Glassholes

Glassholes by Anthony Freda

A Mini NSA On Your Face

eOnline reports:

A new app will allow total strangers to ID you and pull up all your information, just by looking at you and scanning your face with their Google Glass. The app is called NameTag and it sounds CREEPY.

 

The “real-time facial recognition” software “can detect a face using the Google Glass camera, send it wirelessly to a server, compare it to millions of records, and in seconds return a match complete with a name, additional photos and social media profiles.”

 

The information listed could include your name, occupation, any social media profiles you have set up and whether or not you have a criminal record (“CRIMINAL HISTORY FOUND” pops up in bright red letters according to the demo).

Since the NSA is tapping into all of our digital communications, it is not unreasonable to assume that all of the info from your digital glasses – yup, everything – may be recorded by the spy agency.

Are we going to have millions of mini NSAs walking around recording everything … glassholes?

Postscript: I love gadgets and tech, and previously discussed the exciting possibilities of Google Glasses.

But the NSA is ruining the fun, just like it’s harming U.S. Internet business.

Bonus:

Spy Agency Engaged In Internet “False Flag” Attacks


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1d0uIk8 George Washington

State Department Confirms Authenticity Of Intercepted Ukraine Phone Call: Accuses Russia Of Dirty Tricks

If there was any doubt whether the intercepted “Fuck the EU” phone call between Assistant Secretary of State Nuland and the US Ambassador to the Ukraine Pyatt was authentic, it can now be laid to rest: in an earlier response to questions from reporters, State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki did not dispute authenticity of recording and essentially confirmed it was real “I didn’t say it was inauthentic.”

However, in the tried and true fashion of assigning blame elsewhere, the world learned that it was really all Russia’s fault and the released intercept was a “new low of Russian tradecraft.” Psaki added that there are moments “in every diplomatic relationship” when you disagree, Psaki says. But the absolute punchline: “It’s concerning that private conversation was recorded.

Perhaps maybe the NSA can opine on the concernability of a private conversation being recorded.

Then again in a world in which only the NSA is allowed to record every single private conversation, one can easily see why the State Dept thought it was safe to discuss its state subordination strategy over what appears to have been an unencrypted landline. At least the CIA used to communicate by encrypted redlines.

Finally, while Russian “tradecraft” may have hit a new low, so did US reputation and standing abroad, however offset by the humiliation and embarrassment of US foreign policymakers which has never been higher.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1eZqIgB Tyler Durden

Guest Post: Limits to Growth – At Out Doorstep, But Not Recognized

Submitted by Gail Tverberg via Our Finite World blog,

How long can economic growth continue in a finite world? This is the question the 1972 book The Limits to Growth by Donella Meadows and others sought to answer. The computer models that the team of researchers produced strongly suggested that the world economy would collapse sometime in the first half of the 21st century.

 

I have been researching what the real situation is with respect to resource limits since 2005. The conclusion I am reaching is that the team of 1972 researchers were indeed correct. In fact, the promised collapse is practically right around the corner, beginning in the next year or two. In fact, many aspects of the collapse appear already to be taking place, such as the 2008-2009 Great Recession and the collapse of the economies of smaller countries such as Greece and Spain. How could collapse be so close, with virtually no warning to the population?

To explain the situation, I will first explain why we are reaching Limits to Growth in the near term.  I will then provide a list of nine reasons why the near-term crisis has been overlooked.

Why We are Reaching Limits to Growth in the Near Term

In simplest terms, our problem is that we as a people are no longer getting richer. Instead, we are getting poorer, as evidenced by the difficulty young people are now having getting good-paying jobs. As we get poorer, it becomes harder and harder to pay debt back with interest. It is the collision of the lack of economic growth in the real economy with the need for economic growth from the debt system that can be expected to lead to collapse.

The reason we are getting poorer is because hidden parts of our economy are now absorbing more and more resources, leaving fewer resources to produce the goods and services we are used to buying. These hidden parts of our economy are being affected by depletion. For example, it now takes more resources to extract oil. This is why oil prices have more than tripled since 2002. It also takes more resource for many other hidden processes, such as deeper wells or desalination to produce water, and more energy supplies to produce metals from low-grade ores.

The problem as we reach all of these limits is a shortage of physical investment capital, such as oil, copper, and rare earth minerals. While we can extract more of these, some, like oil, are used in many ways, to fix many depletion problems. We end up with too many demands on oil supply–there is not enough oil to both (1) offset the many depletion issues the world economy is hitting, plus (2) add new factories and extraction capability that is needed for the world economy to grow.

With too many demands on oil supply, “economic growth” is what tends to get shorted. Countries that obtain a large percentage of their energy supply from oil tend to be especially affected because high oil prices tend to make the products these countries produce unaffordable. Countries with a long-term decline in oil consumption, such as the US, European Union, and Japan, find themselves in recession or very slow growth.

Figure 1. Oil consumption based on BP's 2013 Statistical Review of World Energy.

Figure 1. Oil consumption based on BP’s 2013 Statistical Review of World Energy.

Unfortunately, the problem this appears eventually to lead to, is collapse. The problem is the connection with debt. Debt can be paid back with interest to a much greater extent in a growing economy than a contracting economy because we are effectively borrowing from the future–something that is a lot easier when tomorrow is assumed to be better than today, compared to when tomorrow is worse than today.

We could not operate our current economy without debt. Debt is what has allowed us to “pump up” economic growth. Consumers can buy cars, homes, and college educations that they have not saved up for. Businesses can set up factories and do mineral extraction, without having past profits to finance these operations. We can now operate with long supply chains, including many businesses that are dependent on debt financing. The ability to use debt allows vastly more investment than if potential investors could only the use of after-the-fact profits.

If we give up our debt-based economic system, we lose our ability to extract even the oil and other resources that appear to be easily available. We can have a simple, local economy, perhaps dependent on wood as it primary fuel source, without debt. But it seems unlikely that we can have a world economy that will provide food and shelter for 7.2 billion people.

The reason the situation is concerning is because the financial situation now seems to be near a crisis. Debt, other than government debt, has not been growing very rapidly since  2008. The government has tried to solve this problem by keeping interest rates very low using Quantitative Easing (QE). Now the government is cutting back in the amount of QE.  If interest rates should rise very much, we will likely see recession again and many layoffs. If this should happen, debt defaults are likely to be a problem and credit availability will dry up as it did in late 2008. Without credit, prices of all commodities will drop, as they did in late 2008. Without the temporary magic of QE, new investment, even in oil, will drop way off. Government will need to shrink back in size and may even collapse.

In fact, we are already having a problem with oil prices that are too low to encourage oil production. (See my post, What’s Ahead? Lower Oil Prices, Despite Higher Extraction Costs.) Other commodities are also trading at flat to lower price levels. The concern is that these lower prices will lead to deflation. With deflation, debt is strongly discouraged because it raises the “inflation adjusted” cost of borrowing. If a deflationary debt cycle is started, there could be a huge drop in debt over a few years. This would be a different way to reach collapse.

Why couldn’t others see the problem that is now at our door step?

1. The story is a complicated, interdisciplinary story. Even trying to summarize it in a few paragraphs is not easy. Most people, if they have a background in oil issues, do not also have a background in financial issues, and vice versa.

2. Economists have missed key points. Economists have missed the key role of debt in extracting fossil fuels and in keeping the economy operating in general. They have also missed the fact that in a finite world, this debt cannot keep rising indefinitely, or it will grow to greatly exceed the physical resources that might be used to pay back the debt.

Economists have missed the fact that resource depletion acts in a way that is equivalent to a huge downward drag on productivity. Minerals need to be separated from more and more waste products, and energy sources need to be extracted in ever-more-difficult locations. High energy prices, whether for oil or for electricity, are a sign of economic inefficiency. If energy prices are high, they act as a drag on the economy.

Economists have missed the key role oil plays–a role that is not easily substituted away. Our transportation, farming and construction industries are all heavily dependent on oil. Many products are made with oil, from medicines to fabrics to asphalt.

Economists have assumed that wages can grow without energy inputs, but recent experience shows the economies with shrinking oil use are ones with shrinking job opportunities. Economists have built models claiming that prices will rise to handle shortages, either through substitution or demand destruction, but they have not stopped to consider how destructive this demand destruction can be for an economy that depends on oil use to manufacture and transport goods.

Economists have missed the point that globalization speeds up depletion of resources and increases CO2 emissions, because it adds a huge number of new consumers to the world market.

Economists have also missed the fact that wages are hugely important for keeping economies operating. If wages are cut, either because of competition with low-wage workers in warm countries (who don’t need as high a wages to maintain a standard of living, because they do not need sturdy homes or fuel to heat the homes) or because of automation, economic growth is likely to slow or fall. Corporate profits are not a substitute for wages.

3. Peak Oil advocates have missed key points. Peak oil advocates are a diverse group, so I cannot really claim all of them have the same views.

One common view is that just because oil, or coal, or natural gas seems to be available with current technology, it will in fact be extracted. This is closely related to the view that “Hubbert’s Peak” gives a reasonable model for future oil extraction. In this model, it is assumed that about 50% of extraction occurs after the peak in oil consumption takes place. Even Hubbert did not claim this–his charts always showed another fuel, such as nuclear, rising in great quantity before fossil fuels dropped in supply.

In the absence of a perfect substitute, the drop-off can be expected to be very steep. This happens because population rises as fossil fuel use grows. As fossil fuel use declines, citizens suddenly become much poorer. Government services must be cut way back, and government may even collapse. There is likely to be huge job loss, making it difficult to afford goods. There may be fighting over what limited supplies are available.What Hubbert’s curve shows is something like an upper limit for production, if the economy continues to function as it currently does, despite the disruption that loss of energy supplies would likely bring.

A closely related issue is the belief that high oil prices will allow some oil to be produced indefinitely. Salvation can therefore be guaranteed by using less oil. First of all, the belief that oil prices can rise high enough is being tested right now. The fact that oil prices aren’t high enough is causing oil companies to cut back on new projects, instead returning money to shareholders as dividends. If the economy starts shrinking because of lower oil extraction, a collapse in credit is likely to lead to even lower prices, and a major cutback in production.

4. Excessive faith in substitution. A common theme by everyone from economists to peak oilers to politicians is that substitution will save us.

There are several key points that advocates miss. One is that if a financial crash is immediately ahead, our ability to substitute disappears, practically overnight (or at least, within a few years).

Another key point is that today’s real shortage is of investment capitalin the form of oil and other natural resources needed to manufacture the new natural gas powered cars and the fueling stations they need. A similar shortage of investment capital plagues plans to change to electric cars. Wage-earners of modest means cannot afford high-priced plug in vehicles, especially if the change-over is so fast that the value of their current vehicle drops to $0.

Another key point is that the alternatives we looking at are limited in supply as well. We use far more oil than natural gas; trying to substitute natural gas for oil will lead to a shortfall in natural gas supplies quickly. Ramping up electric cars, solar, and wind will lead to a shortage of the rare earth minerals and other minerals needed in their production. While more of these minerals can be accessed by using lower quality ore, doing so leads to precisely the investment capital shortfall that is our problem to begin with.

Another key point is that electricity does not substitute for oil, because of the huge need for investment capital (which is what is in short supply) to facilitate the change. There is also a timing issue.

Another key point is that intermittent electricity does not substitute for electricity whose supply can be easily regulated. What intermittent electricity substitutes for is the fossil fuel used to make electricity whose supply is more easily regulated. This substitution (in theory) extends the life of our fossil fuel supplies. This theory is only true if we believe that  coal and natural gas extraction is only limited by the amount those materials in the ground, and the level of our technology. (This is the assumption underlying IEA and EIA  estimates of future fossil use.)

If the limit on coal and natural gas extraction is really a limit on investment capital (including oil), and this investment capital limit may manifest itself as a debt limit, then the situation is different. In such a case, high investment in intermittent renewables can expected to drive economies that build them toward collapse more quickly, because of their high front-end investment capital requirements and low short-term returns.

5. Excessive faith in Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROI) or Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) analyses. Low EROI returns and poor LCA returns are part of our problem, but they are not the whole problem.  They do not consider timing–something that is critical, if our problem is with inadequate investment capital availably, and the need for high returns quickly.

EROI analyses also make assumptions about substitutability–something that is generally not possible for oil, for reasons described above. While EROI and LCA studies can provide worthwhile insights, it is easy to assume that they have more predictive value than they really do. They are not designed to tell when Limits to Growth will hit, for example.

6. Governments funding leads to excessive research in the wrong directions and lack of research in the right direction. Governments are in denial that Limits to Growth, or even oil supply, might be a problem. Governments rely on economists who seem to be clueless regarding what is happening.

Researchers base their analyses on what prior researchers have done. They tend to “follow the research grant money,” working on whatever fad is likely to provide funding. None of this leads to research in areas where our real problems lie.

7. Individual citizens are easily misled by news stories claiming an abundance of oil. Citizens don’t realize that the reason oil is abundant is because oil prices are high, debt is widely available, and interest rates are low. Furthermore, part of the reason oil appears abundant is because low-wage citizens still cannot afford products made with oil, even at its current price level. Low employment and wages feed back in the form of  low oil demand, which looks like excessive oil supply. What the economy really needs is low-priced oil, something that is not available.

Citizens also don’t realize that recent push to export crude oil doesn’t mean there is a surplus of crude oil. It means that refinery space for the type of oil in question is more available overseas.

The stories consumers read about growing oil supplies are made even more believable by forecasts showing that oil and other energy supply will rise for many years in the future. These forecasts are made possible by assuming the limit on the amount of oil extracted is the amount of oil in the ground. In fact, the limit is likely to be a financial (debt) limit that comes much sooner. See my post, Why EIA, IEA, and Randers’ 2052 Energy Forecasts are Wrong.

8. Unwillingness to believe the original Limits to Growth models. Recent studies, such as those by Hall and Day and by Turner, indicate that the world economy is, in fact, following a trajectory quite similar to that foretold by the base model of Limits to Growth. In my view, the main deficiencies of the 1972 Limits to Growth models are

(a) The researchers did not include the financial system to any extent. In particular, the models left out the role of debt. This omission tends to move the actual date of collapse sooner, and make it more severe.

(b) The original model did not look at individual resources, such as oil, separately. Thus, the models gave indications for average or total resource limits, even though oil limits, by themselves, could bring down the economy more quickly.

I have noticed comments in the literature indicating that the Limits to Growth study has been superseded by more recent analyses. For example, the article Entropy and Economics by Avery, when talking about the Limits to Growth study says, “ Today, the more accurate Hubbert Peak model is used instead to predict rate of use of a scarce resource as a function of time.” There is no reason to believe that the Hubbert Peak model is more accurate! The original study used actual resource flows to predict when we might expect a problem with investment capital. Hubbert Peak models overlook financial limits, such as lack of debt availability, so overstate likely future oil flows. Because of this, they are not appropriate for forecasts after the world peak is hit.

Another place I have seen similar wrong thinking is in the current World3 model, which has been used in recent Limits to Growth analyses, including possibly Jorgen Randers’ 2052. This model assumes a Hubbert Peak model for oil, gas, and coal. The World3 model also assumes maximum substitution among fuel types, something that seems impossible if we are facing a debt crisis in the near term.

9. Nearly everyone would like a happy story to tell. Every organization from Association for the Study of Peak Oil groups to sustainability groups to political groups would like to have a solution to go with the problem they are aware of. Business who might possibly have a chance of selling a “green” product would like to say, “Buy our product and your problems will be solved.” News media seem to tell only the stories that their advertisers would like to hear. This combination of folks who are trying to put the best possible “spin” on the story leads to little interest in researching and telling the true story.

Conclusion

Wrong thinking and wishful thinking seems to abound, when it comes to overlooking near term limits to growth. Part of this may be intentional, but part of this lies with the inherent difficulty of understanding such a complex problem.

There is a tendency to believe that newer analyses must be better. That is not necessarily the case. When it comes to determining when Limits to Growth will be reached, analyses need to be focused on the details that seemed to cause collapse in the 1972 study–slow economic growth caused by the many conflicting needs for investment capital. The question is: when do we reach the point that oil supply is growing too slowly to produce the level of economic growth needed to keep our current debt system from crashing?

It seems to me that we are already near such a point of collapse. Most people have not realized how vulnerable our economic system is to crashing in a time of low oil supply growth.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1d0rRrs Tyler Durden

Socialism Works – In One Chart

As the US practically decrees a Maserati in every garage, it would seem the Venezuelan version of socialism is not encouraging its wealth redistributed, price-managed, margin-controlled, centrally-planned citizens to buy cars… January saw the lowest volume of car sales ever on record at 722 (not ‘000s) having dropped 87% year-over-year. At least they have record high stocks and toilet paper… oh wait…

 

 

Is The US today where Venezuela was 6 years ago?

 

Data: Bloomberg


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1bzNe22 Tyler Durden

The Farce Is Complete: Blythe Masters Joining CFTC

We thought today’s newsflow and “market action” ranked pretty high on the absurd surrealism scale. And then we saw this.

  • BLYTHE MASTERS TO JOIN CFTC GLOBAL MARKETS COMMITTEE
  • JPMORGAN’S BLYTHE MASTERS TO JOIN CFTC ADVISORY COMMITTEE
  • CFTC SPOKESMAN COMMENTS ON BLYTHE MASTERS JOINING COMMITTEE

That’s right – you read it correct: “Blythe Masters, head of JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s commodities division, is joining an advisory committee of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, said Steve Adamske, a spokesman for the regulator. Masters, 44, was invited by acting Chairman Mark Wetjen to sit on a global markets committee at the Washington-based regulator of futures and swaps, according to a person with knowledge of the matter. Masters is scheduled to participate in a CFTC meeting on Feb. 12 to discuss cross-border guidance on rules, the person said.”

Ok – ignore, if you will, all alegations about Blythe Masters “interventions” in the precious metals markets.

But don’t ignore Blythe’s CNBC interview in which the soon to be former JPMorganite said, days before the London Whale fiasco was exposed and so were JPM’s attempts to corner the bond market, that JPM has “offsetting positions. We have no stake in whether prices rise or decline. Rather we’re running a flat or relatively flat matched book” – a statement that was a bold faced lie, and was followed up with “what is commonly out there is that JPMorgan is manipulating the metals market. It’s not part of our business model. it would be wrong and we don’t do it.”

No, Blythe had much greater manipulative ambitions, namely becoming the next Enron, which we learned after than the FERC fined JPMorgan – and the group ran by Blythe Masters – for manipulating electricity prices in California and other states.

Fast forward to today when we learn that this certified commodity market manipulator just got a job with none other than the head commodity regulators in the US?

In other words, you too can get a job at the CFTC if only you can answer yes to the following two questions (h/t Manal):

  • Has your bank manipulated energy markets under your watch, and
  • Have you been found guilty of commodity price manipulation

We could ask what Elizabeth Warren would think about this hilarious rotating door out of the most punished for its legal transgressions bank – with about $25 billion in legal fees, expenses and settlement charges – the same Warren who earlier today was parading with pandering populism at the Senate hearing, as a result of which nothing would change…

 

… but we won’t. Because as we noted: nothing will ever change. Actually correction – now it will be Blythe Masters on top of the one regulators that is supposed to enforce a fair, honest and efficient commodities market.

It’s almost as if they are explicitly telling the handful of people who still care about this entire charade a resounding “fuck you.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1bzGFMJ Tyler Durden

Why The Next Global Crisis Will Be Unlike Any In The Last 200 Years

Submitted by F.F. Wiley of Cyniconomics blog,

Sometime soon, we’ll take a shot at summing up our long-term economic future with just a handful of charts and research results. In the meantime, we’ve created a new chart that may be the most important piece. There are two ideas behind it:

  1. Wars and political systems are the two most basic determinants of an economy’s long-term path. America’s unique pattern of economic performance differs from Russia’s, which differs from Germany’s, and so on, largely because of the outcomes of two types of battles: military and political.
  2. The next attribute that most obviously separates winning from losing economies is fiscal responsibility. Governments of winning economies normally meet their debt obligations; losing economies are synonymous with fiscal crises and sovereign defaults. You can argue causation in either direction, but we’re not playing that game here. We’re simply noting that a lack of fiscal responsibility is a sure sign of economic distress (think banana republic).

Our latest chart isolates the fiscal piece by removing war effects and considering only large, developed countries. In particular, we look at government budget balances without military spending components.

(Military spending requires a different evaluation because it succeeds or fails based on whether wars are won or lost. Or, in the case of America’s adventures of the past six decades, whether war mongering policies serve any national interest at all. In any case, military spending isn’t our focus here.)

There are 11 countries in our analysis, chosen according to a rule we’ve used in the past – GDP must be as large as that of the Netherlands. We start in 1816 for four of the 11 (the U.S., U.K., France and Netherlands). Others are added at later dates, depending mostly on data availability. (See this “technical notes” post for further detail.) Here’s the chart:

fiscal balance ex-defense 1

Not only has the global, non-defense budget balance dropped to never-before-seen levels, but it’s falling along a trend line that shows no sign of flattening. The trend line spells fiscal disaster. It suggests that we’ve never been in a predicament comparable to today. Essentially, the world’s developed countries are following the same path that’s failed, time and again, in chronically insolvent nations of the developing world.

Look at it this way: the chart shows that we’ve turned the economic development process inside out. Ideally, advanced economies would stick to the disciplined financial practices that helped make them strong between the early-19th and mid-20th centuries, while emerging economies would “catch up” by building similar track records. Instead, advanced economies are catching down and threatening to throw the entire world into the kind of recurring crisis mode to which you’re accustomed if you live in, say, Buenos Aires.

How did things get so bad?

Here are eight developments that help to explain the post-World War 2 trend:

  1. In much of the world, the Great Depression triggered a gradual expansion in the role of the state.
  2. Public officials failed to establish a sustainable structure for their social safety nets, and got away with this partly by sweeping the true costs of their programs under the carpet.
  3. Profligate politicians were abetted by the economics profession, which was more than happy to serve up unrealistic theories that account for neither unintended consequences nor long-term costs of deficit spending.
  4. With economists having succeeded in knocking loose the old-time moorings to budgetary discipline (see first 150 years of chart), responsible politicians became virtually unelectable.
  5. Central bankers suppressed normal (and healthy) market mechanisms for forcing responsibility, by slashing interest rates and buying up government debt.
  6. Regulators took markets further out of the equation by rewarding private banks for lending to governments, while politicians and central bankers effectively underwrote the private bankers’ risks.
  7. Monetary policies also encouraged dangerous private credit growth and other financial excesses, resulting in budget-destroying setbacks such as stagflation and banking crises.
  8. Budget decisions were made without consideration of the inevitability of these setbacks, because economists wielding huge influence over the budgeting process (think CBO, for example) assumed a naïve utopia of endless economic expansion.

Sadly, all of these developments are still very much intact (excepting small improvements in budget projections that we’ll address next week). They tell us we’ll need substantial changes in political processes, central banking and the economics profession to avert the disaster predicted by our chart. And we’re rapidly running out of time, as discussed in “Fonzi or Ponzi? One Theory on the Limits to Government Debt.”

On the bright side, a fiscal disaster should help trigger the needed changes. Every kick of the can lends more weight to the view expressed by some that the debt super-cycle – including public and private debt – needs to go the distance, eventually reaching a Keynesian end game of massive collapse. At that time, we would expect a return to old-fashioned, conservative attitudes toward debt.

As for the chart, it helps to flesh out a handful of ideas we’ve been either writing about or thinking of writing about. We’ll return to it in future posts, including one drilling down to the individual country level that we’ll publish soon.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1kie3N4 Tyler Durden

Hyperinflation – 10 Worst Cases

Inflation is hot property today, hyperinflation is even hotter! We think we are modern, contemporary, smart and ready to deal with anything. We’ve got that seen-it-all-before, been-there-done-it attitude. But, we are not a patch on what some countries have been through in the worst cases of hyperinflation in history. Here’s the top 10 list of worst cases in history. We’ll start with the worst first…let’s think positive!

Hungary 1946

Inflation at its peak reached a staggering figure of 13.6 quadrillion % per month! That’s 13, 600, 000, 000, 000, 000%. The largest denomination bill was a 100 Quintillion note. Prices ended up doubling every 15 hours at the time.

Zimbabwe 2008

Prices doubled here every 24.7 hours in November 2008 and inflation reached levels of 79 billion-odd %. They eventually stopped using the official currency and switched to the South African Rand or the $US. A loaf of bread ended up costing $35 million. This is the most recent case. It was Mugabe’s land-redistribution program that caused this.

Yugoslavia 1994

In just the one month of January 1994 inflation rose by 313 million %. Prices doubled every 34 hours (which is nothing compared to Hungary). The currency ended up getting revalued 5 times in all between 1993 and 1995, all to no avail. The cause? A recession triggered by overseas borrowing and an on-going political struggle in the 1980s and the following decade.

Germany 1923

Adolf Hitler rose to power as a consequence of hyperinflationary pressure (at least one of the reasons). Prices doubled every 3.7 days and inflation stood at 29, 500%. Germany was crippled with the reparation payments after the Treaty of Versailles and the end of World War I.

Greece 1944

Prices started rising by 13, 800% in October 1944 and they doubled every 4.3 days. The trouble was the debt incurred by World War II.

Poland 1921

Prices rose in 1921 by 251 times in comparison with those of 1914. They doubled every 19.5 days. The Zloty was introduced as the new currency in 1924 in an attempt to start afresh. Inflation stood at 988, 233% in 1924.

Mexico 1982

Mexico had a rate of inflation of 10, 000% in 1982 (due mainly to too much social expenditure).

Brazil 1994

Inflation was 2, 075.8% at its worst in 1994. The Real was adopted in 1994 and it managed to calm inflation down.

Argentina 1981

The highest denomination bill was the one million pesos note. The Peso was revalued three times.

Taiwan 1949

This was a knock-on effect from China and the Chinese Civil War. The New Taiwan Dollar was issued in June 1949. The monthly rate of inflation stood at 399%

Inflation can be creeping (mild or moderate inflation) or galloping. We can talk of Hyperinflation and stagflation (inflation and recession). Deflation is not better. We have so many names for it.

Hyperinflation means prices doubling in such a short space of time that we can’t keep up with it all. Hyperinflation comes about at times of trouble, war, conflict, upheaval, change on unprecedented levels. It comes about because we still haven’t learnt how to control it. History repeats itself, we hear people say. Thankfully, it doesn’t repeat itself too often. Fingers crossed.

Originally posted: Hyperinflation – 10 Worst Cases

You might also enjoy: Death of the Dollar | You’re Miserable USA! | Emerging Markets: Lock, Stock and Barrel | End of the Financial World 2014 |  Kristallnacht on Wall Street? Bull! | China’s Credit Crunch | Working for the Few | USA:The Land of the Not-So-Free  

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1c84WXb Pivotfarm

LinkedIn Is Getting Twittered: Here’s Why

Yesterday it was Twitter, today it is LinkedIn. Moments ago, the professional social network reported EPS that just barely beat at $0.39 vs expectations of $0.38, while revenue printed at $447.2 MM vs $437.6 MM expected. However, it is this excerpt from the LNKD release that is causing the stock to be TWTRed 10% after hours.

LinkedIn is providing guidance for the first quarter and full year of 2014:

  • Q1 2014 Guidance: Revenue is expected to range between $455 million and $460 million. Adjusted EBITDA is expected to range between $106 million and $108 million. The company expects depreciation and amortization to be approximately $48 million, and stock-based compensation to be approximately $68 million.
  • Full Year 2014 Guidance: Revenue is expected to range between $2.02 billion and $2.05 billion. Adjusted EBITDA is expected to be approximately $490 million. The company expects depreciation and amortization to be approximately $225 million, and stock-based compensation to be approximately $325 million.

And since the street was looking for $470 million for Q1 revenue, and $2.17 billion for full year, the stock is currently getting monkeyhammered.

Of course, with LTM PE before earnings in the four-digit range before earnings, this 10% drop means the company is back to being a blue-light special bargain… somewhere in the ultra high triple digit PE range.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1d00uOf Tyler Durden

LinkedIn Is Getting Twittered: Here's Why

Yesterday it was Twitter, today it is LinkedIn. Moments ago, the professional social network reported EPS that just barely beat at $0.39 vs expectations of $0.38, while revenue printed at $447.2 MM vs $437.6 MM expected. However, it is this excerpt from the LNKD release that is causing the stock to be TWTRed 10% after hours.

LinkedIn is providing guidance for the first quarter and full year of 2014:

  • Q1 2014 Guidance: Revenue is expected to range between $455 million and $460 million. Adjusted EBITDA is expected to range between $106 million and $108 million. The company expects depreciation and amortization to be approximately $48 million, and stock-based compensation to be approximately $68 million.
  • Full Year 2014 Guidance: Revenue is expected to range between $2.02 billion and $2.05 billion. Adjusted EBITDA is expected to be approximately $490 million. The company expects depreciation and amortization to be approximately $225 million, and stock-based compensation to be approximately $325 million.

And since the street was looking for $470 million for Q1 revenue, and $2.17 billion for full year, the stock is currently getting monkeyhammered.

Of course, with LTM PE before earnings in the four-digit range before earnings, this 10% drop means the company is back to being a blue-light special bargain… somewhere in the ultra high triple digit PE range.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1d00uOf Tyler Durden

Stocks Surge To Best Day Of 2014

Early volatility around Draghi's lack of easing (and a subsequent surge in EURUSD) gave way to excess exuberance as USDJPY ramped over almost 100 pips (on absolutely no news whatsoever) on the day dragging the S&P 500 25 points higher from the day's lows, back over its 100DMA and back to unchanged to the December taper. Trannies topped the taper (+1.5% on the day) but stocks remain red on the week. All this re-risking ahead of tomorrow's major noise-soaked jobs data… Bonds sold off once again but from 10amET, which coincided with the end of the initial JPY ramp, Treasuries, gold, and the USD all trod water as stocks and JPY pushed on ahead. Systemic cross-asset class correlation surged on the day to well over 0.9. S&P and Dow have best day since Mid-December; Trannies almost best day since October – and all this before tomorrow's crucial weather-impacted jobs report – make sense to anyone? TWTR -24% at $50.

 

The only chart that matters… notice that the initial opening ramp lifted USDJPY perfectly to 102…

 

Trannies were best on the day with the Dow having its best day in almost 2 months… but they all remain lower on the week…

 

The S&P rallied back to unchanged post-Taper

 

Stocks benefitted from a pretty significatng short squeeze at the open (from yesterday's over-zealous shorting)…

 

Gold and Bonds decoupled from equity exuberance soon after the initial JPY ramp faded (and crossed 102)

 

FX was relatively quiet apart from an epic ramp in EUR on Draghi's "no QE discussion" comments and the corresponding JPY crumble…

 

Over all bond yields are up notably on the week with curve steepening… (with yields up 8-10bps from the ADP data miss)…

 

Silver is setting up fro its best week in 6 months… as copper, gold, and oil limp sideways to higher…

 

 

Charts: Bloomberg

Bonus Chart: Intraday Correlation across multiple risk factors (Stocks, bonds, FX carry, credit, and commodities) surged very systemically…

 

Bonus Bonus Chart: Twurmoil…

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1d00rSG Tyler Durden