New Gold Pool at the BIS Switzerland: A Who’s Who of Central Bankers

This is an extract and summary from "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle, Switzerland: Part 1" which was first published on the BullionStar.com website in mid-May. 

Part 2 of the series titled "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle: Part 2 – Pool vs Gold for Oil" is also posted now on the BullionStar.com website.

In the Governor’s absence I attended the meeting in Zijlstra’s room in the BIS on the afternoon of Monday, 10th December to continue discussions about a possible gold pool. Emminger, de la Geniere, de Strycker, Leutwiler, Larre and Pohl were present.”     13 December 1979 – Kit McMahon to Gordon Richardson, Bank of England

A central bank Gold Pool which many people will be familiar with operated in the gold market between November 1961 and March 1968. That Gold Pool was known as the London Gold Pool.

This article is not about the 1961-1968 London Gold PoolThis article is about collusive central bank discussions relating to an entirely different and more recent central bank Gold Pool arrangement

More than 11 years after the London Gold Pool had been abandoned, the very same central banks convened in late 1979 and early 1980 for a series of collusive central bank discussions aimed at reaching agreement on joint central bank action to subdue and manipulate downwards the free market gold price.

These new discussions took place at the headquarters of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle, Switzerland, in the actual office of the President of the BIS, and were attended by a handful of the world's most powerful central bankers. These discussions also took place in an era of soaring free market gold prices, in the midst of the run-up in the gold price to US$850 in January 1980.

Central to illustrating how the most powerful central bankers in the world colluded to attempt to establish a new Gold Pool are a number of internal documents from the Bank of England which provide a detailed blueprint on the evolution of these collusive discussions at the BIS, as well as providing detailed insights into the thinking of the senior Bank of England executives involved in the meetings. These internal correspondence documents from 1979 and 1980 can be thought of as the equivalent of internal emails in the era before corporate email systems.

Above all, these collusive BIS meetings show intent. Intent by a group of the world's most powerful central banks to manipulate a free market gold price so as to distort free market gold pricing signals. Therefore, these documents are timeless in that regard. The documents also illustrate the concern that a rising gold price in the free market creates for senior central bankers, and importantly, also shows that these same central bankers have no qualms, at least from a legal or moral perspective, of intervening to manipulate a gold price when they see it as a threat to their fiat currency monetary system.

Since many names of high level central bankers crop up in the discussions and documents, to provide context, it is helpful to provide some short background summaries on who these people were and what roles they occupied. It is also helpful to provide some brief context on gold price movements during the period under discussion.

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Headquarters, Basle, Switzerland

The Gold Price Run-up during 1979 and 1980

When the London Gold Pool collapsed in mid-March 1968, a two-tier gold market took its place, with the private market gold price breaking higher, while central banks continued to trade gold with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and US Treasury at the official price of US$ 35 per ounce. However, in August 1971, Nixon closed this FRBNY / Treasury ‘Gold Window’ by ending the convertibility of US dollar liabilities into gold that had up to then still been an option for foreign central banks and foreign governments. This was the birth of the free-floating gold price.

By the end of 1974, the US dollar gold price had soared to $187 per troy ounce. Following this, the next 3 years saw the gold price first trade down to near $100 during August 1976 before resuming its uptrend. Year-end gold prices over this period were in the $135 – $165 range. In 1978, the price again broke to a record high and finished the year at $226 per ounce. See chart below.

Gold Price January 1971 to January 1980. Source: BullionStar charts

But it was in 1979 that the US dollar gold price really took off, setting record after record, a bit like the records that are being set by cryptocurrencies right now.

In July 1979, the $300 level was breached for the first time. During October 1979, the gold price then took out $400 for the first time. During December 1979, the gold price hit $500. While these late 1979 price increases were in themselves phenomenal, what then occurred in January 1980 was even more striking, for in the space of a few weeks, the price rocketed up first through $600, then $700, and then through the $800 level before peaking in late January 1980 at a then record of $850 per ounce. See chart below.

Gold Price January 1979 to June 1980. Source: BullionStar Charts 

The mid-1970s saw a flurry of official gold sales to the market which although strategically designed in part to subdue the gold price, in practice didn’t achieve that goal over the medium term. Between June 1976 and May 1980, the International Monetary Fund sold 25 million ounces (777 tonnes) of gold in 45 public auctions. Between May 1978 and November 1979, the US Treasury sold 8.05 million ounces of high grade gold (99.5% fine) and 7.75 million ounces of low grade gold (90% fine) in 23 auctions to the private market. That’s just over 15 million ounces (466 tonnes) of gold in total auctioned by the Treasury. The last US Treasury auctions were on 16 October 1979 when 750,000 ounces of low grade coin bars were auctioned, and then on 1 November 1979 when the Treasury implemented a variable sales quantity approach and auctioned 1,250,000 ounces of low grade coin bars. On 15 January 1980, the US Treasury Secretary announced an official end of US gold sales.

As the 1980 annual report of the bank for International Settlements noted when reviewing the 1979 gold market:

“The further increase in [gold] supplies was overshadowed by the dramatic rise in the demand for gold which, in the space of little over a year, caused the London market price to increase more than fourfold to a peak of $850 per ounce in January 1980.”

“In addition to its sheer magnitude, last year’s [1979] gold price rise had three other remarkable features: firstly,  it took place against all major currencies, including those whose value had increased most during the 1970s. Secondly, it took place at a time of generally rising interest rates in the industrialised world, one effect of which was to increase the cost of holding gold. Thirdly, it took place at a time when, by and large, the dollar was strengthening in the exchange markets.”

It is against this background of surging  gold prices, pre-existing gold auctions, turmoil in currency markets, slow growth and high inflation, that the first of the collusive Gold Pool discussions took place between September 1979 and January 1980 at the BIS.

A Who's Who of Central Banksters

The following document is the 4th main document in the Bank of England series of documents. all of which can be seen in "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle, Switzerland: Part 1".

This document, displayed in blue text below, is a briefing letter from Bank of England executive director Kit McMahon to the Bank of England's Governor Gordon Richardson, written on 13 December 1979, referring to the Gold Pool discussion meeting which took place in the office of the BIS President Jelle Dijlstra on Monday 10 December 1979. This is probably the most important documented featured in Part 1 of the two part article series, since it provides an in-depth insight into one of the collusive Gold Pool discussion meetings which the most powerful central bank governors of the time attended discussing the creation of a syndicate to manipulate down the free market price of gold.

Christopher McMahon, known as ‘Kit’ McMahon, was an executive director at the Bank of England from 1970 to 1980, before becoming Deputy Governor of the Bank of England on 1 March 1980. Prior to McMahon’s promotion, Jasper Hollom was Deputy Governor of the Bank of England. Kit McMahon’s full name is Christopher William McMahon, hence he signed his his internal Bank of England memos and correspondence with the initials ‘CWM’. McMahon left the Bank of England in 1986 to take up the role of Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman of Midland Bank. In 1987, McMahon was also made Chairman of Midland Bank. McMahon left Midland in 1991. Since 1974, Midland Bank had also owned Samuel Montagu, one of the five traditional bullion firms of the London Gold Market. HSBC acquired full ownership of Midland in 1992 after acquiring a 15% stake in 1987 when McMahon was Chairman and Chief Executive of Midland. See profiles of McMahon here and here.

THE GOVERNOR of the Bank of England – Gordon Richardson. Richardson was Governor of the Bank of England for 10 years from 1973 to 1983, and a non-executive director of the Bank of England between 1967 and 1973. He was chairman of J. Henry Schroder Wagg from 1962 to 1972, and chairman of Schroders from 1966 to 1973. Richardson was also a director of Saudi International Bank in London. Saudi International Bank was formerly known as Al Bank Al Saudi Al Alami when it was incorporated in London in 1975, and is now known as Gulf International Bank UK Limited.

The following countries were represented at this 10 December meeting: UK, Switzerland, West Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium.

The following central banks were represented at the meeting:

  • Zijlstra – BIS and Netherlands central bank
  • McMahon – Bank of England
  • Emminger – Deutsche Bundesbank
  • Pohl – Deutsche Bundesbank
  • de la Geniere – Banque de France
  • de Strycker – Belgian central bank
  • Leutwiler – Swiss National Bank
  • Larre – Bank for International Settlements

Zijlstra refers to Dr. Jelle Zijlstra, Chairman and President of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) from 1967 to December 1981. Zijlstra was also simultaneously President of the Dutch central bank, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) from 1967 until the end of 1981. Notably, Zijlstra was also Dutch Prime Minister for a short period during 1966-67.

Emminger refers to Otmar Emminger, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1 June 1977 to 31 December 1979. Emminger was one of the principal architects of the IMF’s synthetic Special Drawing Right (SDR) in 1969 which was designed to be a competitor of and replacement for gold.

Pohl refers to Karl Otto Pohl, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1980 to 1991, and vice-President of the Bundesbank between June 1977 to December 1979. Note that Emminger retired in December 1979, with Karl Otto Pohl taking his place.

Leutwiler refers to Fritz Leutwiler, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank (Switzerland’s central bank) from May 1974 to December 1984. Leutwiler was also a member of the board of the BIS from 1974 to 1984, and served as President of the BIS  between January 1982 and December 1984, as well as Chairman of the Board of the BIS from January 1982 to December 1984.

De la Geniere refers to Renaud de La Genière, Governor of the Banque de France from 1979 to 1984.

De Stryker refers to Cecil de Strycker, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium from February 1975 to the end of February 1982. At that time, De Stryker was also president of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund and then president of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community.

In the meeting document, the name Larre refers to René Larre, General Manager of the BIS. Larre was BIS General Manager from May 1971 to February 1981.

SECRET

[From McMahon]

To: The Governors               Copies to : Mr Payton, Mr Balfour, Mr Sangster , Mr Byatt  only

GOLD POOL

In the Governor’s absence I attended the meeting in Zijlstra’s room in the BIS on the afternoon of Monday, 10thDecember to continue discussions about a possible gold poolEmminger, de la Geniere, de Strycker, Leutwiler, Larre and Pohl were present.

Larre began by outlining a way in which a possible gold pool might be handled. The BIS could undertake all the operations on behalf of a group of central banks on the basis of rather general criteria which would be reviewed monthly.  The criteria would take into account not merely the developments of the price of gold but the affect any such developments appeared to be having on the dollar.   Thus they would envisage selling only when gold was relatively strong and the dollar relatively weak and buying only in the reverse circumstances.   They thought that they at least might start with a sum of around 20 tons (equals around $300 million at present prices).   They could take running profits of losses on their books for a considerable period and though participating central banks would have to envisage the possibility of an ultimate loss or gain in gold, in practice all that might be involved would be a loss or gain in dollars.    On this point both Zijlstra and Leutwiler emphasised that they were already liable to suffer substantial losses on their dollar reserves and would not be worried by the potential losses that they might they might sustain on this scheme.

In answer to a question from me, Zijlstra confirmed that the US realised that if any gold pool were developed, the European central banks would intend to buy back in due course any gold they sold. He said they were unhappy that the Europeans were not prepared to sell gold outright but they accepted it.    Larre pointed out in parenthesis that Tony Solomon was probably the only American now or in the recent past that would be prepared to accept such a line. He knew that Wallich and probably Volcker was against the whole idea.

Page 2

Zijlstra and Leutwiler said they were both strongly in favour of going ahead on the basis Larre had suggested.   They then asked what the other thought.

Emminger said that he had put this proposition to his Central Bank Council who were unanimously against it.   His hands were therefore at present totally tied.

De Strycker said he was extremely doubtful about the scheme.   He thought it was neither desirable nor necessary and carried considerable dangers.   De la Geniere was also negative stressing the great political dangers for him of selling any French gold in this indirect way.

Leutwiler then suggested that they should do it the other way round:   wait until the gold price went below 400 and then start the operation by buying.   When the BIS had bought, say, 20 tons they would have a masse de manoeuvre which they could then sell.   La Geniere said that this might be easier for him and he would consider the possibility of doing something along these lines. Emminger also said, though without much confidence, that it was possible that if the operation were to start along these lines and if it appeared to be going well, it might be possible to persuade the Central Bank Council to join in.

Leutwiler and Zijlstra then said that although they did not think a very large group was necessary to undertake the operation it probably had to be bigger than Two:    specifically they really needed either the French of the Germans.    Zijlstra said that although he had formal powers to do this he did not wish to do it without carrying his Government with him.    The Government was still doubtful and would probably need to know that a number of other countries were going along with it.

At various points during the meeting there was a discussion about publicity for the operation and at an early point Zijlstra said that publicity was both inevitable and desirable if the operation was to have a maximum effect.    He brushed aside my suggestion that while the publicity for any selling operations would be helpful, that attached to the later (or on the revised scheme, earlier) buying could be rather inflammatory.   However, if the scheme were to be 

 Page 3

simply a BIS one, publicity would not necessarily, or perhaps desirably, arise.   This point was not really addressed in the discussion.

I made a number of sceptical points about the failure of commodity stabilisation schemes of all kinds in the past and the dangers of getting drawn in gradually to bigger and bigger commitments. Leutwiler said that there was no danger because the losses would be small.   I said that I envisaged political dangers.    If it got known that the central banks were involving themselves in the price of goldhowever much they said it was only a smoothing rather than a stabilising operation, they would find themselves on a tiger. If the price of gold went on rising they would either have to increase their efforts or add to the upward pressure o gold by pulling out.

None of this carried any weight with anybody except perhaps de Strycker.   In any case I was not asked for any commitment from us.   There was, in fact, no discussion of whether or how contributions to the scheme would be based, but presumably it would be in relation to gold holdings so that they would not expect much from us.

The meeting ended with Leutwiler saying he would approach the Canadians  and Japanese to see how they felt about the idea while Zijlstra would talk to the Italians.   All would then think further about it and revert in January.

I must say I remain personally extremely sceptical about the desirability and efficacy of any scheme along the lines so far suggested.

CWM

13th December 1979

The original pages of this meeting briefing written by McMahon can be seen here: Page 1,  Page 2 and Page 3. The links may take a little while to load first time clicked.

The following key points are notable from McMahon’s briefing of the 10 December Gold Pool discussions meeting. Zijlstra and Leutwiler acted as the 2 main advocates of the proposed Gold Pool arrangement. This is important to remember because Zijlstra was the President of the BIS at that time and Leutwiler became President of the BIS at the beginning of 1982 taking over from Zijlstra. So the heads of the BIS in the early 1980s were both firm advocates of the need for a new Gold Pool. Zijlstra and Leutwiler probably also represented the two most independent central banks present at the discussions, namey the Dutch and Swiss central banks.

The market mechanics of the proposals discussed in the meeting are also classic collusive Gold Pool tactics to torpedo the gold price by “selling only when gold was relatively strong and the dollar relatively weak and buying only in the reverse circumstances.” 

The discussion also made it clear that the preferred approach would be to operate as both a selling syndicate and a buying consortium as “European central banks would intend to buy back in due course any gold they sold.” It was even suggested that the buying could occur first so as to create an inventory of physical gold with which to use to fund the selling interventions, i.e “wait until the gold price went below 400 and then start the operation by buying. When the BIS had bought, say, 20 tons they would have a masse de manoeuvre which they could then sell.”

Given that René Larre, the BIS General Manager, began the meeting shows that he was meeting coordinator in his capacity as BIS General Manager. It is also very interesting that McMahon states that “the BIS could undertake all the operations on behalf of a group of central banks” that could  be “reviewed monthly”, which underlines the fact that overall, this could be viewed as a BIS led scheme, controlled and operated out of Basle.

A BIS scheme would also allow the Gold Pool to operate in secrecy, out of public view. In the words of McMahon “if the scheme were to be simply a BIS one, publicity would not necessarily, or perhaps desirably, arise“.

As mentioned, the above is just an extract from much more detailed article titled “New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle, Switzerland: Part 1”. That article provides a full background to the above, including:

  • There were an entire set of central banker discussions from September to December 1979, that led up to the meeting profile above.
  • At the IMF annual conference in Belgrade in early October 1979, the US monetary authority delegation in the form of Paul Volcker, William Miller, Tony Solomon, and Henry Wallich approached Fritz Leutwiler, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank, and discussed a proposal to launch a joint central bank gold selling operation.
  • During the discussions at the BIS, Zijlstra, who was BIS President until the end of 1981, and Leutwiler, who became BIS President in January 1982, were both strongly in favour of launching a new joint central bank gold pool to manipulate the gold price.
  • The oil-producing cartel OPEC was at that time, “increasingly concerned that gold was outpacing oil”, but Al Quraishi, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) had made an assurance that the Saudi’s “would not rock the boat” and buy gold on the market if a new gold pool was activated. However, Al Quraishi and SAMA were still eager to “diversify” the reinvestment of the Saudi oil revenues into gold.
  • The Bank of England recorded market intelligence in October 1979 that the “USA was planning to sell 10 million ounces of gold in four separate unannounced operations” before the end of 1979 so as to “placate the Saudi Arabians.
  • The Bank of England’s foreign exchange and gold specialist at that time, John Sangster, thought that there was “a need to break the psychology of ‘the market can only go one way and that is up’.” 
  • Sangster’s view was also that there was “no question of any permanent stabilisation of the gold price, merely at a critical time holding it within a target area”, an operation he called a “smoothing operation”.
  • The first meeting to discuss a new collusive gold pool took place in the BIS office of Zijlstra on Monday 12 November 1979, whose invitees (in addition to Jelle Zijlstra) were Gordon Richardson, Governor of the Bank of England, Cecil de Strycker, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium, Fritz Leutwiler, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank, Bernard Clappier, Governor of the Banque de France, and Otmar Emminger, President of the Bundesbank.

Following this 10 December meeting, the governors returned to their respective banks and recessed for Christmas and New Year, returning to Basle in early January 1980 where the next Gold Pool meeting took place on 7 January 1980, in a historic month in which the gold price rocket from $515 to $850 in a matter of weeks.

Conclusion

Did these discussions lead to the formation of a new Gold Pool operated out of the BIS in Basle? That is for you to decide. As well as reading "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle, Switzerland: Part 1", we encourage you to read "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle: Part 2 – Pool vs Gold for Oil".

Part 2 takes up where Part 1 left off, and begins by looking at developments in the BIS Gold Pool discussions during January 1980, a month in which the US dollar gold price rocketed more than 60% during a three-week period to reach a then record of $850 per ounce. Part 2 then looks at how the discussions involving these central banks evolved over the remainder of 1980 and 1981 as key high level central bankers continued to call for intervention into the gold market. Part 2 also looks at evidence that central bankers party to the discussions began advocating gold for oil exchanges between the West and the Saudi Arabia, exchanges which would provide real wealth (gold) to the Arabs in exchange for oil flowing to the West, while simultaneously keeping a lid on the gold price.

In their own words:

"If any operation were ever contemplated, it would have to be geared at some concept of the developing real price of gold and not attempt to hold any particular nominal level. It would almost certainly not be a pool with any significant potentail for recovery of gold sold. Rather it would enable OPEC to acquire some modicum of the chief inflation-proof asset without an excessive rise in the price.

“This is not to advocate gold for oil directly; the price haggling would be too acrimonious. Market intermediation should allow the G10 to move with the price while attempting to control its pace as well as break off the experiment when possible or necessary.”     – John Sangster to Gordon Richardson, Anthony Loenhis & Kit McMahon, Bank of England, 17 September 1980

“I feel that it is necessary for us, within the Group of Ten and Switzerland, to consider ways to regulate the price of gold, admittedly within fairly broad limits”      – Jelle Zjilstra, BIS Chairman and President and Dutch central bank President, 27 September 1981

First, there is the meeting on the Gold Pool, then, after lunch, the same faces show up at the G-10″      – Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pohl to journalist Edward Jay Epstein, in a conversation at the Bundesbank in 1983

An extract from Part 2 will also appear on Zerohedge in the near future.

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Thief Robs Russian Central Bank By Climbing In Through Window

The Russian central bank may have uncovered yet another “unorthodox” way of boosting the wealth effect, one which bypasses the conventional commercial banking pathway altogether.

According to Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency, a thief has stolen more than 11 million rubles ($195,000) from a building owned by Rosstandart, where the Bank of Russia rents offices for its various divisions. The money was taken from the Central Bank’s building on Leninsky Prospekt on Monday, RIA added.

“An unknown individual climbed through the window of the building of the Central Bank, stole more than 11.4 million rubles and disappeared,” a central bank official said. The central bank spokesperson also told reporters that the thief had stolen employees’ personal property, and said that those targeted by the theft worked for Bank of Russia, which rents offices in the building.

The Internal Affairs Ministry confirmed that money had been stolen from a business in the area, but refused to name the company or the amount stolen. The circumstances of the incident are being investigated by police officers, a criminal case has been opened.

It was not immediately clear if the Russian “incident” would prompt central banks around the world to “stimulate” their own economies by pursuing a local version of the “open window” fallacy.

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Trump: “Cowardly Comey” Leaks “Far More Prevalent Than Anyone Ever Thought Possible”

After waking up on Sunday, Trump didn’t waste much time before taking to his favorite social network, where in a series of tweets, he first took credit for the latest Dow Jones record high, while praising the record “business and economic enthusiasm”, slamming “obstructionist” Democrats who “have no message,  not on economics, not on taxes,  not on jobs, not on failing #Obamacare”, and lashing out at “cowardly” Comey’s “leaks” will be “far more prevalent than anyone ever thought possible.”

“I believe the James Comey leaks will be far more prevalent than anyone ever thought possible. Totally illegal? Very ‘cowardly!’, Trump said in a Tweet at 8:30am on Sunday.

… suggesting that Comey’s admission during his Senate testimony last week that he leaked information to the NYT, is just the tip of the iceberg.

Trump’s tweet was his latest response to Comey’s testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee where as a reminder the former FBI director said he leaked notes of his conversations with the president to the NYT through a friend in the hopes it would lead to the appointment of a special prosecutor. Comey said his decision was prompted by Trump’s suggestion, made on Twitter three days after his firing, that he may have secret recordings of their conversations, something Trump made a cryptic refernce to during a Friday press conference when he refused to address the subject but said the media would be “disappointed” with the outcome.

“My judgment was, I need to get that out into the public square,” Comey told the intelligence panel. “I asked a friend of mine to share the content of the memo with a reporter. Didn’t do it myself for a variety of reasons. I asked him to because I thought that might prompt the appointment of a special counsel.”

Needless to say, Trump – who has slammed the FBI’s leaking for months – was not pleased.

Comey also said he is sure that special counsel Mueller is now looking into whether Trump’s actions amounted to obstruction of justice. 

Meanwhile, on Friday Trump’s personal lawyer, Marc Kasowitz, said he is prepared a leak complaint against Comey over his handling of memos on his interactions with the president. In a statement to the press on Thursday, Kasowitz said “selective and illegal leaks of classified information” are undermining the Trump administration.

* * *

Separately, Trump once again slammed the “fake news”, while praising the latest record high in the Dow (if not Nasdaq), while taking credit for the slowing pace of job creation and “record” high but slumping business and consumer confidence.

The #FakeNews MSM doesn’t report the great economic news since Election Day. #DOW up 16%. #NASDAQ up 19.5%. Drilling & energy sector way up. Regulations way down. 600,000+ new jobs added. Unemployment down to 4.3%. Business and economic enthusiasm way up- record levels!

Needless to say, with Trump tempting the market fates on an almost daily basis, it is only a matter of time before they take him, and the stock market – which Trump said last September was a “big, fat, ugly bubble”, to task.

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The DEA’s Warrantless Cash Grab: New at Reason

Cash planeDo you want to know the dirty secret about how the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) confiscates suspected drug traffickers’ money? The truth is, it’s not hard: Agents just go to an airport and wait for cash to drop into their laps.

A March report by the Justice Department’s inspector general (I.G.) found the DEA seized a whopping $4 billion in cash over the past decade using civil asset forfeiture, mostly from airports, train stations, and bus terminals.

Contrary to DEA rhetoric, these seizures have little to do with ongoing criminal investigations and everything to do with bringing in money. In 81 percent of the cases the I.G. reviewed, there were no accompanying criminal charges, writes C.J. Ciaramella.

View this article.

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We Could Have Had Cellphones Four Decades Earlier: New at Reason

An early cell phoneThe basic idea of the cellphone was introduced to the public in 1945—not in Popular Mechanics or Science, but in the down-home Saturday Evening Post. Millions of citizens would soon be using “handie-talkies,” declared J.K. Jett, the head of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Licenses would have to be issued, but that process “won’t be difficult.” The revolutionary technology, Jett promised in the story, would be formulated within months.

But permission to deploy it would not. The government would not allocate spectrum to realize the engineers’ vision of “cellular radio” until 1982, and licenses authorizing the service would not be fully distributed for another seven years. That’s one heck of a bureaucratic delay, writes Thomas Winslow Hazlett.

View this article.

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Liberal Van Jones Shreds Hillary: ‘They Took a Billion Dollars and Lit it on Fire’

Content originally published at iBankCoin.com

 

It appears the lack of momentum in removing the Orange God from the Oval office is beginning to take its toll on the left. As reality sinks in and the hard facts of life with Trump become apparent, the left are eating themselves.

CNN’s Van Jones shreds the Hillary campaign to pieces, only like a social justice warrior can.

“The Hillary Clinton campaign did not spend their money on white workers, and they did not spend it on people of color. They spent it on themselves,” Jones told a packed house at McCormick Place in Chicago. “They spent it on themselves, let’s be honest.”
 
“Let’s be honest,” Jones continued. “They took a billion dollars, a billion dollars, a billion dollars, and set it on fire, and called it a campaign!”
 
“That wasn’t a campaign. That’s not a campaign.”
 
Jones continued, attacking the Clinton campaign’s reliance on consultants and polling data that proved to be wrong.
 
“A billion dollars for consultants. A billion dollars for pollsters. A billion dollars for a data operation, that was run by data dummies who couldn’t figure out that maybe people in Michigan needed to be organized.”
 
“And now they want us to fight about whether black folks or white workers or Latinos or any other group should get the money,” Jones said. “First of all, you need to give the money back to the people, period.”
 
“Quit getting rich off people’s struggles,” Jones finished.

 

Van Jones has been redpilled to the divide and conquer politics of DC.

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Trump Jr. Rips into Comey: ‘You’re the Head of the FBI, You’re Not Some Baby’

Content originally published at iBankCoin.com

 

Donald Trump took away James Comey’s job, now his son will take away any semblance of dignity he has left. In an interview with Judge Jeanine, Trump Jr. laced into Comey, mocking the former FBI head and flat out calling him ‘dishonest’ and of ‘bad character.’
 

“He has proven himself to be a dishonest man of bad character,” Trump Jr. told Jeanine Pirro on Fox News. “They spent 10 months chasing a rabbit down a hole with the sole purpose of taking down my father.
 
“We were vindicated.”
 
“Of all the things that were leaked, the only thing that wasn’t leaked was that Trump was never under investigation,” he said. “Because there is nothing there.
 
“How come that’s not leaked?

 
Trump Jr. hit Comey with a verbal gravity hammer, saying “I think his divisiveness, the way he handled things, everything that leads up to this that we’ve seen over the last few months, and now that we know how he handled the Loretta Lynch thing, explains perfectly why he totally should’ve been fired.”
 
Judge Jeanine posited the idea, in light of the revelation that Comey had leaked to the NY Times, the possibility that he had leaked to the media in the past.

Trump Jr. concurred, “I think almost without question. He said he’s a leaker. You know, if he did it this time, how many time did he do it? I wish there was a follow up for that.
 
He added, “If the head of the FBI is saying ‘well if I was a stronger individual, I may…’, give me a break. You’re the head of the FBI. You’re not some baby, pretending, like, does anyone believe this? And if he is, he’s that guy? He’s not strong enough to say something that he believes is right that he goes and writes a memo and then leaks it to the NY Times? I mean, I can’t imagine anyone actually believing that that happened.”

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Next Generation Risks, Part 1: “Super EMP” Attack

Authored by John Rubino via DollarCollapse.com,

The global financial system’s ever-increasing leverage pretty much guarantees another crisis in coming years – unless it’s pre-empted by new weapons that can, in theory, shut down entire national banking systems, thus screwing up the best-laid plans of today’s savers and investors.

This series will consider some of them, beginning with the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. From The Wall Street Journal:

North Korea Dreams of Turning Out the Lights

Pyongyang doesn’t need a perfect missile. Detonating a nuke above Seoul—or L.A.—would sow chaos.

 

 

In 2001 Congress established a commission to study the danger of an electromagnetic pulse generated by the detonation of a high-altitude nuclear weapon. It concluded that while there would be no blast effects on the ground, critical electricity-dependent infrastructure could be rendered inoperable. The commission’s chairman, William R. Graham, has noted that several Russian generals told the commissioners in 2004 that the designs for a “super EMP nuclear weapon” had been transferred to North Korea.

 

Pyongyang, the Russian generals reported, was probably only a few years away from developing super EMP capability. According to Peter Vincent Pry, staff director of the congressional EMP commission, a recent North Korean medium-range missile test that was widely reported to have exploded midflight could in fact have been deliberately detonated at an altitude of 40 miles.

 

Was it a dry run for an EMP attack? Detonation at that altitude of a nuclear warhead with a yield of 10 to 20 kilotons—similar to those tested by North Korea—would produce major EMP effects and inflict catastrophic damage to unhardened electronics across hundreds of miles of surface territory. It is a myth that large yield nuclear weapons of hundreds of kilotons are required to produce such effects.

 

Although some analysts have dismissed the possibility of a successful North Korean EMP attack—either on South Korea or the United States—several factors could make it a more appealing first-strike strategy for Kim Jong Un’s nuclear scientists than a direct, missile-delivered nuclear strike. For one thing, accuracy is not a concern; the North Koreans simply need to get near their target to sow chaos. Nor would they need to worry about developing a reliable re-entry vehicle for their ballistic missiles.

 

Conventional wisdom aside, a North Korean EMP attack on the U.S. may also not be far-fetched. “North Korea could make an EMP attack against the United States by launching a short-range missile off a freighter or submarine or by lofting a warhead to 30 kilometers burst height by balloon,” wrote Mr. Graham earlier this month on the security blog 38 North. “Even a balloon-lofted warhead detonated at 30 kilometers altitude could blackout the Eastern Grid that supports most of the population and generates 75 percent of US electricity. Moreover, an EMP attack could be made by a North Korean satellite.” Two North Korean satellites currently orbit the earth on trajectories that take them over the U.S.

 

This is not mere theory. In 1962 the United States detonated a 1.4-megaton nuclear warhead over the South Pacific, 900 miles southwest of Hawaii. Designated “Starfish Prime,” the blast destroyed hundreds of street lights in Honolulu, caused electrical surges on airplanes in the area, and damaged at least six satellites. Only Hawaii’s undeveloped electric power-transmission infrastructure prevented a prolonged blackout. It was the era of vacuum-tube electronics. We are living in the digital age.

Some conclusions

Lots of actors in addition to North Korea have this capability. And we can’t stop it. Preventing a nuke-laden plane or balloon from detonating miles above a populated area is hard to the point of impossibility.

Banking and brokerage networks would be shut down – possibly for a long while – by such an attack, which means no access to ATM machines or credit card readers. People without ready cash would be stuck without access to life’s necessities. Meanwhile cars, which have in recent years become rolling computer networks, won’t run, making it hard to get to distant supplies.

The fiat currency of a system shut down in this way might or might not hold its value. This is uncharted financial territory so it’s not certain that cash under the mattress will be of use. And forget about cryptocurrencies in this scenario. Virtual money evaporates when the network on which it circulates goes down.

The solution?

Start upgrading to hardened electronics as part of a basic prepping program. That’s beyond the technical scope of this article, but Google it and you’ll find plenty of resources. And hold precious metals in small enough denominations to use as currency. One of history’s lessons is that gold and silver remain valuable whatever else is going on. If we’re destined to spend a few months back in the Middle Ages, spendable money will make the experience a lot more manageable.

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Tracking Hacking: Visualizing The World’s Biggest Data Breaches

The graphic below shows a timeline of some of the biggest data breaches on record. As Visual Capitalist's Chris Matei notes, each bubble represents the number of records lost in any given breach, with the most sensitive data clustered toward the right side.

This data visualization comes to us from Information is Beautiful. Go to their site to see the highly-recommended interactive format that visualizes the same data, while providing additional details on each specific hack.

Courtesy of: Visual Capitalist

 

Before 2009, the majority of data breaches were the fault of human errors like misplaced hard drives and stolen laptops, or the efforts of “inside men” looking to make a profit by selling data to the highest bidder. Since then, the volume of malicious hacking (shown in purple) has exploded relative to other forms of data loss.

FROM MILLIONS TO BILLIONS

Increasingly sophisticated hacking has altered the scale of data loss by orders of magnitude. For example, an “inside job” breach at data broker Court Ventures was once one of the world’s largest single losses of records at 200 million.

However, it was eclipsed in size shortly thereafter by malicious hacks at Yahoo in 2013 and 2014 that compromised over 1.5 billion records, and now larger hacks are increasingly becoming the norm.

SMALL BUT POWERFUL

The problems caused by hacks, leaks and other data breaches are not just ones of scale. For example, the accidental 2016 leak of information from spam/email marketing service River City Media stands out at an alarming 1.37 billion records lost. However, sorting by data sensitivity paints a different picture. The River City leak – represented by the larger blue dot below – is surpassed in severity by hacks at Yahoo, at web design platform Weebly, and even at adult video provider Brazzers.

Much of the data lost in the River City hack was made up of long lists of consumer email addresses to be used for spam email distribution, while the other hacks listed compromised items like account passwords, banking information, addresses, phone numbers, or health records. While having your email address become the target for spam exploitation is a serious annoyance, the hacking of much more sensitive personal data has quickly become the norm.

The fact that more and more of our data is being stored “in the cloud” and among devices on the Internet of Things means that increasingly sensitive types of data are now more vulnerable than ever to being hacked. This looks to be even more cause for concern than the rapidly rising volume of records that have been exposed, whether intentionally or by accident.

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Did James Comey’s Document Leaks Violate The FBI Employment Agreement?

Authored by Bre Payton via The Federalist,

Former FBI director James Comey's decision to leak FBI documents to a friend may have violated the FBI's employment agreement regarding unauthorized leaks.

During his testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee on Thursday, former FBI director James Comey revealed that he was the source of leaked memos about his conversations with Donald Trump surrounding the Russia investigation. Comey explained that he shared the memos with his friend, a professor at Columbia University, who then shared them with the New York Times, actions that may violate the FBI’s own employee agreement.

“My judgment was I needed to get [the memos] out into the public square,” Comey said.

 

“So I asked a friend of mine to share the content of the memo with a reporter. I didn’t do it myself for a variety of reasons, but I asked him to because I thought that might prompt the appointment of a special counsel.”

By his own account, it seems that Comey may not have followed the agency’s employee agreement, which places numerous restrictions on the use of information or documents acquired during an individual’s employment by the FBI. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the FBI employment agreement appear to cover Comey’s distribution of content he says he created on government property in his capacity as a government official:

Paragraph 2 states that all materials acquired in connection with an employee’s official duties are property of the U.S. government and that such materials must be surrendered to the FBI upon an employee’s separation from the agency. Paragraph 3 states that employees are prohibited from releasing “any information acquired by virtue of my official employment” to “unauthorized individual[s] without prior official written authorization by the FBI.” Paragraph 4 of the agreement requires FBI employees, prior to disclosing or publishing information acquired during their employment, to submit the information to FBI authorities for review to determine whether it is authorized for public release.

So if Comey followed protocol and surrendered all government property, including the memos he produced in his capacity as an FBI employee, it would have been impossible for him to provide the memos to his friend. The fact that he was able to provide hard copies of the memos to both his friend and special counsel Robert Mueller suggests that Comey did not surrender them to authorities as required by the FBI employment agreement.

Page two of the agreement lists the types of information disclosures which are strictly prohibited. Included in the list of information that may not be released without prior written approval by the FBI is “information that relates to any sensitive operational details or the substantive merits of any ongoing or open investigation or case.” While the agreement states that unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a violation of the contract, information does not have to be classified in order to be prohibited from unauthorized disclosure. Comey claims that his memos were unclassified.

Comey’s claim that it would not have been proper to publicly disclose that Trump was not a target of any FBI investigation because the investigation was ongoing and facts could change flies in the face of his decision to provide to his friends records of his meetings about the investigation with the president. If he could not publicly note that Trump was not a target of an ongoing investigation, then why was he able to release FBI records related to that investigation to his friends for the purpose of having those details leaked to the public via the news media? In light of the FBI’s prohibition on publicly sharing documents or information related to ongoing investigations absent prior written authorization, Comey’s dual explanations make little sense.

The FBI employment agreement states that violating any of the included terms may result in termination, civil liability, revocation of security clearances, or even criminal sanctions.

 

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