So the Colorado Court of Appeals held yesterday in Brookhart v. Reaman, in an opinion by Judge Lino Lipinsky de Orlov, joined by Judge Timothy Schutz; note that the opinion applies Colorado state law, and the rules may differ from state to state.
Four individuals (the requesters) asked the Gunnison County Library District (the library district) to remove a book titled Gender Queer: A Memoir (the book) from the shelves of the Gunnison County Public Library (the library) or, alternatively, to prevent children from accessing it. The requesters used the library district’s own “Request for Reconsideration of Materials” form (the reconsideration form) to submit their requests. The library makes the reconsideration form available to the public through its website. Any person may complete and submit a reconsideration form to the library district to ask that an item be removed from the library’s collection or that access to the item be restricted.
Respondent, Mark Reaman, in his capacity as the editor of the Crested Butte News, submitted a request under the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA), to the library district to obtain unredacted copies of the requesters’ reconsideration forms. The library district responded by filing this case in district court … to obtain guidance on how it should respond to Reaman’s CORA request [as the statute allows]….
The narrow, but important, issue before us is whether the library district is required to keep the requesters’ identifying information confidential under section 24-90-119(1), which prohibits the disclosure of “any record or other information that identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific materials or service or as otherwise having used the library.” Section 24-72-204(3)(a)(VII) links section 24-90-119(1) to CORA, providing that a records custodian shall deny disclosure of “[l]ibrary records disclosing the identify of a user as prohibited by section 24-90-119.” This case involves the apparent conflict between two principles embodied in the Colorado Revised Statutes: the mandate that “all public records … be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times,” except as “specifically provided by law,” § 24-72-201, and library users’ right of privacy protected through section 24-90-119(1).
Section 24-90-119(1) does not prohibit the disclosure of any portion of a library record other than specific information that “identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific materials or service or as otherwise having used the library.” Thus, our review is limited to whether the district court erred by ordering Brookhart to redact the requesters’ personal identifying information before producing the reconsideration forms to Reaman….
The court concluded that the removal of books is a “service” of the library, so people who requested the removals are protected by § 24-90-119(1):
First, in section 24-90-119(1), the General Assembly employed the disjunctive “or” in listing the three categories of persons whose identifying information is protected from disclosure: persons who (1) “requested or obtained specific materials”; (2) “requested or obtained [a] specific … service”; or (3) “otherwise … used the library.” We hold that the identifying information in the requesters’ reconsideration forms may not be disclosed under the second category of section 24-90-119(1): persons who “requested or obtained [a] specific … service.”
Second, a “service” is (1) “[t]he official work or duty that one is required to perform” or (2) labor performed “in the interest or under the direction of others; specif[ically], the performance of some useful act or series of acts for the benefit of another.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The second definition “denotes an intangible commodity in the form of human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.” We conclude that both dictionary definitions of “service” encompass the library district’s promulgation and the requesters’ submission of the reconsideration forms.
The first definition of “service” is satisfied because the library district’s creation, dissemination, and use of its reconsideration form established a procedure whereby any person could request that certain books or other items be removed from the library’s collection or made unavailable to underage library patrons. As the library district’s “Challenged Materials” policy states, the “library director” will “review and consider all ‘Requests to Reconsider Materials’ and provide a written response and decision on the subject material(s) to the patron that submitted the request.” (We do not consider whether the outcome of this case would have been different if the library district had not developed and promulgated the reconsideration form or if the requesters had not employed the library’s own form to submit their requests.)
The requesters’ identifying information is also protected under the second dictionary definition of “service.” Although the parties challenge the societal benefit of removing books from a public library’s collections, the dictionary definition of “service” is value neutral. Our application of the governing statutes must be value neutral, as well.
The library district’s review and consideration of the reconsideration forms required “human effort” to perform a “useful act or series of acts for the benefit” of the requesters, and arguably for the benefit of any resident of the library district who may agree with the views of the requesters. The meaning of “useful act,” like the definition of “service,” does not depend on whether the library district agrees with the requesters that removing, or limiting access to, the book is “useful.”
Third, the library district’s own actions compel affirmance of the order. It would defy logic to conclude that the library district engaged in a “useless act” when it created and promulgated the reconsideration form, or that the library district believed submission of its own form would result in harm to the library or violate the rights of its patrons.
The die was cast when the library district created and posted a form to allow any person to seek the removal or restriction of any item in the library’s catalogue. The parties’ disagreement with the requesters’ opinions regarding who should be permitted to access the book does not change the nature of the “service” the library district provides to members of the public who use the library district’s own reconsideration form to question an item in the library’s collection. Thus, the requesters’ completion and submission of the library’s reconsideration forms satisfy the plain meaning of requesting or obtaining a library “service” for purposes of section 24-90-119(1).
Fourth, section 24-90-119(1) distinguishes between “request[ing] or obtain[ing] specific materials” and “request[ing] or obtain[ing] [a] specific … service.” As noted in our discussion above, by using “or” in section 24-90-119(1), the General Assembly intended that, for purposes of the statute, “request[ing] or obtain[ing] specific materials” and “request[ing] or obtain[ing] [a] specific … service” must be considered independently. We therefore reject the parties’ arguments that section 24-90-119(1) only protects the identifying information of a person who “requested or obtained specific materials” — in other words, a person who asks for, reads, listens to, views, or checks out items from the library’s collection….
[W]e disagree with Brookhart’s suggestion that the unredacted reconsideration forms are subject to disclosure under CORA in furtherance of the principle that the people should be protected from “secret government.” General principles of government transparency, no matter how noble, cannot rewrite the specific language the General Assembly chose to include in the statutes we must interpret in this appeal. Similarly, while we “construe any exceptions to CORA’s disclosure requirements narrowly,” we may not redraft statutory language to do so. Moreover, there is no dispute that the content of the reconsideration forms, without the requesters’ personal identifying information, is a public record and, therefore, should be made available to the public. We perceive no persuasive argument that the library’s objective assessment of the requests or the public good would be enhanced by revealing the identity of the requesters….
The majority also stressed that “We are not asked to decide, and do not rule on, the merits of the requesters’ objections to the inclusion of the book in the library’s collection; the artistic or social merit of the book; or whether readers, regardless of age, have a First Amendment right to access the book through a public library.”
Judge Daniel Taubman dissented on procedural grounds, and would not have reached the statutory interpretation question.
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