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More than 100,000 protesters congregated at Democracy Monument in Bangkok yesterday to protest Thai PM Yingluck Shiniwatra’s consideration of an amnesty bill to pardon her banned brother Thaksin Shiniwatra, the former Thai PM ousted from the country in a 2006 coup.

 

 

 

 

Thai anti-government, anti-corruption protests at Democracy Monument, Sunday, 24 November 2013

Simply explained, the proposed amnesty bill by the current Thai PM is similar in nature to US Presidential pardons, often administered by outgoing US Presidents to pardon their criminal friends.

 

For example, here are just a few of the 150 criminals US President Bill Clinton pardoned during his administration:

 

Amy Ralston Pofahl (drug money laundering, distribution and manufacturing ecstasy)

Norman Lyle Prouse (Former Captain for Northwest Airlines, imprisoned for flying while intoxicated)

Richard Wilson Riley Jr. (Cocaine and marijuana charges, father was Clinton’s Education Secretary)

Dan Rostenkowski (former Democratic Congressman convicted in the Congressional Post Office scandal)

Edward Downe, Jr. (wire fraud, false income tax returns and securities fraud)

Roger Clinton, Jr. (cocaine charges, half-brother of President Bill Clinton)

Mansour Azizkhani (1984 false statements in bank loan applications)

Nicholas M. Altiere (1983 importation of cocaine)

Bernice Ruth Altschul (1992 money laundering conspiracy)

Marc Rich (tax evasion and illegally making oil deals with Iran during the Iran hostage crisis)

 

Here are just a few of the 189 criminals George W. Bush pardoned during his administration:

 

Bruce Louis Bartos (Transportation of a machine gun in foreign commerce)

Michael Robert Moelter (Conducting an illegal gambling business)

Samuel Wattie Guerry (Food Stamp fraud)

Meredith Elizabeth Casares (Embezzlement of US Postal Service Funds)

Joseph William Warner (Arson)

Rusty Lawrence Elliot (Making counterfeit Federal Reserve notes)

Rufus Edward Harris (Conspiracy to deliver 10 or more grams of LSD)

Larry Paul Lenius (Conspiracy to distribute cocaine)

Donald Lee Pendergrass (Armed bank robbery)

Karen Marie Edmonson (Distribution of methamphetamines)

Glanus Terrell Osborne (Possession of a stolen motor vehicle)

Samuel Lewis Whisel (Aiding and abetting the transportation of stolen goods)

Richard James Putney, Jr. (Aiding and abetting the escape of a prisoner)

 

And here are just a few of the 39 criminals Barack Obama has thus far pardoned during his administration (most US Presidential pardons are granted just prior to the end of the sitting President’s term. Thus most of Obama’s pardons will be granted in the future):

 

Edwin Hardy Futch, Jr. (Theft from an interstate shipment)

Jon Christopher Kozeliski (Conspiracy to traffic counterfeit goods)

Michael John Petri (Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine)

Lynn Marie Stanek (Unlawful use of a communication facility to distribute cocaine)

Dennis George Bulin (Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of 1,000 pounds of marijuana)

Thomas Paul Ledford (Conducting and directing an illegal gambling business)

Timothy James Gallagher (Cocaine possession and conspiracy to distribute)

Bobby Gerald Wilson (Aiding and abetting the possession and sale of illegal American alligator hides)

 

From the above, it is blatantly obvious that US Presidents regularly abuse the sanctity of their office to pardon a wide range of offenses committed by their friends, including arson, larceny, drug trafficking, armed robbery, fraud, counterfeit, possession and trafficking of stolen goods and participation in illegal gambling enterprises. If you wonder why banks like Wachovia, HSBC, Citigroup, JP Morgan et al regularly get away with knowingly laundering money for violent drug cartels without a single banker ending up in jail for this criminal behavior, the actions of current and former POTUS clearly illustrates that the War on Drugs is a false war with a real ulterior motive of producing profits for those parties, including bankers and politicians, most heavily involved in it. As I couldn’t find a case of human trafficking pardoned among the several hundred pardons granted by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama, perhaps this is the one crime so heinous that even US Presidents are unwilling to pardon it.

 

In light of the above, it is no wonder that Thai citizens are fed up with government corruption that plagues all governments worldwide, and have taken to the streets to protest a proposed amnesty bill that would not only provide amnesty for a list of former PM Thaksin’s “political offenses stretching back to the 2006 coup” according to the Bangkok Post, but would also return Thaksin’s considerable 46 billion baht (USD $1.4 billion) of frozen assets gained through corruption, perhaps with interest. The Bangkok Post also noted that “all government officials, from former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to military commanders, held accountable by the red shirts for the deaths of 92 people in the May 19 crackdown in 2010 will also be absolved of all wrongdoing” as part of the proposed amnesty bill. Furthermore, in a huge conflict of interest, 600 million baht would be returned to the current Prime Minister, Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. According to Bloomberg, “the amnesty bill angered Thaksin’s opponents, who said it could whitewash crimes he allegedly committed in power, while some of his own supporters criticized the law for protecting opposition leaders who allowed the army to use live ammunition to disperse protesters in 2010 when their Democrat party held power.”

 

In response to this protest, thus far, more than USD $2.1 billion in capital has been withdrawn from the Thai bond and equities market just this month through the 22nd of November, and the Thai baht has now fallen to 31.94 to the USD, its weakest showing since 13 September of this year. As the Bank of Thailand refused to engage in the currency war to the bottom at a time when all major Central Banks were engaging in this war, could further Thai baht devaluation be on the horizon, especially in light of the political instability in Thailand now? Most certainly.

 

Related posts: “The Biggest Disaster in SE Asia Waiting to Happen: Thailand’s Massive Real Estate Bubble”. Follow us on Twitter, subscribe to our YouTube channel, and sign up for our free newsletter here.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/1L8FlKkrfog/story01.htm smartknowledgeu

The #AskJPM debacle that JP Morgan cancelled earlier this month due to embarrassment and humiliation regarding the mountain of questions they received in regard to their criminal actions provided a gift to all of us. American Indian tribes did not have jails due to the impracticality of having permanent prisons when their way of life called for a nomadic lifestyle. However, this, by no means, implied that everyone in their tribes acted as angels and committed no wrongdoing. It did however mean that they found another extremely effective solution in dealing with criminal, misanthropic behavior without the threat of imprisonment. For all intents and purposes, Western bankers, having bought out all judges and regulatory and judicial bodies today with their unlimited wallets, have no jails for them today as well, although this clearly is not the case in the East, where a Vietnamese banker faces execution for fraud.

 

However, in looking towards how American Indians handled the problem of criminal behavior within their society effectively without the use of prisons, and given the outcome of the #AskJPM twitter session, I believe that we now have a blueprint to rein in the sociopathic behavior of unrepentant bankers.  I explain further in the video below.

 

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/FK9whfnYf9M/story01.htm smartknowledgeu

In 'An Open Letter To The FOMC' John Hussman lays out in detail the true state of the world that asset-gatherers and Fed members alike seem blinded to. The intent of his letter is not to criticize, but hopefully to increase the mindfulness of the FOMC as to historical evidence, the strength of various financial and economic relationships, and the potentially grave consequences of further extreme and experimental monetary policy. Crucially, as we have heard numerous times in the last few weeks, the Fed sees no bubble, and so, a courtesy to both the investing public and the gamblers at the Fed, Hussman explains the reason that the Fed does not see an “obvious” stock market bubble (to use a word regularly used by Governor Bullard, as if to imply that misvaluations cannot exist unless they smack their observers with a two-by-four).

 

Excerpted from John Hussman's "Open Letter To The FOMC",

…

 

The reason that the Fed does not see an “obvious” stock market bubble (to use a word regularly used by Governor Bullard, as if to imply that misvaluations cannot exist unless they smack their observers with a two-by-four) is because while price/earnings multiples appear only moderately elevated, those multiples themselves reflect earnings that embed record profit margins that stand about 70% above their historical norms.

We can demonstrate in a century of evidence that a) profit margins are mean-reverting and inversely related to subsequent earnings growth, b) margin fluctuations are largely driven by cyclical variations in the combined savings of households and government, and importantly, c) valuation measures that normalize or otherwise dampen cyclical variation in profit margins are dramatically better correlated with actual subsequent outcomes in the equity markets.

 

[ZH: READ THAT AGAIN!!]

 

A few additional charts will drive this point home. The chart below shows the S&P 500 price/revenue ratio (left scale) versus the actual subsequent 10-year nominal total return of the S&P 500 over the following decade (right scale, inverted). Market valuations on this measure are well above any point prior to the late-1990’s market bubble. Indeed, if one examines the stocks in the S&P 500 individually, the median price/revenue multiple is actually higher today than it was in 2000 (smaller stocks were more reasonably valued in 2000, compared with the present). This is a dangerous situation. In this context, the dismissive view of FOMC officials regarding equity overvaluation appears misplaced, and seems likely to be followed by disruptive financial adjustments.

 

 

One obtains a similar view, with equal historical reliability, from the ratio of nonfinancial equity capitalization to nominal GDP, using Federal Reserve Z.1 Flow of Funds data. On this measure, equities are already beyond their 2007 peak valuations, and are approaching the 2000 extreme. The associated 10-year expected nominal total return for the S&P 500 is negative.

 

 

The unfortunate situation is that while the required financial adjustment may or may not be as brutal for investors as in 2007-2009, or 2000-2002, or 1972-1974, when the stock market lost half of its value from similar or lesser extremes, the consequences of extremely rich valuation cannot be undone by wise monetary policy. The Fed has done enough, and perhaps dangerously more than enough. The prospect of dismal investment returns in equities is an outcome that is largely baked-in-the-cake. The only question is how much worse the outcomes will be as a result of Fed policy that has few economic mechanisms other than to encourage speculative behavior.

And of course this speculative behavior ends with only one feature – bubble risk…

A discussion of bubble risk would be incomplete without defining the term itself. From an economist’s point of view, a bubble is defined in terms of differential equations and a violation of “transversality.” In simpler language, a bubble is a speculative advance where prices rise on the expectation of future advances and become largely detached from properly discounted fundamentals. Put another way, a bubble reflects a widening gap between the increasingly extrapolative expectations of market participants and the prospective returns that can be estimated through present-value relationships linking prices and likely cash flows.

 

As economist Didier Sornette observed in Why Markets Crash, numerous bubbles in securities and other asset markets can be shown to follow a “log periodic” pattern where the general advance becomes increasingly steep, while corrections become both increasingly frequent and gradually shallower. I’ve described this dynamic in terms of investor behavior that reflects increasingly immediate impulses to buy the dip.

 

 

 

Along with this pattern, which has emerged with striking fidelity since 2010, we observe a variety of other features typically associated with dangerous extremes:

• unusually rich valuations on a wide variety of metrics that actually have a reliable correlation with subsequent market returns; margin debt at the highest level in history and representing 2.2% of GDP (eclipsed only briefly at the 2000 and 2007 market extremes);
• a blistering pace of initial public offerings – back to volumes last seen at the 2000 peak – featuring “shooters” that double on the first day of issue;
• confidence in the narrative that “this time is different” (in this case, the presumption of a fail-safe speculative backstop or “put option” from the Federal Reserve); lopsided bullish sentiment as the number of bearish advisors has plunged to just 15% and bulls rush to one side of the boat;
• record issuance of covenant-lite debt in the leveraged loan market (which is now spreading to Europe);
• and a well-defined syndrome of “overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yield” conditions that has appeared exclusively at speculative market peaks – including (exhaustively) 1929, 1972, 1987, 2000, 2007, 2011 (before a market loss of nearly 20% that was truncated by investor faith in a new round of monetary easing), and at three points in 2013: February, May, and today (see A Textbook Pre-Crash Bubble).

Many of us in the financial world know these to be classic features of speculative peaks, but there is career risk in responding to them, so even those who view the situation with revulsion can't seem to tear themselves away.

 

 

While I have no belief that markets follow any mathematical trajectory, the log-periodic pattern is interesting because it coincides with a kind of “signature” of increasing speculative urgency, seen in other market bubbles across history. The chart above spans the period from 2010 to the present. What’s equally unsettling is that this speculative behavior is beginning to appear “fractal” – that is, self-similar at diminishing time-scales. The chart below spans from April 2013 to the present. On this shorter time-scale, Sornette’s “finite time singularity” pulls a bit closer – to December 2013 rather than January 2014, but the fidelity to this pattern is almost creepy. The point of this exercise is emphatically not to lay out an explicit time path for prices, but rather to demonstrate the pattern of increasingly urgent speculation – the willingness to aggressively buy every dip in prices – that the Federal Reserve has provoked.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/lrIbnXsG6tE/story01.htm Tyler Durden

In 'An Open Letter To The FOMC' John Hussman lays out in detail the true state of the world that asset-gatherers and Fed members alike seem blinded to. The intent of his letter is not to criticize, but hopefully to increase the mindfulness of the FOMC as to historical evidence, the strength of various financial and economic relationships, and the potentially grave consequences of further extreme and experimental monetary policy. Crucially, as we have heard numerous times in the last few weeks, the Fed sees no bubble, and so, a courtesy to both the investing public and the gamblers at the Fed, Hussman explains the reason that the Fed does not see an “obvious” stock market bubble (to use a word regularly used by Governor Bullard, as if to imply that misvaluations cannot exist unless they smack their observers with a two-by-four).

 

Excerpted from John Hussman's "Open Letter To The FOMC",

…

 

The reason that the Fed does not see an “obvious” stock market bubble (to use a word regularly used by Governor Bullard, as if to imply that misvaluations cannot exist unless they smack their observers with a two-by-four) is because while price/earnings multiples appear only moderately elevated, those multiples themselves reflect earnings that embed record profit margins that stand about 70% above their historical norms.

We can demonstrate in a century of evidence that a) profit margins are mean-reverting and inversely related to subsequent earnings growth, b) margin fluctuations are largely driven by cyclical variations in the combined savings of households and government, and importantly, c) valuation measures that normalize or otherwise dampen cyclical variation in profit margins are dramatically better correlated with actual subsequent outcomes in the equity markets.

 

[ZH: READ THAT AGAIN!!]

 

A few additional charts will drive this point home. The chart below shows the S&P 500 price/revenue ratio (left scale) versus the actual subsequent 10-year nominal total return of the S&P 500 over the following decade (right scale, inverted). Market valuations on this measure are well above any point prior to the late-1990’s market bubble. Indeed, if one examines the stocks in the S&P 500 individually, the median price/revenue multiple is actually higher today than it was in 2000 (smaller stocks were more reasonably valued in 2000, compared with the present). This is a dangerous situation. In this context, the dismissive view of FOMC officials regarding equity overvaluation appears misplaced, and seems likely to be followed by disruptive financial adjustments.

 

 

One obtains a similar view, with equal historical reliability, from the ratio of nonfinancial equity capitalization to nominal GDP, using Federal Reserve Z.1 Flow of Funds data. On this measure, equities are already beyond their 2007 peak valuations, and are approaching the 2000 extreme. The associated 10-year expected nominal total return for the S&P 500 is negative.

 

 

The unfortunate situation is that while the required financial adjustment may or may not be as brutal for investors as in 2007-2009, or 2000-2002, or 1972-1974, when the stock market lost half of its value from similar or lesser extremes, the consequences of extremely rich valuation cannot be undone by wise monetary policy. The Fed has done enough, and perhaps dangerously more than enough. The prospect of dismal investment returns in equities is an outcome that is largely baked-in-the-cake. The only question is how much worse the outcomes will be as a result of Fed policy that has few economic mechanisms other than to encourage speculative behavior.

And of course this speculative behavior ends with only one feature – bubble risk…

A discussion of bubble risk would be incomplete without defining the term itself. From an economist’s point of view, a bubble is defined in terms of differential equations and a violation of “transversality.” In simpler language, a bubble is a speculative advance where prices rise on the expectation of future advances and become largely detached from properly discounted fundamentals. Put another way, a bubble reflects a widening gap between the increasingly extrapolative expectations of market participants and the prospective returns that can be estimated through present-value relationships linking prices and likely cash flows.

 

As economist Didier Sornette observed in Why Markets Crash, numerous bubbles in securities and other asset markets can be shown to follow a “log periodic” pattern where the general advance becomes increasingly steep, while corrections become both increasingly frequent and gradually shallower. I’ve described this dynamic in terms of investor behavior that reflects increasingly immediate impulses to buy the dip.

 

 

 

Along with this pattern, which has emerged with striking fidelity since 2010, we observe a variety of other features typically associated with dangerous extremes:

• unusually rich valuations on a wide variety of metrics that actually have a reliable correlation with subsequent market returns; margin debt at the highest level in history and representing 2.2% of GDP (eclipsed only briefly at the 2000 and 2007 market extremes);
• a blistering pace of initial public offerings – back to volumes last seen at the 2000 peak – featuring “shooters” that double on the first day of issue;
• confidence in the narrative that “this time is different” (in this case, the presumption of a fail-safe speculative backstop or “put option” from the Federal Reserve); lopsided bullish sentiment as the number of bearish advisors has plunged to just 15% and bulls rush to one side of the boat;
• record issuance of covenant-lite debt in the leveraged loan market (which is now spreading to Europe);
• and a well-defined syndrome of “overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yield” conditions that has appeared exclusively at speculative market peaks – including (exhaustively) 1929, 1972, 1987, 2000, 2007, 2011 (before a market loss of nearly 20% that was truncated by investor faith in a new round of monetary easing), and at three points in
  2013: February, May, and today (see A Textbook Pre-Crash Bubble).

Many of us in the financial world know these to be classic features of speculative peaks, but there is career risk in responding to them, so even those who view the situation with revulsion can't seem to tear themselves away.

 

 

While I have no belief that markets follow any mathematical trajectory, the log-periodic pattern is interesting because it coincides with a kind of “signature” of increasing speculative urgency, seen in other market bubbles across history. The chart above spans the period from 2010 to the present. What’s equally unsettling is that this speculative behavior is beginning to appear “fractal” – that is, self-similar at diminishing time-scales. The chart below spans from April 2013 to the present. On this shorter time-scale, Sornette’s “finite time singularity” pulls a bit closer – to December 2013 rather than January 2014, but the fidelity to this pattern is almost creepy. The point of this exercise is emphatically not to lay out an explicit time path for prices, but rather to demonstrate the pattern of increasingly urgent speculation – the willingness to aggressively buy every dip in prices – that the Federal Reserve has provoked.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/lrIbnXsG6tE/story01.htm Tyler Durden

We know the ten “people” that run the world, that 25 cities represent over half the world’s GDP, and that the world’s billionaires control a stunning $33 trillion in net worth… but who controls what the average joe-sixpack on Main Street buys? As PolicyMic notes, these ten mega corporations control the output of almost everything we buy – from household products to pet food and from jeans to jello. The so-called “Illusion of Choice,” that these corporations (and their nepotistic inter-relationships) create is remarkable…

(click image for gigantic legible version)

(Note: The chart shows a mix of networks. Parent companies may own, own shares of, or may simply partner with their branch networks. For example, Coca-Cola does not own Monster, but distributes the energy drink. Another note: We are not sure how up-to-date the chart is. For example, it has not been updated to reflect P&G’s sale of Pringles to Kellogg’s in February.)

 

Via PolicyMic,

Here are just a few examples: Yum Brands owns KFC and Taco Bell. The company was a spin-off of Pepsi. All Yum Brands restaurants sell only Pepsi products because of a special partnership with the soda-maker.

 

$84 billion-company Proctor & Gamble — the largest advertiser in the U.S. — is paired with a number of diverse brands that produce everything from medicine to toothpaste to high-end fashion. All tallied, P&G reportedly serves a whopping 4.8 billion people around the world through this network.

 

$200 billion-corporation Nestle — famous for chocolate, but which is the biggest food company in the world — owns nearly 8,000 different brands worldwide, and takes stake in or is partnered with a swath of others. Included in this network is shampoo company L’Oreal, baby food giant Gerber, clothing brand Diesel, and pet food makers Purina and Friskies.

 

Unilever, of soap fame, reportedly serves 2 billion people around the world, controlling a network that produces everything from Q-tips to Skippy peanut butter.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/slbk6-ZzctQ/story01.htm Tyler Durden

And they’re back:

• 2,277 sq.ft. – Median new-home size in 2007
• 2,306 sq. ft. – Median new-home size in 2012

Just as that crowning achievement of the last housing bubble, the McMansions, have once again returned with the second and final return of the Fed-blown housing bubble, the Bluths picked a perfect time to also come bac on the scene.

But back to the triumphal return of McMansions.

Readers will recall that one of the prevailing themes in the early post-depression years, was a return to thrift – in spending and in housing size – and after the median home size hit a record high of 2,277 square feet in 2007, it declined progressively in the following two years according to Census Bureau figures (we can only assume these were not manipulated unlike the jobs numbers). As David Rosenberg at the time, and as the NYT pointed out a day ago, “It seemed that after more than a decade of swelling domiciles, the McMansion era was over. But that conclusion may have been premature.”

Because as data from 2010 and onward shows, now only is American fascination with size, in this case of one’s home, back but it has never been more acute:

In 2010, homes starting growing again. By last year, the size of the median new single-family home hit a record high of 2,306 square feet, surpassing the peak of 2007. And new homes have been getting more expensive, too. The median price reached $279,300 in April this year, or about 6 percent higher than the pre-recession peak of $262,600, set in March 2007. The numbers are not adjusted for inflation.

However, since we have already covered the return of the housing (and all other) bubbles previously, we will not comment on how the Fed is once again doing everything in its power to bring about the biggest credit and housing bubble crash in history. The NYT has done a rather good and concise job of that:

 Yet the economy remains weak. How can Americans keep buying bigger and more expensive homes? It turns out, of course, that not everyone can.

 

“It’s all about access to credit,” said Rose Quint, an economist at the National Association of Home Builders. “People who are less affluent and have less robust employment histories have been shut out of the new home market. As a result, the characteristics of new homes are being skewed to people who can obtain credit and put down large down payments, typically wealthier buyers.”

 

It’s another sign that in today’s economy, prosperity is not universally shared.

Much more can be added here, although at the end of the day all signs point, as usual, to the Fed and its “reflate everything” panacea.

So instead of analyzing the prevailing Keynesian lunacy in which one needs asset bubbles to fix the aftermath of prior asset bubbles, we will simply constrain ourselves to discussing… interior decoration.

The infographic below from BusinessWeek shows how times, and tastes, how to decorate one’s McMansion have changed in the past few years.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/7dC0YYCusGI/story01.htm Tyler Durden

And they’re back:

• 2,277 sq.ft. – Median new-home size in 2007
• 2,306 sq. ft. – Median new-home size in 2012

Just as that crowning achievement of the last housing bubble, the McMansions, have once again returned with the second and final return of the Fed-blown housing bubble, the Bluths picked a perfect time to also come bac on the scene.

But back to the triumphal return of McMansions.

Readers will recall that one of the prevailing themes in the early post-depression years, was a return to thrift – in spending and in housing size – and after the median home size hit a record high of 2,277 square feet in 2007, it declined progressively in the following two years according to Census Bureau figures (we can only assume these were not manipulated unlike the jobs numbers). As David Rosenberg at the time, and as the NYT pointed out a day ago, “It seemed that after more than a decade of swelling domiciles, the McMansion era was over. But that conclusion may have been premature.”

Because as data from 2010 and onward shows, now only is American fascination with size, in this case of one’s home, back but it has never been more acute:

In 2010, homes starting growing again. By last year, the size of the median new single-family home hit a record high of 2,306 square feet, surpassing the peak of 2007. And new homes have been getting more expensive, too. The median price reached $279,300 in April this year, or about 6 percent higher than the pre-recession peak of $262,600, set in March 2007. The numbers are not adjusted for inflation.

However, since we have already covered the return of the housing (and all other) bubbles previously, we will not comment on how the Fed is once again doing everything in its power to bring about the biggest credit and housing bubble crash in history. The NYT has done a rather good and concise job of that:

 Yet the economy remains weak. How can Americans keep buying bigger and more expensive homes? It turns out, of course, that not everyone can.

 

“It’s all about access to credit,” said Rose Quint, an economist at the National Association of Home Builders. “People who are less affluent and have less robust employment histories have been shut out of the new home market. As a result, the characteristics of new homes are being skewed to people who can obtain credit and put down large down payments, typically wealthier buyers.”

 

It’s another sign that in today’s economy, prosperity is not universally shared.

Much more can be added here, although at the end of the day all signs point, as usual, to the Fed and its “reflate everything” panacea.

So instead of analyzing the prevailing Keynesian lunacy in which one needs asset bubbles to fix the aftermath of prior asset bubbles, we will simply constrain ourselves to discussing… interior decoration.

The infographic below from BusinessWeek shows how times, and tastes, how to decorate one’s McMansion have changed in the past few years.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/7dC0YYCusGI/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Submitted by mickeyman via The World Complex blog,

Interpretation of scaling laws for US income

 

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/yRQgOT6Jawc/story01.htm Tyler Durden