On Wednesday a
Florida jury
found Michael Dunn guilty of first-degree murder for shooting
and killing 17-year-old Jordan Davis after an argument over loud
music at a Jacksonville gas station in 2012. Dunn had already been
convicted on three counts of second-degree attempted murder for
firing at the car in which Davis and three other teenagers were
riding as it pulled out of the station. But the jurors in Dunn’s
first trial could not reach a verdict on the murder charge related
to Davis’ death because some of them
believed Dunn may have reasonably feared for his life during
his argument with Davis. This time around, the jury clearly did not
buy Dunn’s fishy self-defense claim, which hinged on a shotgun that
no one else saw, that he never mentioned to his girlfriend after
the incident, and that police never found.
Still, first-degree murder, which
requires premeditation, seems like a stretch. If Dunn fired in
anger after Davis disrespected him, as the prosecution argued, he
acted in the heat of the moment, with little time for reflection,
and may never have clearly formed an intent to kill. Given the
circumstances, second-degree murder, which requires “an act
imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a depraved mind
without regard for human life,” seems more appropriate. But either
way, Dunn, who already faced at least 60 years on the other
charges, is going to prison for the rest of his life.
One thing that’s clear now that the case has been concluded: The
shooting of Jordan Davis is not, as widely claimed, an example of
how Florida’s “stand your ground” self-defense law lets people get
away with murder. Not only was Dunn convicted, but the absence of a
duty to retreat does not seem to have played a significant role in
either trial. As with George Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon
Martin, the case came down to the same issue that jurors in any
state would confront when someone accused of murder claims he acted
in self-defense: Did the defendant reasonably believe the use of
lethal force was necessary to prevent death or serious injury? If
you believe Dunn invented the shotgun he says Davis had, that is
the end of the inquiry.
New York Times reporter Lizette Alvarez, who
keeps trying to link the Dunn case to special features of
Florida law,
tries again in her story about this week’s verdict:
With Mr. Davis’s death coming only months after the killing of
another unarmed black teenager, Trayvon Martin, his shooting
also brought renewed focus to Florida’s so-called Stand
Your Ground law. The 2005 law makes it easier for people to claim
self-defense if they have a reasonable belief that their lives are
threatened, whether the threat proves real or not. George Zimmerman
was ultimately acquitted of murder in Mr. Martin’s
death.
It is clear why Alvarez brings up the possibility that the use
of lethal force could be justified even if the threat that the
defendant reasonably perceived turns out to have been illusory:
Even if Dunn only imagined that Davis had a shotgun, he still could
have been acquitted (although he wasn’t). The implication is that
such an outrageous outcome is possible only in benighted places
such as Florida, when in fact it could theoretically happen in any
jurisdiction, although persuading a jury that an imagined threat
gave rise to a reasonable fear is a pretty tall order. But at least
Alvarez is not claiming, as the editorial board of her newspaper
did after Zimmerman’s acquittal last year, that Florida is
unusual in recognizing a reasonable fear of death or serious injury
as a justification for the use of lethal force.
Alvarez and her colleagues at the Times are not
alone in comparing Dunn’s case to Zimmerman’s and arguing that both
had something to do with Florida’s excessively broad definition of
self-defense. After the verdict on Wednesday, Jordan Davis’ mother,
Lucia McBath, said, “We’re very grateful that justice has been
served, not only for Jordan, but justice for Trayvon and justice
for all the nameless faces and children and people who will never
have a voice.” McBath may be right that the shooting of Trayvon
Martin was legally unjustified, but the crucial difference between
that case and this one is the evidence of a violent altercation, as
opposed to a mere exchange of words, prior to the shooting. It is
still unclear to me whether Zimmerman reasonably feared for his
life, but his story, unlike Dunn’s, was plausible and supported by
considerable evidence.
To convict Zimmerman, the prosecution had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. It
did not come close to satisfying that standard (which, contrary
to what the folks at the Times might believe, is not
unique to Florida either). Dunn’s case was much easier to win, not
just because of the disappearing shotgun but because he acted like
a guilty man after the shooting, leaving the scene and failing to
call the police. Except for his own self-serving testimony,
there was no evidence that Davis ever physically threatened him,
with or without a weapon.
Although the absence of a duty to retreat does not explain
Zimmerman’s acquittal or the hung jury in
Dunn’s first trial, you could argue that it emboldened both men
to get involved in violent encounters they could easily have
avoided. But that argument is not very plausible either. It is hard
to believe that Zimmerman, when he started following a black
teenager he mistook for a burglar, was thinking about what might
happen if he ended up shooting Martin. And once they were fighting
and rolling around on the ground, the duty to retreat was
irrelevant. In Dunn’s case, where the prosecution argued that he
acted in a fit of anger, it is even less plausible that the details
of Florida’s self-defense law were on his mind. With or without a
duty to retreat, there is no way he could have thought it was OK to
shoot someone for wounding his pride.
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