1974 Enders To Kissinger: “We Should Look Hard At Substantial Sales & Raid The Gold Market Once And For All”

Four years ago we exposed what appeared to be a 'smoking gun' of the Fed's willingness to manipulate the price of gold. Then Fed-chair Burns noted the equivalency of gold and money, and furthermore pointed out that if the Fed does not control this core relationship, it would "easily frustrate our efforts to control world liquidity." Through a "secret understanding in writing with the Bundesbank that Germany will not buy gold," the cloak-and-dagger CB negotiations were exposed as far back as 1975. Recently, we exposed Paul Volcker's fears of "PetroGold" and the importance of the US remaining "masters of gold." Today, via a transcript of then Secretary of State Kissinger's 1974 meeting we see how clearly they understood that demonetizing gold was a critical strategy to maintaining a dominant power position in the world, and "raiding the gold market once and for all."

 

Burns' 1975 Smoking Gun…

On June 3, 1975, Fed Chairman Arthur Burns, sent a "Memorandum For The President" to Gerald Ford, which among others CC:ed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and future Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, discussing gold, and specifically its fair value, a topic whose prominence, despite former president Nixon's actions, had only managed to grow in the four short years since the abandonment of the gold standard in 1971. In a nutshell Burns' entire argument revolves around the equivalency of gold and money, and furthermore points out that if the Fed does not control this core relationship, it would "easily frustrate our efforts to control world liquidity" but also "dangerously prejudge the shape of the future monetary system."

Furthermore, the memo goes on to highlight the extensive level of gold price manipulation by central banks even after the gold standard has been formally abolished. The problem with accounting for gold at fair market value: the risk of massive liquidity creation, which in those long-gone days of 1975 "could result in the addition of up to $150 billion to the nominal value of countries' reserves." One only wonders what would happen today if gold was allowed to attain its fair price status. And the threat, according to Burns: "liquidity creation of such extraordinary magnitude would seriously endanger, perhaps even frustrate, out efforts and those of other prudent nations to get inflation under reasonable control." Aside from the gratuitous observation that even 34 years ago it was painfully obvious how "massive" liquidity could and would result in runaway inflation and the Fed actually cared about this potential danger, what highlights the hypocrisy of the Fed is that when it comes to drowning the world in excess pieces of paper, only the United States should have the right to do so.

Lastly, the memo presents a useful snapshot into the cloak-and-dagger, and highly nebulous world of CB negotiations and gold price manipulation:

"I have a secret understanding in writing with the Bundesbank that Germany will not buy gold, either from the market or from another government, at a price above the official price."
 

Volcker's 1974 "PetroGold" concerns…

First, here is what the S intentions vis-a-vis gold truly are when stripped away of all rhetoric:

U.S. objectives for world monetary system—a durable, stable system, with the SDR [ZH: or USD] as a strong reserve asset at its center — are incompatible with a continued important role for gold as a reserve asset.… It is the U.S. concern that any substantial increase now in the price at which official gold transactions are made would strengthen the position of gold in the system, and cripple the SDR [ZH: or USD].

In other words: gold can not be allowed to dominated a "durable, stable system", and a rising gold price would cripple the reserve currency du jour: well known by most, but always better to see it admitted in official Top Secret correspondence.

 

Specifically, this is among the top secret paragraphs said on a cold night in March 1968:

If we want to have a chance to remain the masters of gold an international agreement on the rules of the game as outlined above seems to be a matter of urgency. We would fool ourselves in thinking that we have time enough to wait and see how the S.D.R.'s will develop. In fact, the challenge really seems to be to achieve by international agreement within a very short period of time what otherwise could only have been the outcome of a gradual development of many years.

 

And Now Kissinger's 1974 Transcript…

Via Mike Krieger's Liberty Blitzkrieg blog,

The following excerpts are from a transcript of a 1974 meeting held by the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his staff. This particular meeting was held on April 25, and focused on an European Commission Proposal to revalue their gold assets. What follows is an incredible insight into the minds of powerful American leaders scheming to maintain power and show other nations their place. What is most significant is how clearly they understood that demonetizing gold was a critical strategy to maintaining a dominant power position in the world.

So to those who continue to say that “gold doesn’t matter” because it hasn’t been used as an official asset in the monetary system for decades, I say give me a break. In fact, the reality of gold having been largely demonetized makes it an even greater threat going forward if the U.S. does not have all the gold it claims to, and other nations have more than they admit to.

Thanks to In Gold We Trust for bringing this to my attention. Choice excerpts are provided below, and breaks in the conversation are denoted with an “…” Enjoy.

Secondly, Mr. Secretary, it does present an opportunity though—and we should try to negotiate for this—to move towards a demonetization of gold, to begin to get gold moving out of the system.

Secretary Kissinger: But how do you do that?

Mr. Enders: Well, there are several ways. One way is we could say to them that they would accept this kind of arrangement, provided that the gold were channelled out through an international agency—either in the IMF or a special pool—and sold into the market, so there would be gradual increases.

Secretary Kissinger: But the French would never go for this.

Mr. Enders: We can have a counter-proposal. There’s a further proposal—and that is that the IMF begin selling its gold—which is now 7 billion—to the world market, and we should try to negotiate that. That would begin the demonetization of gold.

Secretary Kissinger:  Why are we so eager to get gold out of the system?

Mr. Enders: We were eager to get it out of the system—get started—because it’s a typical balancing of either forward or back. If this proposal goes back, it will go back into the centerpiece system.

Secretary Kissinger: But why is it against our interests? I understand the argument that it’s against our interest that the Europeans take a unilateral decision contrary to our policy. Why is it against our interest to have gold in the system?

Mr. Enders: It’s against our interest to have gold in the system because for it to remain there it would result in it being evaluated periodically. Although we have still some substantial gold holdings—about 11 billion—a larger part of the official gold in the world is concentrated in Western Europe. This gives them the dominant position in world reserves and the dominant means of creating reserves. We’ve been trying to get away from that into a system in which we can control—

Mr. Enders: Yes. But in order for them to do it anyway, they would have to be in violation of important articles of the IMF. So this would not be a total departure. (Laughter.) But there would be reluctance on the part of some Europeans to do this. We could also make it less interesting for them by beginning to sell our own gold in the market, and this would put pressure on them.

Mr. Maw: Why wouldn’t that fit if we start to sell our own gold at a price?

Secretary Kissinger: But how the hell could this happen without our knowing about it ahead of time?

Mr. Hartman: We’ve had consultations on it ahead of time. Several of them have come to ask us to express our views. And I think the reason they’re coming now to ask about it is because they know we have a generally negative view.

Mr. Enders: So I think we should try to break it, I think, as a first position—unless they’re willing to assign some form of demonetizing arrangement.

Secretary Kissinger: But, first of all, that’s impossible for the French.

Mr. Enders: Well, it’s impossible for the French under the Pompidou Government. Would it be necessarily under a future French Government? We should test that.

Secretary Kissinger: If they have gold to settle current accounts, we’ll be faced, sooner or later, with the same proposition again. Then others will be asked to join this settlement thing.

Isn’t this what they’re doing?

Mr. Enders: It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that we should try—not rule out, a priori, a demonetizing scenario, because we can both gain by this. That liberates gold at a higher price. We have gold, and some of the Europeans have gold. Our interests join theirs. This would be helpful; and it would also, on the other hand, gradually remove this dominant position that the Europeans have had in economic terms.

Mr. Rush: Well, I think probably I do. The question is: Suppose they go ahead on their own anyway. What then?

Secretary Kissinger: We’ll bust them.

Mr. Enders: I think we should look very hard then, Ken, at very substantial sales of gold—U.S. gold on the market—to raid the gold market once and for all.

Mr. Rush: I’m not sure we could do it.

Secretary Kissinger: If they go ahead on their own against our position on something that we consider central to our interests, we’ve got to show them that that they can’t get away with it. Hopefully, we should have the right position. But we just cannot let them get away with these unilateral steps all the time.

Full transcript here.

 

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/8VwVTODM4Po/story01.htm Tyler Durden

What’s The Difference Between Markets & Reality? About 22% YTD

Faith, hope, and confidence are the 3 key factors driving stocks at this point with fundamentals lagging an awkward 4th place. Faith in the perpetual central bank put (and bad news is thus good news); Hope that repeating the same 'experiment' following its previous failures will work this time; and confidence that the old normal is re-attainable (no matter how many times we kick the can). Year-to-date, S&P 500 earnings are up around 7% (and the trajectory is declining); accordingly, as we noted previously, confidence is ultimately responsible for levitating nominal stock prices through multiple expansion.. and is responsible for the rest of the market's gains. With confidence now fading (according to most surveys) investors will not be willing to pay increasing multiples unless they are confident that the future streams of earnings are sustainable and forecastable…

 

The S&P 500's return year-to-date – between Fundamentals and markets…

(h/t @Not_Jim_Cramer)

 

as we noted before,

But, it's all about confidence… investors will not be willing to pay increasing multiples unless they are confident that the future streams of earnings are sustainable and forecastable… And simply put, the current levels of Consumer Sentiment need to almost double for the US equity market tp approach historical multiple valuation levels…

 

And remember – as we noted here – its the 80% that consume and the 80% are not benefitting from the wealth effect (much to the chagrin of the Fed).

So next time your "manager" or investment advisor proclaims stocks are cheap compared to historical peak levels, perhaps its worth asking him with "risk" priced into the market at almost all-time lows,

 

and a Fed that is only capable of feeding the richest percentiles of the nation (the rich have never been more comfortable)

 

 

Where is the next doubling of Sentiment coming from? Especially in light of the collapse in economic confidence we are seeing recently.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/I4yOjKsXTcM/story01.htm Tyler Durden

What's The Difference Between Markets & Reality? About 22% YTD

Faith, hope, and confidence are the 3 key factors driving stocks at this point with fundamentals lagging an awkward 4th place. Faith in the perpetual central bank put (and bad news is thus good news); Hope that repeating the same 'experiment' following its previous failures will work this time; and confidence that the old normal is re-attainable (no matter how many times we kick the can). Year-to-date, S&P 500 earnings are up around 7% (and the trajectory is declining); accordingly, as we noted previously, confidence is ultimately responsible for levitating nominal stock prices through multiple expansion.. and is responsible for the rest of the market's gains. With confidence now fading (according to most surveys) investors will not be willing to pay increasing multiples unless they are confident that the future streams of earnings are sustainable and forecastable…

 

The S&P 500's return year-to-date – between Fundamentals and markets…

(h/t @Not_Jim_Cramer)

 

as we noted before,

But, it's all about confidence… investors will not be willing to pay increasing multiples unless they are confident that the future streams of earnings are sustainable and forecastable… And simply put, the current levels of Consumer Sentiment need to almost double for the US equity market tp approach historical multiple valuation levels…

 

And remember – as we noted here – its the 80% that consume and the 80% are not benefitting from the wealth effect (much to the chagrin of the Fed).

So next time your "manager" or investment advisor proclaims stocks are cheap compared to historical peak levels, perhaps its worth asking him with "risk" priced into the market at almost all-time lows,

 

and a Fed that is only capable of feeding the richest percentiles of the nation (the rich have never been more comfortable)

 

 

Where is the next doubling of Sentiment coming from? Especially in light of the collapse in economic confidence we are seeing recently.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/I4yOjKsXTcM/story01.htm Tyler Durden

This Inflation Is Supposed To Be GOOD For Japanese Workers?

Wolf Richter   www.testosteronepit.com   www.amazon.com/author/wolfrichter

Japan’s new economic religion, lovingly dubbed Abenomics, relies mostly on a money-printing binge that monetizes the entire government deficit plus a chunk of its public debt, month after month. Printing yourself out of trouble and to wealth works every time. For the elite. This is a lesson learned from the Fed. But how are workers and consumers faring? And by implication the real economy?

We keep getting juicy morsels of data on this phenomenon. Abenomics is accomplishing its two major goals – watering down the yen and stirring up inflation – pretty well. Over the last 12 months, the yen has been devalued by 20% against the dollar that the Fed is trying to devalue as well. So this is quite a feat! It’s been devalued by 28% against the euro. And inflation is heating up.

The consumer price index, released today, rose 0.1% in October and is now up 1.1% for the 12-month period. Less “imputed rent,” inflation rose 1.4% year over year. Service prices were up 0.4%, but goods prices jumped 1.9%. At this rate, Abenomics will have no problems meeting or exceeding by March, 2015, its “2% price stability” target, as the Bank of Japan has come to call it with bitter cynicism.

What isn’t happening: wage increases!

The Japanese Statistics Bureau just reported incomes and expenditures of households with two or more persons. This is by far the largest category of households in Japan. Due to the cost of housing in large urban areas – and due to remnants of tradition – a large number of singles live with their parents. This category is further divided into “workers’ households,” “no occupation” households, and “other” households.  

Incomes of the all-important “workers’ households” rose a measly 0.1% from a year ago to ¥482,684. In nominal terms. But adjusted for inflation – yes, here is where the benefits of Abenomics are kicking in – incomes fell 1.3%. Disposable incomes fell 1.4%. The details were ugly: “Current income” (salaries and wages) dropped 1.2% and “temporary bonuses” plunged 19.5%. Income from self-employment and piecework plummeted 20.8%.

So these strung-out workers’ households whose belts are being tightened by Abenomics and whose real incomes are being whittled away by inflation, how can they spend more to perk up the economy? Turns out, they don’t. Spending rose a scant 0.4% in nominal terms from a year ago – but adjusted for inflation, spending fell 1.0%.

And this despite rampant frontloading of big-ticket purchases. The consumption-tax hike from 5% to 8%, to take effect on April 1, is motivating households to buy big-ticket items now and save 3%. It has turned into a frenzy. Durable goods purchases, the primary target of frontloading, jumped 40.4% in October from a year ago. While it’s goosing the economy now, it will create a hole starting next spring. Japan has been through this before.

When the consumption tax hike from 3% to 5% was passed in 1996, Japanese consumers went out on a buying binge of big-ticket items to avoid paying the extra 2% in taxes, and the economy boomed. The hangover came around April 1, 1997, when the tax hike became effective. The economy skittered into a recession that lasted a year and a half. Now Japanese households are frontloading to avoid an additional 3% in consumption tax. The hangover next year is going to be painful.

But frontloading of a few big-ticket items is hitting day-to-day expenditures. These households spent 1.8% less on non-durable goods and 2.0% less on services, compared to prior year. Hence, the drop of 1% in overall spending by these households, despite their splurging on a few big items.

This is the benefit of inflation without compensation! A process that ever so slowly hollows out the middle class and pushes the lower classes deeper in the quagmire. It’s hurting workers and consumers. It’s constraining the real economy. Yet, holders of assets that the central bank inflates into the stratosphere benefit. Japan isn’t the only country that is practicing this large-scale redistribution of wealth from workers to holders of inflated assets. Abenomics is following the playbook of the Fed. But it’s pushing it further to the extreme.

The dogfight over Japan’s biggest problem, its gargantuan government deficit, entered its annual ritual of leaks and pressure tactics that usually lead to a pre-Christmas draft budget with an even bigger deficit. But this time, it’s different. Very different. Read….. Japan Is Used To Natural Disasters, But This One Is Man-Made


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/rHmc_u2jsMw/story01.htm testosteronepit

The Other America: "Taxpayers Are The Fools… Working Is Stupid"

While what little remains of America's middle class is happy and eager to put in its 9-to-5 each-and-every day, an increasing number of Americans – those record 91.5 million who are no longer part of the labor force – are perfectly happy to benefit from the ever more generous hand outs of the welfare state. Prepare yourself before listening to this… calling on her self-admitted Obamaphone, Texas welfare recipient Lucy, 32, explains why "taxpayers are the fools"…

"…To all you workers out there preaching morality about those of us who live on welfare… can you really blame us? I get to sit around all day, visit my friends, smoke weed.. and we are still gonna get paid, on time every month…"

She intends to stay on welfare her entire life, if possible, just like her parents (and expects her kids to do the same). As we vociferously concluded previously, the tragedy of America's welfare state is that work is punished.

 

(h/t Mish)

 

As we noted previously,

As quantitied, and explained by Alexander, "the single mom is better off earnings gross income of $29,000 with $57,327 in net income & benefits than to earn gross income of $69,000 with net income and benefits of $57,045."

We realize that this is a painful topic in a country in which the issue of welfare benefits, and cutting (or not) the spending side of the fiscal cliff, have become the two most sensitive social topics. Alas, none of that changes the matrix of incentives for most Americans who find themselves in a comparable situation: either being on the left side of minimum US wage, and relying on benefits, or move to the right side at far greater personal investment of work, and energy, and… have the same disposable income at the end of the day.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/O7Ilwdynoiw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The Other America: “Taxpayers Are The Fools… Working Is Stupid”

While what little remains of America's middle class is happy and eager to put in its 9-to-5 each-and-every day, an increasing number of Americans – those record 91.5 million who are no longer part of the labor force – are perfectly happy to benefit from the ever more generous hand outs of the welfare state. Prepare yourself before listening to this… calling on her self-admitted Obamaphone, Texas welfare recipient Lucy, 32, explains why "taxpayers are the fools"…

"…To all you workers out there preaching morality about those of us who live on welfare… can you really blame us? I get to sit around all day, visit my friends, smoke weed.. and we are still gonna get paid, on time every month…"

She intends to stay on welfare her entire life, if possible, just like her parents (and expects her kids to do the same). As we vociferously concluded previously, the tragedy of America's welfare state is that work is punished.

 

(h/t Mish)

 

As we noted previously,

As quantitied, and explained by Alexander, "the single mom is better off earnings gross income of $29,000 with $57,327 in net income & benefits than to earn gross income of $69,000 with net income and benefits of $57,045."

We realize that this is a painful topic in a country in which the issue of welfare benefits, and cutting (or not) the spending side of the fiscal cliff, have become the two most sensitive social topics. Alas, none of that changes the matrix of incentives for most Americans who find themselves in a comparable situation: either being on the left side of minimum US wage, and relying on benefits, or move to the right side at far greater personal investment of work, and energy, and… have the same disposable income at the end of the day.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/O7Ilwdynoiw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Ukraine President Explains Relations With Russia Using Body Language, While Local Violence Escalates

A week ago Europe was furious, and Putin once again glorious, after Europe’s “bread basket”, the Ukraine, under president Yanukovich decided to terminate its pro-European stance, and instead in a very symbolic shift, chose Moscow as its future trading partner hub. “This is a disappointment not just for the EU but, we believe, for the people of Ukraine,” EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said in a statement. Yanukovich said he had declined to sign the EU pact as the cost of upgrading the economy to meet EU standards was too great and that economic dialogue with Russia, Ukraine’s former Soviet master, would be revived. Today, tensions in the Ukraine finally spilled over when following the break up of a pro-Europe protest by local police, the opposition announced it would call a countrywide general strike to force the resignation of president Viktor Yanukovich.

Reuters reports:

Helmeted police bearing white shields stormed an encampment of protesters in Kiev’s Independence Square as they sang songs and warmed themselves by campfires, the opposition said. Tension had been building since Friday, when Yanukovich declined to sign a landmark pact with European Union leaders at a summit in Lithuania, going back on a pledge to work toward integrating his ex-Soviet republic into the European mainstream.

 

Live bands had played earlier and the presence of mainly young people, some of whom were in their teens, had brought almost a party spirit to the demonstration when police moved in, first firing stun grenades and then wading in with batons. TV footage showed police beating one young woman on the legs and kicking young men on the ground. Several people were given emergency treatment on the spot for cuts to the head.

 

The Interior Ministry said the riot police moved in “after the protesters began to resist the (ordinary uniformed) police, throwing trash, glasses, bottles of water and flares at them”.

 

Opposition leaders, who late on Friday had urged protesters to continue campaigning for a European future for the ex-Soviet republic, condemned the police crackdown and said it would call a country-wide strike. “We have taken a common decision to form a headquarters of national resistance and we have begun preparations for an all-Ukraine national strike,” former economy minister Arseny Yatsenyuk, one of three opposition leaders, told journalists.

For jailed former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko this is just the political spark that might escalate and get her out of prison.

The protesters were mainly young supporters from the main three opposition parties – including that of jailed former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko – who are united in pressing for a westward shift in policy towards the European Union.

 

Tymoshenko, who the EU sees as a political detainee, issued a call for people “to rise up” against Yanukovich. “Millions of Ukrainians must rise up. The main thing is not to leave the squares until the authorities have been overthrown by peaceful means,” she said in a letter read to journalists by her daughter.

 

Police cleared away anti-Yanukovich posters and political graffiti and took down flags and banners, including the EU blue and gold standard, before sealing off the area.

Even the boxers (and potential future presidents)chimed in:

Heavyweight boxing champion turned opposition politician Vitaly Klitschko said: “After the savagery we have seen on Independence Square we must send Yanukovich packing…. They undermined the agreement (with the EU) so as to untie their hands for outrageous behavior which would be unthinkable by European standards,” said Klitschko, a likely contender for the presidency in 2015.

Things will likely get worse before they get better:

The events set the scene for possibly more confrontation on Sunday when a pro-Europe rally has been called. About 100,000 people turned out at a similar gathering last Sunday…. At least four people were beaten by police earlier on Friday, including a Reuters cameraman and a Reuters photographer, who was bloodied by blows to the head by police.

Of course, now that Putin has found his opening and the current Ukraine regime is instrumental in his plan of recreating the old USSR sphere of influence, this time with Gazpromia’s resource monopoly, so hated by Europe, the opposition’s work may be cut out for them.

For the clearest explanation of just why it will be next to impossible to shake the Kremlin off, watch the following silent Euronews clip showing Yanukovich’s body language explanation to Angela on just where his country’s relations with Russia currently stand.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/_ujTN8gw_2E/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Is Janet Yellen Smarter Than Me?

Yellen`s Talking Points

 

During Janet Yellen`s Senate Banking Committee testimony to paraphrase she said that she doesn`t see a bubble in stock prices based upon some of the metrics they utilize at the Fed, and she mentioned that the rise in the 10-year Bond Yield approaching 3% caused the Fed to delay their previously telegraphed taper move in October.

 

There are a couple of disturbing points that came out of her take on bubbles and the rationale behind not tapering a mere 10 or 15 Billion dollars given the monthly commitment of 85 Billion in Fed Purchases every month. 

 

Since when did the Fed outright Buying of Bonds become Normal?

 

Just the mere notion given the history of markets and the Fed`s participation in Markets that the Federal Reserve buying $85 Billion of Monthly Asset Purchases is somehow normal or not just an exceptionally unusual participation in financial markets is quite troubling. 

 

First problematic issue is that they do not think this policy is extraordinarily unusual, and second problematic issue is that such an extraordinary policy might not have some unintended consequences or side effects for financial markets. 

 

Are Markets Free or Social Instruments?

 

The Federal Reserve has no business whatsoever in affecting market prices of stocks and commodities, and it seems that the original purpose of easing monetary policy by lowering the Fed Funds Rate to near Zero is one thing, and yes this derivatively will effect Bond Prices and the Bond Markets, but they have no business artificially influencing the Bond Market through outright purchases of government Bonds.

 

This is far overstepping their purview and it vastly distorts market prices, which is bad enough in and of itself, markets exist for a reason to set prices given fundamentals of supply and demand that reflect economic conditions in the real world. 

 

But to not expect the massive influencing of the Bond Market to then have derivative effects into other markets like commodities and equities and that somehow prices could appreciate to unsustainable levels that come crashing down once the intervention is discontinued is just the height of irresponsibility and short-sightedness.

 

Market & Trading Experience in Short Supply at the Federal Reserve

 

Anybody that has actual market experience, someone who regularly through good and bad business cycles trades stocks, bonds, commodities and currencies recognizes how these instruments trade under all conditions. 

 

This is what the Fed lacks is any understanding of what constitutes normal price discovery in financial markets. Economic theory may be great for setting interest rate policy from a Macro level, but once the Fed started directly intervening in Markets, then they need some trading experience to spot bubbly conditions of asset prices, i.e., how the instruments normally trade versus the current market price action.

 

Distorted Price Discovery in Markets

 

Whenever traders get to the point where they know they can buy every dip for the last five years because the Fed was always going to bail them out either by restarting another QE Initiative, or the current backstop of 85 Billion of Direct Market Asset Purchases this distorts in a highly artificial manner true market price discovery.

 

It also leads to borrowing heavily on margin further incentivized by exceptionally low borrowing costs that adds additional fuel to the fire in elevating asset prices to unusually highs levels relative to the actual fundamentals of the market under normal pri
ce discovery conditions. 

 

Isn`t this the same Methodology & Psychology of the Last Bubble Cycle?

 

The most irresponsible portion of this behavior is that this is precisely the behavior that led to the financial crises, the housing crash and resultant mortgage, bank and financial system bailouts of Wall Street firms like AIG, Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers and Citibank. 

 

Every regulator, politician, Fed Policy figure and Bank Executive all agreed that they had learned the lessons of using excessive leverage, excessive risk taking, and that the Federal Reserve especially was going to set the precedent of “Moral Hazard” in that they were going to go out of their way to avoid the monetary policies of excessive intervention that led to the overly disproportionate risk taking responsible for the Housing Bubble. 

 

And yet in just five short years we have forgotten all this wisdom and learning points and have thrown prudent risk management strategies regarding monetary policy out the window and summarily fail to recognize the Fed`s hand in creating a massively unsustainable bubble in financial markets once again.

 

10-Year Yield & 3% Threshold – Really?

 

If the Federal Reserve was threatened by the 10-Year Bond yield approaching 3% so much that they couldn`t taper a mere 15 Billion dollars, then what does that foretell for the future of these markets? The Fed ought to ask themselves this very question, and it ought to keep them up at night! 

 

This says more about the problem that the Fed has gotten itself into with regard to this unusual monetary policy initiative to intervene in financial markets – than at what price level constitutes bubbly conditions in stock prices. 

 

They cannot even approach un-intervening in markets because they have overstepped any normal fed policy boundary or any market policy for that matter that the level of artificial influence is to such a high degree that they basically are the entire market in certain pricing dynamics – unless they are prepared to be the market (whole other set of unintended consequences) then going from an interventionist market back to a free market means absolute chaos – and the classic example of an artificial bubble!

 

This is the 10-Year Bond Yield; the fact that a 3% yield threatens the Federal Reserve is absurd. This is not the 1-Year Yield, we are talking about a 10 year time period; shoot the Fed Funds Rate was 5.5% just 6 years ago! 

 

Get a grip Fed because you’re worried about the least worrisome dynamic of your Fed Policy`s unintended consequences – what happens when you have a Bond Market after five years of intervention that returns to market forces all the sudden and the US is facing a 12% interest payment on its debt? This is what the Federal Reserve should be worried about down the line. 

 

My parents actually had mortgage rates in the 18% range during their lifetime – this degree of escalation in higher yield is not so unprecedented as some might think. It can happen once again!

 

This isn`t my First Bubble Rodeo!

 

I have been a market participant for the last fifteen years and have seen the Tech Bubble, The Enron-World Com Bubbles, The Housing and Financial Crisis Bubbles, and I can tell Janet Yellen asset prices including stock prices are in bubble territory. 

 

When I look at how easily the Google’s, Tesla, Netflix, Priceline’s, Twitter, Amazons of the world have reached these lofty price levels over the last five years the Fed has set the stage for massive price depreciation in stocks and people`s portfolios once the interventionist Fed policy is taken away – these are not normal market conditions Janet Yellen! 

 

Accordingly you may have an economic background, and have economic and financial models that lead you to believe that stocks are not in bubble territory Janet, but from a trading perspective, someone with actual experience in buying and selling financial assets over the last fifteen years – there is no true price discovery, i.e., instruments don`t trade in a two-sided pricing discovery process.

 

It is Risk-On all the time with no consequences yet for the inevitable unintended consequences of such behavior – the inevitable crash when conditions get unsustainable under any intervention policy.

 

Now or Later – That is the Question!

 

This is the real danger to forestall the cessation of intervention for longer, to delay the stepping away, to the point where asset prices get so elevated, that even with an $85 Billion Monthly Asset Purchases, the decline and losses from such elevated levels, means that stocks just crash right through levels in humongous freefalls.

 

This is the scenario where losses exacerbated by out of this world leverage, cause that 85 Billion to be nothing but a mere entry point for more shorting, as the Market Crash takes hold, and stocks freefall dropping chunks of losses along the way that has fund managers selling without Algos – just get this stuff out the door at any price – this is where we were in 2007 with 15 Billion Quarterly Write-Downs by the Banks! 

 

Hence you can pay now or pay later, but you’re going to pay Janet! So until you get some actual market experience, you keep to worrying about how to create jobs, and let me tell you when there are bubbles in stock prices Janet! 

 

Yes Janet I am smarter than you when it comes to Stock Market Bubbles, and we are currently in a stock market bubble. Consequently when do you want to Pay Janet – it is going to cost you either way, Pay now or Pay Much More Later on down the line!


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/NEYAUbJlS98/story01.htm EconMatters

A-Rod And Janet Yellen: What Valuation, Debt And The Fed Can Say About The Next Bear Market

Submitted by F.F. Wiley of Cyniconomics

What Can Valuation, Debt and the Fed Tell Us about the Next Bear Market?

We last wrote about stock valuation in August, when we looked at three types of P/E multiples and argued that stocks were more stretched than you would think if you only relied on the simplest measure.

Since then, we’ve had the non-taper, non-Larry Summers Fed, non-Syria ultimatum, non-keeping your plan if you like it, and non-market bubble (according to Janet Yellen’s soon-to-be authoritative judgment).  You might say we’ve had an unusual amount of non-sense.

After all that’s happened – and with the S&P 500 (SPY) about 7% higher – it seems time to update our research. We’ll look at the three P/Es again as part of a new analysis that ties in credit markets and the Fed and ends with a prediction about the next bear market.

We start with a chart that marks and categorizes 11 historical bears that will play a part in our conclusions:

These bears are slightly different to other lists you may have seen because we’re using Robert Shiller’s long data history, which shows average figures for each month without the daily detail. We’re also identifying all corrections of over 20% as bears, even if the market failed to make a new all-time high at the prior peak.  “Mega-bears” are corrections of more than 40%, while “über-bears” are corrections of over 60%.

Now for the valuation history, starting with traditional P/Es based on trailing 4 quarter earnings:

Here are Shiller’s P/Es, which are based on 10 year trailing averages for earnings:

And here are P/Es derived from 40 years of trailing earnings but using trend lines instead of Shiller’s averages (click here for further detail):

Trailing P/Es are inferior to the other two measures because they don’t account for earnings cycles. As we wrote in August:

[I]t’s clear that changing perceptions about earnings explain a substantial portion of the market’s volatility. Just as investors can easily forget that P/E doesn’t rise forever, they sometimes forget that earnings don’t climb forever. And when earnings are unusually high, traditional P/E multiples fail to capture the full risk of a correction.

Moreover, earnings cycles are more pronounced in recent decades, due to the Fed’s increasing interventions.  (See here for more on this topic.)  Interventionist policies suggest an even stronger case for following the Shiller P/Es or trend earnings P/Es – not the more traditional measure – and we’ll come back to these results in a moment.

Turning to the credit markets, the next chart combines the Fed’s “Flow of Funds” data on nonfinancial private debt with an earlier series that isn’t exactly the same but captures credit trends, nonetheless:

Three time periods stand out as distinct debt or policy regimes:

1929 to 1946 (the Great Deleveraging). Private debt fell from a pre-Great Depression high of 163% of GNP in 1928 to 83% in 1947. Moreover, there was an even greater fall from the economic trough in 1932-33, when nominal GNP dropped to about half the 1929 amount and pushed private debt above 250% on a GNP ratio basis.

1946 to 1998 (the Long Re-Leveraging). Using the Flow of Funds data this time, nonfinancial private debt climbed from only 37% of GDP in 1945 to about 130% by 1998.

1998 to today (the Big Experiment). While re-leveraging continued through the housing boom, it was further supported during the Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke Feds by a new policy approach, which combines limited intervention in good times (leaving bubbles alone, for example) with ample stimulus at any whiff of volatility, deleveraging or deflation. The Greenspan/Bernanke “puts” have emboldened risk takers and pushed valuation measures upward, as shown in the P/E charts. For credit and asset markets, the puts mark a new regime that stands far apart from the old-fashioned approach of “taking the punch bowl away when the party gets going.” We’ll call the new regime a “Big Experiment.”

The Big Experiment began, arguably, with the Fed’s actions after the 1987 market crash and then strengthened progressively. But we chose a 1998 start date because it coincides with Greenspan’s aggressive response to the LTCM crisis and implicit support for the Internet bubble, while also marking the early stages of the housing and mortgage booms.  By the end of the 1990s, the Fed had clearly crossed the Rubicon into a new era that David Stockman aptly calls “bubble finance.”

The three regimes’ relevance may not be immediately clear, but consider what happens when we sort all bear markets since 1929 by size:

It turns out that sorting by size is the same as sorting by our three regimes. Together with the P/E histories, the table gives us a few reasons to expect the next bear to be a big one. (Note that we’re separating the size of the bear from its timing, which we’ll discuss in a later post and doesn’t depend much on valuation.)

First, one thing we’ve learned about the Big Experiment is that stocks tend to fall a long way after the Fed loses its grip.  The bear markets of 2000-03 and 2007-09 were more severe than all but the Great Deleveraging bears of the 1930s and 1940s.

Second, stocks are more expensive than at any of the Long Re-Leveraging peaks, which is the only period in
which bear market losses fell short of 40%.  In fact, the Shiller P/E is now higher than it was in any bull market before the Internet bubble except for the 1929 peak, while the trend earnings P/E has breached even the 1929 levels.

What’s more, it’s reasonable to expect big cycles to persist in today’s policy environment, because it relies so heavily on the Fed. When so much depends on a single, binary factor (in this case, faith in the FOMC’s support), corrections tend to be particularly severe after the factor reverses (when judgment swings from full faith to loss of faith). By comparison, a less manipulated market responds to a wider variety of inputs, most of which develop gradually.

Why so doom and gloomy?

If you disagree with these conclusions, you probably believe we’re headed for another long re-leveraging, thanks to the fall in private debt since the housing boom. The Fed’s policies, you may say, are merely cushioning the path to a lower debt burden and more balanced economy. It’s only a matter of time before the post-WW2 credit boom reignites. In Ray Dalio’s parlance, this scenario would be a “beautiful deleveraging.”

While the beautiful deleveraging is worth contemplating, it seems highly unlikely. Here are three reasons for skepticism:

  1. Private debt hasn’t fallen all that much. Nonfinancial private debt was 156% of GDP as of the latest data point, which is exactly where we were in the second quarter of 2006 as the housing boom was running out of steam.
  2. The Fed’s actions have barely registered with the all-important middle class. Not only is median household income 8% below its 2007 peak after adjusting for inflation, but it was still falling as of 2012 (the latest data point). The median household is now earning the same real income as it was in 1989 – 24 years ago! In addition, the jobs picture is abysmal by any honest assessment (which should include the composition of job gains, unemployed folks who’ve dropped out of the labor force and involuntary part-time workers).
  3. Just about everywhere you turn these days, you’re looking at another classic sign that credit and asset markets are getting out of hand. From record margin debt to a deluge of covenant-lite loans to 1990s-like enthusiasm for Internet companies, it’s hard not to see froth (regardless of your views on bubbles). When we compare these warning signs to the slow progress on debt reduction and no progress for the middle class, the financial economy is too far ahead of the real economy for the eventual outcome to be beautiful.

Put differently, the giant gap between the financial and real economies tells us that any normalization of the real economy will prove fleeting.

Think of it this way:

You’re a baseball player trying to break into the majors despite mediocre fielding skills, no foot speed, and a batting average that hovers around 250. Egged on by your friend, A-Rod, you think you can make it by using steroids and turning yourself into a power hitter. But it doesn’t work out as planned. After a year, you’re losing hair, your skull’s gotten bigger, there’s fatty tissue on your chest that wasn’t there before, and you’ve still only managed 18 home runs in a season. You finally accept that it’s not going to happen for you.

In the baseball scenario, steroids didn’t show enough payoff before the side effects told you enough was enough. And you can say pretty much the same thing about our economic scenario and monetary steroids.  We’re seeing dubious benefits and fast developing side effects from the Fed’s actions, causing many observers to recommend a rethink of the Big Experiment. Yet, the experiment continues.

Getting back to our question about the next bear market, the Fed’s unshakable commitment to its approach – despite growing evidence that it may do more harm than good – is our last reason to expect the next bust to be another killer. When the bull finally runs out of steam, it’s likely to be March 2000 or October 2007 all over again.

Bonus result for Austrians

Although we started our analysis with the Great Depression (because of limited debt data and less familiarity with earlier markets), we sized up all of the bear markets in the Shiller database, which goes back to 1871.

These include a fourth regime: the classical gold standard from 1880 to 1914. There’s also an extra period from 1914 to 1921 that was marked by both World War 1 and the fact that the newly hatched Federal Reserve hadn’t yet established its so-called stabilization policies.  I’ll call this period “transitional.”

Here’s the full list of bear markets, sorted by size:

Note that every one of the pre-Fed stabilization bears is less severe than:

  • All of the Great Deleveraging bears
  • The most extreme Long Re-Leveraging bear (the 43% drop in 1973-74, which would look much worse if you were to factor in inflation)
  • All of the Big Experiment bears

In other words, our stock market history doesn’t reflect very well on the Fed.

(Click here for technical notes about this article and a few more charts.)


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/BNtB9BqwXS8/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Dollar and Yen Weakness may Persist, Aussie Poised for Bounce

The British pound was the only major currency to have gained against the US dollar over the past month.  Its 2% gain helped it finish November at its highest level since August 2011. The dollar rose against the other majors, with its 4.1% rise against the Japanese yen being the largest.

 

 The dollar-bloc currencies, alongside the Norwegian krone were also laggards, losing between 1.2% (Canadian and New Zealand dollars) and 3.6% (Norwegian krona and Australian dollar).  The Swedish krona fell 2.5%.   Most emerging market currencies also fell against the dollar over the past month.  This is not the of price action one would expect if the yen’s carry trade status has been rekindled, as many observers have claimed in recent weeks as the yen as fallen.

 

The US dollar’s weakness seen over the past week is very narrowly based, largely concentrated against the euro (and its two shadow currencies Swiss franc and Danish krone) and sterling.   Given that the US Dollar Index is heavily weighted toward Europe, it has traded heavier, but it is not truly reflective of its overall performance.  It finished last week with its seventh consecutive session of recording lower highs.  Technical indicators warn of scope for additional near-term declines.  Key support is seen around 80.00.

 

Of the currencies reviewed here, the Australian dollar may have the greatest potential for a trend change in the period ahead.  The MACDs are about to turn and the RSI did not confirm the new 12-week low.  The Aussie bears struggled to sustain the downside momentum in the second half of last week. The first real test of the Aussie bears comes in near $0.9200.   If the technicals are anticipating fundamentals, it may suggest either better than expected data and/or a central bank that continues to seem to be in no hurry to cut rates again from record lows.  That said, we still do not want to rule out a rate cut in late Q1 2014.

 

Maybe it was the lack of participation in the second half of last week, but the euro’s (upside) momentum appeared to stall around $1.36.  A retracement of the euro’s fall from the $1.3830 area is found near $1.3630, which also corresponds to the top of the Bollinger Band.  The technical indicators we look at are still constructive for the single currency.  A break to the upside would encourage another run at the $1.38 area.

 

Sterling’s advance has taken it to within striking distance notable resistance in the $1.6400-25 area.  It is where the long-term trend line drawn off the 2009 high near $1.70 and the 2011 high near $1.6750 intersects.  It is also a retracement objective of the decline since from the 2007 high near $2.1150.  If offers in this area are successfully absorbed, technically potential may extend into the $1.70-$1.73 area. Support is likely what appeared to be a double top in October near $1.6260.  

 

The dollar finished November at its highest level against the yen since May.  It appears to have broken out of the six month consolidative pattern.  The next target is JPY103.75, but the measuring objective of the chart pattern may be closer to JPY109.  

 

The yen is also weak against the euro.  The euro is pushing through to new five year highs and although the JPY140 area may mark psychological resistance, but the JPY141 area may be more significant from a technical perspective as it represents a key retracement (61.8%) of the euro’s slide from JPY170 in 2008 to last year’s low near JPY94.  

 

Sterling is at its best level against the yen since late-2008.  At the end of last week, it approached the 38.2% retracement of the more from the 2007 high near JPY251 and the 2009 and 2011-2012 low near JPY117. A break above here would suggest a move toward JPY180-JPY185. 

 

The Korean won’s appreciation against the yen is also noteworthy.   It is trading at 5-year highs against the yen and is approaching the JPY10 level, which is thought to be important for Korean corporations and, consequently, politicians as well.   The won is also strengthening against the US dollar too.  Some reports suggest that Korean officials have been intervening by buying dollars.  

 

Besides the Hong Kong dollar, which is of course pegged to the US dollar, the Korean won was the only Asian currency to have gained against the dollar in November (~0.25%).  Over the past three months, the won has gained almost 5% against the dollar.  This is second in the region, behind the Indian rupee, which was still recovering from the June-August swoon.  Officials will likely escalate their defense especially if the yen remains weak and the dollar threatens the KRW1000 level.  We note that in the past week, foreign investors have bought back about 2/3 of the Korean shares they had sold in the first part of the month.  

 

The US dollar finished November at 2-year highs against the Canadian dollar.  The next target is seen in the CAD1.0660-80 area.  A break of that could open the door to another 1-2 big figure move (CAD1.0760-CAD1.0860.  It is notable that the Canadian dollar failed to get any traction before the weekend despite better than expected GDP figures (Q3 2.7% annualized).   

 

The greenback has been consolidating against the Mexican peso and the technical indicators are not particularly helpful presently in handicapping the direction of the breakout.  The range that has dominated in recent sessions is MXN13.03-MXN13.1450.  However, a breakout will not be confirmed until the wider MXN12.96-MXN13.20 band broken.  

 

The latest CFTC Commitment of Traders report on the CME currency futures is delayed by the Thanksgiving holiday.  We will resume our position 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/5dLwPGboAqY/story01.htm Marc To Market