I’ll be on the Alan
Nathan Show in just a few minutes, in the 6p.m. hour, talking
about the continuing conflict between Israel and Hamas.
Nathan is interested in the question of why some consider the
Palestinians more “righteous” in the conflict because they have
more casualties. As I told him (the interview’s pre-recorded), I’m
not interested in those kinds of questions. Nevertheless, the
Israeli government’s response to Hamas’ haphazard lobbing of
rockets into its territory—largely intercepted by the Iron Dome if
they’re actually headed anywhere where there’s a risk—doesn’t seem
an appropriate one if the goal is to minimize the security threat
posed by Hamas and other extremist groups in Gaza.
As to the rockets and the Israeli government’s response, I
repeated a point I made in a column
earlier this week:
In the U.S., every time an incidence of “gun violence” makes the
national news, certain political groups call for an immediate
widespread curtailment of Second Amendment rights to combat the
threat. Feelings of terror, however they are generated, can be
powerful motivators for reactionary politics. The effort to curtail
gun rights often fails in the U.S. because the intended victims of
the rights-deprivation are a part of the political process and
enjoy broad support despite a vocal, almost hysterical, opposition.
The Gazans have no say in Israeli politics—their opinion on being
bombed is irrelevant. And they have little say in Palestinian
politics, either, when their leaders can’t agree on elections,
stake their survival in escalating conflict with Israel, all
while propagandized their
population with the same anti-Israeli hatred that animates their
politics.
The Israeli government, of course, doesn’t need approval from
the U.N. or the U.S. or anyone else to respond or react in any way
it chooses, only from enough people to make it through the next
election. The only relevant question to U.S. policy is whether
we should be subsidizing it.
Toward the end, I suggested the Israeli government may, in
reviewing the operation after it ends, find that its approach
caused it to miss opportunities. I identified the right prime
minister, Ehud Olmert, though not by name, under which the
Winograd Commission happened but may have mentioned it was
after a conflict with Hamas not Hezbollah. On a semi-related note,
earlier in the segment Nathan asked why Hezbollah and Hamas were
repairing ties when a Sunni-Shi’a conflict is brewing
across the region. You’ll have to tune
in for my answer.
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