Gold “Speculation” Drops To Record Low

While the last two days of relative excitement in the precious metals are noteworthy in their bucking-the-trend of recent months, there is perhaps a much more critical ‘trend’ that may finally allow the demand for physical gold to peer through the veneer of synthetic paper pricing. As JPMorgan notes, speculative positions (defined CFTC net longs minus shorts) have dropped to record lows in the last few weeks. With ETF gold holdings back below ‘Lehman’ levels and gold coin sales elevated, perhaps the Indian government’s (and most of the Western world’s Feds) hope for the death of the precious metals market is greatly exaggerated…

 

Gold Spec positions at record lows…

 

“Paper” Gold ETF Holdings at pre-Lehman crisis levels…

 

As “physical” Gold coin sales are on the rise again…

 

Charts: JPMorgan


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/o8lQe_C-ZAo/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Gold "Speculation" Drops To Record Low

While the last two days of relative excitement in the precious metals are noteworthy in their bucking-the-trend of recent months, there is perhaps a much more critical ‘trend’ that may finally allow the demand for physical gold to peer through the veneer of synthetic paper pricing. As JPMorgan notes, speculative positions (defined CFTC net longs minus shorts) have dropped to record lows in the last few weeks. With ETF gold holdings back below ‘Lehman’ levels and gold coin sales elevated, perhaps the Indian government’s (and most of the Western world’s Feds) hope for the death of the precious metals market is greatly exaggerated…

 

Gold Spec positions at record lows…

 

“Paper” Gold ETF Holdings at pre-Lehman crisis levels…

 

As “physical” Gold coin sales are on the rise again…

 

Charts: JPMorgan


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/o8lQe_C-ZAo/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Top 10 Global Risks for 2014

By EconMatters

 

With another new year upon us mortals, we thought it is time again to check out the top 10 global risks ranked by Oxford Analytica.  Not surprisingly, from a geographical perspective, a majority of the top global risks come from the Middle East region (at 40%) and the Asia-Pacific region, specifically China, and North Korea (at 30%).  U.S., Europe, and Russia round out the rest.

 

 

Source: Oxford Analytica

 

The ranking is mostly based on the potential size of global impact.  However, putting them under the lens of probability, a difference picture emerges (see graph below)

 

Chart Source: Oxford Analytica

While the economic related risks such as a sharp slowdown in China, EU disintegration, and deflation in the U.S may rein supreme in terms of global impact, the probability of them materializing is actually less likely than the geopolitical risk in the Middle East (Syria, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan), and Asia (China, North Korea).

 

In terms of the type of risk, seven out of the top 10 risks are geopolitical, while only three are financial or economic.  So if we look at probability from this perspective, we are more likely to see a war or regime topple before another financial crisis rippling through the world again.

 

Regarding the ‘U.S. Deflationary Trap’, the Fed said last month it would reduce its monthly asset purchases by $10 billion to $75 billion, while also expressed worries about inflation.  Meanwhile, Fed’s balance sheet has ballooned to $4 trillion, we seriously doubt the U.S. deflationary scenario after Fed’s helicoptered five years worth of QEs.

 

 

At this point, we at EconMatters believe that the Federal Reserve removing the Liquidity Punchbowl not because everything is fixed with the US economy, and we have fully recovered from the financial crisis of 2007, but because they have no other choice in the matter given the obvious asset bubbles they have created in the credit, bond and equity markets.

 

For now, the inflationary effect from QEs is mostly trapped in the stock and commodity markets (i.e. enriching the 1%), but inevitably it will manifest and spill over to the consumer side of things hitting hard on the 99%.  The removal of this liquidity, the resultant implications for financial markets, and potential future inflationary consequence of Fed’s QEs remain an under appreciated risk to the global economy in our humble opinion.

 

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via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Y2_Lsy45bMw/story01.htm EconMatters

The NSA Responds To Bernie Sanders Whether It Spies on Congress

Yesterday, in what we characterized as an episode of a “real life magic-mushroom, banana dictatorship envisioned by George Orwell” gone full retard, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders asked the NSA point blank whether it has “spied, or is the NSA currently spying, on members of Congress or other American elected officials?” Today, via the Bezos Post, we got the answer: “Members of Congress have the same privacy protections as all U.S. persons,” the spokesman said, which thanks to Edward Snowden, we now know for a factor are precisely none (for those still unconvinced, please see: “The Complete Guide To How The NSA Hacked Everything“). “We are reviewing Sen. Sanders’s letter now, and we will continue to work to ensure that all members of Congress, including Sen. Sanders, have information about NSA’s mission, authorities, and programs to fully inform the discharge of their duties.” In other words, of course.

More from WaPo:

The answer is telling. We already know that the NSA collects records on virtually every phone call made in the United States. That program was renewed for the 36th time on Friday. If members of Congress are treated no differently than other Americans, then the NSA likely keeps tabs on every call they make as well.

 

It’s a relief to know that Congress doesn’t get a special carve-out (they’re just like us!). But the egalitarianism of it all will likely be of little comfort to Sanders.”

Of course, it is no surprise that the US superspies spy on Congress. After all they spy on everyone. But the bigger question is if the NSA is itself, by implication, above the checks and balances of the US legislative apparatus, just who is in charge of determining the targets of the most powerful spying agency in the history of the world? In other words, who watches the watchmen? And just how is any of this even remotely legal?


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Xbr0SUMdhoI/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Competence, Creativity, Mastery, Genius: The Essential Role Of Risk

Submitted by Charles Hugh-Smith of OfTwoMinds blog,

When risk vanishes, so does creativity.

Which characteristics lead to success? Which lead to greatness? Let's start by pondering companies that were once dominant in their respective fields: Microsoft and Nokia. Microsoft recently bought Nokia's mobile phone business, once valued at $240 billion, for $7.2 billion. Nokia's share of the global smart-phone business is around 4%. Microsoft's share of the global smart-phone software market is less than 1%, despite spending billions of dollars developing and promoting its mobile software.

Bill Gates created a powerhouse based on two principles–monopoly (getting a lock on the PC market as the default operating system) and copying and/or buying successful competitors. MSFT would then slowly increase their market share with two strategies: integrate the new software into their Windows/Office monopoly and keep adding features. In the case of web browsers, this was a successful strategy, as Microsoft's IE (Internet Explorer) overcame Netscape Navigator and its offspring, Mozilla, to dominate the browser market.

In the gaming space, Microsoft took on the established leaders with XBox, using its cash flow to develop the platform during the initial money-losing years–losses that would have doomed less well-funded companies.
Under CEO Steve Ballmer, these strategies have failed spectacularly. Microsoft has continued buying companies left and right, and spent a reported $10 billion trying to compete with Google in search. Its search engine, Bing, remains an also-ran. MSFT also spent billions attempting to dominate the mobile software space, but the results have been catastrophic: MSFT's share of mobile software has declined from around 10% to 1%.

Microsoft's tablet is also an also-ran. Its plan to leverage the XBox platform into the convergence-TV space has also come up short of expectations.

Microsoft's core monopoly continues to generate billions in profits because it is the tech equivalent of a utility: anyone who buys a PC has to pay MSFT $100 for the operating system, and if they are in any sort of business or job that requires computers, then they also have to pony up $300-$500 for Office.

But MSFT's core monopoly is under threat as Google's free operating system Chrome expands from mobile phones to tablets. As PCs lose their dominance, so too does MSFT. If Chrome is good enough to power tablets, why not PCs? Google already offers Google Docs as an alternative to Office. If someone comes up with Word-Lite and Excel-Lite which can open Office docs, MSFT's last bastion of monopoly will face real competition.

Here is an interesting quote on the tone-deaf corporate culture that leads to systemic failure: (Nokia Deal Marks a New Chapter for Microsoft)
 

"It is hard to stress the importance of culture for a technology company; after all it is a transit system for creativity. In an industry that was moving fast, Microsoft became fat and slow. Its products suffered. This brings us to Windows 8. I installed a preview version of Windows 8 on my computer a few months before it was officially released and was shocked at how horrible the product was. I am a computer geek, but I could not figure out how to use that product. Windows 8 was not just buggy, it was thoroughly terrible. 

To be effective and well compensated (within Microsoft), employees don’t need to be good at their jobs, they need to be good politicians. This turned Microsoft from a technology company into the U.S. Congress and therefore its software products started to resemble legislature by Washington’s finest — bulky and full of pork."

Tech darlings Samsung, Google and Apple are also huge companies with plenty of political jockeying and wasted resources–it goes with bureaucratic bloat. Even back in 1983, a few years after Apple went public, Steve Jobs had to physically and managerially sequester the Macintosh development team from the bureaucracy of Apple.

Nokia and Blackberry both squandered dominance and have shrunk to irrelevance. Microsoft is heading down the same path. On the surface, the management of all three firms was competent; but competence doesn't spawn Creativity, Mastery and Genius; competence in a no-risk environment leads to failure.

I think we can draw several conclusions from the MSFT/Nokia story.

1. Doing what worked spectacularly in the past is not guaranteed to keep working.
2. When risk vanishes, so does creativity.

When management and employees alike feel the security of dominance and near-monopoly, they are free to indulge in bureaucratic infighting and loss of focus.When risk has been vanquished, there is no compelling need to keep in touch with the market and customers: dominance/monopoly means they have to take whatever we provide and like it.

Without an awareness of risk, even competence disappears. Creativity, mastery and genius either fall on parched, dead soil or are ruthlessly suppressed as political threats.

I think the same is true of individuals and nations: competence can be reached with practice, but Creativity, Mastery and Genius all require space for spontaneity and risk.

I came across the 1982 obituary of Arthur Rubinstein, one of the 20th century's most famous pianists. I think his story illustrates the limits of practice and competence.

Rubinstein was a bon vivant, and this persona masked the type of practice he undertook in his 20s to acheive mastery. The cliche is that 10,000 hours of practice yields mastery, but this turns out to be false: only practice with the express purpose of getting better has any effect. For Rubinstein, getting better meant being technically good enough to become expressive and spontaneous. 

What Mr. Rubinstein offered, above all others, was the ability to transmit the joy of music.
In a recording session for RCA Victor Records, in Webster Hall here, he would play and replay a piece until he was satisfied that it was his best; and before a concert he would practice, particularly passages that he thought he might have difficulty with. Nothing less than perfection was tolerated.

Practice for its own sake, however, was not Rubinstein's notion of how to extract music from the printed notes. "I was born very, very lazy and I don't always practice very long," he said once. "But I must say, in my defense, that it is not so good, in a musical way, to overpractice. When you do, the music seems to come out of your pocket. If you play with a feeling of 'Oh, I know this,' you play without that little drop of fresh blood that is necessary -and the audience feels it." 

On another occasion he explained in his tumbling English his philosophy this way: "At every concert I leave a lot to the moment. I must have the unexpected, the unforeseen. I want to risk, to dare. I want to be surprised by what comes out. I want to enjoy it more than the audience. That way the music can bloom anew." 

Another ingredient of Rubinstein was an unusually fine ear that, among other things, permitted him to spin music through his mind. "At breakfast, I might pass a Brahms symphony in my head," he said. "Then I am called to the phone, and half an hour later I find it's been going on all the time and I'm in the third movement." 

In his late 20s, he began to take stock of himself as an artist. The result was the end of his days as a playboy and intensive study and practice – six, eight, nine hours a day. In the process he brought discipline to his abundant temperament and intelligence to his grand manner."

Perhaps Competence, Creativity, Mastery and Genius form a sort of matrix. Creativity is limited without basic competence, but competence alone is not fertile ground for creativity. Technical mastery does not lead to genius unless the creativity born of risk and spontaneity is allowed to bloom.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/EHJbHSOMyPQ/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Party Like Its 1914

Forget the last two day's decline.  The consensus opinion for 2014 is pretty uniform: stocks will go up modestly, bond will decline in similar fashion.  Job growth will grind higher, as will inflation.  The Fed will taper its bond-buying program, slowly.  And so it may all come to pass…  But ConvergEx's Nick Colas ponders what could go wrong, or at least different.  Top of his list: fixed income volatility, in conjunction with stock market valuations that are, at best, average. Colas reflects ominously on 1914, where if you read the papers of the day you would have seen much of the same "Yeah, we got this" tone that prevails today

Seven months later, and the New York Stock Exchange had to shut for +4 months due to the start of World War I.  No, we aren’t calling for Armageddon.  After all, the Dow started 1914 at 57.7 and ended at 54.6, even with the European war.  But one thing we know for sure – the time to worry is when no one else seems concerned.

Via ConvergeEx's Nick Colas,

Consider the following quote from the New York Times: “Whatever may be said of the stock market there can be no doubt that the investment situation afforded grounds for a most hopeful view of the outlook.”  Aside from the archaic-sounding wordiness, it is a good summary of the current outlook for U.S. stocks.  Economic conditions are improving, as is investor confidence.  Last year’s 30% return for the S&P 500 means even retail investors are returning to stocks, much as swallows portend the arrival of Spring after a chilly Winter.  Things look good for 2014, both in the domestic economy and stock markets.

The date of the quote, however, is not January 2014, but rather a hundred years ago: January 31st 1914.  The Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at 60.6, up 5.0% from the start of the year.  The first few days of 1914 had been choppy, to be sure, but the good returns of January were enough to give investors some hope that things were solidly on the mend.  The Times did feature some stories about the political situation in Europe, but there was more ink spilled about the fabulous parties given by New York’s 1% of the day.  Fifty person sit down dinners seemed common, with a separate guest list for those who merely attended the coffee and entertainment afterwards.  Not quite as spicy as Bethenny Frankel’s lastest boyfriend – today’s hot news – but close enough.

Just six months after that quote, the New York Stock Exchange closed for over four months.  The start of World War I meant that foreigners – mostly British subjects – wanted their money out of U.S. stocks and repatriated back to their local currency.  The Treasury Secretary at the time felt that suspending the gold standard – the method of exchange between different currencies at the time – was too costly to America’s reputation.  The only alternative was to freeze the U.S. capital markets, and the NYSE did not reopen until December 12th.

Despite the opening salvos of the Great War, U.S. stocks fared pretty well in 1914.  The Dow ended the year 54.5, down only 5.5% for the year.  America’s entry into the conflict would come in 1917, and at the end of the war in 1918 the Dow closed at 87.2  – 38% higher than the beginning of 1914.

Fast-forward a century, and the lessons of 1914 ring true: be careful when the market thinks it has everything under control.  And such is the case as I write this note.  Despite today’s 16 point drop in the S&P 500, the narrative of the U.S. equity market is resoundingly bullish.  A few of the more optimistic sound bites:

Stocks have just finished a very strong year – up 30% for the S&P 500 – and that will draw further money flows.  If you exclude the last 5 years of data from mutual fund money flows, that is generally what happens.  Up markets do tend to pull in more capital from retail investors. Strength begets strength, as the old market aphorism reminds us.

 

The Federal Reserve has set up market psychology to welcome a tapering of its bond-buying program.  Chairman Bernanke first raised the issue at the June FOMC press conference.  Then economic data started to improve modestly, and at the December Fed meeting it followed through with a $10 billion reduction in the program.  If the Federal Reserve follows through with further reductions in 2014, markets will see it as further sign of economic strength.

 

Interest rates are still low enough that they offer little competition to equities. With the 10 year U.S. Treasury yielding 2.99%, bonds are still bringing a knife to a gunfight with stocks.  The common wisdom has it that bonds will gradually decline in value of the course of 2014 as interest rates rise with a stronger domestic economy.

 

Europe and Japan will turn their corners in 2014, albeit in slow motion.  The Yen will weaken, and the euro will hold steady.  The “Smart money” trade to own Japanese stocks (hedged against the currency) and European equities should work in 2014, as it did in 2013.

 

U.S. equity valuations have room to grow as revenue growth accelerates due to better economic fundamentals.  Right now, the S&P 500 trades for 15.3x this year’s expected $120/share expected earnings.  The bulls would say 17-18x earnings is fair for a recovery year, so stocks can rally another 18% in 2014.

All this sounds so neat and compact, and the rally last year seems to confirm the basic outlines of the case.  Yet that quote from the Times shows that the easy case may ignore a lot of important factors.  It wasn’t a surprise that Europe was a tinderbox in 1914.  It was the how, the when, the who, and the why that no one knew.

Happily, there is no World War in the offing in 2014, but let’s take a moment to consider some less-than-perfect outcomes that might make the consensus wrong.

The U.S. economy speeds up more than expected.  Right now, economists peg GDP growth here at 3% for 2014.  What if they are too conservative, anchored in the recent past rather than more typical economic recoveries?

 

The problem with this scenario is that it takes a predictable Federal Reserve and makes it harder to understand their future policies.  No one thinks 3% is the “Right” yield on the 10 year Treasury, given the Fed’s aggressive buying over the last three years.  And with a gradual reduction in this program, we will find out – slowly – what the market rate actually is.  A quicker pace of economic expansion will drive inflation and force the Fed to cut the program more quickly than expected.  Fast rising rates will also make car purchases and mortgages more expensive, taking two legs off the stool of a typical economic recovery.  It is bond market volatility which challenges the bull case for stocks most profoundly.

 

Stock valuations begin to feel too full.  Stocks multiples tend to grow like teenaged children – growth spurts followed by periods of consolidation.  Last year’s rally was essentially all valuation expansion – earnings expectations actually came down as the year progressed.  Yes, the bullish call for further multiple expansion has some limited history on its side.  We did get to 18x earnings in the 1990s and we could again now.

 

In the historical spirit of this note, however, lets look at the Shiller P/E – a 10 year look back at earnings as compared to current prices.  The average for this measure is 16.5x, going back to 1880.  We are now at 26.2 times.  Now, U.S. stocks can still grow into these numbers if earnings continue to climb.  But the Shiller P/E illustrates an important point: we HAVE to grow into this number, for there is little margin of safety otherwise.

 

The butterfly of chaos theory flaps its wings.  We start 2014 with U.S. stocks at all time highs, expectations of improvement to come, and a high degree of confidence that the future will be predictable.  That initial condition leaves very little gas in the tank if something goes awry.  It doesn’t have to be a policy mistake from the Fed or a twitchy bond market.  The disruptive event may be nothing more than a January swoon for stocks that pulls back the indices 7-10% and gives investors pause about the year ahead.

As the great market sage Yogi Berra once opined, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”  Our historical case study about 1914 comes neatly on the 100-year anniversary of the start of World War I, but you needn’t expect a cataclysm to take its cautionary tale to heart.  The U.S. economy and capital markets have much to commend them, but the current optimism seems to run ahead of fundamentals for the moment.  Perhaps today’s pullback is the start of a correction, and that would be both healthy and positive for 2014.  Either way, a cautious outlook is the better part of valor so early in the year.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/CcMCudqLe0E/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Bitcoin For Brownstones: You Can Now Use Digital Currency To Buy New York Real Estate

Having doubled off the post-PBOC-ban-and-Fed-Taper lows, Bitcoin, trading at USD910 currently is becoming increasingly ubiquitous as a payment method for many businesses. The latest, as NY Post reports, is Manhattan-based real-estate broker Bond New York, is "using Bitcoins to help facilitate transactions." With overseas money-laundering as a key support, and Manhattan apartment sales setting a record in Q4 for volume of transactions (+27% YoY), we suspect the acceptance of Bitcoin will merely ease the Chinese (or Russian) ability to transfer funds directly into NYC housing – blowing an even bigger bubble.

 

 

 

Via NY Post,

The bitcoin has gained a foothold in one of the hottest business sectors in the country: Manhattan real estate.

 

Bond New York, a Manhattan-based real estate broker, has started accepting the digital currency for real estate transactions, The Post has learned.

 

Bond New York believes it is the first real estate brokerage firm to accept bitcoin.

 

“Real estate brokerage is a service industry,” said Noah Freedman, a co-founder of Bond New York. “Our job is to make real estate transactions easy for our customers. Bitcoins are just another mechanism to help people facilitate transactions.”

 

Several larger real estate brokers are not sold on the idea and have no plans to set up bitcoin accounts any time soon.

 

“We don’t accept them, and we have no plans to accept them,” Pam Liebman, CEO of the Corcoran Group, said Friday. “We prefer the American dollar.”

 

“Bitcoins could be here today and gone tomorrow,”

But it is that perspective that could indeed be lost on the burgeoning foreign interest in moving money overseas (into US real estate)… (as we noted in September)

In August 2012, when isolating one of the various reasons for the latest housing bubble, we suggested that a primary catalyst for the price surge in the ultra-luxury housing segment and the seemingly endless supply of "all cash" buyers (standing at an unprecedented 60% of all buyers lately as reported by Goldman) is a very simple one: crime. Or rather, the use of US real estate as a means to launder illegal offshore-procured money. We also identified the one key permissive feature which allowed this: the National Association of Realtors' exemption from Anti-Money Laundering provisions. In other words, all a foreign oligarch – who may or may not have used chemical weapons in their past: all depends on how recently they took their picture with the Secretary of State – had to do to buy a $47 million Florida house, was to get the actual cash to the US. Well good thing there are private jets whose cargo is never checked.

But now, with the acceptance of Bitcoin, we would imagine the "funds" transfer process is even easier… blowing what is already a bubble… (via Bloomberg)

Manhattan apartment sales surged in 4Q, setting a record for yr-end transactions, as prospect of rising interest rates and prices pushed buyers to make deals before purchases became costlier.

 

Sales of condos and co-ops jumped 27% from yr earlier to 3,297, highest 4Q total in 25 yrs of record-keeping, according to report from Miller Samuel Inc. and Douglas Elliman Real Estate

 

There’s a concern that homeownership will be more expensive and therefore the time to act apparently is now,” said Jonathan Miller, president of Miller Samuel

 

 

Median price of Manhattan transactions that closed in 4Q climbed 2.1% to $855,000

Into an even bigger one…

 

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/gdbi2JBQ3Mg/story01.htm Tyler Durden

This “Non-Traditional” Valuation Measure Carries 3 Messages About U.S. Stocks

Submitted by F.F.Wiley of Cyniconomics blog,

[S]tock prices have risen pretty robustly. But I think that if you look at traditional valuation measures, the kind of things that we monitor, akin to price-equity ratios, you would not see stock prices in territory that suggests bubble-like conditions.

 

– Janet Yellen, responding to a question in November’s nomination hearing

We offered our take on stock valuation several times last year, while arguing that traditional price-to-earnings multiples (P/Es) are almost useless during periods of heavy policy stimulus. We’ll take a different direction here, by suggesting a “fix” for an entirely different problem with traditional P/Es. Our analysis reveals three messages about current stock prices.

We’ll start with 100+ years of traditional P/Es based on trailing 12 month earnings:

price to peak earnings 1

From this simple chart, analysts draw conclusions about whether valuation is high, low or neutral versus historic norms. One problem with that – and the motivation behind this post – is in the depiction of historic norms. Analysts typically weight periods of expanding earnings equally with periods of depressed earnings. But when earnings are depressed, P/Es tend to spike upwards as the earnings input to the denominator shrinks.

Unusual jumps in P/Es often occur in bear markets, as we saw during the Internet bust and again in the housing bust. In each of these instances, P/Es reached all-time highs despite the fact that stock prices were far below prior peaks. For example, when the S&P 500 plummeted below 700 in March 2009, P/Es climbed to a new record of 79, on their way to five consecutive months of over 100! (These results are cut off the chart for scaling purposes.)

Such distortions may make you wonder: Do P/Es during earnings recessions tell us anything at all about stock valuation?

Our answer is no.

As any Excel user who’s been foiled by a “#DIV/0” message knows, ratios demand careful attention when the denominator is volatile. In this case, a better approach is to divide equity prices by the highest earnings result from any prior 12 month period. (Dividing by trend earnings or 10 year average earnings is better still, but we’ll leave these methods for other posts.) This measure of “price-to-peak earnings” (P/PE) isn’t skewed by recessions because the denominator never falls.

Here’s the chart:

price to peak earnings 2

The last three data points (for October, November and December) are 18.2, 18.7 and 18.8. As of November, we reached a new high for the current bull market. What’s more, there are only nine comparable, historic episodes of P/PE climbing above 18.5 (as numbered on the chart). Combining these episodes with other statistics, we’ve identified three possible messages:

Message #1: Beware the bear (he’ll be here within a few months)

After five of the nine P/PE breaches of 18.5, a bear market began within the next three months (with four of the market peaks remarkably occurring in the very next month):

price to peak earnings 3

Message #2: Time to buy (earnings will bust through their prior peak)

In three other episodes, earnings were accelerating and still hadn’t reached the peak of the previous earnings cycle. Each time, the P/PE breach of 18.5 was followed by three consecutive years of double-digit earnings growth, with stock prices rising strongly but still lagging earnings:

price to peak earnings 4

Message #3: Bull to bubble (prices will leave earnings behind)

In the remaining episode (1996), earnings had already breached their prior cycle peak and would soon level off. The bigger story after this P/PE breach of 18.5 was the dizzying rise in stock prices that would outpace earnings by a large margin. Here are the details, along with a comparison to circumstances as of last month:

price to peak earnings 5

One way to interpret these results is to focus on the number of episodes linked to each of the three messages. That won’t be our approach.

We prefer to condition the results on two factors, one based on the earnings cycle and the other on the Fed. For the first factor, we look at whether earnings were accelerating upwards from below the prior cycle peak. For the second factor, we separate the Fed’s first eight decades (described according to the old-time philosophy of “taking away the punch bowl when the party gets going”) from the last two decades of Greenspan/Bernanke puts (based on the new philosophy of “refilling the punch bowl”).

price to peak earnings 6

As you might guess from the grid, we’re not convinced that current P/PEs signal a bear market in 2014, despite the facts that:

  1. Five of nine instances (56%) of P/PE breaching 18.5 were closely followed by market peaks.
  2. When earnings are at all-time highs, five of six instances (83%) of P/PE breaching 18.5 were closely followed by market peaks.

Not only do we have to be careful about using price multiples for forecasting (as mentioned in earlier posts), but we currently sit in the grid’s lower right-hand quadrant with the Fed setting new standards for short-term market support. The only other P/PE breach of 18.5 belonging to this quadrant was in the early stages of the Internet bubble.

What’s more, recent earnings and stock performance match up more closely with the Internet bubble episode – as shown in the “Message 3” table – than with the episodes in the “Message 2” table.

So, are we predicting four years of soaring stock prices and nonsensical valuations, as in 1996 to 2000?

Not exactly.

The past can offer clues to the future but it doesn’t give us a blueprint. The bigger message is that today’s valuations don’t bode well for long-term returns, where long-term means beyond the next market peak. Prices could surely bubble upwards from here, but bubbles are invariably followed by severe bear markets. (We’ll expand on this outlook in a future post, where we’ll add total return estimates.)

More importantly, we shouldn’t be fooled by traditional valuation measures. P/Es, in particular, have several flaws. We’ve shown in past articles that we get completely different results when we adjust earnings to account for mean reversion. We made a separate adjustment here to correct for the distorting effects of earnings recessions. Either way, our conclusions are a far cry from the “nothing to see here” that we keep hearing from the Fed.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/42RhYniPiBU/story01.htm Tyler Durden

This "Non-Traditional" Valuation Measure Carries 3 Messages About U.S. Stocks

Submitted by F.F.Wiley of Cyniconomics blog,

[S]tock prices have risen pretty robustly. But I think that if you look at traditional valuation measures, the kind of things that we monitor, akin to price-equity ratios, you would not see stock prices in territory that suggests bubble-like conditions.

 

– Janet Yellen, responding to a question in November’s nomination hearing

We offered our take on stock valuation several times last year, while arguing that traditional price-to-earnings multiples (P/Es) are almost useless during periods of heavy policy stimulus. We’ll take a different direction here, by suggesting a “fix” for an entirely different problem with traditional P/Es. Our analysis reveals three messages about current stock prices.

We’ll start with 100+ years of traditional P/Es based on trailing 12 month earnings:

price to peak earnings 1

From this simple chart, analysts draw conclusions about whether valuation is high, low or neutral versus historic norms. One problem with that – and the motivation behind this post – is in the depiction of historic norms. Analysts typically weight periods of expanding earnings equally with periods of depressed earnings. But when earnings are depressed, P/Es tend to spike upwards as the earnings input to the denominator shrinks.

Unusual jumps in P/Es often occur in bear markets, as we saw during the Internet bust and again in the housing bust. In each of these instances, P/Es reached all-time highs despite the fact that stock prices were far below prior peaks. For example, when the S&P 500 plummeted below 700 in March 2009, P/Es climbed to a new record of 79, on their way to five consecutive months of over 100! (These results are cut off the chart for scaling purposes.)

Such distortions may make you wonder: Do P/Es during earnings recessions tell us anything at all about stock valuation?

Our answer is no.

As any Excel user who’s been foiled by a “#DIV/0” message knows, ratios demand careful attention when the denominator is volatile. In this case, a better approach is to divide equity prices by the highest earnings result from any prior 12 month period. (Dividing by trend earnings or 10 year average earnings is better still, but we’ll leave these methods for other posts.) This measure of “price-to-peak earnings” (P/PE) isn’t skewed by recessions because the denominator never falls.

Here’s the chart:

price to peak earnings 2

The last three data points (for October, November and December) are 18.2, 18.7 and 18.8. As of November, we reached a new high for the current bull market. What’s more, there are only nine comparable, historic episodes of P/PE climbing above 18.5 (as numbered on the chart). Combining these episodes with other statistics, we’ve identified three possible messages:

Message #1: Beware the bear (he’ll be here within a few months)

After five of the nine P/PE breaches of 18.5, a bear market began within the next three months (with four of the market peaks remarkably occurring in the very next month):

price to peak earnings 3

Message #2: Time to buy (earnings will bust through their prior peak)

In three other episodes, earnings were accelerating and still hadn’t reached the peak of the previous earnings cycle. Each time, the P/PE breach of 18.5 was followed by three consecutive years of double-digit earnings growth, with stock prices rising strongly but still lagging earnings:

price to peak earnings 4

Message #3: Bull to bubble (prices will leave earnings behind)

In the remaining episode (1996), earnings had already breached their prior cycle peak and would soon level off. The bigger story after this P/PE breach of 18.5 was the dizzying rise in stock prices that would outpace earnings by a large margin. Here are the details, along with a comparison to circumstances as of last month:

price to peak earnings 5

One way to interpret these results is to focus on the number of episodes linked to each of the three messages. That won’t be our approach.

We prefer to condition the results on two factors, one based on the earnings cycle and the other on the Fed. For the first factor, we look at whether earnings were accelerating upwards from below the prior cycle peak. For the second factor, we separate the Fed’s first eight decades (described according to the old-time philosophy of “taking away the punch bowl when the party gets going”) from the last two decades of Greenspan/Bernanke puts (based on the new philosophy of “refilling the punch bowl”).

price to peak earnings 6

As you might guess from the grid, we’re not convinced that current P/PEs signal a bear market in 2014, despite the facts that:

  1. Five of nine instances (56%) of P/PE breaching 18.5 were closely followed by market peaks.
  2. When earnings are at all-time highs, five of six instances (83%) of P/PE breaching 18.5 were closely followed by market peaks.

Not only do we have to be careful about using price multiples for forecasting (as mentioned in earlier posts), but we currently sit in the grid’s lower right-hand quadrant with the Fed setting new standards for short-term market support. The only other P/PE breach of 18.5 belonging to this quadrant was in the early stages of the Internet bubble.

What’s more, recent earnings and stock performance match up more closely with the Internet bubble episode – as shown in the “Message 3” table – than with the episodes in the “Message 2” table.

So, are we predi
cting four years of soaring stock prices and nonsensical valuations, as in 1996 to 2000?

Not exactly.

The past can offer clues to the future but it doesn’t give us a blueprint. The bigger message is that today’s valuations don’t bode well for long-term returns, where long-term means beyond the next market peak. Prices could surely bubble upwards from here, but bubbles are invariably followed by severe bear markets. (We’ll expand on this outlook in a future post, where we’ll add total return estimates.)

More importantly, we shouldn’t be fooled by traditional valuation measures. P/Es, in particular, have several flaws. We’ve shown in past articles that we get completely different results when we adjust earnings to account for mean reversion. We made a separate adjustment here to correct for the distorting effects of earnings recessions. Either way, our conclusions are a far cry from the “nothing to see here” that we keep hearing from the Fed.


    



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Fed’s Bill Dudley: The Fed Doesn’t Fully Understand How QE Works

Well, it took three years, but finally the Goldman Sachs-based head of the New York Fed, Bill Dudley, admitted what we all knew. From a speech just given by NY Fed’s Bill Dudley at the 2014 AEA meeting in Philadelphia:

We don’t understand fully how large-scale asset purchase programs work to ease financial market conditions

Or, in other words, “we still don’t know how QE works.” It just does (thank you Kevin Henry). And this coming from the people who want their word to become equivalent to gospel in a time when QE is being phased out and replaced with forward guidance. Luckily, at least the Fed knows all about how “forward guidance” works.

The good news: it only took $4+ trillion in Fed “assets” for the central bank to understand it had no idea what it was doing.

In retrospect, things could always have been worse.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/osVlyhkTcRY/story01.htm Tyler Durden