Tag: news

Today’s AM fix was USD 1,229.50, EUR 892.62 and GBP 754.57 per ounce.
Friday’s AM fix was USD 1,222.75, EUR 891.22 and GBP 750.89 per ounce.

Gold rose $11.10 or 0.91% Friday, closing at $1,237.60/oz. Silver climbed $0.18 or 0.92% closing at $19.70/oz. Platinum fell $1.05, or 0.1%, to $1,357.70/oz and palladium fell $0.72 or 0.1%, to $714/oz. Gold and silver were both up for the week at 0.72% and 1.13%.

 

All eyes are on the FOMC this week and speculation is high that the Federal Reserve may taper. Fed policymakers gather for the last time in 2013 for a two day policy meeting that concludes this Wednesday.

The dreaded ‘taper’ is becoming a bit of a caper as the death of QE is greatly exaggerated. While a taper is indeed possible, any reduction in bond buying is likely to be small and of the order of less than $15 billion. This means that the Fed is likely to keep its bond buying program at close to $70 billion per month which is still very high and unprecedented for any industrial nation in modern history.

This still high level of debt monetisation, in conjunction with continuing zero percent interest rate policies is bullish for gold.

Gold in U.S. Dollars, 10 Day – (Bloomberg)

Gold was higher last week which was positive from a technical perspective but as of late morning trading in London, there has been, as of yet, little follow through.

The dollar looks overvalued, considering the overly indebted U.S. consumer and government, and is likely to come under pressure again in 2014 which will support gold and could lead to a resumption of gold’s bull market.

2013 has been a torrid year for gold and it is down 26%. Given the still strong fundamentals, we are confident that in a few years, 2013 will be seen as a mere blip in the context of a long term, secular bull market which will likely see gold prices have a parabolic peak between 2016 and 2020.

ETP liquidations have been one of the primary reasons for gold’s weakness in 2013. ETP holdings may continue to fall as more speculative investors reduce allocations to gold and some ETP buyers sold in order to move to the safety of allocated gold.

However, the supply demand data clearly shows that ETP liquidations are being matched by robust global demand, especially in China. Even if ETP holdings dropped by another 300 plus tonnes in 2014, average Chinese imports through Hong Kong alone are running at well over 100 tonnes per month.

Outflows of gold from ETFs amounted to 24.3 million ounces, nearly 700 metric tonnes, in 2013 from their peak at the end of 2012. Much of this gold was taken out of ETF holdings in London and shipped to refineries in Switzerland, where it was melted down and made into kilogramme bars, then sent to Hong Kong and ultimately to China.

Imports from Hong Kong to China totaled 26.6 million ounces or 754 metric tonnes through September alone. It is unknown where the gold would come from to replenish these ETF holdings were there a sudden surge in demand in the West in the event of a new sovereign debt crisis or a Lehman Brothers style contagion event.

Global Asset Performance Since ZIRP Began 5 Years Ago

Despite the 26% fall in 2013, gold is 44% higher in the last five years and has protected those who have bought it as a long term hedge and financial insurance against macroeconomic, systemic and monetary risks.

There is much negative noise and sentiment towards gold due to the recent price falls. The smart money ignores this noise and continues to focus on the long term. We are confident that gold will again perform well in the coming five years and protect investors from the considerable risks lurking out there today.

It is worth noting that gold fell 25.2% in 1975 (from $187.50/oz to $140.25/oz) and many experts pronounced the death of the gold bull market. Experts such as economist Milton Friedman warned that gold prices could fall further.

Gold in U.S. Dollars in 1975 – (Bloomberg)

Gold subsequently rose 6 times in the next 4 years – from January 1976 to January 1980 –  proving many extremely wrong.

A historical perspective is valuable today and history does not always repeat but often rhymes.

The death of the gold bull market is greatly exaggerated.
 
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Five months ago, we highlighted yet another in the inglorious roll of momentum-ignited stop-blasting manipulations of the US "stock market". In most cases, the furore dies down after a day or two as the algos find fresh meat… but in the case of USEC, it would appear the "berserker" algo we highlighted merely removed every willing buyer (i.e. forced short-cover-er) and was exhibiting the death throes of yet another micro-cap as the company has announced it is entering a pre-pack Chapter 11 bankruptcy – with existing stockholders receiving 5% of the new common stock.

 

USEC Statement

…"We are pleased to reach agreement with a significant number of our noteholders on a plan to improve our capital structure…"

 

Discussions continue with the Babcock & Wilcox Investment Company (B&W) and Toshiba Corporation regarding agreement to restructure their preferred convertible equity investment. The noteholders and USEC have made a proposal regarding restructuring the Toshiba and B&W investment and the parties are in discussions on those terms and documentation which must be completed prior to implementing the financial restructuring plan. As strategic investors, Toshiba and B&W remain supportive on deployment of the American Centrifuge Plant.

 

The agreement with the noteholders, which includes the participation of financial institutions representing approximately 60 percent of the company’s debt, calls for the company’s $530 million debt to be replaced with a new debt issue totaling $200 million. The new debt issue would mature in five years and automatically extend an additional five years upon the occurrence of certain events. In addition, the restructuring plan contemplates that the existing equity will be replaced with new equity. The noteholders would receive 79 percent of the new equity as common stock. The plan calls for Toshiba and B&W to jointly obtain 16 percent of the new common stock, as well as $40 million in debt on the same terms as the noteholders, in exchange for their existing preferred equity investment. Existing stockholders would receive 5 percent of the new common stock. As noted above, the detailed terms for restructuring Toshiba and B&W’s preferred equity investment are being negotiated. Once implemented, the new capital structure will increase USEC’s financial flexibility and support the company’s continuing sponsorship of the American Centrifuge project.

 

In order to implement the terms of the agreement, USEC Inc. expects to file a prearranged and voluntary Chapter 11 petition for relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in the first quarter of 2014. It is anticipated that none of the company’s subsidiaries will be filing for relief. United States Enrichment Corporation is anticipated to be a plan proponent for a limited purpose, but will not be included in the Chapter 11 filing. Such a filing is not expected to have any effect on on-going operations, suppliers, deliveries to customers or the American Centrifuge research, development and demonstration program.

 

…

 

The restructuring plan support agreement and related materials can be found in an 8-K publicly filed today with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and is available in the Investors section of the company website, www.usec.com.

On the bright side, this is how the world is supposed to work… failing companies "fail", are restructured, and enabled to re-grow… but zombified by ever-rolling debts, subsidies, and tax dodges… The stock is down 60% in the pre-open (back at "berserker" low levels)

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/YxVY8e-4nvs/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Five months ago, we highlighted yet another in the inglorious roll of momentum-ignited stop-blasting manipulations of the US "stock market". In most cases, the furore dies down after a day or two as the algos find fresh meat… but in the case of USEC, it would appear the "berserker" algo we highlighted merely removed every willing buyer (i.e. forced short-cover-er) and was exhibiting the death throes of yet another micro-cap as the company has announced it is entering a pre-pack Chapter 11 bankruptcy – with existing stockholders receiving 5% of the new common stock.

 

USEC Statement

…"We are pleased to reach agreement with a significant number of our noteholders on a plan to improve our capital structure…"

 

Discussions continue with the Babcock & Wilcox Investment Company (B&W) and Toshiba Corporation regarding agreement to restructure their preferred convertible equity investment. The noteholders and USEC have made a proposal regarding restructuring the Toshiba and B&W investment and the parties are in discussions on those terms and documentation which must be completed prior to implementing the financial restructuring plan. As strategic investors, Toshiba and B&W remain supportive on deployment of the American Centrifuge Plant.

 

The agreement with the noteholders, which includes the participation of financial institutions representing approximately 60 percent of the company’s debt, calls for the company’s $530 million debt to be replaced with a new debt issue totaling $200 million. The new debt issue would mature in five years and automatically extend an additional five years upon the occurrence of certain events. In addition, the restructuring plan contemplates that the existing equity will be replaced with new equity. The noteholders would receive 79 percent of the new equity as common stock. The plan calls for Toshiba and B&W to jointly obtain 16 percent of the new common stock, as well as $40 million in debt on the same terms as the noteholders, in exchange for their existing preferred equity investment. Existing stockholders would receive 5 percent of the new common stock. As noted above, the detailed terms for restructuring Toshiba and B&W’s preferred equity investment are being negotiated. Once implemented, the new capital structure will increase USEC’s financial flexibility and support the company’s continuing sponsorship of the American Centrifuge project.

 

In order to implement the terms of the agreement, USEC Inc. expects to file a prearranged and voluntary Chapter 11 petition for relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in the first quarter of 2014. It is anticipated that none of the company’s subsidiaries will be filing for relief. United States Enrichment Corporation is anticipated to be a plan proponent for a limited purpose, but will not be included in the Chapter 11 filing. Such a filing is not expected to have any effect on on-going operations, suppliers, deliveries to customers or the American Centrifuge research, development and demonstration program.

 

…

 

The restructuring plan support agreement and related materials can be found in an 8-K publicly filed today with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and is available in the Investors section of the company website, www.usec.com.

On the bright side, this is how the world is supposed to work… failing companies "fail", are restructured, and enabled to re-grow… but zombified by ever-rolling debts, subsidies, and tax dodges… The stock is down 60% in the pre-open (back at "berserker" low levels)

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/YxVY8e-4nvs/story01.htm Tyler Durden

After posting a surprising drop in November to -2.21, or only its first negative print since a freak first half of 2013 aberration, the spin was quick to explain away the drop with the government shutdown, which surprisingly affected precisely nothing else in the economy but just a few diffusion indices (and led to epic surges in various PMI prints). Moments ago, the December Empire Fed PMI print came out, and it was once again a dud, printing at 0.98 on expectations of a rise to 5.00 which also was the fifth consecutive miss to expectations in a row. The decline was driven by ongoing weakness in New Orders, which remained negative at -3.54, while Unfilled Orders tumbled deep into the red, from -17.11 to -24.10, while inventories supposedly cratered from -1.32 to -21.69. We say supposedly because other recent surveys have shown that the surge in inventory accumulation from Q3 into Q4 has continued.

The only actual good news was that corporate margins may be finally picking up, as priced Paid declined modestly from 17.11 to 15.66 while prices received rose from -3.95 to 3.61. However, the biggest surprise in the monthly update was not the average employee workweek which declined once again from -5.26 to -10.84, further confirmed by the US Labor Costs data released simultaneously by the BLS which showed a 1.4% decline Q/Q (so much for wage inflation), but the Number of Employees, which as if magically, were 0.00 in November and moved violently to… 0.00 in December. One wonders just whose Non-Random Number Generator the NY Fed is using for this particular time series.

Of course, this blurb may have been just what the market ordered, which rose to fresh pre-market highs on the report, especially since as the Survey announced, “Labor Market Conditions Remain Weak.” It adds:

Price indexes pointed to a continued moderate increase in input prices and a small increase in selling prices. The prices paid index was little changed at 15.7, while the prices received index rose eight points to 3.6. Labor market conditions remained weak. The index for number of employees was 0.0 for a second month in a row, indicating that employment levels remained unchanged. The average workweek index was negative for a second month; with a six-point decline to -10.8, the index signaled that workers were working fewer hours, on average.“

For the algos, this is the buy signal from god, since whatever is bad for the economy, and workers, is great for the markets, and taper delay.

One final point: as part of this month’s survey, the supplementary questions asked manufacturers to assess how much of a problem certain business issues were for their firms and whether the issues were expected to become more or less of a problem in the year ahead. As in earlier surveys, the issue cited most frequently, by far, as a major problem was the cost of employee benefits. Read: Obamacare. Moreover, fully 80 percent of respondents expected that this would become even more of a problem a year from now. Finding qualified workers emerged as the second most widespread problem, eliciting a considerably larger degree of concern than in earlier surveys. This, too, was expected to become more of a problem in the year ahead by a wide margin. In contrast, the availability, cost, and terms of credit were seen as relatively minor problems that would become even less consequential over the next year.

Expect many more laments about Obamacare next year when the full impact on the bottom line is finally felt.

Source: NY Fed

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/QB1ZSSbEYDo/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Larry Summers, who was nearly picked by Obama as the next Fed Chairman before for some inexplicable reason the Economist lobby deemed him “hawkish” and that he would put a halt to the Fed-Treasury cross monetization complex, is no stranger to providing hours of entertainment with his aphoristic quotes. Recall from October 2011, where he said that the solution to record debt is more debt:

“The central irony of financial crisis is that while it is caused by too much confidence, too much borrowing and lending and too much spending, it can only be resolved with more confidence, more borrowing and lending, and more spending.” Larry Summers, source

Or his follow up from June 2012, where he submitted that insolvent governments can “improve their creditworthiness” by becoming more insolvent:

“Rather than focusing on lowering already epically low rates, governments that enjoy such low borrowing costs can improve their creditworthiness by borrowing more not less.”  Larry Summers, source.

This of course led to his pronouncement last month that the US economy needs “bubbles” to “grow“, which promptly won him accolades from none other than his former basher Paul Krugman, best known for this line from 2002: “To fight this recession the Fed needs…soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.” Yes, somehow this person was seen as hawkish.

Either way, it seems Larry was modestly disgruntled with the prevailing assessment of the media world ascribing to him the title of the next Krugs, in proposing a policy of endless bubble booms and busts, and as a result, he decided to take to the pages of that hallowed bastion of “free and efficient markets”, the FT, to explain what he really meant. His full essay is below but the punchline is as follows:

Some have suggested that a belief in secular stagnation implies the desirability of bubbles to support demand. This idea confuses prediction with recommendation. It is, of course, better to support demand by supporting productive investment or highly valued consumption than by artificially inflating bubbles. On the other hand, it is only rational to recognize that low interest rates raise asset values and drive investors to take greater risks, making bubbles more likely. So the risk of financial instability provides yet another reason why preempting structural stagnation is so profoundly important.

Apparently “some” does not include Larry, but what his clarification seems to clarify, is that while proposing bubbles as a policy tool is short-sighted, should they indeed arrive (and many have stated that the current “stock market” on the back of $10 trillion in central bank liquidity and another $25 trillion in Chinese bank asset increases is nothing else), well then – we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it. In the meantime, “stagnation may be the new normal.” Stagnation for the 90% mind you – not the 10% whoe actually benefit day in and day out from the Fed’s ceaseless attempt to get the world to said bridge as fast as possible…

From Larry Summers:

In the past decade, before the crisis, bubbles and loose credit were only sufficient to drive moderate growth

Is it possible that the US and other major global economies might not return to full employment and strong growth without the help of unconventional policy support? I raised that notion – the old idea of “secular stagnation” – recently in a talk hosted by the International Monetary Fund.

My concern rests on a number of considerations. First, even though financial repair had largely taken place four years ago, recovery has only kept up with population growth and normal productivity growth in the US, and has been worse elsewhere in the industrial world.

Second, manifestly unsustainable bubbles and loosening of credit standards during the middle of the past decade, along with very easy money, were sufficient to drive only moderate economic growth.

Third, short-term interest rates are severely constrained by the zero lower bound: real rates may not be able to fall far enough to spur enough investment to lead to full employment.

Fourth, in such situations falling wages and prices or lower-than-expected are likely to worsen performance by encouraging consumers and investors to delay spending, and to redistribute income and wealth from high-spending debtors to low-spending creditors.

The implication of these thoughts is that the presumption that normal economic and policy conditions will return at some point cannot be maintained. Look at Japan, where gross domestic product today is less than two-thirds of what most observers predicted a generation ago, even though interest rates have been at zero for many years. It is worth emphasizing that Japanese GDP was less disappointing in the five years after the bubbles burst at the end of the 1980s than the US GDP has since 2008. In America today, GDP is more than 10 per cent below what was predicted before the financial crisis.

If secular stagnation concerns are relevant to our current economic situation, there are obviously profound policy implications. But before turning to policy, there are two central issues regarding the secular stagnation thesis that have to be addressed.

First, is not a growth acceleration in the works in the US and beyond? There are certainly grounds for optimism: note recent statistics, the strong stock markets and the end at last of sharp fiscal contraction. One should also recall that fears of secular stagnation were common at the end of the second world war and were proved wrong. Today, secular stagnation should be viewed as a contingency to be insured against – not a fate to which we ought to be resigned. Yet, it should be recalled that the achievement of escape velocity has been around the corner in consensus forecasts for several years and we have seen several false dawns – just as Japan did in the 1990s. More fundamentally, even if the economy accelerates next year, this provides no assurance that it is capable of sustained growth at normal real interest rates. Europe and Japan are forecast to have grown at levels well below the US. Across the industrial world, inflation is below target levels and shows no signs of picking up – suggesting a chronic demand shortfall.

Second, why should the economy not return to normal after the effects of the financial crisis are worked off? Is there a basis for believing that equilibrium real interest rates have declined? There are many a prior reasons why the level of spending at any given set of interest rates is likely to have declined. Investment demand may have been reduced due to slower growth of the labor force and perhaps slower productivity growth. Consumption may be lower due to a sharp increase in the share of income held by the very wealthy and the rising share of income accruing to capital. Risk aversion has risen as a consequence of the crisis and as saving – by both states and consumers – has risen. The crisis increased the costs of financial intermediation and left major debt overhangs. Declines in the cost of durable goods, especially those associated with information technology, mean that the same level of saving purchases more capital every year. Lower inflation means any interest rate translates into a higher after-tax rate than it did when inflation rates were higher; logic is supported by evidence. For many years now indexed bond yields have been on a downward trend. Indeed, US real rates are substantially negative at a five year horizon.

Some have suggested that a belief in secular stagnation implies the desirability of bubbles to support demand. This idea confuses prediction with recommendation. It is, of course, better to support demand by supporting productive investment or highly valued consumption than by artificially inflating bubbles. On the other hand, it is only rational to recognize that low interest rates raise asset values and drive investors to take greater risks, making bubbles more likely. So the risk of financial instability provides yet another reason why preempting structural stagnation is so profoundly important.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/sv-XRJr4_mw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Larry Summers, who was nearly picked by Obama as the next Fed Chairman before for some inexplicable reason the Economist lobby deemed him “hawkish” and that he would put a halt to the Fed-Treasury cross monetization complex, is no stranger to providing hours of entertainment with his aphoristic quotes. Recall from October 2011, where he said that the solution to record debt is more debt:

“The central irony of financial crisis is that while it is caused by too much confidence, too much borrowing and lending and too much spending, it can only be resolved with more confidence, more borrowing and lending, and more spending.” Larry Summers, source

Or his follow up from June 2012, where he submitted that insolvent governments can “improve their creditworthiness” by becoming more insolvent:

“Rather than focusing on lowering already epically low rates, governments that enjoy such low borrowing costs can improve their creditworthiness by borrowing more not less.”  Larry Summers, source.

This of course led to his pronouncement last month that the US economy needs “bubbles” to “grow“, which promptly won him accolades from none other than his former basher Paul Krugman, best known for this line from 2002: “To fight this recession the Fed needs…soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.” Yes, somehow this person was seen as hawkish.

Either way, it seems Larry was modestly disgruntled with the prevailing assessment of the media world ascribing to him the title of the next Krugs, in proposing a policy of endless bubble booms and busts, and as a result, he decided to take to the pages of that hallowed bastion of “free and efficient markets”, the FT, to explain what he really meant. His full essay is below but the punchline is as follows:

Some have suggested that a belief in secular stagnation implies the desirability of bubbles to support demand. This idea confuses prediction with recommendation. It is, of course, better to support demand by supporting productive investment or highly valued consumption than by artificially inflating bubbles. On the other hand, it is only rational to recognize that low interest rates raise asset values and drive investors to take greater risks, making bubbles more likely. So the risk of financial instability provides yet another reason why preempting structural stagnation is so profoundly important.

Apparently “some” does not include Larry, but what his clarification seems to clarify, is that while proposing bubbles as a policy tool is short-sighted, should they indeed arrive (and many have stated that the current “stock market” on the back of $10 trillion in central bank liquidity and another $25 trillion in Chinese bank asset increases is nothing else), well then – we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it. In the meantime, “stagnation may be the new normal.” Stagnation for the 90% mind you – not the 10% whoe actually benefit day in and day out from the Fed’s ceaseless attempt to get the world to said bridge as fast as possible…

From Larry Summers:

In the past decade, before the crisis, bubbles and loose credit were only sufficient to drive moderate growth

Is it possible that the US and other major global economies might not return to full employment and strong growth without the help of unconventional policy support? I raised that notion – the old idea of “secular stagnation” – recently in a talk hosted by the International Monetary Fund.

My concern rests on a number of considerations. First, even though financial repair had largely taken place four years ago, recovery has only kept up with population growth and normal productivity growth in the US, and has been worse elsewhere in the industrial world.

Second, manifestly unsustainable bubbles and loosening of credit standards during the middle of the past decade, along with very easy money, were sufficient to drive only moderate economic growth.

Third, short-term interest rates are severely constrained by the zero lower bound: real rates may not be able to fall far enough to spur enough investment to lead to full employment.

Fourth, in such situations falling wages and prices or lower-than-expected are likely to worsen performance by encouraging consumers and investors to delay spending, and to redistribute income and wealth from high-spending debtors to low-spending creditors.

The implication of these thoughts is that the presumption that normal economic and policy conditions will return at some point cannot be maintained. Look at Japan, where gross domestic product today is less than two-thirds of what most observers predicted a generation ago, even though interest rates have been at zero for many years. It is worth emphasizing that Japanese GDP was less disappointing in the five years after the bubbles burst at the end of the 1980s than the US GDP has since 2008. In America today, GDP is more than 10 per cent below what was predicted before the financial crisis.

If secular stagnation concerns are relevant to our current economic situation, there are obviously profound policy implications. But before turning to policy, there are two central issues regarding the secular stagnation thesis that have to be addressed.

First, is not a growth acceleration in the works in the US and beyond? There are certainly grounds for optimism: note recent statistics, the strong stock markets and the end at last of sharp fiscal contraction. One should also recall that fears of secular stagnation were common at the end of the second world war and were proved wrong. Today, secular stagnation should be viewed as a contingency to be insured against – not a fate to which we ought to be resigned. Yet, it should be recalled that the achievement of escape velocity has been around the corner in consensus forecasts for several years and we have seen several false dawns – just as Japan did in the 1990s. More fundamentally, even if the economy accelerates next year, this provides no assurance that it is capable of sustained growth at normal real interest rates. Europe and Japan are forecast to have grown at levels well below the US. Across the industrial world, inflation is below target levels and shows no signs of picking up – suggesting a chronic demand shortfall.

Second, why should the economy not return to normal after the effects of the financial crisis are worked off? Is there a basis for believing that equilibrium real interest rates have declined? There are many a prior reasons why the level of spending at any given set of interest rates is likely to have declined. Investment demand may have been reduced due to slower growth of the labor force and perhaps slower productivity growth. Consumption may be lower due to a sharp increase in the share of income hel
d by the very wealthy and the rising share of income accruing to capital. Risk aversion has risen as a consequence of the crisis and as saving – by both states and consumers – has risen. The crisis increased the costs of financial intermediation and left major debt overhangs. Declines in the cost of durable goods, especially those associated with information technology, mean that the same level of saving purchases more capital every year. Lower inflation means any interest rate translates into a higher after-tax rate than it did when inflation rates were higher; logic is supported by evidence. For many years now indexed bond yields have been on a downward trend. Indeed, US real rates are substantially negative at a five year horizon.

Some have suggested that a belief in secular stagnation implies the desirability of bubbles to support demand. This idea confuses prediction with recommendation. It is, of course, better to support demand by supporting productive investment or highly valued consumption than by artificially inflating bubbles. On the other hand, it is only rational to recognize that low interest rates raise asset values and drive investors to take greater risks, making bubbles more likely. So the risk of financial instability provides yet another reason why preempting structural stagnation is so profoundly important.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/sv-XRJr4_mw/story01.htm Tyler Durden