Event Risk: Down But Not Out

The German election is over and the confrontation over the US debt ceiling has ended, so event risk should be minimal, right? Not so fast, UBS’ Mike Schumacher warns – plenty of pitfalls could trip markets. Forward-looking measures of ‘risk’ are beginning to show some signs of less-than-exuberance reflected in all-time-highs across all US equity indices and if previous episodes of ‘low-vol’ are any guide, the current complacency is long in the tooth… no matter how ‘top-heavy’ stocks become; bloated by the flow of heads-bulls-win-tails-bears-lose ambivalence…

As @Not_Jim_Cramer recently pointed out, the VIX decline appears on borrowed time… (we recently noted, suppressing ‘normal’ volatility leads to “problems” down the line)

And credit markets have already begun to show ‘doubts’ in the short-term…

and longer-term…

As event risks remain across the globe…

Via UBS’ Global Investment Research,

One caveat before we go further. We are bond guys, which means that we naturally look for blue skies to become gray. Even so, risks abound.

We begin with Europe, where news flow should continue to accelerate. The Greek debt burden remains a problem. Furthermore, Ireland probably will seek a precautionary credit line. We expect Portugal to get and use an Enhanced Conditions Credit Line. The May 2014 elections for the European Parliament could pose a test for markets. This statement may seem wild, since the Parliament has only a very indirect effect on financial markets. However, the new Parliament may well contain a significant proportion of members who are “eurosceptic”. If this turns out to be the case, further steps in banking union, and toward greater European integration, could become much more difficult. It is also possible that national governments could reflect the same sentiment and become more populist, thereby hindering these processes even more.

In addition, European markets will be looking for the German Constitutional Court’s blessing on the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transaction policy. The Court is likely to rule in favor. However, there are risks around whether it imposes restrictions on executing the program and what form they might take.

Japan has become a major source of volatility. Its latest event risk is the consumption tax increase, which is due to occur in April. This is a “known unknown.” Still, we worry that the economy could be derailed, leaving the Bank of Japan to increase its already stupendous purchases of Japanese government bonds. Yields probably would fall, even though the 10yr rate of about 0.60% already is near an all-time low and has plunged 30bp since June 30. Although this Japan risk is quite troubling, the good news is that an economic slowdown likely will not become evident until at least June.

While Europe and Japan have challenges, we consider the US the biggest source of event risk over the next three months. We are particularly concerned about a “hat trick” of issues in late January / early February:

Fed transition. Assuming that Janet Yellen’s confirmation proceeds smoothly, the transition at the Federal Reserve will occur on February 1. US economist Drew Matus points out that a new Fed Chair typically has to deal with a bout of market volatility early in his/her tenure.

 

Debt ceiling. We hate to mention this horrid topic, but cannot avoid it. The ceiling has been suspended through February 7. The UBS public policy team opines that a “grand bargain” on the US budget is very unlikely, thereby making for acrimony over the debt ceiling. We suspect that virtually everyone reading this publication shares our hope that the discussions proceed more smoothly than they did this month. Nonetheless, we expect the debate to heat up in late January.

 

Fed tapering. Finally, the market should be abuzz over potential Fed tapering. The UBS economics team continues to look for tapering to be announced in January and begin in February. We share this view. The consensus appears to be for tapering to start in March. Regardless, by late January the market should be abuzz with speculation and repositioning around tapering.

How to play it

Our main conclusion from the discussion of risks is that implied volatility should rise over the next three months, particularly on USD assets. Investors who can transact in options have numerous alternatives. Our top choice is to buy vol on a forward basis. For instance, the investor could purchase options that expire in six months and sell two month options on the same underlying asset, such as a USD 10yr interest rate swap. A client who can only go long options should consider buying 4-6 month expiries.

Fixed income investors who do not use options still can gird themselves for rising vol. For example, we recommend avoiding bonds that are callable in three to six months. Furthermore, they should consider selling agency mortgage-backed securities. We have been negative on this sector for several months, and the potential increase in vol gives us one more reason to be skittish.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/kT5QJDOjEHc/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: Yellenomics – Or The Coming Tragedy of Errors

Submitted by Pater Tenebrarum of Acting-Man blog,

Keynesian Paradigm to Be Revived

We have come across a recent article at Bloomberg that discusses the philosophical roots of Janet Yellen's economics voodoo. This seems in many ways even more appalling than the Bernanke paradigm (which in turn is based on Bernanke's erroneous interpretation of what caused the Great Depression, which he obtained in essence from Milton Friedman).

Janet Yellen, so Bloomberg informs us, was a student of the Keynesian James Tobin at Yale, the economist whose main claim to fame these days is that a tax is named after him. Tobin, like other Keynesians, was an apologist for central economic planning, which made him eligible for the central bank-sponsored Nobel Prize in Economics. He was undoubtedly a man after the heart of the ruling class. It is therefore not a big surprise that one of his students gets to run the Federal Reserve, which is one of the main agencies, if not the main agency, by which the rule of money power and central economic planning are perpetuated. It should be noted that the inflationist who runs the central bank of Argentina, Mercedes Marco del Pont, was also trained in Yale. Marcos del Pont once asserted sotto voce in a speech that the enormous ongoing plunge in the purchasing power of the Argentine peso was not a result of her incessant massive money printing. Since she didn't deign to explain what actually causes it then (foreign speculators perhaps? Just guessing here…), it presumably is just a case of 'sh*t happens'. This just as a hint as to what can be expected from economists trained at Yale. 

From the Bloomberg article:

“When James Tobin joined President John F. Kennedy’s administration in 1961, the U.S. economy was struggling to recover from its third recession in seven years. As a member of Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisers, the Yale University professor put his theoretical research on asset markets to work in fashioning a novel strategy — nicknamed Operation Twist — to reduce long-term interest rates.

 

Now, more than half a century later, two of Tobin’s Ph.D. students — Janet Yellen, nominated to be the next chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Koichi Hamada, a special adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe — are applying some of those same concepts in their efforts to boost their respective countries’ economies.

 

Tobin’s work on asset markets with fellow Yale professor William Brainard “is essentially the backbone of quantitative easing,” said Edwin Truman, a former Fed official who taught at the school in New Haven, Connecticut, from 1967 to 1972.

 

The portfolio-balance theory found that policy makers had the ability to affect the prices of individual assets by altering their supply and demand in the financial markets. And that in turn would have an impact on the economy.

 

The research won Tobin the Nobel Prize in economics and formed the justification for the late economist’s strategy to twist the bond market’s yield curve in 1961 by selling shorter-dated securities and buying longer-term ones.”

(emphasis added)

Naturally, the Bloomberg article neglects to mention that Tobin's toxic advice to Kennedy laid the foundation for the later Nixon gold default and the roaring 'stagflation' of the 1970s.

What is not surprising though is that one of the witch doctors advising Shinzo Abe on his hoary inflationist policies also turns out to be a Yalie indoctrinated by Tobin. The only good thing we have to say about this particular circumstance is that it will accelerate the inevitable collapse in Japan, and thus perhaps bring forward the moment in time when unsound debt and malinvestments in Japan are finally liquidated.

Unfortunately it is to be expected that this will involve massive theft from Japan's savers and bring misery and misfortune to millions, as the statists will no doubt try everything to save the present system. The eventual confiscation of the citizenry's wealth is undoubtedly high on their agenda for dealing with 'fiscal emergencies'  (for proof, see the recent proposals by the IMF, which are more than just idle thought experiments. They are the blueprint for what we must expect to happen down the road).

 


 

Tobin

Keynesian economist James Tobin – he looks harmless enough, but was a wolf in sheep's clothing. There is no government intervention in the economy he didn't like or recommend. His work was directly responsible for the catastrophic 'stagflation' of the 1970s.

(Photo via AFP / Author unknown)

 


 

The Economic Illiteracy of the Planners

Bloomberg also  brings us a brief excerpt from a speech Ms. Yellen delivered on occasion of a reunion of the Yale e
conomics department. The excerpt perfectly encapsulates her and the department's philosophy (which is thoroughly Keynesian and downright scary):

“Fed Vice Chairman Yellen laid out what she called the “Yale macroeconomics paradigm” in a speech to a reunion of the economics department in April 1999.

 

“Will capitalist economies operate at full employment in the absence of routine intervention? Certainly not,” said Yellen, then chairman of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers. “Do policy makers have the knowledge and ability to improve macroeconomic outcomes rather than make matters worse? Yes,” although there is “uncertainty with which to contend.”

(emphasis added)

She couldn't be more wrong if she tried. We cannot even call someone like that an 'economist', because the above is in our opinion an example of utter economic illiteracy.

First of all, the premise she proposes is completely mistaken. The unhampered market economy is the only economic system that can guarantee maximum employment. Only in an economy where there is no intervention in prices and wages at all will all those who want to work actually find work. It is precisely because the state intervenes in the economy and fixes wages and prices that perpetual institutional unemployment exists. In other words, she has things exactly the wrong way around. Of course, we may concede that in a complete command economy, unemployment can be made to disappear as well – along with all traces of freedom, human dignity and wealth. There was no unemployment under Stalin, but we doubt that his army of slave laborers such as that he forced into digging the Baltic-White Sea canal was particularly happy.

Of course Ms. Yellen's contention that the class of philosopher kings to which she belongs “has the knowledge and ability to improve macroeconomic outcomes rather than make matters worse”, must be answered with a resounding 'No'!

The historical record of interventionism speaks for itself: it is a history of constant, recurring failure, that quite possibly has thrown back economic and technological progress by decades, perhaps even centuries.

It can not be otherwise; if it were otherwise, then socialism would work, but socialism demonstrably cannot work. The same problem that makes socialism a literal impossibility – the calculation problem identified by Mises in 1920 – applies in variations to all attempts at economic planning. Central banks are a special case of the socialist calculation problem as it pertains to the modern financial and monetary system (see also J.H. De Soto's work on this point). Similar to the planners of a putative socialist economy in which the means of production have been nationalized and where therefore prices for the means of production no longer exist, the interventionists populating central banks cannot 'calculate'.

They cannot gauge the opportunity costs involved in their actions and compare them to the outcomes, as they are not subject to the market test –  the categories of profit and loss have no meaning for them. There is in fact nothing on which such a calculation could be based. It is an absolute certainty that their interventions will result in precisely what Yellen asserts will not happen: they will “make matters worse”. It is simply not possible for a central economic planning agency to 'improve' on a market-derived outcome. The Federal Reserve's handful of board members cannot 'know' what the ideal level of interest rates for the entire market economy is. Only the market itself can determine the state of society-wide time preference, and thereby establish the natural interest rate. The interventions of the central bank are intended to impose an interest rate that deviates from the natural rate, on the absurd theory that a gaggle of bureaucrats 'knows more' than the entire market!

The reality of what they know and don't know is amply demonstrated by the outcomes of their policies: the recurring booms and busts that have consistently damaged the economy structurally, and which have finally led to a situation where the economy found itself actually worse off when the last boom ended than it was on the eve of the boom. This demonstrates a rare gift for destruction, as normally credit booms cannot crimp the progress of capitalist economies completely. With the Fed at the helm, it has however apparently become possible now to actually enter a cycle of economic regression. Not only are we worse off than we would have been otherwise, we are now worse off in absolute terms as well. These people know less than nothing, which is to say, they do possess knowledge, but it is in a sense negative knowledge, due to the destruction it brings.

Here is Ms Yellen at a post 2008 bust hearing – from a report in the NYT that was dug up by Zerohedge a while ago (here is a link to the audio recording):

 

“Ms. Yellen told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2010 that she and other San Francisco Fed officials pressed Washington for new guidance, sharing the problems they were seeing. But Ms. Yellen did not raise those concerns publicly, and she said that she had not explored the San Francisco Fed’s ability to act unilaterally, taking the view that it had to do what Washington said. “For my own part,” Ms. Yellen said, “I did not see and did not appreciate what the risks were with securitization, the credit ratings agencies, the shadow banking system, the S.I.V.’s — I didn’t see any of that coming until it happened.” Her startled interviewers noted that almost none of the officials who testified had offered a similar acknowledgment of
an almost universal failure.”

 

(emphasis added)

Robert Wenzel among others already reported on Ms. Yellen's absolutely dismal forecasting record. The reason why we are bringing this point up is that it has to be contrasted with the picture painted of her in the mainstream press, where she is regularly portrayed as a veritable Cassandra who foresaw the crash taking before anyone else did – but curiously did absolutely nothing about it, in spite of her position as a Fed governor. For another excellent and very detailed deconstruction of the myth that Ms. Yellen ever knew what she was doing, here is a video by Peter Schiff, who has dug into all the evidence (these days it is luckily very easy to fact-check and expose the lies the media want us to believe). Note that although Schiff is obviously philosophically opposed to Ms. Yellen and everything she stands for, his assessment is very fair. Even so, it is utterly damning:

 


 

Peter Schiff on the myth that Ms. Yellen has 'forecast the crisis'. She forecast absolutely nada.

 


 

What To Expect

It will probably be best to prepare the funeral rites for the US economy. The seemingly inexorable lurch toward socialism is going to be taken up another notch with Ms. Yellen's nomination to Fed chair.  From the Bloomberg article we learn that Anglo-Saxon central banking socialism is indeed going global these days – and that Ms. Yellen is one of its foremost proponents:

“Janet was a force — perhaps ‘the’ force — behind the FOMC’s decision to move to an even more accommodative policy last December,” said Laurence Meyer, a former Fed governor who is now a senior managing director at St. Louis-based Macroeconomic Advisers LLC.

 

Hamada, who retired from Yale this year after a 27-year tenure, also has been aggressive in pushing for more monetary stimulus in Japan, going so far as to publicly criticize his former star pupil Masaaki Shirakawa for not doing enough to lift growth when Shirakawa headed the central bank from 2008 to March of this year.

 

That was “a little bit of stepping out of the Japanese character,” said Richard Cooper, who taught Hamada at Yale and is now professor of international economics at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. “It shows the American influence.”

 

The 77-year-old Hamada is one of the architects of the reflationary policies known as Abenomics and played a role in choosing Haruhiko Kuroda to replace Shirakawa as governor of the Bank of Japan. Under Kuroda, the BOJ is buying more than 7 trillion yen ($71.3 billion) in bonds a month in a bid to spur growth in the world’s third largest economy. The central bank today maintained its unprecedented easing and forecast that inflation will reach its target, even as some board members cautioned the price outlook was too optimistic.

 

The BOJ program “is an extension of the Yale Tobin-Brainard approach,” Hamada said in an interview. The Japanese central bank is “enhancing activity in asset markets” to “activate the real, stagnated economy.”

(emphasis added)

That 'American influence' is certainly pernicious and we should perhaps add here that the whole idea that central economic planning and money printing are panaceas for economic ills is at its root actually deeply un-American. The leftist ivory tower economists who propagate it are certainly not representative of the American spirit, which was always oriented toward liberty, including of course economic liberty. These people are the anti-thesis of this spirit, but we can offer some consolation: before all of this is over, central banks will be utterly discredited and be among the most reviled institutions ever.

Bloomberg offers the views of a sole critic (in the interest of 'fairness')– a proponent of the Friedmanite Chicago School. In other words, a school of thought that as recently as in the 1940s was regarded as part of the 'leftist fringe' as Hans-Hermann Hoppe once pointed out, is brought up as the lone spokesman against central planning a la Keynes and Tobin. These views are then curtly brushed off as irrelevant:

“The lessons Yellen and Hamada learned from Tobin back then aren’t producing the intended results today, said Brendan Brown, who attended the University of Chicago in the 1970s and is now executive director of Mitsubishi UFJ Securities in London.

 

Echoing some of Friedman’s skepticism, Brown argues the Fed’s effort to boost bond and stock prices artificially won’t help the economy because investors and companies realize the run-up won’t last and so will hold back on spending.

 

Rather than stepping up capital investment, companies are responding to the rise in stock prices by buying back shares or increasing dividends, he said. Orders for U.S. equipment such as computers and machinery fell 1.1 percent in September, according to the Commerce Department in Washington.

 

“QE is not working,” said Brown, author of “The Global Curse of the Federal Reserve.”

 

Former central bank official Joseph Gagnon takes issue with that assessment. He supports the Fed’s actions and said the economy has been restrained by households paying off debts, the on-again off-again crisis in the euro region and a “massive” fiscal squeeze.”

(emphasis added)

It is not surprising that a 'former central bank official' takes issue with Mr. Brown's entirely correct assertion that 'QE is not working'. We also take issue with it – not only is it 'not working', it is positively destructive. It will leave the economy's capital structure extremely distorted and misaligned with consumer preferences. The bust that will follow in the wake of this huge policy error is going to be one for the history books.

Bloomberg then quotes Gagnon further:

“This is just Operation Twist redone,” said Gagnon, who taught at the University of California’s Haas School of Business in Berkeley in 1990 and 1991 when Yellen was a professor there. “And what we now know is that Operation Twist did work. They just needed to do more.”

(emphasis added)

Really? Is that what we 'know' today? That 'Operation Twist' somehow worked in spite of not working, and that it actually would have worked if only they 'had done more'?  It is emblematic dear readers that the article closes out with the standard Keynesian excuse fore why Keynesian policies never seem to work:

“They haven't done enough of it”

The logic behind this excuse is quite baffling, to say the least. Something that doesn't work will work if only more of it is done? Has not Japan demonstrated conclusively by now that 'doing more' of the same only ends with government finances in tatters and on the brink of crisis?

Anyway, after reading this paean to Yellen and her teacher Tobin (we haven't quoted from the article's extensive praise of Tobin, but it is as uncritical, unreflected and flattering as such portrayals ever get), we conclude that one must fear the worst. If you thought that after Greenspan and Bernanke things couldn't possibly get worse, you are probably in for a surprise.

 


 

AP_janet_yellen_tk_131009_16x9_608

Keynesian central planner Janet Yellen: believes the free market doesn't work and needs utterly clueless people like her to function 'better'.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/slNQatpTg5k/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Ebay Expands Accepted Digital Currencies, Says PayPal May One Day Incorporate BitCoin

First it was China hinting that where Silk Road failed in monetizing, pardon the pun, BitCoin, the world’s most populous nation could soon take the lead. Then, none other than private equity titan Fortress said it had great expectations for the digital currency. Now, it is eBay’s turn to announce that it is preparing to expand the range of digital currencies it accepts, adding that “its payment unit PayPal may one day incorporate BitCoin.” But not just yet. FT reports that according to eBay CEO John Donahoe, “digital currency is going to be a very powerful thing.”

The ecommerce group, which has more than 124m active users, is initially focusing on incorporating reward points from retailers’ loyalty schemes into its PayPal wallet.

 

“We are building the container so any retailer could put their loyalty points into the PayPal wallet,” Mr Donahoe said.

 

“There is a limit to how many cards you will carry, or remembering what points you have or don’t have,” he said. “But in a digital wallet, you can put 50 different loyalty cards.”

 

Mr Donahoe said Ebay was not expanding the PayPal wallet to include Bitcoins, “but we are watching it”.

 

“That same technology could accept other digital currencies,” he said.

While traditional retailers have so far balked at even the vaguest idea of considering allowing BitCoin as a viable payment method, all that would take to start a seismic shift in perception would be one angel idea “investor” to show that it can be done. That someone may well be eBay, which in a radical attempt to curry favor with “fringe” buyers and sellers, could open up its ecommerce platform, which started as an auction side for small traders, but may well become something far bigger.

eBay’s efforts raise the possibility that virtual currencies such as Bitcoin may in time move beyond a niche role in online commerce. Some enthusiasts believe Bitcoin and other currencies that exist outside the traditional banking system represent the future of online payments.

 

The work to expand the PayPal wallet underlines the emergence of virtual payment systems as the latest front in the battle between the global technology giants, including Google and Apple, to increase consumer reliance on their products.

 

Corporate initiatives have sought to drum up interest in digital wallets for use online and on the high street. Companies from mobile and technology groups to banks and retailers are racing to use new mobile wallets to upend the payments business.

 

Most of these efforts have focused on new ways of paying with traditional currencies such as the pound and the dollar, rather than with niche mediums of exchange such as loyalty points or Bitcoin.

 

Bitcoin transactions are conducted through a peer-to-peer network of computers, outside the traditional banking system and largely beyond the control of governments and monetary authorities. The digital currency is accepted by very few retailers at present.

Paradoxically, the more accepted BitCoin becomes in the conventional marketplace, the more subject to various forms of mandatory regulation, supervision and enforcement it, its purchases, and its users will be. So will BitCoin ultimately become a victim of its own success? That remains to be seen, although what we do know is that neither eBay nor anyone else tightly embedded within the monetary fiat framework, is even close to contemplating expanding the Petrodollar cycle to include gold or other precious metals as viable legal (or illegal) tender.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/SGB40zx0LsM/story01.htm Tyler Durden

U.S. Points Out that Only Tyrants Treat Journalists As Terrorists … While Doing the Exact Same Thing

U.S. and U.K. Attack Independent Journalists

The U.S. government is targeting whistleblowers in order to keep its hypocrisy secret … so that it can keep on doing the opposite of what it tells other countries to do.

As part of this effort to suppress information which would reveal the government’s hypocrisy, the American government – like the British government – is treating journalists as terrorists.

Journalism is not only being criminalized in America, but investigative reporting is actually treated like terrorism.

The government admits that journalists could be targeted with counter-terrorism laws (and here). For example, after Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Chris Hedges, journalist Naomi Wolf, Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg and others sued the government to enjoin the NDAA’s allowance of the indefinite detention of Americans – the judge asked the government attorneys 5 times whether journalists like Hedges could be indefinitely detained simply for interviewing and then writing about bad guys. The government refused to promise that journalists like Hedges won’t be thrown in a dungeon for the rest of their lives without any right to talk to a judge

After the government’s spying on the Associated Press made it clear to everyone that the government is trying to put a chill journalism, the senior national-security correspondent for Newsweek tweeted:

Serious idea. Instead of calling it Obama’s war on whistleblowers, let’s just call it what it is: Obama’s war on journalism.

Moreover:

  • The Bush White House worked hard to smear CIA officersbloggers and anyone else who criticized the Iraq war
  • In an effort to protect Bank of America from the threatened Wikileaks expose of the bank’s wrongdoing, the Department of Justice told Bank of America to a hire a specific hardball-playing law firm to assemble a team to take down WikiLeaks (and see this)

And the American government has been instrumental in locking up journalists in America (and here), Yemen and elsewhere for the crime of embarrassing the U.S. government.

It’s Only Tyrannical When Others Do It

The U.S. State Department correctly noted in April:

Some governments are too weak or unwilling to protect journalists and media outlets. Many others exploit or create criminal libel or defamation or blasphemy laws in their favor. They misuse terrorism laws to prosecute and imprison journalists. They pressure media outlets to shut down by causing crippling financial damage. They buy or nationalize media outlets to suppress different viewpoints. They filter or shut down access to the Internet. They detain and harass – and worse.

And the State Department rightly announced last year:

We are deeply concerned about the Ethiopian government’s conviction of a number of journalists and opposition members under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. This practice raises serious questions and concerns about the intent of the law, and about the sanctity of Ethiopians’ constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of the press and freedom of expression.

 

The arrest of journalists has a chilling effect on the media and on the right to freedom of expression. We have made clear in our ongoing human rights dialogue with the Ethiopian government that freedom of expression and freedom of the media are fundamental elements of a democratic society.

 

As Secretary Clinton has said, “When a free media is under attack anywhere, all human rights are under attack everywhere. That is why the United States joins its global partners in calling for the release of all imprisoned journalists in every country across the globe and for the end to intimidation.”

Sounds great … maybe we should start with the U.S. and UK?

The ACLU’s Ben Wizner sums up the American and British governments’ attitude towards journalists:

Relax, everyone. You’re not terrorists unless you try “to i
nfluence a government.” Just type what you’re told.

Bonus:

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/NRRfWERNJQI/story01.htm George Washington

Buying Time In A Brought-Forward World… And Why There Is No Plan B

Here we go again, creating another asset bubble for the third time in a decade and a half, is how Monument Securities' Paul Mylchreest begins his latest must-read Thunder Road report. As Eckhard Tolle once wrote, “the primary cause of unhappiness is never the situation but your thoughts about it," and that seems apt right now. After Lehman, policy makers went “all-in” on bailouts/ZIRP/QE etc. This avoided an “all-out” collapse and bought time in which a self-sustaining recovery could materialise. The Fed’s tapering threat showed that, five years on from Lehman, the recovery was still not self-sustaining. Mylchreest's study of long-wave (Kondratieff) cycles, however, leaves us concerned as to whether it ever will be. More commentators are having doubts; and the problem looming into view is that we might need a new "plan." The (rhetorical) question then is "Have we really got to the point where it's just about more and more QE, corralling more and more flow into the equity market until it becomes (unsustainably) 'top-heavy'?"

 

Policy makers are pushing monetary systems and experimental policies to their limit, so shouldn’t we consider the possibility of correspondingly extreme outcomes in financial markets in due course… cause and effect?

No Plan B?

After Lehman, policy makers went “all-in” on bailouts/ZIRP/QE etc. This avoided an “all-out” collapse and bought time in which a self-sustaining recovery could materialise. The Fed’s tapering threat showed that, five years on from Lehman, the recovery was still not self-sustaining. Our study of long-wave (Kondratieff) cycles, however, leaves us concerned as to whether it ever will be. More commentators are having doubts, e.g. Andrew Law of Caxton in the recent FT interview. The problem looming into view is that we might need a new “plan.”

Does the incoming Fed Chairwoman have a new plan and, more importantly, one which could work? We have our doubts, the default strategy being continued reliance on liquidity-driven asset bubbles, while hoping for the best in terms of traction with the real economy. Our colleague, Andy Ash, commented last week.

“The biggest impact of QE1 was on metals and EM (emerging markets) indicating that the result of QE was predicted to be growth. The three lowest beneficiaries of QE3 have been Gold , Metals and EM, all SIZEABLY NEGATIVE IN RETURNS. So QE3’s effect unlike QE1’s has been nothing to do with global growth. The biggest return on QE3 was/is Western equities.”

If the US is locked into low growth for the foreseeable future, should the S&P 500 be trading on a 12-month forward earnings multiple of 16.2x, slightly higher than the 15.5x long-term average? Let’s not forget that Europe appears to be stuck in an even lower growth scenario and China’s growth rate is moderating. Moreover, corporate margins are close to an all-time high and earnings forecasts are being progressively downgraded.

So higher and higher valuations for more distant, and (arguably) increasingly uncertain, cash flows.

With the temporary deal agreed in Washington, QE looks set to continue running at US$85bn until March 2014, maybe longer. We’ve written about the QE/repo linkage a lot in recent months and it’s our opinion that the collateralisation of excess deposits created by QE has positively impacted equities via shadow banking conduits, e.g. repos.

Even the US Treasury (Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee report for Q2 2013) noted the correlation between weeks when QE exceeded US$5bn and strength in the S&P 500.

Have we really got to the point where it’s just about more and more QE, corralling more and more flow into the equity market until it becomes (unsustainably) “top-heavy”?

Trying to Make Sense of Bubbles

If we are in a centrally-planned bubble (and it feels like it to us), we are reliant on second guessing policymakers, trying to gauge flows (positive for equities right now) and utilising any indicators which seem to be showing good correlations. An example of the latter is the Summation Index. This is a measure of market breadth, being a running total of Advance minus Decline values of the McClellan Oscillator. A pattern of declining peaks had formed since the correction in late-May, but this reversed with the recent upward move.

We are still in the biggest debt crisis in history and the banking sector will remain at the centre of its ebbs and flows. The divergence of the sector’s performance from the broader market pre-empted the Lehman collapse in 2008. In the US, we are keeping a close eye on the breakdown in the BKX.


In such extreme circumstances, we should also keep an idea of “crash patterns” in the back of our minds in case. These often play out as a peak followed by a failure to make a new high and a subsequent break of support. Here are some notable examples.

A final word on equity market indicators. In our reports since May, we’ve been “road-testing” a model for the US equity market (using the DJIA which has a longer history). It is based on cycles, not economic indicators, but cycles in time. It is created from the interaction of 18 cycles in US equities. These vary in length from just under 3 months to more than 30 years. Most of these cycles were discovered by the Foundation for the Study of Cycles (FSC), which has published a vast body of work during the last 70 years. We’d like to make contact with any readers who’ve also looked into this type of work, as trying to incorporate it into our research is very much work in progress.

While in its very early days, the model has been a reasonably good predictor of market direction since the beginning of 2009 (having also picked out most of the market peaks and troughs since 1905). We are slightly alarmed because it’s predicting that the Dow should be rolling over now into the first part of 2014.

Buying time in a brought forward world

Manipulating the Time Horizon

We’ve been reflecting on the idea that using unconventional monetary policies, i.e. QE at the long end of the yield curve, central banks have “bought time” in a profound sense by manipulating the time horizon. This leads to longer-term cas
h flows associated with financial assets being discounted at artificially low rates. It has been crossing our minds as to how much equity investors have really considered this issue, even if (like us) they are believers in equities overcoming bonds in the inflationary endgame (see “Inflationary Deflation” report from December 2012?

Fixed income investors are acutely aware that QE has forced them to extend duration. That comes with the scary knowledge that they might all rush for the exit at the same time. While many financial assets have long duration, equities have very long “duration,” often reflecting theoretical cash flows to infinity. Equity investors typically make detailed estimates for corporate cash flows, e.g. for 7-10 years. Beyond that, cash flows to infinity are capitalised (using long-term growth rate assumptions, ROIC fades, etc) in the form of terminal values…or until analysts predict that the deposit/reservoir will be depleted in the case of mining/energy stocks. QE obviously keeps rates lower than they would otherwise be and increases the value of these capitalised cash flows – especially more distant ones.

When we think about long-term economic cycles, one of (if not) the biggest single driver is the growth in debt (and, problematically, its eventual reduction at the end of the cycle). If we consider the US economy, the huge increase in debt has brought forward consumption over an extended period of several decades. That process has become increasingly “long in the tooth”, so it’s hardly surprising that credit and consumption growth is currently subdued.

When so much consumption has already been “brought forward”, it might seem counter-intuitive that the valuation of distant cash flows is being inflated via PEs above their historic average AND artificially suppressed interest rates. When you also consider that corporate margins are close to a historic peak, the market takes on the appearance of an athlete that is expected to continue performing at peak level almost indefinitely.

Hmmm, as Grant (“Things That Make You Go Hmmm”) Williams might say.

It Should Work Both Ways

In a world of US$85bn per month QE, the corollary of the discussion above should be that the valuation of long duration financial assets should be unusually sensitive on the downside to anything that threatens this current “buying time” and “brought forward” model for long-term financial assets. The obvious candidates are:

  • A rise in interest rates; and/or
  • An event which leads to a significant contraction in the time horizon for investors, such as a sudden deterioration in the macro outlook, or a geo-political shock.

The market turmoil induced by Bernanke and his colleagues with the taper threat (quickly watered down and subsequently canned) seems entirely fitting in this light. The consequence is that the Fed’s ability to taper looks ever more serious with regard to asset prices. This is the two-way version of the “Stockholm syndrome” between the Fed and markets we’ve highlighted before.

Boxed in?

 

Full Thunder Road Report below:

Thunderroad Report Q4.pdf


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/zhBmzd-NAyQ/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: Finland's Gold

Submitted by Alasdair Macleod of GoldMoney.com,

On Wednesday Finland gave in to public pressure and revealed where she stores her gold reserves. The statement followed a press release by the Bank of Sweden on similar lines released on Monday.

The totals (in tonnes) for these two Scandinavian countries are as follows:

Location Sweden Finland
Bank of England 61.4 25.0
Swedish Riksbank 15.1 9.8
New York Fed 13.2 8.8
Swiss National Bank 2.8 3.4
Bank of Finland 2.0
Bank of Canada 33.2
Total 125.7 49.0

So far, so good. But then the Head of Communications for the Bank of Finland added some more information in Finnish in a blog run on the Bank's website. It is not available in English, so I asked her for a translation, but I am still waiting.

Instead, a Finnish reader of my own blog and a Finnish journalist who has been following this topic have independently given me an English translation of a highly relevant and interesting paragraph, three from the end. This is the journalist's:

"Maximum half of the gold has been within investment activity over the years. Gold has been invested among other things in deposits similar to money market deposits and using gold interest rate swaps. Gold investment activity is common for central banks. The risks associated with gold investments are controlled using limits, investment diversification and limitations concerning duration."

And my reader's translation:

"Throughout these years no more than half of the gold has been invested. Gold has been invested in for example deposits similar to money market deposits and gold interest rate swap agreements. Gold investment activities are common for central banks. Risks related to gold investments are controlled with limits, decentralising investments and limits regarding run times."

Half Finland's gold is stored at the Bank of England, and "no more than half" is "invested". If any "investment" is to take place it would be in London. It is not immediately clear what is meant by invested, but presumably this is a result of translation of what has happened from English into Finnish plus explanation for a non-specialist readership. However if it has been invested, then by definition it is no longer in the possession of the Bank of Finland, and will most probably have been sold into the market in return for a promise to redeliver at a later date. This follows the Austrian National Bank's admission to a parliamentary committee a year ago that it had earned EUR300m by leasing its gold through London.

The evidence is mounting that Western central banks through the Bank of England have been feeding monetary gold into the market through leasing operations. Indeed, the Finnish blog says as much: "Gold investment activities are common for central banks".

This explains in part how the voracious appetite for gold by China, India and South-East Asia is being satisfied, without the gold price rising to reflect this demand. It is also consistent with my disclosure earlier this year of the discrepancy of up to 1,300 tonnes between the gold in custody as recorded in the Bank of England's Annual Report, dated 28th February 2013 and the amount recorded on the virtual tour on the Bank's website the following June.

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/mZLuE_Mkckw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: Finland’s Gold

Submitted by Alasdair Macleod of GoldMoney.com,

On Wednesday Finland gave in to public pressure and revealed where she stores her gold reserves. The statement followed a press release by the Bank of Sweden on similar lines released on Monday.

The totals (in tonnes) for these two Scandinavian countries are as follows:

Location Sweden Finland
Bank of England 61.4 25.0
Swedish Riksbank 15.1 9.8
New York Fed 13.2 8.8
Swiss National Bank 2.8 3.4
Bank of Finland 2.0
Bank of Canada 33.2
Total 125.7 49.0

So far, so good. But then the Head of Communications for the Bank of Finland added some more information in Finnish in a blog run on the Bank's website. It is not available in English, so I asked her for a translation, but I am still waiting.

Instead, a Finnish reader of my own blog and a Finnish journalist who has been following this topic have independently given me an English translation of a highly relevant and interesting paragraph, three from the end. This is the journalist's:

"Maximum half of the gold has been within investment activity over the years. Gold has been invested among other things in deposits similar to money market deposits and using gold interest rate swaps. Gold investment activity is common for central banks. The risks associated with gold investments are controlled using limits, investment diversification and limitations concerning duration."

And my reader's translation:

"Throughout these years no more than half of the gold has been invested. Gold has been invested in for example deposits similar to money market deposits and gold interest rate swap agreements. Gold investment activities are common for central banks. Risks related to gold investments are controlled with limits, decentralising investments and limits regarding run times."

Half Finland's gold is stored at the Bank of England, and "no more than half" is "invested". If any "investment" is to take place it would be in London. It is not immediately clear what is meant by invested, but presumably this is a result of translation of what has happened from English into Finnish plus explanation for a non-specialist readership. However if it has been invested, then by definition it is no longer in the possession of the Bank of Finland, and will most probably have been sold into the market in return for a promise to redeliver at a later date. This follows the Austrian National Bank's admission to a parliamentary committee a year ago that it had earned EUR300m by leasing its gold through London.

The evidence is mounting that Western central banks through the Bank of England have been feeding monetary gold into the market through leasing operations. Indeed, the Finnish blog says as much: "Gold investment activities are common for central banks".

This explains in part how the voracious appetite for gold by China, India and South-East Asia is being satisfied, without the gold price rising to reflect this demand. It is also consistent with my disclosure earlier this year of the discrepancy of up to 1,300 tonnes between the gold in custody as recorded in the Bank of England's Annual Report, dated 28th February 2013 and the amount recorded on the virtual tour on the Bank's website the following June.

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/mZLuE_Mkckw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Three Dimensions of the Investment Climate

There are three dimensions to the broader investment climate:  the trajectory of Fed tapering, the ECB’s response to the draining of excess liquidity and threat of deflation, and Chinese reforms to be unveiled at the Third Plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.  

 

There has been increased speculation that the Federal Reserve can begin tapering in December.  The FOMC statement dropped the reference to tighter financial conditions and the manufacturing ISM was stronger than expected, as was September industrial production.  

 

For the same reasons we did not think it very likely in September, we are skeptical of a December tapering.  First, the impact of the government shutdown will distort much of the data in the coming weeks, including the October employment report on November 8 (for which the ADP data was disappointing).   There has been a trend slowing of non-farm payroll growth, illustrated by the fact that the 3-month average is below the 6-month average, which is below the 12-month average.  

 

Second, measured inflation remains low.   The core PCE deflator for September will be released on November 8 as well and may tick up to 1.3%, after reaching two-year lows in July just above 1.1%.  As we have noted before, the core PCE deflator, the Fed’s preferred inflation measure, is lower now than in the early 2000s, when the then-Fed Governor Bernanke recognized the risk of deflation.  

 

Third, when the Fed revised lower its growth forecasts in September, it did not cut sufficiently, especially in light of the government shutdown.   It seems unreasonable to expect the Fed to taper at the same time as it reduces its growth forecasts.  The effectiveness of the Fed’s communication has again been questioned in light of its decision in September not to taper.  

 

Fourth, and while perhaps the least appreciated, it is also among the most compelling reasons for the Fed not to taper in December.  The credibility of the institution is clear better served by maximizing the degrees of freedom for the next Federal Reserve Chair.     Tapering in December would needlessly tie the hands of Bernanke’s successor and any anti-inflation chits to be earned would be wasted on the ongoing Bernanke, who will go down in history for the unorthodox policies adopted upon reaching the zero bound of nominal interest rates.  

 

This is particularly important because the Federal Reserve sits on the cusp of among the largest changes in personnel in the Fed’s history.  Consider there are two vacancies already on the Board of Governors and that is before a successor to Yellen is found, assuming her nomination is approved by the Senate.  Another Governor’s term expires at the end of January.  Another governor may choose to return to the university from which he is on leave.  

 

In addition, in the coming months, another governor may chose to leave, having long served on the Board and amid reports of philosophical (personal?) differences with Yellen.   Lastly, note that the fine print of Dodd-Frank also calls for the Board to have a second vice-chair to oversee the Fed’s regulatory duties.  

 

We think there is a strong possibility that Bernanke steps down early.  While the Senate Banking Committee might be able to vote on Yellen’s nomination later this month or early December, there may be some delay tactics when it comes to the entire Senate vote.  Recall Bernanke’s nomination for a second term by Obama (Bernanke was initially appointed by Bush-the-Lesser) passed the Senate by a 70-30 margin.  Yellen needs 60 votes to over-ride a filibuster than has been threatened.

 

In any event, shortly after Yellen is confirmed, it is reasonable to expect Bernanke to resign.  It serves no one’s interest to have two Federal Reserve Chairs.  That means Yellen is most likely to Chair the late Jan 2014 FOMC meeting that most expect to be Bernanke’s last.  What this implies too, is that our March tapering call does not require Yellen to announce such at her first meeting, but rather, the second she chairs.  

 

II

 

Europe seems poised to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.  It has been a particularly good year for EMU.  After initially blowing it, European officials managed to address the Cypriot crisis and although it retains capital controls, it remains in every other way a member of the monetary union.   The six quarter contraction ended.  Italian and Spanish stocks and bonds have rallied strongly, helping to ease their debt servicing costs and rebuilding investor confidence.     Target 2 imbalances have been reduced and banks have returned nearly 40% of the LTRO borrowings.  

 

Yet the repayment of the LTRO funds has seen the excess liquidity in the system fall.   Excess liquidity has fallen by about 470 bln euros to stand just below 150 bln.   Nearly 380 bln euros of LTRO borrowing has been returned, including what was announced before the weekend.   The remainder of the decline in excess reserves (~90 bln euros) is due to what the ECB calls autonomous factors. Without getting bogged down in the minutia, autonomous factors include items such as bank notes in circulation, government deposits) and the point is that they are not a function of the ECB itself.  

 

At the same time that excess liquidity is falling money supply growth is weak (M3 is up 2.1% year-over-year) and lending to businesses and households continues to shrink.  Many observers were still surprised to learn that EMU CPI fell to 0.7% in Oct from a year ago, drawing nearer the record low of 0.5% in 2009.  

 

With the traditional medicine of devaluation denied by the monetary union, the path of adjustment toward increased competitiveness requires inflation to be lower than Germany’s.  Germany’s ordo-liberalism requires low inflation.  This forces other countries to undershoot Germany’s low target. The surprise to many is that they are doing it.  Using EU harmonized calculations, German CPI stood at 1.3% in October.  Italy’s October CPI was 0.7% and Spain’s was -0.1%.  France’s September reading was 1.0%, while Greece’s was -1.0%.  

 

In order to respond to the tightening of financial conditions in the euro area and the increasing risk of deflation, the ECB needs to do something as bold as the OMT announced in mid-2012. Consider the limitation of its options.  Many observers are talking about a repo rate cut as early as this week. Yet such a move would be ineffective.  In the current environment, the key rate is the deposit rate, which is set at zero.  Overnight rates (EONIA) trade closer to the deposit rate than the repo rate (50 bp).  

 

The ECB says that it is technically prepared to cut the deposit rate below zero, but it is obviously reluctant to do so and for good reason.  No major central bank has done this and the issue is not only intended and unintended consequences but also foreseeable and unforeseeable effects.  It could further harm the fragile financial institutions.  It could unsettle the global capital markets.  

 

Many observers expect the ECB to provide another LTRO later this year or early next year.  We had thought so as well.  However, it has become clearer, and seems only right, that in stress testing banks, those that rely on ECB funds, should be penalized in some fashion.  This means that while the ECB may offer another LTRO, it may not meet widespread demand, and, there may in fact be a stigma attached to its use.   

 

The ECB is continues to sterilize the sovereign bonds purchased under Trichet’
s SMP program.  In theory, the ECB could refrain from doing so and thereby ease liquidity conditions.  Yet this would not doubt raise the hackles of the Bundesbank, which may still be hoping for a Constitutional Court ruling that finds elements of the OMT program to go against the Germany’s Constitution.   Remember, the former Bundesbank President and a German member of the Governing Council both resigned over the SMP program.  

 

Further dilution liberalization of collateral rules is beside the point, though incentives to strengthen the asset-backed securities market, may be a way to cope with the reluctance of banks to lend. If the ECB is going to lean against the deflationary forces and address tightening of monetary conditions, it does not have as many choices as it may appear.  One way to increase excess liquidity is to reduce the required liquidity (reserves).  A refi rate cut in conjunction would send a stronger signal.  While the sooner the better, given that the ECB had foreseen base effects and the decline in energy prices, so the low inflation number may not have been too surprising, December looks like a more likely time frame than this week’s meeting.    

 

It goes without saying, one would have thought, that Draghi will strike a dovish tone at the press conference following this week’s ECB meeting.  The real data has lagged behind the survey data that Draghi had previously pointed to and what had appeared to be improvements in the labor markets have been revised away.  Austerity among the debtors has not been offset by stimulus among the creditors. Although the citation of Germany in the US Treasury report on the foreign exchange market raised some eyebrows, got some chins wagging and keyboards clicking, there can be little doubt of the unspoken agreement throughout much of Europe. 

 

 

 

III 

 

At the end of next week (Nov 9-12), the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party holds its Third Plenary session.  The Third Plenary session has in the past been the platform from which important changes have been announced.  This one is similarly being promoted as having wide-ranging and substantial reforms.  

 

Chinese officials appear to recognize that reforms are needed or risk the middle-income trap, in which a country exhausts it resources in achieving middle income status.  There are three broad areas that reform is likely to be focused on:  improving the functioning of the market (including unified market for land), transform government by reducing red-tape and providing a basic social safety net for Chinese citizens, and fostering new private businesses and more competition.   The key take away point is that it is not a status quo government, but reformist.  

 

To be sure, despite being reform minded, the new Chinese government has shown little interest in addressing the contradiction that goes largely unspoken yet is ever present, between a modernizing and flexible economy and the archaic and rigid political superstructure.  Political reform and competition in that space is most unlikely to be forthcoming from the Third Plenary Session.  

 

The outcome of the session is unlikely to have much immediate impact on the global capital markets. Nevertheless, investors have a vested interest in the strategy of the world’s second largest economy. The rise of China since 1978 stands alongside the fall of a little more than a decade later as the two most important geopolitical events since the end of the World War. 

 

China has taken significant measures toward giving greater market influence over some interest rates.  It has removed the floor for lending rates, re-opened bond futures and introduced a prime rate.  This new prime rate is a weighted average of 9 domestic commercial banks lending rates to their best customers.  This supplements and, perhaps, will eventually supplant the PBOC’s current benchmark (1-year benchmark has been set at 6% since July 2012, last week the prime rate was 5.71%).    Further financial liberalization is expected in the coming months.  There are reports suggesting the Plenary Session may also take up calls for national deposit insurance.  

 

Chinese officials also appear to be preparing people for slower growth.  The emphasis is shifting toward quality of growth, which seems to emerge only as the quantity has slackened, even according to official data.   Although China’s manufacturing PMI improved, forward looking new orders and export orders were softer, keeping the near-term outlook less certain at best.  

 

The yuan has been resilient this year and rising to multi-year highs into late October, it spent last week on the defensive, as the US dollar rallied broadly.  If our constructive technical outlook for the dollar is correct, it suggest further gains against the yuan as well.  The CNY6.12 area may offer a near-term cap.  It denotes not only the Oct high but also the 100-day moving average.   Above there, the CNY6.15 area is also interesting.  It corresponds to a retracement objective of this year’s dollar decline and the 200-day moving average.  


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/75a7z0e5XSI/story01.htm Marc To Market

A "Frothy", "Overbullish", "Overbought", "Overmargined" Market With "Not Enough Bears" – In Charts

Last week, Bank of America warned that “it’s getting frothy, man” based on the sheer surge of fund flows into equities. Here is the same firm with some other observations on what can simply be described as a “frothy”, “overbought”, “overmargined” market with “not enough bears.”

From Bank of America:

“Daily slow stochastic is generating an overbought sell signal.”

“Based on the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Bulls to Bears ratio investors are more bullish now than they were in late May and mid July. In terms of sentiment, this is a contrarian bearish condition. Since April, near-term peaks and troughs in AAII Bull/Bears have coincided w ith near-term market peaks and troughs.”

 

Bears drops to 16.5% = too few bears;  As of October 25, Investors Intelligence (II) % Bears extended deeper into contrarian bearish territory below the 20% level with a reading of 16.5%. This is down from 18.5% the prior week and the lowest level for II % Bears since April 2011 – this suggests too few bears among new sletter writers. II % Sentiment is an equity market risk and confirms the complacent readings for the 5-day put/call ratios.

NYSE margin debt at record high; confirms S&P 500 high; As of September 2013 NYSE margin debt stood at a new record high of $401.2b and exceeded the prior high from April of $384.4b. This confirms the new S&P 500 highs and negates the bearish 2013 set up that was similar to the bearish patterns seen at the prior highs from 2000 and 2007, where a peak in margin debt preceded important S&P 500 peaks.

Risk: Net free credit at $-111b & back at 2000 extremes; Net free credit is f ree credit balances in cash and margin accounts net of the debit balance in margin accounts. At $-111b, this measure of cash to meet margin calls is at an extreme low or negative reading not seen since the February 2000 low of $-129b. The risk is if the market drops and triggers margin calls, investors do not have cash and would be forced to sell stocks to meet the margin calls. This would exacerbate an equity market sell-off.

Then again, do any of these technicals matter? Of course not: only the size of the Fed’s balance sheet does.



    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/cjwzIXcsREs/story01.htm Tyler Durden

A “Frothy”, “Overbullish”, “Overbought”, “Overmargined” Market With “Not Enough Bears” – In Charts

Last week, Bank of America warned that “it’s getting frothy, man” based on the sheer surge of fund flows into equities. Here is the same firm with some other observations on what can simply be described as a “frothy”, “overbought”, “overmargined” market with “not enough bears.”

From Bank of America:

“Daily slow stochastic is generating an overbought sell signal.”

“Based on the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Bulls to Bears ratio investors are more bullish now than they were in late May and mid July. In terms of sentiment, this is a contrarian bearish condition. Since April, near-term peaks and troughs in AAII Bull/Bears have coincided w ith near-term market peaks and troughs.”

 

Bears drops to 16.5% = too few bears;  As of October 25, Investors Intelligence (II) % Bears extended deeper into contrarian bearish territory below the 20% level with a reading of 16.5%. This is down from 18.5% the prior week and the lowest level for II % Bears since April 2011 – this suggests too few bears among new sletter writers. II % Sentiment is an equity market risk and confirms the complacent readings for the 5-day put/call ratios.

NYSE margin debt at record high; confirms S&P 500 high; As of September 2013 NYSE margin debt stood at a new record high of $401.2b and exceeded the prior high from April of $384.4b. This confirms the new S&P 500 highs and negates the bearish 2013 set up that was similar to the bearish patterns seen at the prior highs from 2000 and 2007, where a peak in margin debt preceded important S&P 500 peaks.

Risk: Net free credit at $-111b & back at 2000 extremes; Net free credit is f ree credit balances in cash and margin accounts net of the debit balance in margin accounts. At $-111b, this measure of cash to meet margin calls is at an extreme low or negative reading not seen since the February 2000 low of $-129b. The risk is if the market drops and triggers margin calls, investors do not have cash and would be forced to sell stocks to meet the margin calls. This would exacerbate an equity market sell-off.

Then again, do any of these technicals matter? Of course not: only the size of the Fed’s balance sheet does.



    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/cjwzIXcsREs/story01.htm Tyler Durden