How Obamacare Made Health Insurance Industry ‘Villains’ Into White House Partners

Recall, for a moment, how health insurers were
treated by Democrats in the Obamacare debate. They were the bad
guys, in no uncertain terms. 
They’ve been
immoral all along,
” Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA),
then the House Majority Leader
said
in July 2009, as the debate over the government-run public
option raged. 
They [insurers] are
the villains in this. They have been part of the problem in a major
way.
 

Democrats found some success in casting insurers as the
antagonists, and made a show of targeting health
insurers. 
It is well known to the
public that the health insurance companies are the
problem,
 as
she 
warned
insurers how much the health law would cost them.

So, how did Obamacare end up punishing the big, bad insurance
company villains? By creating a federal program to help cover their
costs in the event of higher than anticipated spending—and then
expanding that program at the request of the insurers following the
launch of the health law’s exchanges last year.

A
report
released this week by the House Oversight Committee
highlights how, in the months since the exchanges went online, the
Obama administration has worked closely with the insurance
industry, looking for policy options to assuage insurers’ financial
woes and feeding talking points to insurance industry officials
prior to major media appearances. And even though the
administration has stated an intention to run the program in a
revenue-neutral manner, the report finds it’s likely to cost
taxpayers around $1 billion this year. 

The focus of the White House/ health insurer
relationship is Obamacare’s “risk corridor” program. Frequently
described as a bailout of insurers, it is a
symmetrical risk sharing program
set to run through 2016:
Participating insurance carriers set a target for health spending
each year, and if the total amount comes in at 103 percent of the
target or more, the federal government kicks in a share of the
overage; between 103 and 108 percent, the federal government pays
half. Above 108 percent, the federal government pays 80 percent. If
spending comes in lower, insurers pay the government.

The thinking when the law was passed was that the program would
be revenue neutral; some insurers would pay in, and others would be
paid. The payments would even out. But there’s no requirement in
the law that it be revenue neutral, which means that it’s possible
for the federal government to pay out a lot more than it takes
in.

Earlier this year, the Obama administration indicated that it
expected the program to be revenue neutral. But the Oversight
Committee report surveyed 80 percent of participating insurers and
found that, on net, insurers expect payouts of about $725 million
this year. Add in the other insurers who weren’t surveyed, and it’s
possible that risk corridor payouts will end up totaling $1
billion.

Now, it’s of course possible the balance could always shift over
time, leaving a program that is revenue neutral for its entire
three year run. But the early signs aren’t promising.

And insurers sure aren’t excited about the possibility
that the administration might actually decide to operate the
program in a revenue-neutral manner. Insurers, who had already
expressed 
concern
about Republican opposition to the risk corridors,
lobbied

against
the possibility. At least one even contacted the
White House directly.
 

In early April of this year, the Committee report says, Care
First Blue Cross Blue Shield CEO Chet Burrell wrote to Senior
Adviser Valerie Jarrett warning that “a brewing issue” could
“negatively impact upcoming ACA premium rates” and requesting a
conversation. The two spoke on the phone that day, and Burrell
followed up with an email warning that a revenue-neutral
implementation of the risk corridor rule could push insurers “to
increase rates substantially (i.e., as much as 20% or more…).” The
letter described Burrell’s worries as urgent, and thanked her for
understanding. “I am only trying to give a ‘heads-up’ notice on an
issue that could produce an unwelcome surprise.”

Jarrett was eager to assuage his concerns. According to the
report, Jarrett wrote back saying that the White House “policy team
is aggressively pursuing options.” Later that month the
administration published a memo, titled Risk Corridors and Budget
Neutrality, which said that if the program does not take in enough
funds to match the required payouts, payments would be reduced
accordingly the following year.

Burrell wrote back, still concerned about the policy and
warning, again, premium increases would likely appear because the
risk corridors program was no longer
reliable. 

Jarrett’s response: “After speaking at length today with Jeanne
[Lambrew, Deputy Director of the White House Office of Health
Reform] and our other policy folks, I do not think I have any more
to add. They seem to have given you 80 percent of what you
requested and I am not in a position to second guess there [sic]
analysis.”

Eventually, though, the administration did second guess the
analysis. Insurers pressed on, with increasingly adamant lobbying
that the risk corridors program not be operated with “the
constraint of budget neutrality,” as America’s Health Insurance
Plans (AHIP), the top insurance lobby group, put it.

When the final rule came out in May, the administration had made
a number of changes. Even in the event of a shortfall, it said, the
administration would make “full payments” to insurance carriers. If
necessary, “HHS will use other sources of funding for the risk
corridors payments, subject to the availability of appropriations.”
The May rule also made additional changes to the payment formula
making the risk corridor more generous and increasing the
likelihood that insurers would receive payments through the
program.

In short, insurers warned that premium hikes were likely under
Obamacare, and begged the administration for money. The
administration was eager to respond, eventually gave in to the
insurance industry’s demands, and decided to expand and existing
program to minimize insurer losses under the law. The Obama
administration isn’t treating health insurers like villains. It’s
treating them like partners.

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John Stossel on Corporate Money in Science

Lately, activists have become obsessed with
“conflict of interest” in science—any trace of corporate money must
poison honest medical research. Obamacare includes a rule called
the Physician Payment Sunshine Act, which orders companies that
make medical products to disclose even bagels they serve doctors
and anything valued above $10.

But rules like these only make life more difficult for doctors,
and for patients who want cures, argues John Stossel. Markets do
not automatically taint science. As with every other service the
market provides, it is the anti-capitalist attitude that does more
harm.

View this article.

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Another Study Finds No Evidence That Medical Marijuana Increases Cannabis Consumption by Teenagers

A
few weeks ago, in a column about the impact of marijuana
legalization, I
noted
that there is not much evidence to support the frequently
voiced
fear
that allowing medical use encourages teenagers to smoke
pot. A new study by three economists reinforces that
point, finding that the adoption of medical marijuana laws is not
associated with increases in cannabis consumption by high school
students. “Our results are not consistent with the hypothesis
that legalization leads to increased use of marijuana by
teenagers,” write D. Mark Anderson of Montana State University,
Benjamin Hansen of the University of Oregon, and Daniel Rees of the
University Colorado in a working paper
published by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Anderson et al. used data from three sources:
the National Youth Risk Behavior Survey, the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and the Treatment Episode Data Set.
These analyses provide further evidence that
youth marijuana consumption does not increase with
the legalization of medical marijuana,” they write.
Our results are not consistent with the hypothesis
that the legalization of medical marijuana caused an increase
in the use of marijuana among high school students. In
fact, estimates from our preferred specification are small,
consistently negative, and are never statistically
distinguishable from zero.”

The impact of general legalization, of course, might be
different. Assuming that legal marijuana businesses in places such
as Colorado and Washington eventually displace the black market,
teenagers will find it harder to buy pot directly, since licensed
sellers, unlike your average street dealer,
check IDs
to make sure buyers are at least 21. But it may
become easier for teenagers to obtain pot indirectly, via legal
buyers. Still, Anderson et al.’s findings are significant, because
in some states (including Colorado, Washington, and California) the
rules for obtaining medical marijuana are loose enough that it’s
easy for recreational consumers to pose as patients. In fact,
critics commonly complain that medical marijuana in those states is
legalization by another name. Rees nevertheless
told
 The Washington Post that the overall
results of this study hold true for individual states as
well. 
“No single state stood out,” he said. “The
effect of passing a medical marijuana law on youth consumption
appears to be zero across the board.”

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Six Current Economic Myths And Realities

Submitted by Patrick Barron via Mises Canada,

The following are six of the most prevalent economic myths that appear time and again in the mainstream media.  I will give a brief description of each and a brief description of the economic reality, as seen from an Austrian perspective.

Myth #1: Increased money leads to economic prosperity.

This Keynesian myth postulates that increasing aggregate demand through increasing the money supply will lead to more spending, higher employment, increased production, and a higher overall standard of living.

The reality is that an increase in money leads to malinvestment. The time structure of production is thrown into disequilibrium by encouraging investment in projects more remotely removed in time from final consumption.  There are insufficient resources in the economy for the profitable completion of all projects, since individual time preference is unchanged, meaning that there is no increase in savings.  When prices rise, due to this unchanged time preference, these projects will be liquidated, revealing the loss of capital.  Production will be lower than otherwise.  Unemployment will increase while workers adapt to economic reality.

Myth #2: Manipulating interest rates leads to economic prosperity.

This is a corollary of Myth #1 but deserves its own discussion.  In the Keynesian view lower interest rates always are beneficial; therefore, it is the proper role of the monetary authorities to drive down the interest rate via open market operations.

The reality is that interest rates are a product of the market, reflecting the interplay of the demand for loanable funds and the availability of loanable funds.  Historically high or low interest rates can have multiple causes, none of which are prima facie good or bad.  For example, rates can be high because entrepreneurs have highly profitable opportunities due to reduced regulation or a breakthrough in technology.  If time preference is unchanged and, therefore, savings is unchanged, the interest rate rises and allocates the scarce savings to the most highly desired ends.  Or, interest rates can be low due to a change in time preference that leads to increased savings.  If entrepreneurial opportunities are unchanged, interest rates will fall.  Likewise, demand for loans can be high while savings is high or vice versa.  Manipulating the interest rate truly is an act of fantasy by the monetary authorities, who believe that they can know the impact of billions of ever changing decisions affecting the supply of money and demand for money.

Myth #3: Lowering the foreign exchange rate of the currency, to give more local currency in exchange for foreign currency, will lead to an export driven economic recovery.

The reality is that no country can force another to subsidize its economy by manipulating its exchange rate.  Giving more local currency subsidizes foreign buyers in the near term, but it creates higher prices in the domestic economy later.  Early receivers of the new money–exporters, their employees, their suppliers, etc.–benefit by a transfer of wealth from later receivers of the new money.  But as the price level rises from the increase in the domestic money supply, the benefit to foreign buyers evaporates.  Then the exporters demand that the monetary authorities conduct another round of exchange rate interventions.  The big winners are foreign buyers.  Intermediate winners are exporters, but their advantage ends eventually.  The losers are non-exporters, especially retired people.

Myth #4: Money expansion will not cause higher prices.

Currently the U.S. government is engaged in a propaganda campaign to convince us that it can both monetize the government’s debt and engage in quantitative easing without causing a rising price level.

The reality is that there is no escaping the fundamentals of economic law in the monetary sphere.  Ludwig von Mises and many excellent Austrian economists since, such as Murray N. Rothbard, have explained that the relationship between an increase in money and an increase in the price level is not a mechanical one.  Nevertheless, even Mises explained that the basis of all monetary theory is the “Quantity Theory of Money”, that states that there is a positive relationship between the money supply and the price level.  In other words, more money eventually leads to higher prices and vice versa.  What causes all the confusion is that the price level actually can fall even when the money supply expands, if all of the new money plus some of the existing money stock are hoarded.  Mises call this the first stage of the three stages of inflation.  The public expects prices to remain the same or even fall, so they do not increase their spending even when the money supply expands. Eventually, though, the public comes to understand that the money supply will keep increasing and that prices will not return to some previous golden age.  At this point the public will begin to increase spending to buy at lower prices today rather than higher prices tomorrow.  The price level will rise even if the money supply shrinks, because the public spends previously hoarded money faster.  This is Mises’ phase two of inflation.  In the final stage money loses its value, as the public spends it as fast as possible.  This is Mises’ stage three, the “crackup boom”.

Myth #5: More, better, and more vigorously enforced regulations can prevent loan and investment losses.

The politicians and their regulatory agencies believe that prior monetary crises were caused by a combination of stupidity, greed, and criminality by bankers and sellers of investments.

The reality is that no army of regulators armed with the most modern analytical tools and the most powerful means of regulatory enforcement can prevent malinvestment from money supply expansion.  The monetary expansion encourages longer term projects for which the cost of money is a major factor in forecasting success.  But without an increase in real savings, insufficient resources will ensure that many of these projects will never earn a profit and must be liquidated.  Bank and investor losses are inescapable.

Myth #6: Government can prevent hyperinflation.

This is a corollary of Myth #4.  If our monetary masters believe that money expansion will not cause higher prices, then they believe that they can prevent hyperinflation; i.e., the total destruction of the monetary unit as a universal medium of exchange.

The reality is that hyperinflation is cause by a loss of confidence in the money unit, which the monetary authorities may be incapable of preventing.  Once the panic starts, the demand by the public to hold money falls to zero.  Prices skyrocket.  Even if the monetary authorities got religion at this point and froze the money supply, the panic will run its course.  No one will want to be the last holding worthless paper.  More likely, though, the monetary authorities will aid and abet the panic, even if unwittingly, due to political pressure to increase payments to powerful domestic constituencies, such as retirees, the military, the public safety sector, government contractors, etc.  This was the case in Revolutionary France, Weimar Germany, and modern day Zimbabwe.  The mindset of today’s money masters seems little more advanced.

Conclusion

I encourage Austrian economists to point out these common myths whenever encountered.  I have had success writing letters-to-the-editor of major newspapers.  Their editors often seem genuinely pleased to receive a polite letter pointing out the Austrian view.  Perhaps it is simply  a case of controversy selling newspapers.  Furthermore, much business writing often has imbedded Keynesian assumptions that drive the narrative toward government intervention.  Most business reporters have no economic training, so Austrians should politely point out these errors, too.




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Chart(s) Of The Day: A Decade Of GDP Revisions

What is the best word to describe GDP? One suggestion: changing.

Below we present select GDP data revisions over the past decade, from the initial release to the most recent, July 30 2014, nudging of historical GDP data.

First, the “old normal” ancient past:

 

Then, the Great Financial Crisis years:

 

And finally, the post-central planning period:

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis




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Will NLRB Ruling on McDonald’s Franchises Speed Up Low-Wage Job Automation?

If there isn't an app for this, there will be soon.Chalk up what will probably be
a Pyrrhic victory for service employee unions, should the decision
stand. Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has
determined that McDonald’s, the corporation, can be can be
classified as a joint employer connected to complaints by employees
who work for McDonald’s franchises. The coverage of the decision
has quickly produced more verbiage than the
declaration itself
, which is pretty short and actually isn’t
much about the “joint employer” declaration:

The National Labor Relations Board Office of the General Counsel
has investigated charges alleging McDonald’s franchisees and their
franchisor, McDonald’s, USA, LLC, violated the rights of employees
as a result of activities surrounding employee protests.  The
Office of the General Counsel found merit in some of the charges
and no merit in others.  The Office of the General Counsel has
authorized complaints on alleged violations of the National Labor
Relations Act.  If the parties cannot reach settlement in
these cases, complaints will issue and McDonald’s, USA, LLC will be
named as a joint employer respondent. 

The National Labor Relations Board Office of the General Counsel
has had 181 cases involving McDonald’s filed since November
2012.  Of those cases, 68 were found to have no merit. 
64 cases are currently pending investigation and 43 cases have been
found to have merit.  In the 43 cases where complaint has been
authorized, McDonald’s franchisees and/or McDonald’s, USA, LLC will
be named as a respondent if parties are unable to reach
settlement.

The claims brought against McDonald’s accuse the company of
firing or retaliating against employees for engaging in activism
trying to pressure the fast food chain to raise their wages up to
$15 an hour. McDonald’s, the corporation, insists in
The New York Times
the “the company does not determine
or help determine decisions on hiring, wages or other employment
matters.”

Given that the NLRB statement is so small, there is a lot of
“What does it mean?” speculation about how broad a precedent this
could present. Union leaders seem to think this is ultimately going
to result in them winning the fight to unionize, while business
leaders think this decision threatens decades of precedents related
to franchise law. In the
Wall Street Journal
, a labor lawyer speculates that
this decision could potentially make it easier for union organizers
and for collective bargaining, because they wouldn’t have to target
individual stores.

Endemic in some of the responses to the ruling is this
inexplicable idea that businesses are also supposed to be centrally
planned. From the Times again:

And in an era when companies increasingly use subcontractors and
temp agencies to free themselves of employment decisions and
headaches, experts said the ruling could force the companies to be
more accountable.

“Employers like McDonald’s seek to avoid recognizing the rights
of their employees by claiming that they are not really their
employer, despite exercising control over crucial aspects of the
employment relationship,” said Julius Getman, a labor law professor
at the University of Texas. “McDonald’s should no longer be able to
hide behind its franchisees.”

But the franchisees can be held accountable for violating the
rights of their employees, right? It’s not like there’s nothing to
be done if a McDonald’s restaurant breaks employment law. But their
pockets are probably pretty small compared McDonald’s, the
corporation, right? The “Let’s stick it to the man!” attitude is
strong in response to this ruling.

If the ruling holds, though, it is very easy to see who is going
to get screwed over as a consequence. It won’t be McDonald’s. It
will be another factor encouraging the fast food chain (and every
other fast food chain) to introduce as much automation as possible
to be reduce the potential liability of additional future
complaints like these. It has the potential to push out small
business owners (90 percent of McDonald’s restaurants are
franchises). It could encourage McDonald’s to shut down problematic
restaurants that might not be performing as well as others. Why
should some big corporation deal with those big headaches at all if
they’re not getting a decent profit?

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White House Warns that Climate Change Could Reduce U.S. GDP in 2100 from $140.3 Trillion to Just $139 Trillion

Crystal BallThe White House Council of Economic Advisors has
just issued its study,
The Cost of Delaying of Action to Stem Cimate Change
.
The study argues (for illustrative purposes only) that failing to
keep the future average global temperature increase below 2 degrees
Celsius would result in an annual loss of 0.9 percent of GDP due to
climate damage. Sounds serious, no? The study warns:

Based on a leading aggregate damage estimate in the climate
economics literature, a delay that results in warming of 3° Celsius
above preindustrial levels, instead of 2°, could increase economic
damages by approximately 0.9 percent of global output. To put this
percentage in perspective, 0.9 percent of estimated 2014 U.S. Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) is approximately $150 billion. The
incremental cost of an additional degree of warming beyond 3°
Celsius would be even greater. Moreover, these costs are not
one-time, but are rather incurred year after year because of the
permanent damage caused by increased climate change resulting from
the delay.

Most global temperature projections due to man-made warming do
not expect average temperature to exceed 3 degrees Celsius until
around 2100. So using that as a baseline (for illustrative purposes
only), let’s run some rough numbers to see just how bad the
permanent loss of 0.9 percent per year would be in 2100.

Right now the U.S. GDP is about $17.2
trillion
. Assuming a growth rate of 2.5 percent per year for
the next 85 years yields a projected U.S. GDP of $140.3 trillion by
2100. So, a 0.9 percent loss per year in 2100 would mean that
future GDP would instead be about $139 trillion. In other words,
the GDP of the denizens of the 22nd century America would be about
$1.3 trillion lower than it otherwise would have been had global
average temperature been held to 2 degrees Celsius.

So how much economic growth should we be willing to sacrifice
now to prevent this future loss? Put it this way, lowering the
average economic growth rate from 2.5 percent to 2.489 percent over
the next 85 years would result in a similar permanent annual loss
of GDP by 2100.

Assuming a U.S. population of 500 milion by 2100, the
intergenerational equity question is: How much should people now
making an average per capita GDP of $54,000 sacrifice for people 85
years hence whose per capita GDP of around $278,000 would be a
couple of thousand bucks higher if temperatures were a degree
lower?

Of course, all of these calculations projecting outcomes nearly
a century hence need to be taken with vats of salt.

For the record, I do think that man-made climate change is a
problem, but I also think that these sorts of attempts at ginning
up scary scenarios are not very persuasive.

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The Fed's Failure Complicates Its Endgame

Submitted by Charles Hugh-Smith of ofTwoMinds blog,

To demonstrate it hasn't failed, the Fed must taper/withdraw its monetary heroin.

That the Federal Reserve's policies have failed is now so painfully evident that even the political class is awakening to this truth. Rather than re-ignite broad-based, self-sustaining economic growth, the Fed's loose-money policies (zero-interest rate policy a.k.a. ZIRP, and quantitative easing a.k.a. QE or free money for financiers), have perversely distorted the economy and widened wealth and income inequality.

After six long years of unprecedented monetary expansion and intervention–more than enough time to have succeeded in its stated purpose of restarting the real economy– political and financial blowback is forcing the Fed to withdraw its monetary heroin.

Unfortunately for the nation, the Fed's monetary heroin has addicted the economy to ZIRP, loose credit and free money for financiers. As a result, withdrawal will be painful, financially and politically.

The abject failure of these policies to aid Main Street while heaping wealth on Wall Street greatly complicates the Fed's endgame. Given the economy's dependence on the Fed's monetary heroin, declaring victory and beating a hasty retreat is not really an option: once the Fed stops delivery of monetary heroin, the economy will go into withdrawal, and the Fed's failure will be too obvious for even its most ardent backers to deny.

But if the Fed continues pushing its monetary heroin after six long years, its failure to energize the real economy will be equally obvious–as will the unintended consequences (blowback) of monetary heroin: malinvestment, systemic risk and a pernicious faith that the Fed will do whatever is necessary to keep the stock market lofting ever higher.

There are two basic schools of thought on the Fed's real agenda.

The mainstream view is the Fed is pursuing its stated goals of stabilizing inflation and employment. The other view is the Fed's real agenda is enriching its homies, the banking cartel, at the expense of the nation.

Since Wall Street has thrived while households and Main Street have seen earned income decline, the mainstream view is left with the unenviable task of explaining exactly how free money for financiers has helped J.Q. Citizen.

Household income has declined significantly in real terms: Five Decades of Middle Class Wages (Doug Short).

The first line of defense is the wealth effect, the notion that a rising stock market will make people feel wealthier and therefore more likely to borrow and spend money on stuff they don't need. This is of course the foundation of the U.S. economy: debt-based consumption, and it just so happens to generate gargantuan profits for lenders such as banks.

Unfortunately for the Fed apologists, only the top slice of wealthy households own enough equities to feel wealthier as stocks rise. Wealth in the U.S. is an inverted pyramid: the so-called "middle class" owns a small slice near the apex while the super-rich own the entire base:

The reality is the majority of households own a trivial amount of financial assets; the number of households with debt in collection far exceeds the number benefiting from the Fed's wealth effect, which not coincidentally has greatly enlarged the wealth of financiers and the few who own most of the financial assets.

This glaring disconnect between the Fed's publicly stated agenda and the results of its policies has created a political problem for the Fed. In the mainstream media's gauzy perception, the Fed is a god-like assembly that is above the grime of politics.

In truth, the Fed is as intrinsically political as any other branch of the Central State. The thundering gap between the Fed's stated goals and the results of its policies have, after six long years, reached the toadies and lackeys of the political class, who are now reluctantly stirring to the public demand to examine the Fed's closely played cards.

In other words, the failure of the Fed's policies has generated unwelcome political blowback. A few brave politicos have interrupted their campaign fund-raising long enough to grasp that the Fed has not just failed in some random fashion: the Fed is the problem, not the solution.

As a refresher, here is the Fed's Balance Sheet, bloated with over $3 trillion of freshly created money that was mainlined into the financial system:

Debt has skyrocketed under the guiding hand of the Fed's policies; GDP, not so much:

There is no mystery why the Fed's policies have failed. Fed policies have diverted interest income that once flowed to households to the banks, they've enabled the Federal government to borrow and squander trillions of dollars in deficit spending with no political trade-offs or consequences, and they've greatly incentivized malinvestments and risky bets.

Federal debt is borrowed from future generations. If it is squandered on consumption, it is effectively stealing from future generations, as their income will be devoted to paying interest on the trillions of dollars we have borrowed and blown propping up a bloated and ineffective Status Quo.

Perhaps most perniciously, the Fed has nurtured a belief that has now taken on a quasi-religious certainty that the Fed will never let the stock market go down. The Fed has bolstered this faith by launching a new free money for financiers program every time the stock market faltered.

As a direct result, nobody believes the Fed will actually reduce its monetary heroin or allow interest rates to normalize, i.e. rise: traders, money managers and the financial punditry are convinced that the Fed will soothe any tantrum thrown by Wall Street with another dose of monetary heroin.

This greatly complicates the Fed's endgame, because nobody will believe the Fed is serious about ending its monetary heroin until it allows the stock market to plummet off a cliff without rushing to save it with more free money for financiers.

The Fed is hoping to manage expectations and perceptions with such perfection that nobody notices the monetary heroin is no longer flowing. But this is an absurd fantasy: having addicted the stock market and the economy to monetary heroin over the past six years, how can the addict go through cold turkey withdrawal without being completely disrupted?

And in a delicious irony, should the Fed come to the rescue with another round of monetary heroin (free money for financiers), that will only demonstrate the complete and utter failure of the Fed's policies to generate sustainable growth in the real economy.

If the Fed has to rescue Wall Street yet again after six years and trillions of dollars of free money for financiers, that will prove beyond a shadow of doubt that the Fed has failed.

To demonstrate it hasn't failed, the Fed must taper/withdraw its monetary heroin.If the stock market tanks as a result, and the Fed rushes to the rescue with more free money for financiers, that will also prove the Fed has failed: if the economy and financial system is as robust as the Fed claims, why does it need to be rescued yet again after six lo
ng years of unprecedented injections of monetary heroin?

It's a double-bind with no escape. No matter what the Fed chooses to do, the failure of its policies to help households and Main Street while enriching wall Street and the banks will be revealed to all.




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The Fed’s Failure Complicates Its Endgame

Submitted by Charles Hugh-Smith of ofTwoMinds blog,

To demonstrate it hasn't failed, the Fed must taper/withdraw its monetary heroin.

That the Federal Reserve's policies have failed is now so painfully evident that even the political class is awakening to this truth. Rather than re-ignite broad-based, self-sustaining economic growth, the Fed's loose-money policies (zero-interest rate policy a.k.a. ZIRP, and quantitative easing a.k.a. QE or free money for financiers), have perversely distorted the economy and widened wealth and income inequality.

After six long years of unprecedented monetary expansion and intervention–more than enough time to have succeeded in its stated purpose of restarting the real economy– political and financial blowback is forcing the Fed to withdraw its monetary heroin.

Unfortunately for the nation, the Fed's monetary heroin has addicted the economy to ZIRP, loose credit and free money for financiers. As a result, withdrawal will be painful, financially and politically.

The abject failure of these policies to aid Main Street while heaping wealth on Wall Street greatly complicates the Fed's endgame. Given the economy's dependence on the Fed's monetary heroin, declaring victory and beating a hasty retreat is not really an option: once the Fed stops delivery of monetary heroin, the economy will go into withdrawal, and the Fed's failure will be too obvious for even its most ardent backers to deny.

But if the Fed continues pushing its monetary heroin after six long years, its failure to energize the real economy will be equally obvious–as will the unintended consequences (blowback) of monetary heroin: malinvestment, systemic risk and a pernicious faith that the Fed will do whatever is necessary to keep the stock market lofting ever higher.

There are two basic schools of thought on the Fed's real agenda.

The mainstream view is the Fed is pursuing its stated goals of stabilizing inflation and employment. The other view is the Fed's real agenda is enriching its homies, the banking cartel, at the expense of the nation.

Since Wall Street has thrived while households and Main Street have seen earned income decline, the mainstream view is left with the unenviable task of explaining exactly how free money for financiers has helped J.Q. Citizen.

Household income has declined significantly in real terms: Five Decades of Middle Class Wages (Doug Short).

The first line of defense is the wealth effect, the notion that a rising stock market will make people feel wealthier and therefore more likely to borrow and spend money on stuff they don't need. This is of course the foundation of the U.S. economy: debt-based consumption, and it just so happens to generate gargantuan profits for lenders such as banks.

Unfortunately for the Fed apologists, only the top slice of wealthy households own enough equities to feel wealthier as stocks rise. Wealth in the U.S. is an inverted pyramid: the so-called "middle class" owns a small slice near the apex while the super-rich own the entire base:

The reality is the majority of households own a trivial amount of financial assets; the number of households with debt in collection far exceeds the number benefiting from the Fed's wealth effect, which not coincidentally has greatly enlarged the wealth of financiers and the few who own most of the financial assets.

This glaring disconnect between the Fed's publicly stated agenda and the results of its policies has created a political problem for the Fed. In the mainstream media's gauzy perception, the Fed is a god-like assembly that is above the grime of politics.

In truth, the Fed is as intrinsically political as any other branch of the Central State. The thundering gap between the Fed's stated goals and the results of its policies have, after six long years, reached the toadies and lackeys of the political class, who are now reluctantly stirring to the public demand to examine the Fed's closely played cards.

In other words, the failure of the Fed's policies has generated unwelcome political blowback. A few brave politicos have interrupted their campaign fund-raising long enough to grasp that the Fed has not just failed in some random fashion: the Fed is the problem, not the solution.

As a refresher, here is the Fed's Balance Sheet, bloated with over $3 trillion of freshly created money that was mainlined into the financial system:

Debt has skyrocketed under the guiding hand of the Fed's policies; GDP, not so much:

There is no mystery why the Fed's policies have failed. Fed policies have diverted interest income that once flowed to households to the banks, they've enabled the Federal government to borrow and squander trillions of dollars in deficit spending with no political trade-offs or consequences, and they've greatly incentivized malinvestments and risky bets.

Federal debt is borrowed from future generations. If it is squandered on consumption, it is effectively stealing from future generations, as their income will be devoted to paying interest on the trillions of dollars we have borrowed and blown propping up a bloated and ineffective Status Quo.

Perhaps most perniciously, the Fed has nurtured a belief that has now taken on a quasi-religious certainty that the Fed will never let the stock market go down. The Fed has bolstered this faith by launching a new free money for financiers program every time the stock market faltered.

As a direct result, nobody believes the Fed will actually reduce its monetary heroin or allow interest rates to normalize, i.e. rise: traders, money managers and the financial punditry are convinced that the Fed will soothe any tantrum thrown by Wall Street with another dose of monetary heroin.

This greatly complicates the Fed's endgame, because nobody will believe the Fed is serious about ending its monetary heroin until it allows the stock market to plummet off a cliff without rushing to save it with more free money for financiers.

The Fed is hoping to manage expectations and perceptions with such perfection that nobody notices the monetary heroin is no longer flowing. But this is an absurd fantasy: having addicted the stock market and the economy to monetary heroin over the past six years, how can the addict go through cold turkey withdrawal without being completely disrupted?

And in a delicious irony, should the Fed come to the rescue with another round of monetary heroin (free money for financiers), that will only demonstrate the complete and utter failure of the Fed's policies to generate sustainable growth in the real economy.

If the Fed has to rescue Wall Street yet again after six years and trillions of dollars of free money for financiers, that will prove beyond a shadow of doubt that the Fed has failed.

To demonstrate it hasn't failed, the Fed must taper/withdraw its monetary heroin.If the stock market tanks as a result, and the Fed rushes to the rescue with more free money for financiers, that will also prove the Fed has failed: if the economy and financial system is as robust as the Fed claims, why does it need to be rescued yet again after six long years of unprecedented injections of monetary heroin?

It's a double-bind with no escape. No matter what the Fed chooses to do, the failure of its policies to help households and Main Street while enriching wall Street and the banks will be revealed to all.




via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1u08ogE Tyler Durden