Month: August 2022

Can the federal government prevent some state abortion bans from taking effect? Two new court rulings offer mixed opinions on this issue, following the Biden administration’s claim that existing federal law prohibits state abortion bans that don’t contain exceptions for women’s health.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) sued to stop such a ban in Idaho, where a 2020 law set to take effect in August would outlaw abortion except in cases where a doctor had a copy of a police report of rape or could show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that “the abortion was necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman.” The DOJ said Idaho’s ban goes against provisions of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which requires hospitals receiving Medicare funds (i.e., most U.S. hospitals) to provide stabilizing treatment.

“Idaho’s criminal prohibition of all abortions, subject only to the statute’s two limited affirmative defenses, directly conflicts with EMTALA and stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of EMTALA’s federal objectives of providing stabilizing care and treatment to anyone who needs it,” said the DOJ in a press release.

“Federal law is clear: patients have the right to stabilizing hospital emergency room care no matter where they live,” said Department of Health and Human Services (DHS) Secretary Xavier Becerra. “Women should not have to be near death to get care.”

In July, HHS issued new guidance stating that EMTALA’s provision for stabilizing treatment includes a right to an abortion in some circumstances. “If a state law prohibits abortion and does not include an exception for the health or life of the pregnant person—or draws the exception more narrowly than EMTALA’s emergency medical condition definition—that state law is preempted,” the agency said.

No existing abortion ban lacks an exception for a mother’s life, but some do omit exceptions for women’s health. And determining whether something counts as a life-threatening emergency—as opposed to a mere health-threatening emergency—isn’t so clear-cut. Many pregnancy complications could become life-threatening while not being necessarily or immediately so. The HHS guidance attempts to provide clarity, stating that regardless of what a state law says, physicians must provide an abortion if one is necessary to address an emergency medical condition (including, but not limited to, ectopic pregnancy or severely high blood pressure).

Texas sued over the HHS directive. Joined by the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG) and the Christian Medical and Dental Association (CMDA), the state sought to have the HHS “abortion mandate” declared “unlawful, unconstitutional and unenforceable” and for the court to issue a preliminary injunction on its enforcement.

On Wednesday, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the federal government’s motion to dismiss the complaint and granted a preliminary injunction against enforcing the mandate against Texas and AAPLOG or CMDA members. The order stopped short of declaring the mandate unenforceable across the United States.

“Texas law already overlaps with EMTALA to a significant degree, allowing abortions in life-threatening conditions and for the removal of an ectopic or miscarried pregnancy,” noted U.S. District Judge James Wesley Hendrix in the court’s decision (which is heavy on language about “unborn children”):

But in Dobbs‘s wake and in an attempt to resolve any potential conflict with state law, the Department of Health and Human Services issued Guidance purporting to remind providers of their existing EMTALA obligations to provide abortions regardless of state law. That Guidance goes well beyond EMTALA’s text, which protects both mothers and unborn children, is silent as to abortion, and preempts state law only when the two directly conflict. Since the statute is silent on the question, the Guidance cannot answer how doctors should weigh risks to both a mother and her unborn child. Nor can it, in doing so, create a conflict with state law where one does not exist. The Guidance was thus unauthorized. In any event, HHS issued it without the required opportunity for public comment. As a result, the Court will preliminarily enjoin the Guidance’s enforcement against the plaintiffs.

A court in Idaho came to a very different decision related to EMTALA and abortion.

In an August 24 ruling, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho granted the Justice Department’s request for a preliminary injunction against enforcing the Idaho abortion ban. The injunction took effect immediately and remains “in full force and effect through the date on which judgment is entered in this case.”

The court noted the difficult position doctors are put in by the contradictory requirements of Idaho’s abortion ban and EMTALA when it comes to pregnant patients facing health emergencies:

If the physician provides the abortion, she faces indictment, arrest, pretrial detention, loss of her medical license, a trial on felony charges, and at least two years in prison. Yet if the physician does not perform the abortion, the pregnant patient faces grave risks to her health—such as severe sepsis requiring limb amputation, uncontrollable uterine hemorrhage requiring hysterectomy, kidney failure requiring lifelong dialysis, hypoxic brain injury, or even death. And this woman, if she lives, potentially may have to live the remainder of her life with significant disabilities and chronic medical conditions as a result of her pregnancy complication. All because Idaho law prohibited the physician from performing the abortion.

Granted, the Idaho statute offers the physician the cold comfort of a narrow
affirmative defense to avoid conviction. But only if she convinces a jury that, in
her good faith medical judgment, performing the abortion was “necessary to
prevent the death of the pregnant woman” can she possibly avoid conviction. Even
then, there is no certainty a jury will acquit. And the physician cannot enjoy the benefit of this affirmative defense if she performed the abortion merely to prevent
serious harm to the patient, rather than to save her life.

Back to the pregnant patient in the emergency department. The doctor
believes her EMTALA obligations require her to offer that abortion right now. But
she also knows that all abortions are banned in Idaho. She thus finds herself on the horns of a dilemma. Which law should she violate?

Fortunately, the drafters of our Constitution had the wisdom to provide a clear answer in Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution—the Supremacy Clause. At its core, the Supremacy Clause says state law must yield to federal law when it’s impossible to comply with both. And that’s all this case is about. It’s not about the bygone constitutional right to an abortion. This Court is not grappling with that larger, more profound question. Rather, the Court is called upon to address a far more modest issue—whether Idaho’s criminal abortion statute conflicts with a small but important corner of federal legislation. It does.

The discordant rulings could force the issue back before the Supreme Court, if appeals courts in each district concur with the lower courts.

Appeals are expected for both cases “and would be heard by separate appeals courts, one based in San Francisco with a reputation for leaning liberal and another in New Orleans known for conservative rulings,” notes Reuters.

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FREE MINDS

“Taxing Tech Companies for the Failure of the News Industry Is Just Unfair.” Politico‘s Jack Shafer details what’s wrong with Sen. Amy Klobuchar’s (D–Minn.) proposed Journalism Competition and Preservation Act. “The legislation isn’t actually a tax bill, but if enacted would ding the two top tech-media companies, Google and Facebook, for millions and perhaps billions of dollars a year that would go to the news industry,” Shafer points out. But while the idea of taking from tech giants to give to struggling newspapers might appeal to many people, “the Klobuchar bill unjustly punishes the tech giants by making it prop up an industry that has largely failed to address its business problems and has been decaying for decades,” he writes:

It would be nice to blame all of the news industry’s problems on the tech behemoths, but the undoing of the newspaper industry began well before the web’s advent. Newspaper circulation’s per capita decline started in the post-WWII era, as did the industry’s share of ad spending, thanks to competition from radio and TV. Total advertising revenue peaked in 2005. Some savvy newspaper investors, like Warren Buffett, predicted the industry’s coming decline in 1992, a good half-decade before the commercial Internet was a thing. The newspaper audience and ad buyers had already begun migrating to other mediums, like TV and cable….

Although Klobuchar’s bill doesn’t use the word “reparations,” it proceeds as if Google and Facebook injured the news industry by taking something that rightfully belonged to them and should pay annual damages. We can concede that Google makes some money from news headlines and snippets — one independent analyst puts it at $1 billion a year while the news industry’s trade group says more like $4.7 billion. But as writer Frederic Filloux has put it, this is how the market works: Better and cheaper products replace what went before. In the Google and Facebook examples, the two companies did two things. First, they almost completely divorced advertising from editorial or entertainment content, making web ads more like billboards than newspapers. Second, they transformed advertising from a wasteful, crapshoot business that ran campaigns in newspapers, on TV and on billboards with almost zero feedback on effectiveness into an efficient, targeted enterprise whose success could be measured instantly. The analogy isn’t perfect, but what Google and Facebook did to the ad industry was transformative, akin to what digital cameras did to Kodak and personal computers did to typewriters. The newspaper industry had the resources to create something like Google or Facebook but didn’t. The onus for missing what was coming should fall on the news industry, not Google or Facebook. The news industry never had an inherent right to advertising dollars. To imagine they deserve any form of reparations because tech displaced them in the ad marketplace is laughable.

More here.

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FREE MARKETS

The "starter home" is dead and a mix of exclusionary zoning and tightened lending standards killed it. https://t.co/gPOXU8DoRw

— M. Nolan Gray (@mnolangray) August 25, 2022

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QUICK HITS

• Comments that Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg makes in an interview with podcaster Joe Rogan showcase how the government doesn’t need to make direct (and unconstitutional) censorship requests to get tech companies to suppress information. It has threatened social media companies so much (with congressional hearings and investigations, new regulations, antitrust lawsuits, etc.) that their leaders are willing to suppress all sorts of stuff preemptively.

• “Virtually everything since the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade back in June suggests Republicans have a political problem on their hands now that they’ve obtained their long-sought goal of being able to severely restrict and even ban abortion,” writes Aaron Blake at The Washington Post. “And if you look closely, you’ll see signs of potential buyer’s remorse creeping in.”

• The American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona and media outlets are suing over a new Arizona law that makes filming near police a crime.

• A Missouri school district is bringing back paddling students.

• More from Reason on President Joe Biden’s student loan debt forgiveness plan:

• • The Student Loan Debate Isn’t Just About Money. It’s About the Experiences Students Like Me Sacrificed.
  • Will Biden’s Student Loan Debt Cancellation Plan Hold Up in Court?
  • Emma Camp talks to Peter Suderman about why “student loan forgiveness is bad news and bad policy.”

• “Before I got arrested, I had never really thought about how medical care worked behind bars—and I had no idea how bad it could be and often was,” writes Keri Blakinger at CNN.

• Millions in COVID-19 aid went to training veterans. But “only 397 landed jobs,” reports The Washington Post.

• A new White House order will change the way federally funded research is published:

BREAKING: White House issues new policy that will require, by 2026, all federally-funded research results to be freely available to public without delay, ending longstanding ability of journals to paywall results for up to 1 year. Coverage coming on @ScienceInsider. pic.twitter.com/HijntoZFDN

— ScienceInsider (@ScienceInsider) August 25, 2022

The post Courts Split on Whether the Feds Can Overturn These State Abortion Bans appeared first on Reason.com.

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This new article of mine will be coming out next year in the Journal of Law and Religion, and I thought I’d serialize it here; there’s still plenty of time for editing, so I’d love to hear people’s feedback. Here’s Part III (Part II is more doctrinal, so I’m skipping it for now, but you can read it in the PDF, if you’d like).

[* * *]

Weighing a person’s religious community membership in deciding whether to let the person remain pseudonymous might thus not be unduly burdensome or unfair to litigation adversaries [in violation of the Establishment Clause]. But might it be unfair to the religious community?

Consider, for instance, two of the cases described in Part I.A, plus a third one which strikes me as a plausible hypothetical:

1. 1. A woman whose family and friends are Trinidadian Muslims seeks pseudonymity in suing over an alleged rape.
   2. A woman whose family and friends are Southern Baptists seeks pseudonymity in an employment lawsuit stemming from her work as a stripper.
   3. A man whose family and friends are Orthodox Jews seeks pseudonymity in a domestic violence case stemming from a consensual adulterous relationship.[1]

To begin with, a judge would have to determine not just whether the plaintiffs would be stigmatized within that community, but whether they would be unusually stigmatized compared to ordinary litigants. The risk of some such stigma, after all, isn’t by itself generally enough to justify pseudonymity in litigation or as to public licenses or records. [2] And even the particular attributes in these three examples—having been sexually assaulted, being a stripper, or being an adulterer—are often stigmatized even outside particular religious communities.

Many within the religious communities might think the stigma is not materially greater in those communities than elsewhere, and might resent the implication that it is. Our religion calls us on to be loving and forgiving, they might say. Certainly it doesn’t condemn women who were attacked. It might condemn stripping and adultery, but it acknowledges that everyone is a sinner, and that all we can do is repent and strive to change, and to encourage our friends and families to do the same.

True, there might be some unduly judgmental people who won’t take such a kind view; but all communities have unpleasant folks such as that. Why are you making us out to be particularly harsh? In the course of claiming that we unfairly stigmatize certain people—and do so more than society generally does—might you be unfairly stigmatizing us?

Moreover, the magnitude of religious communities’ condemnation of these litigants is hard to measure; decisions are likely to be guesswork, based mostly on the judge’s perception of the group’s reputation. There may well be an affidavit from the litigant,[3] and perhaps from some others, making claims about such condemnation; but such self-serving claims—or claims that support a friend or family member—aren’t likely to be terribly reliable. There may be media accounts,[4] but those may well be one-sided, or based on the author’s own views. Community members might thus plausibly believe that they are being incorrectly tarred as especially judgmental, retrogressive, and intolerant based simply on outsiders’ stereotypes (e.g., of Muslims or of conservative Christians).[5]

To be sure, in traditional religious exemption cases, courts are supposed to accept claimants’ assertions that the law substantially burdens their religious practices, at least so long as the courts conclude the claimants are sincere.[6] But that makes sense because the burden relevant to those cases turns on the claimant’s own subjective beliefs. Here, the claimants are making assertions about the likely actions of coreligionists, assertions that, if believed, reflect badly on the character of those coreligionists.

One possible solution, of course, would be to pseudonymize the religious group, by saying that the defendant belongs to a group that condemns certain behavior without naming the group. But that would deny the public (and future litigants and their lawyers) important information about the basis for a judge’s decision. How, after all, can the public effectively “oversee and monitor the workings of the Judicial Branch,”[7] if it isn’t told the true basis for a judge’s decision?[8]

Another solution might be for the judges to take pains to note that they are just speaking of the views of some religious community members, and not talking about the religious group as a whole. But still, any decision allowing confidentiality for (say) a conservative Muslim alleged rape victim when such confidentiality would be denied for someone from a different religious community would necessarily imply that there are at least many such conservative Muslims—a higher share than among the public as a whole—who would view being a rape victim as shameful.

This sort of decisionmaking thus risks the sort of government disapproval of religion that some of the Court’s Establishment Clause have condemned. Consider, for instance, a litigant’s claim that, say, she “comes from a strict Muslim household where under their cultural beliefs and traditions such a sexual assault would have the tendency to bring shame and humiliation upon her family,”[9] and that she is therefore subject to “social stigma”[10] beyond that faced by a typical litigant. A judicial determination endorsing this claim may well be seen as critical of conservative Islam, even if the judge doesn’t expressly condemn the group for such views. After all, wouldn’t many of us disapprove of a group that blames the victim this way?

To be sure, the Court’s recent American Legion decision repudiated the endorsement test as a formal Establishment Clause doctrine,[11] and the prohibition on disapproval of religion has generally been closely linked to the prohibition on endorsement.[12] Still, even American Legion condemned government speech that “‘deliberately disrespect[s]’ members of minority faiths.”[13]

Of course, one might argue that an impartial determination of the facts about a religious group is as a matter of law not disrespectful: Find the facts and let the chips fall where they may. But a determination based on little more than an outsider judge’s perception of the group, coupled with a litigant’s own affidavit (or even the affidavits of some of the litigant’s supporters), will often risk stemming from disrespectful stereotypes and not just objective reality.

And in any event, even if such determinations aren’t unconstitutional, they seem to me best avoided, for the reasons given above. Certainly the American law of religious exemptions generally avoids having to decide what Southern Baptist or Muslim or Jewish communities are like, focusing instead on the beliefs of the individual claimant and not generalizations about a group.[14]

The notable exception there is Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court’s exemption of Amish objectors from the requirement that parents must send all children to school until age 16 stemmed in part from “evidence … show[ing] that the Amish have an excellent record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient members of society,” and that “the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society.”[15] But this feature of Yoder has been criticized,[16] and I think rightly so.

 

[1] Cf. Complaint, Doe v. Sebrow, No. 2:21-cv-20706, § 17 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 23, 2021) (plaintiff seeking pseudonymity in a lawsuit stemming from alleged libels by his ex-lover, and noting that he “practices Orthodox Judaism and is involved in various activities in that social and religious environment,” at ¶ 17).

[2] See Volokh, supra note 1, at pt. III.F. Many plaintiffs and even more defendants risk some degree of stigma if their identities are revealed. Usually, though, that’s not enough to overcome the strong presumption in favor of public litigation. If I’m sued for sexual harassment, fraud, or even malpractice, that would surely expose me to “shame and humiliation,” even if I claim that it’s unmerited because I’m actually innocent. Likewise if I sue for wrongful firing, and my employer’s defense is that I was really fired for sexual harassment, fraud, or malpractice. Nonetheless, I generally can’t litigate such cases pseudonymously. And while plaintiffs alleging sexual assault often will be allowed to litigate pseudonymously, not all courts take that view. See id. at Apps. 2a & 2b.

[3] See, e.g., Declaration of Jane Doe, Doe v. Neverson, No. 1:20-cv-20016-UU, ¶¶ 7–8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2020) (ECF. No 7-1 app. A).

[4] See, e.g., Motion for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonyms, Doe v. Georgetown Synagogue—Kesher Israel Congregation, No. 1:16-cv-01845-ABJ, at 7 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2016).

[5] In asylum cases in which an applicant raises the risk of religious persecution, immigration courts and Article III courts may have to consider some religious groups’ mistreatment of other groups. See, e.g., Sihotang v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting evidence that” “Islamic fundamentalist fervor seems to have intensified, such that evangelical Christians may now be at special risk in Indonesia,” both risk of discrimination by government and of private violence). But that at least involves courts reporting on conditions in foreign countries, usually bolstered by authoritative “State Department country conditions reports,” id. at 52. The cases described in the text involve courts passing judgment on communities within the United States, usually based on affidavits by litigants coupled with conventional perceptions of those communities.

[6] Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).

[7] Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 263 (4th Cir. 2014).

[8] To be sure, this is a decision about pseudonymity, not about a decision about the bottom-line result in a case. But pseudonymity decisions are indeed significant, because they affect public rights—indeed, in the view of some courts, the public’s First Amendment rights. See Volokh, supra note 1, at pts. I.A–.B.

[9] Doe v. Neverson, 820 F. App’x 984, 988 (11th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

[10] Id.

[11] American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).

[12] See, e.g., Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989).

[13] 139 S. Ct. at 2089.

[14] Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).

[15] 406 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1972).

[16] See, e.g., Peter J. Riga, Yoder and Free Exercise, 6 Journal of Law and Education 449, 466 (1977) (“What the Court has done in Yoder comes dangerously close to that examination of beliefs which, in itself, is a violation of free exercise.”); Mark Tushnet, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court: Kurland Revisited, 1989 Supreme Court Review 373, 379 (“It is not unfair to read [Yoder] as saying that the claims of the Amish prevailed because they were a ‘good’ religion.”); Lisa Biedrzycki, “Conformed to This World” : A Challenge to the Continued Justification of the Wisconsin v. Yoder Education Exception in A Changed Old Order Amish Society, 79 Temple Law Review 249, 267–68 (2006) (faulting Wisconsin v. Yoder for relying on “beatific stereotypes” of the Amish); Nicholas J. Nelson, A Textual Approach to Harmonizing Sherbert and Smith on Free Exercise Accommodations, 83 Notre Dame Law Review 801, 811–12 (2008) (“The Yoder Court was even rather explicit about its function as a stamp of government approval or disapproval of specific religious beliefs. . . . The Court even hinted that it would not be so kind to religious views it found less appealing . . . .”); James M. Oleske, Jr., Free Exercise (Dis)honesty, 2019 Wisconsin Law Review 689, 717–18 (2019).

The post Protecting People from Their Own Religious Communities: Judicial Evaluation of a Religious Community's Qualities appeared first on Reason.com.

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Some California Democrats have recently discovered the concept of “harm reduction” when it comes to a variety of drug-related matters. As the National Harm Reduction Coalition explains, this idea “accepts, for better or worse, that licit and illicit drug use is part of our world and chooses to work to minimize its harmful effects.”

Harm reduction is largely a reaction to the nation’s failed War on Drugs, which treated drug use—including addictive and destructive hard drugs as well as non-addictive drugs that people use for recreational and medical purposes—as criminal matters. Unfortunately, many of the same people who tout this anti-Prohibitionist idea only apply it selectively, but more on that later.

In 1996, the conservative National Review noted that the War on Drugs “is diverting intelligent energy away from how to deal with the problem of addiction, that it is wasting our resources, and that it is encouraging civil, judicial, and penal procedures associated with police states.” Harm reductionists agree with those prescient points.

Californians often get things wrong, but they have been right on this score. The same year National Review published that piece, our voters legalized medical marijuana. Then voters legalized recreational cannabis in 2016, although the new system is so highly taxed and regulated that the black market still thrives. Recently, legislators have proposed harm-reduction measures aimed at less-accepted drugs.

The California state legislature passed Senate Bill 57, which allows supervised injection sites in Los Angeles and San Francisco. The goal is to reduce drug overdoses by recognizing that certain people are going to use dangerous drugs no matter what. The governor vetoed the bill this week. Based on similar thinking, the state has operated syringe-exchange programs for decades.

San Francisco Sen. Scott Wiener’s Senate Bill 517—delayed for consideration until next year—decriminalizes the use of plant-based psychedelics. The senator pitches his “mushroom bill” as a criminal-justice matter. He finds it foolhardy to arrest people for using these substances. I appreciate his non-Prohibitionist approach toward illicit substances, regardless of their potential ill effects.

Nevertheless, during a recent interview, Wiener doubled down on his co-sponsorship of Senate Bill 793, a new state law that bans the sale of flavored tobacco products. The tobacco industry has qualified for the November ballot Proposition 31, which is a referendum on the new law. As with all referenda, the law has been put on hold until voters decide.

By banning flavored tobacco, the state is criminalizing the sale of almost all vaping products except the few that taste (blech) like tobacco, as well as the sale of lower-harm smokeless tobacco products such snus and Zyn, which typically come in flavors (peppermint, cinnamon, coffee). This is the opposite of the harm-reduction approach.

When it comes to hard drugs, the state’s Democrats insist that we shouldn’t judge people who use them, but should instead seek ways to help them and certainly not arrest them. They argue that legalizing or at least decriminalizing some drugs (cannabis, psychedelics) reduces potentially dangerous encounters with police. With tobacco, they are trying to criminalize a legal product.

That means more efforts by police to crack down on black-market sellers. It means sting operations, fines, and even potential jail time for lawbreakers (especially in African American neighborhoods, where menthol cigarettes are popular and will likely be sold illegally on street corners as “loosies”). Menthol smokes are dangerous, but the crackdown ensnares the less-dangerous products that smokers use to break their deadly habit.

Progressive supporters of the flavored-tobacco ban use the same “it’s for the children” lingo that old-time right-wing drug warriors used. The referendum, said SB 793 sponsor Jerry Hill, is Big Tobacco’s attempt to “buy for themselves the right to market highly addictive nicotine products to our kids.” By contrast, I suppose the people who sell heroin to supervised drug users are just public-spirited individuals.

Black market sellers of anything aren’t particularly careful about checking the age of buyers, whereas regulated markets do a better job keeping adult-only substances away from youth. And it’s bizarre to ban legal products to keep them away from underage people who already are not legally allowed to buy them. But for some reason, substance wars distort the thinking of normally sensible people.

When it comes to drugs, harm reduction supporters argue that we shouldn’t follow the federal government’s lead, given that the slow-moving feds still consider marijuana a Schedule 1 drug “with no currently accepted medical use” similar to heroin. When it comes to tobacco, they insist that the Food and Drug Administration’s failure to recognize vaping as a tobacco-cessation strategy is the Gospel truth.

Instead of sympathizing with smokers who want to reduce smoking’s harm, they belittle them by insisting that the only appropriate harm-reduction approaches are abstinence—or the dreary ones (patches, pills, inhalers) approved by the FDA. No wonder a cynic might conclude that many supporters of drug-related harm-reduction policies simply are hypocrites.

This column was first published in The Orange County Register.

The post California Lawmakers Are Being Hypocritical About 'Harm Reduction' Policies appeared first on Reason.com.

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