers infected by China’s irresponsible use of its access to Microsoft Exchange. Deploying a search warrant (or, more accurately, a seizure warrant)requires a far-reaching interpretation of federal criminal Rule 41. But despite valiant efforts, David is unable to disagree with my earlier expressed view that the tactic is lawful.

Brian Egan outlines what’s new in the Biden administration’s sanctions on Russia for its SolarWinds exploits. The short version: While some of the sanctions break new ground, as with the restrictions on Russian bonds, they do so cautiously.

Paul Rosenzweig, back from Costa Rica, unpacks a hacking story that has everything – terrorism, the FBI, Apple, private sector hacking, and litigation. Short version: we now know the private firm that saved Apple from being ordered to hack its own phone. The hacking was done instead by an Australian firm named Azimuth that apparently only works for democratic governments but that is nonetheless caught up in Apple’s bullythe-cybersecurity-researchers litigation campaign.

Gus Hurwitz talks to us about the seamy side of content moderation (or at least one seamy side) – the fight against “coordinated inauthentic behaviour.”

In quicker takes, Paul gives us a master class in how to read the intel community’s Annual Threat Assessment.  David highlights what may be the next Chinese  telecom manufacturing target, at least for the GOP. I highlight the groundbreaking financial industry breach notification rule that has now finished the comment period and is moving toward adoption. And Gus summarizes the state of Silicon Valley antitrust legislation:  Everyone has a bill, so no one is likely to get a bill.

Download the 358th Episode (mp3)

You can subscribe to The Cyberlaw Podcast using iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, Pocket Casts, or our RSS feed. As always, The Cyberlaw Podcast is open to feedback. Be sure to engage with @stewartbaker on Twitter. Send your questions, comments, and suggestions for topics or interviewees to CyberlawPodcast@steptoe.com. Remember: If your suggested guest appears on the show, we will send you a highly coveted Cyberlaw Podcast mug!

The views expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers and do not reflect the opinions of their institutions, clients, friends, families, or pets.

 

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The House Just Voted To Let Marijuana Businesses Use Banks. Again.


rollcallpix104236

On the eve of “4/20,” the House of Representatives gave broad bipartisan support to a bill that would finally allow state-legal marijuana businesses to access banking services.

It’s the second time the House has passed a bill to do so. Unlike in 2019, however, there is reason to believe the Senate may give the bill a warmer welcome this year.

“Passing this bill will show that Congress can work together in a bipartisan way to address outdated marijuana laws,” Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D–Colo.) said from the House floor on Monday, just prior to the vote. “I hope this bill is an icebreaker for the House to take up other reforms and finally remove the conflict between state and federal laws.”

Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act, which passed the House 321-101 on Monday evening, is in many ways the very least that Congress should be doing with regard to legalizing cannabis in America. It does not legalize or decriminalize pot at the federal level, nor does it remove cannabis from Schedule I, the Drug Enforcement Agency’s list of what it considers to be “exceptionally dangerous” substances.

But it does take a big step towards getting the federal government to butt out of transactions that are entirely legal within the 36 states where marijuana has been approved for medical use and the 16 states where recreational use is allowed. The bill would change several federal statutes so banks are no longer pressured to consider state-legal marijuana businesses unlawful.

As I wrote in a piece published Sunday as part of Reason‘s “Weed Week” coverage, most banks won’t offer services to businesses in the marijuana industry for fear of a federal crackdown—and those that do are forced to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), even for totally mundane, completely legal transactions.

That’s a huge barrier to starting and maintaining a business, of course. Without reliable access to banking services, cannabis businesses have to rely on wealthy investors to get started and can’t expand until they’ve establish significant cash reserves. Most transactions have to take place in cash only, which has made legal pot shops a target for crime. Even something as basic as writing to check to buy equipment can be a challenge. No other legal businesses have to operate like this.

“Prohibition is over,” Perlmutter said Monday. “The SAFE Banking Act is focused on taking cash off the streets and making our communities safer.”

The bill now moves to the Senate, where  Sens. Jeff Merkley (D–Ore.) and Steve Daines (R–Mont.) are the lead sponsors. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D–N.Y.) has promised to tackle marijuana legalization this year, but so far he has not provided a timetable for consideration of the SAFE Banking Act or other marijuana legislation.

Another stumbling block sits in the White House. President Joe Biden remains opposed to marijuana legalization, even though new polling shows that 69 percent of all Americans (and 78 percent of Democrats) favor legalization.

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Congress’s 2021 cybersecurity agenda

Our interview is with Mark Montgomery and John Costello, both staff to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.  The Commission, which issued its main report more than a year ago, is swinging through the pitch, following up with new white papers, draft legislative language, and enthusiastic advocacy for its legislative recommendations, many of which were adopted last year. That makes it the most successful of the many cybersecurity commissions that have come and gone in Washington. And it’s not done yet. Mark and John review several of the most important legislative proposals the Commission will be pursuing this year. I don’t agree with all of them, but they are all serious ideas and it’s a good bet that a dozen or more could be adopted in this Congress.

In the news roundup, David Kris and I cover the FBI’s use of a single search warrant to remove a large number of web shells from computers infected by China’s irresponsible use of its access to Microsoft Exchange. Deploying a search warrant (or, more accurately, a seizure warrant)requires a far-reaching interpretation of federal criminal Rule 41. But despite valiant efforts, David is unable to disagree with my earlier expressed view that the tactic is lawful.

Brian Egan outlines what’s new in the Biden administration’s sanctions on Russia for its SolarWinds exploits. The short version: While some of the sanctions break new ground, as with the restrictions on Russian bonds, they do so cautiously.

Paul Rosenzweig, back from Costa Rica, unpacks a hacking story that has everything – terrorism, the FBI, Apple, private sector hacking, and litigation. Short version: we now know the private firm that saved Apple from being ordered to hack its own phone. The hacking was done instead by an Australian firm named Azimuth that apparently only works for democratic governments but that is nonetheless caught up in Apple’s bullythe-cybersecurity-researchers litigation campaign.

Gus Hurwitz talks to us about the seamy side of content moderation (or at least one seamy side) – the fight against “coordinated inauthentic behaviour.”

In quicker takes, Paul gives us a master class in how to read the intel community’s Annual Threat Assessment.  David highlights what may be the next Chinese  telecom manufacturing target, at least for the GOP. I highlight the groundbreaking financial industry breach notification rule that has now finished the comment period and is moving toward adoption. And Gus summarizes the state of Silicon Valley antitrust legislation:  Everyone has a bill, so no one is likely to get a bill.

Download the 358th Episode (mp3)

You can subscribe to The Cyberlaw Podcast using iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, Pocket Casts, or our RSS feed. As always, The Cyberlaw Podcast is open to feedback. Be sure to engage with @stewartbaker on Twitter. Send your questions, comments, and suggestions for topics or interviewees to CyberlawPodcast@steptoe.com. Remember: If your suggested guest appears on the show, we will send you a highly coveted Cyberlaw Podcast mug!

The views expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers and do not reflect the opinions of their institutions, clients, friends, families, or pets.

 

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The House Just Voted To Let Marijuana Businesses Use Banks. Again.


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On the eve of “4/20,” the House of Representatives gave broad bipartisan support to a bill that would finally allow state-legal marijuana businesses to access banking services.

It’s the second time the House has passed a bill to do so. Unlike in 2019, however, there is reason to believe the Senate may give the bill a warmer welcome this year.

“Passing this bill will show that Congress can work together in a bipartisan way to address outdated marijuana laws,” Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D–Colo.) said from the House floor on Monday, just prior to the vote. “I hope this bill is an icebreaker for the House to take up other reforms and finally remove the conflict between state and federal laws.”

Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act, which passed the House 321-101 on Monday evening, is in many ways the very least that Congress should be doing with regard to legalizing cannabis in America. It does not legalize or decriminalize pot at the federal level, nor does it remove cannabis from Schedule I, the Drug Enforcement Agency’s list of what it considers to be “exceptionally dangerous” substances.

But it does take a big step towards getting the federal government to butt out of transactions that are entirely legal within the 36 states where marijuana has been approved for medical use and the 16 states where recreational use is allowed. The bill would change several federal statutes so banks are no longer pressured to consider state-legal marijuana businesses unlawful.

As I wrote in a piece published Sunday as part of Reason‘s “Weed Week” coverage, most banks won’t offer services to businesses in the marijuana industry for fear of a federal crackdown—and those that do are forced to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), even for totally mundane, completely legal transactions.

That’s a huge barrier to starting and maintaining a business, of course. Without reliable access to banking services, cannabis businesses have to rely on wealthy investors to get started and can’t expand until they’ve establish significant cash reserves. Most transactions have to take place in cash only, which has made legal pot shops a target for crime. Even something as basic as writing to check to buy equipment can be a challenge. No other legal businesses have to operate like this.

“Prohibition is over,” Perlmutter said Monday. “The SAFE Banking Act is focused on taking cash off the streets and making our communities safer.”

The bill now moves to the Senate, where  Sens. Jeff Merkley (D–Ore.) and Steve Daines (R–Mont.) are the lead sponsors. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D–N.Y.) has promised to tackle marijuana legalization this year, but so far he has not provided a timetable for consideration of the SAFE Banking Act or other marijuana legislation.

Another stumbling block sits in the White House. President Joe Biden remains opposed to marijuana legalization, even though new polling shows that 69 percent of all Americans (and 78 percent of Democrats) favor legalization.

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Sixth Circuit Grants Habeas Petition for Lower’s Court’s Objectively Unreasonable Application of the Confrontation Clause

Today, in Miller v. Genovese, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Dwight Miller’s petition for a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Miller is challenging his murder conviction and life sentence.

Habeas petitions often divide the Sixth Circuit, but not today. The panel of Judges Batchelder, Bush and Moore was unanimous. Judge Bush wrote for the court. His opinion begins:

When the English Crown sentenced Sir Walter Raleigh to death for treason without allowing him to cross-examine the key witness against him, Lord Cobham, it sparked a public outcry. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44, 50 (2004). That controversy culminated in English law developing a right to confront witnesses. Id. at 44. Almost two centuries later, the American Founders enshrined that right in the  Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

This case presents a wrinkle on Raleigh’s trial. What if Raleigh had, in fact, been allowed to cross-examine Cobham and uncover his motive to lie but—and here’s the  catch— Raleigh was not allowed to reveal to the jury the portion of Cobham’s testimony disclosing that motive? Would that scenario have been any less offensive to principles of justice than an outright denial of Raleigh’s right to cross-examine Cobham? To ask those questions is to answer them. Confrontation of an adverse witness necessarily entails that the trier of fact be allowed to learn the material results of that confrontation. That did not happen with respect to a key witness in the murder trial of Dwight Miller. For that reason and others explained below, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’s application of clearly established law (namely, the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence) was objectively unreasonable. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of habeas corpus and remand for it to grant Miller a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

The opinion concludes:

Maybe, as the State believed and the trial judge suspected, Kathy Blackwell was lying when she claimed that she could not remember anything that she had told the police in her prior statements. Or perhaps, as Miller believes, Blackwell was lying during her second appearance when she claimed that she suddenly could remember and then testified consistently with her prior statements to the police. For our purposes, and for purposes of applying the Confrontation Clause generally, it does not matter which testimony was true. Instead, what matters is that the jury had the opportunity to decide for itself whether to believe Blackwell. By redacting her testimony, the trial court denied the jury in Miller’s second trial that chance and violated Miller’s confrontation right.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’s application of the Confrontation Clause’s protections to that decision to redact Blackwell’s testimony was objectively unreasonable. The trial court justified the admission of Blackwell’s prior testimony based on her unavailability. But it could not justify redacting the products of Miller’s cross-examination. The confrontation guarantee that Sir Raleigh’s trial inspired is not just the right to cross-examine; equally important, it is the right to share with the jury the information the cross-examination  reveals. We therefore reverse and remand for the district court to grant Miller a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

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Notice & Comment Symposium on Sunstein and Vermeule’s Law & Leviathan

This month, the Yale Journal on Regulation‘s Notice & Comment blog is hosting an online symposium on Law & Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State by Harvard law professors Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. Notre Dame’s Jeffrey Pojanowski introduces the symposium here.

Law & Leviathan is an effort to defend the administrative state from originalists, formalists, libertarians and other anti-administrativists (who they refer to, collectively, as the “New Coke”). Sunstein and Vermeule’s argument, in a nutshell, is that the administrative state’s morality and legitimacy are ensured by a set of surrogate safeguards that have developed within administrative law to ensure that administrative action remains sufficiently consistent with the rule of law and law’s internal morality. It is an important and provocative argument that has already provoked substantial comment. See, for instance, Adam White’s review in the WSJ, Richard Epstein’s critique on Law & Liberty, or Paul Gowder’s extremely lengthy analysis in the Law and Politics Book Review.

The Notice & Comment symposium consists of a series of posts from a range of authors, available here. Already posted are Jeff Pojanowski’s introduction, and contributions from Ronald Levin, Kevin Stack, Mila Sohoni, Nicholas Bagley, Emily Bremer and Jennifer Mascott. Still to come are contributions from Matthew Lewans, Aditya Bamzai, Kristin Hickman, and yours truly. Once complete, the contributions will be posted as a single PDF on SSRN.

If you are interested in administrative law (and perhaps even if you’re not), this symposium is highly recommended (at least until I contribute).

 

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Sixth Circuit Grants Habeas Petition for Lower’s Court’s Objectively Unreasonable Application of the Confrontation Clause

Today, in Miller v. Genovese, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Dwight Miller’s petition for a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Miller is challenging his murder conviction and life sentence.

Habeas petitions often divide the Sixth Circuit, but not today. The panel of Judges Batchelder, Bush and Moore was unanimous. Judge Bush wrote for the court. His opinion begins:

When the English Crown sentenced Sir Walter Raleigh to death for treason without allowing him to cross-examine the key witness against him, Lord Cobham, it sparked a public outcry. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44, 50 (2004). That controversy culminated in English law developing a right to confront witnesses. Id. at 44. Almost two centuries later, the American Founders enshrined that right in the  Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

This case presents a wrinkle on Raleigh’s trial. What if Raleigh had, in fact, been allowed to cross-examine Cobham and uncover his motive to lie but—and here’s the  catch— Raleigh was not allowed to reveal to the jury the portion of Cobham’s testimony disclosing that motive? Would that scenario have been any less offensive to principles of justice than an outright denial of Raleigh’s right to cross-examine Cobham? To ask those questions is to answer them. Confrontation of an adverse witness necessarily entails that the trier of fact be allowed to learn the material results of that confrontation. That did not happen with respect to a key witness in the murder trial of Dwight Miller. For that reason and others explained below, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’s application of clearly established law (namely, the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence) was objectively unreasonable. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of habeas corpus and remand for it to grant Miller a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

The opinion concludes:

Maybe, as the State believed and the trial judge suspected, Kathy Blackwell was lying when she claimed that she could not remember anything that she had told the police in her prior statements. Or perhaps, as Miller believes, Blackwell was lying during her second appearance when she claimed that she suddenly could remember and then testified consistently with her prior statements to the police. For our purposes, and for purposes of applying the Confrontation Clause generally, it does not matter which testimony was true. Instead, what matters is that the jury had the opportunity to decide for itself whether to believe Blackwell. By redacting her testimony, the trial court denied the jury in Miller’s second trial that chance and violated Miller’s confrontation right.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’s application of the Confrontation Clause’s protections to that decision to redact Blackwell’s testimony was objectively unreasonable. The trial court justified the admission of Blackwell’s prior testimony based on her unavailability. But it could not justify redacting the products of Miller’s cross-examination. The confrontation guarantee that Sir Raleigh’s trial inspired is not just the right to cross-examine; equally important, it is the right to share with the jury the information the cross-examination  reveals. We therefore reverse and remand for the district court to grant Miller a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

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Notice & Comment Symposium on Sunstein and Vermeule’s Law & Leviathan

This month, the Yale Journal on Regulation‘s Notice & Comment blog is hosting an online symposium on Law & Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State by Harvard law professors Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. Notre Dame’s Jeffrey Pojanowski introduces the symposium here.

Law & Leviathan is an effort to defend the administrative state from originalists, formalists, libertarians and other anti-administrativists (who they refer to, collectively, as the “New Coke”). Sunstein and Vermeule’s argument, in a nutshell, is that the administrative state’s morality and legitimacy are ensured by a set of surrogate safeguards that have developed within administrative law to ensure that administrative action remains sufficiently consistent with the rule of law and law’s internal morality. It is an important and provocative argument that has already provoked substantial comment. See, for instance, Adam White’s review in the WSJ, Richard Epstein’s critique on Law & Liberty, or Paul Gowder’s extremely lengthy analysis in the Law and Politics Book Review.

The Notice & Comment symposium consists of a series of posts from a range of authors, available here. Already posted are Jeff Pojanowski’s introduction, and contributions from Ronald Levin, Kevin Stack, Mila Sohoni, Nicholas Bagley, Emily Bremer and Jennifer Mascott. Still to come are contributions from Matthew Lewans, Aditya Bamzai, Kristin Hickman, and yours truly. Once complete, the contributions will be posted as a single PDF on SSRN.

If you are interested in administrative law (and perhaps even if you’re not), this symposium is highly recommended (at least until I contribute).

 

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