For those of us who are more
used to two-party democracy, last week’s
elections to the European Parliament could easily be a source
of confusion. By my estimate, the European Parliament’s 751 seats
will soon be divided between representatives of 198 different
national parties, themselves organized into seven (or possibly
eight) official groups—with each of those representing a political
faction that draws support from at least 25 members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) who must, between them, represent no fewer than
seven of the E.U.’s 28 member states. Got it?
If you want to know more, read on for a guide to Europe’s main
political factions, how they did in last week’s elections, and what
it means for the future of the European Union.
The Center
A majority of seats (62 percent) went to representatives of
Europe’s three main groups: the European People’s Party (EPP), the
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), and the
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European
Parliament (S&D). Collectively, these groups represent the
pro-E.U. mainstream, and include the main national parties from
most E.U. member states. Nonetheless, each of these groups
represents a distinct European political tradition.
The EPP are best described as Christian democrats. They are on
the center-right of politics, being relatively pro-market and
fiscally conservative in European terms, but nevertheless committed
to a comprehensive welfare state and a regulated, mixed economy.
They are moderately traditionalist, but not in an outspoken
way—they have very little in common with America’s religious right,
for example. After last week’s elections, the EPP remain the
largest group in the European Parliament with 28 percent of its
seats, but that is down from 36 percent last time. France’s
center-right opposition party, the Union for a Popular Movement
(UMP), lost half its seats in the European Parliament; the main
center-right parties in Italy and Spain lost almost one-third of
theirs.
ALDE are Europe’s liberal centrists. The group contains both
classical liberals and moderate social democrats; they generally
favor trade, competition, and individual freedom—but not to the
extent that you would call them libertarians. Moreover, two of the
group’s largest national parties—Germany’s Free Democrats and
Britain’s Liberal Democrats—suffered heavy losses in last week’s
elections, and that looks set to further diminish the influence of
classical liberalism within the group. Expect this bloc, which
holds 9 percent of seats in the European Parliament (down from 11
percent last time), to trend in a more interventionist direction in
future.
S&D, meanwhile, are typically referred to as socialists, a
term that doesn’t carry the same stigma in continental Europe as it
does in the U.S. But while some of S&D’s constituent national
parties are eager to embrace socialism (here’s looking at you,
Ed Milliband), others (like
Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party in Italy) are much more
reformist, pursuing tax cuts, privatization, and market
liberalization. What’s more, many S&D members accept the E.U.’s
strict limits on public debt and deficits. S&D, then, are
perhaps better described as a broad, social democratic
coalition—they are certainly committed to social justice and the
welfare state, but they are not everywhere and always opposed to
fiscal consolidation, business, and markets. They have 25 percent
of seats in the new parliament, down 1 percent from 2009.
The Left
Another reason to hold off on calling S&D socialist is that
a genuinely anti-capitalist group—European United Left/Nordic Green
Left (GUE/NGL)—won 6 percent of seats in the European Parliament,
up 1 percent from 2009. The biggest news here was in Greece, where
the radical left-wing parties (Syriza and the Communist Party)
doubled their share of the vote, from 16 percent in 2009 to 33
percent in 2014—a sign of the deep unpopularity of the “austerity”
policies that were imposed on Greece as a condition of its repeated
E.U./IMF bailouts. With Syriza’s leader, Alex Tsipras, now
demanding an early general election in Greece, there may soon
be renewed concern about the stability and integrity of the
eurozone.
The Greens/European Free Alliance also lean left, albeit not
quite so radically as GUE/NGL. This group, which consists of
environmentalists and progressive parties representing “stateless
nations and disadvantaged minorities,” maintained its 7 percent
share of seats in the European Parliament.
The Right
Perhaps the most interesting news to come from last week’s
elections, however, is the rise of the euroskeptic right, who
oppose the doctrine of “ever-closer union” in Europe, and in some
cases want their countries to leave the European Union altogether.
But this is a very long way from being a homogeneous political
bloc. Indeed, it may yet result in three formal parliamentary
groups, and still leave several nationalist parties out in the
cold.
At the respectable end of the spectrum are the European
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), a group dominated by the U.K.’s
ruling Conservative Party and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS). As
things stand, the group looks set to have 6 percent of seats in the
European Parliament after last week’s vote, down 1 percent from
2009. However, the alliances among euroskeptic parties are
currently in flux, so the group could easily end up bigger than
that. This group is united by its desire to make the European Union
more open, decentralized, and free market. But beyond that, there
are some differences of opinion. The U.K. Conservatives are
relatively liberal on social issues, but also favor stricter
immigration controls; PiS is more socially conservative, but also
opposes restrictions on the free movement of people within the
E.U.
The next euroskeptic group is Europe of Freedom and Democracy
(EFD), which currently appears to have increased its share of
parliamentary seats from 4 to 5 percent. This group is dominated by
the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP), which topped the U.K. poll with
27 percent of the national vote. UKIP seeks Britain’s withdrawal
from the E.U. and favors very strict immigration control, but it
also has a number of free market policies and sometimes describes
itself as libertarian. (I’m
not convinced that it deserves the label.)
Interestingly, it is possible that UKIP will be joined in EFD by
Poland’s Congress
of the New Right, which advocates a minimalist, nightwatchman
state. The party won four seats in the European Parliament with 7
percent of the Polish national vote. It also “gained 28.5 percent
of votes among 18- to 25-year-olds—more than any other party,”
according to The Guardian. It is unfortunate, then,
that the party’s leader, Janusz Korwin-Mikke—described by some as a
Polish Ron Paul—is said to
favor monarchy over democracy,
oppose the right of women to vote, and has been quoted
heaping scorn on the Paralympics, as well as
questioning whether Hitler knew about the Holocaust.
Libertarians would be well advised to contain their excitement.
Another problem for UKIP is that its Italian ally, the Northern
League, plans to defect to the far-right European Alliance for
Freedom (more on that in a moment). Meanwhile, its Nordic
allies—the Finns and the Danish People’s Party—might be off to join
ECR. This could leave UKIP unable to gather representatives from
seven different E.U. member states, and therefore prevent them from
forming an official parliamentary group. (Official status is
important because it comes with central funding, which pays for the
groups’ staff, facilities, and research.) It would be a cruel irony
if UKIP’s electoral success were to translate into parliamentary
isolation, but it remains, for now, a possibility—to his credit,
UKIP leader Nigel Farage has ruled out an alliance with several
parties that are widely viewed as xenophobic and nativist.
Speaking of which, Marine Le Pen’s National Front came out on
top of the French poll, with 25 percent of the votes cast. She will
now seek to win official status for her European Alliance for
Freedom group. The National Front have 24 seats, and were
previously in a parliamentary alliance with Austria’s Freedom Party
(four seats) and Belgium’s Flemish Interest (one seat). The Dutch
Party for Freedom won four seats (a surprisingly lackluster
performance), and its leader, Geert Wilders, has said they will
join Le Pen’s alliance. Italy’s Northern League (five seats) plans
to sign up as well. Throw in the Sweden Democrats (two seats) and
the European Alliance for Freedom has 40 seats in parliament (5
percent of the total) but still needs to find an MEP from a seventh
country before it wins official status.
Taken as a group (there is some variation between the individual
parties involved), this bloc can be expected to espouse a robust,
nationalist ideology that is culturally conservative and
authoritarian, opposed to immigration, concerned about
Islamification, and skeptical of the benefits of global trade.
Unlike UKIP, they have no particular affection for free market
economics, and their chosen name (European Alliance for Freedom)
will strike many as a misnomer. The previous nationalist group,
which collapsed when its Romanian and Italian members
fell out with one another, was at least more honest: it called
itself “Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty.”
Despite this, there are three nationalist parties that won seats
in last week’s elections, but with whom the European Alliance for
Freedom will probably not wish to be associated. These are
Hungary’s Jobbik (three seats), Greece’s Golden Dawn (three seats),
and Germany’s National Democrats (one seat). Though they all reject
the neo-Nazi label that is usually applied to them, there are too
many telltale signs of
racism,
anti-Semitism, and
fascism for other parties to tolerate. As a result, Jobbick,
Golden Dawn, and the National Democrats are likely to remain
isolated.
Implications
Most coverage of the European election results—this article
included—has focused on the rise of radical, populist parties. This
is certainly significant. But the near-term effects of these
elections will mostly be felt at the domestic, rather than the
European level.
In Britain, UKIP’s popularity may—if it endures—sway the course
of 2015 general election, making the opposition Labour Party more
likely to win by depriving the Conservatives of crucial marginal
seats. It could make Scotland, which is relatively pro-E.U.,
more likely to vote for independence from the rest of the U.K.
in September this year. And it could make other European leaders
more willing to help UK Prime Minister David Cameron in his efforts
to reform the E.U., and thus avoid a British vote for withdrawal in
the referendum that is tentatively scheduled for 2017.
In Italy, the strong showing for the ruling Democratic Party is
good news for Matteo Renzi’s plans to liberalize, privatize, and
reform his way to faster economic growth and a more sustainable
debt burden in Europe’s fifth-largest economy. The country’s
traditional center-right groups face a challenge to redefine
themselves in a (possibly) post-Silvio Berlusconi era, after losing
out again to the Five Star Movement’s amorphous protest vote.
France’s UMP faces a similar future: how do they ensure that they
are the ones to benefit politically from the failure of President
Francois Hollande’s failed socialist agenda, rather than the
reactionary National Front?
Yet it may well be Greece where the impact of these elections is
most keenly felt. The electoral success of parties on both the
radical-left and the far-right suggests there may be trouble ahead
for the Greek economy, Greek society, and perhaps the eurozone as a
whole.
Back in Brussels and Strasbourg (the two homes of the European
Parliament) the three traditional parties—EPP, ALDE, P&S—are
likely to function as a grand coalition, ensuring the continued
dominance of pro-E.U., “ever-closer-union” policies. Although the
election results may have some immediate and unwelcome impact on
policy—the Financial Times
notes, for example, that the loss of several liberals from key
committees may lead to more heavy-handed financial
regulation—chances are that business will continue very much as
usual.
This, in itself, is a shame: While there is no need for E.U.
politicians to react to the rise of far-right and radical-left
parties by copying their policies, there are lessons they should
learn. They ought to be more respectful of the principle of
subsidiarity, and decline to legislate and regulate things that are
better left to national or local governments. They should realize
that the E.U. is not meant to be a superstate, and accept that its
direction should be dictated by representatives of national
governments, rather than E.U. functionaries. Most important of all,
they should realize that much more radical action is needed to
boost economic growth in the eurozone, and to prevent it sliding
into a Japanese-style “lost decade.” That means taking measures to
liberalize the E.U.’s internal market, reduce the deadweight costs
of E.U. regulation, and pursue genuine free trade deals with the
rest of the world, while also supporting efforts reduce corruption,
redesign tax codes, and reform outdated and costly public services
in E.U. member states.
In a context of decentralization and renewed economic growth,
far-right and radical-left ideas would likely fade from view as
quickly as they’ve appeared in this round of European elections.
But if power continues to accrue to distant elites, and eurozone
economies continue to fester, these ideologies will continue to
attract European voters.
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