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After repeated warnings about China’s soaring non-performing loans on this site (here, here and here), which have underscroed the basis of Kyle Bass’ “big trade for 2016”, namely shorting China’s currency in the bet it will have to massively devalue in order to address its incipient default cycle, virtually everyone is aware that China has a big Non-Performing Loan problem, a problem whose size we first quantified as much as $3 trillion, or the same amount as all of China’s FX reserves.

However, very few know that while the rest of the world is assuming that China will simply sit there and hold in its imploding NPLs which could well rip it apart from the inside in a massive wave of defaults, some of these bad loans have quietly found their way to the US, where they hope to find a buyer courtesy of the DebtX platform.

The offering:

DebtX is pleased to announce the sale of a RMB 556 million non-performing loan relationship. The offering includes two non-performing loans secured by real estate in Southern China. The collateral includes a petrochemical wharf and an office building that serves one of China’s largest petroleum storage houses, as well as land use rights and additional business assets of the borrowing entities. The loans have strong loan to values, an in-place lease through 2025, and a full guaranty.

 

The details:

 

So, to summarize, a Chinese loan worth RMB556 billion collateralized by RMB1.2 trillion in the form of a petrochemical wharf, or a paltry 46% LTV, and which has a tiny cost of capital of 4.5%, is not only no longer performing in China, but is hoping to find a buyer in the U.S.

Incidentally, this is what a typical Sinopec oil wharf looks like:

One can’t help but wonder how many trilions (in US dollars) of assets are about to be wiped out when the NPL wave is finally recognized, and more to the point, since Chinese bad loans are already quietly trying to find a buyer in “long investment horizon” hands, does this mean that the trillions (in US dollars) in NPLs are about to finally flood the mainland?

To all those who miss this opportunity to own a piece of Chinese “assets”, fear not – many more such NPLs are rapidly coming your way.

via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1mxMLp7 Tyler Durden

Submitted by Dalan McEndree via OilPrice.com,

Do the Saudis have an oil market strategy beyond pumping crude to defend their market share? Are they indifferent to which countries’ oil industries survive? Or, alternatively, are they targeting specific global competitors and specific national markets? Did they start with a particular strategy in November 2014 when Saudi Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister Ali al-Naimi announced the new market share policy at the OPEC meeting in Vienna and are they sticking with it, or has their strategy evolved with the evolution of the global markets since?

And, of course, what does the Saudi strategy beyond pumping crude portend for the Saudi approach to some OPEC members’ calls for coordinated production cuts within OPEC and with Russia?

Conventional Wisdom

Conventional wisdom has it that the Saudis are focused primarily on crushing the U.S. shale industry. In this view, the Saudis blame the U.S. for the supply-demand imbalance that began to make itself felt in 2014. U.S. production data seems to support this. Between 2009 and 2014, U.S. crude and NGLs output increased nearly 4 million barrels per day, while Saudi Arabia’s increased only 1.64 million barrels per day, Canada’s 1.06 million, Iraq’s 0.9 million, and Russia’s 0.7 million (Saudi data doesn’t include NGLs).

In addition, the Saudis, among many others, believed that U.S. shale would be the most vulnerable to Saudi strategy, given relatively high production costs compared to Saudi production costs and shale’s rapid decline rates and the need therefore repeatedly to reinvest in new wells to maintain output.

Yet, if the Saudis were focused on the U.S., their efforts have been unsuccessful, at least in 2015. As the table below shows, U.S. output growth in 2015 outstripped Saudi output growth and the growth of output from other major producers in absolute terms. In addition, many observers also came to believe that U.S. shale production will recover more quickly than production in traditional plays once markets balance due to its unique accelerated production cycle and that this quick recovery will limit price increases when markets balance.

Is the U.S. Really the Primary Target?

The above considerations imply the Saudis—if indeed they primarily were targeting U.S. shale—embarked on a self-defeating campaign in November 2014 that could at best deliver a Pyrrhic victory and permanent revenues losses in the US$ hundred billions.

Is the U.S. the primary target? U.S. import data (from the EIA) suggests the U.S. is not now the Saudis’ primary target, if it ever was. Like other producers, the Saudis operate within a set of constraints. Domestic capacity is one. In its 2015 Medium Term Market Report (Oil), the IEA put Saudi Arabia’s sustainable crude output capacity at 12.34 million barrels per day in 2015 and at 12.42 million in 2016. Export capacity—output minus domestic demand—is another.

Rather than maintaining crude output at 2014’s level in 2015, the Saudis steadily increased it after al-Naimi’s announcement in Vienna as they brought idle capacity on line (data from the IEA monthly Oil Market Report):

This allowed them to increase average daily crude exports by 460,000 barrels in 2015 over 2014 average export levels—even as Saudi domestic demand increased—and exports peaked in 4Q 2015 at 7.01 million barrels per day (assuming the Saudis keep output at average 2H 2015 levels in 2016, and domestic demand increased 400,000 barrels per day, as the IEA forecasts, the Saudis could export nearly 7 million barrels per day on average in 2016):

The Saudis did not ship any of their incremental crude exports to the U.S.—in other words, they did not increase volumes exported to the U.S., did not directly seek to constrain U.S. output, and did not seek to increase U.S. market share. Based on EIA data, Saudi imports into the U.S. declined from 1.191 million barrels per day in 2014 to 1.045 million in 2015—and have steadily declined since peaking in 2012 at 1,396 million barrels per day. (OPEC’s shipments also declined from 2014 to 2015, from 3.05 million barrels per day to 2.64 million, continuing the downward trend that started in 2010). Canada, however, which has sent increasing volumes to the U.S. since 2009, increased exports to the U.S. 306,000 barrels per day in 2015:

Also, the Saudi share of U.S. crude imports declined 1.9 percentage points in 2015 from 2014, and has declined 2.6 percentage points since peaking at 16.9 percent in 2013; during the same two periods, Canada’s share increased 4.5 and 9.9 percentage points respectively (and has more than doubled since 2009):

Other Markets

The Saudis presumably exported the incremental 606,000 barrels per day (460,000 from net increased export capacity plus 146,000 diverted from the U.S.) to their focus markets. Since other countries’ import data generally is less current, complete, and available than U.S. data, where these barrels ended up must be found indirectly, at least partially.

In its 2015 Medium Term Market Report (Oil), the IEA projected that the bulk of growth from 2015 to 2020 will come in China, Other Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, while demand will remain more or less stagnant in OECD U.S. and OECD Europe:

The Saudis find themselves in a difficult battle for market share in China, the world’s second largest import market and the country in which the IEA expects absolute import volume will increase the most through 2020—1.5 million barrels per day (it projects Other Asia demand to increase 2.0 million). The Saudis are China’s leading crude supplier. However, their position is under sustained attack from their major—and minor—global export competitors. For example, through the first eleven months of 2015, imports from Saudi Arabia increased only 2.1 percent to 46.08 million metric tons, while imports from Russia increased 28 percent to 37.62 million, Oman 9.1 percent to 28.94 million, Iraq 10.3 percent to 28.82 million, Venezuela 20.7 percent to 14.77 million, Kuwait 42.6 percent to 12.68 million, and Brazil 102.1 percent to 12.07 million.

As a result of the competition, the Saudi share of China’s imports has dropped from ~20 percent since 2012 to ~15 percent in 2015, even as Chinese demand increased 16.7 percent, or 1.6 million barrels per day, from 9.6 million in 2012 to 11.2 million in 2015. Moreover, the competition for Chinese market share promises to intensify with the lifting of UN sanctions on Iran, which occupied second place in Chinese imports pre-UN sanctions and has expressed determination to regain its prior position (Iran’s exports to China fell 2.1 percent to 24.36 million tons in the first eleven months of 2015).

Moreover, several Saudi competitors enjoy substantial competitive advantages. Russia has two. One is the East Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO) which directly connects Russia to China—important because the Chinese are said to fear the U.S. Navy’s ability to interdict ocean supplies routes. Its capacity currently is 15 million metric tons per year (~300,000 barrels per day) and capacity is expected to double by 2017, when a twin comes on stream. The second is the agreement Rosneft, Russia’s dominant producer, has with China National Petroleum Corporation to ship ~400 million metric tons of crude over twenty-five years, and for which China has already made prepayments. Russia shares a third with other suppliers. Saudis contracts contain destination restrictions and other provisions that constrain their customers’ ability to market the crude, whereas those of some other suppliers do not.

Marketing flexibility will be particularly attractive to the smaller Chinese refineries, which Chinese government has authorized to import 1 million-plus barrels per day.
While they fight for market share in China, the Saudis also have to fight for market share in the established, slow-growing or stagnant IEA-member markets (generally OECD member countries). Saudi exports to these markets declined 310,000 barrels per day between 2012 and 2014, and 490,000 barrels per day between 2012 and 2015’s first three quarters. Only in Asia Oceania did Saudi export volumes through 2015’s first three quarters manage to equal 2012’s export volumes. During the same period, Iraq managed to increase its exports to Europe 340,000 barrels per day (data from IEA monthly Oil Market Report).

It is therefore not surprising that the Saudis moved aggressively in Europe in 4Q 2015—successfully courting traditional Russian customers in Northern Europe and Eastern Europe and drawing complaints from Rosneft.

As with China, the competition will intensify with Iran’s liberation from UN sanctions. For example, Iran has promised to regain its pre-UN sanctions European market share—which implies an increase in exports into the stagnant European market of 970,000 barrels per day (2011’s 1.33 million barrels per day minus 2015’s 360,000 barrels per day).

Might the U.S. be an Ally?

Without unlimited crude export resources, the Saudis have had to choose in which global markets to conduct their market share war, and therefore, implicitly, against which competitors to direct their crude exports.

Why did the Saudis ignore the U.S. market?

First, U.S. crude does not represent a threat to the Saudis’ other crude export markets. Until late 2015, when the U.S. Congress passed, and President Obama signed, legislation lifting the prohibition, U.S. producers, with limited exceptions, could not export crude. Even with the prohibition lifted, it is unlikely the U.S. will become a significant competitor, given that the U.S. is a net crude importer. Therefore, directing crude to the U.S. would not improve the Saudi competitive position elsewhere.

 

Second, the U.S. oil industry is one of the least vulnerable (if not the least vulnerable) to Saudi pressure—and therefore least likely and less quickly to crack. Low production costs are a competitive advantage, but are not the only one and perhaps not the most important one. Financing, technology, equipment, and skilled manpower availability is important, as are political stability, physical security, a robust legal framework for extracting crude, attractive economics, and access and ease of access to markets. The Saudis major export competitors—Russia, Iran, and Iraq—are far weaker than the U.S. on all these areas, as are its minor export competitors, including those within—Nigeria, Libya, Venezuela, and Angola—and outside OPEC—Brazil.

 

Third, in the U.S. market, the Saudis face tough, well-managed domestic competitors, and a foreign competitor, Canada, that enjoys multiple advantages including proximity, pipeline transport, and trade agreements, the Saudis do not enjoy.

 

Finally, the Saudis may be focused on gaining a sustainable long term advantage in a different market than the global crude export market—the higher value added and therefore more valuable petroleum product market. Saudi Aramco has set a target to double its global (domestic and international) refining capacity to 10 million barrels per day by 2025. Depressed revenues from crude will squeeze what governments have to spend on their oil industries and, presumably, they will have to prioritize maintaining crude output over investments in refining.

In this Saudi effort, the U.S. could be an ally. The U.S. became a net petroleum product exporter in 2012 (minus numbers in the table below indicate net exports), and net exports grew steadily through 2015. Growth continued in January, with net product exports averaging 1.802 million barrels per day, and, in the week ending February 5, 2.046 million. U.S. exports will lessen the financial attractiveness of investment in domestic refining capacity, both for governments and for foreign investors in their countries’ oil industries (data from EIA).

Saudi Intentions

The view that the Saudi market share strategy is focused on crushing the U.S. shale industry has led market observers obsessively to await the EIA’s weekly Wednesday petroleum status report and Baker-Hughes weekly Friday U.S. rig count—and to react with dismay as U.S. rig count has dropped, but production remained resilient.

In fact, they might be better served welcoming resilient U.S. production. It may be that the Saudis will not change course until Russian output declines, Iraq’s stagnates, Iran’s output growth is stunted—and that receding output from weaker countries within and outside OPEC would not be enough. If this is case, the Saudis will see resilient U.S. production as increasing pressure on their competitors and bringing forward the day when they can contemplate moderating their output.

NOTE: Nothing in the foregoing analysis should be understood as denying that the U.S. oil industry has suffered intensely or asserting that this strategy, if it is Saudi strategy, will succeed.

via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1QcOCYf Tyler Durden

…but this is a list you do not want to be at the top of…

 

 

As The Burning Platform's Jim Quinn so eloquently exclaims…

Thank God for the Department of Education and Common Core.  

 

No child is being left behind in our quest for idiocy.

 

I’m sure paying union teachers more money will solve our problems.

 

Free college for morons who can’t add 2 + 2 will be the answer.

We're gonna need moar free stuff.

via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/20R18Yw Tyler Durden

By Eddie Zipperer, originally published in The Hill

The complete idiot's guide to being right about Donald Trump

If you operate under the assumption that helium is heavier than the air around you, you're going to lose your balloon. If you're smart, you won't lose many balloons before you change your assumption. If you don't change your assumption, you're going to keep losing balloons and start to look pretty stupid in the process.

But it looks like you can't teach old pundits new paradigms. After presidential candidate Donald Trump finished in second in the Iowa Republican caucus, the media went straight to work picking out a coffin for his campaign, battling it out to see who could write the most definitive obituary. After months of being wrong about Trump, something finally happened to make them look right: All the Iowa polls were wrong — Trump lost! Sure, he scored more Iowa votes than anyone ever — excepting Sen. Ted Cruz (Texas), who won Iowa — but he lost. Trump is a loser and this proves it.

It's hard to blame them for trying to spike the ball in Trump's face. You’ve seen it before. Your favorite NFL team is down by 50 points. The team finally gets a first down, and the halfback celebrates like he just won the Super Bowl. Everyone except him just laughs and shakes their head. That's what opinion writers like David Brooks — who wrote a piece declaring that "Donald Trump Isn't Real" in the aftermath of Iowa — looked like last week. CNN ran a piece by Michael D'Antonio headlined "Donald Trump is a loser." And the list of similar sentiments is long.

The pressure of being wrong about Trump over and over was building, so when it appeared they were finally right about something, the release was earthshaking.

Last July, I asked a political science professor at an Ivy League university how Trump would appeal to the electorate in a general election. He told me that "It's a moot point" because "Trump has no chance of surviving the primaries."

I predicted Trump's demise more than once myself since last summer. The difference between me and the rest of them is that I threw out my broken election assumptions and started holding tight to the string of my balloon. For anyone interested, below is a guide on how to be right about Trump next time. It all starts with rejecting the bad assumptions and embracing the good ones.

Bad assumption: Manners are of the utmost importance. Every time Trump utters a naughty word, the media go nuts. The story was everywhere on Tuesday (you know the one; he repeated an audience member's use of the word "pussy"). I heard more than one talking head predict that Trump would lose the New Hampshire primary when voters found out. Didn't happen; never will. Trump doesn't do manners, and his supporters don't want him to.

Good Assumption: Every time Trump says something that no other politician ever would, he scores points. Politicians are well-mannered in front of voters and employ others to do their dirty work. Take former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush (R), for instance. He talks a big game about the president being mature and the presidency as being above Trump's behavior. Sounds nice, but then consider the truth lurking behind Bush. According to Larry Sabato, "Jeb Bush is Meaner Than He Looks." Or recall former presidential candidate Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) lecturing us on maturity during the same debate where his communications director, Sergio Gor, tweeted a copy of Carly Fiorina's closing statement that had been left in the hotel copier.

Bad assumption: An ideological misstep will dissolve Trump's support. Most Republican voters despise eminent domain. I despise eminent domain. In Saturday night's debate, Trump defended eminent domain. He didn't try to "Rubio" his way out of it with prepared sound bites. He didn’t try to muddy the water and make people question whether he actually supported it. He was totally straight about it.

Good assumption: Honesty transcends ideology. Voters would rather disagree with a straight-shooter than agree with a political wind-tester. We've seen too many politicians run as conservatives and then prove not to be. Voters have become suspect of politicians with ideologies that try too hard to match the electorate.

Bad assumption: Trump is unelectable in November. Uh-huh. Just like he could never win the primaries. Every time a pundit says Trump is unelectable in November, there's a good chance he or she also wrote him off in the GOP primary a few months ago and at every step along the way. Repeating something over and over doesn't make it true. Just ask Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.).

Good assumption: Trump is a winner.

via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1QcINKi Tyler Durden

Submitted by SaxoBank's Dembik Christopher via TradingFloor.com,

• Currency stability is a prerequisite for China's economic transition
• Defending the yuan is prohibitively expensive – China cannot beat the market
• Progressive devaluation managed by PBoC is the most probable scenario for 2016
• Remember that the country is on the capitalism learning curve
• Exchange rates will inevitably be a key discussion point at Shanghai G20
• China has moved from being a net importer to a net exporter of capital

Shoring up a currency ad infinitum is impossible. The market always wins.

The undervalued Chinese yuan is nothing but a bad memory. In the context of competitive devaluations throughout the world, the yuan is now significantly overvalued compared to its main counterparts, primarily the dollar and the euro.

If it is to pull off its economic transition, China needs a stable currency, hence its repeated interventions on the exchange markets over the past few months. Over the last year $513 billion was drawn from the foreign exchange reserves without stemming any of the downwards market pressures on the yuan. Over the period is actually lost 5% against the US dollar. This is a significant depreciation for a currency that is used to fluctuating between narrower markers. By way of comparison, the euro, which floats freely on the market, lost almost 6% of its value against the US dollar last year.

The increasingly credible assumption of a devaluation before this summer:

 

Three possible scenarios exist for the Chinese yuan in 2016:

• The progressive devaluation managed by the People's Bank of China
• Continued defence of the currency on the markets
• New Plaza-type Accord

The progressive devaluation managed by the PBoC is the most probable scenario for 2016. This will not interfere with the process of internationalising the yuan, quite the reverse, since it would make it possible to have an exchange rate that is more in line with Chinese fundamentals. The successive devaluations of last August (1.9% on 11 August, 1.6% on 12 August and 1.1% on 13 August) sent an important signal to the market which will therefore not be taken by complete surprise the next time should China repeat the operation.

If this is to succeed, the PBoC must open communication channels with the market by adopting the methods used by central banks in developed countries. The country is on the capitalism learning curve. Consequently, this revolution will not be without teething problems, but it is certainly a necessary step so that investors can gain a better understanding of China’s monetary policy and its optimal exchange rate.

The G20, due take place in Shanghai on 26 and 27 February, could represent an important step in the yuan’s devaluation. The issue of exchange rates will inevitably be a key discussion point. This forum could be the ideal opportunity to provide China with the necessary expertise and could potentially give it free rein to devalue, as has been the case in the past for Japan. In the short term, the main flaw in this scenario would be an increase in monetary disorder, but the market impact would remain limited and would be nothing like the electric shock precipitated by the Swiss National Bank abandoning the EURCHF ceiling, almost exactly one year ago.

If the yuan is not devalued, the PBoC could be forced to continue to defend the yuan on the markets. This is the counterproductive scenario. The interventions on the forex markets come at a cost that is increasingly prohibitive, given their ineffectiveness in stabilising the yuan. China cannot beat the market. At the current path (close to 100 billion dollars per month), the currency reserves could reach the minimum threshold of 2,800 billion dollars recommended by the IMF by the end of June.

The country cannot afford to let its reserves fall much below this ceiling since it provides PBoC with real flexibility to intervene in the event of an external crisis. Were this to happen, China would sooner or later be forced to throw in the towel and let market forces decide the exchange rate of the yuan. PBoC’s credibility would be permanently damaged. China is therefore aware that such an eventuality is unthinkable, which seems to give even more credence to the scenario of the progressive devaluation of the yuan by this summer.

A new Plaza Accord. This is the dream scenario for economists, but certainly the least likely in the medium term, given the lack of monetary policy coordination between developed and emerging countries. Starting from the premise that exchange rate volatility is too high and competitive devaluations that are not signed off at the global level have recessionary effects on economic activity, new Plaza accords could be signed under the auspices of the G20. These would aim to counter the major problems of the world economy: high exchange rate volatility, overvaluation of the yuan and the strength of the American dollar which heightens the risk of recession due to the debt explosion of market players in USD since 2008.

Following the example of 1985, signatory countries could accept to intervene on the currency markets to depreciate the market price of the dollar and the yuan. Swap agreements between the Fed and the central banks of emerging countries could also be set up, as was the case in 2008, between the main central banks of developed countries, in order to ease tensions on the financial markets. However, for such a scenario to be possible, the countries in question must recognise that they have convergent interests and accept the need to act in concert, which is not yet the case.

The thorny problem of capital outflows:

 
The fall of the yuan is closely correlated with capital outflows. This is difficult to measure precisely given the opaque way in which Chinese statistics are calculated. Our low estimate leads us to conclude that almost 650 million dollars in capital have flowed out of the economy since 2010, based on the change in the "net errors and omissions" in the trade balance. The actual total amount is certainly much higher, but this estimate confirms that contrary to what was commonly admitted, China has moved from being a net importer to net exporter of capital. Despite the 4,000 billion yuan recovery plan presented at the end of 2008, China has not managed to sufficiently strengthen its economy. Regardless of which is PBoC's preferred scenario, when it comes to stabilising the exchange rate for the yuan, capital outflows must inevitably be restricted.

It would not be a good idea to implement the capital controls alluded to, since this would send a very negative message to foreign investors at the worst possible time. In addition, past experience shows that gaps can always be found in such measures in order to transit capital out of the country through indirect means, such as via Hong Kong, in China's case. For true effectiveness, strict controls are required which would result in the economy being completely stifled. This makes absolutely no sense in this case. China will have no other choice in the years to come, but to offer liberalisation guarantees to foreigners for the domestic capital market and strengthen its financial regulations, which are still very inadequate.

This long process does not exclude new significant corrections on the Chinese stock market or even business bankruptcies that will result in reducing the moral hazard. Nevertheless, what is certain is that a stable exchange for the yuan after devaluation could help reassure market players. This is after all, the simplest and quickest way to proceed. China does not have any other credible, effective levers to restore balance to its economy in the short-term.

Curiously, progressive devaluation would actually aid the internationalisation of the yuan.
 

via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1QcIKyi Tyler Durden

Nine months ago, things weren’t look good for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.

Four years into his country’s bloody civil war, he found himself fighting a multi-front war against a long list of largely Sunni extremist elements and the government’s forces were stretched thin. The rebels enjoyed the support not only of the US, but of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. That meant that their resources were essentially unlimited.

It had taken longer than expected, but by summer of last year, the plan that was revealed in a leaked diplomatic cable from 2006 penned by Deputy Chief of Mission in Syria William Roebuck had materialized. The West and its regional allies had managed to engineer a Sunni uprising against the Alawite government by fomenting sectarian discord and within months, Assad would either flee (likely to Russia) or end up like Gaddafi – executed by an angry mob.

Russia’s intervention changed all that by giving Hezbollah an advanced air force to back ground offensives and now, four months since Russia first begun flying combat missions from Latakia, Assad is poised to recapture Aleppo, securing his grip on the country’s main urban centers.

Assad has given several interviews since the end of last summer. We’ve documented most of them here. In September for instance, he had the following advice for the West, which suddenly became acutely aware of the “problem” in Syria when the indelible image of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi drowned on a Turkish beach was plastered all over the nightly news: “If you are worried about them, stop supporting terrorists. That’s what we think regarding the crisis. This is the core of the whole issue of refugees.”

Then, in the wake of the Paris attacks, Assad condemned the assaults as “savage” but reminded the media that “what France suffered from terror is what the Syrian people have been enduring for over five years.” “We said, don’t take what is happening in Syria lightly. Unfortunately, European officials did not listen,” he added.

Then, in December, Assad invited Die Presse to Damascus for a sweeping interview in which the President described the country’s infrastructure as “pretty much destroyed” and blamed Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar for turning Syria into a “hotbed for terrorists.”

Now, with Iran and Russia set to rout the rebels at Aleppo, Assad sat down with AFP and said from Damascus that pro-government forces would “without any hesitation” look to retake the entire country from the rebels. Below, find excerpts from the interview in which Assad also touches on the possibility of a Saudi or Turkish ground invasion, and on Europe’s culpability in vis-a-vis the conflict.

*  *  *

Highlights from AFP and al-Arabiya

Speaking Thursday in Damascus, Assad said his armed forces would try to retake all of Syria “without any hesitation,” but that the involvement of regional players “means that the solution will take a long time and will incur a heavy price.”

“The main battle is about cutting the road between Aleppo and Turkey, for Turkey is the main conduit of supplies for the terrorists,” he said in an interview conducted Thursday in Damascus.

He warned that the French government should change its “destructive policies” in support of extremists.

France has implemented “destructive policies extending direct support to terrorism… It is France’s duty to reverse or change its policies,” Assad said.

“We have fully believed in negotiations… however, if we negotiate, it does not mean that we stop fighting terrorism. The two tracks are inevitable in Syria,” he said.

But he said he sees a risk that Saudi Arabia or Turkey could launch a military intervention in his country.

He said he “doesn’t rule out” such an intervention, but said that his armed forces “will certainly confront it.”

On the issue of the refugee crisis he said Europe was a “direct cause” of Syrians fleeing their homeland and must stop “giving cover to terrorists” before people return.

He called on European governments “which have been a direct cause for the emigration of these people… to help in making Syrians return to their country.”

“I would like to ask every person who left Syria to come back,” he said.

“They would ask ‘why should I come back? Has terrorism stopped?‘”

Full transcript

Question 1: How do you feel when you see tens of thousands of your citizens starving, running away from hunger, from their areas which are being shelled by your Russian allies, and trying to cross the borders to Turkey? And how do you feel when you see the pictures of them drowning in their attempt to cross the seas?

President Assad: If we talk about emotions, I belong to this people; and it is self-evident that I have the same feelings my people have. Any scene of suffering is painful to all of us as Syrians. But as an official, the question for me is less about emotions than about what I, as an official, should do, being responsible before my people.

However, when the cause of this suffering is the terrorists, not the Russian shelling as claimed by Western media, and when one cause for migration is the almost five-year-old embargo against the Syrian people, naturally my, and every Syrian official’s first task is to fight terrorism essentially using Syrian capabilities, but also using our friends’ support in the fight against terrorism. That’s why I say the problem of Syrian refugees abroad, as well as the problem of hunger inside Syria, as you referred to it, is a problem caused by terrorism, Western policies, and the embargo imposed on the Syrian people.

Question 2: Mr. President, can we talk about the possibility of putting an end to shelling civilian populations and also lifting the blockade imposed on certain areas?

President Assad: The conflict has been, since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, about who wins the support of the people in Syria. Consequently, it doesn’t make sense for us to shell civilians if we want to win them to our side. This is in theory. Practically, while moving around in Syria, you will find that in any area under the control of the state, all sections of Syrian society, including the families of the militants, are being cared for by the state. What is more is that in a city like Raqa, which is under the full control of Daesh (ISIS), the state continues to pay the salaries of employees and send vaccines for children. So it doesn’t make sense for the state to shell civilians while doing all the above, unless we are talking about mistakes which happen in every battle. The general rule is that there are innocent victims in every war. This is a rule of thumb in wars, but this is definitely not the Syrian state’s policy.

Question 3: Mr. President, what do you say to those emigrating to Europe? Do you ask them to come back?

President Assad: I would like to ask every person who left Syria to come back. That’s natural but not enough. Emotions are not enough. They would ask: “Why should I come back? Has terrorism stopped? Have the basic requirements for life been restored?” Many of those who have emigrated are neither against the Syrian state or with the terrorists, but sometimes there are circumstances which force people to emigrate. So, my answer to this question is: when terrorism recedes, and things are better, they will return of their own volition without any invitation. So, instead of asking these people to return, I’ll call on the European governments, which have been a direct cause for the emigration of these people, by giving cover to terrorists in the beginning, and through the sanctions imposed on Syria, to help in making the Syrians return to their country.

Question 4: Mr. President, will the Syrian state regain control over Aleppo in the next few days? If so, what is next?

President Assad: The battle in Aleppo now is not about regaining control over Aleppo, because the Syrian state is there; but the main battle is about cutting the road between Aleppo and Turkey; for Turkey is the main conduit of supplies for the terrorists. The battle is going on now on more than ten fronts at the same time, from north to south, to the east, to the far east too, and to the west in Latakia. It was going on in Homs, and now it’s over. So, all these stages are moving in parallel.

Question 5: Do you think, Mr. President, that you can regain control over all Syrian territory?

President Assad: Regardless of whether we can do that or not, this is a goal we are seeking to achieve without any hesitation. It makes no sense for us to say that we will give up any part. The timeframe is dependent on two scenarios. Suppose that the problem is purely Syrian, i.e. that Syria is isolated from its surroundings, we can put an end to this problem in less than a year by moving on two fronts: fighting terrorism and political action. The second scenario — which is the case now — taking the shape of continuing supplies to terrorists through Turkey, Jordan, and partly from Iraq ? because Daesh (ISIS)exists in Iraq with Saudi, Turkish, and Qatari support -? naturally means that the solution will take a long time and will incur a heavy price. So it is difficult to give a precise answer about the timeframe.

Question 6: Can’t you say precisely how many years you need to restore peace to Syria?

President Assad: The question is: for how many years will Turkey and Saudi Arabia continue to support terrorism? That is the question. And when will the West put pressure on these countries to stop supporting terrorism?

Question 7: Who is your main enemy? Is it the so-called moderate opposition and the Islamists, or is it Daesh (ISIS)?

President Assad: I don’t think that the term “opposition” can be used, in France or anywhere else in the world, to describe somebody carrying a weapon. Opposition is a political act. Suppose that you mean to say “moderate terrorists”, this is a different term. Saying that, you mean that they do not belong to Daesh (ISIS), Al-Nusra, or to these extremist groups. Obama said that the moderate opposition is a fantasy. Biden said the same thing. But what’s more important is reality which says that such an opposition is non-existent. Most of the militants belong to extremist groups, such as Daesh (ISIS), Al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and others. So, my answer is that every terrorist is an enemy. We respect every political opposition; and we do have political opposition inside Syria. They adopt tough positions against the state, and we are not attacking them.

Question 8: You see no difference between these armed groups and Daesh (ISIS), Al-Nusra, and others?

President Assad: Legally speaking, there is no difference. The state will confront all those who carry weapons. It will not ask them about their ideology. But the difference is that the extremist groups refuse to have any dialogue with the state. They believe that they will fight, die, and go to heaven. This is their doctrine. The other groups are not ideological. Most of them have been misled. They got involved in dialogue with the state later. Some of them have laid down their weapons, and some are actually fighting with the Syrian Army today. We grant them amnesty in return for laying down their weapons.

Question 9: Mr. President, what do you think of Jaish al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham? They did negotiate with you, and went to Geneva.

President Assad: They went as part of the opposition formed by Saudi Arabia, because it is Saudi Arabia which supports terrorism worldwide. So it is only natural for the representatives of Saudi Arabia to be terrorists, not politicians.

Question 10: So you will not negotiate with those?

President Assad: In principle, direct negotiations were not supposed to take place in Geneva 3. They were supposed to take place through de Mistura. And here we should be precise: we are not negotiating with Syrians, but with representatives of Saudi Arabia, France, the UK, and others. So, if you mean Syrian-Syrian dialogue, the answer is naturally no. Dialogue with these people is not a Syrian-Syrian dialogue at all. A Syrian dialogue is that conducted with Syrian groups which have grassroots in Syria, like the political opposition in Syria, for instance. Any persons calling themselves opposition but belong to foreign states or foreign intelligence services do not represent Syrians in the dialogue, and simply we do not consider them Syrian.

Question 11: All those who went to Geneva were based outside Syria. Can you explain?

President Assad: No, some of them are based inside Syria, and some live outside Syria but they are involved in politics and have supporters in Syria. I’m not talking only about terrorists, I’m talking about people who have been formed in a foreign state and act on behalf of a foreign state.

Question 12: Don’t you think that had you been more tolerant in dealing with this opposition in the past, you would have avoided this conflict? Don’t you bear part of the responsibility?

President Assad: We do not claim that we did not make mistakes in Syria. This is natural in any state. And we do not claim that we, in the Middle East, have reached a stage of significant political openness. We were moving in that direction, not very quickly, and maybe slowly. Back to your question, the more radical segments of the opposition inside Syria, which attack the state, have not been imprisoned or prosecuted by the state, neither before or after the crisis. So, I don’t know what is meant by tolerance in this case.

Question 13: Maybe it was difficult for the opposition inside Syria before. Maybe they did not have a margin for movement?

President Assad: You are talking about a general condition in the Middle East. This is partly true, particularly in the Arab world. But the question in this case is not that of tolerance. The question has to do with individuals rather than institutions. The question is: what is the institutional action that we should take in order to move forward. This has legal, social, or cultural aspects, because democracy is more of a culture than a law. You cannot proceed with laws while remaining culturally in your place.

Question 14: Mr. President, do you think that there might be a Turkish intervention in Syria now? And do you think the Saudi threats are serious?

President Assad: Logically, intervention is not possible, but sometimes reality is at odds with logic, particularly when there are irrational people leading a certain state. That’s why I don’t rule that out for a simple reason: Erdogan is a fanatical person with Muslim Brotherhood inclinations. He is living the Ottoman dream. For him, the collapse which took place in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria is something personal. This threatens his political future, on the one hand, and his fanatical Islamist ambitions, on the other. He believes that he has an Islamist mission in our region. The same applies to Saudi Arabia. The collapse of the terrorists in Syria is a collapse of their policies. I tell you that this process is surely not going to be easy for them, and we will certainly confront it.

Question 15: Mr. President, are you prepared to give northern Syria to the Kurds for self-rule after the crisis?

President Assad: This question is directly related to the Syrian constitution; and as you know, the constitution is not given by the government, all sections of Syrian society have a say in it, and it is put to public referendum. That’s why this should be a national question, not a question put to any Syrian official, whether it has to do with self-rule, federalism, decentralisation, or any similar thing. All these things are part of the political dialogue in the future; but I would like to stress that the Kurds are a Syrian national group.

Question 16: Is it true that the Russians tried to persuade you to step down? Don’t you fear a Russian-American deal on this issue?

President Assad: If we look at Russian policies and Russian officials in the same way we look at unprincipled Western officials and policies, this is a possibility. But the fact is the exact opposite, for a simple reason: the Russians treat us with great respect. They do not treat us as a superpower dealing with a minor state, but as a sovereign state dealing with a sovereign state. That’s why this issue has not been raised at all in any shape or form.

Question 17: Mr. President, are you prepared to give Russia and Iran permanent bases on your territory? Do you fear that Syria will become a satellite to these powers?

President Assad: Having military bases for any country in Syria does not mean that Syria will become a satellite state to these countries. They do not interfere in issues related to the law, the constitution, nor to politics. In any case, the Russian base exists already, while the Iranians have not asked to have one. But in principle, we do not have a problem.

Question 18: So if the Iranians raise this possibility, will you accept?

President Assad: The issue hasn’t been raised, and consequently this is hypothetical. But as I said, when we accept it in the case of Russia, it means the principle is acceptable. But this also depends on the capabilities of every state and their role on the regional and international arena.

Question 19: Has Russia asked your permission to build new bases on your territory?

President Assad: No.

Question 20: The American elections are still at the primaries stage. Are you, personally, with candidate Trump or Clinton or is there a third person who might be in the interest of the region?

President Assad: We have never placed our bets on any American president. We always bet on policies; and these policies are not controlled only by the president, but by the establishment in general, and by the lobbies operating in the United States. If you look at the competition between many candidates, now or in the past, you will find that it revolves around who is more inclined to start wars, and this doesn’t bode well. The problem with American politicians is that they say something and do the exact opposite, before and after the elections.

Intervention: So, the promises made by Trump do not frighten you?

President Assad: No. As I said, since I don’t build on what the American candidates say, I see no reason why I should comment on any of them, i.e. they are all alike to me.

Question 21: Mr. President, do you intend to be a president for life? And if you don’t, are you in the process of grooming a successor, perhaps one of your sons?

President Assad: First, the presidency is not a hobby that we enjoy. It is a responsibility, particularly in these circumstances. As to my selecting a successor, this country is neither a farm nor a company. If I want to remain president, that should be dependent on two factors: first, my desire to be president, and second, the desire of the people. When the next elections come and I feel that the people don’t want me, I shall not stand. That’s why it’s too early to talk about this. We still have years before the next elections.

Question 22: Mr. President, you know that there have been many accusations made about your government and you personally, most recently by the UN investigation committee which accused you of genocide, which is a crime against humanity. Aren’t you concerned that you will one day face an international court?

President Assad: First, you know that UN institutions express balance among the superpowers and the conflict among them. And these organisations are now basically controlled by Western powers. That’s why most of their reports are politicised and serve a political agenda. The evidence is that these organisations haven’t said anything about clear massacres perpetrated by terrorist groups against innocent civilians in Syria. What refutes the reports of these organisations is that, first, they do not provide any evidence, and this is the case in general. Second, there is a logic for things: if Western states and rich Gulf states are against an individual, and this individual is killing his people, how would he withstand for five years in these circumstances? That’s why I’m not concerned about these threats or these allegations.

Question 23: But don’t you believe that these reports are correct? There are eyewitnesses in this case.

President Assad: No, there is a difference between individual crimes having been committed and having a state policy of systematic killing. I said that innocent people die in the war. That is true, but war crimes are committed when orders are given to follow a policy of committing massacres for certain purposes. Had this been true, people would have fled from state-controlled areas to the areas controlled by armed groups. What is happening is the exact opposite — everybody moves to the state-controlled areas.

Question 24: Mr. President, how do you think you will figure in history: as a man who saved Syria or a man who destroyed it?

President Assad: This depends on who will write the history. If it is the West, it will give me all the bad attributes. What’s important is how I think. Certainly, and self-evidently, I will seek, and that is what I’m doing now, to protect Syria, not to protect the chair I’m sitting on.

Question 25: Mr. President, do you still really intend to negotiate?

President Assad: We have fully believed in negotiations and in political action since the beginning of the crisis; however, if we negotiate, it does not mean that we stop fighting terrorism. The two tracks are inevitable in Syria: first, through negotiations, and second through fighting terrorism. And the two tracks are separate from each other.

Question 26: What is your comment on the resignation of French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius? Do you believe that this will change French policy?

President Assad: Changing personnel is not that significant. What’s important is the change of policies. The French administration changed almost completely between Sarkozy and Hollande, but for us the policies have not changed. They have been destructive policies extending direct support to terrorism. That’s why we should not assume that the foreign minister makes the policies. They are made by the whole state, headed by the president. As to what we can do in Syria, I don’t think that Syria has to do anything towards France. It is France which should do something towards fighting terrorism. So far, it supports terrorists, albeit politically, and in some cases it supported them militarily. It is France’s duty to reverse or change its policies in order to fight terrorism, particularly after hundreds of French citizens paid with their lives for their wrong policies.

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Americans are fat. And they’re getting fatter all the time.

It was just last month when we showed you a series of graphics that demonstrated how it came to this. In short, average calories available to Americans jumped 25 percent to 2500, between 1970 and 2010. And it wasn’t because the US added a fourth meal to the day.

It was all added fats and grains (which include oils and fats in processed foods and flour) which used to make up 37% of America’s diet, but now comprise something like 46%. The biggest contributor to the trend was cost. The increasingly more caloric foods have become progressively cheaper which means lower and middle class people are more inclined to eat them, leading directly to a worsening obesity epidemic.

As we noted back in October, America’s obesity problem has resulted in a rather shocking development researchers uncovered when they analyzed data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey: “This generation of Americans is the first that will have a shorter life expectancy than the previous generation, and obesity is one of the biggest contributors to this shortened life expectancy because it is driving a lot of chronic health conditions.”

Against this rather disconcerting backdrop we present new numbers from Gallup which show that America’s obesity rate climbed to a record high of 28% in 2015. 

That’s right, America. A third of you are grossly overweight. As it turns out, whites have seen the sharpest uptick, with obesity rates climbing 2.8% since 2008. 

“In addition to the 28.0% who are obese, another 35.6% of adults are classified as overweight, with 34.6% normal weight and 1.8% underweight, as reported in 2015,” Gallup goes on to report, before noting that the incidence of diabetes has trended upwards as well. Here’s more: 

These results are based on more than 175,000 interviews conducted each year from 2013 to 2015 and more than 350,000 interviews conducted each year from 2008 to 2012 as part of the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index. Unlike some government estimates of obesity, the Well-Being Index uses respondents’ self-reported height and weight to calculate body mass index (BMI). It does not involve in-home clinical measurements that typically result in higher obesity estimates.

Across racial and ethnic groups, increases in obesity and diabetes rates since 2008 have been uneven. Both rates have increased much more among whites than among blacks, Asians and Hispanics. Blacks have the highest obesity rate by far of the major racial and ethnic groups, followed by Hispanics, but these two groups have had comparatively modest increases in obesity since 2008, and have shown little to no change in diabetes diagnoses during this time.

 

The obesity rate has continued to rise in the U.S. after leveling off from 2011 to 2013, and has done so despite rising public concern. Past research has demonstrated that obesity and its associated chronic conditions including diabetes cost the U.S. economy $153 billion per year in unplanned absenteeism due to poor health, a figure that has increased since the time of that study. And while blacks suffer disproportionately from chronic conditions associated with obesity, the sharp increase in obesity measured among whites since 2008 signifies that this is not a problem isolated to one racial or ethnic group.

 

Obesity affects all elements of well-being, not just physical wellness. It is associated, for example, with lower financial and social well-being. While obesity can diminish overall well-being, the relationship can also work in reverse; high well-being can reduce the chances of being obese. Those who have high or improving well-being across all five elements — purpose, social, financial, community and physical — are less likely to be obese or to become obese in the future than those who do not.

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Submitted by Mike Krieger via Liberty Blitzkrieg blog,

It is the job of the Fourth Estate to act as a check and a restraint on the others, to illumine the dark corners of Ministries, to debunk the bureaucrat, to throw often unwelcome light on the measures and motives of our rulers. ‘News’, as Hearst once remarked, ‘is something which somebody wants suppressed: all the rest is advertising’. That job is an essential one and it is bound to be unpopular; indeed, in a democracy, it may be argued that the more unpopular the newspapers are with the politicians the better they are performing their most vital task.

– Brian R. Roberts from a October 29, 1955 article in the London periodical “Time & Tide”

 

A newspaper is a device for making the ignorant more ignorant and the crazy crazier.

– H.L. Mencken

If you really want to know how weak Hillary Clinton is as a candidate, you merely have to appreciate that the U.S. media essentially acts as her own personal PR firm, yet the public still recognizes her as a dishonest crook. Brace yourself for the following story, it’s huge.

Earlier this week, we learned from Gawker that at least one U.S. reporter traded content in his article for information from Hillary Clinton’s staff while she was Secretary of State. In what is an almost hard to believe exchange, Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic,  agreed to insert specific words and imagery into his article in return for a copy of Hillary’s upcoming speech at the Council on Foreign Relations.

We have the exact exchange thanks to emails released from a 2012 Freedom of Information Act Request (FOIA). Gawker reports:

The emails in question, which were exchanged by Ambinder, then serving as The Atlantic’s politics editor, and Philippe Reines, Clinton’s notoriously combative spokesman and consigliere, turned up thanks to a Freedom of Information Act request we filed in 2012 (and which we are currently suing the State Department over). The same request previously revealed that Politico’s chief White House correspondent, Mike Allen, promised to deliver positive coverage of Chelsea Clinton, and, in a separate exchange, permitted Reines to ghost-write an item about the State Department for Politico’s Playbook newsletter. Ambinder’s emails with Reines demonstrate the same kind of transactional reporting, albeit to a much more legible degree: In them, you can see Reines “blackmailing” Ambinder into describing a Clinton speech as “muscular” in exchange for early access to the transcript. In other words, Ambinder outsourced his editorial judgment about the speech to a member of Clinton’s own staff.

 

On the morning of July 15, 2009, Ambinder sent Reines a blank email with the subject line, “Do you have a copy of HRC’s speech to share?” His question concerned a speech Clinton planned to give later that day at the Washington, D.C. office of the Council on Foreign Relations, an influential think tank. Three minutes after Ambinder’s initial email, Reines replied with three words: “on two conditions.” After Ambinder responded with “ok,” Reines sent him a list of those conditions:

 

Ambinder made good on his word. The opening paragraph of the article he wrote later that day, under the headline “Hillary Clinton’s ‘Smart Power’ Breaks Through,” precisely followed Reines’ instructions.

This is literally the first paragraph from Ambinder’s article:

When you think of President Obama’s foreign policy, think of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. That’s the message behind a muscular speech that Clinton is set to deliver today to the Council on Foreign Relations. The staging gives a clue to its purpose: seated in front of Clinton, subordinate to Clinton, in the first row, will be three potentially rival power centers: envoys Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell, and National Security Council senior director Dennis Ross.

If nothing else, Ambinder is very good at following instructions. Journalism, not so much.

Now back to Gawker.

Reines didn’t respond when we asked if he engaged in similar transactions with other reporters covering the State Department. But on the day of his trade with Ambinder, at least one other journalist used Reines’ preferred adjective—“muscular”—to describe the speech at the Council on Foreign Relations. That reporter was none other than Mike Allen of Politico.

 

We can’t say for sure that Reines implored Allen to describe Clinton’s speech as “muscular” and emphasize where particular audience members were seated, but that kind of request would hardly be out of the ordinary. As we noted above, Allen allowed Reines to ghost-write an item for his Playbook newsletter; and, in the course of attempting to secure an interview with Chelsea Clinton, told Reines he was prepared to submit interview questions to Clinton’s team in advance for their approval.

 

In any case, Reines’ strategy worked out nicely. For an article aggregating Allen’s piece, New York magazine quoted his use of “muscular” in the headline, and even commissioned an illustration of Clinton wearing the arms of a body builder.

Can you believe this? And you wonder why the public is so ignorant. Much of the press is not doing its job. 

Meanwhile, there’s a lot more good stuff in the Gawker article, so I suggest you read the entire thing.

Of course, this is something I’ve been saying for a while. For example, as I wrote in the recent article, A Detailed Look at The New York Times’ Embarrassing, Deceitful and Illogical Endorsement of Hillary Clinton:

The New York Times’ endorsement of Hillary Clinton against Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primary consists of an unreadable, illogical piece of fiction. In this post, I will critique the paper’s position in detail, but first I want to take a step back and explain to people what I think is going on in the bigger picture.

 

In its endorsement of Hillary, the New York Times editorial board did such a sloppy job I can’t help but think it may have done permanent damage to its brand. Upon reading it, my initial conclusion was that the editorial board was either suffering from Stockholm syndrome or merely concerned about losing advertising revenues should they endorse Sanders. Then I thought some more and I realized my initial conclusions were wrong.

 

Something else is going on here, something far more subtle, subconscious and illuminating. The New York Times is defending the establishment candidate simply because the New York Times is the establishment.

 

One of the biggest trends of the post financial crisis period has been a plunge in the American public’s perception of the country’s powerful institutions. The establishment often admits this reality with a mixture of bewilderment and erroneous conclusions, ultimately settling on the idea people are upset because “Washington can’t get anything done.” However, nothing could be further from the truth. When it comes to corruption and serving big monied interests, both Congress and the President are very, very good at getting things done. Yes it’s true Congress doesn’t get anything done on behalf of the people, but this is no accident. The government doesn’t work for the people.

 

With its dishonest and shifty endorsement of Hillary Clinton, I believe the New York Times has finally come out of the closet as an unabashed gatekeeper of the status quo. I suppose this makes sense since the paper has become the ultimate status quo journalistic publication. The sad truth is the publication has been living on borrowed time and a borrowed reputation for a long time. Long on prestige, it remains very short on substance when it comes to fighting difficult battles in the public interest. Content with its position of power and influence within the current paradigm, the paper doesn’t want to rock the boat. What the New York Times is actually telling its readers with the Hillary Clinton endorsement is that it likes things just the way they are, and will fight hard to keep them that way. It is as much a part of the American establishment as any government institution.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this post, the U.S. press basically acts like a PR firm for Hillary Clinton, yet the public still can’t stand her. That’s how bad she really is.

For related articles on the shadiness of American media, see:

A Detailed Look at The New York Times’ Embarrassing, Deceitful and Illogical Endorsement of Hillary Clinton

“Non-Official Cover” – Respected German Journalist Blows Whistle on How the CIA Controls the Media

HBO and Snapchat are Actively Working with the U.S. Government to Create Propaganda

20-Year CBS News Veteran, Sharyl Attkisson, Details Massive Censorship and Propaganda in Mainstream Media

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