Video of the Day – Reporter Reveals White House Press Conferences are Entirely Scripted Nonsense

I hold the world but as the world, Gratiano;
A stage where every man must play a part,
And mine a sad one.

– The Merchant of Venice, Act I, Scene I

As readers of this site are already very much aware, the entire world around us is micro-managed with intense propaganda by what Professor C. Wright Mills called ”the power elite.” This culminates into an existence within a manufactured, nonsensical world that investment legend Seth Klarman referred to as The Truman Show.

Well The Truman Show that is the USA has been exposed once again. According to this CBS reporter from Arizona, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney receives all questions to “press briefings” ahead of time. In many cases, the reporters themselves even possess the scripted answers to their questions before the conference starts. Yes, as suspected, it’s all just one gigantic stage and you are the clown in the audience.

Watch and weep serfs.

 

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Video of the Day – Reporter Reveals White House Press Conferences are Entirely Scripted Nonsense originally appeared on A Lightning War for Liberty on March 20, 2014.

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What A Surprise! It Turns Out They Lied About The Deficit Last Year

Submitted by Simon Black of Sovereign Man blog,

Truth can be a damn difficult thing to digest sometimes.

Some of us have been there. You get that news from the doctor that you, or a loved one, has just been diagnosed with a serious disease, and it hits you like a ton of bricks.

Several years ago my father was diagnosed with a brain tumor known as a Glioblastoma (GBM). A GBM diagnosis is essentially a death sentence– it’s one of the most aggressive tumors in existence, and it grows in the part of the body that modern medicine understands the least.

I clearly remember the neurosurgeon telling us, “There have been some miraculous advances in medicine over the last 20-years related to the treatment of cancerous tumors. Unfortunately, this tumor is not one of them.”

It was a tough pill for everyone to swallow… especially my father.

Our natural defense mechanism as human beings is to deny reality. These sorts of things happen to other people, not to us.

It’s this same defense mechanism that leads people to ignore the obvious fiscal realities of their home country despite overwhelming objective evidence.

After all, debt-fueled collapse happens to other countries. Not to us.

We go our entire lives being told that our country is different. We’re special.

We have televised ‘experts’ going on TV explaining why our debts and deficits don’t matter. And Nobel Prize-winning pseduoscientists complaining that our debts and deficits aren’t big enough.

But deep down you know the truth.

In the Land of the Free, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released its 2013 Financial Report of the United States government.

This is the government’s best attempt at an honest accounting of its books. And even though they use a different accounting system that gives them special advantages, the picture is still remarkably bleak.

We all know that the US government has racked up a substantial debt; as of this morning, total outstanding public debt is $17,546,814,482,078.90. ($17.5 trillion)

But it’s not all about the debt. Debt is not necessarily evil… and it’s important to look at the situation qualitatively in addition to quantitatively.

Let’s drop a few zeros and consider this in terms of personal finance.

Assume you had $1.75 million in total debt. That sounds like a lot to most people.

But if you had $3 million in liquid assets to offset the debt, plus $500,000 in annual income to pay interest, living expenses, and just about any contingency that could come your way, you’d be in great shape.

It would be even better if that $1.75 million in debt financed a lucrative real estate investment which was generating a 25% cash-on-cash return for you.

But that’s not the case for the US government.

Despite the Obama administration touting a budget deficit of “only” $680 billion in 2013, the GAO’s more accurate accounting shows a total government cost of $3.8 trillion on total revenue of $2.8 trillion.

In other words– the administration wasn’t exactly honest with the American people– the deficit was more like $1 trillion, not $680 billion. But it gets worse.

The GAO added up ALL the US government’s assets in 2013. Aircraft carriers. The highway system. Land. Cash and financial assets. The total is $2.97 trillion.

The liabilities, on the other hand, total $19.88 trillion. This includes the official public debt, plus all sorts of IOUs and loan guarantees.

This means the net EQUITY of the US government is minus $16.9 trillion.

Moreover, the US government’s cash position is a mere $206 billion… roughly 1.1% of its public debt. This isn’t enough to cover net interest payments for the next year.

Unlike a savvy investor who borrows cheap money to purchase productive assets, the US government borrows money to pay interest.

Quantitatively AND qualitatively, the data point to an inevitable conclusion: despite all the propaganda, this is NOT a risk free environment.

And understanding these trends and consequences is absolutely critical to your long-term financial survival.


    



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President Obama Explains How He’s Improving The Economy For All – Live Feed

Having been shown yesterday by the all-knowing Federal Reserve that growth expectations are “over-optimistic”, we are sure President Obama will make it clear that the US is growing (but could do better), that jobs are being created (but could do better), and how middle-class opportunity is right around the corner if it wasn’t for them dastardly Republicans…

 

The President is due to speak at 230pmET…


    



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John McCain Responds To Russia’s Sanctions, “Cancels Spring Break In Siberia”

While the US administration continues to fire ‘sanction’ bullets at Russia and explains how painful these will be, Senator John McCain – in response to his own sanctioning by the Russians – has responded… (as has John Boehner)

Via John McCain’s website,

U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) today released the following statement on being sanctioned by Russian President Vladimir Putin:

 

I guess this means my spring break in Siberia is off, my Gazprom stock is lost, and my secret bank account in Moscow is frozen.

 

Nonetheless, I will never cease my efforts on behalf of the freedom, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including Crimea.”

A few more of the exclusive club of sanctioned Americans have commented too…


    



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“QE’s Are… Cake” – The Full Walkthru How Bond Traders Manipulate Daily POMO

It has gotten to the point where even we are amused how every “conspiracy theory” we suggest becomes proven fact in the span of a few years, usually involving criminality on behalf of at least one (usually more) perpetrator.

In today’s most recent instance of “conspiracy theory” becomes “non-conspiracy” fact, we have the not so curious case of one Mark Stevenson, a former bond trader at Credit Suisse Group, who was fined 662,700 pounds ($1.1 million) and banned from working in the finance industry for “deliberately” manipulating a U.K. government bond price. Specifically, what Stevenson did, was to take advantage of the BOE’s POMO auctions in 2011 to sell some 1.2 billion-pounds of existing gilt holdings which he had accumulated previously with the express intention of selling back to the BOE during a POMO operation at an artificially high price. All this was revealed as fact earlier today by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, the markets regulator.

How shocking. Who could have possibly predicted that banks would abuse POMO – that noble operation meant simply to provide banks with a means to sell paper without making abnormal profits on the back of the taxpayer (because all that debt that is being issued and monetized simply means that either there will be far less growth in the future, or inflation is set to surge – no other options) – to simply enrich themselves and a few select criminal traders.

Zero Hedge, that’s who.

It was on January 11, 2011, months before Stevenson was engaged in this particular crime (in which he certainly is not alone in and where every single govvy and MBS trading desk has engaged in comparable price manipulation courtesy of POMO, with an intent and a means to sell at the highest possible price to Fed or any other central bank), when we explained precisely this:

While commenting on yesterday’s NYT joke of a profile of the New York Fed POMO group, we openly mocked the claim by one Mr. Frost who said that when monetizing debt “We are looking to get the best price we can for the taxpayer.” We politely suggested that this is a blatant, tendentious lie, and that in fact the New York Fed merely cares to gift the Primary Dealers with any price it can for their bonds just so it stays on their good side (think Primary Dealer Auction take down over 50%), and after all – it is only money that according to Steve Liesman appears out of thin air.

And… three years later we were shocked to learn we were right. Because the Stevenson case, described in clear, informative language, explains precisely how it is that Dealers took advantage of the BOE (and by extension continue to take advantage of the Fed’s) POMO, where the central bank buys back bonds from the dealer community, with zero regard for its cost-basis during the POMO reverse auction segment, to generate abnormal profits for these same dealers.

What follows is a somewhat technical narrative released earlier today by the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority, which explains precisely this. We recommend readers read it to understand precisely that the purpose of POMO is, in addition to loading up banks with reserves which can and in the case of JPM were used to corner risk markets as initial margin collatereal, is to provide bank traders with riskless profits. We certainly hope US regulators (yes, we are laughing too) read it as well, to understand just how US traders abuse the Fed’s own POMO on a day to day basis. We know they won’t because their rightful owners, the banks, will never allow this generous daily piggy bank spigot to ever be shut down.

Select excerpts from the FCA’s final notice against Mark Stevenson (pdf)

Events from June 2011 to 9 October 2011

June 2011

Mr Stevenson’s position in the Bond was first established on 14 June 2011. This was a purchase of £50 million from a sovereign wealth fund, an existing client of CSSEL. This was a typical client trade by CSSEL and one which was consistent with its obligation as a GEMM to provide market liquidity through client trading. Mr Stevenson dealt with the trade for CSSEL.

Two further acquisitions of the Bond (totalling £100 million) were made by CSSEL on 16 June 2011. These purchases were made by the GEMM side of the desk and were transferred to Mr Stevenson’s proprietary book shortly after the acquisition.

1 July – 5 October 2011

Between 1 July and 5 October 2011, Mr Stevenson acquired further amounts of the Bond. Mr Stevenson had formed a view that the Bond was undervalued relative to other gilts and that it would be a good trading strategy to accumulate the Bond. Mr Stevenson believed there was considerable potential for the Bond to appreciate in value should further QE be introduced by the BOE. The first phase of QE had been halted in 2010 but Mr Stevenson agreed with some market commentators who felt that further QE was more likely than not.

On 29 September 2011, Mr Stevenson had a telephone conversation with Trader A, an acquaintance and employee of another GEMM. During the conversation, the following exchange took place in the context of QE:

STEVENSON: I mean I’ll give you my sort of run down. So we’re sort of thinking where the cusp could come, so obviously it could be 3 years and out but we’re sort of fancy longs because 5 years and out is possible.

TRADER A: Yes.

STEVENSON: In which case 8 3 17 [i.e. the Bond] I mean they look off the dial-y cheap to me and who’s … going to stop you putting them up.

TRADER A: Yeah yeah.

STEVENSON: I mean they’re the same err you know same swap thing as 8 21 or are they were until 2 days ago until the basis went a bit bid.

TRADER A: Yes.

STEVENSON: And who’s … going to stop them going 20 basis richer.

TRADER A: Yeah yeah.

STEVENSON: If [the BOE says its] buying them against the DMO’s screen.

The “cusp” refers to the maturity bucket starting point for QE reverse auction eligibility – that is, whether gilts with a residual maturity of 3 years or 5 years will be the eligibility starting point for the QE program. “Buy[ing] them against the DMO screen” refers to the process the BOE uses to buy gilts offered to it during QE – that is, ranking the value of offers relative to the DMO mid-price for the relevant gilt. “Putting them up” refers to the Bond increasing in value. “Going 20 basis points richer” means decreasing the yield of the Bond by 20 basis points with the price of the Bond increasing or becoming “richer” by an equivalent amount.

Between 28 September and 5 October 2011, Mr Stevenson did not purchase the Bond. The Bond did not trade at all in the IDB market between 30 September and 5 October 2011. There was a significant level of trading in the Comparator Bonds in the period between 30 September and 5 October 2011 (£648,230,000 of UKT 1.75% 2017, £504,850,000 of UKT 5% 2018 and £581,300,000 of UKT 4% 2016 were traded in the IDB market), illustrating the Bond’s relative illiquidity. Mr Stevenson did not buy more of the Bond because QE2 had not been announced and there was no certainty that it would be. Mr Stevenson’s described his strategy as “…a trade idea for an event which might or might not occur.” QE was therefore a key factor in his strategy to buy more of the Bond.

 

6 October 2011

At midday on Thursday 6 October 2011, the BOE announced that QE would be reintroduced on 10 October 2011. The market notice released by the BOE confirmed that the Bond was potentially eligible for inclusion in the QE2 operation on 10 October 2011. At 16:00 on 6 October 2011, the BOE issued a further market notice, which stated that certain gilts would be excluded where the BOE owned more than 70% of the free float (free float information is freely available to the market), consistent with the approach taken in QE1. The BOE did not own more than 70% of the Bond meaning that it was not excluded from, and was eligible for, QE2.

Mr Stevenson purchased an additional £31 million of the Bond through the IDB market on 6 October 2011 through switch trades with one of the Comparator Bonds, UKT 1.75% 2017.

 

7 October 2011

On Friday 7 October 2011, £29.3 million of the Bond was traded by other market participants through the IDB market. Mr Stevenson did not acquire any more of the Bond, although he did actively trade gilts on 7 October 2011.

During the day, Mr Stevenson took part in a telephone conversation with Broker A, a friend of Mr Stevenson and an agency broker. During the telephone conversation with Broker A, Mr Stevenson said “And we’ve been loading up with QE trades for months”, and “QE’s are … cake…”. The Authority has concluded that Mr Stevenson was indicating his belief that QE was an opportunity to profit from selling gilts to the BOE.

Mr Stevenson received a telephone call on 7 October 2011 from Risk Management at CSSEL, who were calling in respect of a profit and loss spike on a book jointly held by Mr Stevenson and another trader. Mr Stevenson explained on the telephone to the Risk Management officer that:

“… I mean the MPC, the Bank of England has announced you know they’re extending their asset purchase scheme yesterday, and you know we’re preparing to… well we’re buying some assets to sell to them, I mean basically that’s what’s going on.”

In other words, Mr Stevenson stated that he had been acquiring assets and his intention was to buy more, for the express purpose of selling them onto the BOE as part of QE2.

 

10 October 2011

Monday 10 October 2011 was the first day of QE2. Between 14:15 and 14:45 GEMMs could submit offers to sell gilts to the BOE through its B-Tender electronic platform. Buying gilts on QE days can be more difficult than non-QE days because sellers of eligible gilts are fully aware that a large buyer (that is, the BOE) will enter the market at 14:15.

At 07:34, Mr Stevenson made enquiries to try to find out if CSSEL’s client from whom the initial acquisition of the Bond had taken place in June 2011 had any further amounts of the Bond for sale. No indication was received that this was the case.

At 08:49, Mr Stevenson contacted a broker at IDB A and asked for the yield spread between the Bond and UKT 1.75% 2017. Mr Stevenson also told the broker at IDB A that he was a buyer of the Bond.

Between 09:00 and 14:30, Mr Stevenson bought a total of £331.1 million of the Bond through the IDB market. This was 2,700% of the Bond’s average daily trading value for the period from June to October 2011 and represented 92% of the purchases of the Bond in the IDB market that day. He purchased the Bond outright and through switch trades as follows:

(a) £57 million by buying the Bond outright at progressively higher prices;

(b) £254.1 million by buying the Bond and selling UKT 5% 2018 at an increasingly more expensive spread (that is, he paid increasingly more to acquire the Bond whilst selling UKT 5% 2018);

(c) £20 million by buying the Bond and selling UKT 1.75% 2017 at an increasingly more expensive spread (that is, he paid increasingly more to acquire the Bond whilst selling UKT 1.75% 2017).

The table at Appendix 1 sets out details of Mr Stevenson’s trading in the Bond on 10 October 2011. Mr Stevenson had never previously traded the Bond in such significant volumes in a single day.

At 09:07, Mr Stevenson received a telephone call from Trader A, who was calling to speak to one of Mr Stevenson’s work colleagues. Mr Stevenson and Trader A initially discussed trading generally and then discussed trading with respect to QE. Towards the end of the conversation, the following exchange took place:

STEVENSON: Well we’re thinking about sort of doing something today but erm…

TRADER A: I think you should just offer way up.

STEVENSON: Well, it depends if you get it way up before, or offer way up.

TRADER A: Yeah [laughs].

STEVENSON: [Laughs]. If you see what I mean.

The Authority has concluded that:

(a) “Doing something today” means making an offer into the QE reverse auction.

(b) “Offer way up” means offering gilts to the BOE at a high price.

(c) “Get it way up before” means moving the price of a gilt higher ahead of the reverse auction.

 

Buying the Bond outright

Mr Stevenson bought £57 million of the Bond outright in a series of 7 trades between 09:44 and 13:58 as set out in the table at Appendix 1. The increasing price at which Mr Stevenson was prepared to acquire the Bond on an outright basis can be contrasted with the gilt futures price, described by brokers at the time as trading at “a new low”. It can also be contrasted with the increasing yield (and decreasing price) of the Comparator Bonds on 10 October 2011 as set out in Chart 1.

 

Buying the Bond through switch trades

Trading the Bond vs UKT 5% 2018

Mr Stevenson bought £254.1 million of the Bond on a switch basis against the UKT 5% 2018. These purchases took place in a series of 12 transactions between 10:26 and 14:27 and occurred at a yield spread of between -22 and -28.5 basis points. The most expensive purchase of the Bond by Mr Stevenson at -28.5 basis points at 14:01 and 14:13 represented a richening in the yield spread of the Bond against the UKT 5% 2018 of 10.5 basis points compared to his initial bid of -18 at 09:47.

Through this period of trading, Mr Stevenson consistently improved the level at which he was bidding for the Bond. The effect of this was to increase the price of the Bond relative to that of UKT 5% 2018 (and the other Comparator Bonds).

There was a pattern to Mr Stevenson’s trading whereby he bought and then increased his bid within a short time frame. For example:

(a) At 12:17 he lifted an offer at -25 and he then immediately bid at -25.5.

(b) At 12:20 his bid at -25.5 was hit and he then immediately bid at -26.

(c) Between 12:23 and 12:31 his bid at -26 was hit four times and at 12.42 he bid at -26.5.

(d) At 12:51 he lifted an offer at -26.75 and then immediately bid at -27.

This style of trading, buying at one level and immediately rebidding at a higher level is known amongst traders as “facing”. It is called this because the trading is “in your face” and is unusual in circumstances where the wider market is not moving in the same direction, because it is usually unnecessary to trade very aggressively if buying in a market where prices are generally falling. On 10 October 2011, the wider gilt market was moving in the opposite direction to the Bond and losing value and therefore the aggressive trading undertaken by Mr Stevenson was unlikely to have been necessary.

Mr Stevenson was the only market participant who provided bids in this switch to IDB B on this day and he will have been aware of the absence of other bidders throughout the day through his interaction with the IDBs.

As the day progressed and the level of the Bond’s outperformance increased, it became apparent that some sellers were beginning to enter the market. For example, the broker at IDB B noted to Mr Stevenson that the seller with whom he traded at 12:20 was a different counterparty from the one who sold to him at 12:17. Despite this, Mr Stevenson continued to offer to pay increasingly more for the Bond.

Between 12:23 and 12:31 Mr Stevenson’s bid at -26 was hit by four different counterparties resulting in Mr Stevenson buying £58.4 million of the Bond. Mr Stevenson continued to bid at -26 and then improved his bid at 12:42 to -26.5.

From around 13:45, additional sellers began to enter the market and a number of offers began to be made by other participants. Mr Stevenson’s bids were hit 3 times at -28.5 (at 13:45, 14:01 and 14:13) and his bid at -28 was also hit (at 14:16).

Mr Stevenson’s activity in the IDB market after the BOE reverse auction had commenced at 14:15 is particularly significant and the continued activity in the market informed the DMO mid-price which in turn informed the price of offers made to the BOE. In the 15 minutes between 14:15 and 14:30, Mr Stevenson purchased £56.7 million of the Bond on a switch basis against the UKT 5% 2018.

 

Trading the Bond vs UKT 1.75% 2017

At 09:00, a broker from IDB A noted in response to a request from Mr Stevenson that there had been a move in the yield spread between the Bond and the UKT 1.75% 2017 (from +10 to +9.5) which reflected a broader movement in the market, that is, a flattening in the yield curve.

As the morning progressed, the Bond outperformed the UKT 1.75% 2017 such that the relationship between the two yields changed significantly. From approximately midday, the yield of the Bond became lower than that of the UKT 1.75% 2017. Thereafter, Mr Stevenson was prepared to buy the Bond against selling the UKT 1.75% 2017 and drop a negative yield rather than pick-up a positive yield, meaning that Mr Stevenson was effectively paying for the trade rather than receiving payment as he would have done earlier in the day.

Between 14:23 and 14:30, Mr Stevenson bought £20 million of the Bond on a switch basis against the UKT 1.75% 2017. These purchases took place in a series of 4 individual purchases and occurred at a yield spread of between -2 and -3 basis points. The average yield spread at which Mr Stevenson bought the Bond through this switch was -2.63 which represented a richening in the yield spread of the Bond against the UKT 1.75% 2017 of 11.63 basis points in comparison to the initial bid of +9 that he placed at 09:01. The most expensive purchase of the Bond by Mr Stevenson at -3 basis points represented a richening in the yield spread between the Bond and the UKT 1.75% 2017 of 12 basis points from the initial bid.

 

The impact of Mr Stevenson’s trading

The three charts below demonstrate the significant impact Mr Stevenson’s trading had on the Bond’s yield and yield spread relative to other comparable bonds. For example:

(a) Chart 1 shows the Bond outperforming all Comparator Bonds on 10 October 2011. From around 09:20, the Bond’s yield decreases (reflecting a price increase) as the yield of all other Comparator Bonds increase (reflecting a price decrease). The yield spread between the Bond and the Comparator Bonds is at its widest at around 14:30. Following this, Mr Stevenson leaves the IDB market and ceases bidding for or trading the Bond. By approximately 15:30, the Bond’s yield movement had fallen in line with each of the other Comparator Bonds, completely reversing its earlier outperformance.

(b) Chart 2 shows the movement in the yield of the Bond (UKT 8 3 17) and the UKT 1.75% 2017 (UKT 1 75 17) and the movement of the spread between the Bond and UKT 1.75% 2017 (17/17s Yield Spread) on 10 October 2011. The yield spread moves from approximately -9 to +3 between the times Mr Stevenson placed his first bid (09:01) and when he executed his last trade (14:30).

(c) Similarly, Chart 3 shows the movement in the yield of the Bond (UKT 8 3 17) and the UKT 5% 2018 (UKT 5 18) and the movement of the spread between them on 10 October 2011. The yield spread can be seen dropping throughout the day until around 14:30, at which time it begins to increase, until approximately 15:30 when it stabilises.

Offers submitted by Mr Stevenson to the Bank of England

The QE2 reverse auction ran from 14:15 to 14:45 on 10 October 2011. During this period, the GEMMs were able to submit offers to sell gilts through the BOE’s B-Tender system during the auction period. Mr Stevenson was responsible for placing the offers in the Bond on behalf of CSSEL to the BOE.

Mr Stevenson submitted a number of offers through the B-Tender system during this time. Each offer superseded the previous one and only offers in the system as at 14:45 could be accepted by the BOE. As shown in the table below, the quantity of the Bond offered by Mr Stevenson increased from £800 million to £850 million and the price at which Mr Stevenson offered the Bond decreased during the auction.

Bond offers submitted by Mr Stevenson to the BOE on 10 October 2011

The size of Mr Stevenson’s offer of the Bond into the QE2 reverse auction on 10 October 2011 was larger than all of the other offers in the Bond on 10 October 2011 combined and represented two-thirds of the value of the Bond offered to the BOE on 10 October 2011 and the total consideration payable by the BOE to CSSEL (had the offer been accepted by the BOE) would have been 70% of the amount (£1.7 billion) it had allocated to the reverse auction on 10 October 2011.

 

Events following submission of the offer

At 14:56, the BOE announced the “Asset Purchase Facility gilt purchase operation results” which included the following statement:

“The Bank has decided to reject all offers against UKT_8.75_250817 following significant changes in its yield in the run up to the auction.”

The Bank therefore decided to reject all offers in the Bond – the only time that the BOE has ever taken such a step.

Shortly afterwards, the BOE contacted CSSEL. In a telephone conversation between senior representatives of the BOE and CSSEL, the BOE explained that it believed that the Bond had been traded in such a way so as to increase its price in order to sell it to the BOE at a distorted level, and that someone would contact the relevant trading desk at CSSEL to further investigate.

The BOE was concerned that the Bond was being offered to it at an inflated level, such that there would have been an additional, unacceptable cost to the taxpayer in buying at that level. The BOE therefore rejected all offers in the Bond.

 

The market’s view of the trading

Several gilt market participants commented on the Bond’s significant outperformance on 10 October 2011.

By 09:39 (38 minutes after Mr Stevenson began trading in the Bond), a market participant had telephoned the BOE regarding the Bond’s outperformance. Several other market participants telephoned the BOE throughout the day, suggesting that the Bond had been “squeezed”, “rammed”, and that someone “was messing around with” it. One market participant said he could see no reason for the significant trading in the Bond on 10 October 2011 other than deliberately pushing the price higher in order to sell to the BOE later in the day.

Some market participants declined to trade the Bond with clients on 10 October 2011, with one indicating that he would be prepared to do so only at the previous trading day’s closing price in view of the unusual price movements. Other market participants commented on the scale of the outperformance.

 

Mr Stevenson’s explanation for the trading

Mr Stevenson has stated that he bought the Bond on 10 October 2011 because he believed it was cheap and not with the definite intention of offering to sell it to the BOE later that day. He stated that he traded the Bond throughout the day on 10 October 2011 in an open and transparent manner. He said that he continued to purchase the Bond until it reached what he believed was its fair value. He said that once the Bond reached what he believed was its fair value, he was entitled to offer it into the reverse auction.

Mr Stevenson said that one reason for offering the Bond into the QE reverse auction on 10 October 2011 was in order to rebalance the trading book. He said that the Bond was offered because it had reached what he believed was its fair value, but that he could have offered a number of other gilts instead.

 

The Authority’s findings about Mr Stevenson’s trading in the Bond

The Authority has reached the view that Mr Stevenson made the decision to purchase the Bond with a view to offering it to the BOE in the auction. He was aware that his trading in the Bond on 10 October 2011 would not only increase CSSEL’s holding in the Bond but also increase its price. This was done in order to increase the return for CSSEL if its bid in the auction was accepted by the BOE.

The Authority has concluded that Mr Stevenson had formed an intention to offer the Bond into the next round of QE before 10 October 2011. He had an opportunity to buy more of the Bond before 10 October 2011 (both before and after QE2 was announced on 6 October 2011) but instead chose to buy an extremely large quantity on 10 October 2011 (92% of the value traded in the Bond through the IDBs and 2,700% of the Bond’s 5 month daily average volume, the only time he has traded the Bond in this volume).

Mr Stevenson’s trading in the Bond on 10 October 2011 had a significant effect on the price of the Bond, something Mr Stevenson would have been aware of at the time yet he continued to buy the Bond aggressively throughout the day. The comments made during the day by other market participants indicate how remarkable the movements in the Bond’s price and yield were compared to the Comparator Bonds during the day. The Authority has concluded that Mr Stevenson’s trading was designed to move the price of the Bond on 10 October 2011 and that he was not simply trying to acquire more of a bond that he perceived as being cheap.

Having considered these factors, the Authority has concluded that Mr Stevenson’s conduct is at level 5 in terms of seriousness and therefore, the percentage of relevant income for step 2 is 40 %. This amounts to £946,800. As this amount is larger than £100,000, the step 2 figure is £946,800.

The Authority therefore imposes a total financial penalty of £662,700 on Mark Stevenson for market abuse.

The Authority considers that Mr Stevenson deliberately acted to increase the price of the Bond on 10 October 2011 and considers that this amounted to deliberate market abuse. His behaviour is particularly egregious as it took place on the first day of QE2 and effectively sought to deprive the economy from QE’s full effect in order to maximise the potential profit from selling the Bond to the BOE in the QE2 reverse auction. The Authority considers that, as a result of this behaviour, Mr Stevenson lacks fitness and propriety in terms of his integrity.

The Authority therefore makes a prohibition order pursuant to section 56 of the Act prohibiting Mr Stevenson from performing any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by any authorised or exempt person or exempt professional firm. This order takes effect from 20 March 2014.

 

 


 

That’s ok – we are confident Mr. Stevenson will live comfortably for the rest of his life away from trading, with the millions of bonuses he has collected during his tenure trading bonds in a fair and honest manner.

As for everyone else, now that you know how POMO manipulation is done, keep doing it.


    



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S&P Brings Out The Big Policy Guns – Downgrades Russia To Outlook Negative

S&P, still deep in the mire of a legal battle with the US government, has decided now is an opportune time to cut the ratings outlook on Russia:

  • *RUSSIAN FEDERATION OUTLOOK TO NEGATIVE FROM STABLE BY S&P
  • *S&P SEES EU-U.S. IMPOSING FURTHER SANCTIONS

Russia remains a BBB credit (but with the outlook shift remains open to a downgrade with 24 months). S&P has cut 2014 GDP forecast to 1.2% and 2015 to 2.2%. Of course, we are sure, this would have nothing to do with currying favors with the US government (who threatened them when they downgraded the USA). Full report below.

 

S&P Reduces Russian Federation outlook to Negative from Stable.

Below is the full report:

OVERVIEW
• In our view, heightened geopolitical risk and the prospect of U.S. and EU economic sanctions following Russia's incorporation of Crimea could reduce the flow of potential investment, trigger rising capital outflows, and further weaken Russia's already deteriorating economic performance.

• We are therefore revising the outlook on our long-term sovereign credit ratings on Russia to negative from stable.

• We are affirming our 'BBB/A-2' foreign currency and 'BBB+/A-2' local currency ratings on the Russian Federation.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 "EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on the Russian Federation are subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a pre-established calendar (see "Calendar Of 2014 Publication Dates For EMEA Sovereign, Regional, And Local Government Ratings," published Dec. 30, 2013, on RatingsDirect). Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation. In this case, the reason for the deviation is the material and unanticipated intensification of geopolitical risks since our most recent release on Dec. 13, 2013, the introduction of sanctions, and the increased financial and economic downside risks to Russia related to these events. The next scheduled rating publication on the sovereign rating of the Russian Federation will be on April 25, 2014.

RATING ACTION

On March 20, 2014, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on the Russian Federation (Russia) to negative from stable. At the same time, we affirmed our 'BBB/A-2' foreign currency and 'BBB+/A-2' local currency long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on Russia.

We also affirmed our 'ruAAA' long-term national scale rating on Russia.

RATIONALE

The outlook revision reflects our view of the material and unanticipated economic and financial consequences that EU and U.S. sanctions could have on Russia's creditworthiness following Russia's incorporation of Crimea, which the international community currently considers legally to be a part of Ukraine.

In February 2014, pro-Russian forces took control of Crimea. As a consequence, on March 6, the European Union (EU) and the U.S. agreed on an initial round of sanctions, as part of a staged approach to imposing sanctions on Russia. On March 16, a referendum was held in Crimea in which approximately 97% of voters reportedly were in favor of Crimea joining Russia. The following day, the EU and U.S. announced that they viewed the referendum as illegitimate and sanctioned certain Russian and Ukrainian nationals through travel bans and asset freezes. On March 18, Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, signed a decree incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation which was ratified by parliament today.

We expect that the EU and U.S. will impose further sanctions.

In our view, the deteriorating geopolitical situation has already had a negative impact on Russia's economy. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation appears to have abandoned its policy of increased currency flexibility and limited intervention in the foreign-exchange market. The Central Bank is now focused on stabilizing financial markets in light of the inflationary impact of the around 10% depreciation of the currency so far this year and the significant capital outflow, which we estimate at about $60 billion in the first quarter of 2014, similar to the level for the whole of 2013. The Central Bank also called an extraordinary meeting in March, raising its benchmark interest rate by 150 basis points to 7%.

Economic growth in Russia slowed to 1.3% in 2013, the lowest rate since 1999–excluding the economic contraction in 2009. We expect a further modest deceleration in growth this year and have lowered our GDP growth forecasts for 2014 and 2015 to 1.2% and 2.2%, respectively, from 2.2% and 3.0% in December 2013. In our view, there is a significant downside risk that growth will fall well below 1% if the uncertainties caused by the geopolitical tensions do not subside in the near term.

In our view, there is a material risk that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine could extend beyond Crimea and that violence between pro- and anti-Russian protesters could spread to other cities in Eastern Ukraine. Should the situation deteriorate, we believe further and wider sanctions could be imposed against Russian institutions and individuals, potentially including trade restrictions. In our view, these sanctions could further undermine Russia's economic growth prospects. We note, however, that sanctions, particularly those that might be imposed by EU countries, could be tempered by European economic trade and energy interests.

Our ratings on Russia continue to be supported by its relatively strong external and government balance sheets. The ratings remain constrained by structural weaknesses in Russia's economy, in particular the strong dependence on hydrocarbons and other commodities. Further constraints are what we view as comparatively weak governance and economic institutions that impede the economy's competitiveness, investment climate, and business environment.

The Russian government's finances continue to be buoyed by strong commodity revenues, particularly from oil. These account for almost one-half of the government's budget revenues, but also leave it exposed to swings in commodity prices. To mitigate this vulnerability, the government has instituted a fiscal rule from 2013, which caps government expenditure based on long-term historical oil prices. This fiscal rule is designed to lead to the accumulation of assets in times of high oil prices, and to the drawing on fiscal assets in times of low oil prices, reducing the procyclicality of fiscal policy. In our view, the government's commitment to this fiscal rule will likely be significantly tested by the recent further deterioration in growth prospects, while off-budget measures to support additional spending could also increase. We estimate Russia's 2013 general government budget to have recorded a deficit of 0.6% of GDP. Based on our expectation that commodity revenues will decline slightly on the back of a slightly weaker oil price (falling to $95 by 2015), we think the general government deficit will gradually worsen, reaching 1.5% of GDP by 2016, just outside the level targeted by the fiscal rule, and implying an average annual change in general government debt of 1.5% of GDP over 2013-2016.

Russia's aging population will be a source of considerable medium- to long-term fiscal pressure. In a no-policy-change scenario, we expect the aging of the population to add more than 10% of GDP to government spending by 2050 compared with 2010 levels. While the government has been adjusting pension system parameters, it has so far shied away from more decisively tackling the issue. We now estimate the Russian government to be in a marginal net debtor position due to revised data on the outstanding stock of gross general government debt. Nevertheless, low levels of gross debt imply low general government interest payments at about 2% of revenues during 2014-2016.

Commodity exports are also behind Russia's persistent current account surpluses, resulting in a net external asset position of about 4% of GDP in 2014. Measured in terms of narrow net external debt, that is, external debt minus liquid external assets held by the public and banking sector, we expect Russia to be in a small net external creditor position. This strong external asset position has been declining since reaching a peak of 34% in 2009. We note, however, that due to consistently negative errors and omissions in Russia's balance of payments (averaging almost $8 billion annually, or 1.5% of CAR in 2007 to 2013) the reported net asset position is considerably lower than implied by the large current account surpluses.

We expect the current account surpluses to disappear by 2015, owing to imports rising faster than exports. Further ruble weakness could weigh on imports and keep current account deficits from occurring a little later, but we believe the longer-term trend of a weakening current account will remain in place even so. Gross external financing needs (current account payments plus short-term external debt by remaining maturity) will amount to 70% of CARs and usable reserves in 2014, in our view. Dependence on commodity exports results in terms-of-trade volatility, although past experience has shown that imports tend to adjust strongly, offsetting part of a commodity price-induced drop in export revenue.

Russia's political institutions remain comparatively weak and political power is highly centralized. Protesters, opposition members, nongovernmental organizations, and liberal members of the political establishment have come under increasing pressure. We do not expect the government to decisively and effectively tackle the long-standing structural obstacles to stronger economic growth over our forecast horizon (2014-2017). These obstacles include high perceived corruption, comparatively weak rule of law, the state's pervasive role in the economy, and a challenging business and investment climate.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects our view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could reassess the risks to Russia's creditworthiness based on its deteriorating external profile and reduced monetary policy flexibility. As a result, we could lower our ratings on Russia within the next 24 months. Geopolitical reaction to Russia's incorporation of Crimea could further reduce the flow of potential investment and negatively affect already weak economic growth, which would provide a further basis for lowering the ratings. Similarly, we could equalize the local and foreign currency ratings on Russia if we were to view Russia's transition toward a more flexible exchange rate regime as having stalled.

We could revise the outlook to stable if Russia's economy were to prove resilient to the current challenges, resulting in a return to a policy of a more flexible exchange rate, and if its external and fiscal buffers were to remain in line with our current expectations.


    



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Ukraine Goes Cyprus 2.0, To Tax Deposits Over 100,000 Hryvnia (To Appease IMF?)

It would appear the IMF’s dirty little fingerprints are all over this latest piece of legislation in Ukraine. The Ukraine Finance Ministry is proposing to take a very-similar-to-Cyprus approach to bailing in its despositors:

  • *UKRAINE PROPOSES NEW TAX ON DEPOSITS EXCEEDING 100,000 HRYVNIA
  • *UKRAINE TAX PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE 1.5% OF ALL DEPOSITS

This would appear a measure designed to stabilize the budget for potential IMF negotiations and fits perfectly with what the IMF has consistently hinted as the next steps for many nations.

 

This is further to the news last week that a 25% deposit “tax” was being considered…

Via Tax News,

Ukraine’s parliament is to consider draft laws which would ban foreign-currency bank deposits and introduce a 25% tax on interest on deposits in banks and other financial institutions in circumstances where the interest received is more than 5% above the rate set by the National Bank of Ukraine.

 

The proposed amendments to banking and tax legislation were put forward by Yevhen Sihal, who is a member of the country’s ruling Party of Regions. In an explanatory note submitted with the drafts, he argued that the higher tax rate will encourage consumer spending, reduce the cost of business loans, and provide extra funding for the country’s Pension Fund. Sihal also explained that his tax proposal is based on the experience of the Russian Federation.

 

Sihal’s proposals have united the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) and the country’s Communist Party in opposition. The NBU was quoted as saying that it was concerned about the politicization of economic issues, and that its policy was to increase the deposit base in line with international practice, while Communist leader Petro Symonenko suggested that the owners of large deposits will simply move their funds abroad to avoid the tax.

We assume, just as with Cyprus, that the big money has already left the building leaving small businesses and the average joe to foot the IMF-demanding bill (for the good of the country) to get their bailout funds.


    



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US/Europe Stocks Melt-Up Into EU Close

US and European stocks are spiking higher this morning supposedly on the back of better-than-expected data (Philly Fed) and self-referencing bias that surely Janet Yellen didn't mean what she said. Stocks (oddly) melted up on the last Philly Fed release (which was a massive miss). Anyway, fun-durr-mentals aside, this move is all about AUDJPY all the time as Financials lead the way (and are the only sector green post Yellen). European stocks are merelty tagging along for the exuberant melt-up ride. Beware of financials as CDS are widening even as stocks soar – a pattern we have seen before into the run-up to CCAR (stress-tests) and doesn't end well for bank stocks.

 

All about AUDJPY…

 

And Europe catching up into the close…

 

With financials leading the way…

 

But we've seen this exuberance before…

 

and copper is tanking…

 

Charts: Bloomberg


    



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British tax authorities just out-mafia’d the IRS

March 20, 2014
Sovereign Valley Farm, Chile

A few months ago, I told you about a bold report published within the IRS that absolutely blasted the agency’s mafia tactics.

In its 2013 annual report to Congress, the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate wrote that the IRS shows “disrespect for the law and a disregard for taxpayer rights.”

Further, the report says that the current system “disproportionately burdens those who [make] honest mistakes,” and that “tax requirements have become so confusing and the compliance burden so great that taxpayers are giving up their U.S. citizenship in record numbers.”

We all know the stories. The IRS has nearly infinite power to do whatever it wants, including freezing you out of your own bank account without so much as a phone call, let alone due process.

In the Land of the Free, people think they’re innocent until proven guilty. This is total BS. If you are only suspected of wrongdoing, you can be locked out of your entire savings.

This is an incredible amount of authority to wield.

But the British government has just gone even further.

Buried in its most recent budget package is a curt little paragraph that reads “The Government will modernise and strengthen [the tax agency’s] debt collection powers to recover financial assets from the bank accounts of debtors who owe over £1,000 of tax.”

Read that one more time just to let it sink in.

The British government is setting an absurdly low threshold at £1,000… about $1,650 in back taxes.

And they’re saying that if the tax authorities believe you owe even just a minor tax debt, they will not only FREEZE your assets, they’ll dip into your bank account and TAKE whatever they want.

Judge, jury, and executioner. They get to decide in their sole discretion if you owe them money, and they get to take as much as they want to satisfy the debt.

It’s unbelievable.

I can’t even begin to imagine why any Brit in his/her right mind would continue to hold a substantial amount of savings in UK banks.

You are practically begging for the government to relieve you of your hard-earned savings.

Even if you haven’t done anything wrong, and have paid up everything that you owe, the slightest clerical error could have them plunging their filthy hands into your account.

These issues are worldwide. Whether you’re in the US, UK, France, Cyprus, etc., when governments go bankrupt, these are precisely the sorts of tactics they resort to.

Rational, thinking people need to be aware of this trend. And it behooves absolutely everyone to come up with a plan B. Because at the rate things are going, Plan B may very soon become Plan A.

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