Use of Flock Cameras Is Not a Fourth Amendment “Search,” District Court Rules

For reasons explained in my draft article, The Fourth Amendment After Chatrie, there is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s June ruling in Chatrie v. United States will trigger a rethinking of how the Fourth Amendment applies to automated license plate reader systems such as those provided by Flock Safety.  There was an oral argument in the Eleventh Circuit on this question on July 29 that you can listen to here, but there has been no ruling yet on that from the Eleventh Circuit.  Last week, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of California became the first court I’m aware of to weigh in on whether the use of Flock cameras is a Fourth Amendment search after Chatrie.

The new ruling, United States v. Riley, concludes that use of Flock cameras was not a search. In the case, police investigating two kidnappings queried the Flock cameras of two California cities, obtaining four photographs each of the whereabouts of the defendant’s car.   According to the court, this was not enough of a privacy invasion to constitute a Fourth Amendment search:

The ALPR database searches used during the Culver City and Carson investigations are thus clearly distinguishable from and less extensive than the “near perfect surveillance” achievable through the historical CSLI at issue in Carpenter and the Google Location History data at issue in Chatrie. The ALPR data in this case could not create “an all-encompassing record” of Defendant’s whereabouts. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 311. And although some of Defendant’s path in the Dodge Charge and Chevrolet Malibu may be inferred, there is no indication in the record that law enforcement could recreate the complete paths that Defendant traveled in those cars, even in combination with information from other sources, such that officers could create a “detailed log of [Defendant’s] movements” from the data at issue here. Id. at 312. Nor did this surveillance provide the “intimate window” into Defendant’s personal life that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter. Id. at 311. That is to say, the ALPR data did not reveal defendants “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” Id. Furthermore, the record does not show that the ALPR data here allows police to “reconstruct ‘retrospective[ly],’ and with no real effort, [Defendant’s] comings and goings in any area. Chatrie, 146 S. Ct. at 2208 (alteration in original) (quoting Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 312).

For these reasons, the record here does not reveal a privacy threat analogous to the issues addressed in Carpenter and Chatrie. And it does not present “dragnet type law enforcement practices” constituting a Fourth Amendment search. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).

This is just a trial court decision, of course, and I assume it will be appealed to the court of appeals.  Other courts are considering the same question, and we don’t know how they will rule.  But given the public interest in the issue, I thought I would flag the new opinion.  As always, stay tuned.

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Montreal Economic Institute Webinar on Legal Challenges to the Trump Tariffs Against Canadian Goods

An American flag breaks with a Canadian flag
Illustration: Midjourney

On Wednesday, September 23, from 12 to 1:30 PM, eastern time, the Montreal Economic Institute will be hosting an online webinar on legal challenges to the Trump tariffs against Canada, entitled “Trump Tariffs: How the American Court System Can Help Restore Free Trade in North America.” I will be one of the speakers, along with Marc Wheat (general counsel of Advancing American Freedom), and Andrew Hale (economic and trade policy expert at AAF).

Additional information and free registration are available here.

We will, I expect, cover various illegal imposed tariffs against Canada, including the Section 301 tariffs (which I wrote about here), and the Section 338 tariffs (see here and here). I will also discuss how best to avoid such harmful and tariff actions in the future.

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A Federal Judge Enjoins DHS From Threatening To Prosecute a Critic for Constitutionally Protected Speech


David Streever next to a video still of ICE investigators visiting his home | Jeffrey Carlson/Crimson Dawn Media/FIRE

On January 26, two days after Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees fatally shot Minneapolis protester Alex Pretti, David Streever sent an angry email to Todd Lyons, then acting director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Streever called Lyons “a monstrous human being,” likened him to the genocidal Nazi official Reinhard Heydrich, and predicted that he would be haunted by “shame at your own pathetic weakness” in defending the Pretti shooting “until your last day on Earth.”

That message was surely intemperate and insulting, but it was not illegal. By contrast, a federal judge ruled on Tuesday, the DHS response—a “WARNING NOTICE” that two ICE investigators delivered to Streever’s home in Rochester, New York, five months later—likely violated the First Amendment by threatening him with retaliation for constitutionally protected speech.

U.S. District Judge Rudolph Contreras issued a preliminary injunction that bars the DHS from taking any action against Streever based on that notice and from “issuing similar warnings” that “suggest he cannot engage in non-threatening criticism of the government.” The order remains in effect while the case, Streever v. Mullin, is pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

“ICE knowingly pursued an American citizen for criticizing his government—speech that is at the heart of the First Amendment,” said Adam Steinbaugh, a senior attorney at the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, which represents Streever in his lawsuit against the DHS. “Ominous letters warning people their speech might land them in prison are meant to coerce people into silence, and that’s not how the First Amendment works.”

Although the government conceded that Streever’s email was protected by the First Amendment, it maintained that the ICE notice was merely an advisory that caused him no real harm. Contreras, a former President Barack Obama appointee, rejected that argument, noting the threatening implications of the document’s language.

YOU MAY BE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW,” said the notice, which ICE investigators Abbi Henry and David Brodie left with Streever’s wife on June 23 because he was traveling in Europe at the time. It cited two statutes, one dealing with threats of violence against federal officials, the other making it a crime to reveal “restricted personal information” about them with the intent to intimidate or incite violence against them.

Streever had not violated either of those laws. But the notice said ICE had “reason to believe” his email to Lyons “may constitute a violation of Title 18 of the United States Code,” which includes more than 1,500 offenses.

The document asked Streever to “promptly remove and/or discontinue the aforementioned behavior.” It added that “receipt of this Notice will be taken into consideration, should you continue to be involved in any criminal activities described above.”

Given the reference to Streever’s email, the ICE “request” is “fairly read as a demand that [he] refrain from criticizing Acting Director Lyons,” Contreras writes. “The notice also warns Mr. Streever of the potential for prosecution….If that were not enough, the letter closes by telling Mr. Streever that ‘[r]eceipt of this Notice will be taken into consideration, should you continue to be involved in any criminal activities described above. The use of ‘continue’ implies that Mr. Streever’s email already exposed him to criminal liability and, critically, that any similar speech by Mr. Streever in the future will be viewed the same way.”

Since “political speech is not a crime,” the notice “is hardly a reminder to follow the law,” as the government maintained, Contreras says. “And because the Warning Notice speaks of ‘discontinu[ing]’ Mr. Streever’s political speech and threatens consequences if he ‘continue[s]’ to speak out, it represents a continuing, rather than a past, injury.”

Streever’s injury is “the loss of his freedom to engage in political speech now because
the threat of such an investigation or prosecution looms over him like the sword of Damocles, and he is forced to self-censor under that threat,” Contreras writes. “The Warning Notice works because Mr. Streever is too intimidated by the threat of future government action that he will not test whether the government will follow through on
its threat.”

ICE has deployed the same tactic against other critics. On the same day that Henry and Brodie visited Streever’s home, his complaint notes, they “confronted a Syracuse resident,” Paigelynne Gonyea, at a polling place where she was working as a volunteer and gave her a warning notice. Gonyea’s purported offense was similar to Streever’s. “The ICE agent who shot and killed Renee Good in broad daylight has been identified as Jonathan Ross by the Minnesota Star Tribune,” she had written on Instagram. “I think today is a great day for Jonathan to be indicted!”

ICE also has tried to unmask anonymous commentators who dared to criticize the agency on social media. The Wall Street Journal reports that ICE “has deployed a round-the-clock digital dragnet” that tracks online speech to identify more targets.

“I’m deeply relieved that the court affirmed what I knew all along: that I am permitted to speak my conscience in the United States of America, including when I criticize government officials,” Streever said. “While I wish this ordeal hadn’t happened, hopefully this incident will serve as a reminder that the First Amendment protects us all.”

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DOJ Says Workers at L.A. Homeless Nonprofits Spent Tax Dollars on Vacations, Nightclubs, Bail


Dollar tent | Illustration: Midjourney

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced Wednesday that it had charged three individuals with defrauding federal funds intended for Los Angeles–area homelessness programs. 

Two of the defendants, Michael Young and Lakiya Malone, were arrested by federal agents at their homes Wednesday morning. Both have been charged with wire fraud. A third defendant, Donye Mitchell, remains at large. 

Young is the founder of the nonprofit Home At Last. The DOJ says that the nonprofit received $118 million in public funds through various contracts with the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA), a city-county body tasked with coordinating and managing a wide range of city, state, and federal homeless grant programs. 

Federal prosecutors allege that Young misappropriated $12 million of those funds for his own personal expenses, including vacations and business ventures like a nightclub he founded in Inglewood. 

Malone, an employee of the nonprofit Special Service for Groups, is accused of accepting $180,000 in bribes and kickbacks from another nonprofit homeless provider, Alexander Soofer, to place homeless clients in programs administered by his charity, including fictitious “ghost clients” who only existed on paper. 

Soofer was arrested in January on fraud charges related to these schemes and has admitted to misappropriating $10 million in public funds for his own use. He’s expected to plead guilty to felony fraud charges in the coming weeks, according to the DOJ. 

Mitchell, who prosecutors said during a press conference this afternoon had not been arrested yet, is accused of misrepresenting his experience as a homeless service provider to obtain public grant funding, which he then spent on personal expenses, including his own bail costs for a domestic violence arrest.  

“The scale and brazenness of these fraudsters expose a profound failure by the State of California and Los Angeles County to safeguard public funds,” said First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California in a statement. 

The charges against Malone, Mitchell, and Young come several months after the Trump administration suspended federal funding to LAHSA, citing the authority’s poor financial management and conflicts of interest with vendors. 

In August, LAist published a detailed report on how LAHSA continued to sign contracts with Soofer’s charities after internal auditors flagged it as “high-risk.” LAist had previously reported that hundreds of apartments rented by the authority to serve as housing for the homeless sat empty. 

LAHSA’s mismanagement has become a focal point in Los Angeles’ mayoral election. Mayor Karen Bass, who appointed herself to the authority’s governing commission in 2023, has been criticized for its failures and for her own absence at LAHSA commission meetings. 

Bass’ opponent, Councilmember Nithya Raman, who until recently chaired the committee overseeing the city’s homelessness spending, has been criticized by Bass allies for slow-walking efforts to redirect city homeless funds from LAHSA to city-controlled programs. 

Los Angeles County has already removed $300 million of its own money from LAHSA to support homeless programs run by its new homelessness department. 

In July, LAHSA reported that homelessness across all of Los Angeles County had risen 1.2 percent

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Biden Pardoned Maduro’s Fixer. He Just Pleaded Guilty to New Charges and Agreed To Forfeit $195 Million.


Alex Saab alongside Venezuelan former dictator Nicolás Maduro. | Jesus Vargas/dpa/picture-alliance/Newscom

A former Venezuelan minister and longtime ally of Nicolás Maduro, Alex Saab, pleaded guilty Tuesday in Miami to conspiring to launder money. Saab admitted to profiting from at least six food and medicine contracts by approximately $195 million in an eight-page factual proffer.

It is the latest turn in a story that reads like a mob movie. U.S. officials called Saab, a Colombian-born businessman, Maduro’s “bag man.” In 2023, after being captured and extradited to the U.S., Saab received a full pardon from then-President Joe Biden amid a prisoner swap with Venezuela. Maduro welcomed him home as a hero and made him acting industry minister. Now Saab has agreed to cooperate with investigators and may even serve as a state witness against his old boss.

Under the plea agreement, Saab accepted a $195 million forfeiture judgment and agreed to disclose and help locate assets. He faces up to 20 years in prison. Prosecutors agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the applicable range and may seek a further reduction if they determine that Saab provided substantial assistance.

Saab returned to U.S. custody after acting dictator Delcy Rodríguez’s regime deported him to the U.S. in May. While the Venezuelan Constitution prohibits extraditing Venezuelan citizens, the regime’s interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, claimed Saab’s Venezuelan identity record was fraudulent or nonexistent—even though Maduro’s regime had issued him a passport, calling him a diplomat.

Before he became indispensable to Maduro, Saab was a little-known textile businessman in his native Barranquilla, a coastal city in Colombia. Former Colombian Sen. Piedad Córdoba, an ally of Hugo Chávez, helped Saab gain access to Venezuela while Maduro was foreign minister, according to investigative journalist Roberto Deniz. Córdoba has denied introducing him to Chávez or Maduro.

In 2011, a Saab company entered a large public housing deal between Colombia and Venezuela despite, according to Deniz, having no construction experience. Saab and his business partner, Álvaro Pulido, received three to four times the homes’ actual construction costs, the U.S. Department of the Treasury later said. As Maduro consolidated power, Saab’s business also expanded from housing into food contracts, and by 2019, a payment system involving Venezuelan oil, gold, and other natural resources.

(PBS documentary A Dangerous Assignment traces Saab’s fortune to a mansion in Barranquilla, private jets, a property on Rome’s Via Condotti, and a Beverly Hills rental for his son Shadi while he pursued acting.)

Saab’s most consequential role involved CLAP, the state food program that Maduro created in 2016 amid shortages and inflation. The regime distributed boxes with groceries at subsidized prices. Most of the time, the boxes arrived late and contained poor-quality or even expired products, as Reason has previously reported. Regime officials also used access to the CLAP program to reward supporters and punish critics.

The journalists at Armando.info, a Venezuelan investigative outlet, were the first to expose Saab’s role in the food contracts. Saab sued Deniz and three editors for defamation in 2017. Facing harassment and possible jail time, they fled Venezuela. Authorities later raided the house of Deniz’s parents.

In 2019, the Treasury alleged that Saab and his associates won overpriced, no-bid CLAP contracts through bribes and kickbacks, then moved the proceeds through shell companies. Saab has now admitted that the conspirators used fake companies, false invoices, and false shipping records. They moved illegal payments through bank accounts in at least nine foreign jurisdictions. Senior Venezuelan authorities approved, participated in, and protected the operation, according to the factual proffer. Saab also admitted arranging millions of dollars in transfers toward $17 million in bribes and kickbacks promised to José Gregorio Vielma Mora, a former Chavista governor. The payments were tied to a 2016 contract for 10 million food boxes.

Authorities in Cabo Verde, an island nation off West Africa, detained Saab at the United States’ request during a fuel stop in June 2020 while he was traveling to Iran. After a 16-month legal fight, Cabo Verde extradited him to Miami in 2021. That prosecution concerned an earlier housing and currency-exchange scheme in which Saab and Pulido were accused of laundering up to $350 million.

Court records later showed that Saab had signed a cooperation agreement with the Drug Enforcement Administration in 2018, met with agents, provided information about Venezuelan corruption, and transferred $12.5 million to an account controlled by the agency. However, he missed a deadline to surrender. After the cooperation became public, Saab’s lawyer David Rivkin said the Venezuelan regime knew about the contacts and that Saab met with U.S. officials to maintain that neither he nor his companies had done anything wrong.

In December 2023, Biden granted Saab the full, conditional pardon. It accompanied Venezuela’s release of 10 Americans, six of whom the State Department considered wrongfully detained, and 20 Venezuelan political prisoners, as well as fugitive defense contractor Leonard Francis.

Maduro received Saab at the presidential palace in Caracas, interviewed him and his wife on his podcast, and made him president of Venezuela’s foreign-investment center in January 2024. Nine months later, he appointed Saab as acting industry minister. After returning to Venezuela, Saab accepted money from earlier CLAP contracts and continued to assist and take directions from Venezuelan officials through February 2026, according to the factual proffer. That political rehabilitation ended with Maduro’s fall.

Court documents describe one participant as “Government Official 1A,” one of Venezuela’s highest-ranking officials. Saab admitted that the official approved and protected the scheme and used a surrogate to receive illegal payments. The document does not identify that person, but with Maduro awaiting trial in New York, prosecutors may ask Saab to testify against his former patron. Saab may also be able to tell them who Government Official 1A was.

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Pentagon Auditors Say the Iran War Has Cost $33 Billion. The Real Price Tag Is Far Higher.


A helicopter comes in for a landing on a U.S. military ship | Photo: United States Department of Defense

Shortly after the United States launched into a war with Iran, White House economic adviser Peter Navarro boldly proclaimed that the conflict would “lower energy prices.”

More than six months later—with the war still raging on and the Trump administration ignoring congressional demands to end it—that’s turned out to be as laughably false as the promise that the whole thing would be wrapped up in a few weeks.

Diesel fuel prices hit record highs this week, a direct consequence of the supply chains that have been disrupted by the war. Earlier this month, Brown University estimated that Americans had already paid more than $100 billion in higher gasoline prices due to the war—and that was before the surging prices that are now hitting after attacks last week on a key Saudi pipeline.

Higher fuel prices are the most direct way that most Americans are feeling the cost of the war, but that’s hardly a full accounting.

Neither is the eye-popping figure reported by the Pentagon’s inspector general this week. In a report released Tuesday, auditors pegged the cost of “Operation Epic Fury” at $33.4 billion, including the $22.3 billion worth of munitions that have been fired off since February 28.

But that tally only covers the first four months of the war—through June 29. It also “does not include costs for infrastructure repairs,” the audit notes.

The war’s impact on infrastructure across the region is becoming more obvious. “Hundreds of buildings and structures” on American military bases have suffered significant damage from months of Iranian drone and missile attacks, the inspector general report concludes.

Civilian infrastructure has taken a pounding too. This week, Amazon said that data centers in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates were damaged beyond repair. And then, of course, there are the crucial oil and energy supply chains—which bring us back to the higher costs on the home front.

According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the war with Iran was responsible for “roughly 40 percent” of the inflation that Americans experienced during the second quarter of this year. Much of that is due to rising gas prices, which affect not only the price you pay at the pump but also add to the cost of shipping just about anything.

The war has also contributed to rising interest rates. The CBO estimates that the war has pushed interest rates up by 0.2 percent, and it expects those rates “to remain higher for several quarters.” The CBO now expects inflation in early 2027 to be about 0.5 percent higher than it previously anticipated.

As if to confirm that assessment, the Federal Reserve voted Wednesday to hike its benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points. In a statement released after the decision, the Federal Reserve Board said the action was taken because “inflation remains elevated.”

All signs point back to the Iran War. It is costing taxpayers billions in direct costs. It is making gasoline and other fuels more expensive, which adds to inflation throughout the economy. It is nudging interest rates higher, making everything from mortgages to credit card payments less affordable. It has led to the deaths of 18 Americans and hundreds, if not thousands, of Iranians.

If the Iran war cost only $33 billion, it would be a travesty. The real price tag is, unfortunately, much higher.

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AI Could Make Our Lives Better. So Why Are We Trying To Stop It?


John Stossel is seen next to a brain that says "AI" | Stossel TV

Cellphones made my life easier. So did the internet.

Artificial intelligence may enrich it even more.

But lots of people are worried.

“Stop AI or we’re all going to die!” shout protesters.

It’s possible that AI will decide that we humans are in the way and imprison us or kill us. Not likely, say AI specialists, but possible.

Anthropic’s CEO just warned that AI is advancing faster than our ability to control it. He and other AI executives say they want to slow it down.

He proposes embedding independent “evaluators” inside his company to assess risks. He also wants international coordination and federal regulation that would slow his competitors’ innovations too.

Has that ever worked? I don’t think so.

“The anti-AI movement makes all the same mistakes as the anti-fossil fuel movement,” says author Alex Epstein in my new video. “They deny the huge benefits of something and totally exaggerate the hazards and ignore all the ways we have of solving them.”

Street protesters worry about cooling water used by data centers that power AI. But data centers account for a fraction of a percent of U.S. water use (0.04 percent in 2024).

Also, they can use recycled water.

Some people worry that data centers’ demand for power will raise electricity prices.

“We can definitely do AI in a way that keeps electricity prices the same,” says Epstein. “But it’s going to require a reversal of the anti-electricity policies that have gotten us in this situation.”

Like closing nuclear plants and forcing use of renewable energy.

“With AI,” says Epstein, “we’ve screwed ourselves unnecessarily. Enact policies that make it easier to build electricity capacity and make it easy for AI to build its own private grids.”

Why not?

“It’s not that there are no concerns,” notes Epstein, “but data centers can be a dream asset to the community that basically just sits in a corner and prints money….People have no idea what they’re thinking about foregoing….A lot of your job that you consider drudgery, like a teacher spending 50 percent of her time grading or a nurse filling out medical forms. Those people can start to delegate that to AI, which makes them better teachers, better nurses.”

AI will also eliminate some jobs. But predictions about technology killing lots of jobs or most jobs have repeatedly been proven wrong.

We were told automation would cause 15 percent unemployment. Automation happened. Now there are more jobs!

Adam Thierer, author of Permissionless Innovation, says, “History shows us that technology has been a friend of humanity and utilized for great good. That will include AI…if we allow it.”

Will we?

Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) wants government to take “50 percent ownership.”

“If the government owns half,” says Thierer, “we’re probably not going to develop very good AI. Government doesn’t have a very good history of creating hot new technologies that serve the public well. I don’t think we want the U.S. Post Office running our internet or communications networks and we don’t want to have Bernie Sanders…controlling our AI robotic systems.”

If American companies do slow AI, innovation won’t just stop.

“If we get this wrong,” says Thierer, “the Chinese are there waiting….They’re spending a lot of money to be the global leader….Their values will come baked into their systems: censorship, surveillance, and control.”

China does say: all AI must adhere to “core socialist values.”

“Whoever wins AI, wins,” says President Donald Trump. He doesn’t want the United States to slow AI innovation. I think he’s right about this.

AI will shape what billions of us understand about the world. We want technologies of freedom to win.

COPYRIGHT 2026 BY JFS PRODUCTIONS INC.

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The Justification for New Time Limits on Student Visas ‘Borders on the Absurd,’ a Federal Judge Says


backpack-wearing students walk pass a courthouse | U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusettes/Gerald Mothes/Dreamstime/Midjourney

A year ago, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed new restrictions on visas for international students and journalists, limiting the former to four years and the latter to 240 days without a discretionary extension. The department portrayed those caps as necessary to combat visa fraud and protect national security. But as thousands of people pointed out during the 32-day public comment period, that rationale did not make much sense, and the downside was obvious: The rule would disrupt press coverage and deter foreign enrollment in U.S. universities, an important source of revenue for those institutions and a major driver of economic growth.

Unfazed by those objections, the DHS finalized its rule in July. Although that might seem like business as usual for a federal bureaucracy, the process that produced the rule was so illogical and heedless that it provoked a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the limits while a lawsuit challenging them is pending. In a scathing decision this week, a federal judge in Massachusetts concluded that the DHS rule qualifies as “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act because the department did not offer a plausible justification, consider alternatives, estimate predictable costs, or meaningfully respond to the points raised by commenters.

“The damage to the higher education system and to the economy of the United States is
likely to be catastrophic,” U.S. District Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV, a former President George W. Bush appointee, writes in response to a lawsuit filed by organizations representing universities, educators, and journalists. “Notwithstanding the scale of the likely harm, the government’s proffered rationales for the rule are exceptionally weak, and the connection between the rule and the problems it purports to address is exceptionally attenuated.”

Although the DHS estimated that complying with the rule would cost about $250 million in the first year, “the real expected costs go far beyond” that figure, Saylor notes. Under prior regulations, foreign students could remain in the United States until they completed their educational programs, including “authorized practical training following completion of studies.” For people earning one or more advanced degrees, that process often takes longer than four years. By ignoring that reality, the DHS rule would undermine the huge scientific and economic benefits generated by international students.

A “flexible and welcoming approach” to foreign students “has allowed U.S. higher education to flourish,” the plaintiffs told Saylor, noting that “education is among the Nation’s top services exports.” That policy, they said, also “has helped power American innovation and productivity, as those students and scholars both perform pathbreaking research while in school and, if they choose to remain in the United States to work after graduation, contribute their talents to leading American companies, or even start their own.”

Major research universities “typically have large percentages of foreign students, particularly at the graduate level,” Saylor notes, citing figures for MIT (40 percent), Harvard (38 percent), Northeastern (57 percent), and Boston University (28 percent). The policy that the DHS wants to revoke “has permitted tens of millions of foreign students and researchers to come to the United States,” he writes. “It has also resulted in groundbreaking research in science, medicine, and technology, substantial economic growth, and a host of other benefits, often on a vast scale.”

U.S.-educated students from other countries, most of whom earn degrees in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM), play an outsized role in the U.S. economy, accounting for a quarter of billion-dollar startups. They also figure disproportionately in patents and Nobel Prizes. From 1990 to 2010, according to a study cited by the plaintiffs, “the increase in US city-level productivity caused by inflows of foreign STEM workers” was “sufficient in magnitude” to explain between 30 percent and 50 percent of “all aggregate productivity growth in the United States.”

The four-year cap favored by the DHS would throw a monkey wrench into this engine of discovery, innovation, progress, and prosperity. It would introduce a new element of uncertainty for students, since they could not be confident that they would have time to complete their degrees. If four years were not enough, they would have to apply for an extension.

“Any decision by DHS to deny a request for an extension is entirely discretionary and unappealable, even within DHS itself,” Saylor notes. “In other words, a DHS official—based on limited and vague criteria, and with no possibility of appeal—will have the power to cut short the academic, research, or teaching activities of any non-U.S. citizen for no reason or any reason.”

An international student “who is one credit short of graduating,” for example, “could be required to leave the United States without a degree and without any recourse,” Saylor writes. “That introduces, at a minimum, a high degree of uncertainty into the educational process, which will have an obvious deterrent effect on student enrollment.”

In a 2025 Institute for Progress survey cited by the plaintiffs, 49 percent of international students said they would not have enrolled under the new DHS policy, while 16 percent of prospective students said they would be less likely to enroll if the DHS began enforcing the rule. “Even conservatively assuming only a 10% reduction in international student enrollment,” the plaintiffs said, “the negative effects on the American economy are likely to reach tens of billions of dollars each year.” According to an estimate by George Mason economist Michael Clemens, they noted, the annual loss from such a reduction could eventually amount to as much as $145 billion.

The government’s response to such warnings was essentially a shrug. Although the DHS questioned calculations based on survey data, it did not offer contrary evidence, let alone produce its own estimate of the new rule’s economic impact.

The DHS “summarily rejected” commenters’ criticism, “dismissing their concerns as merely ‘speculative,’ based on mere ‘predictions,’ or ‘unquantifiable,'” Saylor notes. “In fact, because it asserted that the impact on enrollment was unquantifiable, it effectively concluded that the cost of that impact was zero. And in support of its own position, it offered almost entirely conclusory statements, non sequiturs, and statements of ‘belief’ without supporting reasoning.”

In addition to economic concerns, critics of the rule noted the potential chilling impact of giving DHS officials complete discretion over whether students or journalists can remain in the country after their initial visa periods have expired. “It is not difficult to imagine how that system might be abused to punish those whose viewpoints or research are disfavored by the officials making the decision” or to “punish disfavored institutions,” Saylor says.

Commenters also worried that press visas “could be denied in retaliation for unfavorable reporting, thereby placing government officials in a position to punish journalists for exercising their First Amendment rights.” Saylor agrees that “the possibilities for abuse are rampant.” In particular, he says, there is an “obvious likelihood” that “the visas of foreign journalists who are critical of the government (or, more particularly, DHS officials) will not be renewed.”

The DHS response to that concern, like its take on the economic consequences of its rule, was not exactly reassuring. The department “does not intend for the rule to chill speech, encourage censorship, or result in viewpoint discrimination,” it said, and “does not have data, and cannot draw on any relevant historical precedence, to quantify or monetize the rule’s potential chilling effect.”

Nor did the DHS plausibly project benefits that might outweigh the costs it refused to consider. The national security justification for the four-year cap on student visas “borders on the absurd,” Saylor says. “It is based almost entirely on a small handful of anecdotes, each of which involved incidents that the new rule would do nothing to prevent or even mitigate.”

Three of those incidents “involved Chinese students attempting to photograph military installations or exercises,” Saylor notes. “The other two involved an individual who overstayed his visa and a Russian intelligence operative who entered the U.S.
with [a student] visa obtained with a fraudulent Brazilian identity.”

The government “makes no real effort” to explain how the four-year limit would “eliminate” or “even reduce” such incidents, Saylor says. “Presumably, a foreign student who wishes to photograph military bases could do so during a four-year period—or, indeed, could do so on a six-month B-1 tourist visa.”

The DHS likewise “did not explain how a four-year cap will prevent individuals from obtaining visas by fraud,” Saylor notes. “Similarly, for those who overstay their visas, DHS offered no real explanation as to how the Final Rule will prevent or deter such abuse to any meaningful degree as compared to the current system.” While the government complained that some visa holders had spent “more than 10 years in student status,” he says, “there is nothing inherently suspect in an education and training program that lasts ten years, particularly at the highest levels.”

As for journalists, “DHS makes no real effort even to defend the new rule on its
merits,” Saylor writes. “In fact, it did not offer any national security or fraud-and-abuse evidence, or indeed provide any reasoned explanation, at all.”

The official justification for the rule is so lame, Saylor says, that it suggests an ulterior motive. “The weakness of the connection between the rule and its purported rationales,” he writes, “raises legitimate questions as to whether its real purpose is not to safeguard national security and protect our borders, but to achieve other, undisclosed, goals,” such as “asserting greater government control over academic institutions and the press.”

Saylor emphasizes that he is not passing judgment on the wisdom of the visa limits. But he concludes that the DHS fell far short of meeting the requirements imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act.

“DHS failed to conduct any reasoned calculation of the costs and benefits of the
Final Rule,” Saylor writes. “DHS failed entirely to perform a meaningful consideration of reasonable alternatives.” It “failed to provide meaningful responses to significant comments,” he says, and it “failed to show that there is a rational connection between the Final Rule and its purported objectives.”

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Defamation via Songs and AI-Generated Video? U Tenn Coach’s Claim Can Go Forward

An excerpt from Judge Thomas Varlan’s long opinion today in Ross v. Lambert (E.D. Tenn.):

Plaintiff alleges that he is an accomplished track and field athlete who has held numerous collegiate coaching positions over the past ten years, including Head Coach and Director of Track and Field at the University of Tennessee (“UT”) beginning in 2022…. [I]n May 2023, plaintiff advised defendant [an employee of the program] that he was being terminated from his position at UT. Plaintiff claims that he gave defendant the option to voluntarily resign in lieu of being fired for cause, which defendant accepted.

Defendant subsequently filed an EEOC complaint against plaintiff and UT, plaintiff asserts, but this case was closed without a finding of probable cause against either plaintiff or UT. Then, on or about May 30, 2024, defendant sent a demand letter to UT’s Office of General Counsel, threatening to sue UT and plaintiff for “wrongful termination and discrimination” if he did not receive a $150,000 payment from UT.

Plaintiff alleges that, within the demand letter, defendant made a series of “patently false and inflammatory allegations” against plaintiff, which included statements claiming that plaintiff and plaintiff’s son were involved in “doping.” Defendant also warned in his demand letter that he would go to the media if UT did not settle. In response, UT rejected defendant’s demand, citing to his “baseless” and “highly offensive” attack on plaintiff’s reputation, and advised defendant that it was unwilling to engage further with defendant on the matter.

Defendant never filed a lawsuit, plaintiff submits. Instead, plaintiff claims that defendant initiated a “vindicative and wide-ranging campaign that spread untruthful and malicious information” about plaintiff and portrayed plaintiff “in a highly offensive and negative light throughout the track and field community.” In more detail, plaintiff alleges that on or about March 3, 2025, defendant, using a pseudonym, released two songs on Apple Music and Spotify, both of which contain defamatory lyrics impugning plaintiff’s character. Specifically, plaintiff claims that these songs contain allegations of drug use on the part of plaintiff, describes plaintiff as untrustworthy and of low character, and warns parents to not entrust their children to plaintiff. Around the same time, defendant published his songs to a public Facebook group, believed to include track and field recruits and their families…. [P]laintiff asserts that defendant [later] released … additional songs on Apple Music and Spotify….

Between December 12 and 25, 2025, defendant purportedly posted more than 20 videos on Instagram and Facebook attacking plaintiff’s character with “blatantly false allegations of wrongdoing” and “highly offensive and demeaning fake [AI] videos.” For example, plaintiff claims that defendant created a fake, sexually suggestive video depicting plaintiff with Sean “Diddy” Combs. Similarly, defendant allegedly posted another fake, AI-generated video depicting plaintiff in prison with Combs and Sherrone Moore, a disgraced former university football coach. In one of these videos, plaintiff asserts that defendant made it clear that he was intentionally targeting plaintiff by referring to plaintiff by name. In another video, defendant allegedly gloated that “his ongoing propaganda and online ‘content’ [was] negatively affecting” plaintiff’s ability to attract track and field recruits to UT.

On January 2, 2026, defendant purportedly posed another AI-generated video in which he bragged about mentally torturing and abusing plaintiff for months. A few days later, defendant posted another fake interview on Instagram and Facebook in which he again accused plaintiff of infidelity and impregnating his former assistant coach….

The court largely allowed plaintiff’s claim to go forward, including with regard to the songs; you can read the opinion for more details, but here’s an excerpt of the court’s analysis:

[T]he Court recognizes and considers the context in which defendant made his allegedly defamatory statements—through song. See Kersey v. Wilson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“We must also note that a poem is a work of imagination which allows the minds of both poets and readers to venture into areas that lie beyond the realm of verifiable facts.”). However, defendant’s suggestion that his songs should be regarded as a “matter of opinion” is, to some extent, quelled by his promotional post to a public Facebook group titled “The Real Deal Track & Field Group.” In this post, defendant claims that his songs “ain’t just music” but are rather “statement[s]” that combine “lyrical warfare with real track & field knowledge.” Defendant goes on to write that, through his songs, he “exposed the cracks, the deception, and the shady recruiting moves happening in the game.” He also poses the question in his post, “What happens when the truth gets exposed?” …

[D]efendant’s lyrics suggest that plaintiff has utilized performance-enhancing drugs to achieve his “legacy” rather through means of hard work [See Doc. 44 (“Claims you built your legacies on blood and sweat / But it[‘]s P.E.D. dreams”)]. Again, such an accusation could hold plaintiff up to “hatred, contempt, and ridicule” [and may thus be defamatory -EV] Furthermore, the Court concludes that several of defendant’s lyrics, while perhaps opinion, are nonetheless “actionable as defamatory” because they can “reasonably be understood to imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts justifying the opinion.” Specifically, stating that plaintiff took “shortcuts” in coaching and abandoned “every rule” can lead to the conclusion that plaintiff is a cheat who flouts the rules of collegiate sports….

And the court adds this about the AI-generated videos, “which plaintiff claims attack his character with ‘blatantly false allegations of wrongdoing’ or are generally offensive and demeaning”:

These videos include depictions of plaintiff with “Diddy” and Sherrone Moore, a disgraced former university football coach, in suggestive contexts. Unsurprisingly given the nascent nature of AI, the Court cannot find, nor do the parties identify, any case law on defamation in relation to AI content, and specifically, videos which are AI-generated. As noted previously, an alleged defamatory statement must be “judged within the context it is made” and “should be read as a person of ordinary intelligence would understand [it] in light of the surrounding circumstances.”

In attempting to evaluate defamatory statements in accordance with these principles, AI content leads the Court into uncharted territory. Considering this, the Court finds it most appropriate to allow plaintiff’s defamation claim as to these AI-generated videos to continue on at this stage of the litigation to allow further record development….

In July, Magistrate Judge Jill McCook declined to issue a preliminary injunction against defendant, concluding that it would be a prior restraint; that question remains pending before the District Judge. Here, the District Judge just held that the case as a whole can go forward, without deciding the preliminary injunction question.

Ryan McMillan, Gregory F. Coleman, and S. Jarret Raab (Coleman Law, PLLC) represent plaintiff.

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Firing of Employee for Kirk-Murder-Related Post Wasn’t a Clear First Amendment Violation,

An excerpt from Judge Benjamin Settle’s longish opinion Monday in Bromm v. Lewis County (W.D. Wash.):

Plaintiff Paul Bromm was employed as a part-time Deputy Coroner with Lewis County. After conservative activist and media personality Charlie Kirk was shot in September 2025, Bromm shared memes and made other posts on his Facebook that appeared to make light of the killing, even suggesting it was deserved.

Bromm was placed on administrative leave and then terminated for his posts. Bromm sued Lewis County, the City of Centralia, and five individual defendants, asserting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims premised on alleged violations of his First Amendment right to free speech, and that defendant [County] Commissioner Sean Swope “doxed” him in violation of RCW 4.24.792.

The court dismissed Bromm’s First Amendment claim against the individual defendants, finding that it was barred by prosecutorial immunity (as to a prosecutor) and qualified immunity (as to the others). The government defendants didn’t move for summary judgment. Here’s the underlying post, followed by the meat of the qualified immunity analysis:

When dealing with first amendment retaliation in public employment claims, the question is not whether the right to be free from first amendment retaliation in public employment is clearly established, but “whether the outcome of the Pickering balance so clearly favored [the plaintiff] that it would have been patently unreasonable for the [officials] to conclude that the First Amendment did not protect their speech.” The Ninth Circuit has noted that “the law regarding [claims implicating Pickering] will rarely, if ever, be sufficiently ‘clearly established’ to preclude qualified immunity.” Bromm’s case is not the exception.

Under the Pickering test, the court first considers whether the employee spoke on a matter of public concern. If so, the court considers whether the government’s interest in promoting the efficient provision of public services outweighs the First Amendment value of the speech in question. The second prong is context-specific, and factors in the nature of the employee’s role, where and when their speech occurred, the nature of the agency’s mission and services, and whether any disruption has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. On the other side, the Court should consider the relative First Amendment value of the speech—for example, does the speech substantially involve matters of public concern, or is it more akin to an employee grievance? Is it commentary on a matter within the scope of the employee’s work-related expertise, entitling it to great weight? Or is it expressed in a derogatory manner, entitling it to less weight? …

[In] Rankin v. McPherson (1987)[, a]fter the attempted assassination of President Reagan in 1981, Arda McPherson, a clerical employee working for the constable’s office in Harris County, Texas, remarked to her coworker, “if they go for him again, I hope they get him.” Unknown to her, another employee was within earshot and reported the conversation to McPherson’s supervisor, Constable Rankin. Rankin … fired [McPherson]….

Although McPherson’s statements were made in the workplace, there was no evidence that they had interfered with the efficient functioning of the office …. Constable Rankin testified that the possibility of interruption had not been a consideration in his decision to fire McPherson, nor had he inquired whether the remark had caused any disruption. There also was no evidence that McPherson had discredited the office by making her statement public, or that her statement had been overheard by a member of the public. Considering the non-public, clerical nature of her role and the absence of any disruption to the office’s business or public perception, the Court held that McPherson had been fired simply for the content of her speech and the Constable’s belief that she was “unworthy” of employment in his agency, and that this was unlawful.

The Court explained that “at some point, such concerns are so removed from the effective functioning of the public employer that they cannot prevail over the free speech rights of the public employee.” However, the Court cautioned that even employees with non-public roles could be terminated for their speech if the facts show it “truly injures the public interest,” such as where a clerical employee for a law enforcement agency goes on television and identifies themselves as both an employee of that office, and a recruiter for the Ku Klux Klan.

In addition to how public-facing the employee’s role is, and the context in which their speech occurs, courts consider the nature of the public employer’s business when deciding how much weight to afford their interest in avoiding disruptive speech. For example, the government’s interest in reducing tension and maintaining close working relationships among its staff in the context of higher education, where a vigorous exchange of ideas, and any attendant tension or discomfort, is an accepted part of college life. Conversely, courts have recognized a heightened interest in maintaining “discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity.”

The relevance of the employee’s speech to the scope of their employment, and the language used, are also relevant factors. For example, the value of government employees’ speech on matters relating to the agency or field in which they work has been considered the “apex” of First Amendment protection, such as when teachers speak out on issues in the field of education.

Conversely, derogatory speech will be accorded less weight in the Pickering balance. In Thompson v. Cent. Valley Sch. Dist. No. 365 (9th Cir. 2025), an assistant principal was placed on leave and then demoted for comments he made on Facebook, namely his reaction to the Democratic National Convention, in which he referred to Democrats as “demtards” and suggesting that “the rest of us are sick and tired of your act and going to take you to the woodshed for a proper education.” The court concluded that Thompson’s post could be construed as commentary on a matter of public concern, but that it was “not speech entitled to the highest constitutional protection” due to the disparaging and violent language used. See also MacRae v. Mattos (1st Cir. 2024) (plaintiff’s posts about transgender individuals and immigrants were on a matter of public concern but were entitled to less weigh considering the “mocking, derogatory, and disparaging manner” in which they were conveyed).

Finally, as Rankin made clear, there must be evidence that the speech in question had or will disrupt the employer’s operations. A government employer may rely on reasonable predictions of future disruption, even if none has yet occurred, but it must “provide some evidence for the court to evaluate whether the government’s claims of disruption appear reasonable.” Courts are more likely to accept a government’s employer’s prediction of future disruption if some disruption has already occurred.

The question now before the Court is whether, in September 2025, it was so “clearly established” that Bromm’s interest in sharing memes about the slaying of Charlie Kirk outweighed the County’s interests in maintaining the efficiency and public confidence that it would be unreasonable for the defendants to think otherwise. The Court concludes that Bromm has satisfied the first prong of the Pickering test. Viewed in the light most favorable to Bromm, his social media posts constituted commentary on a matter of public concern, namely the assassination of a prominent media figure, and by extension, the views he espoused…. “The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” … Bromm asserts he was pushing back against what he viewed as the undeserved lionization of Charlie Kirk.

The second prong is whether it was sufficiently clear to the defendants, at the time of their conduct, that their asserted interests in avoiding disruption to their agencies’ operations would be outweighed by Bromm’s interest in making these posts.

McCleod argue that Bromm’s posts caused disruption to the operations of the coroner’s office, threatened to undermine investigations, and brought the coroner’s office into disrepute. He has supplied some evidence to that effect. For example, McCleod testifies that he received “multiple calls and emails from citizens complaining about Mr. Bromm’s posts.” There is also some evidence that Bromm’s posts threatened the working relationship between the coroner’s office and its partner agencies. Bromm argues that this disruption was not “widespread or sustained,” or that it was self-inflicted because the defendants amplified the reach of Bromm’s posts, but these are ultimately arguments about how much weight to give the defendants’ interests in the balancing test. This is not a case where the government has offered no evidence demonstrating actual or reasonably anticipated disruption such that the defendants’ hopes of prevailing under Pickering would have been doomed from the start.

Further, given the public-facing nature of the coroner’s office (and of Bromm’s role specifically) and the public nature of his comments, the court concludes that it was at least reasonably non-speculative to anticipate that Bromm’s statements would cause disruption in the future. Although the coroner’s office is not a law enforcement agency, it frequently works alongside law enforcement, and it does occupy a “unique and sensitive position” having “necessary and constant interactions with the public.” Bromm’s work for the coroner’s office was also public-facing, requiring him to interface both with the public and with other agencies….

The defendants also argue, and the Court agrees, that Bromm’s posts are entitled to less weight in the Pickering analysis due to their disparaging tone. Some of the posts were memes that Bromm shared, including one with what appears to a photo of the vocalist for the rock band Filter singing with the text “HEYYYYY Man, Nice Shot!” [from a 1995 song -EV] paired with an image of Charlie Kirk’s suspected killer. Another combined an image of Charlie Kirk with another photo of the spray-painted words “Make Racists Afraid Again” and the outline of a balaclava. And a third shows the text “FA+FO=” followed by a picture of Charlie Kirk bleeding from his neck. The defendants interpret this as a shorthand for the phrase “fuck around and find out,” and Bromm does not dispute this. The defendants also point to a post in which Bromm wrote “I have said it b4- Violence is never the answer but it is part of the equation to get to the answer.” … [T]he posts … are plainly mocking and violent in tone. As such, Bromm’s posts are entitled to less weight in the Pickering analysis.

On these facts, the Court cannot conclude that McCleod’s decision to terminate Bromm violated clearly established law. This conclusion is further supported by the authority cited in the defendants’ motion, MacRae and Hussey v. City of Cambridge (1st Cir. 2025), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn (1st Cir. 2026).

In MacRae, the First Circuit held it was permissible for a school district to fire a teacher who shared social media posts that were derogatory toward transgender individuals and immigrants because it posed a reasonable—if not yet realized—threat of disruption to the classroom environment. And in Hussey the court held that a police officer could be disciplined over social media posts he made disparaging George Floyd because it was reasonable to believe they posed a threat to the department’s relationship of trust with the public. {The First Circuit subsequently granted rehearing en banc [in Hussey] but has not yet issued a new opinion. In any case, this opinion was in force during the time in which Bromm’s speech and resulting termination occurred, and it is therefore relevant to understanding what a reasonable individual would have understood to be permissible under the law at the time.}

These cases are instructive, particularly because they both held in the government’s favor on the merits of the Pickering analysis. As noted, the inquiry for purpose of qualified immunity is not whether the government’s anticipation of disruption was reasonable, but whether it was “patently unreasonable,” a more lenient standard than the one under which the defendants prevailed in MacRae and Hussey….

I discuss the court’s dismissal of the doxing claim in a separate post.

David Edward Bailey (Lewis County Prosecutor’s Office) and Elena C. Bundy and Kristofer John Bundy (Bundy Law Group PLLC) represent most of the individual defendants; W. Sean Hornbrook and Jessie L. Harris (Williams Kastner) represent one of the individual defendants.

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