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Tomorrow, I will be testifying against the proposed “Preserving a Sharia-Free America Act” at a hearing before the US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution and Limited Government.  My written testimony, already submitted to the Subcommittee is available here. Here is an excerpt from the Introduction, summarizing my testimony:

I am grateful for the opportunity to address some of the important issues raised by the
proposed “Preserving a Sharia-Free America Act.” My conclusions about this bill are clear
and unequivocal: It is manifestly unconstitutional, in violation of the First Amendment. In
addition, the vast majority of immigrant adherents of Sharia law – a category that includes all or most Muslims – pose no threat and there is no good reason to bar them from the United States.

The proposed legislation states that “Any alien in the United States found to be an adherent of Sharia law by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security, or Attorney General shall have any immigration benefit, immigration relief, or visa revoked, be considered inadmissible or deportable, and shall be removed from the United States.” This provision amounts to blatant discrimination on the basis of religious belief. As such, it violates both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

In addition, expelling virtually all Muslim immigrants would needlessly harm many
thousands of people and is not necessary to combat terrorism or any other threat to the United States. Far from seeking to undermine America’s liberal democratic values, most Muslim immigrants – like those of other faiths – have come precisely because of those values. If enacted, the legislation would harm national security by playing into the hands of radical Islamists and terrorists.

The rest of the testimony covers the constitutional and policy issues in more detail, including explaining why there is no immigration exception to the First Amendment which allows exclusion and deportation of immigrants on the basis of their speech and religious beliefs. It also explains why discrimination on on the basis of religion is unconstitutional even with respect to rights and government benefits that are not themselves constitutional rights. These points are supported by Supreme Court precedents backed by conservative justices.

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From Kohls v. Ellison, decided today by Eighth Circuit Chief Judge Steven Colloton, joined by Judges James Loken and Duane Benton:

In May 2023, the Minnesota legislature enacted a law regulating deep fakes. The relevant text reads as follows:

A person who disseminates a deep fake or enters into a contract or other agreement to disseminate a deep fake is guilty … if the person knows or reasonably should know that the item being disseminated is a deep fake and dissemination:

(1) takes place within 90 days before an election;

(2) is made without the consent of the depicted individual; and

(3) is made with the intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election….

A deep fake is defined as “any video recording, motion-picture film, sound recording, electronic image, or photograph, or any technological representation of speech or conduct … that is so realistic that a reasonable person would believe it depicts speech or conduct of an individual who did not in fact engage in such speech or conduct.” … [A later] amendment expanded the scope of the prohibition to include the periods “within 90 days before a political party nominating convention” or “after the start of the absentee voting period.” As amended, the statute further provides that a state or local candidate who violates the law must forfeit any nomination or elected office, and is disqualified from any future appointment to office.

Kohls is a political commentator who produces and publishes parodies on social media. On July 26, 2024, Kohls broadcast on the YouTube website a video generated by artificial intelligence that depicted a likeness of Vice President Harris making statements that she never made. The video was labeled as “PARODY” and included a disclaimer stating that “[s]ounds or visuals were significantly edited or digitally generated.” Elon Musk shared the video on the “X” social networking service but did not convey that the video was a parody or was generated artificially. Franson, a member of the Minnesota state legislature, shared Musk’s post on her own “X” account. She, too, did not communicate that the video was a parody.

The district court rejected Kohls’ and Franson’s request for a preliminary injunction, and the Eighth Circuit upheld the denial. It agreed with the district court that Kohls lacked standing:

To qualify as a deep fake under the statute, a video must be “so realistic that a reasonable person would believe it depicts speech or conduct of an individual who did not in fact engage in such speech or conduct.” By labeling his videos as parody, however, Kohls communicates that statements in the videos “cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts.” Kohls’s videos, labeled as parodies, are not deep fakes under the statute, so he is not injured by any threat of enforcement….

Kohls further maintains that he is injured by the threat of enforcement against third parties. His verified complaint alleges that “[t]he chilling effect and enforcement of the law will dissuade others from sharing his content and preclude him from earning a living, which he currently does via monetization of his content on YouTube and X.”

“Where traceability and redressability depend on the conduct of a third party not before the court, ‘standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.'” A plaintiff must show that third parties will act “in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” A permissible theory of standing “does not rest on mere speculation about the decisions of third parties; it relies instead on the predictable effect of Government action on the decisions of third parties.”

The record is insufficient to establish standing on this theory. The evidence showed that Kohls’s video of July 26 depicting a likeness of Vice President Harris “was retweeted over 240 thousand times.” Kohls did not present evidence that others were deterred from sharing the video or that he lost income from any such reduction in sharing. A plaintiff cannot establish standing based merely on an unsupported assumption that some users of YouTube or X might decline to share a video because of the Minnesota statute.

The court also agreed with the district court that Franson did have standing, because she “reshared Kohls’s video depicting Vice President Harris without any accompanying label or disclaimer,” which “was arguably proscribed by § 609.771, because a reasonable person could believe that the video depicted actual speech or conduct of Harris in which she never engaged.” But it concluded that the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying Franson a preliminary injunction, because of Franson’s delay in suing:

A plaintiff’s delay may justify denial of preliminary injunctive relief where it is not adequately explained, and Franson has not provided a sufficient explanation for her sixteen-month delay.

On appeal, Franson argues that she really did not delay for sixteen months because the legislature amended the 2023 statute in July 2024. The 2024 amendments, however, altered only the timing and penalty provisions of the statute. They did not change the statute’s basic prohibition on dissemination of deep fake videos, the enforcement of which Franson seeks to enjoin. Franson’s proposed conduct was arguably proscribed and subject to criminal penalties ever since May 2023. She voted for the 2023 law as a member of the legislature and possessed the complete factual predicate of her suit at that time. The district court found that Franson disseminated content “as early as 2021” that arguably would be proscribed by the statute. The court did not err in finding that nothing about the 2024 amendments changed the basis for Franson’s alleged fear that her speech would be punished under the statute.

Franson disputes this conclusion on the ground that there were no federal elections in 2023 about which she sought to disseminate deep fake content. But there were state and local elections during 2023. And Franson, a member of the Minnesota legislature, alleged without limitation that it was her practice to disseminate “videos featuring the likeness of real politicians for comedic or satirical effect” to her “constituents, colleagues, and ideological allies.” The district court did not err in construing Franson’s claim to encompass content concerning state or local elections….

The district court entered its order on preliminary relief in January 2025, and the case likely could have proceeded toward a final resolution on the merits in the year that has elapsed since. But Kohls and Franson appealed the order denying preliminary relief, and then stipulated that the case should be stayed in the district court pending disposition of this appeal. At oral argument, counsel explained that the plaintiffs sought “guidance” from the court of appeals on the merits of their constitutional claims. This court, however, does not sit to dispense guidance on matters that are unnecessary to a decision.

We conclude here only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying extraordinary preliminary relief in light of the delay in bringing the request. The purpose of interim equitable relief, where appropriate, is to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward, (per curiam), and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Franson’s delay weighed definitively against her request.

In further proceedings, the district court may consider any additional evidence regarding whether Kohls has standing under Article III and, if there is standing, whether he is entitled to relief on the merits. The court also may address whether Franson is entitled to permanent injunctive relief on the merits, despite her delay in seeking preliminary relief, under the different considerations that apply to the question of permanent relief.

Peter J. Farrell of the Minnesota Attorney General’s office argued on behalf of the state.

The post No Preliminary Injunction in Challenge to Minnesota Election Deepfake Law, but Challenge Goes On appeared first on Reason.com.

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In the U.S., criticizing the government is a national pastime—whether in polite conversation, on social media, or across the dinner table. There’s a reason Thanksgiving predictably gives way to yearly advice columns on how to placate the crazy uncle who somehow finds a way to make mashed potatoes political.

In China, meanwhile, it can effectively amount to a life sentence.

Such is the case of Jimmy Lai, the 78-year-old Chinese political dissident who was sentenced on Monday to 20 years’ imprisonment following his conviction last year on two counts of conspiring to collude with foreign forces and one count of publishing seditious material. That rap sheet sounds ominous. It is, but not in the way it reads. The portentous language of the charges masks that he was ultimately found guilty of exercising a basic right: railing against the state.

There is no shortage of material in China for government critics. That helps explain why, in 2020, the mainland imposed a “national security law” on Hong Kong, where Lai made his home. He was arrested that same year. The name of the legislation is again deceptive, as it used “national security” as a guise to paralyze dissent, especially as some in the city sought to hold onto the liberties that once distinguished it from Beijing.

Lai was at the forefront of that fight. It is genuinely difficult to think of anyone whose story more clearly epitomizes both the promise of Hong Kong and what happens when that promise is broken. At 12 years old, Lai escaped to the city as a stowaway on a fishing boat after his mother was sent to work in a labor camp for the crime of being a “class enemy.” He slept in rat-infested factories as a garment worker—until he was the one running them. His sweater brand, Giordano, became an international success and helped make Lai a billionaire.

Following the 1989 pro-democracy showdown in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, Lai founded two media companies—Next Magazine in 1990 and the Apple Daily in 1995—known for their irreverent coverage and unapologetic support for democracy, freedom of speech, and government reform. 

China’s “national security law” was, in other words, perfectly tailored to zero in on someone like Lai. The government leveraged it to freeze the assets at the Apple Daily, arrest other employees, and eventually shutter it entirely. Prosecutors alleged Lai spearheaded a conspiracy to secure sanctions or blockades against China and Hong Kong, referencing meetings he had with U.S. officials like Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. (Lai testified that he’d merely asked them to voice their support for the city’s freedoms.) Authorities secured a conviction on the third count—publishing seditious material—using colonial-era legislation to argue that Lai’s publication incited people to rebel against the government.

Beyond the charges themselves, that national security law also paved the way for a trial with a foregone conclusion. Calling it a trial at all feels like a bit of a stretch, as it had no jury and was instead overseen by a panel of judges handpicked by the government. Nor was Lai permitted to pick an attorney of his choosing, which the Constitution there supposedly promises. And the proceedings came amid a long-standing, ruthless pursuit of the businessman and activist, who was already serving a nearly-6-year-sentence on flimsy fraud charges pertaining to a sublease for part of his newspaper office.

But for those who still doubt that Lai was targeted for his political expression, consider that he has company. Former Apple Daily Editor in Chief Law Wai-kwong, Executive Editor in Chief Lam Man-chung, and English Edition Managing Editor Fung Wai-kong received 10-year sentences; Yeung Ching-kee, an editorial writer, received seven years and three months; Associate Publisher Chan Pui-man got seven years; and CEO and Publisher Cheung Kim-hung was handed six years and nine months. This, unfortunately, isn’t new. There are many others who have received draconian sentences for offending the Chinese government.

Lai had an advantage, however. He is a citizen of the United Kingdom, meaning he did not have to do this. He did not have to wait for law enforcement to come and take him, which was essentially guaranteed. And yet he continued to speak out against the government with the same energy as those who fear no repercussions at all.

The post Jimmy Lai Got a 20-Year Sentence for Saying Things the Chinese Government Didn't Like appeared first on Reason.com.

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From Judge Brian Davis (M.D. Fla.) in Shorstein v. Hardwick (M.D. Fla.):

The facts giving rise to this case follow Plaintiff’s claim of being sexually battered on April 20, 2018. Plaintiff was participating in her bachelorette party with dinner and drinks at several local bars. As her friends trickled away, Plaintiff remained and continued drinking alcohol. She could not recall the circumstances completely, but she remembered calling for an Uber and then being sexually assaulted in the passenger seat of a vehicle.

Plaintiff submitted to a sexual assault examination at the Family Life Center. Plaintiff also filed a police report and contacted Defendant Undersheriff Matthew Cline (“Cline”) to arrange for an interview between Plaintiff and law enforcement officers from the St. John’s Sheriff’s Office (“SJSO”).

Law enforcement officers began investigating Plaintiff’s claims immediately and were able to discover the alleged assailant’s name. Officers also interviewed the bartender serving Plaintiff immediately before the incident. The bartender stated that the pair were very close at the bar and may have been kissing before leaving together. Video and photographic evidence showed the two dancing and touching while at the bar.

The alleged assailant denied assaulting Plaintiff. He claimed that before leaving together the two kissed in his truck. As he was driving Plaintiff home, he claims she began touching his crotch before Plaintiff asked him to pull over where the pair engaged in what he described as consensual sexual intercourse.

He admitted to ripping Plaintiff’s panties when he pulled them to the side, and Plaintiff was photographed with injuries to her left wrist after the incident. Plaintiff left the vehicle and waived down another driver and awoke in that person’s car. Ultimately, Plaintiff declared that she did not want the investigation to go further once the alleged assailant was identified, and law enforcement ceased further efforts. Defendant Cline found the alleged assailant’s version of events to be more corroborated by the evidence.

Plaintiff expressed grave concern that her reporting of the alleged assault would circulate, and people would learn of the incident. Defendant Cline assured her that he would “lock it down.” Defendant Cline had the impression that Plaintiff was trying to communicate to him that the situation should not have happened but that it was not a sexual assault, and moreover, Plaintiff wanted no one finding out. The report was classified as “unfounded” and closed.

Despite the case’s closure, Defendant Cline contacted the Honorable Carlos Mendoza, United States District Court Judge, with whom he had previously worked when the pair were prosecutors. Defendant Cline described the situation to Judge Mendoza hoping to gain his honor’s opinion on whether he had done the right thing by closing the case—or alternatively, that he should close the case despite Plaintiff’s objection to continued investigation. Judge Mendoza then relayed the conversation he had with Defendant Cline to attorney Terry Shoemaker, who was left with the impression that Judge Mendoza was told by Defendant Cline that he did not believe Plaintiff’s account of April 20, 2018.

Defendant Cline also showed former Defendant Joshua Woolsey an unredacted copy of the report on June 9, 2022, after Joshua Woolsey made a public records request for all records pertaining to Plaintiff. Defendant Cline alerted Plaintiff before providing the report, and after litigation in state court over the report’s release, the state court ordered the release of the report publicly with the names and identifying information of the individuals in the report redacted. At the time the request was made, Joshua Woolsey’s wife, Casey Woolsey was running against Plaintiff for county judge. The evidence establishes that Joshua Woolsey had independent knowledge about the night of Plaintiff’s bachelorette party, which surprised Defendant Cline.

Defendant also disclosed the unredacted report to a county commissioner during a budget meeting with the Sherriff. Defendant Cline’s disclosure came amongst the ongoing state court litigation pertaining whether the report was subject to disclosure. Defendant Cline denied providing an unredacted report to the commissioner, but this testimony is contradicted by the deposition of the commissioner that said it was unredacted….

Plaintiff sued, and the remaining claims focused on Defendant Cline and his employer, the SJSO. Among other things, the court rejected the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim:

[T]here is no evidence that Defendants’ conduct was outrageous. Defending one’s position in a legal proceeding, such as in a state court proceeding, is almost never a basis for a finding of outrageous conduct—especially since the state court ultimately ordered the redacted release of the report. Moreover, Defendants disbelief of Plaintiff and disclosing their take on what occurred on April 20, 2018, do not defy the bounds of human decency.

While imperfect, Defendants’ disclosures to Judge Mendoza or even the county commissioner and Joshua Woolsey were not outrageous. No jury could find Defendant Cline’s effort to get advice from a former colleague and well-regarded member of the legal community as atrocious. Nor can a jury find the disclosure to the county commissioner intolerable since it was directly pertinent to ongoing litigation and the commissioner had already known of the events—and could have learned about them ultimately owing to the court’s ruling. The same can be said about the disclosure of Plaintiff’s name and information to Joshua Woolsey. The court ordered disclosure and the unredacted premature disclosure would have occurred but for Defendant Cline attempting to alert Plaintiff to Joshua Woolsey’s request.

And the court rejected plaintiff’s defamation claim:

By voluntarily entering the race for public office, Plaintiff is properly classified as a public figure. Plaintiff has adequately provided evidence that Defendants published statements[,] and the statements were false insomuch as they, among other things, claimed Plaintiff fabricated being sexually assaulted. On the record before the Court, a reasonable jury could find Plaintiff was sexually assaulted after her bachelorette party. A reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with her alleged assailant. There is no way it can be conclusively proven what happened and no jury could say with the requisite specificity that either party was lying. As previously stated, there is also no evidence of actual malice.

Defendants are entitled to share their belief Plaintiff lied to cover up an act of infidelity. Plaintiff is free to respond that Defendants’ opinions are biased because of their relationship with Plaintiff’s political rivals. What is clear is that both positions are now opinions.

Plaintiff’s claim for defamation by implication fails for similar reasons. A claim for defamation by implication imposes liability on a defendant who “juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection between them, or creates a defamatory implication by omitting facts[.]” This claim provides relief for an aggrieved party though the falsity element of a defamation claim is not technically met so long as the “gist” misleads the listener. Because there is no provable mistruth there is no defamation….

And the court added this:

Many of the counts are brought against Defendant Cline in his individual capacity. Florida only allows suit against officers or employees of state agencies (or its subdivisions) if the act was not within the scope of his employment or was done in “bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” As previously explained, Plaintiff has not offered evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant Cline acted in bad faith or with malice. His disclosure was, at worst, misguided and ultimately harmless.

A records request pertaining to Plaintiff was made when she declared herself a candidate for public office. The report was ordered to be released. Everyone knew who the alleged victim was despite redaction. Moreover, Defendant Cline went out of his way to alert Plaintiff before its release, which is why Plaintiff was even allowed to litigate its release in state court. This added protection was uniquely afforded to Plaintiff and does anything but show bad faith.

Finally, it is beyond dispute Defendant Cline came into possession of the report because of his role as a lawyer acting as undersheriff for SJSO. He disclosed that report to Judge Mendoza, the commissioner, and Joshua Woolsey in that role. Defendant Cline is protected in his individual capacity.

SJCO stands in a similar position, in so much as Plaintiff asserts an invasion of privacy. All disclosures in this case came through Defendants’ roles as law enforcement officers and cannot be used as basis for an invasion of privacy claim….

Gwendolyn P. Adkins and William B. Armistead (Coppins Monroe, P.A.) represent defendants.

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The United Educators of San Francisco (UESF) went on strike on Monday, shutting down the San Francisco Unified School District’s 120 schools and robbing 50,000 children of their regularly scheduled education.

The strike is the first one in 50 years, reports ABC10, and will continue “until we win the schools our students deserve and the contracts our members deserve,” said UESF President Cassondra Curiel at a Monday press conference. Curiel’s statement suggests that the district is taking advantage of union members, but the current contract is already quite generous.

Fully credentialed K–12 teachers (those with a bachelor’s degree) who are in their very first year of service had a base salary of $73,689 as of January 1, 2025, according to school district data. These teachers receive an additional $1,897 from the Quality Teacher and Education Act (2008), billed as rewarding schools for improving student achievement, and $3,882 from the Fair Wages for Educators Act (2020), which instituted a parcel tax to increase teachers’ salaries by 7 percent, amounting to a total effective salary of $79,468.

Earning nearly $80,000 as a starting yearly salary is a healthy sum by any reasonable standard: The average American made approximately $62,608 last year, per the Bureau of Labor Statistics. But, according to the official salary schedule, the unionized teacher works only 184 days a year. This means that they make nearly $432 per day. The median per capita income in San Francisco was $92,289 from 2020 to 2024, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Assuming the median San Franciscan works 260 days a year, that would mean they make $355 per day—nearly 20 percent less than a new UESF K–12 teacher.

In addition to their salary, United Educators members’ fringe benefits included monthly contributions of up to $373.72 per month for family health insurance coverage under their preceding contract (July 2023–June 2025). Setting aside the fewer days worked by teachers as opposed to other civilian workers, this is substantially less than the average monthly employer contribution of $1,232.59 to family coverage, or $14,791.08 per year.

In light of this fact, the union succeeded in extracting the concession of “an annual allowance of $24,000 for teachers to choose their health care plan.” Additionally, the district offered the union a 6 percent wage increase to be phased in over the course of three years.

Neither of these concessions satisfied the union, which has sought a 9 percent raise over two years, which would cost the school district an additional $92 million per year, reports ABC10, even though the district is already running a $102 million deficit. The UESF is also seeking fully paid family coverage on a Kaiser Permanente health plan and protections against AI replacement.

Only 53.2 percent and 46 percent of students at noncharter schools met or exceeded English and math proficiency levels, respectively, in the 2024–2025 school year in the San Francisco Unified School District. A decrease of 3.32 percentage points and 4.58 percentage points from the 2018–2019 school year (the earliest period for which data are available). Instead of protesting for even higher salaries and cushy health care plans, San Francisco teachers should focus on doing a better job educating children.

The post San Francisco Public Schoolteachers Make $79,468 for 184 Days of Work. Now They're Striking for Even More. appeared first on Reason.com.

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