From Helmann v. Codepink Women for Peace, decided June 13 by Judge Stephen Wilson (C.D. Cal.), but just posted on Westlaw:
This case arises out of the events that took place at the Adas Torah [Orthodox] Synagogue … on June 23, 2024 … in Los Angeles’s Pico-Robertson neighborhood.
On June 23, 2024, the Synagogue held its usual religious services: a morning, afternoon, and evening prayer. That same day, the Synagogue also hosted a special “Aliyah Event,” where a real estate company presented opportunities to purchase homes in Israel. According to the complaint, this event held religious significance for many attendees, who view moving to Israel as a fulfillment of a religious commandment. Similar events often include prayer or Torah study and are generally understood by the community as religious in nature.
{Defendants contest the religious nature of the Aliyah Event, largely because Plaintiffs’ claims depend in part on whether they were attempting to enter the Synagogue to exercise their First Amendment rights. The complaint contains detailed allegations regarding the religious nature of the Aliyah Event, e.g. that a common belief among Orthodox Jews is that returning to and dwelling in Israel is a religious commandment. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court takes Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the religious nature of the Aliyah Event as true and therefore that attempts to enter the Synagogue to attend that event pertained to an exercise of First Amendment rights. In any event, several Plaintiffs allege that they attempted to enter the Synagogue at least in part for a squarely religious purpose, e.g. to attend prayer services.}
Plaintiffs sued various defendants over various roles in what they characterized as “a mob” that assembled outside the Synagogue; some members allegedly engaged in violence against some of the synagogue-goers. Here, I’ll focus on claims that certain posts were “threat[s] of force” and thus violated the FACE Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994; that law bars interference through obstruction, force, or threat of force not just with reproductive health facilities but also with places of religious worship.
The CodePink social media post at issue claims that “A MEGA ZIONIST REAL ESTATE EVENT IS IN LA THIS WEEK” and asks CodePink’s followers to “HELP US ADVOCATE THE STOP OF HOMES BEING SOLD ON PALESTINIAN LAND!” Neither statement contains a threat on its face.
But CodePink’s social media posts are not limited to these innocuous statements. Plaintiffs allege that in the social media posts, CodePink placed the date of the Aliyah Event and the address of the Synagogue inside an inverted red triangle. This inverted triangle, according to Plaintiffs, is used by “Hamas and its supporters (particularly those on social media) … as a symbol for Hamas and to celebrate its use of violence against Jews and Israelis.” The inverted triangle also purportedly acts “as a target designator to identify Jews and Jewish targets for extermination.” In short, Plaintiffs allege that when CodePink placed the date of the Aliyah Event and the address of the Synagogue inside an inverted red triangle, they were calling on Hamas supporters to take violent action at the synagogue.
This use of the inverted red triangle, as alleged, plausibly constitutes a true threat. A true threat is one in which, “in the entire context and under all circumstances,” a “reasonable person” would interpret it “as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm.” That is exactly how a reasonable person would interpret CodePink’s use of the red triangle. And for multiple reasons.
First, the legal reality is that the Court must take Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and make all reasonable inferences in their favor. So, if Plaintiffs allege that Hamas and their supporters commonly use the inverted red triangle as a call for violence, the Court must assume that is true and infer that other people know about its meaning.
And while the Court certainly does not need to consider conclusory allegations, Plaintiffs do not invent their assertion about the inverted red triangles out of thin air. They cite to a report from the Anti-Defamation League, which describes the inverted red triangle “as a symbol that in certain cases can signify support for violent Palestinian resistance against Israel” and “as a way to call for further violent resistance.”
Second, the context in which CodePink made its social media posts makes it plausible that a reasonable person would understand the meaning of the inverted red triangle and interpret it as a threat. The post was made in June 2024, less than nine months after the widely publicized October 7, 2023 terrorist attack by Hamas. At that time, the conflict between Israel and Hamas dominated headlines. Given this backdrop, it is entirely plausible that a reasonable person would recognize symbols associated with Hamas—particularly those linked to violence—and view their use as threatening.
Third, CodePink’s history of violent and disruptive protests makes it more likely that a reasonable person would interpret their use of the inverted red triangle as a threat. Courts consider context when assessing whether a statement qualifies as a true threat, including “whether the victim ha[s] reason to believe that the [alleged threat] maker had a propensity to engage in violence.” Here, Plaintiffs allege that CodePink has a well-documented record of protests that “often result in violence, arrests, and unlawful disruptions.”
For example, Plaintiffs claim that in July 2024, a CodePink member “assaulted Congressman Derrick Van Orden during a CodePink protest.” They further allege that in November 2024, “CodePink operatives” “harassed CNN anchor Dana Bash” at a synagogue while she was attending a religious service.
Given the widespread media attention surrounding pro-Palestine protests after the October 2023 Hamas attacks, it is plausible that a reasonable person would be aware of CodePink’s reputation. That awareness, combined with the use of a symbol like the inverted red triangle, supports the inference that a reasonable person could view the posts as threatening—particularly in light of Plaintiffs’ allegation that “CodePink has long supported terrorists.”
Fourth, CodePink’s use of the inverted red triangle, as alleged, is meaningfully similar to the “GUILTY” posters that the Ninth Circuit held were true threats in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activist (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). There, the Ninth Circuit considered whether anti-abortion protesters violated the FACE Act by displaying, at various press conferences and anti-abortion events, posters that featured the word “GUILTY” along with the names of abortion providers. The court found the “GUILTY” posters to be true threats because they closely resembled earlier “WANTED” posters, each of which named a doctor who was later murdered. The court concluded that, to doctors performing abortions, the posters conveyed the message: “You’re Wanted or You’re Guilty; You’ll be shot or Killed.”
This case bears striking similarities. Like the “GUILTY” posters, CodePink’s social media posts do not “contain[ ] any language that is overtly threatening.” See id. But the threat lies in the context and the symbolism. In Planned Parenthood, the doctors who were named on the “GUILTY” posters were later murdered—demonstrating a deadly pattern where inclusion on the poster signaled imminent danger. The same logic applies here. Plaintiffs alleged that CodePink placed the Synagogue’s address inside an inverted red triangle—a symbol Plaintiffs allege is used by Hamas to identify targets for violence. So, it is not just symbolism; it is a call for action. When that symbol is used to mark a specific location, it suggests that violence will follow. Just as abortion providers reasonably understood the “GUILTY” posters to mean, “You’re Wanted or You’re Guilty; You’ll be shot or Killed”; a reasonable Jewish observer could interpret CodePink’s posts as saying: “You’ve been marked: this place is a target.” In short, like the “GUILTY” posters, CodePink’s posts “connote something they do not literally say, yet both the actor and the recipient get the message.”
And while it is certainly true that CodePink did not direct its social media posts directly at Jewish worshipers, that kind of targeting isn’t required for FACE Act liability. In Planned Parenthood, the defendants didn’t deliver their threatening messages straight to the abortion providers either. Instead, they displayed the “GUILTY” posters at press conferences, published them in pro-life magazines, and showed them at events they organized. The messages were directed at their supporters, not their targets—just like CodePink’s posts here. Just as this did not bar FACE Act liability in Planned Parenthood, it does not do so here.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ have sufficiently alleged that CodePink’s social media posts constitute a true threat. To the extent that CodePink argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations are not true or that the reasonable inferences made in their favor are not accurate, those are arguments better made after the pleadings stage. After all, “it is a jury question whether actions and communications are clearly outside the ambit of First Amendment protection.”
There’s much more going on in the long opinion: Some other claims against defendants were rejected (including threats claims against another defendant, Palestinian Youth Movement, for its different social media posts); I hope to blog separately about that later. But this struck me as an especially interesting passage.
The post CodePink Social Media Posts with Inverted Red Triangle Urging Protest Outside Synagogue Could Be Punishable Threats of Violence appeared first on Reason.com.
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