America’s Involvement in Ukraine Increasingly Looks Like War


Black and white photo of President Joe Biden against scene in Ukraine

President Joe Biden announced yesterday that the United States would send another $800 million in weapons aid to Ukraine, adding to the multibillion-dollar raft of assistance already sent to the country as it beats back the Russian invasion. The conflict recently entered its fourth month, and though U.S. government officials have been steadfast in asserting that America “will not be directly engaged” in the fight, that claim stands on shaky ground.

Last week, The New York Times cast a light on just how deeply entrenched the U.S. has become in the conflict in Ukraine, describing “a stealthy network of commandos and spies rushing to provide weapons, intelligence and training.” Though the Biden administration has repeatedly stressed that it won’t deploy American troops to Ukraine, the Times reports that “some C.I.A. personnel have continued to operate in the country secretly, mostly in the capital, Kyiv, directing much of the vast amounts of intelligence the United States is sharing with Ukrainian forces.”

Much of what the Biden administration has done to help Ukraine has fallen short of formal involvement in the war, but just barely. American soldiers won’t enter the fight, but American spies will. American officials have warned of the escalatory effects of enforcing a no-fly zone over Ukrainian territory, but American weapons are being funneled to Ukraine with regularity. The U.S. hasn’t officially declared war against Russia, but it’s helped kill Russian generals and sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

These moves have largely been unilateral, secretive, or both, leaving Americans unaware of just how implicated the U.S. is in the conflict. Government officials themselves lack insight into the effects of American assistance, telling The Wall Street Journal that they have “little direct knowledge” of where equipment goes once it reaches the Ukrainian government. And lawmakers have helped enable this lack of transparency by rubber-stamping massive aid packages, eschewing discussions of financial oversight, and failing to effectively challenge the president on the aims of American assistance.

As Biden announced the latest aid package, he swore that the U.S. would “support Ukraine as long as it takes.” It might be a noble statement, but for a president who has rallied against “forever wars,” it neglects several key realities. American involvement could very well become protracted if leaders don’t establish a clear off-ramp. The sunk-cost fallacy being what it is, politicians may find ways to maintain involvement in the future as a way to justify the hefty financial investments they’ve already made in the fight. This approach runs the risk of simply helping the war lumber on rather than incentivizing the involved parties to engage in peace talks.

“At the very least, what the United States is doing in Ukraine is not not war,” Bonnie Kristian, a fellow at Defense Priorities, wrote in The New York Times. “If we have so far avoided calling it war and can continue to do so, maybe that’s only because we’ve become so uncertain of the meaning of the word.”

Kristian correctly points out that “the line between what is war and what is not war has perilously blurred,” as technological advances and executive war making have made it easier for presidents “to commit what might otherwise be seen as acts of war.” Sporadic drone strikes against terror groups throughout the Middle East, “trainingmissions in hostile nations that go unauthorized by Congress, weapons and logistical support to Saudi Arabia as it wages a devastating war in Yemen—government officials often paint these as acts short of war, which distorts our understanding of the gravity of conflict.

At some point, Russia may come to view the U.S. as a co-belligerent. American politicians can’t be certain of what Russian President Vladimir Putin sees as the uncrossable line. That’s why it’s so critical for lawmakers and their constituents to know the particulars of U.S. involvement in Ukraine and debate them robustly. Otherwise, America will trend ever closer toward war—even if politicians hesitate to call it that.

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California Trucking Prepares For “Radically New World” Under Independent Contractor Law AB5

California Trucking Prepares For “Radically New World” Under Independent Contractor Law AB5

By John Kingston of FreightWaves,

It is going to be a radically new world in California’s trucking sector with the imposition of AB5, and it isn’t clear what parts of the industry — if any — are ready for it.

“Most immediately, motor carriers must evaluate and adopt alternative operating models to mitigate risk if they intend to continue to do business in California” was the admonition from the Benesch law firm in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in the case of California Trucking Association vs. (state Attorney General) Bonta. The decision opens the door for the imposition of AB5, the law on independent contractors that leans heavily toward classifying workers as employees rather than ICs.

“Motor carriers should immediately evaluate their California operations to determine what steps, if any, should be taken to respond to the changed backdrop for trucking” was the call to action from the trucking-focused Scopelitis law firm.

On the other side of the divide, there was celebration, including a victory lap by Lorena Gonzalez, the former and future labor leader who successfully pushed for AB5’s passage in the California legislature in 2019. 

“The fact that trucking companies will have to abide by basic labor laws in CA takes us one step closer to rebuilding the middle class that was almost deregulated out of existence,” Gonzalez said in a tweet.

In denying a review of the appellate court decision, the Supreme Court returned the case to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. A 9th Circuit ruling in 2021 overturned a lower court injunction that had kept AB5 at bay from California’s trucking sector, even as the law that seeks to define independent contractors was implemented in other parts of the economy.

The original injunction from the lower court was based on its conclusion that AB5 was in conflict with provisions in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (F4A). Attorneys for the trucking industry were heartened when the court agreed to consider questions of state preemption of F4A, including looking at a case involving C.H. Robinson (NASDAQ: CHRW). But ultimately, the court failed to take up both the CTA and C.H. Robinson cases. 

The appellate court had allowed the injunction against the law to remain in effect while the CTA pushed to have the Supreme Court hear its appeal. With that denied, the stay is expected to be lifted within days and AB5 will go into effect, retroactively, to Jan. 1, 2020. That creates the prospect of litigation or state action for past actions.

A mixed bag of earlier exemptions

The implementation of AB5 throughout the California economy in 2020 came with a Swiss cheese lineup of exemptions, both in the original bill and in AB 2257, which sought to address the concerns of sectors that said they had been particularly hard-hit by AB5.

Among the exempted professions: doctors, dentists and hairstylists. Among those exempted in the second bill: translators (who were particularly vocal about the damage to their industry under AB5,) youth sports coaches and insurance inspectors.

Critics of AB5 have held that the lengthy, seemingly random list of exemptions was evidence that AB5 was largely targeting two sectors: trucking and gig drivers such as those at Uber, Lyft and with parcel services. So far, that latter group has not come under AB5 because of voter approval of Proposition 22 on Election Day 2020, though a court later ruled Prop 22 unconstitutional. That court decision is on appeal, and a stay has allowed gig drivers protected by Prop 22 to remain outside the control of AB5.

AB5 is particularly problematic for the trucking sector. That’s because it is based on the ABC test to define independent contractors, the B prong of which is being interpreted as a possible death knell or at least a major hindrance to the independent owner-operator model in trucking.

The  B test defines an independent contractor as a worker who is engaged in “work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.” A trucking company hiring an independent owner-operator to move freight is seen as likely in violation of the B prong.

Unions eye drayage drivers as an opportunity

The question now turns to what the trucking industry does specifically in response to the hard reality that AB5 has arrived on the doorstep.

From the organized labor side, recommendations on how trucking companies should proceed include turning drivers into employees.

“If I was advising the trucking sector, I would be getting ready for AB5 to be the law of the land in California, and for the state to begin enforcing it,” Doug Bloch, political director for Teamsters Joint Council 7, which represents the union in Northern California and northern Nevada, told FreightWaves.

Bloch said the Teamsters “recognizes there are legitimate owner-operators out there in trucking.” But he pivoted when discussing trucking to a specific part of the trucking ecosystem: drayage drivers.

“In places like the ports, the state has found misclassification to be the norm,” Bloch said. Drayage drivers should now be “looking at where I am going to end up working,” he said, predicting that port companies that now utilize the services of independent drayage drivers will turn to an employee model.

Bloch said the Teamsters ran a campaign “a decade ago” that was successful in converting some drayage companies to an employee model rather than one utilizing independent owner-operators.

“That is our goal, to have owner-operators hired as drivers,” Bloch said. “Our goal is for the shipping industry to take responsibility for these drivers.” If the workers are converted to employees, he said, it will be easier for them to be paid an amount that reflect at least the minimum wage, and it would push the responsibility for buying new zero-emission vehicles on to the port companies, rather than on to the drivers. “We’ll be asking fleet owners to do this,” Bloch said.

Given the state’s focus on regulatory issues surrounding the ports, it is reasonable to think actions by California under AB5 might first arrive in the drayage industry. 

Matt Schrap, the CEO of the Harbor Trucking Association, which represents drayage companies, issued a brief but harsh statement in response to the high court’s decision.

“It is extremely unfortunate that this Court couldn’t see through their own political agenda to identify the obvious preemption that exists under the F4A,” he wrote in an email to FreightWaves. “This ruling will have far reaching impacts that will upend the industry as we know it. Tens of thousands of truck drivers will be driven out of established business relationships within a week. No doubt this will further stress the supply chain.”

Bloch was asked what would be the impact on freight movement in lanes away from the ports — specifically an example in which an independent owner-operator moves freight between Riverside County outside of Los Angeles and Northern California. What might that person’s legal status become?

“It’s a good question,” he said. But he came back to the issue of misclassification. “I don’t really care what sector of the trucking industry you’re in, I would be concerned about misclassification.”

Bloch added that “what we’ve seen is that every time the laws change, the industry finds some way to adapt.”

CTA issues blistering statement

Not surprisingly, the statement issued by the CTA after the SCOTUS non-action held little back.

“Gasoline has been poured on the fire that is our ongoing supply chain crisis,” the organization said. “In addition to the direct impact on California’s 70,000 owner-operators who have seven days to cease long-standing independent businesses, the impact of taking tens of thousands of truck drivers off the road will have devastating repercussions on an already fragile supply chain, increasing costs and worsening runaway inflation.”

Existing trucking company models may need to change

In a note Marc Blubaugh of the Benesch law firm sent to clients, he discussed several alternatives to the traditional model.

One is an employee driver model, along the lines of what union officials would like to see. Another is largely turning a carrier that now utilizes independent owner-operators into a brokerage house, and putting freight in the drivers’ hands in the same way that a traditional brokerage would do. Since freight movement would no longer be part of the company’s activity, the independent owner-operators would be engaged in “work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business,” the specific wording in the B prong. 

Blubaugh did not mention it, but AB5 came with the business-to-business exception, a multipronged test that must be fully met to legally hire an independent contractor who might otherwise violate the ABC test. There is disagreement in the industry about whether the exception’s rigorous tests and need for 100% compliance make it largely unworkable.

Greg Feary, a partner with the Scopelitis law firm, said Thursday he already had discussions with clients who are “starting to take action. You are going to see the trucking industry respond to this relatively rapidly.”

He said there was a “laundry list of options on the table.” Some of them are extreme, like halting all business in California, particularly if it’s a relatively small part of a company’s business. “Why take the risk?” Feary said.

A push by a company to bring on more employee drivers might come into conflict with what Feary said was the “conventional wisdom … that most of these independent contractors don’t want to be employee drivers.”

The brokerage option as discussed by Feary would involve drivers who are now independent but are leased to a company, and operating under their DOT authority, would obtain their own authority. The company they are leased to would then broker freight to that driver.

“For me, motor carriers are going to have to be making decisions and review all of the potential options,” Feary said.

Action by the state might come quickly, Feary said. The state agencies most likely to bring legal action for what are seen as violations of AB5 would be the state Division of Labor Standards Enforcement or the state’s Employment Development Department.

Tyler Durden
Fri, 07/01/2022 – 15:40

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Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature from the Institute for Justice.

Do you like warrantless, suspicionless, unannounced, nonconsensual business inspections? If so, we deeply regret to inform that the Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources is no longer doing those. Read all about it.

  • Family owes $1.2k in property taxes on their home but can’t afford to pay. Ontario County, N.Y. officials puts a lien on the home and, after several months, seeks to foreclose. The property owners file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. Meanwhile, the county sells the home for $22k, satisfies the $1.2k lien, and pockets the difference. The homeowners challenge the sale as a fraudulent conveyance. Second Circuit: As is their right. The sale would give the county a windfall at the expense of other creditors.
  • During the pandemic, the Port Authority of Allegheny County (just renamed Pittsburgh Regional Transit) required employees to wear masks but forbade political messages such as “Black Lives Matter” or “Trump 2020” on them. A violation of public employees’ free speech? Third Circuit:  If the messages were disruptive, maybe not. But to prove that you need this thing called “evidence.” No need to disturb the preliminary injunction.
  • Under federal civil rights law, plaintiffs can recover attorney’s fees as a prevailing party. But winning a preliminary injunction doesn’t make you a prevailing party—even if the government then hastily repeals the law you’re challenging after you win the injunction—because, says the Fourth Circuit . . . well, because we said so 20 years ago and we’re stuck with it. Concurrence: I’m just going to go ahead and ghostwrite your en banc petition for you.
  • Texas University System: Another challenge to our use of race in college admissions?! Surely we can just rely on our 2016 victory before the U.S. Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas to resolve this. Fifth Circuit: Nope. This case—brought by Students for Fair Admissions—brings different claims and seeks different, prospective relief. So the courts will just have to hear it.
  • Practice tip from the Fifth Circuit: “When a lawyer has an outstanding motion but hasn’t heard from the court for a long time, prudence would advise double-checking to make sure the motion is still pending. No news may mean that the court already ruled on the motion, and the time to appeal is ticking away.” Relatedly, this municipal official from Pharr, Tex. can no longer appeal being denied qualified immunity and must proceed to trial. The bench ruling against him started a 180-day clock that had long since run out when he filed his appeal 412 days later.
  • Upset with the officiating at a San Antonio, Tex. high school football game, assistant coach orders his players to blindside the ref. The ref sues the coach and the school. Fifth Circuit: Can’t sue the school because the coach went rogue. But you can definitely sue the coach even though it was students who did the actual tackling.
  • Circuit Split Watch! Does the First Amendment prohibit government officials from blocking citizens on their Facebook pages? The Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have said yes, “focusing on a social-media page’s purpose and appearance.” But the Sixth Circuit parts ways, choosing instead to “focus on the actor’s official duties and use of government resources or state employees.” All of which counsel against a finding of state action in this case.
  • After the Biden administration chose to abandon the Trump-era “Public Charge Rule,” under which would-be immigrants were required to prove that they would not need public assistance, several states wishing to defend the ruled tried to intervene in ongoing federal litigation against it. Seventh Circuit: But they were untimely; there’s no reason the states can’t file their own lawsuit challenging the policy’s recission.
  • The FBI raids homes and offices of Milwaukee investment fund managers and seizes, among other things, rare gems and minerals. But the investigation concludes (and the gems are returned) without criminal charges being filed. Seventh Circuit: If you exclude the allegedly false statements an FBI agent made on the search warrant application, there’s still enough there for probable cause. So qualified immunity for the agent from the fund managers’ Fourth Amendment claims. But we’ll note that, in this circuit at least, you can definitely still sue federal agents for damages for garden-variety Fourth Amendment violations (like excessive force and fabricating evidence).
  • Allegation: Harrison County, Mo. sheriff forced woman into sexual relationship and into selling drugs for him—and then had her prosecuted once she ended the relationship. (The sheriff died by suicide after (sealed) criminal charges were filed against him.) Does Missouri state law immunize the woman’s probation officer, who allegedly invited the sheriff to attend their probation meetings, where the sheriff threatened her not to disclose the relationship. Eighth Circuit: It does not; it merely says the state must indemnify the probation officer if there’s a damages award.
  • Allegation: St. Louis police are instructed that when an individual is cuffed, they shouldn’t be held prone. Nor should officers apply pressure to their back even if they are thrashing (because that could be attempting to breathe, not resist). Nonetheless, these officers pinned a cuffed, shackled arrestee facedown for 10 to 15 minutes, putting pressure on his back. He dies. An autopsy reveals a broken sternum. Eighth Circuit (2020): Qualified immunity. SCOTUS: You know what, take another look. Eighth Circuit (this week): Qualified immunity. There’s no clearly established law on prone restraint (and we’re not making any).
  • One of the world’s largest undeveloped deposits of copper sits below a national forest an hour east of Phoenix, Ariz., and in 2014 Congress approved a land swap that will allow it to be extracted. Which will destroy Oak Flat, an area that is sacred to Apache American Indians. (It is going to sink 1,000 feet.) Will that “substantially burden” their religious exercise and fall afoul of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Ninth Circuit (over a dissent): A substantial burden is when the gov’t imposes some kind of penalty on someone or denies them a gov’t benefit because of their religion, which isn’t happening here.
  • Allegation: Bicyclist rides away from Mesa, Ariz. officer who’d tried to stop him for lacking a front light. The officer then pulls his SUV in front of the cyclist and stops abruptly, sending the cyclist tumbling to the pavement, dislocating a wrist, among other injuries. Excessive force? Ninth Circuit: Maybe, but not clearly established excessive force. So qualified immunity. Concurrence: It was deadly force! But not clearly established deadly force.
  • Ninth Circuit: It’s clearly established that officials shouldn’t deceive a court in child custody cases, nor should they conspire to remove a child from a parent’s custody without a court order in the absence of imminent danger. So no qualified immunity for this Kauai County, Haw. police employee who allegedly did both of those things, resulting in an 11-year-old being taken from her mother for 21 days and given to her father (who allegedly raped the mother when she was underage, conceiving the girl).
  • At fourth trial, man is convicted of beating his wife to death, in large part based on bitemark evidence and blue fibers underneath the wife’s fingernail that supposedly came from the husband’s shirt. But wait! The expert who gave the bitemark testimony later recants, and evidence arises suggesting a San Bernardino County, Calif. investigator planted the fibers (i.e., they were missing from crime-scene photos, not discovered during the autopsy, and only arose during the investigator’s later examination). The man’s conviction is tossed, and he walks after nearly two decades behind bars. Ninth Circuit: His claims against the investigator ought to go to trial; his claims against the county are undismissed as well.
  • Fort Myers Beach, Fla. bans all portable signs. All of them. And, noting various instances of sign-holding—including the 2000 election recount, Black Lives Matter, and the Tea Party—the Eleventh Circuit rules that the ban likely fails intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment even though it is content neutral.
  • Doraville, Ga. “relies heavily on revenues from fines and fees.” In other words, if people aren’t convicted, the city can’t pay its employees. Like, for instance, the municipal court judge, who can be let go for not generating enough revenue. Does that violate the due process rights of those brought before him? Eleventh Circuit: We’ll credit the city’s in-court representations that it can’t fire the judge at will, even if the city’s code and Rule 36 admissions say otherwise. All is fine in Doraville. Concurrence: It’s actually a really close case, and the city is now judicially estopped from firing judges without good cause. (This is an IJ case; in 2016, one of our clients was fined and put on criminal probation (a condition of which required her to avoid alcohol!) after code enforcers spotted cracks in her driveway.)
  • Wreal, LLC launches FyreTV, distributed through the FyreBoXXX. It streams, well, exactly what you think it does. Amazon later launches fireTV and seems to perhaps confuse a fan who tweets at Wreal “Did you guys just merge with Amazon?” Is this an example of the doctrine of reverse-confusion trademark infringement? Eleventh Circuit: Let’s apply this not-at-all-confusing seven-part test and send it to a jury.
  • And in en banc news, the Fifth Circuit will reconsider its decision to dismiss a challenge to an executive order requiring federal workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19.

Victory! In 2020, SWAT officers in McKinney, Tex. stormed a home that a fugitive had forced himself into (after evading police in a high-speed chase), shooting tear-gas grenades through windows, blowing a hole in the garage door, and driving through the front door. The destruction left the innocent homeowner, Vicki Baker, in financial ruin; the city and her insurance both refused to pay for the damage. (The raid also left her daughter’s dog permanently deaf and blind.) But this spring, in a first-of-its-kind ruling, a federal district court said that police action can amount to a Fifth Amendment “taking” that requires just compensation (and also that other courts that have ruled against property owners in similar straits are disastrously wrong). And last week a jury ruled that the city must pay nearly $60k to make Vicki whole. Click here to learn more.

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Justice Kagan Throws Down the Gauntlet: We Are Not “All Textualists Now”

Yesterday,  in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency lacks the power under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act to base greenhouse gas emission limits for power plants based on generation switching. I summarized the ruling here. (Prior posts on the case are linked here.)

Justice Elena Kagan wrote a powerful dissent, challenging the majority’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act and its express reliance on the “major questions doctrine” to narrow the scope of EPA’s authority.

Justice Kagan’s dissent concludes with a forceful challenge to the Court’s avowed textualists. From Kagan’s opinion:

Some years ago, I remarked that “[w]e’re all textualists now.” . . . It seems I was wrong. The current Court is textualist only when being so suits it. When that method would frustrate broader goals, special canons like the “major questions doctrine” magically appear as get out-of-text-free cards.  Today, one of those broader goals makes itself clear: Prevent agencies from doing important work, even though that is what Congress directed. That anti-administrative-state stance shows up in the majority opinion, and it suffuses the concurrence.

While her analysis is powerful, Justice Kagan does not fully grapple with the portions of the Clean Air Act that undermine her conclusions. Rather, she focuses on the word “system” in “Best system of emission reduction,” without really engaging with those portions of the Act that indicate such systems must be adopted on a source-specific basis. To be fair, however, the majority opinion does not really call her on it, resting more heavily on the major questions doctrine than on close and careful statutory analysis. (In this regard, the majority opinion has some parallels with the opinion in NFIB v. OSHA.) Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence defends the provenance of the major questions doctrine, but it too fails to square off with Kagan on the statutory text.

Justice Kagan also concludes with a paean to delegation, extolling the reasons Congress delegates and warning against limits on such authority. Her opinion closes:

when it comes to delegations, there are good reasons for Congress (within extremely broad limits) to get to call the shots. Congress knows about how government
works in ways courts don’t. More specifically, Congress knows what mix of legislative and administrative action conduces to good policy. Courts should be modest.

Today, the Court is not. Section 111, most naturally read, authorizes EPA to develop the Clean Power Plan—in other words, to decide that generation shifting is the “best
system of emission reduction” for power plants churning out carbon dioxide. Evaluating systems of emission reduction is what EPA does. And nothing in the rest of the Clean Air Act, or any other statute, suggests that Congress did not mean for the delegation it wrote to go as far as the text says. In rewriting that text, the Court substitutes its own ideas about delegations for Congress’s. And that means the Court substitutes its own ideas about policymaking for Congress’s. The Court will not allow the Clean Air Act to work as Congress instructed. The Court, rather than Congress,
will decide how much regulation is too much.

The subject matter of the regulation here makes the Court’s intervention all the more troubling. Whatever else this Court may know about, it does not have a clue about how to address climate change. And let’s say the obvious: The stakes here are high. Yet the Court today prevents congressionally authorized agency action to curb power plants’ carbon dioxide emissions. The Court appoints itself—instead of Congress or the expert agency—the decisionmaker on climate policy. I cannot think of many things more frightening. Respectfully, I dissent.

 

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America’s Involvement in Ukraine Increasingly Looks Like War


Black and white photo of President Joe Biden against scene in Ukraine

President Joe Biden announced yesterday that the United States would send another $800 million in weapons aid to Ukraine, adding to the multibillion-dollar raft of assistance already sent to the country as it beats back the Russian invasion. The conflict recently entered its fourth month, and though U.S. government officials have been steadfast in asserting that America “will not be directly engaged” in the fight, that claim stands on shaky ground.

Last week, The New York Times cast a light on just how deeply entrenched the U.S. has become in the conflict in Ukraine, describing “a stealthy network of commandos and spies rushing to provide weapons, intelligence and training.” Though the Biden administration has repeatedly stressed that it won’t deploy American troops to Ukraine, the Times reports that “some C.I.A. personnel have continued to operate in the country secretly, mostly in the capital, Kyiv, directing much of the vast amounts of intelligence the United States is sharing with Ukrainian forces.”

Much of what the Biden administration has done to help Ukraine has fallen short of formal involvement in the war, but just barely. American soldiers won’t enter the fight, but American spies will. American officials have warned of the escalatory effects of enforcing a no-fly zone over Ukrainian territory, but American weapons are being funneled to Ukraine with regularity. The U.S. hasn’t officially declared war against Russia, but it’s helped kill Russian generals and sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

These moves have largely been unilateral, secretive, or both, leaving Americans unaware of just how implicated the U.S. is in the conflict. Government officials themselves lack insight into the effects of American assistance, telling The Wall Street Journal that they have “little direct knowledge” of where equipment goes once it reaches the Ukrainian government. And lawmakers have helped enable this lack of transparency by rubber-stamping massive aid packages, eschewing discussions of financial oversight, and failing to effectively challenge the president on the aims of American assistance.

As Biden announced the latest aid package, he swore that the U.S. would “support Ukraine as long as it takes.” It might be a noble statement, but for a president who has rallied against “forever wars,” it neglects several key realities. American involvement could very well become protracted if leaders don’t establish a clear off-ramp. The sunk-cost fallacy being what it is, politicians may find ways to maintain involvement in the future as a way to justify the hefty financial investments they’ve already made in the fight. This approach runs the risk of simply helping the war lumber on rather than incentivizing the involved parties to engage in peace talks.

“At the very least, what the United States is doing in Ukraine is not not war,” Bonnie Kristian, a fellow at Defense Priorities, wrote in The New York Times. “If we have so far avoided calling it war and can continue to do so, maybe that’s only because we’ve become so uncertain of the meaning of the word.”

Kristian correctly points out that “the line between what is war and what is not war has perilously blurred,” as technological advances and executive war making have made it easier for presidents “to commit what might otherwise be seen as acts of war.” Sporadic drone strikes against terror groups throughout the Middle East, “trainingmissions in hostile nations that go unauthorized by Congress, weapons and logistical support to Saudi Arabia as it wages a devastating war in Yemen—government officials often paint these as acts short of war, which distorts our understanding of the gravity of conflict.

At some point, Russia may come to view the U.S. as a co-belligerent. American politicians can’t be certain of what Russian President Vladimir Putin sees as the uncrossable line. That’s why it’s so critical for lawmakers and their constituents to know the particulars of U.S. involvement in Ukraine and debate them robustly. Otherwise, America will trend ever closer toward war—even if politicians hesitate to call it that.

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Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature from the Institute for Justice.

Do you like warrantless, suspicionless, unannounced, nonconsensual business inspections? If so, we deeply regret to inform that the Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources is no longer doing those. Read all about it.

  • Family owes $1.2k in property taxes on their home but can’t afford to pay. Ontario County, N.Y. officials puts a lien on the home and, after several months, seeks to foreclose. The property owners file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. Meanwhile, the county sells the home for $22k, satisfies the $1.2k lien, and pockets the difference. The homeowners challenge the sale as a fraudulent conveyance. Second Circuit: As is their right. The sale would give the county a windfall at the expense of other creditors.
  • During the pandemic, the Port Authority of Allegheny County (just renamed Pittsburgh Regional Transit) required employees to wear masks but forbade political messages such as “Black Lives Matter” or “Trump 2020” on them. A violation of public employees’ free speech? Third Circuit:  If the messages were disruptive, maybe not. But to prove that you need this thing called “evidence.” No need to disturb the preliminary injunction.
  • Under federal civil rights law, plaintiffs can recover attorney’s fees as a prevailing party. But winning a preliminary injunction doesn’t make you a prevailing party—even if the government then hastily repeals the law you’re challenging after you win the injunction—because, says the Fourth Circuit . . . well, because we said so 20 years ago and we’re stuck with it. Concurrence: I’m just going to go ahead and ghostwrite your en banc petition for you.
  • Texas University System: Another challenge to our use of race in college admissions?! Surely we can just rely on our 2016 victory before the U.S. Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas to resolve this. Fifth Circuit: Nope. This case—brought by Students for Fair Admissions—brings different claims and seeks different, prospective relief. So the courts will just have to hear it.
  • Practice tip from the Fifth Circuit: “When a lawyer has an outstanding motion but hasn’t heard from the court for a long time, prudence would advise double-checking to make sure the motion is still pending. No news may mean that the court already ruled on the motion, and the time to appeal is ticking away.” Relatedly, this municipal official from Pharr, Tex. can no longer appeal being denied qualified immunity and must proceed to trial. The bench ruling against him started a 180-day clock that had long since run out when he filed his appeal 412 days later.
  • Upset with the officiating at a San Antonio, Tex. high school football game, assistant coach orders his players to blindside the ref. The ref sues the coach and the school. Fifth Circuit: Can’t sue the school because the coach went rogue. But you can definitely sue the coach even though it was students who did the actual tackling.
  • Circuit Split Watch! Does the First Amendment prohibit government officials from blocking citizens on their Facebook pages? The Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have said yes, “focusing on a social-media page’s purpose and appearance.” But the Sixth Circuit parts ways, choosing instead to “focus on the actor’s official duties and use of government resources or state employees.” All of which counsel against a finding of state action in this case.
  • After the Biden administration chose to abandon the Trump-era “Public Charge Rule,” under which would-be immigrants were required to prove that they would not need public assistance, several states wishing to defend the ruled tried to intervene in ongoing federal litigation against it. Seventh Circuit: But they were untimely; there’s no reason the states can’t file their own lawsuit challenging the policy’s recission.
  • The FBI raids homes and offices of Milwaukee investment fund managers and seizes, among other things, rare gems and minerals. But the investigation concludes (and the gems are returned) without criminal charges being filed. Seventh Circuit: If you exclude the allegedly false statements an FBI agent made on the search warrant application, there’s still enough there for probable cause. So qualified immunity for the agent from the fund managers’ Fourth Amendment claims. But we’ll note that, in this circuit at least, you can definitely still sue federal agents for damages for garden-variety Fourth Amendment violations (like excessive force and fabricating evidence).
  • Allegation: Harrison County, Mo. sheriff forced woman into sexual relationship and into selling drugs for him—and then had her prosecuted once she ended the relationship. (The sheriff died by suicide after (sealed) criminal charges were filed against him.) Does Missouri state law immunize the woman’s probation officer, who allegedly invited the sheriff to attend their probation meetings, where the sheriff threatened her not to disclose the relationship. Eighth Circuit: It does not; it merely says the state must indemnify the probation officer if there’s a damages award.
  • Allegation: St. Louis police are instructed that when an individual is cuffed, they shouldn’t be held prone. Nor should officers apply pressure to their back even if they are thrashing (because that could be attempting to breathe, not resist). Nonetheless, these officers pinned a cuffed, shackled arrestee facedown for 10 to 15 minutes, putting pressure on his back. He dies. Eighth Circuit (2020): Qualified immunity. SCOTUS: You know what, take another look. Eighth Circuit (this week): Qualified immunity. There’s no clearly established law on prone restraint (and we’re not making any).
  • One of the world’s largest undeveloped deposits of copper sits below a national forest an hour east of Phoenix, Ariz., and in 2014 Congress approved a land swap that will allow it to be extracted. Which will destroy Oak Flat, an area that is sacred to Apache American Indians. (It is going to sink 1,000 feet.) Will that “substantially burden” their religious exercise and fall afoul of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Ninth Circuit (over a dissent): A substantial burden is when the gov’t imposes some kind of penalty on someone or denies them a gov’t benefit because of their religion, which isn’t happening here.
  • Allegation: Bicyclist rides away from Mesa, Ariz. officer who’d tried to stop him for lacking a front light. The officer then pulls his SUV in front of the cyclist and stops abruptly, sending the cyclist tumbling to the pavement, dislocating a wrist, among other injuries. Excessive force? Ninth Circuit: Maybe, but not clearly established excessive force. So qualified immunity. Concurrence: It was deadly force! But not clearly established deadly force.
  • Ninth Circuit: It’s clearly established that officials shouldn’t deceive a court in child custody cases, nor should they conspire to remove a child from a parent’s custody without a court order in the absence of imminent danger. So no qualified immunity for this Kauai County, Haw. police employee who allegedly did both of those things, resulting in an 11-year-old being taken from her mother for 21 days and given to her father (who allegedly raped the mother when she was underage, conceiving the girl).
  • At fourth trial, man is convicted of beating his wife to death, in large part based on bitemark evidence and blue fibers underneath the wife’s fingernail that supposedly came from the husband’s shirt. But wait! The expert who gave the bitemark testimony later recants, and evidence arises suggesting a San Bernardino County, Calif. investigator planted the fibers (i.e., they were missing from crime-scene photos, not discovered during the autopsy, and only arose during the investigator’s later examination). The man’s conviction is tossed, and he walks after nearly two decades behind bars. Ninth Circuit: His claims against the investigator ought to go to trial; his claims against the county are undismissed as well.
  • Fort Myers Beach, Fla. bans all portable signs. All of them. And, noting various instances of sign-holding—including the 2000 election recount, Black Lives Matter, and the Tea Party—the Eleventh Circuit rules that the ban likely fails intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment even though it is content neutral.
  • Doraville, Ga. “relies heavily on revenues from fines and fees.” In other words, if people aren’t convicted, the city can’t pay its employees. Like, for instance, the municipal court judge, who can be let go for not generating enough revenue. Does that violate the due process rights of those brought before him? Eleventh Circuit: We’ll credit the city’s in-court representations that it can’t fire the judge at will, even if the city’s code and Rule 36 admissions say otherwise. All is fine in Doraville. Concurrence: It’s actually a really close case, and the city is now judicially estopped from firing judges without good cause. (This is an IJ case; in 2016, one of our clients was fined and put on criminal probation (a condition of which required her to avoid alcohol!) after code enforcers spotted cracks in her driveway.)
  • Wreal, LLC launches FyreTV, distributed through the FyreBoXXX. It streams, well, exactly what you think it does. Amazon later launches fireTV and seems to perhaps confuse a fan who tweets at Wreal “Did you guys just merge with Amazon?” Is this an example of the doctrine of reverse-confusion trademark infringement? Eleventh Circuit: Let’s apply this not-at-all-confusing seven-part test and send it to a jury.
  • And in en banc news, the Fifth Circuit will reconsider its decision to dismiss a challenge to an executive order requiring federal workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19.

Victory! In 2020, SWAT officers in McKinney, Tex. stormed a home that a fugitive had forced himself into (after evading police in a high-speed chase), shooting tear-gas grenades through windows, blowing a hole in the garage door, and driving through the front door. The destruction left the innocent homeowner, Vicki Baker, in financial ruin; the city and her insurance both refused to pay for the damage. (The raid also left her daughter’s dog permanently deaf and blind.) But this spring, in a first-of-its-kind ruling, a federal district court said that police action can amount to a Fifth Amendment “taking” that requires just compensation (and also that other courts that have ruled against property owners in similar straits are disastrously wrong). And last week a jury ruled that the city must pay nearly $60k to make Vicki whole. Click here to learn more.

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Flight Delay Chaos Begins As Delta Pilots Warn Of “Perfect Storm” 

Flight Delay Chaos Begins As Delta Pilots Warn Of “Perfect Storm” 

The busiest travel period of the year is underway as hundreds of flights are already delayed setting up for what could be a “perfect storm” of disruptions over the Independence Day holiday weekend. 

As of 1440 ET, FlightAware, a flight tracking company, reports 680 flights are delayed and 28 canceled. The number has been steadily increasing Friday as air travel demand soars amid pilot and crew shortages causing flight disruptions. Most of the delays are at airports across the Northeast, including New York City and Washington–Baltimore metropolitan regions. 

We’re now going into the Independence Day Holiday weekend and are concerned that our customers’ plans will be disrupted once again,” Captain Jason Ambrosi, Chairman of the Delta Master Executive Council (MEC), a unit of the Air Line Pilots Association, said in a statement

Ambrosi continued: “The perfect storm is occurring. Demand is back, and pilots are flying record amounts of overtime but are still seeing our customers being stranded and their holiday plans ruined.”

Hundreds of off-duty pilots picketed Delta Airlines at airports this week. Pilots are stressed as flight delays and cancelations result in record amounts of overtime this year. 

Earlier this week, Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg told NBC Nightly News’s Lester Holt, “there are going to be challenges” this holiday weekend. 

“There’s no quick fix” to the mess in the air, United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby recently said, adding the industry is short 12,000 pilots. 

Besides labor shortage, airline industry group Airlines for America, which represents the country’s largest airlines (American Airlines, Delta, United, Southwest, JetBlue, and Alaska Airlines, as well as shippers FedEx and UPS), blamed the Federal Aviation Administration’s own understaffing for “crippling” East Coast air traffic. This looks like finger-pointing to us. 

Buttigieg warned last month that airlines face federal government action— presumably fines — over mounting flight cancellations and delays. 

This weekend will be nothing short of a disaster if the trend of delays and cancelations continues. 

Tyler Durden
Fri, 07/01/2022 – 15:20

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/7KgNlzS Tyler Durden

No-Contact Order Against Law Students (and Professor) Based on Conversation About Homosexuality and Bible …

From Perlot v. Green, decided yesterday by Chief Judge David Nye (D. Idaho), the facts:

On April 1, 2022, the law school at the University of Idaho held a “moment of community” in response to an anti-LGBTQ+ slur that had been left anonymously on a whiteboard in one of its classrooms …. Plaintiffs Perlot, Miller, and Alexander are law students and members of the University’s chapter of the Christian Legal Society (“CLS”). Plaintiff Seamon is a professor at the law school and the CLS faculty advisor.

At the event, Plaintiffs gathered in prayer—with members of their society and others—in a showing of support for the LGBTQ+ community. After the prayer concluded, Jane Doe {a queer female and a law student at the University of Idaho School of Law} approached the group and asked those present why the CLS constitution affirms that marriage is between one man and one woman. Plaintiff Miller explained that CLS adhered to the traditional biblical view of marriage and sexuality—including the concept that marriage is defined as being between one man and one woman. Jane Doe expressed her opinion that the Bible did not support such a conclusion. Miller explained further that the Bible defines marriage as between one man and one woman in several places and that it condemns homosexuality—along with all other sins. Plaintiff Seamon purportedly affirmed Miller’s explanation of CLS’s position on marriage.

According to both sides, the parties then parted ways without further comment. Shortly after the event, Plaintiff Perlot left a handwritten note on Jane Doe’s carrel. The note read—in its entirety: “I’m the president of CLS this semester. Feel free to come talk to me if you have anything you need to say or questions you want to ask. I’m usually  in my carrel: 6-034. over by the windows. Peter [smiley face].” {Defendants relay that Jane Doe interpreted this action as “violating” her private carrel with “messaging she interpreted as one of the Plaintiffs’ efforts to proselytize about extreme hateful religious dogma that [she] emphatically rejects.”}

A few days later, on April 4, 2022, Plaintiffs Perlot and Alexander attended an event with other students regarding the American Bar Association’s accreditation of the law school. According to Plaintiffs, Jane Doe and others raised concerns about CLS and its members—namely that they held religious beliefs that were bigoted and anti-LGBTQ+. Plaintiff Alexander then spoke up, defended CLS, and stated that the biggest instance of discrimination he had seen on campus was actually against CLS and the administration’s failure to timely recognize and register it as a group.

That same day, several students staged “walkouts” for two of the courses taught by Plaintiff Seamon—seemingly in response to his participation at the event on April 1.

Also on April 4, Defendant Lindsay Ewan—Deputy Director of OCRI— interviewed Miller about the events that took place during the law school’s community event on April 1.

Three days later, on April 7, 2022, Plaintiffs Perlot, Miller, and Alexander received no-contact orders from OCRI. Apparently, Jane Doe reported to OCRI that Plaintiffs’ actions at the events described above left her feeling “targeted and unsafe.” The no-contact orders prohibit Plaintiffs from having any contact with Jane Doe unless they receive advance permission from OCRI. The orders apply on and off campus, do not have termination dates, and state that “[a]ny action deemed to be in violation of this no- contact order will be taken seriously and considered retaliation. Further action may be taken by this administration as a result, which could include suspension or expulsion.” …

After the filing of this suit—in fact after Plaintiffs had filed the instant PI Motion— OCRI issued a limited contact order against Plaintiff Seamon.

Plaintiff Seamon is a law professor. Sensing the community event may have caused Jane Doe stress, Seamon emailed her on April 3, 2022, to express his concern for her well-being. Jane Doe thanked Seamon for “reaching out,” said she was still processing matters, and stated she would speak to him later in the week during his office hours. Jane Doe never met with Seamon, however, and began attending his class online due to some personal health issues. Seamon reached out again on April 26, 2022, to inquire whether Jane Doe wanted to speak. On April 27, 2022, Jane Doe sent an email to Seamon, copying the law school’s dean and associate dean, in which she stated, in part:

Your event caused me to fear for my life at the university of Idaho. I am scared to be on campus, I am scared to be in your class. I fear you. I fear the CLS. My life, my grades, my law school career are not safe with a professor that is actively working towards taking away my human rights.…

The group you are the admin for, subjected me and others to violent verbal abuse, in which you took the lead on and agreed with. This has created unpreparable [sic] damage to your students and faculty at the school of law. If you continue to email me, I will file get [sic] a restraining order from the police.

Jane Doe then demanded that Seamon respond to the Deans (and not her) affirming that she would not be docked participation points for attending class remotely. Jane Doe gave Seamon a deadline by which to respond.

On May 10, 2022, OCRI issued a limited contact order against Seamon. Like the no-contact orders issued to the student Plaintiffs, this order prohibits Seamon from contacting Jane Doe for anything except “what is required for classroom assignment, discussion, and attendance.” … {[U]nless otherwise noted, the use of the phrase “Plaintiffs” in the remainder of this decision means the student Plaintiffs and not Seamon.} {[Prof.] Seamon has not joined the PI Motion. … [but] the Court notes that its discussion and findings today would likely apply to Seamon as well. [After all], Seamon’s allegations mirror those of Perlot, Miller, and Alexander, and the Court’s legal analysis as to those Plaintiffs would extend to Seamon as he is similarly situated.}

The court concluded the no-contact orders were highly likely to be content- and viewpoint-based, because they were issued because of content and viewpoint of Plaintiffs’ speech, and were therefore presumptively unconstitutional; and none of the law school’s justifications for such speech restriction were sufficient:

[Defendants] they claim they had essentially no choice under Title IX but to issue the no-contact orders…. Title IX—and Defendants’ own policy—define harassment to include “conduct on the basis of sex” {[which, i]n light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, … necessarily includes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity} that is “determined by a reasonable person to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the University’s education program or activity.” But there appears to be no sexual harassment in this case….

Nothing here appears to be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” as to hamper Jane Doe’s access to her University education. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ. (1999) (to be actionable, harassment must be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit”). What’s more, “[t]here is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech clause.” “Harassment law generally targets conduct” and it can “sweep[ ] in speech … only when consistent with the First Amendment.” Rodriguez v. Maricopa County Comm. College Dist. (9th Cir. 2010). {Additionally, “core political and religious speech,” is “within a student’s First Amendment rights” even if it “offends someone,” so long as it “does not pose a realistic threat of substantial disruption.” Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist. (3d Cir. 2001).} See also Lopez v. Candaele (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a university would have to take a “strained construction” of its own sexual harassment policy to make it “applicable to religious speech opposing homosexuality or gay marriage”)…. Using Title IX as an excuse when there is no underlying sexual harassment to trigger Title IX is untenable and jeopardizes the vitality of Title IX….

Defendants assert that “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient,” Rowan v. Post Office Dept. (1970), and that the no-contact orders protect Jane Doe from being an “unwilling recipient” of speech she disagrees with so she can “be free from persistent importunity, following and dogging”  (citing Hill v. Colorado (2000)). {[But] Rowan involved the sending of unwanted materials into the sanctuary of another’s home, not a public interaction. In fact, the paragraph cited by Defendants ends with this sentence: “The asserted right of a mailer, we repeat, stops at the outer boundary of every person’s domain.” } …

[And t]he Court in Hill made a clear distinction between the right to attempt to persuade others to change their views and offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it. The right to free speech cannot be curtailed simply because the speaker’s message may be offensive to his audience. {After all, “[w]e are a social people and the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss information with a view to influencing the other’s action are not regarded as aggression or a violation of that other’s rights.” Hill. A person’s interest in freedom from “importunity, following and dogging” ripens only “after an offer to communicate has been declined.” Jane Doe made no such request in this case. She never declined to speak with Plaintiffs; in fact, she initiated the interactions at the two events. And while the University took some initial “investigatory” steps, those steps were largely one-sided. At no time did Jane Doe—personally or via OCRI—tell Plaintiffs she did not want to speak with them before the no-contact orders were issued. The University never provided an opportunity for informal resolution either.} …

Defendants offer virtually no support for their somewhat novel proposition that limited public interactions should require a no-contact order to allow a person to be free from persistent importunity, following, and dogging. {Defendants cite to a case out of the Eleventh Circuit, Doe v. Valencia College (11th Cir. 2018)) in support of this proposition. The facts of that case, however, are drastically different from what is present in this case—to the point that it is all but inapplicable. In Doe, the college suspended a male student who sent a female student “dozens of messages throughout the night making lewd references to her body.” The female student made “repeated pleas that he stop contacting her,” but “he continued to send unwanted messages over a period of days.” He even sent her twenty messages after the college imposed a time limited no-contact order…. [T]he court concluded that the college could suspend the male student for invading the female student’s right “to be let alone.” Again, Plaintiffs’ attempts to respond to Doe’s inquiries are nothing like the student’s behavior in Doe.}

And, contrary to Defendants’ argument, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the “college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.'” Healy v. James (1972). Without the freedom “to inquire, to study and to evaluate,” the Court has warned that “our civilization will stagnate and die.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957).

{Could behavior similar to the behavior alleged here warrant Title IX intervention? Possibly. For example, if Plaintiffs were to persist in contacting Jane Doe against her wishes or were to escalate their efforts to more invasive or harassing contact, the Court could understand how that would disrupt Jane Doe’s educational experience. As it stands, however, it appears to be the general tenor of Plaintiffs’ beliefs (expressed or not) that is causing Jane Doe stress rather than anything Plaintiffs actually said or did. It goes without saying that individuals interact with, work among, and even live with, people with whom they disagree. But such does not warrant intervention. And even in an educational setting (where the government is an actor), a person does not have a right to be shielded from everything with which they disagree.} …

Defendants next claim the no-contact orders at issue here are “mutual” and, therefore, are not specifically directed at Plaintiffs or their speech, but rather at creating a harmonious environment amongst all students…. It does appear that Jane Doe was issued a similar order at her request…. But there is a stark difference between a student receiving an order because she said, “I don’t want people contacting me and, therefore, I agree not to contact them,” and a student receiving an order saying, “You cannot contact other people because of your behavior/speech/viewpoint.” …

Defendants further argue Plaintiffs can still talk to anyone else on campus about whatever they want and, therefore, their actions were “narrowly tailored”—it was just Plaintiffs’ speech as applied to Jane Doe. But Defendants miss the mark. “If the state wishes to regulate speech, then it must undertake the burden to show a precise nexus between that speech and some evil which the state has a right to prevent.” … Defendants cannot “abridge[ ]” Plaintiffs’ “exercise of [their] liberty of expression in appropriate places … on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”

Furthermore, it is not actually clear Plaintiffs will be able to talk about whatever they want with whomever they want in the future. As discussed, the speech at issue here can hardly be said to be harassment. But when each Plaintiff stated his religious view, such views were deemed harassing and worthy of action by OCRI. What happens when Plaintiffs discuss their religious views with others? It is not difficult to imagine another student (or professor) taking offense to something Plaintiffs say and trying to utilize OCRI’s process in this manner again.

{Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff Seamon will be teaching a course this fall on the Fourteenth Amendment and individual rights. He is the only professor for this required course. Jane Doe is enrolled in this course. It remains unknown to what degree Plaintiff Seamon will be allowed to interact with Jane Doe without incurring discipline. What’s more, a class on individual rights will surely discuss topics that some might find polarizing. If Seamon discusses individual rights in regard to the legal topics of LBGTQ+ rights, abortion, immigration, religion, or race, does he run the risk that someone will take subjective offense to his comments and allege he is violating their individual rights in his individual rights class? The question seems almost satirical.} …

Finally, Defendants argue there is no harm because they view the no-contact orders as non-punitive. Again, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff Perlot recently applied to sit for the State of Oregon bar exam. The application requires applicants to disclose any “no contact order[s]” they have received and warns that “[l]ack of complete candor” could lead to “denial of admission to the bar.” Because the no-contact orders in this case still apply to graduated students, Perlot had to explain the no-contact order as part of his application. The Oregon Bar investigation is ongoing. Defendants’ subjective view of the no-contact orders does not alter the punitive nature of an investigation by a state’s professional licensing board.

The court also concluded that the orders violated the student plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause and Due Process Clause rights:

Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law or rule that is not neutral or generally applicable is subject to strict scrutiny…. Defendants’ no-contact orders show hostility to religious people and beliefs and thus flunk neutrality.

Similarly, Defendants issued the no-contact orders to Plaintiffs with almost no due process. While it appears OCRI began a quasi-investigation, they did not provide any of the Plaintiffs with notice of the allegations against them or allow Plaintiffs to respond to the allegations. Frankly, they did not involve Plaintiffs in any meaningful way. Rather, Defendants issued the orders because they were “requested by [Ms. Doe]” and “deemed”—in Defendants’ own estimation—”reasonable based on the information presented.” …

There is a sad irony in the fact that the restraint on Plaintiffs’ speech began at an event meant to reiterate acceptance and tolerance and to dissuade bullying and marginalization. The Court shares law school Dean Johanna Kalb’s hope that, at a law school, “classrooms and hallways will be a place of robust discussion and debate” and that “the foundation for all of these discussions [will be] mutual respect and grace.”

Some may disagree with Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Such is each person’s prerogative and right. But none should disagree that Plaintiffs have a right to express their religious beliefs without fear of retribution. The Constitution makes that clear…

The court therefore ordered the no-contact orders rescinded, and wiped from the plaintiffs’ records.

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