Biden’s Support for Pot Prohibition Belies His Recognition of the Harm It Causes


Even as he pardons thousands of marijuana users, President Joe Biden stubbornly resists legalization.

“We have to hold every drug user accountable,” Sen. Joe Biden declared in 1989, “because if there were no drug users, there would be no appetite for drugs, and there would be no market for them.” The mass pardon for low-level marijuana offenders that the president announced last week suggests how far he has traveled since his years as a gung-ho drug warrior, even as it demonstrates that he remains out of step with the times.

Biden’s decision applies to anyone convicted of simple marijuana possession under the Controlled Substances Act or the District of Columbia Code. He said the pardons will help “thousands of people who were previously convicted of simple possession” and “who may be denied employment, housing or educational opportunities as a result.”

As an act of clemency, the blanket pardon is massive. But in the context of a prohibition that has generated nearly 29 million arrests since 1965, it looks less impressive. Rep. Dave Joyce (R–Ohio), co-chair of the Congressional Cannabis Caucus, notes that “more than 14 million cannabis-related records at the state and local level continue to preclude Americans from stable housing and gainful employment.”

Because simple marijuana possession is rarely prosecuted at the federal level, the vast majority of such cases are beyond the president’s clemency powers. But Biden’s mercy notably did not extend to people convicted of manufacturing or distributing marijuana under federal law, who still languish in prison or carry the lifelong burden of felony records.

The injustice of that situation is especially striking now that most states treat those federal felonies as legitimate business activities. Depending on the jurisdiction, the same conduct that can send someone to federal prison for years, decades, or even life can make someone else a rich and respected entrepreneur.

By himself, Biden does not have the authority to resolve the untenable conflict between state and federal marijuana laws. But despite his avowed transformation from an anti-drug zealot into a criminal justice reformer, he has stubbornly opposed efforts to repeal the federal ban on marijuana.

That position is contrary to the preferences expressed by more than two-thirds of Americans, including four-fifths of Democrats and half of Republicans. The most Biden is willing to offer them is his rhetorical support for decriminalizing cannabis consumption—a policy that was on the cutting edge of marijuana reform in the 1970s.

Fifty years ago, when less than 20 percent of Americans thought pot should be legal, the Nixon-appointed Shafer Commission recommended that “possession of marihuana for personal use no longer be an offense.” President Jimmy Carter endorsed decriminalization in 1977, when he told Congress that “penalties against possession of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than the use of the drug itself.”

Half a century later, Biden has finally come around to that position. “Sending people to jail for possessing marijuana has upended too many lives—for conduct that is legal in many states,” he said on Twitter last week.

The same thing is true of sending people to jail for growing or selling marijuana, of course, although that is a point Biden refuses to acknowledge. The moral logic of his distinction between simple possession and other marijuana offenses is hard to follow.

Back in 1989, when Biden was keen to show that Democrats could be even tougher on drugs than Republicans, he correctly identified the source of the problem he was fighting: Americans who defied the law by choosing to consume intoxicants that Congress had arbitrarily proscribed. Without those individual decisions, he noted, there would be no black market to suppress.

Now Biden says marijuana use should not be treated as a crime. But if so, how can helping people use marijuana justify arresting, prosecuting, and imprisoning anyone?

There is no satisfying answer to that question. And even as he recognizes the grievous harm caused by “our failed approach to marijuana,” Biden has not attempted to supply one.

© Copyright 2020 by Creators Syndicate Inc.

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Adnan Syed’s Exoneration Shows How Hard It Is To Free Innocent People


Adnan Syed outside the Baltimore courthouse

In 2016, Adnan Syed—the man who was convicted in 2000 of murdering his high school classmate Hae Min Lee—was offered a new trial. The podcast Serial had thrown much doubt on the levers pulled, and not pulled, that led to his conviction, including (but not limited to) the prosecution relying on shoddy evidence and his defense attorney failing to represent him adequately.

Syed’s conviction was vacated last month, and today, prosecutors in Maryland dropped the charges. That’s not a result of the new trial, which you would be forgiven for not knowing about, because it never happened.

But the trial-that-wasn’t is still important to this story, as it says a lot about the lengths to which the U.S. criminal legal system goes to protect the integrity of wrongful convictions, despite that being an oxymoron.

A year and a half after Serial forced new life into Syed’s case, a judge with the Baltimore City Circuit Court vacated his conviction—not to be confused with Syed’s vacated conviction this past September—and, in June 2016, ordered a retrial, citing ineffective assistance of his defense counsel. That attorney, who was disbarred a year later, had failed to press the state’s witness about the notorious unreliability of cellphone tower location “evidence.”

In March 2018, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals confirmed that decision. “The criminal justice system places great value on finality, and there are a multitude of procedural hoops, unforgiving deadlines, and burdens of proof for inmates to meet when appealing a sentence,” wrote Reason‘s C.J. Ciaramella after that ruling came down. “Add in recalcitrant district attorney’s offices that often oppose DNA testing and introduction of new evidence that could lead to exonerations, and it’s a small miracle when anyone succeeds.”

The above was perversely prophetic in a way because, like the inmates who fail for the outlined reasons, Syed did not actually succeed. Another wasted year later, after yet another government appeal, Maryland’s highest court revoked that new trial in 2019, acknowledging that Syed’s counsel had not done her job but ruling he was out of luck anyway.

That the legal system can persist in withholding someone’s liberty in the face of viable innocence claims may seem shocking. But it is the rule, not the exception, and Syed’s release is the exception, not the rule.

Case in point: The overturning of Syed’s conviction happened in spite of, not because of, his appeals to his innocence. Quoting a wise painter, it was a happy accident. Doomed to die in prison, he applied for mercy under a Maryland law that permits resentencing consideration after people convicted as minors serve at least two decades behind bars. But as Lara Bazelon notes in New York magazine, the chief of the Sentencing Review Unit for Baltimore City, Becky Feldman, found a lot more in his application than just a potential candidate for early release. In addition to the aforementioned holes in the case, it became clear that the prosecution had pinpointed two other potential suspects—one had threatened to murder Lee prior to her death—and had concealed at least one of those possible perpetrators from the defense, which is illegal.

More frustrating still is the why. Why is the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office declining to retry Syed, as is often the case when convictions are overturned? DNA evidence from Lee’s shoes, which were just recently tested, excluded him. That evidence did not just magically appear 23 years after the murder.

“The Adnan Syed case just goes to show you that there are many, many more [wrongful convictions] underneath,” Bazelon, a professor of law at the University of San Francisco, tells Reason. “The only reason he got out was because of the sheer pressure of the media attention forcing prosecutors to revisit it over and over…. [Most] don’t have any resources, and it’s going to be really, really hard to ever find them, and then if we do find them, it’s almost impossible to get them out because of these crazy procedural obstacles that we stick in their path.”

Syed is indeed not alone. A recent example may be found in Charlie Vaughn, a man who is serving a life sentence for murder and whose case has been meticulously outlined by journalist Radley Balko, as the state continues to prioritize procedure over his claims of innocence. More pertinent still is that today, on the same day that prosecutors dropped the charges against Syed, the Supreme Court will hear a case centered around a man named Rodney Reed. The question before them: Should the state perform DNA testing before it executes Reed for a murder he says he didn’t commit?

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Biden Chips Away at Trump’s Deregulatory Legacy With New Gig Worker Rule


Biden speaking

The Biden administration took yet another swipe at former President Donald Trump’s deregulatory legacy today with the release of a draft regulation that would expand (and complicate) the federal definition of who counts as an employee vs. an independent contractor.

It’s the latest spat in the war being waged in states across the country (most notably/notoriously California) over how to classify Uber drivers, tattoo artists, and opera singers as gig economy arrangements have grown in relation to traditional employment.

Organized labor and liberal lawmakers have tried to lump as many workers into the “employee” bucket as possible in an effort to guarantee more people the overtime pay and benefits that come with that designation. But those efforts have often provoked rebellions from gig workers themselves (and the companies they do business with) who object to the added regulation and rigidity that comes with being an employee.

The draft regulation released by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) today sides with the former group. They propose reinstating a pre-existing, six-factor “totality-of-the-circumstances” test for determining who counts as an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

That test more closely aligns with the expansive definition of an employee put forth by bills like California’s A.B. 5 or the federal PRO Act.

“While independent contractors have an important role in our economy, we have seen in many cases that employers misclassify their employees as independent contractors, particularly among our nation’s most vulnerable workers,” said Secretary of Labor Marty Walsh.

The DOL’s proposal would replace a narrower test issued during the last days of the Trump administration that determined a worker’s employment or contractor status by how much control the worker exercised over his time and his “opportunity for profit or loss.”

In a complicated legal-regulatory back-and-forth, the Biden administration’s efforts to delay that rule were shot down by the courts. The DOL’s regulatory filing today moves to fully rescind and replace that rule.

The new proposed rule is provoking criticism from business interests who argue the narrower Trump administration rule is a better fit for the modern economy.

“The current rules clearly define the difference between employees and independent contractors, providing much-needed legal certainty for employers, employees and independent contractors alike,” said David French (not that one) of the National Retail Federation. “The changes being proposed by the Labor Department will significantly increase costs for businesses across all industries, and further drive already rampant inflation.”

Contractor associations have objected too.

“[We’re] deeply disappointed that the Biden DOL is moving forward with a proposed rule that will disrupt legitimate independent contractors, which are an essential component of the construction industry,” said Ben Brubeck of the Associated Builders and Contractors, a co-plaintiff in the successful lawsuit that stopped the Biden administration revoking the Trump administration regulations. “Rescinding the commonsense 2021 final rule will increase the confusion and litigation chaos.”

Sean Higgins, a labor policy researcher at the free market Competitive Enterprise Institute, says that litigation chaos is unlikely given that the DOL is reinstating federal standards that had been on the books for decades. But the Biden administration’s new standard reduces certainty for businesses and workers about when an employer-employee relationship exists.

The Trump rule “boiled it down to a fairly simple question of just who is in charge around here. That determined whether a worker was a freelancer or not. It put the hands of the power on the worker themselves,” Higgins tells Reason. Returning to the old six-factor test “makes everything more confusing.”

The primary impact of DOL’s rule-making, says Higgins, will be to make it easier to have states pursue A.B. 5–type bills and regulations by reimposing that more expansive federal definition of employee.

The proposed DOL rule will be published in the Federal Register later this week. The public will have until November 28 to submit comments on it.

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Biden Can’t Have It Both Ways on Drone Strikes


Joe Biden and U.S. drone strikes

The U.S. drone strike which killed several Islamic State leaders in Syria on Thursday was, by the Defense Department’s account, a very successful affair. “Initial assessments indicate no civilians were killed or wounded during this operation,” said the press release. “No U.S. forces were injured or killed and there was no loss or damage to U.S. equipment in the execution of this operation.”

Maybe that’s all true, though with the August 2021 drone strike in Afghanistan fresh in mind—the one originally touted as a hit on the Afghan ISIS branch, then later revealed to have killed seven children—it is reasonable to be skeptical. But even if it’s all true, this strike should raise two red flags.

One is that its planning and execution were not subject to the Biden administration’s comparatively strict rules for drone warfare. Intended to reduce civilian casualties, which had increased under the Trump administration’s more reckless approach, these rules were implemented on a temporary basis in early 2021 and helped to dramatically scale down the U.S. drone war across the greater Middle East. The White House formalized that new, more careful procedure just this past Friday with a classified memo to the CIA and the Pentagon.

The policy indicates this administration “intends to launch fewer drone strikes, and commando raids away from recognized war zones than it has in the recent past,” as The New York Times summarized, by requiring “Mr. Biden’s approval before a suspected terrorist is added to a list of those who can be targeted for ‘direct action,’ in a return to a more centralized control of decisions about targeted killing operations that was a hallmark of President Barack Obama’s second term.” 

Insofar as it is an improvement over the methods of the Trump years—admittedly, a low bar to clear on this front—that’s all to the good. But the Biden rules have two major flaws: First, this is a presidential policy memorandum, and not a law; it did not go through Congress. It has, therefore, no binding power beyond the end of the Biden administration. 

If the next president wants to return to a Trump-era approach, he can do so in the blink of an eye. As the next president could well be former President Donald Trump himself, he might want exactly that. A presidential policy memorandum, like an executive order, need not be retained by the next president if he doesn’t want it. However admirable, then, it is a fleeting executive whim, not a reliable, long-term reform.

Second, and more to the point where this Syria strike is concerned, the new rules do not apply in “areas of active hostilities,” a category in which, at present, the Biden administration places Iraq and Syria. In these “conventional war zones,” “commanders in the field will retain greater latitude to order counterterrorism airstrikes or raids without seeking White House approval,” the Times reported, citing an unnamed administration official.

And that brings me to the second red flag: Iraq and Syria are still being treated as active war zones. They’re still classified as areas of active hostilities even though the territorial defeat of ISIS was completed in early 2019. The remnants of the terrorist organization are largely a regional threat, not a direct danger to the United States, and President Joe Biden said he ended the U.S. combat mission in Iraq last December. 

Biden can’t have it both ways: If the combat mission is over, the more cautious drone guidelines should apply. But beyond the details of drone policy in particular, Biden’s continuation of U.S. military intervention in Iraq and Syria is indicted by his own case for a U.S. exit from Afghanistan. 

“We cannot continue the cycle of extending or expanding our military presence … hoping to create ideal conditions for the withdrawal, and expecting a different result,” he argued of Afghanistan in April of 2021. The prudential case Biden made in that speech is, if anything, even truer of our lingering military entanglements in Iraq (where the initial argument for invasion was grounded in falsehood) and Syria (where U.S. intervention was always illicit in that it was never authorized by Congress as the Constitution demands).

The Biden administration deserves credit for reducing the number of U.S. drone strikes and taking new pains to prevent civilian casualties when they do happen. It should likewise be lauded for last year’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and its partial shift of the U.S. role in Yemen’s civil war. Yet we can praise those positive changes to our inhumane and stagnant Middle East policy while still recognizing how much remains to be done. Last week’s drone strike in Syria was a timely reminder of all that hasn’t changed.

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The original meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause

The Indian Commerce Clause will be a major issue in the Nov. 9 Supreme Court argument in Brackeen v. Haaland. The questions presented are:

(1) Whether the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978’s placement preferences — which disfavor non-Indian adoptive families in child-placement proceedings involving an “Indian child” and thereby disadvantage those children — discriminate on the basis of race in violation of the U.S. Constitution; and

(2) whether ICWA’s placement preferences exceed Congress’s Article I authority by invading the arena of child placement — the “virtually exclusive province of the States,” as stated in Sosna v. Iowa — and otherwise commandeering state courts and state agencies to carry out a federal child-placement program.

This post examines one aspect of the second question, namely the original meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause.

The Constitution grants Congress the power: “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Art. I, sect. 8. The originalist works of two scholars have earned the notice of Justices.

The first such article was Robert Natelson’s, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 Denver U.L. Rev. 201 (2007). It was extensively cited in Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 658-65 (2013); and in his dissent from denial of certiorari in Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 2587, 2587-88 (2017).

Responding in part to Natelson’s article is Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1012 (2015). That article is cited in the Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, which was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 142 S.Ct. 2486, 2506-07 (2022).

Natelson responds in The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause: An Update, 23 Federalist Soc. Rev. 209 (2022), and in a separate writing, Cite Checking Professor Ablavsky’s Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause (2022).

Ablavsky is a law professor at Stanford. Natelson, a retired law professor, is my colleague at the Independence Institute. My own scholarship on Indian history and law has not focused on the Indian Commerce Clause, but rather on issues related to my textbooks Colorado Constitutional Law and History and Firearms Law and the Second Amendment. I have worked with Natelson extensively on amicus briefs and scholarship involving the Interstate Commerce Clause.

Surprisingly, Natelson and Ablavsky agree on the original meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause: it covered some but not all topics on Indian affairs, and it did not displace all state government power over Indians. Natelson argues that the clause should be read the same way today. Ablavsky argues that the clause should now be construed to support a grant of plenary power, and he says that such a reading is consistent with a “holistic” original understanding of the structure of federal government Indian powers, as opposed to the modern Court’s “clause bound” approach to constitutional interpretation.

Below, I summarize the scholarship, and add some of my own analysis.

Natelson’s analysis

Natelson’s view is as follows: As the text shows, there is only one “commerce” power. The power “To regulate Commerce” can be applied to three zones of commerce: “with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” The commerce power is the same for all three subjects.

By the common law understanding, the scope of the power to regulate inter-jurisdictional commerce is the Lex Mercatoria (“the Law Merchant”). This is far broader power than simply regulating the exchange of goods and services. According to Natelson, the Lex Mercatoria, and thus the inter-jurisdictional commerce power, includes:

  • the law of bankruptcy
  • regulation and licensing of merchants, brokers (“factors”), and others involved in trade, including requirements of oaths, bonds, and recordkeeping;
  • the regulation of commercial paper—notes, drafts, and the like;
  • price controls;
  • all aspects of ships and navigation,
  • prohibitions on certain forms of trade and of activities associated with trade, including territorial restrictions, both outside and within the legislature’s jurisdiction;
  • regulations of inventory, such as packing and shipping, marking and labeling—and flat prohibitions on inter-jurisdictional trading of certain goods (contraband);
  • financial charges, including but not limited to customs and duties;
  • administration of commercial treaties;
  • marine insurance;
  • incorporation of trading entities;
  • certain criminal measures, such as penalties for piracy and unauthorized mercantile activities; and
  • the appointment of commissioners (agents) to administer the system.

Of course the particular laws that a legislature might choose to enact under the Lex Mercatoria would differ based on the circumstances. Parliament might regulate English trade with France differently from how Parliament regulated English trade with the English colony of Jamaica. Likewise, Congress might regulate trade with the Cherokee differently from trade with Canada. For example, Congress might choose to prohibit alcohol sales to the Cherokee but not to Canadians. The full scope of the inter-jurisdictional commerce power, however, is always the same. (Presuming that no other constitutional provision was relevant; the Second Amendment did not forbid congressional bans on arms sales to hostile Indian nations, but it does forbid a congressional ban on interstate commerce in arms for American citizens.)

Broad as the foreign/Indian/interstate commerce power is, it is not infinite. It pertains only to trade and to the many incidents of trade. Moreover, it pertains only to certain types of trade: namely, with foreign nations, with Indian tribes, or among the several states. Because bankruptcy was part of the Lex Mercatoria, the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to create bankruptcy laws for companies engaged in the three enumerated types of commerce. But the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress power to regulate bankruptcies by firms or individuals engaged in commerce only within a single state. The power to regulate even intrastate bankruptcies is granted by a separate enumerated power, “To establish … uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Art. I, sect. 8.

The Indian Commerce Clause grants a wide variety of powers to regulate commerce, and no other powers. For noncommercial matters, other parts of the Constitution granted other powers over Indian affairs:

  • “To define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations” (art. I, sect. 8);
  • “To declare War . . . and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water” (art. I, sect. 8);
  • “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.” (art. IV, sect. 3).
  • The President’s power “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” (art. II, sect. 2).
  • “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” (art. I, sect. 8).

Some of these original powers have little relevance today. As of 1789, most indigenous people within the boundaries of the United States lived in non-State territories claimed by the United States. Today, most do not, except in U.S. overseas territories, such as American Samoa. Thus, the federal property power is of little relevance.

Title to Indian reservations is held by the relevant tribes. Natelson is skeptical of the claim that Indian Reservations are held in trust by the U.S. government. Although such a claim has been enacted by Congress, no Indian treaty ever recognized tribal reservation land as being held in trust by the U.S. (Natelson, DU, at 207-08). Even if the trust theory were true, most American Indians today do not live on reservations.

The treaty power still exists and it still usable, but has been unused since 1868, in the Hunt Treaty, which provided the Ute Indians in the Colorado Territory with a large reservation. In 1871, a congressional statute provided that future enactments regarding Indian affairs would not be by treaty. 25 U.S.C. sect. 71. The reason was that the U.S. House wanted to have a larger role in Indian relations. Even with the statute, previous treaties remain valid, and Congress has the continuing power to effectuate them by statute, just as with foreign treaties.

Of little relevance today are war powers, since Indian wars ended well over a century ago.

Likewise irrelevant ever since the 1924 is the power to define and punish offenses against “the Law of Nations.” Before the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, some but not all American Indians were U.S. citizens. Today, all are American citizens, so international law powers are not usable against them.

At the same time, the Indian Citizenship Act greatly expanded federal powers over Indians. All the legislative powers that Congress can exercise over American citizens are fully applicable to American Indians.

Historical evidence

Natelson is a strict originalist, so he concentrates on materials up to 1790, when the final holdouts North Carolina (1789) and Rhode Island (1790) chose to ratify the Constitution. As he shows, during the colonial period and the early years of independence (1776-1790), there was continuing debate over what levels of government would have power over different aspects of Indian affairs. Initially, the British government in London claimed plenary power, but that proved unworkable. The Crown instead concentrated on diplomatic relations and left most other issues to the colonies. Similarly, the Continental Congress and the Confederation Congress both wrestled with States over control of Indian affairs. The Philadelphia Convention continued the long-standing policy of divided national/state powers on Indian affairs, although not with the exact same wording as in the Articles of Confederation. During the ratification debates, proponents of the Constitution assured skeptics that States would continue to exercise some, but not all, powers over Indian affairs within state borders.

In sum, the original meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause is a broad power to regulate all commerce with Indians, and nothing else. It was not understood as a plenary power over Indian affairs.

Natelson recognizes that some Supreme Court cases, long after 1790, asserted that the Indian Commerce Clause is grant of plenary powers on Indian affairs. He rejects some these assertions as having no basis in original meaning, and others as, when carefully read, being invocations of the treaty power and not of the Indian Commerce Clause.

Ablavsky’s view

While disagreeing on some points here and there, professor Ablavsky does not dispute the overall accuracy of Natelson’s description of the Indian Commerce Clause as it stood in 1790. He agrees with Natelson that the Indian Commerce Clause was not, originally, understood as a plenary power or as encompassing all Indian affairs.

Instead, he points to a variety of statements by government leaders, most importantly during the George Washington administration, asserting that the federal government has complete power over Indian affairs. He characterizes these statements as being “holistically” based on the sum of all the various Indian powers granted in the Constitution. From this holistic meta-power, Ablavsky writes that President Washington et al. were asserting something like what we today call “field preemption”: the totality of federal regulation of Indians is so comprehensive that there is no area of law in which the States may legislate.

Ablavsky acknowledges that the other constitutional clauses that were foundations of his citations from Washington administration officials about total federal power have crumbled. As noted above, the territories clause applies to few if any Indians within the 50 states, and the Indian treaties power is no longer exercised to create new treaties. In Ablavsky’s view, the Indian Commerce Clause, being the only pillar still standing, should now be interpreted as embodying the plenary, “field preemption,” power that was once asserted during the Washington administration. “As the props that once supported exclusive federal power have been knocked out, only a single slender pillar [the Indian Commerce Clause] remains to support the edifice.”

Natelson argues in this context (and all others) that post-ratification actions or works of early federal governments under the Constitution cannot retroactively change the meaning of constitutional clauses as they were understood at the time of ratification. How much weight, if any, to give to post-ratification material is a topic of continuing debate among persons who are generally supportive of originalism.

Ablavsky bolsters his case for post-ratification history by arguing that the Indian Commerce Clause was not very clear, since the Philadelphia Convention spent little time on it. Natelson does not agree, for his history shows a major record of conflict on Indian affairs between the Continental/Confederation Congresses and the States, especially South Carolina. Most importantly, the Convention turned Madison’s proposal for a general power over Indian “affairs” into a narrower power over Indian “commerce.”

The citecheck of Ablavsky

To me, the greatest weakness of Ablavsky’s thesis is that several of his quotes from the years of the Washington administration are not in fact assertions of plenary federal powers over “Indians.” As detailed in Natelson’s citecheck of the Ablavsky article, full versions of the partial quotes in the Ablavsky article, which Ablvasky characterizes as early “field preemption,” were not necessarily about “Indians” in general. These quotes were about a specific tribe that was in a treaty relationship with the United States; and hose treaties promised the treating tribe that the United States government, and not any state, would be the only American government to exercise power over the American relationship with the tribe.

Ablavsky:

Soon into his presidency, George Washington informed the Governor of Pennsylvania that “the United States . . . possess[es] the only authority of regulating an intercourse with [the Indians], and redressing their grievances.'”

Natelson: The full quote from the letter shows that President Washington was discussing “the Seneca Indians.” The Ablavasky quote omits Washington’s advice that the Seneca’s grievance “should be referred to the Executive of the United States, as possessing the only authority of regulating an intercourse with them, and redressing their grievances.”

President Washington was not purporting to assert power that had been granted to Congress by the Indian Commerce Clause. He was carrying out the Jan. 9, 1789, treaty between the United States and the Six Iroquois Nations, including the Seneca. That treaty required the United States to punish Americans who perpetrated crimes against members of the Six Nations. Therefore, under the treaty, the United States, not the State of Pennsylvania, had responsibility to address the Seneca grievances.

—————–

Ablavsky:

When the Virginia legislature supplied Indians with ammunition, it made sure President Washington knew it had acted from exigency alone, “le[]st in case of silence it might be interpreted into a design of passing the limits of state authority.” 167

167 Virginia House of Delegates, Journal of the House of Delegates, of the Commonwealth of Virginia 7-8.

Natelson: The citation has no date or volume number. Natelson and his intern, Jeremy Sallee, found it at the Founders Online website, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0228. The Virginia legislature communicated to President Washington on Oct. 30, 1789, that the legislature had given ammunition to the Chickasaw because the Chickasaw were in danger of being attacked by the Creeks.

The Chickasaw had signed a 1786 treaty with the United States. It provided that “the United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner as they think proper.”

Thus, the Virginia legislature was writing to explain its unilateral actions, based on necessity, regarding the Chickasaw (not Indians in general). The exclusive powers of the U.S. government were based on a treaty with the Chickasaw, not the Indian Commerce Clause.

—————–

Ablavsky: South Carolina Governor Charles Pinckney wrote a Dec. 14, 1789, letter to President Washington appealing for help against hostile Indians from “the general Government, to whom with great propriety the sole management of India[n] affairs is now committed.”

Natelson: Pinckney was writing about “western territory” Indians, who did not reside in South Carolina. The Territories Clause was the main basis of federal power with Indians who did not reside in a State.

—————–

Other portions of the citecheck raise additional concerns about the Ablavsky article’s accuracy.

Ablavasky:

Moreover, although the Indian Commerce Clause no longer provided that federal authority was “sole” or “exclusive,” as Article IX [of the Articles of Confederation] had, the Constitution eschewed these labels for all of the federal government’s enumerated powers, opting instead for broad federal authority through the Supremacy Clause.

Natelson: Incorrect. The Seat of Government clause gives Congress power “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever.” (art. I, sect. 8). The Constitution gives the House the “sole power of impeachment” and gives the Senate the “sole Power to try impeachments.” (art. I, sect. 2 and 3).

[Note: the Articles of Confederation Indian affairs power was limited by express reservations in the Articles about Indians within State boundaries.]

—————–

Ablavsky:

Early American Imprints—the database Natelson employed [in his DU article]—reports only fourteen instances of “commerce with the Indians,” one instance of “commerce with Indians,” and seven instances of “commerce with the Indian tribes” in all works printed between 1639 and 1800 in what became the United States.

Natelson: The DU article also used the Thomson Gale database Eighteenth Century Collections Online, which has 110 uses of the same phrases. It is more extensive because Early American Imprints omits items that were published in England, which constituted many of the works that circulated in America at the time.

Ablavsky:

Unlike Yates, other Anti-Federalists accepted paramount federal authority over Indian affairs. 128

128 Justice Thomas’s evidence supports this point. Id. at 2570 (citing Brutus, (Letter) X, N.Y. J., Jan. 24, 1788,

Natelson: The Brutus letter says nothing of the sort. It urges that standing armies be forbidden, with certain exceptions, including “garrisons to such posts on the frontiers, as it shall be deemed absolutely necessary to hold, to secure the inhabitants, and facilitate the trade with the Indians.”

—————–

Ablavsky:

Washington’s Secretary of War, Henry Knox, wrote a letter on April 28, 1792, to federal Indian agent Israel Chapin, stating:

“[T]he United States have, under the constitution, the sole regulation of Indian affairs, in all matters whatsoever”…159

159 Letter from Henry Knox to Israel Chapin, Apr. 28, 1792, in 1 American State Papers: Indian Affairs, supra note 81, at 231, 232.

Natelson:

Knox’s instructions to Chapin do not appear at the stated location nor, indeed, anywhere in the volume. We were able to locate a facsimile of the manuscript letter containing the instructions at https://sparc.hamilton.edu/islandora/object/hamLibSparc%3A12353530#page/7/mode/1up. However, the letter does not include the quoted language.

—————–

Ablavsky: Cites an Aug. 31, 1792, letter from Secretary of War Knox, to the Governor of Georgia, “in 1 American State Papers: Indian Affairs, supra note 81, at 258, 259.”

Natelson: “The cited letter does not appear at the stated location, nor anywhere in the volume.”

—————–

Ablavsky: Georgia political leaders “insisted that the Treaty of New York’s guarantee of Creek title to lands within Georgia, as well as federal commissioners’ authority within the state, was unconstitutional” 182. “182. E.g., 2 Annals of Cong. 1793 (1790).”

Natelson: “There is no reference to any such claim on that page…”

—————–

Ablavsky: “Not until the final version of the Trade and Intercourse Act in 1834 did the United States assert criminal jurisdiction over Natives.”

Natelson: But see, e.g., Article VIII of the 1790 Treaty with the Creeks.

Unlike Natelson, I am not a pure originalist, and I don’t have any advice to the Supreme Court about what to do with Brackeen v. Haaland. To the extent that original meaning does matter to the Justices, it does not seem plausible to contend that the original meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to regulate noncommercial matters, such as adoptions, involving Indians.

The post The original meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause appeared first on Reason.com.

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The New Bicameralism and Presentment

The Constitution establishes a very precise process by which laws can be enacted. First, a bill must be approved by one house of Congress. Second, the other house of Congress must approve the bill. Third, the President can sign the bill into law. If the bill is vetoed, Congress can override the veto. This process is known as bicameralism and presentment: two houses must pass the bill, which is then presented to the President for his signature.

This process, regrettably, has become rarer and rare. Virtually all major changes to the law occur outside the confines of the traditional form of bicameralism and presentment. Instead, there is a different three-step process.

First, the executive branch proposes a new legal regime. Maybe there is notice-and-comment rulemaking, or maybe it is bypassed. There is always good cause when the need arises. Or an agency issues some sort of non-binding guidance document that regulated entities treat as binding.

Second, after the policy is promulgated, it is challenged in favorable forums. A district court judge then decides if the rule can go into effect, or not.

Third, if the trial court blocks the rule, the case is presented to the Supreme Court. And pursuant to the major question doctrine, the Justices must determine if this is the sort of rule that Congress would have approved of.

In this regard, there is still a familiar three-step process, involving the executive branch, the lower courts, and the Supreme Court. Congress is involved in an imaginative sense, as one Justice gets to decide what Congress would have intended. If all three boxes are checked, federal laws is changed! Call it a new bicameralism and presentment.

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Gavin Newsom Vetoed California Crypto Regulations—and Invited Even Worse Federal Intervention


Gavin Newsom sitting at a public speaking event

California Gov. Gavin Newsom’s surprise veto of a cryptocurrency regulation bill looks like a boon to consumers and creators alike. Unfortunately, his rationale for rejecting it is antithetical to promoting currency competition: Newsom is rolling out the welcome mat for even more expansive federal regulation, and anyone with a stake in the crypto market should be on guard.

A.B. 2269, sponsored by some of Newsom’s fellow Democrats, soared through the California Assembly with unanimous approval. When the governor blocked it at the end of September, he explained that he felt the bill was “premature”—not because it would compromise the potential of the industry it targets, but because it could impede looming federal regulation.

As written, the bill would already strike a fatal blow to the California crypto market and send devastating shock waves throughout the crypto space. Akin to New York’s famed BitLicense law, it would, as policy group Blockchain Association notes, “effectively outlaw” crypto businesses in California in two ways.

First, the bill would have forced all crypto exchanges—platforms where cryptocurrency tokens can be bought, sold, swapped, sent, or received—to apply for and obtain state-issued licenses in order to operate in California. That would strangle small exchanges and startups unable to navigate a costly and cumbersome waiting game. It would also choke consumers’ access to the latest platforms and apps, which are usually the first to carry the newest tokens. These volatile assets often get scooped up by mainstream exchanges like CoinBase only after they’ve already skyrocketed in value from their launch price.

Cutting smaller platforms’ ability to reach California’s 40 million residents—and blocking those residents from what is often the most lucrative stage of trading—also cuts off creators’ and current traders’ access to 40 million residents’ worth of potential buy-in.

Second, the bill would have banned all businesses not licensed by the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation (DFPI)—essentially, all nonbanks—from dealing in stablecoins.

Among their many purposes, stablecoins can act as a sort of middlemen through which exchanges and developers convert tokens and transfer information. Their value is pegged to stable currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, making them just as stable as their “pegs.” For example, if a crypto business holds U.S. dollar assets on reserve, those tend to come in the form of the stablecoin USDC, the digital U.S. dollar token. Because they don’t require a credit card or a place to store physical currency, stablecoins are more accessible—and, in many parts of the world, more secure—than their “pegs.” For that reason, they’ve become a critical means through which nontraditional financial entities extend access to communities underserved by brick-and-mortar banks.

By outlawing all nonbank stablecoin issuers from trafficking in the state of California, the bill effectively bans nonbank businesses from conducting crypto transactions with California consumers. It would also strike a blow to Californians’ privacy: Under A.B. 2269’s provisions, entities that could afford the cost and confusion of obtaining and maintaining a DFPI license would be required to keep records of all California client activity for five years.

Justifying his veto in a letter to the bill’s supporters, Newsom paid lip service to calls for looser regulation: “A more flexible approach is needed to ensure regulatory oversight can keep up with rapidly evolving technology and use cases,” he wrote. In a rare nod to budgetary restraint, the typically profligate governor added that the bill would demand a hefty loan from the state’s general fund for the first several years of implementation.

So far, so good. But Newsom also declared it “premature to lock a licensing structure in statute without considering…forthcoming federal actions” and promised to collaborate with state policy makers “to achieve the appropriate regulatory clarity once federal regulations come into sharper focus.” In other words, this apparent patience could signal heftier federal legislation down the line.

A patchwork of state regulations would stifle the creative spiral that characterizes the crypto market. But with regulation backed by the full force of the federal government, the damage could be lethal. Behind the jargon and platitudes, Newsom is saying that his veto is a stopgap measure. He isn’t trying to protect crypto from overbearing controls; he’s clearing the way for even harsher controls down the line.

Any new rules of the crypto market should protect entrepreneurs and investors from overzealous oversight, not subject them to it. And Californians should be wary of anyone who rejects a regulation because it isn’t bureaucratic enough.

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The Problem With DeSantis’ ‘Stop WOKE’ Act


desantis

Our institutions have been infected by “the woke mind virus,” Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis (R) told an audience at the National Conservatism conference in Miami this September. “Some of these big corporations are now exercising quasi-public power.”

Is it time to fight fire with fire? To wield government power to stop a dangerous ideology from destroying America’s vital institutions? DeSantis thinks so.

“We’re not just going to sit idly by if you’re trying to circumscribe people’s freedoms,” he said in the same speech. “And that’s true if it’s government. It’s also true if it’s big business.”

DeSantis, a likely presidential candidate and favorite of the conservative movement, seeks to jettison the libertarian idea that the government shouldn’t meddle in the affairs of private business.

Earlier this year, DeSantis and Republicans in the Florida Legislature retaliated against Disney for opposing a state law prohibiting the discussion of sexuality and gender identity in kindergarten through third-grade classrooms. Critics attempted to make the new education law a national issue and dubbed it the “Don’t Say Gay Act,” and DeSantis’ communications team responded by routinely calling the law’s critics “groomers.”

Now DeSantis, who declined our interview request, has signed into law the Individual Rights Act, which he formerly referred to as the Stop WOKE Act.

A U.S. District Court judge struck down part of the law on First Amendment grounds. That portion of the law prohibited private companies from holding any mandatory training that “espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels [employees] to believe” eight concepts, such as that “members of one race, color, sex, or national origin are morally superior to members of another race, color, sex,” and that your inherent characteristics make you “inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive.”

It also banned trainings that promote the idea that these characteristics determine one’s moral status as privileged or oppressed or mean that you bear personal responsibility for past injustices, that concepts like “merit, excellence, hard work, fairness, neutrality, objectivity, and racial colorblindness are racist,” or that trying to be colorblind and treat people without regard to race is wrong.

Banning workplace trainings that tell people that their race or sex makes them morally culpable might sound reasonable to many Americans. A recent Rasmussen poll found just 29 percent of Americans think corporate diversity trainings actually improve race relations.

But opponents say laws banning a broad set of ideas set a dangerous precedent.

The state made the concepts “seem terrible,” says Jerry Edwards, a staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, who is challenging a separate part of the law that applies to universities. He calls the bill a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” because anytime a government bans broad categories of speech, it gives politicians the ability to define the terms of acceptable discourse. This, he says, should be concerning to Americans of all political stripes.

“If you’re a person who’s conservative and you agree with the idea that that affirmative action is wrong, if you give the state the power to say that you can only hold that belief, you also give them the power to say that you can’t hold that belief,” says Edwards. “We can’t allow the state this power to regulate speech.”

The left also craves state power to impose its cultural preferences. Nation writer Jeet Heer recently tweeted that we should use state power “for good,” like expanding the scope of civil rights law and defending the LGBT community. “The only objection to DeSantis,” Jeer wrote, “is that he wants to use state power to push big business to do bad things.”

Of course, from the perspective of DeSantis and his allies, the Individual Rights Act is an expansion of civil rights law meant to force businesses to do what they think is “good” for Americans, in this case by removing identity politics from mandatory workplace trainings.

But the more power politicians have to determine which type of speech is good and, therefore, legal and which type is bad and, therefore, illegal, the more the sphere of acceptable discourse is likely to shrink as both sides of the political spectrum hem in those boundaries to promote their subjective notions of the “common good,” a phrase that’s become a guiding principle of the new brand of national conservatism that’s aiming to both refine and expand upon the populism that former President Donald Trump injected into the GOP.

“The state should not be banning ideas,” says Edwards.

LeRoy Pernell, a law professor at Florida A&M University (FAMU), a historically black college and plaintiff in the ACLU’s case challenging the higher education component of the law, says that this amounts to the state attempting to “control thought.”

“That [kind of control is] reminiscent of societies and governments that we supposedly fought wars against,” says Pernell. 

The part of DeSantis’ law that hasn’t been struck down pertains to universities that receive state funding. It bans college professors at such colleges from promoting any of the eight forbidden concepts.

Pernell is afraid that the law will outlaw discussions of systemic racism, which he says is part of FAMU’s institutional history. The state created the law school in 1949 to accommodate two black law students who applied to the racially segregated University of Florida. In 1966, the state forced it to cease admitting new students until former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush signed a law to reopen it in 2000.

Pernell worries that if instructors were to characterize that history as “systemically racist,” they’d run afoul of the law’s restrictions around teaching the concept.

I do now live with the idea that at any moment, the state can come and take negative action against me because of my thought,” says Pernell.  

Pernell also worries that the law would prohibit him from teaching material from his own book about systemic racism in the U.S. legal system, a book that denies the premise that racial “color blindness” is a useful concept.

“It is impossible to understand criminal procedure and understand the issues that arise in criminal procedure without understanding that the history has not been colorblind,” says Pernell.

But the state has argued that it does have a say over what’s taught at taxpayer-subsidized schools.

“Teaching kids to hate their country and to hate each other is not worth one red cent of taxpayer money,” DeSantis said in March 2021.

Pernell’s response to the criticism of race-conscious instruction is that it’s”just silly” and that “to understand that there are racial differences” is not “a negative thing” because “different races, different communities bring different things to the table.” 

You might disagree with Pernell. Maybe teaching law students to celebrate racial identity and differences isn’t the best use of classroom time. But the relevant policy question is not what goes on in the classroom, the boardroom, or the break room, but who gets to decide?

“Diversity is good for business in many ways,” says Sara Margulis, who co-founded with her husband Honeyfund, a business that administers online cash wedding registries in Clearwater, Florida. They are plaintiffs in the case against Florida and argue that the law restricts their freedom to provide diversity training seminars to their employees.

DeSantis’ office declined our interview requests, but a press representative responded by email that because the concepts covered in mandatory trainings are “forced on employees as a condition of employment,” they are “designed to force individuals to believe something” and “adopt a certain proscribed ideology” and, therefore, “the law is designed to prohibit forced indoctrination in these concepts because doing so is discriminatory” under Florida civil rights law.

But Honeyfund’s attorney Shalani Agarwal of the nonprofit Protect Democracy says the existence of civil rights law implies the opposite: Anyone who feels personally targeted by a diversity training workshop is already protected.

“Our current employment discrimination law that preceded the Stop WOKE Act already covers hostile work environments,” says Agarwal, whose argument was supported by the judge who ruled against the state. When an employee faces persistent, offensive comments related to his or her identity in the workplace, that employee can file a harassment claim under current civil rights law. But Agarwal believes “the Stop WOKE Act creates a whole set of pretty flimsy and vague standards that make it kind of impossible for an employer to figure out how to proceed.” 

In practical terms, the state can’t really banish ideas. It can make people more hesitant to speak openly and honestly through threat of punishment, which might be an effect of the Florida law. But hampering real communication that way makes solving hard problems even harder. And there are a lot of hard problems left to solve.

Some so-called “woke” ideas really are pernicious because reducing every injustice to an identity-based formula flattens nuance, cultivates grievances, and can create tension where none existed before, as borne out by studies that find diversity training quite often makes people more prejudiced. This simplistic and counterproductive approach only further clouds our view of real solutions and real progress.

But is the situation really so dire as portrayed by political operatives like Chris Rufo, who stood beside DeSantis as he introduced the law and who calls critical race theory and similar teachings “neo-Marxism”?

Even some libertarians have come to look at the issue as a high-stakes fight against communism. The Libertarian Party’s official account tweeted that “Soon, parents will be required to help enforce the state’s Marxist, queer theorist, critical race agenda at home. Parents who fail to adequately indoctrinate their kids will have them taken away.”

And when you believe you’re fighting an existential domestic threat, it can justify all sorts of very un-libertarian, authoritarian behavior. The party account defended Joseph McCarthy while approvingly quoting anti-woke academic James Lindsay saying it’s “time to deal with American communists for real.”

Communism was a serious enemy of human prosperity throughout much of the 20th century, and politicians were right to be concerned about Soviet infiltration of the U.S. government. But McCarthy in the Senate and the Committee on Un-American Activities in the House went overboard in their hunts for communist spies, eventually expanding the scope of the search to target actors, writers, poets, musicians, and teachers.

And we’re not even talking about Soviet espionage here, which is what kicked off McCarthy’s crusade. We’re talking about professors teaching what they believe college students need to hear, and employers training their workers in ways they think will help create a more harmonious workplace, virtue signal to customers, and, ultimately, help their bottom line.

We’re talking about a state government regulating the free exchange of ideas. That is a bigger threat to our liberty and to American values than “wokeness” ever will be.

This isn’t the way to “stop woke.” Does that mean opponents have to just roll over and take it? After all, as conservatives will point out, the progressive left has no problem using civil rights law to push its ideas into the workplace and onto the college campus. Why shouldn’t the American right pick up that tool and use it for its own ends?

One reason for caution is that sharpening a legal tool can be fatal once your opponents have the opportunity to turn it against you. Instead, you could be blunting or even dismantling it. If existing laws are part of the problem, limit or repeal the laws. Also, build, improve, and support alternative institutions, ones that reflect your values. Don’t work for or buy from companies that disrespect you or attend colleges that spend a lot of time on issues of little value. They’ll get the message. Some already are.

If you think woke ideas should be stopped, be wary of shortcuts. The long, hard path is the one more likely to bring enduring change: Criticize, resist, and, when need be, opt out.

Produced by Zach Weissmueller; edited by Danielle Thompson; graphics by Thompson. Sound editing by Ian Keyser.

Photos: Douglas R. Clifford/ZUMA Press/Newscom; Daniel A. Varela/TNS/Newscom; Stephen M. Dowell/TNS/Newscom; Michael Brochstein/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom; Paul Weaver/Sipa USA/Newscom; John-Marshall Mantel/Polaris/Newscom; BONNIE CASH/UPI/Newscom; Karla Cot/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom; Stephen Zenner/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom; Paul Hennessy/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom; Image of Sport/Newscom; Joe Burbank/TNS/Newscom; Daniel A. Varela/TNS/Newscom; James Borchuck/ZUMA Press/Newscom; Megan Jelinger/ZUMA Press/Newscom; Stephen Zenner/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom; Circa Images / Glasshouse Images/Newscom; DPST/Newscom; Chris Sweda/TNS/Newscom; University of Florida Archives, CC-BY-SA-2.0, via Wikimedia Commons; Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law; The American Legion Digital Archive; St Petersburg Times/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom; Amy Beth Bennett/TNS/Newscom

Music: “IX” by Angel Salazar via Artlist; “Now You Know” by Angel Salazar via Artlist; “Day Drunk” by Amparo via Artlist; “More to the Story” by Charlie Ryan via Artlist; “Waves and Pulses” by Evert Z via Artlist; “Lost” by Generation Lost via Artlist; “It Was Time We Let Go” by Stanley Gurvich via Artlist; “X” by Angel Salazar via Artlist; “Renewal” by The David Roy Collective via Artlist; “Killing Time” by Stanley Gurvich via Artlist

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Canadian Sex Workers Fight for Full Decriminalization of Prostitution


Jelena Vermilion, executive director of Sex Workers' Action Program (SWAP) Hamilton, speaking about the challenge to Canada's anti-prostitution laws

Canadian sex workers are fighting back against the criminalization of their clients. A coalition of sex workers went before the Ontario Superior Court last week to argue against Canada’s prohibition on paying for sex. The groups are also challenging a suite of anti-prostitution laws, passed in 2014, known as the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA).

The PCEPA was passed after the Canadian Supreme Court in 2013 struck down several laws related to prostitution—something that was legal in Canada but seriously restricted due to laws against activities related to it, like brothel keeping. Judges in the 2013 case—Canada v. Bedford—said these ancillary restrictions violated sex workers’ constitutional rights to liberty and security.

Sex workers in the current case—brought by the Canadian Alliance for Sex Work Law Reform (CASWLR), a coalition of 25 sex worker rights organizations, and several individuals—say the PCEPA is also unconstitutional.

These laws cause “serious and repeated breaches of sex workers’ Charter rights to life, liberty, and security of person, equality, freedom of expression, and freedom of association … without protecting communities or exploited persons,” they argue.

Under the PCEPA, it’s illegal to advertise sexual services, communicate in a public place for the purpose of offering sexual services, or receive a “material benefit” from the purchase of sexual services. It’s also illegal to procure or purchase sexual services generally.

With the PCEPA, Canada adopted what’s known as the “Nordic model” of regulating prostitution, patterned on policies popularized in Sweden, Norway, and Iceland. The Nordic model (which some U.S. campaigners have tried to rebrand as the “end demand” or “equality model”) technically makes it legal to provide paid sex but a crime to pay for sex. Proponents of the Nordic model like to argue that it’s a scheme that’s friendlier to sex workers. But with their customers criminalized, it’s still difficult for sex workers to screen clients, market through traditional means, or otherwise operate in an open way. Essentially, the Nordic model re-creates all the problems of full criminalization but gives anti-prostitution campaigners a progressive veneer.

“Taken individually and together, the PCEPA provisions reproduce harms of the criminal laws struck down in Canada v. Bedford and causes new harms to all sex workers,” said Jenn Clamen, national coordinator of the CASWLR, at a September 29 media briefing. “The harms of these provisions are extensively documented in our evidentiary record, which includes academic and community research on the experiences of Indigenous, Black, racialized, trans, and migrant sex workers across the country, many of whom work in some of the most difficult conditions.”

Under the PCEPA, “clients fear detection by police, which impacts my ability to communicate with them, and make my work riskier,” said Monica Forrester, a sex worker and one of the plaintiffs in the case. “I cannot negotiate prices and services with clients, especially in public spaces, because the police might show up. The fear of police makes me rush and I’m not able to do the screening I need to.”

CASWLR’s case “is the first constitutional challenge to PCEPA provisions initiated by sex workers, and the first to challenge all the provisions individually and together arguing they violate sex workers’ human rights to dignity, health, equality, security, autonomy and safety of people who work in the sex industry, which includes their right to safe working conditions,” the group said in a press release.

Organizations supporting the CASWLR case include Amnesty International Canada, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, the Black Legal Action Centre, the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and The Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund.

Jelena Vermilion, executive director of Sex Workers’ Action Program of Hamilton, told the CBC that her organization had hoped Canadian lawmakers would pass a decriminalization bill but “nobody has had the courage to do so, so sex workers are taking the government to court to fight for their rights.”

Tracy Gregory, founder and executive director of the Sex Workers Advisory Network of Sudbury said that no matter what happens in the Ontario Superior Court, she suspects the case will end up before Canada’s Supreme Court.


Free Minds 

Why China didn’t liberalize. “With populist authoritarianism on the rise around the globe, it’s hard to remember that only a quarter century ago the dominant assumption in American foreign policy circles was that liberal democracy would naturally spread to the rest of the world,” writes Noah Millman at Persuasion. And this assumption applied to China, too.

Starting in 1979, China had already begun to embrace markets and property rights as its route to prosperity. A decade later, the Tiananmen Square protests raised hopes that democracy and political rights might not be far behind. Even after the government brutally crushed those protests, the dominant view amongst American foreign policy experts was that economic development and engagement with the United States would push China in the direction of liberal democracy. And as it became more liberal, the theory went, China would grow into a responsible partner in an American-led global security order.

Those hopes have long since been comprehensively dashed. Under its current leader, Xi Jinping, China has taken a decisive turn away from free markets, and become more repressive and totalitarian in its regulation of private life than it has been in decades. At the same time, China has been vocally opposed to the American-led security order, and is increasingly prepared to challenge it militarily. China now poses the greatest emerging non-domestic threat to both American liberal values and American geopolitical dominance. Such a momentous policy failure demands an accounting. Why did China not evolve as American policymakers had hoped and expected? And what are the implications for the democracy agenda in foreign policy?

More here.


Free Markets 

Rescheduling marijuana could take years. Last week, President Joe Biden said he was directing the relevant folks in his administration to look into rescheduling marijuana, which is currently a Schedule I drug—the most prohibited kind, declared to have no accepted medical use. Building a case for reclassification is hindered, however, by the fact that being a Schedule I drug means people can hardly even study the effects of marijuana. In other words, efforts to revoke its Schedule I status are being hindered by its Schedule I status.

The Washington Post reported on this Catch 22 yesterday, noting that “a final determination over how to classify marijuana could take years. The prospect is sure to ignite a flurry of lobbying and a renewed push in Congress to decriminalize the drug at the federal level.”

Reason‘s Joe Lancaster has more on the situation here. “Even just changing the classification of weed to Schedule II, the same as fentanyl, would at least open it up to medical research, a change advocated by such groups as the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of Physicians. Further, under Schedule II, it could even be prescribed by doctors similar to the way painkillers are now,” he points out.


Quick Hits

• President Joe Biden “spins yarns that often unravel,” notes The New York Times, citing a recent story Biden told about losing much of his house after lightning struck. “In fact, news reports at the time called it little more than ‘a small fire that was contained to the kitchen’ and quoted the local Delaware fire chief as saying ‘the fire was under control in 20 minutes.'”

Reason‘s Robby Soave looks at Paypal’s efforts to police misinformation.

• J.D. Tuccille writes on surviving a nuclear exchange.

• Erik Cantu, the Texas teenager shot by police during a misguided stop in a McDonald’s parking lot, is still on life support.

• “A Black teenager in Mississippi was taken off life support days after Gulfport police shot him in the head outside a discount store, and his relatives are questioning officers’ actions,” reports the Guardian.

• “Politicians exercising control over the political speech of others is a very dangerous recipe,” Christopher Cox, a Republican former and former U.S. representative who co-wrote Section 230, tells The Washington Post in an article about partisan divides in content moderation.

• Walmart is challenging a class action lawsuit against the company drug testing job applicants by arguing that it can only be enforced by the state—New Jersey—that has barred such a practice, not by a private lawsuit.

• “A federal judge held the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in civil contempt and levied sanctions against the agency last week for allowing an incarcerated man to waste away from untreated cancer, as well as for willfully ignoring and misleading the court,” reports Reason‘s C.J. Ciaramella.

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“Face to Face”: Dave Stewart’s, Boris Grebenshchikov’s, Serhii Babkin’s, and Stevie Nicks’s Ukraine War Song

I thought this was very well done: the lyrics work well with the generally understated sound and the intimate visuals. The artists are using the song to raise funds for Ukraine (via the Ukraine government’s United24), at CollaborateForPeace.com, but for reasons that elude me they don’t seem to have an English translation of the lyrics there. With my mother Anne Volokh’s help, I’ve put together the following, though of course I’d be glad to link instead to an authorized translation should one be made available.

Note that Grebenshchikov, who lives in England, has been protesting the war since at least March 2; for his performance of Vertinsky’s anti-war “That Which I Must Say,” regrettably a perennial, see here. Stewart and Grebenshchikov have apparently known each other for over 30 years; Stewart produced a 1989 album of Grebenshchikov’s band Aquarium, which Wikipedia says was “the first contract of a Russian (then, Soviet) rock musician with a Western label.” (Stewart and Nicks also apparently go way back.)

Babkin was the cofounder of 5’Nizza (apparently pronounced as the Russian word “Friday”), a band that was prominent both in Russia and Ukraine; for another of his war-related songs, with an interesting pre-war backstory, see here.

In any event, here are the lyrics:

[Dave Stewart, with vocals by Stevie Nicks, in English]
I’ll say goodbye to you, Mother
I hope one day that I’ll come back home
Father please don’t watch me go
‘Cause I’m old enough to know
I’ll walk along the street I love
The street we played in as friends before
This time it seems the street’s not the same
As we make our way to war

[Boris Grebenshchikov, in Russian]
From January to the first leaves
To stride is like to sing
But the one whose heart is dead pulled the trigger
And instead of Spring came death
The day will arrive, and the war will become a dream
And in the sky the light will return
But it is just where my home once was
It’s no longer there

[Serhii Babkin, in Ukrainian]
Closed eyes bring back the azure of the sky
The quiet is like memory of the soul’s fragile opposition
Finally that morning will arrive
The lives will awaken together in the same moment
And someone will whisper, let’s go home quickly

Hearts soaked to their core fall into the bottomless Dnieper
The memory will be gradually dying, absorbing the warmth of the sun
The outstretched arms of the faces will revive the broken glass
And it will be impossible not to hear this victory cry:

[Chorus, with Stevie Nicks]
Face to face [repeated]

The distance drops its weapons and falls on its back
The world will no longer be how it was before
The water will again retreat and will leave behind just a pile of trifles
And even all the dead will gain new life

The post "Face to Face": Dave Stewart's, Boris Grebenshchikov's, Serhii Babkin's, and Stevie Nicks's Ukraine War Song appeared first on Reason.com.

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