We Should Keep Expanding Telehealth, Even After the Pandemic

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At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many states waived existing restrictions on telehealth so doctors and patients could continue to consult without having face-to-face visits.

Now, with the end of the pandemic hopefully within sight, some state and federal lawmakers are looking to keep those arbitrary and nonsensical restrictions from coming back into force.

Sens. Brian Schatz (D–Hawaii) and Tim Scott (R–S.C.) on Tuesday introduced a bill to abolish some particularly silly Medicare restrictions on telehealth that effectively prevent many older Americans from taking advantage of the option to consult with a doctor from the comfort of home. Under Medicare’s existing “geographic and originating site” rules, patients can only use telehealth services if they live in an area defined as having a shortage of health professionals by the Department of Health and Human Services. Even sillier, the rule requires that Medicare patients can only use telehealth services from an existing medical clinic or doctor’s office—which means you have to leave home and drive to a doctor’s office in order to use a webcam to chat with a doctor in a different office.

As a result, most of America’s 61 million Medicare recipients—many of whom are elderly and may have difficulty leaving home—are completely cut-off from one of the best ways that modern technology helps deliver vital services. It’s not the 1980s anymore, but Medicare forces senior citizens to get medical treatment as if it were.

Those restrictions were lifted on a temporary basis due to COVID-19, but Schatz and Scott are right to want them gone for good. In announcing their bill, the Telehealth Modernization Act, the two senators noted that about 40 percent of all Medicare visits between April and July of last year took place remotely.

“Telehealth has been a godsend for millions of Americans receiving health care services during the pandemic, while ensuring the spread of the virus stays at a minimum,” Scott said in a statement. “Updating our laws to solve today’s challenges through commonsense and practical approaches will ensure more access to health care and a safer aging population.”

While those changes to Medicare’s rules would be a big development at the federal level, there are also many state-level obstacles to a more robust telehealth system that should be left on the sidelines when the pandemic ends. One of the biggest issues is the lines between the states—and, more specifically, the licensing regulations that often prohibit doctors in one state from seeing virtual patients who live somewhere else.

“A person can travel from, say, Phoenix, Arizona, to Los Angeles, California, to consult and receive care from a renowned expert in a unique medical condition, but cannot do telehealth follow up appointments with that practitioner unless that practitioner gets a license in Arizona,” writes Jeffrey Singer, an Arizona-based physician and senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Disclosure: Singer is a financial supporter of Reason Foundation, the nonprofit that publishes this website.) “In other words, the patient can travel to the doctor, but the doctor cannot travel to the patient.”

Changing Medicare’s rules so an out-of-state doctor can get paid for telehealth services won’t actually open up the market unless states change their licensing rules to allow those virtual visits to take place.

Thankfully, some states are taking the initiative to remove such barriers. Lawmakers in Arizona have introduced the most ambitious proposal, says Courtney Joslin, a resident fellow at the R Street Institute, a free market think tank. The bill would require insurers to cover telehealth visits at the same rates as in-person visits and would permit Arizonans to get telehealth services from doctors in other states.

The Arizona bill aims to “create a permanent, stable, and innovative telehealth market for Arizonans” and is a model for other states to follow, says Joslin. “The demand for telehealth services erupted almost overnight once state lockdowns set in last year, and has become immensely popular. Why should legislators move slowly in allowing it to stick around?”

Indeed, it’s a shame that it took a global pandemic to spur lawmakers to make some of these common-sense changes at the state and federal levels. Telehealth is no longer a fringe service that should be seen as a last-ditch effort to bring medical access to areas with shortages—it’s a mainstream aspect of a modern health care system that should stick around even after COVID-19 is gone.

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“That’s Why It’s Poetry”

Lawrence Ferlinghetti, poet and publisher, died yesterday. Among other things, Ferlinghetti published Allen Ginsberg’s Howl, and was prosecuted for obscenity because of that. One particular passage from that trial sticks in my head, as reported in Edward de Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere 335-36 (1992); the colloquy was with an expert witness, literary critic Mark Schorer, who was testifying to the poem having “redeeming social importance“:

Prosecutor: I presume you understand the whole thing, is that right?:

Schorer: I hope so. It’s not always easy to know that one understands exactly what a contemporary poet is saying….

Prosecutor: Do you understand what “angel-headed hipsters burning for the ancient heavenly connection to the starry dynamo in the machinery of night” means?

Schorer: Sir, you can’t translate poetry into prose. That’s why it’s poetry.

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A New Report Shows Elijah McClain Was Killed by a Cascade of Constitutional Violations

Elijah-McClain-mural

A new report on Elijah McClain’s fatal 2019 encounter with police in Aurora, Colorado, concludes that the 23-year-old black man’s death followed a series of unconstitutional decisions, the questionable use of force, and reckless medical care by EMTs who injected him with an outsized dose of ketamine. In the 157-page report, an independent panel appointed by the Aurora City Council also criticizes the police department’s slipshod investigation of the incident, which provoked local protests and became yet another exhibit in the national conversation about police brutality and racially biased law enforcement.

On a Saturday night in August 2019, McClain had just bought a bottle of iced tea at a local convenience store and was walking home when he was accosted by Officer Nathan Woodyard. The officer was responding to a 911 call from a teenager who thought McClain “look[ed] sketchy” because he was wearing a ski mask and making “all these kinds of signs” with his hands. The caller added that “he might be a good person or a bad person.” He said no one was in danger and he had not seen any weapons.

Woodyard ordered McClain to stop, but McClain, who was listening to music through earbuds and apparently did not hear the command, continued walking. He was holding his cellphone in one hand and the bag with his purchase in the other. “Within ten seconds of exiting his patrol car,” the report notes, “Officer Woodyard placed his hands on Mr. McClain. Mr. McClain had no observable weapon and had not displayed violent or threatening behavior. No crime had been reported. The officers later said they stopped Mr. McClain because he was overdressed and wearing a mask, in an area one officer referred to as ‘high crime,’ and a caller had reported his unusual behavior.”

In addition to an open-faced ski mask, McClain was wearing sweat pants and a long-sleeved shirt, which might have seemed strange on an August night but is understandable in light of his anemia, a symptom of which is cold extremities. Aside from his clothing and the “unusual behavior” reported by the 911 caller, Woodyard had no reason to suspect that McClain was doing anything illegal.

The Supreme Court has said the Fourth Amendment requires “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” to justify an investigatory stop. “Officer Woodyard’s decision to turn what may have been a consensual encounter with Mr. McClain into an investigatory stop—in fewer than ten seconds—did not appear to be supported by any officer’s reasonable suspicion that Mr. McClain was engaged in criminal activity,” the panel’s report says. “This decision had ramifications for the rest of the encounter.”

Woodyard, who was “joined immediately by Officers Jason Rosenblatt and Randy Roedema,” then decided to frisk McClain, a step that is legally justified only if police reasonably suspect the subject is armed. Yet the 911 caller had not reported any weapons (a point that was noted in the police dispatcher’s message), McClain was plainly holding nothing but his phone and the bag from the convenience store, and Woodyard himself later said he “felt safe making an approach” because McClain “didn’t have any weapons.” The panel’s report says “we were not able to identify sufficient evidence that Mr. McClain was armed and dangerous in order to justify a pat-down search.”

McClain, whose walk home had been forcibly interrupted for no good reason, was understandably dismayed. He repeatedly asked the cops to leave him alone and let him continue on his way. “I have a right to walk to where I’m going,” he told Woodyard. “I have a right to stop you because you’re being suspicious,” Woodyard replied as he grabbed McClain’s arm.

The encounter escalated quickly. “Less than one minute from when Officer Woodyard first exited his vehicle and commanded Mr. McClain to ‘stop,'” the report notes, “the officers decided to physically move him to a grassy area nearby in case they needed to take him to the ground. Officers Rosenblatt and Woodyard, who were each holding one of Mr. McClain’s arms, attempted to move him several steps onto the grass, and Officer Rosenblatt stated ‘we’re going to lay you down, okay, come on.’ This decision likewise cannot be justified by the record available to the Panel.”

At this point, Woodyard’s unjustified investigatory stop became an arrest, which is constitutionally permissible only when police have probable cause to believe someone has committed a crime. That is a higher standard than reasonable suspicion, a test the cops had already failed to meet. “Since Officer Woodyard’s order to him to stop, the only facts that had changed were Mr. McClain’s attempt and stated intention to keep walking in the direction he had been going and his ‘tensing up,'” the report says. “In the Panel’s view, none of these facts would be sufficient to establish probable cause of a crime.”

While the cops were trying, without any legal justification, to force McClain onto the grassy area, Roedema exclaimed, “He grabbed your gun, dude.” That statement, Woodyard later said, “changed the situation.” While tackling McClain, the officers twice attempted a “carotid control hold,” which involves applying pressure on both sides of the neck to cut off blood flow to the brain and induce unconsciousness. The second, more successful attempt happened after McClain was restrained on the ground.

“Once he was lying on the ground, Mr. McClain’s ability to reach an officer’s gun or other weapons was limited by the fact that Officer Woodyard was on the ground behind him, with his gun and pepper spray pinned beneath him,” the report says. “If Mr. McClain was no longer presenting a threat of harm to the officers, there would have been no justification for Officer Woodyard to apply a carotid hold.” The body camera footage is unclear at this point, because the cameras were dislodged during the struggle. But the available record “does not provide evidence of the officers’ perception of a threat that would justify Officer Woodyard’s carotid hold, which caused Mr. McClain to either partially or fully lose consciousness.”

The officers described McClain as violently resisting them, justifying the use of “pain compliance” techniques even after he was handcuffed. But the audio record and the limited video tell a different story. McClain, who was five feet, seven inches tall and weighed 140 pounds, was “surrounded by officers, all larger than he, crying out in pain, apologizing, explaining himself, and pleading with the officers.” The audio “records Mr. McClain crying out in pain, apologizing, vomiting, and at times sounding incoherent. His words were apologetic and confused, not angry or threatening. He became increasingly plaintive and desperate as he struggled to breathe.”

Based on the available evidence, the report says, it is unclear “whether Mr. McClain’s movements, interpreted by the officers as resisting, were attempts to escape or simply an effort, voluntary or involuntary, to avoid the painful force being applied on him, to improve his breathing, or to accommodate his vomiting.” It notes that “the responding officers applied pain compliance techniques and restraints to Mr. McClain continuously from the first moments of the encounter until he was taken away on a gurney.”

Paramedics from Aurora Fire Rescue arrived about 10:53 p.m., 11 minutes after Woodyard first approached McClain, but they waited several minutes before attending to him. Rather than check his vital signs or render aid, they “decided to sedate Mr. McClain without conducting anything more than brief visual observation.” Aurora Fire Lt. Peter Cichuniec advised EMTs to inject McClain with a 500-milligram dose of ketamine, based on the officers’ impression that he was experiencing “excited delerium.” Cichuniec prescribed that dose “based on a grossly inaccurate and inflated estimate of Mr. McClain’s size.” He estimated that McClain weighed 190 pounds, 50 pounds more than his actual weight.

At the time of the injection, McClain “had not moved or made any sounds for about one minute.” Yet Cichuniec “determined it was appropriate to administer ketamine to Mr. McClain despite the fact that he did not appear to be offering meaningful resistance.” McClain’s heart stopped around 11:04 p.m., shortly after the injection. Although he was eventually resuscitated, he was declared brain dead at a hospital three days later. “The events leading to the medical crisis that resulted in Mr. McClain’s death occurred rapidly, within an eighteen-minute period,” the report says. “The autopsy concluded that Mr. McClain died of undetermined causes.”

According to the report, the investigation of the incident by the Aurora Police Department’s Major Crime/Homicide Unit “raised serious concerns” and “revealed significant weaknesses in the Department’s accountability systems.” During their interviews, detectives “failed to ask basic, critical questions about the justification for the use of force necessary for any prosecutor to make a determination about whether the use of force was legally justified.” The questions “frequently appeared designed to elicit specific exonerating ‘magic language’ found in court rulings.” The investigators’ report, on which both the district attorney and the police department’s Force Review Board relied, “failed to present a neutral, objective version of the facts and seemingly ignored contrary evidence.”

Unsurprisingly, the Force Review Board’s examination of the incident was “cursory and summary at best.” The case “was never referred to Internal Affairs investigators,” which would have required the police chief’s approval. That policy, the panel’s report says, “places the Chief in a difficult and potentially compromised role, and limits the independence of Internal Affairs to investigate potential failures to comply with Department policy.”

The panel recommends several steps to “lessen the chance of another tragedy like this one.” They include better training and supervision, a review of the department’s policies regarding de-escalation and the use of force, improved cooperation between police and emergency medical personnel, a reexamination of sedation practices, and “an overhaul of the post-incident review process.”

This report reveals that Aurora police officers either do not understand the constitutional constraints on their behavior or cannot be bothered to comply with them. That goes for the remarkably incurious detectives who investigated the incident as well as the officers who illegally detained and assaulted McClain.

This blithe disregard for constitutional rights, which in this case had lethal consequences, reinforces the indictment laid out in the state lawsuit filed last month by Brittney Gilliam. Like McClain, Gilliam was detained by Aurora cops even though she had done nothing wrong. With guns drawn, they forced her to lie on the pavement along with her 6-year-old daughter, 17-year-old sister, and two teenaged nieces, all because of a stupid error that could have been easily rectified if only the officers had been paying attention: They mistook her SUV with Colorado plates for a stolen motorcycle registered in Montana.

“This was a horrible mistake,” Aurora Police Chief Vanessa Wilson acknowledged in January. But Gilliam’s lawsuit describes dozens of similar “mistakes” by Wilson’s officers, including unconstitutional searches, illegal detention, trumped-up arrests, and excessive force.

Aurora cops “have a history of committing police brutality, especially against Black victims, and racially profiling Black individuals,” the complaint says. From 2013 through 2019, it notes, the Aurora Police Department “ranked 8th out of the 100 largest cities in the United States for most police killings per capita.” The lawsuit also cites statistics indicating that black people are disproportionately likely to be mistreated by Aurora police.

That track record suggests the department’s policies and practices invite such abuse. The Justice Department’s investigation of McClain’s death may shed further light on the issue.

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“That’s Why It’s Poetry”

Lawrence Ferlinghetti, poet and publisher, died yesterday. Among other things, Ferlinghetti published Allen Ginsberg’s Howl, and was prosecuted for obscenity because of that. One particular passage from that trial sticks in my head, as reported in Edward de Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere 335-36 (1992); the colloquy was with an expert witness, literary critic Mark Schorer, who was testifying to the poem having “redeeming social importance“:

Prosecutor: I presume you understand the whole thing, is that right?:

Schorer: I hope so. It’s not always easy to know that one understands exactly what a contemporary poet is saying….

Prosecutor: Do you understand what “angel-headed hipsters burning for the ancient heavenly connection to the starry dynamo in the machinery of night” means?

Schorer: Sir, you can’t translate poetry into prose. That’s why it’s poetry.

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A New Report Shows Elijah McClain Was Killed by a Cascade of Constitutional Violations

Elijah-McClain-mural

A new report on Elijah McClain’s fatal 2019 encounter with police in Aurora, Colorado, concludes that the 23-year-old black man’s death followed a series of unconstitutional decisions, the questionable use of force, and reckless medical care by EMTs who injected him with an outsized dose of ketamine. In the 157-page report, an independent panel appointed by the Aurora City Council also criticizes the police department’s slipshod investigation of the incident, which provoked local protests and became yet another exhibit in the national conversation about police brutality and racially biased law enforcement.

On a Saturday night in August 2019, McClain had just bought a bottle of iced tea at a local convenience store and was walking home when he was accosted by Officer Nathan Woodyard. The officer was responding to a 911 call from a teenager who thought McClain “look[ed] sketchy” because he was wearing a ski mask and making “all these kinds of signs” with his hands. The caller added that “he might be a good person or a bad person.” He said no one was in danger and he had not seen any weapons.

Woodyard ordered McClain to stop, but McClain, who was listening to music through earbuds and apparently did not hear the command, continued walking. He was holding his cellphone in one hand and the bag with his purchase in the other. “Within ten seconds of exiting his patrol car,” the report notes, “Officer Woodyard placed his hands on Mr. McClain. Mr. McClain had no observable weapon and had not displayed violent or threatening behavior. No crime had been reported. The officers later said they stopped Mr. McClain because he was overdressed and wearing a mask, in an area one officer referred to as ‘high crime,’ and a caller had reported his unusual behavior.”

In addition to an open-faced ski mask, McClain was wearing sweat pants and a long-sleeved shirt, which might have seemed strange on an August night but is understandable in light of his anemia, a symptom of which is cold extremities. Aside from his clothing and the “unusual behavior” reported by the 911 caller, Woodyard had no reason to suspect that McClain was doing anything illegal.

The Supreme Court has said the Fourth Amendment requires “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” to justify an investigatory stop. “Officer Woodyard’s decision to turn what may have been a consensual encounter with Mr. McClain into an investigatory stop—in fewer than ten seconds—did not appear to be supported by any officer’s reasonable suspicion that Mr. McClain was engaged in criminal activity,” the panel’s report says. “This decision had ramifications for the rest of the encounter.”

Woodyard, who was “joined immediately by Officers Jason Rosenblatt and Randy Roedema,” then decided to frisk McClain, a step that is legally justified only if police reasonably suspect the subject is armed. Yet the 911 caller had not reported any weapons (a point that was noted in the police dispatcher’s message), McClain was plainly holding nothing but his phone and the bag from the convenience store, and Woodyard himself later said he “felt safe making an approach” because McClain “didn’t have any weapons.” The panel’s report says “we were not able to identify sufficient evidence that Mr. McClain was armed and dangerous in order to justify a pat-down search.”

McClain, whose walk home had been forcibly interrupted for no good reason, was understandably dismayed. He repeatedly asked the cops to leave him alone and let him continue on his way. “I have a right to walk to where I’m going,” he told Woodyard. “I have a right to stop you because you’re being suspicious,” Woodyard replied as he grabbed McClain’s arm.

The encounter escalated quickly. “Less than one minute from when Officer Woodyard first exited his vehicle and commanded Mr. McClain to ‘stop,'” the report notes, “the officers decided to physically move him to a grassy area nearby in case they needed to take him to the ground. Officers Rosenblatt and Woodyard, who were each holding one of Mr. McClain’s arms, attempted to move him several steps onto the grass, and Officer Rosenblatt stated ‘we’re going to lay you down, okay, come on.’ This decision likewise cannot be justified by the record available to the Panel.”

At this point, Woodyard’s unjustified investigatory stop became an arrest, which is constitutionally permissible only when police have probable cause to believe someone has committed a crime. That is a higher standard than reasonable suspicion, a test the cops had already failed to meet. “Since Officer Woodyard’s order to him to stop, the only facts that had changed were Mr. McClain’s attempt and stated intention to keep walking in the direction he had been going and his ‘tensing up,'” the report says. “In the Panel’s view, none of these facts would be sufficient to establish probable cause of a crime.”

While the cops were trying, without any legal justification, to force McClain onto the grassy area, Roedema exclaimed, “He grabbed your gun, dude.” That statement, Woodyard later said, “changed the situation.” While tackling McClain, the officers twice attempted a “carotid control hold,” which involves applying pressure on both sides of the neck to cut off blood flow to the brain and induce unconsciousness. The second, more successful attempt happened after McClain was restrained on the ground.

“Once he was lying on the ground, Mr. McClain’s ability to reach an officer’s gun or other weapons was limited by the fact that Officer Woodyard was on the ground behind him, with his gun and pepper spray pinned beneath him,” the report says. “If Mr. McClain was no longer presenting a threat of harm to the officers, there would have been no justification for Officer Woodyard to apply a carotid hold.” The body camera footage is unclear at this point, because the cameras were dislodged during the struggle. But the available record “does not provide evidence of the officers’ perception of a threat that would justify Officer Woodyard’s carotid hold, which caused Mr. McClain to either partially or fully lose consciousness.”

The officers described McClain as violently resisting them, justifying the use of “pain compliance” techniques even after he was handcuffed. But the audio record and the limited video tell a different story. McClain, who was five feet, seven inches tall and weighed 140 pounds, was “surrounded by officers, all larger than he, crying out in pain, apologizing, explaining himself, and pleading with the officers.” The audio “records Mr. McClain crying out in pain, apologizing, vomiting, and at times sounding incoherent. His words were apologetic and confused, not angry or threatening. He became increasingly plaintive and desperate as he struggled to breathe.”

Based on the available evidence, the report says, it is unclear “whether Mr. McClain’s movements, interpreted by the officers as resisting, were attempts to escape or simply an effort, voluntary or involuntary, to avoid the painful force being applied on him, to improve his breathing, or to accommodate his vomiting.” It notes that “the responding officers applied pain compliance techniques and restraints to Mr. McClain continuously from the first moments of the encounter until he was taken away on a gurney.”

Paramedics from Aurora Fire Rescue arrived about 10:53 p.m., 11 minutes after Woodyard first approached McClain, but they waited several minutes before attending to him. Rather than check his vital signs or render aid, they “decided to sedate Mr. McClain without conducting anything more than brief visual observation.” Aurora Fire Lt. Peter Cichuniec advised EMTs to inject McClain with a 500-milligram dose of ketamine, based on the officers’ impression that he was experiencing “excited delerium.” Cichuniec prescribed that dose “based on a grossly inaccurate and inflated estimate of Mr. McClain’s size.” He estimated that McClain weighed 190 pounds, 50 pounds more than his actual weight.

At the time of the injection, McClain “had not moved or made any sounds for about one minute.” Yet Cichuniec “determined it was appropriate to administer ketamine to Mr. McClain despite the fact that he did not appear to be offering meaningful resistance.” McClain’s heart stopped around 11:04 p.m., shortly after the injection. Although he was eventually resuscitated, he was declared brain dead at a hospital three days later. “The events leading to the medical crisis that resulted in Mr. McClain’s death occurred rapidly, within an eighteen-minute period,” the report says. “The autopsy concluded that Mr. McClain died of undetermined causes.”

According to the report, the investigation of the incident by the Aurora Police Department’s Major Crime/Homicide Unit “raised serious concerns” and “revealed significant weaknesses in the Department’s accountability systems.” During their interviews, detectives “failed to ask basic, critical questions about the justification for the use of force necessary for any prosecutor to make a determination about whether the use of force was legally justified.” The questions “frequently appeared designed to elicit specific exonerating ‘magic language’ found in court rulings.” The investigators’ report, on which both the district attorney and the police department’s Force Review Board relied, “failed to present a neutral, objective version of the facts and seemingly ignored contrary evidence.”

Unsurprisingly, the Force Review Board’s examination of the incident was “cursory and summary at best.” The case “was never referred to Internal Affairs investigators,” which would have required the police chief’s approval. That policy, the panel’s report says, “places the Chief in a difficult and potentially compromised role, and limits the independence of Internal Affairs to investigate potential failures to comply with Department policy.”

The panel recommends several steps to “lessen the chance of another tragedy like this one.” They include better training and supervision, a review of the department’s policies regarding de-escalation and the use of force, improved cooperation between police and emergency medical personnel, a reexamination of sedation practices, and “an overhaul of the post-incident review process.”

This report reveals that Aurora police officers either do not understand the constitutional constraints on their behavior or cannot be bothered to comply with them. That goes for the remarkably incurious detectives who investigated the incident as well as the officers who illegally detained and assaulted McClain.

This blithe disregard for constitutional rights, which in this case had lethal consequences, reinforces the indictment laid out in the state lawsuit filed last month by Brittney Gilliam. Like McClain, Gilliam was detained by Aurora cops even though she had done nothing wrong. With guns drawn, they forced her to lie on the pavement along with her 6-year-old daughter, 17-year-old sister, and two teenaged nieces, all because of a stupid error that could have been easily rectified if only the officers had been paying attention: They mistook her SUV with Colorado plates for a stolen motorcycle registered in Montana.

“This was a horrible mistake,” Aurora Police Chief Vanessa Wilson acknowledged in January. But Gilliam’s lawsuit describes dozens of similar “mistakes” by Wilson’s officers, including unconstitutional searches, illegal detention, trumped-up arrests, and excessive force.

Aurora cops “have a history of committing police brutality, especially against Black victims, and racially profiling Black individuals,” the complaint says. From 2013 through 2019, it notes, the Aurora Police Department “ranked 8th out of the 100 largest cities in the United States for most police killings per capita.” The lawsuit also cites statistics indicating that black people are disproportionately likely to be mistreated by Aurora police.

That track record suggests the department’s policies and practices invite such abuse. The Justice Department’s investigation of McClain’s death may shed further light on the issue.

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Vaccines Are 100% Effective at Preventing COVID-19 Hospitalizations and Deaths

covidvac

The COVID-19 vaccines developed by Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna are about 95 percent effective at preventing symptomatic illness. What does that really mean? It does not mean that 95 percent of people are protected from disease with the vaccine, as Oxford Centre for Global Health Research infectious disease specialist Piero Olliaro recently explained in the Lancet. Olliaro notes that an earlier ambiguous editorial in the Lancet may have lead readers to make just such a mistaken inference.

What the 95 percent figure really means here is that vaccinated people in the clinical trials had a 95 percent lower risk of getting COVID-19 compared with the unvaccinated control group participants. That means that vaccinated people were 20 times less likely than the control group to get COVID-19.

Olliaro looked at what a 95 percent vaccine efficacy rate would mean in a hypothetical case in which a population of 100,000 people have all been vaccinated. Applying the 1 percent rate at which unvaccinated folks became ill during the vaccine trials over three months suggests that 1,000 people in an unvaccinated population of 100,000 would fall ill. But because all 100,000 people are vaccinated, the actual rate in the vaccinated population would be just 50 cases (0.05 x 1,000 = 50 cases).

As Olliaro pointed out:

The mRNA-based Pfizer and Moderna vaccines were shown to have 94–95% efficacy in preventing symptomatic COVID-19, calculated as 100 × (1 minus the attack rate with vaccine divided by the attack rate with placebo). It means that in a population such as the one enrolled in the trials, with a cumulated COVID-19 attack rate over a period of 3 months of about 1% without a vaccine, we would expect roughly 0·05% of vaccinated people would get diseased.

There is even more good news about COVID-19 vaccine efficacy. As LiveScience reports, the Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson clinical trials all found that their vaccines were essentially 100 percent effective in preventing severe disease six to seven weeks after trial participants had received a first/single dose. As biotech journalist Anna Nowogrodzki notes, “Zero vaccinated people in any of the trials were hospitalized or died of COVID-19 after the vaccines had fully taken effect.” Now that’s the kind of vaccine efficacy that we can all cheer.

Further good news is that Pfizer/BioNTEch and Moderna, which have so far distributed 75 million doses of their vaccines in the United States, are now pledging to steeply ramp up their vaccine deliveries to 140 million additional doses by the end of next month. Johnson & Johnson, whose one-shot vaccine could be approved by the Food and Drug Administration by this weekend says that it can deliver 20 million doses in the United States by the end of March. Which vaccine to take? The first one you can get.

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Vaccines Are 100% Effective at Preventing COVID-19 Hospitalizations and Deaths

covidvac

The COVID-19 vaccines developed by Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna are about 95 percent effective at preventing symptomatic illness. What does that really mean? It does not mean that 95 percent of people are protected from disease with the vaccine, as Oxford Centre for Global Health Research infectious disease specialist Piero Olliaro recently explained in the Lancet. Olliaro notes that an earlier ambiguous editorial in the Lancet may have lead readers to make just such a mistaken inference.

What the 95 percent figure really means here is that vaccinated people in the clinical trials had a 95 percent lower risk of getting COVID-19 compared with the unvaccinated control group participants. That means that vaccinated people were 20 times less likely than the control group to get COVID-19.

Olliaro looked at what a 95 percent vaccine efficacy rate would mean in a hypothetical case in which a population of 100,000 people have all been vaccinated. Applying the 1 percent rate at which unvaccinated folks became ill during the vaccine trials over three months suggests that 1,000 people in an unvaccinated population of 100,000 would fall ill. But because all 100,000 people are vaccinated, the actual rate in the vaccinated population would be just 50 cases (0.05 x 1,000 = 50 cases).

As Olliaro pointed out:

The mRNA-based Pfizer and Moderna vaccines were shown to have 94–95% efficacy in preventing symptomatic COVID-19, calculated as 100 × (1 minus the attack rate with vaccine divided by the attack rate with placebo). It means that in a population such as the one enrolled in the trials, with a cumulated COVID-19 attack rate over a period of 3 months of about 1% without a vaccine, we would expect roughly 0·05% of vaccinated people would get diseased.

There is even more good news about COVID-19 vaccine efficacy. As LiveScience reports, the Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson clinical trials all found that their vaccines were essentially 100 percent effective in preventing severe disease six to seven weeks after trial participants had received a first/single dose. As biotech journalist Anna Nowogrodzki notes, “Zero vaccinated people in any of the trials were hospitalized or died of COVID-19 after the vaccines had fully taken effect.” Now that’s the kind of vaccine efficacy that we can all cheer.

Further good news is that Pfizer/BioNTEch and Moderna, which have so far distributed 75 million doses of their vaccines in the United States, are now pledging to steeply ramp up their vaccine deliveries to 140 million additional doses by the end of next month. Johnson & Johnson, whose one-shot vaccine could be approved by the Food and Drug Administration by this weekend says that it can deliver 20 million doses in the United States by the end of March. Which vaccine to take? The first one you can get.

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Making sense of Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Degraffenreid

On Monday, the Supreme Court decided Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Degraffenreid (formerly Boockvar) and Corman v. Pennsylvania Democratic Party. Both of these cases raised the same issue: can entities other than the state legislature (such as the state courts) modify the rules governing federal elections. The Court issued a one paragraph per curiam opinion that resolved both petitions.

The motions of Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. for leave to intervene as petitioner are dismissed as moot. The motions of Thomas J. Randolph, et al. for leave to intervene as respondents are dismissed as moot. The motion of Hon- est Elections Project for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 20–542 is granted. The motion of White House Watch Fund, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in No. 20–574 is granted. The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

Justice Thomas dissented from the denial of certiorari. Justice Alito wrote a separate dissent from denial of certiorari, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch.

Counting the votes here is tricky.

First, let’s count the votes in the motion to intervene. We know a majority of the Court voted to deny Donald Trump’s motion to intervene because that motion was moot. At this point, Trump’s presidential campaign is over. There is no interest on which he could intervene. The denial here is unsurprising. But a majority of the Court did not state that the Republican Party of Pennsylvania’s petition was moot. The Court does not explain why cert was denied. The motion to intervene could be moot, but the underlying petition could not be moot, for the reasons identified in the dissent. (For example, this issue is capable of repetition, yet evades review). Furthermore, we do not know if any Justices dissented from the denial of the motion to intervene. Justices are not required to indicate dissents from these sorts of unsigned, summary orders. For all we know, the three dissenters, plus one more, contended that Trump’s intervention was not moot, but declined to note their dissent. At a minimum, five Justices denied the motion to intervene.

Second, let’s count the votes with respect to the cert denial. Under the so-called Rule of 4, four Justices must vote to grant review in a case. In this case, we know that three Justices–Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch–would have granted cert. That split tell us that six Justices voted to deny cert: Roberts, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. But we do not know why any of those six members voted to deny cert. It’s possible that one or two of those Justices agreed with arguments put forth in the dissents, but chose to deny cert for other reasons. In short, we know a majority of the Court thought Trump’s motions to intervene were moot, but we do not know if a majority of the Court found the petitions were moot.

Third, why was Justice Kavanaugh not a fourth vote to grant certiorari? In October, he was a proponent of the independent state legislature doctrine. But now, he was MIA. Both dissents referenced the fact that four Justices voted to grant a stay on this issue in October. The Wall Street Journal questioned, “where did Justice Brett Kavanaugh wander off to, since he was the fourth vote in October?” What happened?

I have no reason to think Justice Kavanaugh changed his mind on the merits. Why, then, did he not vote to grant cert? Perhaps Justice Kavanaugh determined that the petitions were now moot. If so, he could have issued a statement respecting the denial of certiorari, similar to his concurrence in NYS Rifle & Pistol: this controversy is moot, but the Court should address this important issue in another case. But he didn’t write separately.

Or, perhaps, Justice Kavanaugh thought it was not prudential to decide this issue now. The events of January 6 may have given him pause. But if not now, when? This issue is truly a ticking time bomb. In 2024, the Republican Presidential candidate will raise the issue, forcing the nine (or more) members of the Court to resolve this important question. Chief Justice Roberts is content to keep kicking the can down the road, knowing that each subsequent kick allows the issue to fester. Does Justice Kavanaugh agree?

Or, perhaps, Justice Kavanaugh was affected by criticism of his Wisconsin dissent. By some accounts, he mischaracterized Professor Richard Pildes’s article. And I think Justice Kagan’s dissent torched him on the “flipping” votes argument. And this argument looks even worse after the never-ending nonsense of Dominion machines “flipping” votes. Justice Kavanaugh probably did not want to line up with the pillow guy. For now, Justice Kavanaugh was silent.

Fourth, we have no idea where Justice Barrett is on this question. In October, Barrett recused from the Pennsylvania and North Carolina absentee ballot cases. She had recently joined the Court, and was not yet up to speed. Now, we still don’t know where she is. A denial of cert does not in any way suggest her substantive views on the question presented. We will find out in 2024, or even sooner.

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Making sense of Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Degraffenreid

On Monday, the Supreme Court decided Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Degraffenreid (formerly Boockvar) and Corman v. Pennsylvania Democratic Party. Both of these cases raised the same issue: can entities other than the state legislature (such as the state courts) modify the rules governing federal elections. The Court issued a one paragraph per curiam opinion that resolved both petitions.

The motions of Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. for leave to intervene as petitioner are dismissed as moot. The motions of Thomas J. Randolph, et al. for leave to intervene as respondents are dismissed as moot. The motion of Hon- est Elections Project for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 20–542 is granted. The motion of White House Watch Fund, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in No. 20–574 is granted. The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

Justice Thomas dissented from the denial of certiorari. Justice Alito wrote a separate dissent from denial of certiorari, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch.

Counting the votes here is tricky.

First, let’s count the votes in the motion to intervene. We know a majority of the Court voted to deny Donald Trump’s motion to intervene because that motion was moot. At this point, Trump’s presidential campaign is over. There is no interest on which he could intervene. The denial here is unsurprising. But a majority of the Court did not state that the Republican Party of Pennsylvania’s petition was moot. The Court does not explain why cert was denied. The motion to intervene could be moot, but the underlying petition could not be moot, for the reasons identified in the dissent. (For example, this issue is capable of repetition, yet evades review). Furthermore, we do not know if any Justices dissented from the denial of the motion to intervene. Justices are not required to indicate dissents from these sorts of unsigned, summary orders. For all we know, the three dissenters, plus one more, contended that Trump’s intervention was not moot, but declined to note their dissent. At a minimum, five Justices denied the motion to intervene.

Second, let’s count the votes with respect to the cert denial. Under the so-called Rule of 4, four Justices must vote to grant review in a case. In this case, we know that three Justices–Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch–would have granted cert. That split tell us that six Justices voted to deny cert: Roberts, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. But we do not know why any of those six members voted to deny cert. It’s possible that one or two of those Justices agreed with arguments put forth in the dissents, but chose to deny cert for other reasons. In short, we know a majority of the Court thought Trump’s motions to intervene were moot, but we do not know if a majority of the Court found the petitions were moot.

Third, why was Justice Kavanaugh not a fourth vote to grant certiorari? In October, he was a proponent of the independent state legislature doctrine. But now, he was MIA. Both dissents referenced the fact that four Justices voted to grant a stay on this issue in October. The Wall Street Journal questioned, “where did Justice Brett Kavanaugh wander off to, since he was the fourth vote in October?” What happened?

I have no reason to think Justice Kavanaugh changed his mind on the merits. Why, then, did he not vote to grant cert? Perhaps Justice Kavanaugh determined that the petitions were now moot. If so, he could have issued a statement respecting the denial of certiorari, similar to his concurrence in NYS Rifle & Pistol: this controversy is moot, but the Court should address this important issue in another case. But he didn’t write separately.

Or, perhaps, Justice Kavanaugh thought it was not prudential to decide this issue now. The events of January 6 may have given him pause. But if not now, when? This issue is truly a ticking time bomb. In 2024, the Republican Presidential candidate will raise the issue, forcing the nine (or more) members of the Court to resolve this important question. Chief Justice Roberts is content to keep kicking the can down the road, knowing that each subsequent kick allows the issue to fester. Does Justice Kavanaugh agree?

Or, perhaps, Justice Kavanaugh was affected by criticism of his Wisconsin dissent. By some accounts, he mischaracterized Professor Richard Pildes’s article. And I think Justice Kagan’s dissent torched him on the “flipping” votes argument. And this argument looks even worse after the never-ending nonsense of Dominion machines “flipping” votes. Justice Kavanaugh probably did not want to line up with the pillow guy. For now, Justice Kavanaugh was silent.

Fourth, we have no idea where Justice Barrett is on this question. In October, Barrett recused from the Pennsylvania and North Carolina absentee ballot cases. She had recently joined the Court, and was not yet up to speed. Now, we still don’t know where she is. A denial of cert does not in any way suggest her substantive views on the question presented. We will find out in 2024, or even sooner.

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New Jersey Finally Legalizes Recreational Marijuana

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New Jersey officially became the 14th state to legalize recreational use of marijuana after Democratic Gov. Philip D. Murphy signed three bills into law this week.

New Jersey lawmakers have been struggling and failing to actually legalize recreational sales and use for years. Last year, lawmakers punted the matter to voters in a referendum. Those voters overwhelmingly said yes67 percent approved an amendment to the state constitution legalizing marijuana possession, cultivation, and use.

But that amendment still left lawmakers with the job of hammering out the actual laws controlling the marijuana marketplace. In the meantime, police were actually still citing people for marijuana possession despite the legalization proposition passing in November.

The new legislation will allow adults over the age of 21 to possess up to six ounces of marijuana. It’ll be months before retail sales actually start, and, of course, those sales will be heavily regulated and taxed. And unfortunately for New Jersey tokers with green thumbs, residents will not be permitted to grow their own.

A debate over how to deal with underage users contributed to the delay in getting the bills passed. Ultimately, pushed by Murphy, lawmakers agreed to smaller penalties for underage use, starting with a written warning, followed by recommendations to social service organizations, and then finally $50 citations for subsequent offenses.

The legislation also contains some notable criminal justice reforms. For example, it states that the smell of marijuana is not enough to constitute “reasonable articulable suspicion” to justify a police stop to determine if a suspect is violating the new marijuana laws. It also specifies that underage users will be cited, not arrested, and will not be photographed or fingerprinted. Records for underage marijuana violations will be maintained separately from other records and will be kept confidential. Essentially, to the extent that they’ll be enforcing marijuana restrictions against those under 21, the state is trying to avoid a punitive approach that will affect a young person’s future.

Meanwhile, the neighboring state of New York is still figuring out how or if it’s going to legalize marijuana this year. Like New Jersey, the Empire State has been trying and failing for several years now to get a bill together that will earn the support of both lawmakers and the governor.

Democratic Gov. Andrew Cuomo has made legalization a priority this year, but his initial plan had some serious problems. Like New Jersey, it will still forbid New Yorkers to grow their own marijuana. In addition, it lacked a mechanism to allow for marijuana to be delivered. And, strangely, Cuomo’s proposal actually increased the criminal penalties for anybody caught selling marijuana to anybody under 21.

Cuomo has now released some proposed amendments that will resolve some of the conflicts. One amendment calls for the state’s regulatory agency to oversee licenses for delivery. A second amendment will keep penalties for underaged dealing as they are (a misdemeanor). Notably, Cuomo’s plan does not include the automatic expungement of previous marijuana convictions.

Cuomo’s amended plan still forbids home cultivation. However, Marijuana Moment notes that a bill proposed by lawmakers does allow for personal cultivation, so this is still a point of contention between lawmakers and the governor.

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