Prof. Rick Hasen (UCLA) on Trump’s Brief in the Section 3 Disqualification Case

From his Slate column today:

There are many ways that Trump could win in the Supreme Court. For example, the court could accept the First Amendment defense Trump has offered. Or it could agree with Trump that states can only consider disqualifying candidates under Section 3 if Congress passes a statute authorizing it. Or it could agree that Trump did not have an adequate chance to defend himself in the state court. Or it could hold that the evidence was not sufficient to show that he actually “engaged in insurrection.” Or it could resuscitate an extreme version of the “independent state legislature” theory that Colorado law did not authorize Colorado courts to remove Trump from the ballot for violating Section 3. Winning on some of these issues would mean not only that Trump would be back on the ballot in Colorado, but potentially throughout the country.

What’s most interesting about Trump’s brief, though, is what it leads with—and what it leaves out, telling us a lot about where Trump thinks he has the best shot at the Supreme Court and the strength of his arguments. Trump leads with the hypertechnical argument accepted by the trial court (but rejected by Colorado’s Supreme Court) that Trump is not an “officer of the United States” for purposes of Section 3. Trump devotes about three times as much space to this argument compared to any of his other individual arguments. [To be precise, the argument takes up 12½ pages, and the two longest other arguments each take up a bit more than 5 pages each. -EV]

Briefs are typically written to put the strongest argument first. Why would Trump think the officer argument is the strongest? It seems weak: As Trump’s challengers argue in the Supreme Court: “It would defy common sense to hold that Section 3 disqualifies every oath-breaking insurrectionist officer (down to postmaster or county sheriff) except the most powerful one—a former Commander-in-Chief.” This is especially true given the historical context of the amendment’s passage. As conservative scholar Sam Bray recently wrote over at the Volokh Conspiracy:

It is hard to imagine that the Reconstruction Congress that proposed Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the state legislatures that ratified it—in the middle of an intense struggle with President Andrew Johnson, and focused on all the problems that could come from a President who was not on board with reconstruction—would say that the two people who should be allowed to be Confederates would be the President and Vice President.

Trump or his lawyers must have calculated that a technical argument would be more appealing to the conservative majority than his other ones, such as an argument that Trump had the constitutional right to encourage his supporters to invade the Capitol…. Trump’s lawyer probably does not want to get up in front of the justices at oral argument and parse Trump’s comments made in the speech before the Capitol invasion about why his supporters need to “fight like hell.” (Trump’s brief says he made that comment “metaphorically.”)

Equally interesting is an argument that Trump left out of his brief on the merits. When he first petitioned the Supreme Court to take the Colorado case, Trump opened with the argument that disqualification under Section 3 is a question that only Congress, not the courts, has the power to decide. In legal parlance, it’s a “nonjusticiable political question” left for Congress alone. That argument has disappeared entirely from Trump’s current merits brief in the Supreme Court….

The reason Trump likely abandoned it is because of what could happen down the line…. Without the court weighing in on disqualification before the election, there’s a real chance that Trump could appear to beat Biden in the Electoral College vote in November, followed by members of Congress declaring on Jan. 6, 2025, as Electoral College votes are counted, that Trump is disqualified from serving given his participation in an insurrection. If that happens, Trump is going to want to go to the Supreme Court to ask them to second-guess or overrule a congressional determination about disqualification. That’s of course a recipe for chaos….

I haven’t focused enough on the case to myself decide on the relative strength or weakness of the various arguments, but Prof. Hasen’s analysis struck me as worth passing along; and I agree that Trump would want a decision that offers a definitive interpretation of Section 3 under which he’s not disqualified, rather than one that leaves the matter to Congress to decide when tallying the electoral vote.

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California Stopped San Francisco’s $1.7 Million Toilet. The City Can’t Build Something Cheaper.


Toilet | Illustration: Lex Villena

In October 2022, San Francisco raised eyebrows when the city budgeted $1.7 million for a single-stall public restroom in the city’s Noe Valley neighborhood. The high price tag, according to city officials, was due to the steep price of construction in San Francisco, as well as remaining supply chain issues.

But the state stepped in shortly after, scrapping the planned bathroom after outrage spread over its high cost to taxpayers. Fifteen months later, the public plaza where the restroom was originally planned still doesn’t have a place to pee—and it doesn’t look like it will get one any time soon.

“Why isn’t there a toilet here? I just don’t get it. Nobody does,” one resident told The New York Times last week. “It’s yet another example of the city that can’t.”

San Francisco has the most expensive construction costs in the world—and it’s hardly surprising. In order to build a public bathroom in Noe Valley, at a location that already had the necessary plumbing to add a restroom, builders would have to pass a dizzying number of regulatory stops. These include seeking approval from the Arts Commission’s Civic Design Review committee, passing review under the California Environmental Quality Act, and getting the go-ahead from the city’s Rec and Park Commission and San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors. If that isn’t enough, the project would also be subject to a period of “community feedback.”

Even after gaining approval, the city wouldn’t be free to simply find the cheapest acceptable bathroom—likely a pre-fabricated option—and connect it to city plumbing. According to a 2022 San Francisco Chronicle article, pre-fabricated bathrooms violate the city’s Public Labor Agreement. Adding to costs, the city would also be required to use union labor to construct the bathroom.

While the $1.7 million price tag was rightfully criticized, should the project have been allowed to go forward, the budget might not have been an overestimate. San Francisco’s regulatory burden on new construction—even something as simple as a single-stall bathroom—is just that high. 

Even San Francisco’s own government has conceded that the Noe Valley bathroom fiasco was a sign that the city has too much regulation. “It’s worth changing the laws that are in place around construction projects like the restroom that slow things down,” a spokesperson for Mayor London Breed told the Times

But this is far from the first time that local governments have earmarked absurdly large sums of money to pay for public bathrooms. In 2017, New York City spent $2 million on a public park bathroom. And last year, Philadelphia caused controversy when it announced that it would spend $1.8 million on six modular Portland Loo bathrooms over the next five years—a model that cities across the country have spent millions on in recent years.

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Prof. Danielle Allen (Harvard) on Diversity and Academic Freedom

An excerpt from an opinion piece that she wrote at the Washington Post Dec. 10, but that I had missed:

I was one of three co-chairs of Harvard’s Presidential Task Force on Inclusion and Belonging, which in 2018 delivered a strategic framework for the campus…. Across the country, DEI bureaucracies have been responsible for numerous assaults on common sense, but the values of lowercase-i inclusion and lowercase-d diversity remain foundational to healthy democracy….

We wrote [in our report]: “Our shared pursuits … depend on the open and direct expression of ideas and on criteria of evaluation established by the judgments of experts. Excellence therefore also requires academic freedom. Inclusion and academic freedom — these principles are linked in each being necessary to the pursuit of truth.”

We grounded the work in a broad commitment to pluralism. We wanted a diversity of views on campus, and we recognized that the sources of diversity are myriad. We cared as much about viewpoint and religion as any other source of diversity…. While we acknowledged historical patterns in our report, we did not dwell on the theme of historical injustices. We did not see the challenge in front of us as “white supremacy”; we never used a vocabulary of that kind. Our faces were set to the future. We saw in the rich diversity of our campus an opportunity — a chance to achieve a higher level of excellence powered by intense engagements across a vast range of viewpoints….

[But] three themes in our report went largely overlooked by university administrators as they began to pursue implementation — our focus on academic freedom, on the need to make space for religious identity and on the need for greater political diversity on our campus. Older paradigms that focused only on some groups as marginalized, as opposed to all groups as sources of potential and perspective, came back to the fore….

I am as against racism as anyone, but I believe we can all be better together based on a positive vision. Yes, it is necessary to tackle challenges such as implicit bias. But, counter to the anti-racism agenda, we cannot create a framework for inclusion and belonging that is focused on accusation.

As was the case in our 2018 report, the conceptual center of such a framework in our campus communities should be excellence, and what each and every one of us can contribute to that, for the sake of increased benefit to society. Bringing out the best in all of us — to achieve a sum greater than the parts — is possible only if we cultivate a culture of mutual respect. Somehow the racial reckoning of 2020 lost sight of that core goal of a culture of mutual respect with human dignity at the center. A shaming culture was embraced instead….

There’s a lot more in the article, and I don’t entirely agree with its analysis; but this passage struck me as especially worth passing along.

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iRobot Lays Off 350 Employees as Amazon Kills Merger Elizabeth Warren Opposed


Sen. Elizabeth Warren and a Roomba by iRobot | Illustration: Lex Villena;  Ben Molyneux, Gage Skidmore

Today, Amazon terminated its planned acquisition of iRobot, manufacturer of Roomba robot vacuums, as the companies saw “no path to regulatory approval.” iRobot then announced that it would be cutting nearly one-third of its work force.

While the companies blamed regulators in the European Union for the termination, meddlesome U.S. lawmakers played their own part in souring the deal.

In August 2022, Amazon announced its intent to buy iRobot for $1.7 billion. The acquisition would complement Amazon’s growing stable of smart home products, like Echo Hub control panels and Ring video doorbells.

The following month, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began an investigation of the merger, and lawmakers weighed in soon after. In a letter to FTC Chair Lina Khan, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.) and five Democratic representatives recommended that “the FTC should use its authority to oppose the Amazon–iRobot transaction” as the acquisition “could harm consumers and reduce competition and innovation in the home robotics market.”

The letter referenced a Bloomberg article about the proposed merger, which noted that “iRobot’s Roomba dominates the smart vacuum market with a 75% market share by revenue in the US.” The lawmakers cited the FTC’s antitrust authority and “Amazon’s history of anticompetitive practices” as reasons the agency should oppose the merger.

In November 2023, the European Commission issued a Statement of Objections in conjunction with its own review. The commission worried the deal “may restrict competition in the market for robot vacuum cleaners.” It noted that “because Amazon’s online marketplace is a particularly important channel” for selling robot vacuums, Amazon “may have the ability and the incentive to foreclose iRobot’s rivals” either by excluding them from its marketplace or by “degrading their access to it.”

Notably, the United Kingdom—which is no longer part of the European Union—approved the merger in June 2023. At the time, the nation’s Competition and Markets Authority “concluded that the deal would not lead to competition concerns in the UK.”

Earlier this month, Politico reported that Amazon had until January 10 to offer concessions that may address the European Commission’s concerns; Amazon let the deadline lapse without offering any concessions.

Today, the companies jointly announced the termination of the acquisition deal, seeing “no path to regulatory approval in the European Union.” Soon after, iRobot announced “an operational restructuring plan,” in which it would lay off 350 employees—31 percent of its work force. Co-founder and CEO Colin Angle, who was expected to remain in charge under the terms of the merger, would step down.

While Europe’s concerns may have been what soured the deal, it seems the U.S. lawmakers who asked the FTC to oppose the deal also got their wish.

But the complaints from the E.U. and lawmakers like Elizabeth Warren are overblown. Acquiring iRobot would not have denied consumers the ability to purchase robot vacuums: While Roomba may be the best-selling, companies like Shark and Eufy make their own competitive versions, including at lower prices than a Roomba. In its list of the best robot vacuums of 2024, Wirecutter recommended no iRobot products, citing poor performance when compared to competitors.

Meanwhile, as the companies waited on regulators, iRobot was losing money: The company took out a $200 million bridge loan in July 2023 to tie it over until the deal closed (at which point Amazon lowered its offer to account for the new debt). With the deal scuttled, Amazon will now pay a $94 million termination fee, but iRobot expects to report an operating loss of as much as $285 million for 2023.

It’s worth wondering, then, if this is what lawmakers like Warren had in mind. The FTC letter worried the merger “could harm consumers and reduce competition and innovation in the home robotics market.” But without the merger, iRobot could very well face insolvency, and nearly one-third of its work force will lose their jobs—and considering the company is based in Massachusetts, a substantial number of them may very well be Warren’s constituents.

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The Killing of 3 American Troops Was an Avoidable Tragedy


Three American soldiers killed on the Jordanian-Syrian border | Lex Villlena

American blood has been drawn in a Middle Eastern war for the first time in a while. Iraqi guerrillas allied with Iran killed three U.S. troops and wounded dozens more along the Jordanian-Syrian border on Sunday, using an explosive drone. President Joe Biden has promised to “all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner of our choosing.” Members of Congress have called for a harsh response, with some Republicans demanding a full-on war against Iran.

The government of Jordan, clearly not keen on getting dragged into the conflict, has denied that the attack happened on its side of the border. Iran shrugged off responsibility for the bombing, insisting that the issue is entirely between the United States and “resistance groups in Iraq and Syria.” The Iraqi fighters may have indeed been acting on their own accord. Iraqi commander Qais al-Khazali had complained about U.S. airstrikes on Iraq in a speech last November: “You are cautious when it comes to Iranian blood, but you pay no regard to Iraqi blood. Therefore, Iraqis should teach you a lesson for what you have done.”

The immediate cause of the violence is the war in Gaza, which prompted Iraqi militias to break a truce they had with the U.S. military. But this particular attack was a long time coming. The target was Tower 22, an extension of al-Tanf, a base that the U.S. military maintains in Syria for murky and confusing purposes. Over the past few years, Israeli aircraft have used al-Tanf’s airspace to strike Iran’s forces, and Iranian forces have struck back at the base. It was only a matter of time before Americans were dragged into the proxy war, with tragic results.

U.S. Special Forces had first set up shop in al-Tanf during the war against the Islamic State. Their plan was to support the Revolutionary Commando Army, a friendly Syrian rebel group. That project failed embarrassingly. The Revolutionary Commando Army suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Islamic State in 2016, and one of its leaders ran off with American-made guns after he was accused of drug trafficking in 2020. Kurdish-led forces elsewhere in Syria became a much more reliable partner for the U.S. military.

Meanwhile, Russia—which is allied with the Iranian and Syrian governments—agreed to enforce a 55 kilometer “deconfliction zone” around al-Tanf. The zone also included Rukban, an unofficial refugee camp built by Syrians fleeing government persecution. (The Syrian government reportedly tortured two former Rukban residents to death in October 2022.) No country wanted to take responsibility for the camp, and it took almost a decade for the U.S. military to begin providing food aid to Rukban.

Washington, however, had a different purpose for al-Tanf in mind: countering Iran and its allies. The base’s location near the Iraqi-Syrian border made it valuable real estate, especially for anyone intent on breaking up the “land bridge” between Iranian allies. It also allowed the U.S. military and Israeli intelligence to listen in on Iranian communications, according to Al-Monitor, a Washington-based magazine focused on the Middle East. So the Americans stayed.

“Control of [al-Tanf] neutralized a key border crossing point on the road between Baghdad and Damascus, which forced Iran and others to cross from Iraq into Syria at a more distant border crossing to the north,” former Trump administration official John Bolton declared in his 2020 memoir, The Room Where It Happened. “Besides, why give away territory for nothing?”

More provocatively, Israeli forces began using al-Tanf’s airspace to bomb Iranian and pro-Iranian forces in Syria. (Since American aircraft often fly the same route, Syrian “air defenses can’t tell the difference until it’s too late,” a U.S. official told Al-Monitor.) The Israeli air campaign, known as “the war between the wars,” was designed to prevent Iran from moving weapons into the region in anticipation of a future war. Israel dropped more than 2,000 bombs on Syria in 2018, through “near-daily” air raids, with the direct involvement of U.S. leaders.

“The Israeli strike plans were submitted through the U.S. military chain and reviewed at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], usually days in advance of the strike; the strike plans outlined the purpose of the mission, the number of warplanes that would carry out the attack, and when it would occur,” wrote Wall Street Journal reporter Michael Gordon in his 2022 book, Degrade and Destroy: The Inside Story of the War Against the Islamic State. “They also spelled out the routes the Israeli planes would take and the coordinates of the target that would be struck. CENTCOM would examine the request, which would also be shared with the U.S. defense secretary, who would have the final say.”

It seemed like a win-win arrangement. Israel had a safe route for its bombing runs, and the United States could weaken a foreign rival without getting directly involved. But there was a problem: Iran was not stupid, and it could see that the American troops were facilitating the raids on its own troops. In retaliation for a series of Israeli attacks in October 2021, the Iranian military bombed al-Tanf the following month. No Americans were harmed at the time, but it was an ominous sign of the dangers involved.

The U.S. mission also lacked a legal mandate. Although the president arguably had a congressional mandate to fight the Islamic State, there were no legal grounds whatsoever to help Israel bomb Iranian troops. Former Trump administration official David Schenker, in a 2021 article defending the base at al-Tanf, admitted that “U.S. military officials are often loath to publicly acknowledge [their Iran-related goals] given concerns about the legal justification for America’s presence in Syria.”

When former President Donald Trump sought to withdraw from Syria, officials fought to keep U.S. forces in al-Tanf. Ambassador James Jeffrey, a former U.S. special envoy for Syria, admitted to “playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had” in the country. Bolton successfully pushed to have the garrison at al-Tanf counted separately from other troop deployments. The game succeeded. U.S. forces stayed until Biden took office, and the new president preferred to keep them in Syria.

Other officials and experts continued to worry that al-Tanf could become a liability. Former U.S. Air Force colonel Daniel L. Magruder Jr. called al-Tanf “strategic baggage” in an article published by the Brookings Institute a few weeks after Biden was elected. He recommended withdrawing U.S. forces in exchange for a deal to allow the refugee safe passage. The colonel warned that Russia and Iran had “acted provocatively” against al-Tanf in the past. “Would the U.S. be able to control escalation if an American were killed?” he wondered.

Three years later, Magruder’s question is sadly relevant. It remains to be seen how Biden will react to the killing of the three American troops, and whether that reaction deters further violence or escalates the situation even more. But Washington can’t say it wasn’t warned.

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Virginia May Finally Fix a Dumb Drink Law


Liquor bottles behind a bar | Photo: Eaters Collective on Unsplash

When it comes to identifying America’s most ridiculous and nonsensical alcohol law, there are many ignominious candidates to choose from. But Virginia’s infamous food-beverage ratio certainly deserves a spot on any list of the dumbest drink laws in the country. A plucky coterie of Virginia policy makers has sought to reform the commonwealth’s beverage ratio for years, only to run into a buzzsaw of special interest cronyism. But suddenly there is hope for boozy freedom.

Virginia’s food-beverage ratio mandates that restaurants earn $45 in food sales for every $55 they take in selling liquor-based drinks. This may sound innocuous at first, but it has the effect of making establishments like elite cocktail lounges or high-end whiskey bars—which often offer scotch pours costing upwards of a thousand dollars—nearly impossible to operate in the commonwealth. After all, it takes a lot of food sales to offset a single $2,000 shot of Macallan M under the ratio. The rule also creates burdensome record-keeping requirements for restaurants, who are forced to prove they have not violated the ratio each year.

The provenance of Virginia’s ratio (at least spiritually) traces back to the Prohibition era, when it was, of course, illegal for any restaurant to sell alcohol. In 1968, the state Legislature passed the Mixed Beverage Act, which stipulated that restaurants could not make more money from booze than food. The law underwent several iterations in the 1980s and ’90s before reaching its current 45–55 ratio. Bizarrely, in the 1990s, beer and wine were arbitrarily exempted from counting toward the ratio, meaning it has only applied to liquor sales since that time.

The upshot is that a craft brewery in Virginia can sell as much beer as it wants—even booze-bomb Imperial IPAs—without so much as a trace of food on the premise, while a cocktail lounge that specializes in, say, gourmet hot dogs and sophisticated drinks might have trouble even opening in the first place. This makes little sense given that defenders of the law argue that the point of the ratio is to reduce the potential level of intoxication among patrons of drinking establishments.

Some of the lawmakers defending the ratio even went so far as to invoke the language of Prohibition, such as then-Senate Minority Leader Richard Saslaw (D–Fairfax County) growling in 2015: “If you can’t meet that ratio, you ain’t running a restaurant, you are running a bar. If you want saloons in Virginia, say so.” Opponents painted a doomsday picture of “bars on every corner” of the commonwealth—all while conveniently overlooking neighboring Washington, D.C., which does not have a ratio or a saloon epidemic.

If anything, the ratio is actually more likely to incentivize lower-end “saloons” or “gin mills” at the expense of the aforementioned high-end cocktail lounges and whiskey bars. Once again, that’s because it is a lot easier to meet the ratio by selling $4 rail drinks with rotgut spirits than by selling $350 pours of Pappy Van Winkle. During state budget shortfalls in the past, lawmakers have further compounded the problem by increasing the costs of liquor at state-run Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) stores to raise more revenue, which in turn forces restaurants to increase food prices to account for this increase in liquor prices. In this way, the ratio even impacts nondrinkers by acting as a form of stealth taxation on food in the commonwealth.

Unsurprisingly, the real reason the ratio persists is that an influential group of Richmond restaurateurs has heavily lobbied the state Legislature for years to keep it in place. Rather than being motivated by altruistic concerns over protecting the public from the purported terrors of saloons, these business owners are actually worried about upstart competitors like speak-easies and cocktail bars—which are becoming increasingly popular amid the ongoing craft spirit boom—from undercutting their bottom line.

This protectionist influence has acted as an iron curtain repelling repeated efforts to change or modify the ratio. But just when it appeared all hope was lost for fixing the ratio, a recent reform bill suddenly started flying through legislative committees and has now improbably passed the state Senate unanimously. The unexpected success of this reform effort seems to be attributable to turnover in the Legislature and the retirement of old-guard senators like Saslaw.

Should the legislation also clear the House of Delegates and make it to Gov. Glenn Youngkin’s desk, it would reduce the food-beverage ratio from 45–55 to 35–65 for restaurants with monthly food sales below $10,000, and it would outright eliminate the ratio for restaurants exceeding that threshold. Ideally, the ratio would be axed for all establishments, regardless of their monthly food sales—especially given that beer and wine sales are already unlimited in Virginia.

Outright elimination of the ratio may have to wait for a future time, but Virginia is on the precipice of at least severely kneecapping one of the worst laws in its code book. If it does, it will serve as an all-too-rare example of free market champions finally outlasting the protectionists.

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Utah Would Rather Repeal Social Media Age Check Law Than Defend It In Court


Smart phone display of social media apps | Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@rami_alzayat?utm_content=creditCopyText&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=unsplash">Rami Al-zayat</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/silver-android-smartphone-w33-zg-dNL4?utm_content=creditCopyText&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=unsplash">Unsplash</a>

Rather than defend a clearly unconstitutional measure passed to “protect” kids from social media, the government of Utah intends to repeal the law.

Last year, Utah became the first state to pass a law limiting minors’ social media use to those who had parental consent and requiring platforms to provide a way for parents to access their kids’ accounts. It kicked off a wave of similar measures in statehouses across the country—laws that would require anyone using social media to prove their age through such methods as submitting biometric data or a government-issued ID.

Now that it faces a pair of challenges in federal court, the state has a new stance: “Psych! We didn’t actually mean it!”

“They know it’s unconstitutional. They know it’s pure grandstanding and culture warrioring,” writes Techdirt editor Mike Masnick. “And they don’t want to face the music for abusing the rights of the citizens who elected them to support the Constitution, not undermine it.”

Utah Backs Down 

Utah’s parental consent for social media law (S.B. 152) was scheduled to take effect in March, along with a law (H.B. 311) to create liability for social media companies that “addict” kids. Both laws were challenged in December by the tech industry association NetChoice.

Then, earlier this month, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) sued on behalf of four Utah residents—including Hannah Zoulek, a teenager who identifies as queer—to stop S.B. 152. “Growing up already isn’t easy, and the government making it harder to talk with people who have similar experiences to mine just makes it even more difficult,” Zoulek told FIRE.

The FIRE lawsuit is still in its earliest stages, but the NetChoice lawsuit was already moving forward. A hearing on NetChoice’s motion for preliminary injunction was set for February 12.

Then, on January 19, Utah lawmakers voted to postpone the law’s effective date until October 1, 2024. And Utah officials asked the court to cancel the February hearing, given that the effective date had been postponed “and the Legislature is likely to repeal and replace the law during the current legislative session.”

The state said in a January 19 motion that the law “is likely to be repealed in the next few weeks.”

Tech Companies in Limbo

Last week, Judge David Barlow agreed to cancel the hearing about halting enforcement of the law, “given the delayed implementation…and given the possibility that the Act will be altered during Utah’s legislative session.” A meeting to make an updated schedule is slated for mid-March.

For now, that leaves social media companies in limbo.

Utah officials said in the January 19 motion that they “anticipate” the law being amended or replaced soon. But that’s not a given, and for now the new rules are still scheduled to take effect this fall. Should tech companies prepare for that? For something similar? Nobody knows.

The state does “not even dispute the prospect of irreparable harm,” noted NetChoice in a reply opposing the amended schedule. “Rather, Defendants argue that the irreparable harm is not ‘imminent.'”

“NetChoice’s members still need certainty about their compliance obligations well before the Act takes effect,” the group stated:

The prospect that the Legislature might pass some legislation at some point that has some effect on this litigation is not enough to derail briefing that is well underway and set for hearing. This legislation has not even been introduced. Its terms are not public knowledge. Nor are its constitutional flaws or its overlap with the Act at issue here (if any). In any event, no one can make any guarantees about the outcome or timing of the legislative process. In the meanwhile, NetChoice’s members still face an active choice between incurring unrecoverable compliance costs with an unconstitutional law or confronting potential enforcement actions when the Act takes effect in October.

Making Laws or Making Headlines?

If all of this represents Utah recognizing that its social media statute is an unworkable, unconstitutional, privacy-infringing mess…great! But it also highlights a fundamental issue with politics these days: lawmakers who are more interested in passing legislation that makes a statement than passing legislation that actually works.

We’ve seen this recently with tech bills, measures meant to curb abortion access, laws meant to defy “wokeness,” and other restrictions on books, performances, and academic subjects that deal with race, sex, or gender themes. Politicians often seem more intent to signal anger or disgust—and capture the anger and disgust of constituents—than to make changes that pass constitutional muster.

Sometimes this may just be cluelessness, and other times it may be deliberately designed to test the limits of protected rights. But there are also situations—like this one in Utah, or an Ohio town’s speech-restricting statute against aiding or abetting abortion—where authorities simply back down when challenged, suggesting they know this was never going to fly and basically just passed it as a P.R. move.

Hating on Big Tech is an especially good way to garner positive attention these days. And saying you’re doing something to “protect kids” is a time-worn way to get props.

Besides, lawmakers are as susceptible to moral panic about new technology as anyone else, making them vulnerable to pleas to “Do something!” even if they know—or at least should know—that the Constitution frowns on it.

Ultimately, this winds up wasting time and a lot of taxpayer money. But as long as that doesn’t actually translate to negative consequences for the officials whose support these laws, there’s little downside for them to keep trying.

Age Verification Whack-a-Mole

Social media age-check measures like Utah’s “violate the First Amendment…rob users of anonymity, pose privacy and security risks, and could be used to block some people from being able to use social media at all,” as the American Civil Liberties Union puts it.

Alas, whatever happens in Utah, it looks like we’re going to be playing whack-a-mole with similar laws for a while.

Arkansas and Ohio passed social media age verification laws last year—the Social Media Safety Act and the Parental Notification by Social Media Operators Act, respectively—though courts have preliminarily blocked enforcement of both.

Louisiana also passed social media age verification measure last year (the Secure Online Child Interaction and Age Limitation Act), as did Texas (the Securing Children Online Through Parental Empowerment Act, or SCOPE). The Louisiana measure is supposed to take effect in July, and the Texas law is slated to take effect in September.

Similar proposals are now on the table in Florida, Georgia, and New Jersey.

And this isn’t even counting the laws passed or under consideration to card people visiting porn websites.

There’s also federal legislation—like the Social Media Child Protection Act and the Protecting Kids on Social Media Act—that would require nationwide age verification by social media platforms. And both at the federal and state level, proposals like these have been gaining bipartisan support. For many Democrats and Republicans alike, free speech is out and childproofing the internet is in this year.

Today’s Image

Richmond, 2018 (ENB/Reason)

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Section Three and the “First Insurrection” … That Wasn’t

[Prof. Kurt Lash (Richmond), who is a leading legal historian of the Fourteenth Amendment, was kind enough to pass along this response to an amicus brief by Profs. Akhil Reed Amar (Yale) and Vikram David Amar (Illinois) in Trump v. Anderson, and I’m delighted to have it published here. As readers of the blog know, several of our bloggers have expressed their own views on the case, which are quite different from each other, and I’m very glad that the blog provides a forum for those competing views. None of them, of course, is the view of the blog as a whole, or of anyone other than the individual author. I would of course be delighted to publish any response to this item as well. -EV]

Professors Akhil Amar and Vik Amar have submitted an interesting amicus brief in Trump v. Anderson, the case involving Donald Trump’s potential disqualification under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment. The brief claims that Section Three represents the framers’ response to two insurrections, one tall and one small, and that the small one is analogous to the events of January 6, 2021.

The smaller “First Insurrection” (the brief capitalizes the term) supposedly involved an oath breaking cabinet member named John B. Floyd. Floyd, they argue, was a co-conspirator in the First Insurrection(ist) attempt in February 1861 to disrupt the counting of electoral votes and prevent the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln. Since the framers of Section Three intended this small failed First Insurrection to fall within the meaning of the text, they must also have intended to include the similarly small but briefly successful “insurrection” of January 6, 2021.

The brief is fun and imaginative, as is everything the Amars write. Unfortunately, in this case the historical evidence does not support the argument. Their brief is an unsuccessful attempt to place someone who wasn’t there at an insurrection that did not occur. Even more damningly for their side, the brief calls attention to an 1862 statute that actually blows a hole through the already weak originalist case for disqualification.

First: The man who wasn’t there. John B. Floyd served as President Buchanan’s Secretary of War. Floyd objected to Buchanan’s reinforcement of Fort Sumter and he resigned his position on December 29, 1860. This was more than a month before Congress met in joint session to count the electoral votes on February 13, 1860, and more than two months before Lincoln’s inauguration in early March. When Virginia voted to secede in April 1861, Floyd fled a pending indictment for corruption and fraud[1] and joined the Confederacy, eventually rising to the position of general in the Confederate Army.[2]

From the moment he resigned, Floyd was suspected of abusing his authority as Secretary of War.[3] As one of his last official acts, Floyd arranged to transfer 125 cannon to southern arsenals—actions that Ulysses S. Grant and others characterized as an attempt to make those arms available to the seceding states.[4] “Floyd’s Robberies”[5] and his betrayal of the United States were infamous, but they were not part of any small “First Insurrection.” His actions were recognized at the time as the opening act of the one and only American Civil War.

As future framer of Section Three, Senator Jacob Howard explained, from December 20th, 1860, onward “there was flagrant Civil War in the United States.”[6] By the time of Floyd’s resignation on December 29, “there was flagrant war—war in every practical sense of the term—existing in the southern states.”[7] The brief quotes part of Senator Howard’s speech,[8] but it misses Howard’s central point. Howard was explaining why any insurrectionist support of the confederacy after January 1, 1861, including that of John B. Floyd, should be viewed as part of the same great rebellion against the United States that fired the shot on Fort Sumter later that April.

The brief is doubly mistaken about John B. Floyd and the so-called “Two” Insurrections.  Floyd’s treachery was part in the one great insurrection called the Civil War, and his treasonous actions occurred long before the 1861 counting of the electoral votes and the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln. Floyd’s name remained infamous, but not because he played any role in interrupting the electoral count of the inauguration of Pres. Lincoln.[9]

Second: The First Insurrection that wasn’t. In fact, the brief is triply wrong. Floyd could not have played a part in a First Insurrection(ist) conspiracy to disrupt the counting of electoral votes because there was no such conspiracy.

In the early weeks of 1861, Washington, D.C. was abuzz with rumors of invasion and attempted assassination. President-elect Lincoln’s security team was so concerned that they made elaborate provisions for Lincoln’s secret arrival in Washington.[10] General Winfield Scott was convinced there was a secret conspiracy to disrupt the counting of electoral votes and prevent Lincoln’s inauguration.[11]

In order to determine whether such rumors had any basis in fact, on January 9, 1861, Congress appointed a select Committee to investigate the possible existence of insurrectionist conspiracies in the city of Washington.[12] Throughout that January and early February, the select committee investigated and received hours of testimony from local informants and military officials, including General Scott. Scott was certain a secret conspiracy was afoot and he unsuccessfully tried to convince President Buchanan to bring the New York Seventh Regiment to D.C. to guard the capitol.[13] Newspapers dutifully reported Scott’s concerns, but were skeptical. According to the New York Herald, there was “not a scintilla of evidence” supporting Scott’s concerns.[14]

The House Committee agreed and reported that the evidence did not support the existence of any local conspiracy to disrupt the “counting of ballots” or “the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln.”[15]

In fact, the counting of electoral votes that year went off without a hitch. According to the Baltimore Sun, “there was no demonstration of any kind on the floor of the house or in the galleries.”[16] Likewise, the New York Times reported “everything passed off with more than ordinary quiet and decorum.”[17] The Philadelphia Press noted that when Vice President Breckenridge declared Lincoln’s victory, “[t]he announcement was received quietly by the galleries and the house.” [18] “[N]otwithstanding the many rumors which have been circulating in regards to riotous and treasonable demonstrations on that occasion, everything passed off as quietly and harmoniously as on any previous occasion of a similar character.”[19]

The brief insists that the successful counting of electoral votes on February 13, 1861 was “a close run thing.”[20] It wasn’t. Whatever the memories of participants three decades in the future,[21] reports at the time indicated that the counting of votes and the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln were completely peaceful. There was no “First Insurrection,” attempted or otherwise. This means there was no “small” insurrection that served as a model for Section Three.

Third: The 1862 Ironclad Oath. In my own amicus brief, I argue that Section Three’s declaration that “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States,” is best read as not including the office of President of the United States. The reasons are many, including the fact that the highest constitutional authority in the land, Supreme Court Justice and leading treatise-writer Joseph Story, insisted that the President did not hold a “civil office under the United States.”[22] Any framer or ratifier aware of Story’s Commentaries would read Section Three’s general reference to “civil [office] under the United States” as not including the office of President. At best, the language of Section Three is ambiguous on this point, and the ambiguity was not resolved during the ratification debates.

The Amar brief does not investigate the ratification debates (the gold standard for originalists). However, it does make an argument about the framers’ intent. According to the brief, the language of Section Three can be traced back to the Ironclad Oath Act of 1862. That act demanded an oath of loyalty from “every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service, excepting the President of the United States.”[23] This text, the brief triumphantly announces, “proves that Congress and the public plainly understood that “the President of the United States” was emphatically a person who held an “office … under the government of the United States.”[24]

The brief is right to highlight similarities between the 1862 Ironclad Oath Act and Section Three, but doing so leads to the opposite conclusion. The debates over the Ironclad Oath Act strongly suggest that key framers of Section Three would not have viewed its general language as including the office of President of the United States.

The original draft of the Ironclad Oath Act did not expressly refer to the President of the United States. The initial draft simply bound “every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service.”[25] Despite the express reference to “every person elected or appointed to any office,” future framer of Section Three Senator Lyman Trumbull insisted that this general language did not include the office of President of the United States.

Democrat William Saulsbury objected that the Oath Act’s general language did include the President and would therefore unconstitutionally require the President to take an oath beyond that prescribed by the Constitution.[26] In response, Senator Trumbull explained that the language “does not apply to the President of the United States.”[27] According to Trumbull, a general reference to “persons elected or appointed ‘either in the civil, military or naval departments of the public service'” “would hardly embrace the Executive, the Chief Magistrate of the nation.”[28]

Senator Carlile disagreed, stating that it was his understanding that the President held an “office under the Government of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval department.” Trumbull calmly responded that the President did not hold an office in any department. According to Trumbull, “The executive is one by itself; it is one of the divisions of the Government.”[29]

Trumbull’s view of the President as a division of government and not an office under the government had a long and authoritative history. In the 1799 congressional precedent known as Blount’s case, James A. Bayard, Sr. explained, “[t]he Government consists of the President, the Senate, and House of Representatives, and they who constitute the Government cannot be said to be under it.”[30] In his massively influential Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story agreed with Bayard’s argument, noting that the President did not hold an office under the government of the United States, but instead obtained his position “from a source paramount to the national government.”[31]

Trumbull was the future chair of the Judiciary Committee in the Thirty-Ninth Congress and he was a participant in the caucus that framed the final version of Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment.[32] His interpretation of the language of the Ironclad Oath—language that the brief insists is analogous to Section Three—establishes beyond doubt that at least some key participants in the framing of Section Three would not have understood Section Three’s general reference to “civil [officers] under the United States” as including the office of the President.[33]

Even more importantly from an originalist perspective, Trumbull’s declaration that the initial language of the Ironclad Oath should not be understood as applying to the office of President was published in multiple newspapers.[34] This means that members of the public were informed about how leading Republicans understood such language.

Congress did eventually add language to the Ironclad Oath that expressly “except[ed] the President of the United States.”[35] But this addition simply clarified that the Act did not unconstitutionally add an additional oath requirement to the office of President. The general language of the original draft was ambiguous and members disagreed about whether it included the office of the President. The drafters of the Ironclad Oath therefore expressly addressed the office of President in order to remove the ambiguity. The drafters of Section Three did not.

So the brief is right to encourage the Supreme Court to investigate the history and language of the Ironclad Oath. By doing so, the Court will confront important evidence that the final text of Section Three, unlike the final version of the Ironclad Oath, remained ambiguous when it was sent to the people. And there is not a scrap of evidence that the ratifiers resolved the issue one way or another.

In conclusion: Neither this brief nor any other submission in Trump v. Anderson provides a plausible originalist argument that Section Three prevents the people from choosing their president. There was no “small” aspect of the “insurrection and rebellion” that produced Section Three. The one and only Civil War involved more than one million rebel troops and caused the death of over 600,000 Americans. Whatever happened on January 6, it wasn’t this.

In the aftermath of that terrible war, the framers of Section Three feared that leading rebels might use their remaining state level popularity and interfere with Republican Reconstruction. Section Three successfully addressed those fears. But neither the framers nor any other supporter of the Fourteenth Amendment feared the national electoral decisions of a loyal American public. Any claim to the contrary is mistaken.

[1] See, “Floyd Wanted in Court,” New York Herald (New York, New York), Feb. 1, 1861, p. 4 (Floyd “indicted at Washington as one of the parties, in the matter of those Indiana Trust bonds, guilty of defrauding the Treasury of the United States … Having seceded from the Cabinet on a point of honor, he may possibly secede from the Union on a point of safety.”).

[2] See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 328 (1988).

[3] Id. at 226.

[4] See id. See also 1 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant 226 (1885).

[5] See New York Times, May 18, 1861, p. 2.

[6] Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1169 (Feb. 14, 1868).

[7] Id.

[8] Amar Amicus Brief at 3.

[9] In an attempt to link Floyd to a conspiracy to prevent Lincoln’s inauguration, the brief quotes James Hepburn Campbell as saying “[T]his treasonable conspiracy, to resist the inauguration by force of arms, … has drawn within its fatal vortex chiefs of the Cabinet.” Amar Brief at 10. The edit makes it sound like Campbell claims “the chiefs of the Cabinet” (i.e., Floyd) were engaged in a treasonable conspiracy to “resist the inauguration by arms.” Campbell makes no such claim. Here is the full version of the quote: “It is proposed, or has been proposed by the leaders and participators in this treasonable conspiracy, to resist the inauguration by force of arms, to seize the federal capital, to precipitate revolution in the border and intermediate states, to break up the Government and to plunge a great and prosperous people into all the horrors of civil war. To carry out these destructive purposes, the most subtile and extended combination has been formed. Embracing many of the leading Senators and dignitaries of the Gulf States, it has drawn within its fatal vortex chiefs of the Cabinet.” See Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 909 (Feb. 14, 1861).  Even if Campbell believes all of these efforts are real and not just “proposed,” he does not say whether “chiefs of the Cabinet” were involved a conspiracy to “resist the inauguration by force of arms” or were instead involved in some other aspect of the effort to “plunge” the nation into the “horrors of civil war,” such as “precipitat[ing] revolution in the border and intermediate States” (for example, “Cabinet Chief” Floyd sending cannons into the hands of southern rebels).

Similarly, in an effort to link Floyd to an attempt to interrupt the inauguration, the brief partially quotes Secretary of War Joseph Holt’s statement on Feb. 18, 1861, “[M]en in high political positions here … were known to have intimate affiliations with the revolution—if indeed they did not hold its reins in their hands—to the effect that Mr. Lincoln would not, or should not, be inaugurated at Washington.” Amar Brief at 10. The full passage, without ellipsis, shows that Holt was referring to hearing “the oft repeated declaration of men in high political positions here, and who were known to have intimate affiliations with the revolution—if indeed they did not hold its reins in their hands—to the effect that Mr. Lincoln would not, or should not, be inaugurated at Washington. Such declarations, from such men, could not be treated as empty bluster.” See Cong. Globe, 37th Cong. 1st Sess. at 457-58 (adding to the record Holt’s report of Feb. 18, 1861) (emphasis added).  Holt’s point was that hearing such talk put him on guard because he could not be certain it was not “bluster.” Holt was defending his security decisions in light of Congress’s report issued four days earlier which concluded such talk was nothing more than bluster. See note 15 and accompanying text.

[10] See, Benjamin P. Thomas, Abraham Lincoln 242-44 (1952). According to biographer Benjamin Thomas, “[w]hether an actual plot to murder Lincoln existed has never been determined.” Id. at 244.

[11] See, e.g., The Alleged Conspiracy to Seize the Capital Washington, Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Feb. 1, 1861, p. 1.

[12] See, Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. at 913.

[13] Augusta Chronicle, Feb. 6, 1861, p. 1.

[14] New York Herald, Feb. 1, 1861, p.1

[15] Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. at 913. (submission of the Report of the Select Committee).

[16] Baltimore Sun, Feb. 14, 1861, p. 4.

[17] New York Times, Feb. 14, 1861, p. 4.

[18] News Article, The Press (Philadelphia), Feb. 14, 1861, p. 2.

[19] Id.

[20] Amar Brief at 11.

[21] The Amar’s rely on a New York Times essay by Ted Widmer which, in turn, apparently relies on L.E. Chittenden’s Recollections of President Lincoln and his Administration (1891). See Amar Amicus Brief at 11 (citing Widmer’s op-ed piece). See also Ted Widmer, The Capital Takeover That Wasn’t, New York Times, January 8, 2021 (not naming sources but repeating a narrative found in Widmer’s book, Lincoln on The Verge: Thirteenth Days to Washington (2020), which relies on Chittenden’s 1891 narrative).

[22] See 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 258-60 (1833).

[23] See, Act of July 2, 1862, Ch.128, 12 Stat. 502.

[24] Amar Brief at 18.

[25] See, Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2693 (original draft of H.R. 371: “hereafter every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the Government of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service, shall, before entering into the duties of his office, and before being entitled to any of its salary, or other emoluments, take and subscribe to the following oath or affirmation: I, A., B. do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the Government of the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel or encouragement to persons engaged in hostility thereto …”).

[26] Id. at 2693-94 (remarks of Mr. Saulsbury).

[27] Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2694.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] See, Impeachment of William Blount 2258 (Argument of James Asherton Bayard, Sr., Jan. 3, 1799) source at https://bit.ly/47bgOKK.

[31] 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 259-60 (1833).

[32] See Lash, The Meaning and Ambiguity of Section Three at 32 (Forthcoming, Harv. J. L. & P. Policy, 2024), (describing the private meeting of Republican Senators in the Thirty-Ninth Congress which drafted the final version of Section Three). https://bit.ly/46Qodi6

[33] See, Act of July 2, 1862, Ch.128, 12 Stat. 502.

[34] See New York Daily Tribune, (New York, New York), June 14, 1862, p.8 (“Mr. Trumbull” noted that “the Constitution prescribed the form of oath for the President, but this act did not apply to the President… . The object of this act is to prevent persons engaged in the Rebellion from holding office under the Government.”); Evening Post (New York, New York), June 13, 1862, p. 3 (same quotes); Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), June 14, 1862, p. 4. (same quote); Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), June 14, 1862, p. 1 (same).

[35] See, Act of July 2, 1862, Ch.128, 12 Stat. 502.

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Death in Jordan


President Biden | Samuel Corum/UPI/Newscom

The U.S. and Iran are on a collision course—and that could mean war. Iranian-backed militants launched a drone strike on a military outpost in Jordan, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. service members stationed there. The attack was a response to continued U.S. support for Israel and its war effort against Hamas, an effort that has destroyed much of Gaza and resulted in 20,000 Palestinian casualties.

President Joe Biden vowed to respond to the attack. “Have no doubt: We will hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner our choosing,” he tweeted Sunday afternoon.

Hawkish Republicans are already calling for open war with Iran, with Sens. Lindsey Graham (R–S.C.) and John Cornyn (R–Tex.) urging Biden to hit Iran hard. Their remarks drew swift rebukes from others on the right, including Tucker Carlson, Vivek Ramaswamy, and Candace Owens.

Former Rep. Justin Amash (L–Mich.) criticized the decision to keep U.S. troops “in harm’s way” all over the world without a clear mission or congressional authorization. He has a point: Doing so has endangered these soldiers’ safety and U.S. national security interests. Even if it is reasonable for the government to retaliate after an attack, the best policy would be to forestall this possibility by keeping the troops out of danger in the first place.

And while the Biden administration has stood firmly behind Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu—offering only mild, occasional criticism of Netanyahu’s war aims—perhaps Biden should consider whether total and unqualified support, and financial assistance, to Israel is undermining our own security.

The bottom line: The Middle East is in crisis, and the U.S. is being dragged into a broader military conflict of dubious necessity.

Biden wants the border deal, and he wants it now. The president is practically begging Democrats and Republicans to agree to legislation that would give him the authority “to shut down the border when it becomes overwhelmed.”

The Senate’s version of the current deal requires a shutdown of the border the number of illegal crossings reaches a certain threshold. At that point, migrants would be sent back to their home countries, whether or not they plan to claim asylum.

Mexico would need to agree to take back these migrants. But an even steeper challenge could be getting House Republicans on board. Former President Trump has ordered Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to nix anything short of a “perfect” border deal. Trump probably believes that he benefits politically from unrest at the border—and he’s right—so the GOP has very little incentive to actually agree to anything.

In any case, the Senate border plan is a mess, and springs from profoundly un-libertarian impulses: 4,999 migrant crossings is fine, but 5,000 is too many and should trigger a shutdown of the border and automatic deportations? Congress needs to make it easier for people to come to the U.S. legally and work here. Arbitrary caps make no sense.

Is Robert F. Kennedy Jr. pursuing the Libertarian Party’s presidential nomination after all? In a recent interview on CNN, the independent candidate again addressed the possibility that he might join up with the Libertarian Party.

“That is something that we’re looking at,” Kennedy told CNN’s Michael Smerconish. “We have a really good, relationship with the Libertarian Party. I’m going to be speaking at the California Libertarian Party convention.”

Last summer, at a time when RFK Jr. was ostensibly still running against President Joe Biden for the Democratic Party’s nomination, he met with Libertarian leadership about changing parties. Angela McArdle, chair of the Libertarian Party, was clearly excited about the possibility, telling me in an interview that she was thrilled to see his political thinking evolving in a more libertarian direction. “The lockdowns and mandates seem to have stirred an awakening within him, causing him to reconsider many of his other political stances,” she said.

Nevertheless, RFK Jr. opted to run as an independent candidate. The October 7 attacks on Israel further strained matters, as RFK Jr.’s unqualified support for U.S. financial assistance to Israel irked many libertarians; the Libertarian Party’s X account invited his “disenfranchised” anti-war supporters to jump ship.

One possible reason for Kennedy to consider seeking the party’s endorsement is ballot access. Qualifying for the ballot in all 50 states is a difficult task for an independent; as the U.S.’s largest third party, the Libertarian Party already possesses access in most states.

In other RFK Jr. news, the candidate has claimed that former President Donald Trump’s campaign floated the idea last year of offering him the vice presidency.

“I would not take that job,” said Kennedy, according to NewsNation. “And I’m flattered that President Trump would offer it to me, but it’s not something that I’m interested in.”


Scenes from Washington, D.C.: The federal government has vowed to intervene in D.C.’s crime wave, saying it will assist with carjacking cases and other violent offenses.

“This surge in law enforcement resources will build on the Department’s efforts to target the individuals and organizations that are driving violent crime in the nation’s capital,” said Attorney General Merrick Garland. “The Justice Department will not rest until every community in our country is safe from the scourge of violent crime.”


QUICK HITS

  • Sen. John Fetterman (D–Penn.) said he opposes Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer’s prposed crackdown on Zyn, saying that he’s “on the side of more freedom.”
  • A jury has ordered Trump to pay $83 million to E. Jean Carroll.
  • Workers at a U.N. aid agency have been accused of having ties to Hamas.
  • Climate activists are at it again:

  • The San Francisco 49er and the Kansas City Chiefs will advance to the Super Bowl.
  • Biden clearly had a good time at this beer brewery:

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Against Political Statements by Academic Departments

The University of California system is debating whether to allow academic departments to issue political statements. Barnard College is currently in the midst of a campus controversy over college officials removing a political statement from a department’s website.

Should departments be issuing such statements, and who should be understood to control the content of a departmental website or social media account? In an essay in the Chronicle of Higher Education, I argue that such political statements have no place in academia. They invite a further erosion of public support for higher education, and they threaten the foundations of individual academic freedom.

Here’s a taste:

Another set of concerns involves the direct pressure put on individual scholars by the proliferation of institutional political statements. Individual members of the faculty are free to engage in individual political expression or to associate with others to express themselves collectively, and universities should be diligent in protecting the freedom of individual professors to do so. But individual members of the faculty also have the freedom to remain silent on matters of controversy and to choose their own time and manner of expressing their political views. They should not, as a condition of employment at a university, be dragooned into the political activities of others. Departmental statements make that impossible. Dissenting individuals are forced either to hold their tongue and allow statements to be issued in their name or to wade into a political controversy when they would prefer not to do so. Faculty members can always speak in their own name. That is an exercise of free expression. To attempt to speak in the name of others is rather an infringement on free expression.

For departments qua departments to issue political statements is to assert that those sentiments are not just personal, but professional. As such, they may also become professionally relevant to evaluation of current and future members of the faculty. It is an important protection of the academic freedom of individuals that institutions not take the personal political views and activities of professors into account when making decisions regarding hiring and promotion. It is possible to construct a firewall protecting professors from being punished for their political opinions by distinguishing such personal activities from professional activities. If, however, a department as such has specific political views, then the political views of prospective members of the faculty are suddenly professionally relevant and cannot be regarded as off-limits. Junior faculty would justly worry that their professional future will be damaged if they do not go along with the political activities of their senior colleagues. Dissenting members of the faculty will justly believe that they are made outsiders to their own department as a consequence of their political beliefs.

Read the whole thing here.

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