Summarizing The President’s Busy Weekend

Perhaps the NYT was on to something when even the most liberal of media outlets finally came out against the president’s recreational plans as reported in “A “Tone-Deaf” Obama Mocked By The NYT For Vacationing While The World Burns.” The latest case in point:




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"London Fix" Gold Rigging By Bullion Bank Exposed In Class Action Lawsuit: The Complete Charts

Some interesting news crossed the tape late afternoon yesterday when it was reported that the silver bullion banks (Deutsche Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia and HSBC) were sued for manipulating the silver fix in a class-action lawsuit. However, a closer look reveals that the plaintff in the lawsuit, J. Scott Nicholson, has a recurring bone to pick with the banks as this is certainly not his first lawsuit alleging precious metals rigging, and as such we are convinced it will be tossed out shortly, along with every other lawsuit alleging a manipulated precious metals market since discovery could lead to some very unpleasant revelations about the primary source of gold and silver rigging: the central banks themselves, alongside the BIS.

Instead, we uncovered something that was missed several few weeks earlier: a far more informative and detailed class action lawsuit filed by Edward Derksen on July 9, 2014 against the London gold fix member banks: Bank of Nova Scotia, Barclays, Deutsche, HSBC and SocGen (profiled here in From Rothschild To Koch Industries: Meet The People Who “Fix” The Price Of Gold).

Recall from “How Gold Price Is Manipulated During The “London Fix“” that this was one of the first conspiracy theories about gold manipulation to end with a bank, and following the official revelation (as opposed to merely on the pages of fringe blogs) that over 100 years the price of gold was consistently manipulated during the London fix (and during every other period as well but that is a revelation for a different time) the very process of the Gold and Silver Fix itself was finally ended (only to be replaced with a comparable process run by the very same people who manipulated gold and silver from Rothschild’s London office on St. Swithin’s Lane for decades.

The short and sweet summary of the lawsuit:

“Plaintiff alleges that from approximately January 1, 2004 to the present, Defendants manipulate the prices of gold and gold derivatives contracts on their own and combined, conspired, and agreed with one another and unnamed co-conspirators to manipulate the prices of gold and gold derivatives contracts. This agreement was intended to permit each Defendant individually and all Defendants collectively to reap profits from their foreknowledge of price movements in the gold market.”

Nothing new there, but while the allegations in the lawsuit are well-known to frequent (and all other) readers of Zero Hedge, we recommend reading the full filing as it explains in clear English just what the fixing process worked.

Perhaps what is more interesting are the abnormalities in the price of gold as highlighted by Derksen, which clearly show the critical role the daily fix has in the manipulation of the price of gold, both in a downward and upward direction: whichever suits the London Fix member banks.

Here are some of the highlights:

The following chart of average intraday gold price shows the same strong relationship between the physical gold and the COMEX gold futures markets.

Anomalous price movements during the fixing window that are highly suggestive of manipulation – like those on June 28, 2012 – can be witnessed on numerous days, where prices near the 3 p.m. London Fix spike, either upward or downward, and then retreat in the opposite direction as the price is “fixed”. Five trading days are analyzed below as illustrative of the overall trend during the Class Period. On February 1, 2013, there was a dramatic drop in price from nearly $1678 to below $1665, contemporaneous with the beginning of the London Fix. The price began recovering during the London Fix and continued  afterwards. This movement around the fixing window is highly anomalous and suggestive of manipulation because it tends to show that the market ultimately discounted to some degree the pricing information that occurred during the London Fix.

On January 4, 2012, there was anomalous price movement before the beginning of the PM Fix call, this time in an upward direction. The gold price rose from below $1599 to more than $1614 within the half hour before the beginning of the call, only to surrender most of these gains within the half hour following the call. This movement around the fixing window (steep rise just before the call, with a clear reversal that begins at the very beginning of the call) is highly anomalous and suggestive of manipulation because it tends to show that the market ultimately discounted to some degree the pricing information that occurred during the London Fix.

On May 21, 2013, the gold price declined significantly in the 25 minutes prior to the call only to recovery briskly once the call ended. This movement around the fixing window is highly anomalous and suggestive of manipulation because it tends to show that the market ultimately discounted to some degree the pricing information that occurred during the Fix

The punchline:

If the five previous examples of anomalous volatility around the London Fix mere statistical outliers and not evidence of manipulation, then it would be expected that this volatility would disappear when looking at an average of all the trading days during the class period. To the contrary, the price manipulation actually becomes clearer when viewed over the past fifteen years. The chart below shows the change in physical gold prices if each trading day for the period from 1998 through 2013 were averaged together. The dramatic changes in price followed by swift reversals at the time of the AM and PM London Fix in this chart demonstrate that the phenomenon is not coincidental statistical noise occurring on only a few cherry-picked dates, but rather is a clear trend that cannot be explained by chance.

And the logical continuation:

The table below illustrates that price moves of statistically anomalous size during the London Fix occurred with great frequency. If these London Fix price moves were the result of natural market forces, it would be expected that those price moves would be either maintained or reversed with the same statistical regularity as any other price move observed during the trading day. If it were manipulation that caused the London Fix price moves, these moves would
be reversed with greater frequency than expected because the manipulators must reverse their trade in order to book a profit and because legitimate market factors would ultimately cause some degree of discounting of the pricing information from the London Fix. Sure enough, statistically anomalous price reversals after the London Fix, of the price changes during the London Fix, occurred with enough regularity to indicate manipulative activity.

 

The chart below demonstrates from 1998-2013 the rate of “forecast error” – a square of the difference between predicted market moves based on econometrics and the market’s actual moves. These forecast errors hit a massive peak during the brief period that is encompassed by the 3 p.m. London Fix. Appendix B contains charts of forecast erro
rs broken down by year. This is contrary to what should occur in a market free of manipulation.

Ok, gold was manipulated. But it must have been manipulated up as well as down, so in effect the two would offset each other right?

Wrong!

Although the London Fix was associated with both manipulative and abnormal increases and decreases in gold prices, the London Fix appears, in the aggregate, to have had a net negative effect overall on the price of gold throughout the Class Period. This can be demonstrated by examining the price of gold during the part of the trading day closest to the London Fixes. Gold is traded 24 hours a day. The trading day for gold can be broken up into three equal eight-hour periods, the “Fixing Period” from 8:00-16:00 London Time in which both the AM and PM London Fixes occur, the “Pre-Fix Period” from 0:00-8:00 and the “Post Fix Period” from 16:00-24:00 London time. If the volatility surrounding the London Fix was purely random and not the result of manipulation, there would be no significant difference over time between the period containing the London Fixes (8:00-16:00) and the Pre-Fix and Post-Fix periods.

However, as the chart below demonstrates, gold prices during the Fixing Period (8:00-16:00) moved consistently lower over time when compared to price activity during Pre-Fix and Post-Fix portions of the trading day. This trading pattern is consistent with manipulation and cannot be explained by random variation.

Why do it?

As shown above, the manipulation detailed herein both artificially inflated and artificially suppressed the price of gold, injuring both long and short holders of gold futures and options contracts. To the extent the aggregate trend has been to suppress prices,this has resulted in (as of the last available “This Month in Gold Futures Market” Report from the CFTC44) an extraordinarily positive result for Commercial Traders in gold futures contracts (who held between 352,500 and 381,200 short futures contracts, as opposed to merely 140,900 to 145,100 long futures contracts in the same period. This heavy weight toward shorting gold futures contracts means a net drop in gold prices would be extremely lucrative for commercial traders. “Commercial” Traders are entities, such as Defendants, that use futures or options for hedging purposes, as opposed to “non-commercial” entities that do not own the underlying asset or its financial equivalent and hold only derivatives contracts.

Most importantly, it is no longer just some tinfoil goldbug making manipulation allegations: the very head of Germany’s BaFIN regulator agrees:

Plaintiff did not discover, and could not have reasonably discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the wrongdoing discussed in this complaint, until, at the very earliest, January 2014, when Defendant DB withdrew from the fixing after interviews with Bafin, Germany’s financial regulator.

 

Before the DB departure was announced and Bafin’s president revealed the seriousness of the allegations, Plaintiff could not have stated facts plausibly stating the conspiracy to manipulate the price of gold and gold derivatives.

 

The activity Defendants undertook was of a self-concealing nature. The London Fix teleconference is not publicly-accessible. The information Defendants received from their clients about the demand for purchases and sales of gold before and during the teleconference were not publicly-accessible. Without these pieces of information, Plaintiff would not be able to discern market dislocation or the existence of spoof trades.

In summary, the lawsuit’s conclusions are as follows:

The price activity surrounding the London Fixes is indicative of manipulation and not natural market forces for the following reasons:

a. Around the period of the London Fix calls, gold prices experience anomalous volatility in price.

b. This volatility is present not on isolated trading days but manifests even more clearly when averaged across years of trade data.

c. The anomalous price changes during the call were not maintained afterwards, but in fact were in some part reversed with an unusual frequency and to an
anomalous degree.

d. The anomalous price moves occurred during peaks in trading volume, when the market should be at its most efficient.

e. The pricing anomalies strengthened in intensity over time, demonstrating that they are not an inevitable result of an innocent fixing process.

f. There were upward and downward manipulations over a period of years, price activity surrounding the London Fix periods had a net negative effect on gold
prices in comparison to other periods. This tends to indicate that artificial forces were acting on the market during those periods.

g. Trading activity during immediately after the beginning of the London Fix was highly predictive of activity during the rest of the call, and of the final London Fix price, suggesting that manipulative traders were moving the prices of gold based on information gleaned for the London Fix calls.

h. The price activity surrounding the London Fixes is not typical of the price activity one would expect to attend a regularly scheduled announcement of
news material to the gold market.

i. The anomalous price activity in the gold market is not mirrored by other precious metals or broader market indices, further eliminating innocent
explanations and supporting a conclusion that manipulation occurred.

There is much more in the full lawsuit which can be read in its entirety below. The complete chart data is showin in Appendix A and B.




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“London Fix” Gold Rigging By Bullion Bank Exposed In Class Action Lawsuit: The Complete Charts

Some interesting news crossed the tape late afternoon yesterday when it was reported that the silver bullion banks (Deutsche Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia and HSBC) were sued for manipulating the silver fix in a class-action lawsuit. However, a closer look reveals that the plaintff in the lawsuit, J. Scott Nicholson, has a recurring bone to pick with the banks as this is certainly not his first lawsuit alleging precious metals rigging, and as such we are convinced it will be tossed out shortly, along with every other lawsuit alleging a manipulated precious metals market since discovery could lead to some very unpleasant revelations about the primary source of gold and silver rigging: the central banks themselves, alongside the BIS.

Instead, we uncovered something that was missed several few weeks earlier: a far more informative and detailed class action lawsuit filed by Edward Derksen on July 9, 2014 against the London gold fix member banks: Bank of Nova Scotia, Barclays, Deutsche, HSBC and SocGen (profiled here in From Rothschild To Koch Industries: Meet The People Who “Fix” The Price Of Gold).

Recall from “How Gold Price Is Manipulated During The “London Fix“” that this was one of the first conspiracy theories about gold manipulation to end with a bank, and following the official revelation (as opposed to merely on the pages of fringe blogs) that over 100 years the price of gold was consistently manipulated during the London fix (and during every other period as well but that is a revelation for a different time) the very process of the Gold and Silver Fix itself was finally ended (only to be replaced with a comparable process run by the very same people who manipulated gold and silver from Rothschild’s London office on St. Swithin’s Lane for decades.

The short and sweet summary of the lawsuit:

“Plaintiff alleges that from approximately January 1, 2004 to the present, Defendants manipulate the prices of gold and gold derivatives contracts on their own and combined, conspired, and agreed with one another and unnamed co-conspirators to manipulate the prices of gold and gold derivatives contracts. This agreement was intended to permit each Defendant individually and all Defendants collectively to reap profits from their foreknowledge of price movements in the gold market.”

Nothing new there, but while the allegations in the lawsuit are well-known to frequent (and all other) readers of Zero Hedge, we recommend reading the full filing as it explains in clear English just what the fixing process worked.

Perhaps what is more interesting are the abnormalities in the price of gold as highlighted by Derksen, which clearly show the critical role the daily fix has in the manipulation of the price of gold, both in a downward and upward direction: whichever suits the London Fix member banks.

Here are some of the highlights:

The following chart of average intraday gold price shows the same strong relationship between the physical gold and the COMEX gold futures markets.

Anomalous price movements during the fixing window that are highly suggestive of manipulation – like those on June 28, 2012 – can be witnessed on numerous days, where prices near the 3 p.m. London Fix spike, either upward or downward, and then retreat in the opposite direction as the price is “fixed”. Five trading days are analyzed below as illustrative of the overall trend during the Class Period. On February 1, 2013, there was a dramatic drop in price from nearly $1678 to below $1665, contemporaneous with the beginning of the London Fix. The price began recovering during the London Fix and continued  afterwards. This movement around the fixing window is highly anomalous and suggestive of manipulation because it tends to show that the market ultimately discounted to some degree the pricing information that occurred during the London Fix.

On January 4, 2012, there was anomalous price movement before the beginning of the PM Fix call, this time in an upward direction. The gold price rose from below $1599 to more than $1614 within the half hour before the beginning of the call, only to surrender most of these gains within the half hour following the call. This movement around the fixing window (steep rise just before the call, with a clear reversal that begins at the very beginning of the call) is highly anomalous and suggestive of manipulation because it tends to show that the market ultimately discounted to some degree the pricing information that occurred during the London Fix.

On May 21, 2013, the gold price declined significantly in the 25 minutes prior to the call only to recovery briskly once the call ended. This movement around the fixing window is highly anomalous and suggestive of manipulation because it tends to show that the market ultimately discounted to some degree the pricing information that occurred during the Fix

The punchline:

If the five previous examples of anomalous volatility around the London Fix mere statistical outliers and not evidence of manipulation, then it would be expected that this volatility would disappear when looking at an average of all the trading days during the class period. To the contrary, the price manipulation actually becomes clearer when viewed over the past fifteen years. The chart below shows the change in physical gold prices if each trading day for the period from 1998 through 2013 were averaged together. The dramatic changes in price followed by swift reversals at the time of the AM and PM London Fix in this chart demonstrate that the phenomenon is not coincidental statistical noise occurring on only a few cherry-picked dates, but rather is a clear trend that cannot be explained by chance.

And the logical continuation:

The table below illustrates that price moves of statistically anomalous size during the London Fix occurred with great frequency. If these London Fix price moves were the result of natural market forces, it would be expected that those price moves would be either maintained or reversed with the same statistical regularity as any other price move observed during the trading day. If it were manipulation that caused the London Fix price moves, these moves would
be reversed with greater frequency than expected because the manipulators must reverse their trade in order to book a profit and because legitimate market factors would ultimately cause some degree of discounting of the pricing information from the London Fix. Sure enough, statistically anomalous price reversals after the London Fix, of the price changes during the London Fix, occurred with enough regularity to indicate manipulative activity.

 

The chart below demonstrates from 1998-2013 the rate of “forecast error” – a square of the difference between predicted market moves based on econometrics and the market’s actual moves. These forecast errors hit a massive peak during the brief period that is encompassed by the 3 p.m. London Fix. Appendix B contains charts of forecast errors broken down by year. This is contrary to what should occur in a market free of manipulation.

Ok, gold was manipulated. But it must have been manipulated up as well as down, so in effect the two would offset each other right?

Wrong!

Although the London Fix was associated with both manipulative and abnormal increases and decreases in gold prices, the London Fix appears, in the aggregate, to have had a net negative effect overall on the price of gold throughout the Class Period. This can be demonstrated by examining the price of gold during the part of the trading day closest to the London Fixes. Gold is traded 24 hours a day. The trading day for gold can be broken up into three equal eight-hour periods, the “Fixing Period” from 8:00-16:00 London Time in which both the AM and PM London Fixes occur, the “Pre-Fix Period” from 0:00-8:00 and the “Post Fix Period” from 16:00-24:00 London time. If the volatility surrounding the London Fix was purely random and not the result of manipulation, there would be no significant difference over time between the period containing the London Fixes (8:00-16:00) and the Pre-Fix and Post-Fix periods.

However, as the chart below demonstrates, gold prices during the Fixing Period (8:00-16:00) moved consistently lower over time when compared to price activity during Pre-Fix and Post-Fix portions of the trading day. This trading pattern is consistent with manipulation and cannot be explained by random variation.

Why do it?

As shown above, the manipulation detailed herein both artificially inflated and artificially suppressed the price of gold, injuring both long and short holders of gold futures and options contracts. To the extent the aggregate trend has been to suppress prices,this has resulted in (as of the last available “This Month in Gold Futures Market” Report from the CFTC44) an extraordinarily positive result for Commercial Traders in gold futures contracts (who held between 352,500 and 381,200 short futures contracts, as opposed to merely 140,900 to 145,100 long futures contracts in the same period. This heavy weight toward shorting gold futures contracts means a net drop in gold prices would be extremely lucrative for commercial traders. “Commercial” Traders are entities, such as Defendants, that use futures or options for hedging purposes, as opposed to “non-commercial” entities that do not own the underlying asset or its financial equivalent and hold only derivatives contracts.

Most importantly, it is no longer just some tinfoil goldbug making manipulation allegations: the very head of Germany’s BaFIN regulator agrees:

Plaintiff did not discover, and could not have reasonably discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the wrongdoing discussed in this complaint, until, at the very earliest, January 2014, when Defendant DB withdrew from the fixing after interviews with Bafin, Germany’s financial regulator.

 

Before the DB departure was announced and Bafin’s president revealed the seriousness of the allegations, Plaintiff could not have stated facts plausibly stating the conspiracy to manipulate the price of gold and gold derivatives.

 

The activity Defendants undertook was of a self-concealing nature. The London Fix teleconference is not publicly-accessible. The information Defendants received from their clients about the demand for purchases and sales of gold before and during the teleconference were not publicly-accessible. Without these pieces of information, Plaintiff would not be able to discern market dislocation or the existence of spoof trades.

In summary, the lawsuit’s conclusions are as follows:

The price activity surrounding the London Fixes is indicative of manipulation and not natural market forces for the following reasons:

a. Around the period of the London Fix calls, gold prices experience anomalous volatility in price.

b. This volatility is present not on isolated trading days but manifests even more clearly when averaged across years of trade data.

c. The anomalous price changes during the call were not maintained afterwards, but in fact were in some part reversed with an unusual frequency and to an
anomalous degree.

d. The anomalous price moves occurred during peaks in trading volume, when the market should be at its most efficient.

e. The pricing anomalies strengthened in intensity over time, demonstrating that they are not an inevitable result of an innocent fixing process.

f. There were upward and downward manipulations over a period of years, price activity surrounding the London Fix periods had a net negative effect on gold
prices in comparison to other periods. This tends to indicate that artificial forces were acting on the market during those periods.

g. Trading activity during immediately after the beginning of the London Fix was highly predictive of activity during the rest of the call, and of the final London Fix price, suggesting that manipulative traders were moving the prices of gold based on information gleaned for the London Fix calls.

h. The price activity surrounding the London Fixes is not typical of the price activity one would expect to attend a regularly scheduled announcement of
news material to the gold market.

i. The anomalous price activity in the gold market is not mirrored by other precious metals or broader market indices, further eliminating innocent
explanations and supporting a conclusion that manipulation occurred.

There is much more in the full lawsuit which can be read in its entirety below. The complete chart data is showin in Appendix A and B.




via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1ppNbIO Tyler Durden

"It Can't Be A Bubble!"

Submitted by Pater Tenebrarum of Acting-Man blog,

It Can’t Be A Bubble!

Articles claiming that the current situation in financial markets does not deserve the epithet “bubble” are a dime a dozen – we come across several every week since at least late 2013. Before continuing, we should point out that there is a big difference between recognition of a bubble and forecasting the timing of its actual bursting. For instance, we were well aware that there was a bubble in the late 1990s, but not only did it still take a good while before it hit its peak (a peak that was then retested in terms of the broader market half a year later), it also expanded considerably further before it did so, and only started collapsing in earnest in late 2000.

It is important to realize in this context that this particular bubble – the one in technology stocks that peaked in early 2000 – is not some sort of “standard measure” for what constitutes a bubble. It was certainly the most extreme stock market bubble in all of history in a major developed market (in terms of valuation expansion in this particular sector) – beating even the Nikkei’s famous 1989 blow-out by a huge margin. Again, only if one compares the tech sector’s then trailing P/E of more than 300 to the Nikkei’s trailing P/E of more than 80 in 1989.

In terms of the broader market’s valuation, the bubble peak in 2000 was less than half as spectacular as the Nikkei’s, but it was still the top of the greatest valuation expansion ever experienced in the US stock market. We merely want to point out here that it would be wrong to claim that “well, the year 2000 was a bubble, and therefore anything that doesn’t look quite as extreme as this one outlier isn’t”.

We came across another article of this type recently and want to discuss what we believe the flaws in its arguments are. The article in question is Bubble paranoia on S&P 500 is a storm in a teacup”, which was posted at Saxo’s tradingfloor.com by Mr. Peter Garnry. Note here that we don’t want to make an argument about the likely timing of the bubble’s bursting or its potential for further expansion (that is a different subject) – we only want to discuss whether a bubble actually exists or not.

Opinions and Bubble Talk

One of the main arguments made in the above article is the following:

“Financial bubbles are characterized by the lack of different opinions, which is clearly not where we are today”

It is explained in the article that this is a reference to a recent increase in people’s belief in the existence of a bubble. This is usually reflected in a surge in references to bubble conditions in various financial news media. Mr Garnry (who was 15 years old at the time of the tech mania, and probably remembers the gaudy atmosphere at the time, which was indeed one of a kind) writes in this context:

“The most important point about bubbles is that they exist when no one seems to think they are there. In 2000, very few thought there was a bubble in tech stocks, but with hindsight it is clear that the bubble was massive. Again, very few acknowledged that there was a bubble in US housing in 2006-2007. The fact that three out of five people believe there is a bubble in US equities tells us that we are not in a bubble. When most bears have crawled back into their caves and maybe a few have come out as bulls then we need to worry, but not before.”

As a more grizzled veteran of the markets, we would immediately assert that this just isn’t true, based on anecdotal evidence alone. However, we can actually buttress it with data, and have actually already done so late last year (see “Circular Bubble Logic” for details). As a matter of fact, the exact opposite is the case – as a bubble matures and nears its peak, “bubble talk” increases. Anyone who experienced the tech bubble and the housing bubble on the front lines should be aware of this even if the studies proving it didn’t exist – but they do exist.

In addition to the Google Trend data we have shown in our earlier article, Bob Prechter has e.g. documented the prevalence of bubble references in newspapers as historical bubbles have progressed. Clearly, as a bubble climbs toward a frenetic peak, talk about bubble conditions begins to literally explode along with prices. Just because Alan Greenspan, Ben Bernanke and 95% of mainstream economists wouldn’t recognize a bubble if it bit them in the behind doesn’t mean that there aren’t a great many other people who do in fact recognize them.

One can also safely ignore the fact that Wall Street sell side analysts will rarely identify bubble conditions in real time publicly. As we know from the bubble post mortems after the peaks of 1929, 2000 and 2007, many of them do in fact acknowledge privately when such conditions exist. We should also note that given the experiences of the past two major asset price collapses as well as the change in the composition of market participants (not least due to the growth of the hedge fund industry), Wall Street research has overall become a great deal more nuanced. In the end though, the business of Wall Street is the selling of securities, and that creates a certain bias in its published  assessments of bubble conditions.

Needless to say, there are probably thousands of articles in the Wayback Machine’s cache which discuss the bubble conditions in both 1999/2000 and 2006/2007. If bubble talk is on the rise, it is definitely not proof that there is no bubble. Almost all authors writing about this subject do not realize the irony of the fact that there is at the same time always a flood of articles attempting to explain why a bubble is not a bubble, a flood to which they themselves contribute!

If there is one way to fairly objectively ascertain whether the danger posed by a bubble is taken seriously by investors, then it is by looking at measures of investor fear and complacency as well as various positioning data. One of these measures can be seen below:

 

Financial Stresss index

The St. Louis Fed’s financial stress index – click to enlarge.

 

One of the reasons why the current bubble is not marked by the same outward excitement that was seen in 2000, is precisely that the participants are no longer the same. The current bubble is mainly driven by professionals – institutional investors of every kind – with retail investors only passively participating by e.g. buying mutual fund shares and ETFs. However, these professionals are clearly almost completely oblivious to risk at present – which can inter alia be seen in the historically unprecedented expansion in junk debt issuance over the past two years.

 

The Monetary Component

One point on which we agree with Mr. Garnry is when he notes that one’s analysis of the market must differentiate between the pure fiat money system that has been established in 1971 and the
time period preceding it. The fact that money supply and credit expansion have gone into overdrive ever since has altered a number of “tried and true” yardsticks that served as good rules of thumb back when at least still a gold exchange standard was still in place.

For example, prior to the asset bubble becoming greatly extended for the first time in the mid to late 1990s, the market’s overall dividend yield never fell much below 3%. This has changed, and the author is on the right trail when he blames the monetary system, or rather, when he points out that different monetary and institutional dispensations do make a difference to market analysis.

We disagree with a subsidiary assumption though, namely that therefore, anything that happened before 1971 is basically irrelevant. This is surely not correct. For instance, during the “roaring 20s”, the true US money supply increased by about 65% (see Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, which contains a very precise calculation of the era’s money supply growth), which is a far cry from today’s monetary expansions, but was certainly extreme at the time. There are no fixed quantitative relations between the size of such an expansion and its effects, such as those on the prices of assets or on other goods. At the time, the bulk of the price effects was concentrated first in real estate and later in securities – just as is the case today. Surely we cannot say that everything that happened before 1971 is entirely irrelevant.

However, Mr. Garnry is correct when he states that every slice of economic and financial history is different, and that these differences often encompass major aspects of the contingent historical setting:

“We do not subscribe to the valuation analysis since 1870 being thrown around on Wall Street. This is because the period includes many regime shifts in inflation, real interest rates, nominal interest rates, economic growth, monetary policy, the nature of businesses and the government’s size relative to the economy. All these parameters have changed so much that going too far back distorts the overall conclusion and causes inferences that are wrong.”

Sure enough, predictions can not possibly be based solely on empirical data, as there can be no empirical causal constants in human action (thus, every historical boom and bust sequence looks different, even though there are many parallels between them as well). This is where economic theory comes in.  While it does not allow us to make precise “predictions” either, it can at least tell us what is and what isn’t logically possible. From this we can, in concert with historical understanding, deduce what is likely. The reason why many historical bubbles evince numerous parallels in spite of their differences is precisely that the same economic laws are in operation every time.

Oddly though, Mr. Garnry doesn’t discuss the money and credit supply any further. Surely though,  it is a major component of the whole “bubble debate”.  In fact, we happen to believe that it is the most important component.

 

TMS-2-w.o.

A chart of money TMS-2 without memorandum items (which add approx. another $50 billion to the total). The money supply has approximately doubled between 1990 and 2000 and risen more than three and a half times since then. This is the reason why we have a bubble. All other arguments become mere ancillary arguments, including those on valuations – click to enlarge.

 

The Valuation Argument

This brings us the second major argument, which concerns valuations. Mr. Garnry writes:

“Bubbles are normally characterized by the data point (valuations, house prices etc.) being close to two times standard deviations away from the mean. Valuation on S&P 500 is not even close to that scenario. The current 12-month forward P/E ratio is 15.7x, which is a bit above the average of 15.5x since 1990 and the 12-month expected dividend yield is 2.1 percent. The forward P/E ratio translates into an earnings yield of around 6.4 percent. This yield does not smell of a bubble when you consider that the 10-year Treasury yield is at 2.5 percent and corporate bond yields are at historical lows.”

So here we are evidently back to empirical arguments. First of all, at the 2007 peak, market valuations by that very same criterion didn’t warn that a bubble was about to burst either. The market’s “forward P/E” was also well below the “two standard deviation band” at the time. And yet, the market collapsed by 58% after the bubble had ended. The reason was that the bubble in asset prices was accompanied and caused by a huge credit expansion, in this case specifically in mortgage debt. The current asset bubble is accompanied by a credit bubble as well – only this time, it is concentrated in low grade corporate debt and government debt (there are also smaller credit bubbles on the side, such as that in student debt and sub-prime auto debt for example).

Why is this important? Because it ultimately vitiates the entire valuation argument. Let us think back to 2007 again. What happened after the bubble burst? Corporate earnings collapsed into a heap and turned into the most massive corporate losses of the entire post WW2 era. Obviously, analysts’ “forward estimates” completely missed this turning point (generally, these estimates are almost always over-optimistic and tend to be continually revised lower – the only time when they tend to be too pessimistic is near major bear market bottoms).

Current low government and corporate bond yields – which are a direct result of central bank manipulation of interest rates and the money supply – are not a reason to deem current valuations not excessive – quite the contrary. The losses following the 2007 peak were only booked in 2008 and 2009, but they were actually made long before that time. When market interest rates are distorted, economic calculation is falsified, hence the accounting profits booked during the boom period are actually to a large part fictitious – they effectively tend to mask capital consumption. It is easy to see why this must be so: the money supply expansion and artificially lowered market interest rates must lead to capital malinvestment, which by its very nature is destined to destroy wealth.

However, this is never immediately apparent, since it takes time for long term investments to turn out to have been misguided. Amid monetary inflation, businessmen inter alia reckon with depreciation rates that refer to the price structure that existed before the inflationary policy was set into motion. They therefore report a part of the funds that are actually required to maintain their capital as profits. It matters not in what form these funds are then distributed – whether as higher wages, higher dividends or as share buybacks. A large portion of them is paid out of the substance of companies, and as a general rule of thumb, we can say that the bigger the money supply inflation, the more distorted economic calculation will tend to be. Consequently, the errors will tend to be commensurat
ely larger as well (again, no fixed quantitative relationships can be ascertained in this context, thus it is a “rule of thumb”).

This is what is meant by the saying that we are “eating our seed corn”, or are “heating the house by burning the furniture”. Mr. Garnry asked us what we meant by capital consumption and whether it could be measured. The answer is that it cannot be measured while it occurs. However, there will come a point in time when measurements will be taken.

After the housing boom, that time arrived in 2008. Usually, the growth rate of the money supply falls below a threshold that later turns out to have been required to keep the distorted capital structure aloft. Once that happens, the most marginal malinvestments and bubble activities begin to experience difficulties and are liquidated (e.g. the first sub-prime lenders folded in February of 2007 already). From there, the realization that the fanciful reckonings of the boom were erroneous begins to spread. Once the bust arrives with full force, many of the profits made during the boom disappear, as corporate accounts are reconstituted and begin to reflect the true underlying economic conditions – that is when “measurement” takes place.

 

TMS-2-y-y-change rate

Year-on-year growth rate of money TMS-2. Where the threshold will be this time is unknowable, but our guess is that it is higher than the last two times, as the underlying real economy seems far weaker (the red parallel lines indicate the area which we guess might prove important). Note that in the mid 1970s, the bust threshold was a growth rate of around 7% – click to enlarge.

Conclusion:

If one wants to identify bubbles, one must perforce study monetary conditions. The comparison of historical data on valuations and other ancillary factors can only take one so far. The problem is that in times of strongly inflationary policy, the economy’s price structure becomes thoroughly distorted, and that therefore a great many “data” can no longer be regarded as reliable. An added complication is that we e.g. cannot know in advance if the effects of the inflationary policy on prices will broaden out or not. Should “inflation expectations” (expectations regarding future CPI rates of change) rise markedly in the future, this would have a major impact on valuations, which would then begin to contract rather than continue to expand.

However, a bubble can easily burst even if this doesn’t happen. Ultimately the question is whether brisk money supply growth will be maintained and whether the economy’s real pool of funding is still large enough to allow for additional diversions of scarce resources into bubble activities. Most of the time, it’s the eventual slowdown of money supply growth that brings a bubble to its knees.




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“It Can’t Be A Bubble!”

Submitted by Pater Tenebrarum of Acting-Man blog,

It Can’t Be A Bubble!

Articles claiming that the current situation in financial markets does not deserve the epithet “bubble” are a dime a dozen – we come across several every week since at least late 2013. Before continuing, we should point out that there is a big difference between recognition of a bubble and forecasting the timing of its actual bursting. For instance, we were well aware that there was a bubble in the late 1990s, but not only did it still take a good while before it hit its peak (a peak that was then retested in terms of the broader market half a year later), it also expanded considerably further before it did so, and only started collapsing in earnest in late 2000.

It is important to realize in this context that this particular bubble – the one in technology stocks that peaked in early 2000 – is not some sort of “standard measure” for what constitutes a bubble. It was certainly the most extreme stock market bubble in all of history in a major developed market (in terms of valuation expansion in this particular sector) – beating even the Nikkei’s famous 1989 blow-out by a huge margin. Again, only if one compares the tech sector’s then trailing P/E of more than 300 to the Nikkei’s trailing P/E of more than 80 in 1989.

In terms of the broader market’s valuation, the bubble peak in 2000 was less than half as spectacular as the Nikkei’s, but it was still the top of the greatest valuation expansion ever experienced in the US stock market. We merely want to point out here that it would be wrong to claim that “well, the year 2000 was a bubble, and therefore anything that doesn’t look quite as extreme as this one outlier isn’t”.

We came across another article of this type recently and want to discuss what we believe the flaws in its arguments are. The article in question is Bubble paranoia on S&P 500 is a storm in a teacup”, which was posted at Saxo’s tradingfloor.com by Mr. Peter Garnry. Note here that we don’t want to make an argument about the likely timing of the bubble’s bursting or its potential for further expansion (that is a different subject) – we only want to discuss whether a bubble actually exists or not.

Opinions and Bubble Talk

One of the main arguments made in the above article is the following:

“Financial bubbles are characterized by the lack of different opinions, which is clearly not where we are today”

It is explained in the article that this is a reference to a recent increase in people’s belief in the existence of a bubble. This is usually reflected in a surge in references to bubble conditions in various financial news media. Mr Garnry (who was 15 years old at the time of the tech mania, and probably remembers the gaudy atmosphere at the time, which was indeed one of a kind) writes in this context:

“The most important point about bubbles is that they exist when no one seems to think they are there. In 2000, very few thought there was a bubble in tech stocks, but with hindsight it is clear that the bubble was massive. Again, very few acknowledged that there was a bubble in US housing in 2006-2007. The fact that three out of five people believe there is a bubble in US equities tells us that we are not in a bubble. When most bears have crawled back into their caves and maybe a few have come out as bulls then we need to worry, but not before.”

As a more grizzled veteran of the markets, we would immediately assert that this just isn’t true, based on anecdotal evidence alone. However, we can actually buttress it with data, and have actually already done so late last year (see “Circular Bubble Logic” for details). As a matter of fact, the exact opposite is the case – as a bubble matures and nears its peak, “bubble talk” increases. Anyone who experienced the tech bubble and the housing bubble on the front lines should be aware of this even if the studies proving it didn’t exist – but they do exist.

In addition to the Google Trend data we have shown in our earlier article, Bob Prechter has e.g. documented the prevalence of bubble references in newspapers as historical bubbles have progressed. Clearly, as a bubble climbs toward a frenetic peak, talk about bubble conditions begins to literally explode along with prices. Just because Alan Greenspan, Ben Bernanke and 95% of mainstream economists wouldn’t recognize a bubble if it bit them in the behind doesn’t mean that there aren’t a great many other people who do in fact recognize them.

One can also safely ignore the fact that Wall Street sell side analysts will rarely identify bubble conditions in real time publicly. As we know from the bubble post mortems after the peaks of 1929, 2000 and 2007, many of them do in fact acknowledge privately when such conditions exist. We should also note that given the experiences of the past two major asset price collapses as well as the change in the composition of market participants (not least due to the growth of the hedge fund industry), Wall Street research has overall become a great deal more nuanced. In the end though, the business of Wall Street is the selling of securities, and that creates a certain bias in its published  assessments of bubble conditions.

Needless to say, there are probably thousands of articles in the Wayback Machine’s cache which discuss the bubble conditions in both 1999/2000 and 2006/2007. If bubble talk is on the rise, it is definitely not proof that there is no bubble. Almost all authors writing about this subject do not realize the irony of the fact that there is at the same time always a flood of articles attempting to explain why a bubble is not a bubble, a flood to which they themselves contribute!

If there is one way to fairly objectively ascertain whether the danger posed by a bubble is taken seriously by investors, then it is by looking at measures of investor fear and complacency as well as various positioning data. One of these measures can be seen below:

 

Financial Stresss index

The St. Louis Fed’s financial stress index – click to enlarge.

 

One of the reasons why the current bubble is not marked by the same outward excitement that was seen in 2000, is precisely that the participants are no longer the same. The current bubble is mainly driven by professionals – institutional investors of every kind – with retail investors only passively participating by e.g. buying mutual fund shares and ETFs. However, these professionals are clearly almost completely oblivious to risk at present – which can inter alia be seen in the historically unprecedented expansion in junk debt issuance over the past two years.

 

The Monetary Component

One point on which we agree with Mr. Garnry is when he notes that one’s analysis of the market must differentiate between the pure fiat money system that has been established in 1971 and the time period preceding it. The fact that money supply and credit expansion have gone into overdrive ever since has altered a number of “tried and true” yardsticks that served as good rules of thumb back when at least still a gold exchange standard was still in place.

For example, prior to the asset bubble becoming greatly extended for the first time in the mid to late 1990s, the market’s overall dividend yield never fell much below 3%. This has changed, and the author is on the right trail when he blames the monetary system, or rather, when he points out that different monetary and institutional dispensations do make a difference to market analysis.

We disagree with a subsidiary assumption though, namely that therefore, anything that happened before 1971 is basically irrelevant. This is surely not correct. For instance, during the “roaring 20s”, the true US money supply increased by about 65% (see Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, which contains a very precise calculation of the era’s money supply growth), which is a far cry from today’s monetary expansions, but was certainly extreme at the time. There are no fixed quantitative relations between the size of such an expansion and its effects, such as those on the prices of assets or on other goods. At the time, the bulk of the price effects was concentrated first in real estate and later in securities – just as is the case today. Surely we cannot say that everything that happened before 1971 is entirely irrelevant.

However, Mr. Garnry is correct when he states that every slice of economic and financial history is different, and that these differences often encompass major aspects of the contingent historical setting:

“We do not subscribe to the valuation analysis since 1870 being thrown around on Wall Street. This is because the period includes many regime shifts in inflation, real interest rates, nominal interest rates, economic growth, monetary policy, the nature of businesses and the government’s size relative to the economy. All these parameters have changed so much that going too far back distorts the overall conclusion and causes inferences that are wrong.”

Sure enough, predictions can not possibly be based solely on empirical data, as there can be no empirical causal constants in human action (thus, every historical boom and bust sequence looks different, even though there are many parallels between them as well). This is where economic theory comes in.  While it does not allow us to make precise “predictions” either, it can at least tell us what is and what isn’t logically possible. From this we can, in concert with historical understanding, deduce what is likely. The reason why many historical bubbles evince numerous parallels in spite of their differences is precisely that the same economic laws are in operation every time.

Oddly though, Mr. Garnry doesn’t discuss the money and credit supply any further. Surely though,  it is a major component of the whole “bubble debate”.  In fact, we happen to believe that it is the most important component.

 

TMS-2-w.o.

A chart of money TMS-2 without memorandum items (which add approx. another $50 billion to the total). The money supply has approximately doubled between 1990 and 2000 and risen more than three and a half times since then. This is the reason why we have a bubble. All other arguments become mere ancillary arguments, including those on valuations – click to enlarge.

 

The Valuation Argument

This brings us the second major argument, which concerns valuations. Mr. Garnry writes:

“Bubbles are normally characterized by the data point (valuations, house prices etc.) being close to two times standard deviations away from the mean. Valuation on S&P 500 is not even close to that scenario. The current 12-month forward P/E ratio is 15.7x, which is a bit above the average of 15.5x since 1990 and the 12-month expected dividend yield is 2.1 percent. The forward P/E ratio translates into an earnings yield of around 6.4 percent. This yield does not smell of a bubble when you consider that the 10-year Treasury yield is at 2.5 percent and corporate bond yields are at historical lows.”

So here we are evidently back to empirical arguments. First of all, at the 2007 peak, market valuations by that very same criterion didn’t warn that a bubble was about to burst either. The market’s “forward P/E” was also well below the “two standard deviation band” at the time. And yet, the market collapsed by 58% after the bubble had ended. The reason was that the bubble in asset prices was accompanied and caused by a huge credit expansion, in this case specifically in mortgage debt. The current asset bubble is accompanied by a credit bubble as well – only this time, it is concentrated in low grade corporate debt and government debt (there are also smaller credit bubbles on the side, such as that in student debt and sub-prime auto debt for example).

Why is this important? Because it ultimately vitiates the entire valuation argument. Let us think back to 2007 again. What happened after the bubble burst? Corporate earnings collapsed into a heap and turned into the most massive corporate losses of the entire post WW2 era. Obviously, analysts’ “forward estimates” completely missed this turning point (generally, these estimates are almost always over-optimistic and tend to be continually revised lower – the only time when they tend to be too pessimistic is near major bear market bottoms).

Current low government and corporate bond yields – which are a direct result of central bank manipulation of interest rates and the money supply – are not a reason to deem current valuations not excessive – quite the contrary. The losses following the 2007 peak were only booked in 2008 and 2009, but they were actually made long before that time. When market interest rates are distorted, economic calculation is falsified, hence the accounting profits booked during the boom period are actually to a large part fictitious – they effectively tend to mask capital consumption. It is easy to see why this must be so: the money supply expansion and artificially lowered market interest rates must lead to capital malinvestment, which by its very nature is destined to destroy wealth.

However, this is never immediately apparent, since it takes time for long term investments to turn out to have been misguided. Amid monetary inflation, businessmen inter alia reckon with depreciation rates that refer to the price structure that existed before the inflationary policy was set into motion. They therefore report a part of the funds that are actually required to maintain their capital as profits. It matters not in what form these funds are then distributed – whether as higher wages, higher dividends or as share buybacks. A large portion of them is paid out of the substance of companies, and as a general rule of thumb, we can say that the bigger the money supply inflation, the more distorted economic calculation will tend to be. Consequently, the errors will tend to be commensurately larger as well (again, no fixed quantitative relationships can be ascertained in this context, thus it is a “rule of thumb”).

This is what is meant by the saying that we are “eating our seed corn”, or are “heating the house by burning the furniture”. Mr. Garnry asked us what we meant by capital consumption and whether it could be measured. The answer is that it cannot be measured while it occurs. However, there will come a point in time when measurements will be taken.

After the housing boom, that time arrived in 2008. Usually, the growth rate of the money supply falls below a threshold that later turns out to have been required to keep the distorted capital structure aloft. Once that happens, the most marginal malinvestments and bubble activities begin to experience difficulties and are liquidated (e.g. the first sub-prime lenders folded in February of 2007 already). From there, the realization that the fanciful reckonings of the boom were erroneous begins to spread. Once the bust arrives with full force, many of the profits made during the boom disappear, as corporate accounts are reconstituted and begin to reflect the true underlying economic conditions – that is when “measurement” takes place.

 

TMS-2-y-y-change rate

Year-on-year growth rate of money TMS-2. Where the threshold will be this time is unknowable, but our guess is that it is higher than the last two times, as the underlying real economy seems far weaker (the red parallel lines indicate the area which we guess might prove important). Note that in the mid 1970s, the bust threshold was a growth rate of around 7% – click to enlarge.

Conclusion:

If one wants to identify bubbles, one must perforce study monetary conditions. The comparison of historical data on valuations and other ancillary factors can only take one so far. The problem is that in times of strongly inflationary policy, the economy’s price structure becomes thoroughly distorted, and that therefore a great many “data” can no longer be regarded as reliable. An added complication is that we e.g. cannot know in advance if the effects of the inflationary policy on prices will broaden out or not. Should “inflation expectations” (expectations regarding future CPI rates of change) rise markedly in the future, this would have a major impact on valuations, which would then begin to contract rather than continue to expand.

However, a bubble can easily burst even if this doesn’t happen. Ultimately the question is whether brisk money supply growth will be maintained and whether the economy’s real pool of funding is still large enough to allow for additional diversions of scarce resources into bubble activities. Most of the time, it’s the eventual slowdown of money supply growth that brings a bubble to its knees.




via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1lHYWcl Tyler Durden

Historic NYT Editorial: Feds Should Legalize Marijuana Pronto

NYTThe New York Times editorial board demanded
the end of the federal government’s marijuana ban in an editorial
published Saturday. That editorial, titled “Repeal
Prohibition, Again
,” notes that most states are rightly moving
away from vigorous prosecution of drug crimes and asks the feds to
follow suit:

The federal government should repeal the ban on marijuana.

We reached that conclusion after a great deal of discussion
among the members of The Times’s Editorial Board, inspired by a
rapidly growing movement among the states to reform marijuana
laws.

There are no perfect answers to people’s legitimate concerns
about marijuana use. But neither are there such answers about
tobacco or alcohol, and we believe that on every level — health
effects, the impact on society and law-and-order issues — the
balance falls squarely on the side of national legalization. That
will put decisions on whether to allow recreational or medicinal
production and use where it belongs — at the state level.

We considered whether it would be best for Washington to hold
back while the states continued experimenting with legalizing
medicinal uses of marijuana, reducing penalties, or even simply
legalizing all use. Nearly three-quarters of the states have done
one of these.

But that would leave their citizens vulnerable to the whims of
whoever happens to be in the White House and chooses to enforce or
not enforce the federal law.

The editorial’s endorsement of legalization is qualified in some
respects, since it does recommend that the sale of marijuana be
limited to people over the age of 21:

There are legitimate concerns about marijuana on the development
of adolescent brains. For that reason, we advocate the prohibition
of sales to people under 21.

Creating systems for regulating manufacture, sale and marketing
will be complex. But those problems are solvable, and would have
long been dealt with had we as a nation not clung to the decision
to make marijuana production and use a federal crime.

Still, it’s a step in the right direction—albeit one that
libertarians have advocated for decades. If anything, it’s another
clear sign that
libertarianism is winning
.

Way to get with the times, Times.

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Remy: What are the Chances? (An IRS Love Song)

First published on July 21, 2014. Original text below:

Remy weighs the odds of finding true love and, like a well-timed
IRS hard drive failure, finds a higher power at work.

Approximately 2 minutes.

Written and performed by Remy. Video and graphics by Meredith
Bragg. Music arranged by Ben Karlstrom. 

Subscribe to Reason TV’s YouTube channel to get automatic
notifications when new material goes live and follow Reason on
Twitter at @reason. Follow Remy on Twitter at @goremy and on
YouTube here.

View this article.

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The Lesson from the Death of the Aussie Carbon Tax

When Australia embraced a carbon tax two years ago, global
warming warriors were ecstatic. Australia had gone Climate.Change.Summitfrom environmental laggard, refusing to even the
sign the Kyoto treaty at first (just like the benighted US of A),
to environmental leader. They told the world to watch and
learn.

But two weeks ago, Australia’s newly elected Prime Minister Tony
Abbott scrapped the tax that was as popular in the Land Down Under
as Donald Sterling.

So if anyone needs to learn rfrom the death of Australia’s
carbon tax, and the terminal fate of Europe’s cap-and-trade
program, I note in the Washington Examiner, it is the
enviros themselves. And the lesson is for that “mitigation”
strategies — curbing greenhouse gases by putting economies on
an energy diet — are not winning or workable.

 Instead,  envrios should accept that “the sins of
emission can’t be legislated away and abandon their quixotic quest
for radical cuts in emissions in favor of less economically
destructive coping strategies.”

Go
here
to read the whole thing.

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Indexation Is A Socialist Way Of Allocating Capital

Authored by Charles Gave of Evergreen Gavekal,

The role of financial markets is to evaluate in real time the marginal return on capital of different assets. This is done through a ‘price discovery mechanism’, with the ‘right price’ found out through a system of constant trial and error. To discover this price calls for a community of active money managers, each doing his or her due diligence before buying and selling. This price is a function of the return on capital and of the expected growth rate of this return. It has nothing at all to do with the size of the investment under consideration. What’s more, if the price of an asset has been going down for the ‘wrong’ reasons, then active money managers should buy more of it. Over time this process will help to stabilize the system.

Active money management is essentially a ‘mean reversion’ strategy. That’s not so for indexation. In the indexation process, there is no attempt at price discovery. The only thing that matters is the relative size of the asset: the bigger the market capitalization, the more an investor should own. This means if the price of a large asset goes up more than the market as a whole, indexers have to buy even more of it.

Thus indexation is a momentum-based strategy. Worse, it is a form of socialism, since new money is allocated not according to the expected return on capital but rather according to the current price of an asset relative to other assets. The bigger an asset, the more one should own…

In a true capitalist system, the rule is the higher the price, the lower the demand. With indexation, the higher the price, the higher the demand. This is insane.

Where it becomes really ridiculous is in the bond markets. Over time, the government bond market of a very badly managed country (like France) will become much bigger than the bond market of a well managed country (like Sweden). As a result, over time indexers have to buy more French bonds than Swedish bonds. The bond vigilantes of yesteryear are now condoning the very crimes they once condemned… and they have no choice about it.

Any economic system based on momentum must be extremely unstable, moving relentlessly from boom to bust and back again, which over time will cause a massive waste of capital. The swings will only be reinforced by zero interest rate policies, since these suppress the cost of capital against which returns on capital should be measured.

The deep thinkers on the New York Times bestseller list all wonder why our economies are moving ex-growth. May I offer a simple explanation?

We cannot have economic growth without a proper cost of capital, nor if capital is allocated, not according to the marginal growth rate of the return on invested capital, but according to the market capitalization of the existing capital stock. What matters is the expected changes in the ROIC and not the current value which the market puts on that return.

Indexation could work if it remained a satellite strategy, with say 10% of the money being managed through indexation, the rest being managed by active money managers. As such, it would be a parasitic strategy. Indexers would benefit from the price discovery work done by others without paying the costs associated with the process.

But a system where everybody wants to be a freeloader cannot work. The real problem here is that investment ‘consultants’ (read failed money managers) have defined risk as a deviation from the index against which the money manager is benchmarked.

This is idiotic. It forces even mean reversion managers to become closet indexers.

Let me be clear: in a properly managed capitalist economy there should only be three returns – in real terms – to worry about:

1) 1%—if one buys 3 month T-bills and does not want to take a duration risk
2) 3%—if one buys long government bonds and is willing to take a duration risk
3) 6%—if one buys shares and accepts the risk one may not get all of one’s money back

Over the long term, equity managers should be measured against the 6% real target. All other benchmarks will lead to the misallocation of capital and create a deeply unstable financial system together with a much lower growth rate and higher unemployment.

In effect, by pursuing indexation we have introduced a socialist way of allocating capital in the heart of the capitalist system.

As we all know, socialism is the ultimate form of freeloading. It has never worked, and it never will. This indexation is one of the most obvious forms of parasitism I have ever encountered.




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