From Judge Brantley Starr (N.D. Tex.) May 12 in Fisher v. Campbell:
This case stems from a Texas Tech University law student allegedly making a celebratory statement {in the clinic program offices} after Charlie Kirk’s assassination while she was working at a legal clinic at the school. The school … reprimanded her and reported her to the state bar for acting unprofessionally, in violation of the school’s honor code [on the grounds that she had] {“fail[ed] to uphold professional or fiduciary obligations including, but not limited to, performance related to clinical programs”}.
The alleged celebratory statements were said to be:
“I’m in such a good mood.”
“That mother fucker got shot.”
“I’m in the best mood ever.”
“They got him.”
“This is great.”
The student, Fisher, denied making those statements, and the Honor Council report that initially considered the matter appeared ambivalent. But the Dean concluded that Fisher had made such statements; here’s an excerpt from his letter to the bar:
The Dean’s Office recommends against Ms. Ellen Fisher’s admission to the Bar.
We do so for three related reasons. First, Ms. Fisher, as a clinical student with a supervised practice card, disrupted our clinical spaces with a celebration of a political assassination. Second, she has refused to take responsibility or show any remorse for her unprofessional actions. And, third, she has displayed dishonesty when discussing this incident in our Honor Code proceedings.
On September 10, 2025, Ms. Fisher celebrated a political assassination in the Law School’s clinical suite during work hours. This occurred while Ms. Fisher was a clinical student with a supervised practice card and thus able to represent clients in our clinics under our professional supervision. The celebration was loud, overheard by others, and adversely affected the operation of the clinic.
Ms. Fisher’s actions were unprofessional and also constitute a violation of the Law School’s Honor Code, Section 2.H (Violation of Professional Duties), which prohibits “failing to uphold professional … obligations” related to “clinical programs.” To state the obvious, we expect our clinical law students engaged in supervised practice under our supervision to display the same levels of professionalism in our clinical spaces that law firms expect from their attorneys in their law offices. The disruptive celebration of a political assassination in our clinical spaces is a reprehensible act radically inconsistent with widely recognized professional expectations in law firm spaces. Therefore, we also view this conduct as severe enough to constitute a violation of the Honor Code….
The Dean’s Office has 100% confidence in its fact-finding that Ms. Fisher celebrated an assassination in the clinical suite in a disruptive fashion on September 10, 2025. Notably, on September 16, Professor Metze’s administrative appointment as a clinical director was terminated and he was given modified instructional duties with limited student contact precisely because of his admitted failure to take any steps to correct Ms. Fisher’s celebration of a murder in his office. Professor Metze later retired from the law faculty at the end of calendar year 2025 in the face of further disciplinary proceedings supported by Texas Tech University and the Texas Tech University System for this same admitted failure to perform basic job responsibilities on September 10.
At no point, to my knowledge, during his employment with TTU did Professor Metze ever retract his admission that Ms. Fisher celebrated a murder in his office on September 10, though he would later claim that he could no longer recall details of what happened that day when the Honor Code investigation of Ms. Fisher began. Professor Terri Morgeson continues to corroborate Professor Metze’s account, confirming Ms. Fisher’s misconduct.
The Honor Council majority found by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Fisher celebrated a murder in the hallway of our clinical suite. The Honor Council did not find by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Fisher also celebrated the murder in Professor Metze’s office, though a majority seem to agree that a celebration of the murder did take place in that office.
The Dean’s Office concurs in the Council’s finding on the disruptive hallway murder celebration but believes the Council reached the wrong result on the question of the disruptive office murder celebration. The Dean’s Office believes the Council reached the wrong result principally because it failed to follow a recommendation from the Dean’s Office on which witnesses should be called to testify and thus failed to hear from crucial witnesses who would have provided important testimony on this point. Significantly, in our inquisitorial process, the Honor Council must call all relevant witnesses since there is no “prosecutor” to rely on to present a case for responsibility. The Dean’s Office continues to believe that Professor Metze’s admissions and Professor Morgeson’s detailed corroboration establish that Ms. Fisher celebrated a murder not just in the clinical hallway but also in Professor Metze’s clinical office….
Notably, Ms. Fisher has refused to take responsibility for any of her misconduct or express any form of remorse for it. Instead, she has responded with repeated acts of dishonesty in an effort to avoid accountability, denying that the disruptive conduct in both the clinical hallway and the clinical office took place.
As we all know, often “the cover-up is worse than the crime.” Had Ms. Fisher taken responsibility for her disruptive misconduct and expressed remorse rather than respond with repeated falsehoods, we would be offering a different recommendation today on her admission to the Bar. I will also note that Ms. Fisher has received an extraordinary degree of grace from our Honor Council in both its fact-finding and in its recommended sanction, which, frankly, in my opinion, she does not deserve, given her dishonesty, and which will only further reinforce her lack of character and fitness for the practice of law.
Fisher sought an injunction “to prevent Dean Nowlin from entering a reprimand and annul all disciplinary action against her,” but the court held that such a request was precluded by state sovereign immunity:
“Sovereign immunity bars private suits against nonconsenting states in federal courts.” And state sovereign immunity also “precludes suits against state officials in their official capacities.”
That said, there are two primary exceptions. “First, Congress may expressly abrogate state sovereign immunity.” And second, Ex parte Young “permits suits for prospective … relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law.” “Here, Congress has not abrogated Texas’s sovereign immunity, and the State has not consented to suit. Young is the whole ballgame.”
The Fifth Circuit has explained that “Ex parte Young created a narrow doorway through the sovereign immunity defense” and “[t]o turn the key on the Ex parte Young door, a plaintiff must sue the right defendants and ask for the right remedy.”
First, the right defendants. To be the right defendants under Ex parte Young, the individuals must be “officers of the state … clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state … who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature.” In short, the defendant “must have some connection with the enforcement of the law being challenged.” … [T]he official must have “more than the general duty to see that the laws of the state are implemented”; it must be a “particular duty to enforce the statute in question”; the official must have “demonstrated willingness to exercise that duty”; and “the state official, through her conduct, compels or constrains persons to obey the challenged law.” Even so, plaintiffs “need only show a scintilla of enforcement by the relevant state official.” …
[T]he only defendants who have even a scintilla of enforcement authority to effectuate this relief are Dean Nowlin, who sent the reprimand to the Texas Board of Law Examiners; Dean Gonzales, who has appellate review of Honor Code violations; and the Board of Regents….
Second, the right remedy. Ex parte Young‘s narrow carveout permits courts to “command[ ] a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law.” So the doctrine is limited to “prospective relief to stop future harms.” It “does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past.” Nor can it be used to attack or undo a state official’s past actions.
Accordingly, injunctions that are packaged as prospective relief but require “the voiding of a final state” official’s action are “quintessentially retrospective and thus out of bounds under Young.” …
Fisher … seeks two remedies: (1) an injunction annulling the defendants’ disciplinary action against her and (2) enjoining the defendants to inform the Texas Board of Law Examiners that any and all disciplinary outcomes against Fisher are officially retracted.
Like invalidating or voiding a state agency order, annulling defendants’ past disciplinary action against Fisher is “quintessentially retrospective.” Namely, to annul is to “declare or make legally invalid or void.” Thus an annulment can only reach what has been, not what will be. To conclude otherwise would impermissibly conflate retroactive and prospective relief. So her first remedy it is “out of bounds under Young.“
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to order Dean Nowlin, Dean Gonzales, and the Board of Regents to annul the past action, it cannot order them to tell the Texas Board of Law Examiners that they have done so. Such would be a lie. That too is barred by Ex parte Young. {The Texas Board of Law Examiners is owed the truth. And our dues. But maybe not sovereign immunity anymore under Galette v. New Jersey Transit Co., 607 U.S. — (2026).}
In sum, Ex parte Young‘s narrow doorway is locked to Fisher as to these requests.
Fisher argues that her injunction is warranted to return this case to “the last uncontested status of parties.” For example, in Doe v. Texas Christian University, the learned Judge O’Connor issued a temporary restraining order against TCU that ended a suspension.
Suspensions and reprimands are different, as are Title IX and the First Amendment. Doe centered on a Title IX claim, and Congress abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of Title IX. Section 1983 does not do to the states what Title IX does. Besides, suspending a student is a continuing course of conduct. And the courts under Ex parte Young can enjoin the future action of continuing a suspension. But there is no future action with a reprimand.
Likewise, Shah v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical School—which Fisher does not cite—is inapplicable. In Shah, a medical student was dismissed, sued UT Southwestern alleging his dismissal was unlawful, and asked for preliminary injunctive relief because Shah feared UT Southwestern would disclose Shah’s disciplinary record to the other medical schools he was applying to. On that record, Judge Fitzwater granted preliminary injunctive relief because there was “an imminent threat that defendants will disseminate” Shah’s disciplinary record to third parties and “send notice to the schools that he was dismissed.” The future issue was not focused on harm to the plaintiff’s reputation but rather on conduct of the school.
But here, Dean Nowlin has already informed the Texas Board of Law Examiners and State Bar of Texas about the reprimand. The Defendants’ conduct has already occurred. So there is no future or ongoing action by the Defendants to enjoin.
The Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional bar therefore remains as to the relief Fisher seeks in this motion.
But the Court must note that circumstances might change. It is possible the Defendants would take future action (like suspending Fisher or preventing her from graduating) that Fisher might believe to be unlawful. Some of those actions might fit within—instead of fight—Ex parte Young. But no such request is before the Court. Nor is there any indication that those harms are forthcoming. For that reason, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this motion and “cannot proceed at all” on the requested injunctive relief….
This does not mean that Fisher has no case. Under section 1983, she may still seek monetary damages against the individual defendants. {And this is a separate reason why the Court will not issue injunctive relief to preserve the last uncontested status quo. As Judge O’Connor has explained, injunctive relief is necessary when preserving the last uncontested status quo if it is the only way to “prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.” Despite the fact that more money has been known to cause more problems, money is still a meaningful remedy that precludes the need for injunctive relief here.}
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” They are not the courts of universal justice. Accordingly, the Court may only act where the Constitution or a statute permit it. Here, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Fisher’s requested relief, so the Court DENIES the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
I don’t have much of an opinion on the Eleventh Amendment question. But I am quite troubled by the law school’s actions here.
Even if you do agree that the student did engage in “disrupti[ve]” and “unprofessional” speech, consider just how broad law schools’ authority would be on that standard. Nothing in the standard would be limited to celebrating assassinations, or praising violence more broadly: A wide range of speech on contested matters—race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, abortion, affirmative action, and more—may be seen by some as disruptive and unprofessional. It’s easy to imagine some students, faculty members, and deans so labeling, for instance, celebration of a court decision or election result that they see as racist or anti-trans or Islamophobic or what have you. That’s not a standard, I think, that’s compatible with the First Amendment rights of students in public universities.
Perhaps a clinic ought to have some authority to eject students (essentially firing them as employees) based on disruptive or unprofessional speech in its offices, just as law firms would generally have such authority. I’m not sure how far that would extend, since even that power can easily be abused and is quite dangerous in what is after all primarily a higher educational institution, not an ordinary law firm. But even assuming such a power, that still doesn’t justify recommending that the student be denied a license to practice, which would keep her from working in any law firm, whatever its ideological views.
Finally, I appreciate that one of the three reasons given for the recommendation is that the Dean viewed her as dishonest in the investigation. But the report makes clear that this was just one of the reasons; and the focus on the other reasons shows that she likely wouldn’t have been treated that way based on dishonesty in some other context, in the absence of her statements about the Kirk killing.
The post Law School Recommended Against Student's Bar Admission, Partly for Alleged "Celebration" of Charlie Kirk Assassination in Law School Clinic appeared first on Reason.com.
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