A Look At Russia’s Military Assets In Syria

As the West contemplates just when it will drop the hammer on Syrian president Bashar al Assad – based solely on evidence provided by an Al Qaeda-linked NGO that he gassed his own people a week after President Trump announced a U.S. withdrawal, let’s take a look at some of the Russian assets on the ground in Syria – since Russia has openly threatened to directly oppose an American attack

Russia troops primarily operate out of two sites in Syria; the Khmeimim air base near the northern port city of Latakia, and the naval facility in Tartus which lies in the northern Syrian coast – the port which eleven Russian naval vessels cleared out of this week to conduct training exercises.

Russia has deployed a mix of upgraded soviet aircraft, along with the latest and greatest in modern Russian aviation – including the deployment Su-24s, Su-25s, Su-30s and SU-34s at Khmeimim airbase, along with Mi-24 attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Both of Russia’s primary operating sites contain long-range surface-to-air missiles, including S-300VM systems defending Tartus and an the S-400 system defending Khmeimim. Both are reportedly able to hit targets up to 400km away.

Here is the S-400 system in action, filmed at the Kapustin Yar test range in the Astakhan region of Russia (h/t foxtrotalpha):

To combat the S-400 system, the U.S. military can deploy American’s “premier electronic attack aircraft, the EA-18G Growler:

Firing long-range low observable (stealthy) weaponry from even a non-stealthy aircraft gives enough stand-off distance to begin taking out an enemy’s known air defenses at a safe distance today, the S-400 included in most cases. When a stealthy launch platform is used instead, you can use more plentiful weapons with less range as that stealth aircraft can get closer to the air defenses being targeted than their non-stealthy brethren can.

An advanced IADS including the S-400 in it will likely feature increased detection ranges against stealthy and non-stealthy aircraft alike. It will also make jamming more problematic, and could mean blinding even a portion of that network is much tougher due to multiple layers of redundant air defenses tied together. This is where cyber warfare and pinpoint strikes based on multiple sources of intelligence can be more effective than jamming or going after the surface-to-air missiles and sensors themselves. For instance, taking out the IADS’ “brains,” locations where the sensor fusion occurs, or striking the system’s communications channels.   –Foxtrotalpha (an excellent read)

The Russians also have Buk-M2E short-to-mid-range systems on the ground in Syria, as well as the short-range Pantsir S1 – meant to project layers of anti-access / area denial coverage.

As of 2015 – while helping the Assad regime combat ISIS, Russia had deployed several different types of munitions which would ostensibly be used in the current conflict. 

While Russia has deployed some precision-guided munitions, such as the KAB-500S GPS/GLONASS-guided bomb or the Kh-25ML laser-guided missile, the bulk of the munitions are unguided gravity bombs and high-fragmentation bombs of the OFAB 250-270 variety. These unguided munitions are supplemented by BETAB-M bunker busting munitions against buildings and RBK-500-SPBE-D cluster munitions against enemy vehicles and tanks. While such bombing from medium altitude is fraught with inaccuracies, Russia’s air force is largely going after rural targets and fixed structures with a targeting approach that can be summarized as “close enough.” –warontherocks.com

Russian Su-24 Fencer dropping *something* on Aleppo thought to be a cluster bomb or illumination flares on Aleppo:

Meanwhile, Syria’s jet fleet has been heavily propped up by Russian fighters.

Russian naval power

As of 2015, Russia had deployed their Black Sea Fleet – a Mediterranean squadron which provides extended air defense off the Syrian coast. 

This squadron consists of roughly ten ships on rotation, most of which are landing, support, or intelligence vessels, along with four surface combatants. Though antiquated, the lone Slava-class missile cruiser Moskva provides the bulk of the firepower and capability of this fleet, including a naval variant of the S-300 air defense system. Given Moscow’s worries about Western aviation, this naval mission is a convenient way of keeping an S-300 near Latakia and Tartus without deploying it on the ground in the region. This squares the circle of deploying a long-range air defense without running afoul of Israel’s security concerns — an S-300 on the ground in Syria could cover all of Israel’s airspace.   Deploying such a system inside Syria would aggravate Israeli Air Force, leading to problems with Tel Aviv that Russia is keen to avoid.

The rest of the ships — two Krivak-class frigates and a 46-year-old Kashin-class destroyer —are not impressive.  Far from capable, they are in need of replacement.  Just earlier in July a Krivak failed to successfully launch its SS-N-14 Silex missile during the parade in Crimea. Most of the Russian Black Sea Fleet remains in shipyards and planning documents.-warontherocks.com

Radar coverage

Russia’s counterpart to the U.S. AWACS, the A-50 airborne radar, would help Russian defenses acquire targets. It has reportedly been integrated into older Soviet assets used by Syrian troops.

So we’re sure about that gas attack, right? Those Raytheon Tomahawks don’t come cheap at $1.5 million each, and the humanitarian crisis caused by yet another Middle East regime change could mean a flood of new refugees across Europe after a portion of Syria’s population of 18.4 million people are displaced by bloody war. 

U.S. Naval assets, meanwhile, are shifting towards the Mediterranean (via Stratfor).

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