Bagehot & Deflation: Interview with David Kotok

Last week, I published two articles, on Zero Hedge and Breitbart, respectively, that highlight the issue of “financial repression” via low interest rates. Below is an exchange with my dear friend and mentor David Kotok, Chairman of Cumberland Advisors. We discuss the question of whether the current policy of the Federal Open Market Committee is feeding deflation via low rate policy. This question has great significance since the stated goal of FOMC policy is to raise inflation to ~2% annually and boost employment. From my perspective working in the housing sector, the combination of current Fed policy and new regulatory strictures such as Dodd-Frank and Basel III are clearly thwarting efforts by the FOMC to reflate the housing sector and the wider US economy. — RCW

Whalen: David, I really appreciate your comments on the ZH article last week, “Default, Deflation and Financial Repression.” In particular, your focus on ultralow interest rates, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation premiums and the flow of cash from the banks to the Federal Reserve System is very illuminating – and disturbing. As you know, I have long maintained that the FDIC’s fiscal need to fund the deposit insurance scheme is a separate matter from monetary policy, but when we have near-zero interest rates, the average FDIC premium of 7-10bp does become significant. Can you talk first about what is happening in the US money markets from your perspective?

Kotok: You wrote a very important article last week, especially the part about the Fed taking billions out of the economy and away from savers in order to subsidize the banking industry. But there is another and more nuanced part of the puzzle that we need to consider. We have a Fed Funds target of 0-0.25% in place presently. The Fed is also paying 0.25% per annum on excess reserves. This means the reserve rate is higher than the actual Fed Funds rate while the lower bound is maintained at zero. The GSEs, who are large sellers of Fed Funds, cannot legally deposit directly with the Fed. So, they sell Fed Funds, and the banks buy them and redeposit the cash with the Fed. The FDIC levies an asset-based fee on each bank and that includes the reserve deposit assets which are under their FDIC jurisdiction. So the actual Fed Funds rate, inclusive of the FDIC insurance levy, is below the gross (0.25%) reserve deposit rate. Some larger, riskier banks pay even higher FDIC fees than the average and are effectively losing money on this trade. Meanwhile the US subsidiaries of foreign banks, which are not subject to the FDIC levy, have an advantage in the short-term markets.

Whalen: So your basic point is that the fact that rates are so low in absolute terms is distorting the US money markets, in part due to structural costs like the FDIC insurance premium? The nineteenth-century economist Walter Bagehot maintained that in order to prevent bank panics a central bank should provide liquidity to the market at a very high rate of interest. Yet today the neo-Keynesian tendency that controls the FOMC believes that the fact the Fed has the virtually unlimited ability to temporarily expand the money supply refutes Bagehot’s dictum. In today’s terms, Bagehot was warning us against keeping rates too low for too long because real money would flee from financial repression.

Kotok: Antoine Martin of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in his important 2005 paper “Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed’s Response to September 11,” argues that Bagehot had in mind a commodity money regime in which the amount of reserves available was limited. Thus, keeping rates high was a way to draw liquidity, that is gold, back into the markets. Bagehot also understood that low interest rates fuel bad asset allocation decisions – what we call “moral hazard.” In the age of fiat money, however, economists have taken the opposite view, namely that an unlimited supply of reserves obviates the need to attract money back into the financial markets.  Remember that Martin’s paper was written two years before the start of the subprime crisis.

Whalen: His timing was impecable.

Kotok:  Bagehot’s classic text advocated a penalty interest rate secured by good collateral. He was envisioning a form of discount window mechanism similar to what central banks used in the pre-QE era. That mechanism has been mostly replaced with QE, which is a policy that we are still in the early stages of learning about.  More recent Fed papers have delved into the impact of QE on otherwise neutral interest rates. It certainly lowers them for a while and in the early stages of QE. Other researchers have noted how the central bank’s remittances to the Treasury alter the fiscal authority budget balance. And others have focused on the potential methods for terminating QE and getting to a neutral position. Still others are trying to solve the mystery of how to reduce the impact of QE and restore a more neutral policy. Lastly there are the inflation hawks, who forecast an inflationary outcome of QE. They may eventually be right, but after five years the evidence suggests that excess reserves are not by themselves very inflationary. It takes an acceleration of growth to turn post-crisis disinflation force around,.  That means rising demand is needed to obtain  rising price pressures. So far, we haven’t seen much of either in the course of our grand experiment with QE. My colleagues and I have written about these various research papers, and the links can be found on our website, www.cumber.com.

Whalen:  Well, the 2001-2007 period certainly suggests that Bagehot’s concerns about low interest rates fueling moral hazard have not been refuted. The FOMC’s aggressive easing of interest rates, combined with deregulation of the financial markets and the FDIC’s safe harbor with respect to bank asset sales between 2000 and 2010, fueled a speculative binge that nearly destroyed the western world. When Lehman Brothers failed, we had created some $60 trillion in toxic assets that were not supported by the $13 trillion asset US banking system. Now almost seven years since the bust, a large portion of that pile of crap has yet to be remediated.

Kotok: Very true, but the past is past. We must focus on the future. Whether or not you believe that a flexible reserve system like the Fed’s addresses Bagehot’s concern about attracting liquidity back into the markets, the fact is that very low interest rates do distort money flows. That is why your point about the Fed taking $100 billion per quarter out of the hands of savers is so important. But what do the banks do with that money? They deposit it with the Fed. And what does the Fed do with that money? They pay the banks 0.25% and then invest in US Treasury debt and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) at a higher rate, and thereby generate what they call a “profit.”

Whalen: So your point is that the $100 billion per year that the Fed is taking from the hands of consumers, meaning savers, is actually passing through the banking system and going to the Tr
easury via remittances from the Fed?

Kotok: Precisely. The practice of the Fed calling the spread they earn on their nearly $3 trillion portfolio of securities “profits” is a monstrous distortion of the word. What they are doing is feeding deflation in the real economy by reducing savers’ income while pushing down the federal budget deficit. Between budget sequestration and the spread arbitrage created by the low interest rate paid on excess bank reserves, US government policy is clearly operating with a deflationary bias. As you and I have discussed for several years with respect to the higher FDIC deposit insurance premiums, we need to take a holistic view of government policy. The whole playing field gets level if the Fed’s excess-reserve deposit rate is set higher and thus eliminates the false profit they now recognize via remittances to the Treasury.

Whalen: Well, you are assuming that the banks would actually lend out the additional profit that they earned in higher rates on excess reserves. Wouldn’t we need to also raise the target for Fed Funds to say 0-1% from the current 0-0.25% in order to give some of the benefit back to savers of all stripes?

Kotok: As we wrote last week in our Market Comment, in the Fed there are those who argue that the rate should be lowered or maybe go to zero. It is currently 0.25%. Others argue that the rate should be raised or that the amount of required reserves should be changed, thereby changing the excess reserves composition. All sides of this debate are passionately argued by skilled agents in monetary economics. But the real question the FOMC needs to ask is, what are we going to do if inflation continues to fall? That is, if we find ourselves in a deflationary trap. Many commentators argue that we are in one or near one. I am worried about it.

Whalen: It is perhaps not surprising that commercial bankers are against lowering the rate paid on the $2.3 trillion plus in excess reserves sitting on deposit at the Fed.  That is 20% of the assets of the entire US banking sector, again another sign of deflation.  Given the sharp drop in net interest margins in the US banking industry, the Fed may need to boost interest paid on reserves just to keep the industry from imploding.  Just as in the 1930s the Fed fueled deflation by not making credit available, today the opposite seems to be the case – low rates are fueling deflation and impeding the creation of credit to support the economy.  Where are you on the issue of when FOMC policy is likely to change?

Kotok: At Cumberland we believe the short-term interest rate will be kept low for a long period of time, which we measure in years, not months. We do not expect the Fed to deliberately shock the economy by any action that would cause another recession. The June press conference has served to chasten members of the FOMC. Some members of the Fed are already worrying about the possibility of recession. There is evidence of deflationary and/or disinflationary forces at work now. That evidence has raised the eyebrows of some policymakers and commentators. We are among those who worry about this issue. We do not think Japanese-style deflation will happen, but we worry that it could happen. We keep watching commodity prices and oil prices. Oil is especially important because it flows through so any sectors of the economy. And changes in the oil price quickly translate to gasoline prices, and that means a consumption tax increase or decrease. At an annual rate, a 1-cent change in the gasoline price adds up to about $1.4 billion in raised or lowered consumer expenditures.

Whalen: That is a big change. Let’s get back to the deflation issue. For the past year and more I have been writing about the deflationary impact of Dodd-Frank and Basel III, which are effectively offsetting the low rate policy of the FOMC in terms of consumers and households. Companies and leverage investors benefit from low rates, but the sharp drop in mortgage loan origination volumes is a huge red flag regarding deflation in my book. Imagine what the debt and equity markets will do when we see a negative print on the monthly Case-Shiller Index? Our friend Michelle Meyer at Bank America Merrill Lynch says that Q2 2013 was the peak in home price appreciation in this cycle. I agree and think a big part of the reason that housing is now slowing are the excessive regulatory constraints on lending.

Kotok: You are right to worry about housing and the banks, as usual. Many observers look only at the price level, and they miss the fact that it is the rate of change that counts at the margin. That said, the key piece of the puzzle we need to make people understand is the deflationary effect of low rates. If the FOMC increased the target for Fed Funds gradually, say a quarter point per quarter to 1%, and likewise raised the deposit rate for excess reserves, I think that move would go a long way toward curtailing the deflationary threat we now see building. The Fed could do this by widening the band from 0.0% bottom and 0.25% top to 0.0% bottom and 1.00% top. Then raise the reserve deposit rate to 0.50%. That would allow the markets to clear after the distortion of the FDIC fee. It would also allow a slightly positive numerical interest rate to be attached to REPO and to large deposits. Right now, the very large depositors are actually paying a negative rate cost to have their money in the bank. Your point about low-rate policy hurting consumers is right on target, but look at the short-term funds markets for these large institutional folks. Very low rates and structural impediments such as the FDIC insurance premium are preventing the markets from clearing and functioning in a normal fashion. We cannot rebuild the short-term funds markets until the FOMC allows rates to rise. And the longer we wait, the more painful and dangerous the adjustment process will be.  And we haven’t discussed added cost such as those coming from the FDIC’s Orderly Liquidation Authority.  I believe that public release is due soon.

Whalen: Well, if you had a 1% overnight Fed Funds rate, the 7-10bp FDIC insurance premium would be irrelevant. If we translate the fundamental concerns of Bagehot into today’s terms, he probably would agree with your view that low rates are preventing the efficient flow of capital in the markets. But our friends at the Fed just don’t seem to understand their own limits and how policy decisions create future crises. The members of the FOMC led by Janet Yellen believe that they can manipulate interest rates and the economy to a satisfactory income, but in fact the current policy mix may be leading us to another crisis – just as the FOMC did between 2001 and 2007.

Kotok: I’m not as harsh on the FOMC members. Janet Yellen knows the difficulties, and she will use her skills and experience to try to manage the transition from QE at $85 billion a month to something less and eventually to zero. A target for Fed Funds is of no significance in terms of monetary policy when we are at a zero boundary. You can make the target 0-1.00 instead of 0-0.25, and I would do that at once if I were in the decision chair. But it makes no difference until the FOMC neutralizes its balance sheet by raising the rate paid on excess reserves and by reaching a neutral position on QE. Remember that they may also have to term out the reserves to show the markets that they can manage the eventual decline in balance sheet size. Market agents
are very skeptical about that. Sometimes I wonder if our colleagues at the Fed don’t really listen to comments from outside of the temple – from the markets and from private economists and market pundits. The FOMC missed a very valuable opportunity in September to slowly begin to change policy and to start the process of adjusting market expectations. The Fed believes they can eventually manage a gradual transition from the current, extreme policy stance to something more moderate and stable. The market reaction to the unwise June 19th press conference by Chairman Ben Bernanke suggests otherwise. In September, the markets had adjusted to an expectation for some tapering. The Fed had a free shot to do something. They failed to take it.

Whalen: Look at the carnage that the Bernanke press conference caused in the mortgage market. Many banks, non-banks got slaughtered in the TBA market for mortgage financing. PennyMac Mortgage Investment Trust (PMT) missed their hedging for mortgage funding by 16% and lost half of their gain-on-sale margin. The Q3 2013 FDIC data also suggests huge hedging losses by commercial banks. The reference securities in the housing market moved 2-3x vs. the 10-year bond. As you noted earlier, only about 1% of the audience actually understands the utterances of central bankers. Obviously this does not include bond traders or most economists, who were caught flat-footed in June and then wrongly predicted tapering of Fed securities purchases in September. So David, if you were on the FOMC, what would you recommend to your colleagues?

Kotok: First, I would strongly reject the idea that lowering the interest paid on excess reserves is a viable option. Fed remittances to the Treasury are $100 billion per year and rising. If the FOMC takes interest paid on excess reserves to zero, remittances to Treasury will rise unless tapering of bond and MBS purchases resolves and ends completely and abruptly. That would shock markets and weaken the economic recovery, which is still fragile. The FOMC must be very careful here. Even if they could simply stop quantitative easing, remittances will rise since the Fed will not sell and must run off the portfolio over a number of years. The Fed could raise the reserve rate paid to 50bp for a start. That clears the FDIC fee hurdle and allows banks to earn small arbitrage on GSE cash. It also allows markets to clear above zero by a small amount, and that restores repo to neutrality. My guess is that bond yields would fall if the bond market saw this action by the Fed. Market agents would accept that the Fed’s QE would peak in 2014, and the process of discounting a return to a more normal neutral Fed could therefore commence.

Whalen: Agreed. A more enlightened FOMC would be issuing bonds to individual savers with the old 6% coupons of Series E bonds to help blunt the impact of financial repression instead of handing the supposed profit to the Treasury. Issue the bonds in $1,000 increments, with a $100,000 limit and make them non-transferable. So we both agree that the folks clamoring to reduce the rate on excess reserves don’t get it?

Kotok: I do not expect any quick return to 6%. Not even close. I guess the US Treasury could issue a small saver bond with a limit but I doubt it will happen.  Chris, we are at a zero boundary for the cost of funds in the US markets, so the only way to go is up. We are also at the near-zero bound in most of the rest of the developed world. That means the global clearing system of interest rates is distorted. Forcing an imposed negative policy under these conditions is very dangerous. Positive incentives are usually a better policy prescription than are negative rules. If we raise excess reserve rates and get the financial system to clear, we start to relieve financial repression. Savers gain; hence, consumers gain. Some banks and non-banks start to rebuild earning assets. Poorly managed banks fail or are merged by regulators. You and I both know some of these banker players. They bear shame for launching new banks a decade ago and then watching the erosion of their investors’ capital by as much as 90%. The managements and boards of these banks own some of this outcome. They point fingers at the regulators or the Fed. Meanwhile they haven’t been fired, and they haven’t paid a penalty, and few have been jailed for fraud.

Whalen: No argument here.

Kotok: Chris, your focus in your writings over the past year on falling net interest margins for banks is crucially important here. Now, if you had a counterparty as a prosecutor and if the board-management policing mechanism didn’t protect the embedded imbeciles who ran their institutions into the ground, you would really have a team approach to addressing these issues. If I were czar, excess reserve rates would be higher and terming out. The zero boundary for rates makes the US economy dysfunctional. And the longer we are in it, the worse it becomes. Japan is the proof.  And lastly, I would use Singapore law to regulate our politicians and our financial services.

Whalen: Thanks David


    



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The Age of Deceit: The Misappropriation of Our Freedoms, Part 2

Most people’s opinions about major political events are based upon the news that they access through mass news distribution channels. Unfortunately mass news distribution channels are all owned by the ruling class that have a biased agenda and therefore can rarely, if ever, be counted on to distribute the truth. As former CNN journalist Amber Lyons exposed, various governments around the world actually paid CNN to unethically run propaganda stories as if they were real “news” without ever disclosing that they had accepted large sums of money to run these stories.

 

In Thailand currently, massive anti-government protests originated after current PM Yingluck Shinawatra attempted to grant full amnesty to her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, for his corrupt activities while he was Prime Minister of Thailand during 2001 to 2006 before being ousted in a military coup. Mass media coverage of this people’s uprising in Thailand has also suffered from questionable reporting, both

 

(1) in the magnitude of numbers of protesters, sometimes reported as in the tens of thousands when real numbers have been in the hundreds of thousands, as well as

(2) a circus-like, sensationalistic focus on just the violent clashes that have recently resulted instead of a more intelligent focus on the reasons why the uprising has occurred.

 

Thai Protests, December 2013

 

Former Assistant US Treasury Secretary Paul Craig Roberts, a prominent voice that exposes the fascist corruption of the US government, recently chimed in on the Thai uprising, yielding an interesting analysis that, “the corrupt [Thai] politicians the Americans have bought and paid for [the Shinawatras]…are being challenged by massive demonstrations in the streets all over the country.” Though the US is known for putting puppets in countries all over the world that support American interests and even resorting to war to replace leaders that do not, this is an angle that has not been not discussed at all in the Thai media  (Obama’s attempt to foster international support to invade Syria, allegedly based upon Syrian President Assad’s refusal to bow down to Western interests that wanted to control an oil and gas pipeline through his country, serves as a perfect example of this). On the other hand, the paramount Amnesty Bill issue so widely discussed in the Thai media has largely been absent from coverage in the Western media.

 

In Part 2 of the Misappropriation of Our Freedoms, I discuss how social media, the concept of community and especially critical thinking have all been misappropriated by the ruling class to misinform and weaken the masses upon over whom they lord. As Leonardo da Vinci wisely stated, “nothing strengthens authority so much as silence” and “anyone who conducts an argument by appealing to authority is not using his intelligence; he is just using his memory.”

 

You may view the video “The Age of Deceit: The Misappropriation of Our Freedoms, Part II” here.


Read The Age of Deceit: The Misappropriation of Our Freedoms, Part I


    



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Brickbat: Sheriff Promises to Obey the Law

East Baton Rouge Sheriff Sid
Gautreaux has promised to stop arresting gay men for crimes against
nature. Undercover sheriff’s deputies had been meeting men in local
parks and arranging to have consensual sex with them
in private
locations
 then arresting them under the state’s
anti-sodomy law, which was declared unconstitutional after a
Supreme Court case 10 years ago. Gautreaux insists the stings did
not target gays.

from Hit & Run http://reason.com/blog/2013/12/02/brickbat-sheriff-promises-to-obey-the-la
via IFTTT

3 Times As Many Americans Supported King George During the Revolutionary War than Support Our OWN Congress Today

When Congress’ approval rating was in the double-digits, polls showed that it was less popular among the American public than cockroaches, lice, root canals, colonoscopies, traffic jams, used car salesmen, Genghis Khan, Communism, North Korea, BP during the Gulf Oil Spill, Nixon during Watergate or King George during the American Revolution.

An October poll by Public Policy Polling showed that Congress is less popular among the American people than zombies, witches, dog poop, potholes, toenail fungus and hemorrhoids.  That was when Congress’ approval rating was 8%.

A new Economist/YouGov.com poll shows that Congress has hit an all-time low: only 6% of the American public approves of Congress.

To put this in perspective, Wikipedia notes:

Historians have estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of the European-American population of the colonies were Loyalists.

In other words, around 3 times as many colonists supported King George as the 6% which support our own Congress today.

Moreover, a May 2013 poll by Fairleigh Dickinson University found that 29% of registered voters think that armed revolution may be “necessary” in the next couple of years. In other words, the number of Americans who think that armed revolution may be “needed” dwarf the number of Americans who approve of the job that Congress is doing.

Even back in 2010, Rasmussen noted that only a small minority of the American people think that the government has the consent of the governed, and that the sentiment was “pre-revolutionary”.

Bonus: 


    



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Supply and Demand 1 December

Let’s consider speculation and arbitrage, and look at what it really means when the cobasis is deeply negative, in that light. This is the case in silver.

Per the definition of cobasis = Spot(bid) – Future(ask), it means either that physical metal is being dumped on the bid, pressing it down, or that people are aggressively buying futures, thus lifting the ask in that market.

The price of silver has been falling all year, with a sharp correction in the first three weeks of August. The cobasis has been low and/or falling most of that time (though it has come up a little in the past few weeks). We suspect that both market actions are occurring in silver right now. That is, at times silver metal is being dumped in quantity in the spot market, and at other times paper silver is being bought aggressively in the futures market.

Who might be selling physical silver? The data does not tell us, but looking around at the world economy, we can guess that smaller inventories may be needed at manufacturers of electronics. People may be bringing their metal to “cash4gold” companies to get dollar cash to pay their bills. For whatever reason, in the world of the physical stuff supply is coming to market. In contrast, the demand for the paper stuff—futures—is still strong at the moment.

Readers may have a different experience—we would love to hear about it—but we see continued optimism in comments on investor sites, Facebook groups, etc. Surely, “the bottom is in” and as the prices of the metals takes off once again, silver will rise faster than gold.

As we have written before, analysis of the open interest in COMEX futures is not so simple, but in the context of the present discussion it is interesting to take a look at the open interest for both monetary metals.

            The Open Interest of Gold and Silver

Open Interest in Gold and Silver

 

The graph supports our theory that leveraged speculators (which comprise a large percentage of the change in open interest) have gotten much more excited about silver since July. By contrast, the graph suggests that they are less exuberant about gold.

Thus we have a much higher cobasis in gold at this point. The question is: will demand for silver turn around first, or will leveraged speculators capitulate first?

We would not bet our money that it will be the former.

This week was punctuated by the major American holiday, Thanksgiving. Volumes were lighter than normal and liquidity less. We take with a grain of salt both the price moves and the basis moves. The prices ended up slightly on the week.

Here is the graph of the metals’ prices.

            The Prices of Gold and Silver

Prices

 

We are interested in the changing equilibrium created when some market participants are accumulating hoards and others are dishoarding. Of course, what makes it exciting is that speculators can (temporarily) exaggerate or fight against the trend. The speculators are often acting on rumors, technical analysis, or partial data about flows into or out of one corner of the market. That kind of information can’t tell them whether the globe, on net, hoarding or dishoarding.

One could point out that gold does not, on net, go into or out of anything. Yes, that is true. But it can come out of hoards and into carry trades. That is what we study. The gold basis tells us about this dynamic.

Conventional techniques for analyzing supply and demand are inapplicable to gold and silver, because the monetary metals have such high inventories. In normal commodities, inventories divided by annual production can be measured in months. The world just does not keep much inventory in wheat or oil.

With gold and silver, stocks to flows is measured in decades. Every ounce of those massive stockpiles is potential supply. Everyone on the planet is potential demand. At the right price. Looking at incremental changes in mine output or electronic manufacturing is not helpful to predict the future prices of the metals. For an introduction and guide to our concepts and theory, click here.

Here is a graph of the ratio of the gold price to the silver price. This shows how many ounces of silver one needs, to buy an ounce of gold. There was a small gain in the ratio this week. 

            The Ratio of the Gold Price to the Silver Price

Gold to Silver Ratio

 

For each metal, we will look at a graph of the basis and cobasis overlaid with the price of the dollar in terms of the respective metal. It will make it easier to provide terse commentary. The dollar will be represented in green, the basis in blue and cobasis in red.

Here is the gold graph. The February cobasis flirted with backwardation this week.

            The Gold Basis and Cobasis and the Dollar Price

Gold

 

The rising cobasis, now in backwardation, combined with a basically flat price of the dollar—just under 25mg—means that some selling of gold futures is balanced by buying of gold metal. There is nothing extreme in this graph, and as we noted above, volume and liquidity were not normal this week, especially the latter part of the week.

Now let’s look at silver.

The Silver Basis and Cobasis and the Dollar Price

Silver

 

We see a sharp rise in the cobasis, though it’s impossible to tell if this is just the poor liquidity or if this is the start of a major move (the move is not pronounced in farther-out futures). This bears monitoring in the coming week.

 

© 2013 Monetary Metals


    



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Central Banker Admits Faith In “Monetary Policy ‘Safeguard'” Leads To “Even Less Stable World”

While the idea of the interventionist suppression of short-term 'normal' volatility leading to extreme volatility scenarios is not new, hearing it explained so transparently by a current (and practicing) central banker is still somewhat shocking. As Buba's Jens Weidmann recent speech at Harvard attests, "The idea of monetary policy safeguarding stability on multiple fronts is alluring. But by giving in to that allure, we would likely end up in a world even less stable than before."

 

Excerpts from Jens Weidmann – Europe's Monetary Union

Harvard, 11/25/13 (Full speech here)

In the eyes of many politicians, economists, at least if they are central bankers, cannot have enough arms now – arms with which they are to pull all the levers to simultaneously deliver price stability, lower unemployment, supervise banks, deal with sovereign credit troubles, shape the yield curve, resolve balance sheet problems, and manage exchange rates.

 

It is probably safe to say that this change in attitude is not just due to a sudden surge in the popularity of economists and central bankers. Rather, it reflects the widespread view that central banking has come to be the only game in town. And quite a few economists seem to agree with this notion.

 

To some, the notion that the primary goal of central banks is to keep prices stable has become old-fashioned. Against the backdrop of the financial crisis, they argue that financial stability has become just as important, if not more so, than price stability.

 

 

By tearing down the walls between monetary, fiscal and financial policy, the freedom of central banks to achieve different ends will diminish rather than flourish. Put in economic terms: Monetary policy runs the risk of becoming subject to financial and fiscal dominance.

 

Let me explain these mechanisms a bit more in detail, starting with financial dominance.

 

The financial crisis has provided a vivid example of how financial instability can force the hand of monetary policy. When the burst of an asset bubble threatens a collapse of the financial system, the meltdown will in all likelihood have severe consequences for the real economy, with corresponding downside risks to price stability.

 

In that case, monetary policy is forced to mop up the damage after a bubble has burst. And, confronted with a financial system that is still in a fragile state, monetary policy might be reluctant to embrace policies that could aggravate financial instability.

 

 

Public debt and inflation are related on account of monetary policy's power to accommodate high levels of public debt. Thus, the higher public debt becomes, the greater the pressure that might be applied to monetary policy to respond accordingly.

 

Suddenly it might be fiscal policy that calls the shots – monetary policy no longer follows the objective of price stability but rather the concerns of fiscal policy. A state of fiscal dominance has been reached.

 

Technically, fiscal dominance refers to a regime where monetary policy ensures the solvency of the government. Practically, this could take the form of central banks buying government debt or keeping interest rates low for a longer period of time than it would be necessary to ensure price stability. Then, traditional roles are reversed: monetary policy stabilises real government debt while inflation is determined by the needs of fiscal policy.

 

 

A lender-of-last-resort role would violate this principle of self-responsibility – in that same way as Eurobonds in this setting are at odds with it. Therefore, it would aggravate, rather than alleviate, the problems besetting the euro area.

 

 

The idea of monetary policy safeguarding stability on multiple fronts is alluring. But by giving in to that allure, we would likely end up in a world even less stable than before. This holds true especially for the euro area, where a Eurosystem acting as a lender-of-last-resort role for governments would upend the delicate institutional balance.

 

To disentangle the euro area's fiscal and financial conundrums, we should practice the art of separation – especially with regard to the sovereign-bank doom loop. Or let me put it this way: Rather than for monetary policy to waltz with fiscal and financial policy, we need to erect walls between banks and sovereigns.

 

Of course, Taleb's somewhat seminal piece on vol suppression remains a concerning glimpse of the inevitable.

ForeignAffairs


    



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Central Banker Admits Faith In "Monetary Policy 'Safeguard'" Leads To "Even Less Stable World"

While the idea of the interventionist suppression of short-term 'normal' volatility leading to extreme volatility scenarios is not new, hearing it explained so transparently by a current (and practicing) central banker is still somewhat shocking. As Buba's Jens Weidmann recent speech at Harvard attests, "The idea of monetary policy safeguarding stability on multiple fronts is alluring. But by giving in to that allure, we would likely end up in a world even less stable than before."

 

Excerpts from Jens Weidmann – Europe's Monetary Union

Harvard, 11/25/13 (Full speech here)

In the eyes of many politicians, economists, at least if they are central bankers, cannot have enough arms now – arms with which they are to pull all the levers to simultaneously deliver price stability, lower unemployment, supervise banks, deal with sovereign credit troubles, shape the yield curve, resolve balance sheet problems, and manage exchange rates.

 

It is probably safe to say that this change in attitude is not just due to a sudden surge in the popularity of economists and central bankers. Rather, it reflects the widespread view that central banking has come to be the only game in town. And quite a few economists seem to agree with this notion.

 

To some, the notion that the primary goal of central banks is to keep prices stable has become old-fashioned. Against the backdrop of the financial crisis, they argue that financial stability has become just as important, if not more so, than price stability.

 

 

By tearing down the walls between monetary, fiscal and financial policy, the freedom of central banks to achieve different ends will diminish rather than flourish. Put in economic terms: Monetary policy runs the risk of becoming subject to financial and fiscal dominance.

 

Let me explain these mechanisms a bit more in detail, starting with financial dominance.

 

The financial crisis has provided a vivid example of how financial instability can force the hand of monetary policy. When the burst of an asset bubble threatens a collapse of the financial system, the meltdown will in all likelihood have severe consequences for the real economy, with corresponding downside risks to price stability.

 

In that case, monetary policy is forced to mop up the damage after a bubble has burst. And, confronted with a financial system that is still in a fragile state, monetary policy might be reluctant to embrace policies that could aggravate financial instability.

 

 

Public debt and inflation are related on account of monetary policy's power to accommodate high levels of public debt. Thus, the higher public debt becomes, the greater the pressure that might be applied to monetary policy to respond accordingly.

 

Suddenly it might be fiscal policy that calls the shots – monetary policy no longer follows the objective of price stability but rather the concerns of fiscal policy. A state of fiscal dominance has been reached.

 

Technically, fiscal dominance refers to a regime where monetary policy ensures the solvency of the government. Practically, this could take the form of central banks buying government debt or keeping interest rates low for a longer period of time than it would be necessary to ensure price stability. Then, traditional roles are reversed: monetary policy stabilises real government debt while inflation is determined by the needs of fiscal policy.

 

 

A lender-of-last-resort role would violate this principle of self-responsibility – in that same way as Eurobonds in this setting are at odds with it. Therefore, it would aggravate, rather than alleviate, the problems besetting the euro area.

 

 

The idea of monetary policy safeguarding stability on multiple fronts is alluring. But by giving in to that allure, we would likely end up in a world even less stable than before. This holds true especially for the euro area, where a Eurosystem acting as a lender-of-last-resort role for governments would upend the delicate institutional balance.

 

To disentangle the euro area's fiscal and financial conundrums, we should practice the art of separation – especially with regard to the sovereign-bank doom loop. Or let me put it this way: Rather than for monetary policy to waltz with fiscal and financial policy, we need to erect walls between banks and sovereigns.

 

Of course, Taleb's somewhat seminal piece on vol suppression remains a concerning glimpse of the inevitable.

ForeignAffairs


    



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Jeff Bezos Unveils Amazon PrimeAir – Drone Delivery

While the fundamentals continue to deteriorate, we are sure the idea of drone-based delivery (which fits with the 7500 drones the FAA expects within the next few years) will add a few multiple points to Amazon’s share price valuation. On a side note, with increasing awareness of the government’s surveillance, what better way for the NSA to keep an eye on everyone up close and personal (and to get an occasional invoice by the company that has made burning cash from operations into an art form).

 

The Amazon PrimeAir Drone…

 

 

 

In Action…

 

We suggest not buying fine glassware…

 

The flying machine already has its own twitter account – @AmazonDrone


    



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Ukraine On The Edge: The 7 Minute Video Summary

The following seven minutes of mayhem look eerily reminiscent of the violent pre-ambles to the middle-east’s recent coups or non-coups. As anti-government protesters demonstrated against the shunning of a European trade agreement (President Yanukovych – “I will not allow any serious economic losses and decline of living standards”); the clashes became ever more violent as the police cracked down. Following heavyweight boxing champion (and opposition leader) Vitali Klitschko’s call for a new government – “our main task is Yanukovych’s resignation. But the first step is the resignation of Azarov’s government” – the clashes left at least 265 people injured. The crackdown followed Interior Minister comments that they “won’t allow Ukraine to become another Libya or Tunisia, where uprisings toppled governments in recent years.” Of course, the main difference is the Ukraine is now squarely under Putin’s sphere of influence.

 

0:20 Initial fireworks followed by police flash-bangs and tear gas…

1:45 Some standard police beatings

3:00 Ubiquitous projectile exchange

3:30 Police charge…

4:30 Serious police beatings handed out

5:30 The two fronts stare each other down

6:00 Serious police reinforcements

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/vYMMKOhmTDk/story01.htm Tyler Durden