Tag: news

Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk.com,

Recent polls for Italian politicians supporting the eurozone and EU have collapsed.

Pro-Europe polls are highly likely to get worse as a  further splintering of Matteo Renzi’s PD party takes place.

It is not out of question for Beppe Grillo’s eurosceptic Five Star Movement (M5S) party to achieve an absolute majority in the next election. However, please note that 40% is the threshold for a “majority”.

The Financial Times reports Italy is Falling Out of Love with Europe.

Foreigners often underestimate Italy’s ability to sidestep calamity. That said, the stakes are higher now than in 1992. Solutions may prove harder to find. The reason lies in the radically different EU and Mediterranean contexts in which Italy finds itself.

 

Some of contemporary Italy’s challenges appear similar to those of the early 1990s. The party system is once again in fragments. The ruling centre-left Democratic party (PD) split last month. The right is divided. The most popular opposition party is the anti-establishment Five Star Movement. Since November 2011 four prime ministers have taken office not because voters chose them, but because of a financial emergency, factional squabble, party coup and failed constitutional reform.

 

Matteo Renzi, the former premier and PD leader, suffered a blow this month when it emerged that Tiziano Renzi, his father, and Luca Lotti, a close political ally, had been caught up in a judicial probe into suspected graft in public procurement.

 

The most disturbing comparison between 1992 and the present day concerns the Italian economy, which is projected this year to be the slowest-growing in the eurozone. Public debt is more than 132 percent of gross domestic product. Unemployment is almost 12 per cent; the youth jobless rate is over 37 percent.

 

As a consequence, ever more Italian politicians question the merits of eurozone membership. So do Italian voters. In a Eurobarometer poll published in December, 47 percent called the euro “a bad thing” for their country and only 41 percent “a good thing”. This is the big difference with 25 years ago.

 

As long as the moderate left or right governs Italy, it may be possible to contain this disenchantment with the EU and the euro. But the PD’s fissures are the latest sign that the party system is cracking under the strain. The Five Star Movement is waiting in the wings.

PD Suicide

Via email, Eurointelligence comments on the costs of Matteo Renzi’s PD’s suicide mission.

We have been saying it for a while – political parties that preoccupy themselves with their internal divisions are electorally doomed. It is happening to the Labour Party in the UK, and it is now happening to the Partito Democratico. This tendency is now being picked up by the polls, which show the Five Star Movement ahead of the PD by five points. We are now at the point where it becomes increasingly improbable for the PD to regain power after the next elections. They cannot do it on their own, and they do not have natural coalition partners to help them. Even a hypothetical alliance between Matteo Renzi and Silvio Berlusconi would not, on its own, meet the 40% majority threshold for a coalition, and there is no way the two parties would enter the election with a pre-arranged electoral pact in the first place.

 

The Five Star Movement is now only 6 points away from an absolute majority that would allow it to govern on its own – assuming that the present electoral law for the chamber of deputies forms the basis of a new electoral system for the Senate. If one adds up all the non-extremist parties (and let’s count Berlusconi’s Forza d’Italia among them for the sake of argument), one would get to just over 40% – with the PD, Forza Italia, and the New Centre Right of foreign minister Angelino Alfano which only gets 2.8%.

 

Worse for the PD, its support will fall even more after the split of the party becomes a reality – which it will before the elections. The poll puts the hypothetical support for PD dissidents at 7.1%, which would reduce the PD’s overall support to under 20%. The new left, together with the old left, would have the support of close to 10%. All this shows that there can be only two election outcomes: either a fragmented parliament, with unstable and shifting coalitions, or a majority reign of the Five Star Movement. The Five Star Movement promises not to enter coalitions, and it will be interesting to see whether the party maintains that position after the elections.

 

On the issue that interests us the most – Italy’s future in the EU, and in the eurozone in particular – the picture is even more grim. The only two parties that unconditionally support Italy’s membership of the eurozone are the PD and the New Centre Right. Forza Italia is toying with the idea of a parallel currency, while the Five Star Movement has pledged a consultative referendum on Italy’s future in the euro. While this referendum can legally not end Italy’s membership in the eurozone, it would send a devastating signal to the outside world.

 

The Five Star Movement has its own share of scandals – for example involving the new municipal government in Rome, and the party is in an internal state of war over the candidate for the mayoral elections in Genoa. But none of that seems to stick.

 

Our conclusion is that the Five Star Movement is rational to avoid alliances with other parties, as this approach is paying off electorally. With that strategy in place, they will either gain a sufficient majority (over 40%) at the next elections, or in the one after that.

Italian Polls

Eurointelligence referenced a specific Italian poll that has been since superseded.

However, support for PD is clearly on the wane. Let’s take a look at all of the recent Italian Election Polls.

In only one poll since March 9 (clearly an outlier) did Matteo Renzi’s PD party come in first place. Moreover, PD has not yet split for polling purposes but it will.

I fail to see how M5s was “6 points away from an absolute majority that would allow it to govern on its own” as Eurointelligence states, but a coalition of eurosceptic parties totaling over 50%  is easily at hand.

Support for M5S (Five Star Movement) + Fi (Forza Italia) + LN (Lega Nord), all eurosceptic parties, totals 54.5%in the most recent poll.

Forza Italia is former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s  party.

On March 9, Bloomberg reported  Enter Berlusconi: A Man, a Ban, and His Plan to Restore the Lira.

If elections were held today, eurosceptic parties would easily hit not only a 40% threshold but a 50% threshold as well.

Whether eurosceptic could agree to form a coalition is another matter, but I suspect they would, especially if the alternative was a minority government led by PD.

via http://ift.tt/2mvokxG Tyler Durden

Just as Yellen & Co. has finally decided that ‘Everything is Awesome’ and started raising interest rates (the timing of which we’re almost certain was in no way influenced by the conclusion of the recent election cycle), signs continue to mount that global economies are not as healthy as the Fed suddenly believes them to be.  In fact, over just the past couple of days we’ve highlighted a litany of negative economic data points including crashing bank loan creation, surging auto loan delinquencies and continuous deterioration of the retail sector, just to name a few.

And while the mega wealthy folks of the world are typically somewhat immune from the economic cycle, even they are suddenly taking a breather from purchases of multi-million dollar works of fine art which have collapsed to levels not recorded since 2009.  Per Bloomberg:

Sales of art and antiques dropped 11 percent to $56.6 billion, according to a report released on Wednesday by UBS Group AG and Art Basel. The decline, on top of a 7 percent slide in 2015, wipes out the gains seen in 2013 and 2014, when sales reached an all-time high of $68.2 billion.

 

“It was quite a challenging year for the art market,” Clare McAndrew, founder of Arts Economics that prepared the report, said in a telephone interview.

 

Her outlook for 2017 is cautious, with sellers holding back as economic and geopolitical uncertainty continues in many countries. Buyers, on the other hand, may view art and antiques as “a relative safe haven amidst volatility elsewhere,” increasing prices for the works that appear on the market, according to the report.

This follows a note we published a few weeks ago noting that Russian billionaire Dmitry Rybolovlev had taken a 74% bath on a Paul Gauguin piece he purchased in 2008 for $85 million.

Russian billionaire Dmitry Rybolovlev paid €54 million or $85 million for a landscape by Paul Gauguin in a private transaction in June 2008. Yesterday, he incurred a whopping 74% loss on his store of value “investment” as reported by Bloomberg:

 

Gauguin’s 1892 landscape “Te Fare (La Maison)” fetched 20.3 million pounds ($25 million), including commission, at Tuesday evening’s sale of Impressionist and modern art at Christie’s in London. Rybolovlev will net about $22 million based on the hammer price. The auction house had estimated the value at $15 million to $22.4 million. The buyer was a client of Rebecca Wei, president of Christie’s Asia.

 

The Gauguin was one of four Rybolovlev pieces offered for sale on Tuesday. Another work, a Mark Rothko painting, will be auctioned March 7.

Of course, not all fine art is created equal…here were the biggest losers of 2016:

• Auction sales declined 26 percent to $22.1 billion, according to the report, released to coincide with the opening of Art Basel Hong Kong.
• Sales of postwar and contemporary works at auction fell 18 percent to $5.6 billion; modern art was down 43 percent at $2.6 billion; the Impressionist category declined 31 percent to $1.3 billion.
• The high end of the auction market — where prices for artworks exceed $1 million — fell 34 percent. Trophies priced at more than $10 million saw the biggest decline, at 53 percent.
• Industry leaders Sotheby’s and Christie’s lost market share, together accounting for 38 percent of the auction sales, down from 42 percent in 2015.

via http://ift.tt/2mXozOe Tyler Durden

Authored by Simon Black via SovereignMan.com,

Sometimes you have to marvel at the absurdity of the financial universe in which we live.

On one side of the Atlantic, we have the United States of America, which triggered yet another debt ceiling disaster last Thursday when the US government’s maximum allowable debt reset to just over $20 trillion.

Of course, the US national debt is pretty much already at $20 trillion.

(That’s roughly $166,000 per taxpayer in the Land of the Free.)

This means that Uncle Sam is legally prohibited from ‘officially’ borrowing any more money.

But far be it from the US government to start living within its means. Sacrilege!

These guys have zero chance of making ends meet without going into debt.

Just last year, according to the government’s own financial report, their annual net loss totaled $1 TRILLION, and the national debt increased by $1.4 trillion.

And that was in a relatively stable year. There was no major war or financial crisis to fight. It was just business as usual.

This year isn’t going to be any different.

So, cut off from their normal debt supply (the bond market), the Treasury Department is resorting to what they call “extraordinary measures.”

They’re basically pillaging government employee retirement funds, and will continue to do so until Congress raises the debt ceiling.

It’s a repeat of what happened in 2015. And 2013. And 2011.

Pretty amazing to consider that the “richest” country in the world has to plunder retirement funds in order to keep the lights on.

Former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers said it perfectly when he quipped “How long can the world’s biggest borrower remain the world’s biggest power?”

Then, of course, on the other side of the Atlantic, we have Greece, which is now in its NINTH YEAR of a major debt crisis.

Incredible.

Greece has had nine different governments since 2009. At least thirteen austerity measures. Multiple bailouts. Severe capital controls. And a full-out debt restructuring in which creditors accepted a 50% loss.

Yet despite all these measures GREECE IS STILL IN A DEBT CRISIS.

Right now, in fact, Greece is careening towards another major chapter in its never-ending debt drama.

Just like the United States, the Greek government is set to run out of money (yet again) in a few months and is in need of a fresh bailout from the IMF and EU.

(The EU is code for “Germany”…)

Without another bailout, Greece will go bust in July– this is basic arithmetic, not some wild theory.

And this matters.

If Greece defaults, everyone dumb enough to have loaned them money will take a BIG hit.

This includes a multitude of banks across Germany, Austria, France, and the rest of Europe.

Many of those banks already have extremely low levels of capital and simply cannot afford a major loss.

(Last year, for example, the IMF specifically singled out Germany’s Deutsche Bank as being the top contributor to systemic risk in the global financial system.)

So a Greek default poses as major risk to a number of those banks.

More importantly, due to the interconnectedness of the financial system, a Greek default poses a major risk to anyone with exposure to those banks.

Think about it like this: if Greece defaults and Bank A goes down, then Bank A will no longer be able to meet its obligations to Bank B. Bank B will suffer a loss as well.

A single event can set off a chain reaction, what’s called ‘contagion’ in finance.

And it’s possible that Greece could be that event.

This is what European officials have been so desperate to prevent for the last nine years, and why they’ve always come to the rescue with a bailout.

It has nothing to do with community or generosity. They’re hopelessly trying to prevent another 2008-style meltdown of the financial system.

But their measures have limits.

How much longer do Greek citizens accept being vassals of Germany, suffering through debilitating capital controls and austerity measures?

How much longer do German taxpayers continue forking over their hard-earned wages to bail out Greek retirees?

After all, they’ve spent nine years trying to ‘fix’ Greece, and the situation has only become worse.

For a continent that has been at war with itself for 10 centuries and only managed to play nice for the last 30 or so years, it’s foolish to expect these bailouts to last forever.

And whether it’s this July or some date in the future, Greece could end up being the catalyst which sets off a chain reaction on both sides of the Atlantic.

Do you have a Plan B?

via http://ift.tt/2nq4JhW Tyler Durden

By Nick Kounis of ABN Amro

Euro Rates Watch – Will the TLTRO spark carry trades?

• The last of the ECB’s TLTRO-II operations is expected to have a big take up, with the market expecting EUR 125bn, and some forecasts as high as EUR 300bn
• From a rates perspective, what matters is whether these funds will trigger flows into the bond or swap markets as banks set up carry trades
• Carry trades have certainly looked attractive and currently there is a possible spread of around 80bp between the rate on the TLTRO and similar maturity peripheral bonds
• However, there is little evidence that banks have used TLTRO-II funds for carry trades over the last few months
• Eurozone bank government bond holdings have actually fallen sharply since the first TLTRO-II…
• …while a very small proportion of banks said they would use the funds to buy assets in the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey
• Finally, there was no discernible impact on government bond curves around the time of the TLTROs…
• ….and only a temporary impact on swap spreads in one of the three operations
• Overall, we doubt the last of the TLTRO’s will have a major lasting impact on bond or swap markets

The impact of TLTRO-II on the eurozone rates market

On Thursday, the ECB will hold its fourth tender under the TLTRO-II (Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations) programme. A large take-up is expected. A poll published by Reuters had a  median forecast of EUR 125bn net borrowing (EUR 141bn gross given banks will repay EUR 16.74bn), with estimates as high as EUR 300bn. From a rates perspective, what matters is whether these funds will trigger flows into the bond or swap markets as banks set up carry trades. Certainly, carry trades can be attractive. At the time of past operations there has been a possible spread of around 40bp between the rate on the TLTRO and similar maturity peripheral bonds. Currently this spread has risen to around 80bp, given the rise in peripheral yields. In this note we assess how likely it is that we will see a major impact on bond and swap markets by looking at the impact of the first three tenders, which saw a cumulative net take up of EUR 138bn. We first take a look at what banks have said about the uses of TLTRO funds in the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey. We go on to look at bank bond holdings. Finally, we analyse price movements in the bond and swap markets around the time of the TLTROs.

Only a very small proportion of banks say they used TLTRO to buy assets

The ECB’s Euro area Bank Lending Survey of January 2017 (see here) asked 134 banks about their participation in past TLTRO-II operations and the upcoming tender. In addition, the banks were questioned on their planned use of the funds (see charts below). Of the banks, 37% said they participated in the third TLTRO-II operation, which was lower than in the second tender (see graphs below). Meanwhile, 26% said they intended to participate in the upcoming TLTRO-II tender, while 42% was undecided and 32% indicated that they did not plan to participate. It is likely that more banks now intend to participate given it is final tender and market expectations of interest rate hikes have risen (see appendix). For the use of past TLTRO-II liquidity, banks revealed that they would use the cheap liquidity for granting loans (60%), to refinance other funding sources (24%), while only a very modest proportion said they intended to buy assets (9%). For tomorrow’s tender, a slightly higher proportion of the banks said they would engage in carry trades (13%).

Eurozone government bond holdings have fallen

The banks’ responses in the ECB survey appear to be corroborated in data on eurozone banks’ non-MFI bond holdings (see charts below). Eurozone banks’ bond holdings fell significantly between June of last year and  January of this year. Total bond holdings fell by EUR 153bn (-9.6%), while domestic bond holdings fell by EUR 124bn (-10.6%). The large absolute falls were seen in Spain and Italy, followed by France and Germany. If banks had  initiated carry trades by using TLTRO-II funds to invest in bonds, their bond holdings would have been expected to rise. Rather, a large buyer – the Eurosystem central banks – seems to have crowded them out of the market.

Little discernible impact on bond or swap markets

Finally, we find no major or sustained impact on bo nd or swap markets in the day surrounding the TLTRO-II operations. In the charts below, T is the TLRO-II settlement day for the various operations, and we show movements in swap and bond markets 5 days before and 5 days after. Carry trades would be expected to induce steepening as they would support the segment around 4-years. The left hand chart shows 5s10s ASW swap spreads. There was only temporary steepening around the time of the first TLTRO-II in June, while there was no visible impact in the September and December editions. In the run-up to this month’s TLTRO-II, we do see some steepening, as there appears to be some front running. But it is too early to say it trend will be sustained, given the experience of the swap market behaviour in the first three tenders. The right hand chart shows the average 4s8s spreads of Italian and Spanish government bonds. There is little evidence of bull steepening around any of the operations.

No major sustained impact expected from last TLTRO-II

The last of the TLTRO-II operations will probably see a large net take up of EUR 100bn or more. As discussed above, it would seem very attractive to invest TLTRO proceeds into especially peripheral government bonds  or to conduct carry trades by entering receiver swaps of similar maturities to the tender. However, there is little evidence that banks have done so up until now, even though it has always been relatively attractive. One  potential reason for this is that (especially peripheral) bank holdings of government bonds were already very large at the start of the TLTRO-II operations. They may feel uncomfortable adding to those holdings. Another reason is that by investing in assets, banks increase their balance sheets. This could be accompanied by higher regulatory costs which would make carry trades less profitable. Furthermore, there have been initiatives in Europe to risk-weight banks’ domestic government bond holdings. At the same time, investors have recently become more concerned about the fundamentals of certain sovereigns in the periphery,  especially once QE ends. Overall, we  doubt the last of the TLTRO’s will have a major lasting impact on bond or swap markets

via http://ift.tt/2nFmxpQ Tyler Durden

Authored by Altay Atli via The Strategic Culture Foundation blog,

As the diplomatic squabble between Turkey and the Netherlands continues to fester, concerns are raised about whether — and to what extent — the tensions will harm bilateral relations, particularly in economics where the two countries have robust trade and investment connections.

For Turkey, the Netherlands offers a large and expanding export market. Trade between the two countries has roots in the 17th century when the Ottomans exported wool and cotton (later tobacco as well) to the Netherlands and imported clothes and linen in return. Commerce between the two countries remained strong into modern times; in 2016 the bilateral trade volume was US$6.6 billion.

The Netherlands is the 10th largest export destination for Turkey, and perhaps more importantly from the Turkish perspective, it is also a fast-growing market. Last year Turkish exports to the Dutch market amounted to $3.6 billion, against $3 billion in imports. And while the annual increase in imports was 3.4%, exports expanded much faster, at 13.8%. For the Turkish economy, which is suffering an acute current-account deficit, the increasing trade surplus with the Dutch is a precious commodity.

Turkey is home to 2,700 companies funded by Dutch capital. This figure includes those transnational companies registered in the Netherlands for legal and tax-related purposes. This sizeable Dutch involvement in the Turkish economy benefits both sides. For Dutch multinationals such as Unilever, ING Bank, Philips, Perfetti, Royal Dutch Shell and Philip Morris, Turkey is not only a favorable production base but also a lucrative market and a trading and logistics hub for access to the Middle East and North Africa, Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. More Dutch investment is set to come to Turkey, such as the recent purchase by Vitol Group of the Turkey-based fuel products distribution company Petrolofisi for $1.47 billion. Investment needs a stable political climate, and the diplomatic spat between Turkey and the Netherlands doesn’t help.

It is also worth nothing that while the amount of Turkish investment in the Netherlands is considerably smaller, there are several large Turkish firms that have set up subsidiaries enabling access to the larger EU market.

For the past week, Dutch pundits have been commenting that Turkey is more dependent on the Netherlands, so possible sanctions imposed by Ankara would only mean “shooting themselves in the foot.” Turkish authorities have imposed political sanctions over the Dutch government’s refusal to allow Turkish ministers to meet with members of the Turkish diaspora there, including halting high-level political discussions between the two countries and the closing of Turkish airspace to Dutch diplomats. But Ankara has carefully ruled out economic sanctions. Turkey’s economics minister, Nihat Zeybekçi said: “If we take these steps, both sides would be hurt.” Ömer Çelik, minister of EU affairs said the Dutch business community, which is “investing in Turkey, doing commerce and generating employment” is “certainly not a part of this crisis,” and “Dutch investment in Turkey is by no means under risk”.

Economic sanctions between Turkey and the Netherlands don’t seem likely at the moment, but longer-term threats remain.

First, even if no sanctions are imposed, the significant loss of confidence caused by recent events will take a toll on bilateral economic relations for some time.

 

Second, the sizeable Turkish diaspora in the Netherlands, as well as the relatively smaller Dutch community living in Turkey, will face uncertainty, and this will have an economic impact too. An estimated 400,000 Turks live in the Netherlands, according to a diaspora association, and there are 25,000 businesses with Turkish owners, most of them smaller enterprises. Many of these companies are doing business with Turkey, and they are negatively affected by the current dispute between the two governments. So is the much smaller Dutch community in Turkey. But it is equally active in the economy, especially in the tourism sector. Declining tourist numbers will hurt Turkish and Dutch operators alike, and it might take some time to recover to pre-crisis levels of business.

 

Third, the diplomatic spat is likely to have a negative effect on efforts to revise the Turkish-EU Customs Union. The union, which took effect in 1996, is outdated, failing to catch up with the requirements of today’s global trade. Ankara and Brussels had begun talks to improve the deal, but the current circumstance is likely to overshadow attempts based on economic rationality.

This week Turkish football team Be?ikta? played the Greek side Olympiakos in the European cup. The Turks won 4-1 helped by two goals from Ryan Babel, the Amsterdam-born Dutch striker. Turkey and the Netherlands have links that are closer than many realize, and it will benefit both to keep them intact.

via http://ift.tt/2nffhjw Tyler Durden

We first need to remember where this all started — nearly a hundred years ago Trotsky was exiled from Russia; he packed his bags and headed for Mexico to start what is known today as the neocon movement. Their stated goal was to spread a brand of government via military means — remaining in a state of revolution at all times. They are, essentially, communists masquerading as capitalists and they co-opted the republican party. Today, the children of the original neocons, like Bill Kristol, have hard-ons for Russia — because it’s in their blood. They can’t help themselves.

Now the left were always fans of the Soviet Union — because communism appealed to them. If you recall, Ted Kennedy actually reached out to the Russians in the 80’s to broker a deal with them in exchange for their help in undermining Reagan. It failed and Reagan ended up being the best leader since JFK.

But ever since communism ended in Russia, the left have been very sore with them and have merged ideologies with the neocons to foment strife with them. Events transpiring in the Ukraine was the first excuse for these sleeper cells in our government to activate — trying to lure Putin into an escalation. When Putin went into Syria, to defend his only deep water port in the Mediterranean and take out ISIS, who we armed and permitted to run wild about the region, we had Turkey shoot down their fighter jet followed by Secretary Kerry requesting that we send troops into Syria to support the ‘rebels’ — who were/are terrorists.

When John Podesta’s emails were released, it was a massive embarrassment to the DNC and Hillary Clinton. Rumors of a child-pedo ring were running rampant and weird things started to happen — such as the death of Seth Rich. Following Trump’s victory, this narrative that Russia somehow hacked Podesta’s emails and then delivered them to Wikileaks was energized to the tenth degree by the mercenary media, neocons, and the left. They’ve been using this feeble and easy to disprove narrative to undermine President Trump — because he represents everything the establishment hates. They’re impugning the honor and integrity of a military giant, one with advanced nuclear weaponry — because their childish behavior demands it.

Would you want your son drafted into a war to fight and die in Moscow because John “I don’t need pizza now” Podesta’s email box was hacked? Get the fuck out of here with these lunatics.

I clipped this from the Russian ‘echo-chamber’ Infowars — who did a good job documenting some of the more outlandish statements made by the left — regarding Russia. These are not the actions and words of stable people.

Content originally generated at iBankCoin.com

via http://ift.tt/2npM0TJ The_Real_Fly

Authored by Mike Krieger via Liberty Blitzkrieg blog,

The Daily Beast just published an article previewing what should be referred to from this day forth as Davos for Democrats; a big-money infused orgy of wealthy donors telling their political puppets what to do as they mingle at one of the most luxurious hotel chains in the world.

Clearly learning absolutely zero lessons from their recent election pummeling, the Democratic Party is simply doubling down on its hopelessly failed strategy. Namely, a focus on more cash, even more donor influence and an absence of any new or interesting ideas that could actually get frustrated and struggling American voters excited. The post referenced below reads like something out of The Onion and would be downright hilarious if it wasn’t so pathetic and deranged.

From the article, Democratic Donors Gather in D.C. to Plot the Resistance:

The Democratic Party’s top officials will meet with some of their wealthiest donors in Washington, D.C., this week to plot the Trump resistance, according to documents obtained by The Daily Beast.

 

The chairs of the Democratic National Committee and the party’s House and Senate campaign arms will huddle with activists, operatives, and deep-pocketed Democratic financiers at a biannual conference hosted by the Democracy Alliance, a leading left-wing donor collaborative at Washington’s ritzy Mandarin Oriental hotel.

 

They will discuss strategy for immediate opposition to President Donald Trump’s policies, begin laying the groundwork for Democratic campaigns in next year’s midterm elections, strategize future efforts for congressional redistricting, and promote an agenda focused on the state level, where Democrats still retain some power and hope to build a model for national progressive victories. And perhaps most importantly, map out how to fully fund their opposition to all things Trump.

 

The Alliance brings together high-dollar liberal donors—individuals, labor unions, and charitable foundations—that pledge to give at least $200,000 annually to a suite of left-wing organizations. Through its “partners,” as the donors are known internally, the Alliance in 2015 raised $75 million for its supported organizations, an annual record for the group.

A lot of good that $75 mill did. Encouraging to see the solution is just throw more donor money at the problem.

Those include the Center for American Progress, a liberal policy shop that has turned its 501(c)(4) arm into an anti-Trump “war room,” and Media Matters for America, a media-focused rapid response group that has recently retooled its efforts toward “fake news” and pro-Trump disinformation.

Dumb and Dumber.

And on Friday, the Alliance will host what it describes as “the first in a regular series of off-the-record dialogues between progressive political donors and Democratic Party officials about the future.”

A regular series of off-the-record meetings between donors and Democratic officials. You can’t make this stuff up.

Donors in attendance will include Michael Vachon, a top aide to billionaire hedge fund manager George Soros; health care technology mogul Paul Egerman; Dallas philanthropist Naomi Aberly; Susan Sandler, the daughter of subprime mortgage pioneer Herb Sandler; and Ian Simmons, the husband of Hyatt hotel fortune heiress Liesel Pritzker Simmons.

 

The Alliance’s donors have recently had to step up their financial commitments as the group retools its mission from policymaking by way of an allied White House to opposition to Republican dominance at all levels of government.

 

In addition to their annual contribution thresholds, Alliance partners must chip in to support the donor collaborative’s operations. Partner dues increased by between $5,000 and $10,000 this year to support the Alliance’s revamped mission, BuzzFeed News reported in January.

Long on money, short on ideas. That’s the Demcoratic Party for you.

That dovetails with recent Alliance strategy, which has focused on reversing dramatic Democratic losses at the state level ahead of the 2020 census and redistricting process. The Alliance considers a Democrat-friendly round of redistricting essential to future progressive policy gains.

A focus on redistricting. Again, no ideas.

Another event, featuring Planned Parenthood president Cecile Richards, will examine the “opportunity, spurred by the enormous energy of ordinary people taking grassroots action, to oppose the Trump agenda and how to channel this energy for a change in the nation’s political direction, starting with building back power and winning critical state elections in 2017 and 2018.”

This article is just so telling about the priorities of the donor-controlled Democratic Party. They remain focused on money, redistricting and “channeling energy” (i.e. manipulating voters), as opposed to ideas. The party has nothing to offer Americans other than Trump opposition and Russia conspiracy theories.

The first of those break-out sessions will plot “strategy and plans to protect the safety net for low-income families and individuals.” Among its attendees will be the director of US Programs for Soros’s Open Society Foundations.

Perhaps getting the opinions of actual poor people might be useful, as opposed to listening to the operatives of billionaires.

That discussion will be held at Washington’s elite Cosmos Club, whose members—which have included three U.S. presidents, two vice presidents, and 12 Supreme Court justices—pay annual dues of about $2,000.

How grassroots of them.

Meanwhile, did you watch the clip of Nancy Pelosi being asked by Anderson Cooper who the leader of the party is?

Obama and Hillary Clinton.

This party is an absolute joke, and the quicker we admit this and create something else, the better. It hasn’t changed, and it’s not going to.

via http://ift.tt/2npoq9s Tyler Durden

During the so-called Chinese Banking Liquidity Crisis of 2013, the relative cost of funds for non-bank institutions spiked to 100bps. So, the fact that the 'shadow banking' liquidity premium has exploded to almost 250 points – by far a record – in the last few days should indicate just how stressed Chinese money markets are.

While interbank borrowing rates have climbed across the board, the surge has been unusually steep for non-bank institutions, including securities companies and investment firms. They’re now paying what amounts to a record premium for short-term funds relative to large Chinese banks, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The premium is reflected in the gap between China’s seven-day repurchase rate fixing and the weighted average rate, which, by Bloomberg notes, widened to as much as 2.47 percentage points on Wednesday after some small lenders were said to miss payments in the interbank market. Non-bank borrowers tend to have a greater influence on the fixing, while large banks have more sway over the weighted average.

"It’s more expensive and difficult for non-bank financial institutions to get funding in the market," said Becky Liu, Hong Kong-based head of China macro strategy at Standard Chartered Plc. “Bigger lenders who have access to regulatory funding are not lending much of the money out.”

Without access to deposits or central bank liquidity facilities, many of China’s non-bank institutions must rely on volatile money markets. As Bloomberg points out, The People’s Bank of China has been guiding those rates higher in recent months to encourage a reduction of leverage, while also stepping in at times to prevent a liquidity crunch.

The PBOC responded to this week’s jump in borrowing costs by making an unscheduled injection of hundreds of billions of yuan on Tuesday, and it followed that with another addition of cash through daily open-market operations on Wednesday.

"The PBOC is allowing smaller lenders to miss payments in order to force financial institutions to de-leverage," said Harrison Hu, chief greater China economist at Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc in Singapore.

 

"But it will keep a fine balance. It doesn’t want the pressures to become out of control. There’s a possibility that the PBOC will directly inject funds in smaller banks, if the cash shortage continues.”

As Goldman noted, the rate surge reflects a combination of:

• A tightening bias by the PBOC. The central bank has shifted policy stance since autumn last year, but the clearer interbank rate rise in recent days suggests that the hawkish bias has stepped up further.
• Diminished clarity of the role of interbank rates in the PBOC’s policy framework. Since mid-2015, interbank rates had been kept largely steady, partly reflecting the PBOC’s efforts to build up a policy rate framework centering on interbank rates. The PBOC has also introduced SLF (standing lending facility), which is understood as a tool to keep volatility in interbank funding conditions low. However, in a signal that deviates from these previous efforts, the PBOC last Thursday tried to dissociate interbank rates from “policy rates”, which the PBOC said should mean benchmark bank lending and deposits rates. The comment appeared to open up a bigger scope for the PBOC to allow interbank rates to move higher (with the possible intention to avoid conflict with its official “stable and neutral” policy stance or potential pushback from other policy authorities).
• The SLF mechanism appears to have not functioned effectively in recent days. There have been occasional breaches of the general 7-day repo rate above the SLF rate (3.35% per PBOC’s official communication, although it was reportedly raised to 3.45% last week). This suggests that SLF has not effectively fulfilled its supposed function of imposing a ceiling to interbank rates. One possible reason is that SLF is accessible only by banks, and much of the spikes of the general 7-day repo rate have been a result of liquidity scramble by NBFIs (which have no SLF access), while banks' interbank funding cost (as measured by DR007; Exhibit 1) has remained more moderate and still below the SLF rate (note that the 7-day repo fixing rate is partly based on funding cost of NBFIs as well). Nevertheless, the apparent lack of effectiveness of SLF in suppressing interbank rate volatility might have weakened the anchoring of the market’s rate expectations in the near term, and such uncertainty could have compounded the liquidity squeeze.
• Continued high interbank repo borrowing by funds. The wide gap of R007-DR007 reflects continued stress imposed by NBFIs, likely particularly funds, on the funding market. Indeed, as of end-Feb, interbank repo borrowing by funds remained high at over 30% of the interbank repo borrowing (Exhibit 2) despite the increased pressure on the commercial viability of repo trades (borrowing via interbank repo to finance long-dated bond holdings).
• Regulatory impact. The PBOC has tightened the prudential requirements (particularly on the growth of banks' balance sheet) under its MPA examination, which is to be conducted at quarter-end. This has likely further contributed to, and amplified the impact of, a tightening in the interbank market.

In total, the interbank rate volatility may remain quite high in the coming days, especially in light of the near-term consideration of MPA examination at quarter-end and the PBOC's apparent deviation from the previous monetary policy framework. Alternatively, today's plunge in the dollar may have had a secondary purpose of easing Chinese financial conditions, where the ongoing dollar rally has pushed the local financial sector to the brink of illiquid collapse.

via http://ift.tt/2nfc975 Tyler Durden

Authored by Wolf Richter via WolfStreet.com,

Not quite, not yet, but it’s not good either.

Let’s hope that the problems piling up in the used vehicle market – and their impact on new vehicle sales, automakers, $1.1 trillion in auto loans, and auto lenders – is just a blip, something caused by what has been getting blamed by just about everyone now: the delayed tax refunds.

In its March report, the National Association of Auto Dealers (NADA) reported an anomaly: dropping used vehicle prices in February, which occurred only for the second time in the past 20 years. It was a big one: Its Used Car Guide’s seasonally adjusted used vehicle price index plunged 3.8% from January, “by far the worst recorded for any month since November 2008 as the result of a recession-related 5.6% tumble.”

The index has now dropped eight months in a row and hit the lowest level since September 2010. The index is down 8% year over year, and down 13% from its peak in 2014.

The price decline spanned all segments, but it hit the two ends of the spectrum — subcompact cars and the luxury end — particularly hard. The list shows the change in wholesale prices from January to February in vehicles up to eight years old:

NADA blamed three factors:

1. The surge in new vehicle incentive spending. Automakers, drowning in unsold inventories on dealer lots and desperate to move the iron and keep their plants running, increased incentive spending by 18% to the highest level in over a decade. This made new vehicle more competitive with late-model used vehicles. So this would be on the demand side.
2. The growing flood of used vehicles going through auction. Over the first two months this year, volume of vehicles up to eight years old rose by about 5% year-over-year. Volume of late-model vehicles – the supply from rental car companies and lease turn-ins – jumped 10%. So that’s on the supply side.
3. The IRS tax refund fiasco. Restaurants, retailers, and others are already blaming various February debacles on these delayed tax refunds. After the IRS was hit with millions of fake e-filed tax returns last year that claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Additional Child Tax Credit, Congress required the agency to delay sending out refunds this year.

It’s big money. According to the IRS, refunds issued through February 10 plunged 69% from the same period a year ago. That’s $65 billion that didn’t make it into consumers’ bank accounts. But then the money was unleashed. In the week ending February 17, the IRS sent out a record $74 billion in refunds. By the week ending February 24, refunds were down only 10%, or $15 billion, year-over-year. So most of the problem was resolved by the end of February.

That might explain part of the problem on the demand side, at least at the lower end of the scale. But it’s hard to explain the plunge in prices at the luxury end. Also, these are wholesale prices. They don’t react instantly to a brief consumer cash crunch caused by tax-refund delays, now resolved. Something else appears to be going on.

The report, in attempting a forecast, cautioned:

February’s unusually soft showing makes pinpointing where used prices will go over the next few months a bit more challenging. However, given the slower than usual rollout of federal tax refunds, it’s assumed prices will be somewhat stronger in March and April than originally anticipated.

The Used Vehicle Index by Manheim, the world’s largest wholesale auto auction, didn’t pick up a massive drop in used vehicle prices over the past few months, though it too is showing some weakness. The index edged down 0.2% in February. The report pointed out that, “given a sharp decline in pricing in February of last year, the Manheim Index now shows a year-over-year gain of 1.1%.”

The index has dropped in six of the past seven months (chart), but in small increments, and as it says, “stability remains the watchword.” It too acknowledge headwinds for the market, including the “heavy new vehicle inventory and incentives,” and “a crazy tax refund season.”

Why are used vehicle wholesale prices important?

For one, they matter to lenders. Used vehicle wholesale prices determine the value of the collateral for $1.11 trillion in auto loans that have boomed on higher prices, higher unit sales, longer maturities (the average hit a new record of 66.5 months in Q4), and higher loan-to-value ratios (negative equity):

Dropping wholesale prices increase loan losses for lenders as recovery is lower. Declining wholesale values of lease turn-ins, if the trend persists, impacts how finance companies structure the lease terms, thus raising the costs for the customers and putting a damper on leasing activity.

All this puts pressure on new vehicle sales, further pushing automakers to pile on even larger incentives in order to move the units, grapple with inventories, and keep plants open. This works for a while – there’s nothing like big-fat incentives to bring out reluctant buyers. But incentives, when everyone is doing them, are front-loading sales. This is ultimately self-defeating and gets very costly even as sales begin to decline. It was a contributor in the collapse of the industry during the Financial Crisis.

And there are well-established patterns of customers switching between new vehicles and late-model used vehicles. Large incentives by automakers put pressure on late-model used vehicles. In turn, falling prices on the used vehicle side cannibalize sales from the new vehicle side. In other words, they compete with each other, often on the same dealer lot. Especially if demand is lackluster despite the incentives, these patterns can trigger a downward spiral that is difficult to get out of.

First oil & gas, then construction, then new vehicle sales. Read…  How Auto Sales Are Getting Crushed in Houston

via http://ift.tt/2mWw1sV Tyler Durden