California Gives Free Healthcare To Illegal Immigrants

California Gives Free Healthcare To Illegal Immigrants

Authored by Jamie Joseph via The Epoch Times,

California is now the only state in the U.S. to offer free healthcare to all low-income illegal immigrants after Gov. Gavin Newsom signed a $307.9 billion budget June 30.

The allocation will give an estimated 764,000 people free healthcare coverage for $2.7 billion annually beginning 2024 under the budget provision’s expanding of the state’s Medi-Cal coverage.

“This is what being ‘pro-life’ ACTUALLY looks like,” Newsom wrote on Twitter Thursday.

Across the country, federal and state governments currently provide free healthcare to low-income residents through Medicaid, but it excludes illegal immigrants. Newsom’s provision will make California the only state to offer free healthcare regardless of citizenship status.

An estimated 92 percent of Californians have some form of healthcare, but that will change once the budget is in full swing and illegal immigrants—who make up the largest group of people in the state without healthcare—receive it under the expansion.

Various reports give different estimations of how many illegal immigrants live in the state, but according to Pew Research Center, there were roughly 2.2 million recorded in 2016. Despite not having legal status, these immigrants make up about 7 percent of the state’s workforce according to a 2020 report by the healthcare nonprofit Kaiser Family Foundation.

Hailed by immigrant advocates and proponents of universal healthcare, some critics worry that free healthcare will further incentivize illegal crossings at the Southern border at a time when deaths among those crossing are increasing.

Jon Coupal, president of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, told the Associated Press the expansion of Medi-Cal is “a magnet for those who are not legally authorized to enter the country.”

“I think many of us are very sympathetic to the immigrant community, but we really wish we had better control of who enters this nation and this state,” he said.

Tyler Durden
Sat, 07/02/2022 – 19:30

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Residential Picketing and Abortion

I’ve seen some people argue that the Supreme Court’s objection to the picketing of Justices’ homes about abortion is inconsistent with the Court’s upholding the right to picket outside abortion clinics, or stressing the right to protest more broadly.

It’s worth noting, though, that bans on residential picketing have been particularly useful to, among other people, abortion providers. Frisby v. Schultz (1988), upheld a content-neutral ban on targeted picketing that was prompted by picketing “outside the … residence of a doctor who apparently performs abortions.” That opinion was written by Justice O’Connor, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Scalia; Justice White concurred as to the principle. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.

Then in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center (1994), the Court considered an injunction banning picketing within 300 feet of abortion clinic employees’ homes. The Court struck that down, because

[T]he 300-foot zone around the residences in this case is much larger than the zone provided for in the ordinance which we approved in Frisby…. [That] prohibition was limited to “focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence.” By contrast, the 300-foot zone would ban “[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses.”

But the majority (here, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Blackmun, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens) reaffirmed Frisby, as to “targeted residential picketing.” (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas viewed such injunctions as unconstitutional prior restraints, but didn’t cast doubt on the correctness of Frisby as to content-neutral ordinances.)

So the rule seems clear: Content-neutral bans on residential picketing are constitutionally permissible. And that would apply whether the residence is that of an abortion provider or that of a Justice who ruled that the Constitution doesn’t secure abortion rights. Perhaps Justices Brennan and Marshall (and possibly Stevens, though his position in Frisby was more complex) were right to reject this, and to conclude that people should be free to picket outside the homes of everyone (again, abortion providers or others). But the current rule upholding residential picketing bans has been useful to abortion providers as well as others.

The post Residential Picketing and Abortion appeared first on Reason.com.

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Residential Picketing and Abortion

I’ve seen some people argue that the Supreme Court’s objection to the picketing of Justices’ homes about abortion is inconsistent with the Court’s upholding the right to picket outside abortion clinics, or stressing the right to protest more broadly.

It’s worth noting, though, that bans on residential picketing have been particularly useful to, among other people, abortion providers. Frisby v. Schultz (1988), upheld a content-neutral ban on targeted picketing that was prompted by picketing “outside the … residence of a doctor who apparently performs abortions.” That opinion was written by Justice O’Connor, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Scalia; Justice White concurred as to the principle. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.

Then in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center (1994), the Court considered an injunction banning picketing within 300 feet of abortion clinic employees’ homes. The Court struck that down, because

[T]he 300-foot zone around the residences in this case is much larger than the zone provided for in the ordinance which we approved in Frisby…. [That] prohibition was limited to “focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence.” By contrast, the 300-foot zone would ban “[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses.”

But the majority (here, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Blackmun, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens) reaffirmed Frisby, as to “targeted residential picketing.” (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas viewed such injunctions as unconstitutional prior restraints, but didn’t cast doubt on the correctness of Frisby as to content-neutral ordinances.)

So the rule seems clear: Content-neutral bans on residential picketing are constitutionally permissible. And that would apply whether the residence is that of an abortion provider or that of a Justice who ruled that the Constitution doesn’t secure abortion rights. Perhaps Justices Brennan and Marshall (and possibly Stevens, though his position in Frisby was more complex) were right to reject this, and to conclude that people should be free to picket outside the homes of everyone (again, abortion providers or others). But the current rule upholding residential picketing bans has been useful to abortion providers as well as others.

The post Residential Picketing and Abortion appeared first on Reason.com.

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Some Cities Cancel July 4 Fireworks Because Of Shortages And Fire Concerns 

Some Cities Cancel July 4 Fireworks Because Of Shortages And Fire Concerns 

The skies over some American cities and small towns will remain dark this Fourth of July as fireworks displays are canceled due to supply chain snarls, staffing shortages, and/or wildfire concerns amid exceptionally dry weather. 

NYTimes said Phoenix, Arizona, canceled Independence Day celebrations because the city’s vendor couldn’t source professional-grade fireworks due to “supply-chain-related” issues. 

Julie Heckman, executive director of the American Pyrotechnics Association (APA), said high demand for fireworks and supply chain woes blended with labor shortages are creating a “perfect storm” of cancellations across the country. 

Ottawa, Kansas, rescheduled its Independence Day fireworks show because of a shortage of mortars and labor. The small town of 12,600 people will host a fireworks show in September. 

In Minneapolis, Minnesota, the town “blamed” construction at a park where July 4th fireworks are held and a labor shortage for the cancellation. 

Fireworks in Fairfax, Virginia, will be a day late because the first fireworks company didn’t have enough pyrotechnicians. A second company was called in to conduct the show on July 5. 

College Park, Maryland, canceled their Independence Day firework shows, while Ocean City, Maryland, rescheduled theirs due to both labor shortages and supply chain issues.

Other cities around the country are halting shows because of the threat of wildfire. Flagstaff in northern Arizona will replace fireworks with a new laser light show. Due to environmental risks, drones will replace fireworks in North Lake Tahoe, California. 

A popular fireworks show in northern San Joaquin Valley, California, was canceled because of drought concerns. 

Lompoc in Santa Barbara County, California, and a town in Douglas County, Colorado, both canceled fireworks over fears of sparking wildfires.

The Southgate Mall in Missoula, Montana, canceled theirs but did not explain why.

Some North Carolina towns canceled Independence Day firework shows after a man was killed in a recent fireworks-related accident. 

Those who plan to purchase consumer-grade fireworks, such as mortars, bottle rockets, firecrackers, and Roman Candles, will pay a hefty premium this year as the industry has been inundated with soaring costs, according to APA. 

The shortage of fireworks is so severe that some vendors are ordering 18 months out. About 90% of the world’s fireworks come from China.

Tyler Durden
Sat, 07/02/2022 – 19:00

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86% Of Recent Student Loan Borrowers Banked On Biden Bailout

86% Of Recent Student Loan Borrowers Banked On Biden Bailout

Nearly 9 out of 10 recent student debt borrowers say Joe Biden’s campaign pledge to cancel at least $10,000 of college debt affected their decision-making. And a big majority think he’ll do more than that. 

The survey results come as Biden is reportedly considering $10,000 cancellations for federal college borrowers earning under $150,000 a year.

At the same time, Biden faces a decision over whether to allow student debt repayments to resume after several pandemic-era pauses, but at a time when surging inflation gives postponement advocates more ammo. 

Absent signing off on his fifth extension, borrowers would resume payments after August 31—as midterms approach and Democrats stare down the barrel of a major nationwide setback.  

It remains to be seen whether Biden will use debt cancellation as a spoonful of sugar to help the payment-resumption medicine go down, or if he’ll pair cancellation with yet another payback postponement as a self-serving election gimmick.

The college-focused website intelligent.com surveyed 1,000 people who’d taken on student debt since the 2020 election. A whopping 86% claim Biden’s campaign promise affected their decision to take on debt. 

Of those who are still enrolled, 30% say they’re either unlikely or very unlikely to continue going to college unless Biden takes a chunk of debt off their backs and redistributes it across everyone else’s. 

For this crowd of debtors, Biden’s $10,000 pledge doesn’t seem relevant, as a whopping 71% are either confident or very confident that Biden will forgive most or all of student debt. Cancelling it all would represent a nearly $1.7 trillion giveaway. 

If Biden doesn’t forgive any debt, 31% of the Democratic survey participants say they’re either unlikely or highly unlikely to vote for him in 2024. 

It reminds us of a sentiment that that’s been expressed in many ways and dubiously attributed to various historical figures. Its accuracy, however, is unquestionable:  “When the people find they can vote themselves largesse from the treasury, it will herald the end of the republic.”

 

Tyler Durden
Sat, 07/02/2022 – 18:00

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S. Ct. Marshal Asks for Enforcement of Va. Residential Picketing Ban; Can That Ban Be Rendered Constitutional?

I wrote a few minutes ago that the Maryland residential picketing ban, mentioned in the Marshal of the Supreme Court’s letter to Maryland enforcement authorities, is unconstitutional under Carey v. Brown (1980), because it has an exception for labor picketing. I’ve just learned that the Marshal also sent similar letters to the Virginia Governor and the Fairfax County Chief of Police, urging them to enforce the Virginia residential picketing ban.

Now the Virginia law also has the same labor picketing exception that the Court has said makes a residential ban unconstitutionally content-based; but the letter cites to a 1989 Virginia Attorney General’s opinion that argues that the labor picketing exception could just be struck down, and the rest of the statute could be upheld:

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an Illinois statute prohibiting the picketing of residences, but exempting “the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute” violates the equal protection clause …. Carey v. Brown (1980)…. It is my opinion that no substantive distinction exists between the portion of the Illinois statute declared unconstitutional in Carey and the labor dispute exception in § 18.2–419. It is further my opinion, therefore, that the exception to the prohibition of § 18.2–419 for “the picketing in any lawful manner, during a labor dispute, of the place of employment involved in such labor dispute” violates the equal protection clause … and, therefore, is unenforceable….

Unlike the Illinois statute in Carey, however, the constitutionally invalid provision of § 18.2–419 may be severed from the remainder of that statute. “The provisions of statutes in … [the Virginia] Code … which are held invalid shall not affect the validity of other … provisions or applications of this Code which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or applications.” The test to determine the severability of an invalid portion of a statute from the remainder of the statute is whether or not the General Assembly would have passed the statute if it had been presented with the invalid portion removed.

There is no constitutional proscription against the blanket prohibition of residential picketing…. Frisby v. Schultz (1988) ….

In its statement of legislative intent, the General Assembly expressly declared “that the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwelling places causes emotional disturbance and distress … [and] has as its object the harrassing of such occupants; and without resort to such practice, full opportunity exists … for the exercise of freedom of speech.” Based on the above, it is my opinion that the General Assembly would have enacted current § 18.2–419 without the provision that I conclude violates the equal protection clause …. It is further my opinion, therefore, that the phrase “the picketing in any lawful manner, during a labor dispute, of the place of employment involved in such labor dispute” in § 18.2–419 is severable from the remainder of this statute and that § 18.2–419 may be enforced without the provision quoted above.

Such striking down of content-based exceptions has been done on occasion (see, in the federal system, Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants (2020)). Still, it’s pretty rare, since it would effectively criminalize behavior (labor picketing) that the legislature deliberately chose not to criminalize. Indeed, in a 1995 case, a Virginia trial court refused to do that with regard to this very statute (and expressly rejected the Virginia AG’s opinion I quote above):

In this case, if the court were to sever the labor exception …, what would remain would be a blanket prohibition on picketing in residential areas…. [This] is clearly not what the legislature intended when it enacted this statute. The intent of the legislature is clear: it wanted labor picketing to be allowed in residential areas, and it wanted picketing in front of a construction site to be allowed in residential areas. By removing those exceptions, this court would negate the expressed will of the legislature.

As a corollary to that, as defendants correctly point out, this court would be creating crimes that do not otherwise exist: the crimes of picketing residences that are also places of employment or construction sites. That is not a proper judicial function. The decision whether to ban picketing in such areas is “more appropriately made by a legislative body and not a court.” See Hueblein, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Dept., 237 Va. 192, 201 (1989).

The Commonwealth urges the court to conclude based on the legislative declaration of policy found in Code of Virginia § 18.2–418 that the Legislature would have enacted this statute even without the exceptions stated in the second paragraph. It is true that § 18.2–418 contains a clear expression of the high value that the Legislature places on the right to peace and tranquility within one’s own home. But equally clear is the expression in § 18.2–419 of the high value the Legislature places on the right to engage in picketing related to labor disputes and construction projects. It is not possible for this court to know which of the two values the Legislature holds in higher esteem. Only the Legislature may make the determination of whether the right to peace and tranquility in the home is so important that it justifies banning labor and construction picketing in residential areas, or whether labor and construction picketing is so valuable it justifies permitting picketing in all residential areas.

(The case is Commonwealth v. Hyatt, which also happened to involve anti-abortion picketing, but again wasn’t limited to that.)

And the Maryland high court in State v. Schuller (Md. 1977) expressly held that a labor picketing exception from a similar residential picketing statute was not severable:

The General Assembly clearly intended that those who engage in residential picketing in connection with a labor dispute should not be guilty of a criminal offense. A holding that the residential picketing provisions are severable would extend the statutory prohibition to a class which was intended to be excepted. Nothing in the statute suggests that the Legislature would have intended this result. Consequently, the residential picketing provisions of the act are not severable and are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.

So the Virginia AG’s opinion does show that there’s some doubt here; but on balance, I think it would still be hard to persuade Virginia courts that the unconstitutional content discrimination in the residential picketing statute can be cured by severing the labor picketing exception.

The post S. Ct. Marshal Asks for Enforcement of Va. Residential Picketing Ban; Can That Ban Be Rendered Constitutional? appeared first on Reason.com.

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How Public Pensions Turn Cities Into Unlivable Hellholes

How Public Pensions Turn Cities Into Unlivable Hellholes

Authored by MN Gordon via EconomicPrism.com,

“It’s like going to the ATM in Vegas and then going to the roulette wheel and it comes up red and you go back to the ATM.”

The remark was recently made by Steve Mermell.  The man retired last year as city manager of Pasadena, California.  He knows a thing or two about how borrowing to enhance pension fund returns can result in spectacular losses.

The Wall Street Journal article did not clarify whether red was a winning turn of the roulette wheel or not.  Within the article’s context it didn’t really matter.

The main point was that public pension funds are grossly underfunded.  Consequently, more and more pension funds are borrowing money to play the markets.  The goal is to boost returns to cover their massive funding gaps.

If you recall, public-sector retirement plans offer defined benefits, where retiree pension checks are calculated based on salaries and years of service.  Private employers, on the other hand, generally offer defined-contribution plans (like 401Ks), where payouts are based on market returns.

If you live long enough, and are a recipient of a public pension fund you will get out far more than you put in.  If you work in the private sector, there’s a good chance you will outlive your retirement savings.

Certainly, pension funds can attempt to fill their funding gaps by requesting increases in yearly contributions from governments and workers.  But the public-employee unions go full ape when such measures are proposed.  So the remaining option is to take on greater risk.  What could go wrong?

The late Robert Citron could tell you.  As he discovered the hard way, even the most calculated bets will eventually go against you.

Something Special

Nearly 20-years ago, while providing consulting services to a county sanitation district, we crossed paths with a grumpy fellow who had only a secondary interest in providing industrious work.  His primary interest was deliberating on his upcoming retirement; he could bend your ear off.

Between sips of coffee and bites of a glazed donut one Friday morning, he told us of an important milestone that would be reached within six months.  This would be achieved by the coalescing of two critical marks: (1) his 55th birthday, and (2) exactly 36 years of doing time at the district.

As he explained it, after 55 years of age the retirement formula went from 2 to 2.5.  So after collecting a paycheck every two weeks for the past 36 years, something special was about to happen.

He could take a factor of 2.5 and times it by 36 to equal 90.  Specifically, he would now receive 90 percent of his final year’s pay for the rest of his life.  He set his retirement date accordingly.

Mr. Grumpy was an entitled member of the roughly $469 billion California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS).  The nation’s largest public pension fund.  It’s so large it takes 2,843 full time equivalent positions to administer it.

At last count, there were over 2 million members in the CalPERS retirement system.  Some of these people may have done good work prior to retirement.  Others were likely career loafers.  All, without question, did their time with purpose and intent and eyes squarely on the prize.

Are they feeling lucky?

Starting this month, CalPERS will add leverage for the first time in its 90-year history.  Perhaps it will all work out just fine.  Regardless, the fund’s managers have their work cut out for them.

Legacy Costs

Officially, CalPERS has roughly two-thirds of the money it needs to pay benefits that state and local governments have promised their workers.  But this is based on an assumption of future investment returns averaging 7 percent a year.  Historically, CalPERS’ returns have fallen well short of this assumption.

Over the last 20 years, the average annual return has been 5.5 percent.  Hence, the unofficial gap between what CalPERS has and the promises it owes is much larger than advertised.

For instance, if CalPERS investment returns assumption was lowered to its historical average, unfunded liability would rise from $160 billion to over $200 billion.  For this reason, the mega pension fund will now attempt to lever its returns.

In the case of Pasadena and Steve Mermell’s experience, funding the local pension plan it once offered to its police and firefighters has been a decades long struggle.  In 1999, in an effort to keep pace with its inflation-adjusted benefits, Pasadena borrowed $102 million through municipal bonds.  The borrowed money went towards its pension obligations.

The idea was simple enough.  The pension fund could immediately begin earning on a larger amount of money, while the bonds would be paid back gradually.

But then the stock market crashed during the dot com bust in 2001-03.  Yet the city still had to make bond payments at interest rates north of 6 percent.

Pasadena then went back to the ATM in 2004 with another pension-obligation bond.  Several years later, in 2007-09, the stock market crashed again.  Still, the city’s pension legacy costs remain.  As noted by the Wall Street Journal:

“The local police and fire pension plan has been closed for nearly 50 years.  Pension recipients have dwindled to fewer than 180.  But the city still owes about $135 million in bond debt on the plan.  Payments on it are expected to be about $6 million in 2022.”

What a complete cluster.

Following Pasadena’s closure of its local pension plan, public pensions are managed by CalPERS.  To add insult, the city’s annual contributions to CalPERS have doubled since 2015, to about $70 million last year.  That’s more than the city spends on transportation.

What to make of it…

How Public Pensions Turn Cities into Unlivable Hellholes

Without question, gambling with public money is a foolish thing to do.  Nonetheless, many pension funds – like CalPERS – are now using leverage to juice returns.

According to a Municipal Market Analytics analysis of Bloomberg data, more than 100 city, county, state, and other governments borrowed for their pension funds last year.  This is twice the highest number that did so in any prior year.

Standing behind these pension funds are state and local taxpayers – that’s you, acting as the ATM.  Moreover, when the investment returns of public pension funds fall short, governments are primarily responsible for filling the void.  This means cutting other spending and services or increasing taxes.

Covering pension fund obligations is a massive drag on state and local government finances.  The fact is, there’s a legion of public workers out there who’ve been promised a retirement that’s no longer affordable.

These grand promises must be broken.

You can witness the effects when traversing through just about every city in America that has been in existence for more than 60 years.  By repeatedly reallocating spending from much needed services, the present and future conditions of cities and municipalities are being transformed to unlivable hellholes.

Your neighbor, who retired from the city over 25 years ago, may frequently lament the shoddy conditions of the streets and sidewalks.  He may bemoan the lack of resources to address burgeoning homeless encampments and the mobs of mentally ill zombies flailing about on the tired asphalt.

Yet it has never occurred to him that he and his retired cohorts are receiving money that should be used to maintain basic municipal services.  The generous promises made many decades ago – the entitlements – are now destroying the world around them.

*  *  *

A massive wave of municipal and corporate bankruptcies is cresting.  The longer the bear market runs, the greater the collateral damage.  Don’t leave your retirement in the hands of others.  Instead, consider trying simple, practical steps everyday Americans can take to protect their wealth and financial privacy.  The steps are documented in the Financial First Aid Kit.  If you’d like to find out more about this important and unique publication, and how to acquire a copy, stop by here today!

Tyler Durden
Sat, 07/02/2022 – 17:30

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S. Ct. Marshal Asks for Enforcement of Md. Residential Picketing Ban; but that Ban Is Likely Unconstitutional

The Marshal of the Supreme Court has asked the Governor of Maryland and the Montgomery County Chief Executive to enforce Maryland’s and Montgomery County’s residential picketing bans “outside of the homes of Supreme Court Justices who live in” those jurisdictions. And content-neutral restrictions on residential picketing are generally constitutional (see item 2 below).

[1.] But the Maryland law appears to be unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey v. Brown (1980), because it’s not content-neutral. The law (which bans assemblies conducted “in a manner that disrupts a person’s right to tranquility in the person’s home”) has an exception for “picketing or assembly in connection with a labor dispute,” and Carey held that a similar exception in an Illinois statute for “picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute” made the statute unconstitutionally content-based.

As with the Illinois statute in Carey, the Maryland statute “accords preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject; information about labor disputes may be freely disseminated, but discussion of all other issues is restricted:

While broadly permitting all peaceful labor picketing notwithstanding the disturbances it would undoubtedly engender, the statute makes no attempt to distinguish among various sorts of nonlabor picketing on the basis of the harms they would inflict on the privacy interest. The apparent overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the statute’s restriction would seem largely to undermine appellant’s claim that the prohibition of all nonlabor picketing can be justified by reference to the State’s interest in maintaining domestic tranquility.

Had the Maryland Legislature revisited the subject after 1980, when it was clear that its statute was unconstitutional, or after 1988, when it was clear that it could be saved by just excluding the labor picketing exception (see below), then residential picketing would be illegal in Maryland today. But there was no such amendment, even when some changes were made in 2002, so the Maryland law is likely just as invalid as the Illinois law struck down in Carey.

Nor could a Maryland court sever the unconstitutional content-based exception from the statute, thus invalidating the exception, making the statute content-neutral, and then upholding the result (under Frisby, noted below). While this has been done on occasion (see, in the federal system, Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants (2020)), it’s pretty rare, since it would effectively criminalize behavior (labor picketing) that the legislature deliberately chose not to criminalize. And State v. Schuller (Md. 1977) expressly held that a labor picketing exception from a similar residential picketing statute was not severable:

The General Assembly clearly intended that those who engage in residential picketing in connection with a labor dispute should not be guilty of a criminal offense. A holding that the residential picketing provisions are severable would extend the statutory prohibition to a class which was intended to be excepted. Nothing in the statute suggests that the Legislature would have intended this result. Consequently, the residential picketing provisions of the act are not severable and are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.

[2.] The Montgomery County ordinance (§ 32-23), however, is likely constitutional, because it has no content-based labor picketing exception. In this respect, it’s like the content-neutral residential picketing ban upheld in Frisby v. Schultz (1988), and can indeed be enforced, as to homes in Montgomery County.

[3.] Some might ask: Why doesn’t the federal government go after the picketers under the federal law related to picketing the homes of judges, jurors, witnesses, or court officers (which is likely constitutional given Cox v. Louisiana (1965))?

That federal law, it turns out, is limited to such picketing engaged in “with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty.” Such an intent may be hard to prove, especially after the decision has been handed down, and the Justices have already discharged their duties.

To be sure, there is still time for the Court to consider a petition for rehearing, but those are almost never granted. It seems likely that the picketers intend to condemn the Justices and to draw the attention of the public at large, not to get the Justices to grant a petition for rehearing. The advantage of the Montgomery County ordinance is that it limits residential picketing generally, regardless of intent.

My view, by the way, is that protesting targeted at a person’s home is generally bad, because it’s generally aimed more at intimidation than persuasion; I also think it would be ineffective in this instance, because Supreme Court Justices aren’t easy to intimidate (and the publicity is likely to backfire against the protesters). But here I talk only about which bans on such protesting are applicable here, and constitutionally permissible.

The post S. Ct. Marshal Asks for Enforcement of Md. Residential Picketing Ban; but that Ban Is Likely Unconstitutional appeared first on Reason.com.

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S. Ct. Marshal Asks for Enforcement of Va. Residential Picketing Ban; Can That Ban Be Rendered Constitutional?

I wrote a few minutes ago that the Maryland residential picketing ban, mentioned in the Marshal of the Supreme Court’s letter to Maryland enforcement authorities, is unconstitutional under Carey v. Brown (1980), because it has an exception for labor picketing. I’ve just learned that the Marshal also sent similar letters to the Virginia Governor and the Fairfax County Chief of Police, urging them to enforce the Virginia residential picketing ban.

Now the Virginia law also has the same labor picketing exception that the Court has said makes a residential ban unconstitutionally content-based; but the letter cites to a 1989 Virginia Attorney General’s opinion that argues that the labor picketing exception could just be struck down, and the rest of the statute could be upheld:

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an Illinois statute prohibiting the picketing of residences, but exempting “the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute” violates the equal protection clause …. Carey v. Brown (1980)…. It is my opinion that no substantive distinction exists between the portion of the Illinois statute declared unconstitutional in Carey and the labor dispute exception in § 18.2–419. It is further my opinion, therefore, that the exception to the prohibition of § 18.2–419 for “the picketing in any lawful manner, during a labor dispute, of the place of employment involved in such labor dispute” violates the equal protection clause … and, therefore, is unenforceable….

Unlike the Illinois statute in Carey, however, the constitutionally invalid provision of § 18.2–419 may be severed from the remainder of that statute. “The provisions of statutes in … [the Virginia] Code … which are held invalid shall not affect the validity of other … provisions or applications of this Code which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or applications.” The test to determine the severability of an invalid portion of a statute from the remainder of the statute is whether or not the General Assembly would have passed the statute if it had been presented with the invalid portion removed.

There is no constitutional proscription against the blanket prohibition of residential picketing…. Frisby v. Schultz (1988) ….

In its statement of legislative intent, the General Assembly expressly declared “that the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwelling places causes emotional disturbance and distress … [and] has as its object the harrassing of such occupants; and without resort to such practice, full opportunity exists … for the exercise of freedom of speech.” Based on the above, it is my opinion that the General Assembly would have enacted current § 18.2–419 without the provision that I conclude violates the equal protection clause …. It is further my opinion, therefore, that the phrase “the picketing in any lawful manner, during a labor dispute, of the place of employment involved in such labor dispute” in § 18.2–419 is severable from the remainder of this statute and that § 18.2–419 may be enforced without the provision quoted above.

Such striking down of content-based exceptions has been done on occasion (see, in the federal system, Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants (2020)). Still, it’s pretty rare, since it would effectively criminalize behavior (labor picketing) that the legislature deliberately chose not to criminalize. Indeed, in a 1995 case, a Virginia trial court refused to do that with regard to this very statute (and expressly rejected the Virginia AG’s opinion I quote above):

In this case, if the court were to sever the labor exception …, what would remain would be a blanket prohibition on picketing in residential areas…. [This] is clearly not what the legislature intended when it enacted this statute. The intent of the legislature is clear: it wanted labor picketing to be allowed in residential areas, and it wanted picketing in front of a construction site to be allowed in residential areas. By removing those exceptions, this court would negate the expressed will of the legislature.

As a corollary to that, as defendants correctly point out, this court would be creating crimes that do not otherwise exist: the crimes of picketing residences that are also places of employment or construction sites. That is not a proper judicial function. The decision whether to ban picketing in such areas is “more appropriately made by a legislative body and not a court.” See Hueblein, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Dept., 237 Va. 192, 201 (1989).

The Commonwealth urges the court to conclude based on the legislative declaration of policy found in Code of Virginia § 18.2–418 that the Legislature would have enacted this statute even without the exceptions stated in the second paragraph. It is true that § 18.2–418 contains a clear expression of the high value that the Legislature places on the right to peace and tranquility within one’s own home. But equally clear is the expression in § 18.2–419 of the high value the Legislature places on the right to engage in picketing related to labor disputes and construction projects. It is not possible for this court to know which of the two values the Legislature holds in higher esteem. Only the Legislature may make the determination of whether the right to peace and tranquility in the home is so important that it justifies banning labor and construction picketing in residential areas, or whether labor and construction picketing is so valuable it justifies permitting picketing in all residential areas.

(The case is Commonwealth v. Hyatt, which also happened to involve anti-abortion picketing, but again wasn’t limited to that.)

And the Maryland high court in State v. Schuller (Md. 1977) expressly held that a labor picketing exception from a similar residential picketing statute was not severable:

The General Assembly clearly intended that those who engage in residential picketing in connection with a labor dispute should not be guilty of a criminal offense. A holding that the residential picketing provisions are severable would extend the statutory prohibition to a class which was intended to be excepted. Nothing in the statute suggests that the Legislature would have intended this result. Consequently, the residential picketing provisions of the act are not severable and are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.

So the Virginia AG’s opinion does show that there’s some doubt here; but on balance, I think it would still be hard to persuade Virginia courts that the unconstitutional content discrimination in the residential picketing statute can be cured by severing the labor picketing exception.

The post S. Ct. Marshal Asks for Enforcement of Va. Residential Picketing Ban; Can That Ban Be Rendered Constitutional? appeared first on Reason.com.

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CNN’s New Boss Fails To Halt Plummeting Ratings

CNN’s New Boss Fails To Halt Plummeting Ratings

After two months under new management and marching orders to stop being so woke, CNN’s ratings continue to tank.

The changes instituted under Jeff Zucker replacement Chris Licht have included efforts to make the network less ‘politically divisive’ and instead shift to a more neutral tone, according to the Daily Beast. Licht was brought in to deal with the aftermath of chief anchor Chris Cuomo’s implosion, as well as the network’s disastrous streaming service.

Licht promised that the network would “seek to go a different way” in an environment “where extremes are dominating cable news,” and has reportedly been looking at firing partisan hosts and commentators – a rumor which has thus far not panned out.

What’s more, Licht has ordered the network to stop sticking “Breaking News” banners on everything, and to stop calling former President Trump’s 2020 election fraud claims the “Big Lie,” and to instead use “Trump election lie” or “election lies.”

And despite all that, ratings continue to plummet – dropping even more since Licht began his post.

For the month of June, and despite the Jan. 6 House committee holding several blockbuster hearings that should have been squarely in the channel’s wheelhouse, CNN actually lost viewership from the previous month. Worse yet, the network had already seen drops over the previous two months.

CNN’s primetime lineup only attracted 654,000 total viewers and 148,000 in the key advertising demographic of viewers aged 25-54—a 1-percent decline in both categories from May. And in total day viewership, CNN’s overall audience dropped to 487,000 while it attracted 104,000 viewers in the 25-54 demo, shedding 3 percent and 2 percent, respectively.

And during the week of June 13 to 19, which featured quite a bit of focus on the committee hearings, the network only averaged 480,000 viewers overall, a 13-percent drop from its May averages and the channel’s worst week since November 2015.

June 2022 was CNN’s lowest-rated month in total day viewership since July 2015. -Daily Beast

CNN competitor MSNBC, on the other hand, saw big gains surrounding the Jan. 6 hearings and analysis, however it still finished second in all of basic cable with just 767,000 viewers – up 21% from May.

When it comes to primetime viewers, CNN dropped 5% (660,000) and 11% in the coveted 24-54 primetime demographic (150,000) vs. April, and saw worse losses for the total day audience of 20% in that same demographic, and 14% overall.

In May and June, CNN ranked just 12th across primetime basic cable.

Fox News, meanwhile, has seen its audience steadily increase since the second-half of 2021.

Tyler Durden
Sat, 07/02/2022 – 17:00

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