Category: zerohedge

Not Tesla, Not Apple, Not Netflix…

 

 

Via The Guardian,

Kristoffer Koch invested 150 kroner ($26.60) in 5,000 bitcoins in 2009, after discovering them during the course of writing a thesis on encryption. He promptly forgot about them until widespread media coverage of the anonymous, decentralised, peer-to-peer digital currency in April 2013 jogged his memory.

 

…

 

The meteoric rise in bitcoin has meant that within the space of four years, one Norwegian man’s $27 investment turned into a forgotten $886,000 windfall.

 

…

 

Bitcoins are stored in encrypted wallets secured with a private key, something Koch had forgotten. After eventually working out what the password could be, Koch got a pleasant surprise: “It said I had 5,000 bitcoins in there. Measuring that in today’s rates it’s about NOK5m ($886,000),” Koch told NRK.

 

…

 

Koch exchanged one fifth of his 5,000 bitcoins, generating enough kroner to buy an apartment in Toyen, one of the Norwegian capital’s wealthier areas.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/SH1lDBzd0Yc/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Submitted by Peter Schoff via Euro Pacific Capital,

Since Obamacare made its debut, discussions have focused on Ted Cruz' efforts to defund the law and the shockingly bad functionality of the Website itself. Fortunately for Obama, polling indicates that Senator Cruz has lost, at least for now, the battle for hearts and minds. The President has not been nearly so lucky on the technological front. If current trends continue, the rollout may go down as the worst major product launch in history. But given the government's enormous resources, it's safe to say that the site itself will ultimately be fixed. But when it is finally up and running, the plan's many deeper, and more intractable, flaws will come into focus. That's when the fun will really begin.

Put simply the program is built on a mountain of false assumptions and is covered by a terrain of unanticipated incentives. Any cleared-eyed observer should conclude that it is perfectly designed to raise the costs of care and wreck the federal budget. However, like just about every other complicated problem that bedevils the nation, the public has become far too caught up in the politics and has ignored the horrific details.

Most people agree that the plan can only remain solvent if enough young and healthy people ("the invincibles") agree to sign up. They are the ones who are likely to pay more into the system than they take out. But now that insurance coverage is guaranteed to anyone at any time (at the same price — even after they have gotten sick or injured), the only incentive for the invincibles to sign up will be to avoid the penalty (I think we can dismiss "civic duty" as an effective motivator). But as I detailed in a column last year, Justice John Roberts declared the law to be constitutional only because the penalties are far too low to actually compel behavior. Once young healthy people understand that they can save money by dropping insurance, they will. No amount of slick, cheerful TV ads will change that.

The good news for Obama is that the plan will get a large percentage of young people covered. The bad news is that many of those that do sign up will not help the bottom line. The youngest and healthiest of the group are under 26 and will now be able to stay on their parents' plans. This group will add nothing to the pool of premiums (but will use services). Among those older than 26, the ones who qualify for the largest subsidies will be more inclined to sign up. The way the plan is structured, individuals and families earning between 1.38 and 4 times the Federal poverty level will qualify for a subsidy. The government subsidy covers almost the entire premium for those near the bottom of that spectrum. These individuals will definitely sign up. But just like those under 26, they will be a net drain on the system.

From my estimations, private premium contributions don't surpass the government contributions until an individual or a family makes about 2.5 times the poverty level (which equates to about $28,000 for an individual and $55,000 for a family of 4). Since a very large percentage of young people earn less than that, many will sign up to get the benefit. But these people will likely be net drains to the system as well. Their total premiums paid may be more than the services they receive, but that may not be true when you look only at what they actually pay in.

Young women, who plan on using maternity care, may also be motivated. But they can cost more than they bring in. The real cash cows are the young men, not covered by parents, who make more than 4 times the poverty level. But their only incentive to sign up is to avoid the penalty. But at just one percent of income, the penalty just won't be a deciding factor. Most young men will save money by dropping insurance, paying the tax and incidental doctor visits out of pocket, and then only adding the insurance if and when something really bad happens.

The subsidies in Obamacare kick in and kick out very abruptly. People finding themselves on the wrong side of a dividing line will face difficult choices that hurt the plan's finances. The San Francisco Chronicle recently profiled a California couple in their early 60s making about $64,000 per year who would be able to qualify for a $14,000 annual subsidy by reducing their income by $2,000 dollars per year. It's easy to imagine such individuals reducing their hours or their pay to qualify. Of course this type of behavior modification has not been anticipated by preparing premium and budget projections. It is no accident that the government has offered no serious projections about how much in healthcare subsidies it should expect to pay out over the coming years

In truth, the premium levels themselves are based on nothing but assumptions. It is true that those lucky enough to actually get through the website's technological maze have seen (unsubsidized) premiums that are lower than similarly constituted plans in the private market. But those low prices are only possible because no one knows what the new pool of insurance holders will look like. They assume it will look like the pools that already exist. But they won't.

Of course, the incentives for the young and healthy to drop out, and for the sick, old and the heavily subsidized to drop in will mean that the post-Obamacare pool will have very different actuarial arithmetic than the current pools. But all of that is as yet unknown. The numbers we see now were put there just to make us feel good. But once the economics kicks in, look for them to rise quickly.

It is also ironic that high-deductible, catastrophic plans are precisely what young people should be buying in the first place. They are inexpensive because they provide coverage for unlikely, but expensive, events. Routine care is best paid for out-of-pocket by value conscious consumers. But Obamacare outlaws these plans, in favor of what amounts to prepaid medical treatment that shifts the cost of services to taxpayers. In such a system, patients have no incentive to contain costs. Since the biggest factor driving health care costs higher in the first place has been the over use of insurance that results from government-provided tax incentives, and the lack of cost accountability that results from a third-party payer system, Obamacare will bend the cost curve even higher. The fact that Obamacare does nothing to rein in costs while providing an open-ended insurance subsidy may be good news for hospitals and insurance companies, but it's bad news for taxpayers, on whom this increased burden will ultimately fall.

The real shock of Obamacare is not the unbelievable ineptitude in which it was launched, but the naiveté in which it was designed. The only thing worse than the product launch may be the product itself. But unlike other major entitlements, like Social Security and Medicare, that took years to produce red ink that was far in excess of original assumptions, the financial shortfalls in Obamacare should show up very quickly. Republicans should not miss that opportunity to destroy this monster that threatens us all.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/FRJEzGrRqcc/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Submitted by Peter Schoff via Euro Pacific Capital,

Since Obamacare made its debut, discussions have focused on Ted Cruz' efforts to defund the law and the shockingly bad functionality of the Website itself. Fortunately for Obama, polling indicates that Senator Cruz has lost, at least for now, the battle for hearts and minds. The President has not been nearly so lucky on the technological front. If current trends continue, the rollout may go down as the worst major product launch in history. But given the government's enormous resources, it's safe to say that the site itself will ultimately be fixed. But when it is finally up and running, the plan's many deeper, and more intractable, flaws will come into focus. That's when the fun will really begin.

Put simply the program is built on a mountain of false assumptions and is covered by a terrain of unanticipated incentives. Any cleared-eyed observer should conclude that it is perfectly designed to raise the costs of care and wreck the federal budget. However, like just about every other complicated problem that bedevils the nation, the public has become far too caught up in the politics and has ignored the horrific details.

Most people agree that the plan can only remain solvent if enough young and healthy people ("the invincibles") agree to sign up. They are the ones who are likely to pay more into the system than they take out. But now that insurance coverage is guaranteed to anyone at any time (at the same price — even after they have gotten sick or injured), the only incentive for the invincibles to sign up will be to avoid the penalty (I think we can dismiss "civic duty" as an effective motivator). But as I detailed in a column last year, Justice John Roberts declared the law to be constitutional only because the penalties are far too low to actually compel behavior. Once young healthy people understand that they can save money by dropping insurance, they will. No amount of slick, cheerful TV ads will change that.

The good news for Obama is that the plan will get a large percentage of young people covered. The bad news is that many of those that do sign up will not help the bottom line. The youngest and healthiest of the group are under 26 and will now be able to stay on their parents' plans. This group will add nothing to the pool of premiums (but will use services). Among those older than 26, the ones who qualify for the largest subsidies will be more inclined to sign up. The way the plan is structured, individuals and families earning between 1.38 and 4 times the Federal poverty level will qualify for a subsidy. The government subsidy covers almost the entire premium for those near the bottom of that spectrum. These individuals will definitely sign up. But just like those under 26, they will be a net drain on the system.

From my estimations, private premium contributions don't surpass the government contributions until an individual or a family makes about 2.5 times the poverty level (which equates to about $28,000 for an individual and $55,000 for a family of 4). Since a very large percentage of young people earn less than that, many will sign up to get the benefit. But these people will likely be net drains to the system as well. Their total premiums paid may be more than the services they receive, but that may not be true when you look only at what they actually pay in.

Young women, who plan on using maternity care, may also be motivated. But they can cost more than they bring in. The real cash cows are the young men, not covered by parents, who make more than 4 times the poverty level. But their only incentive to sign up is to avoid the penalty. But at just one percent of income, the penalty just won't be a deciding factor. Most young men will save money by dropping insurance, paying the tax and incidental doctor visits out of pocket, and then only adding the insurance if and when something really bad happens.

The subsidies in Obamacare kick in and kick out very abruptly. People finding themselves on the wrong side of a dividing line will face difficult choices that hurt the plan's finances. The San Francisco Chronicle recently profiled a California couple in their early 60s making about $64,000 per year who would be able to qualify for a $14,000 annual subsidy by reducing their income by $2,000 dollars per year. It's easy to imagine such individuals reducing their hours or their pay to qualify. Of course this type of behavior modification has not been anticipated by preparing premium and budget projections. It is no accident that the government has offered no serious projections about how much in healthcare subsidies it should expect to pay out over the coming years

In truth, the premium levels themselves are based on nothing but assumptions. It is true that those lucky enough to actually get through the website's technological maze have seen (unsubsidized) premiums that are lower than similarly constituted plans in the private market. But those low prices are only possible because no one knows what the new pool of insurance holders will look like. They assume it will look like the pools that already exist. But they won't.

Of course, the incentives for the young and healthy to drop out, and for the sick, old and the heavily subsidized to drop in will mean that the post-Obamacare pool will have very different actuarial arithmetic than the current pools. But all of that is as yet unknown. The numbers we see now were put there just to make us feel good. But once the economics kicks in, look for them to rise quickly.

It is also ironic that high-deductible, catastrophic plans are precisely what young people should be buying in the first place. They are inexpensive because they provide coverage for unlikely, but expensive, events. Routine care is best paid for out-of-pocket by value conscious consumers. But Obamacare outlaws these plans, in favor of what amounts to prepaid medical treatment that shifts the cost of services to taxpayers. In such a system, patients have no incentive to contain costs. Since the biggest factor driving health care costs higher in the first place has been the over use of insurance that results from government-provided tax incentives, and the lack of cost accountability that results from a third-party payer system, Obamacare will bend the cost curve even higher. The fact that Obamacare does nothing to rein in costs while providing an open-ended insurance subsidy may be good news for hospitals and insurance companies, but it's bad news for taxpayers, on whom this increased burden will ultimately fall.

The real shock of Obamacare is not the unbelievable ineptitude in which it was launched, but the naiveté in which it was designed. The only thing worse than the product launch may be the product itself. But unlike other major entitlements, like Social Security and Medicare, that took years to produce red ink that was far in excess of original assumptions, the financial shortfalls in Obamacare should show up very quickly. Republicans should not miss that opportunity to destroy this monster that threatens us all.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/FRJEzGrRqcc/story01.htm Tyler Durden

One of the great things about the neverending series of Libor busts and settlements (which incidentally were once a “conspiracy theory” because it was supposedly  impossible for so many people to keep their mouth shut, or so the always wrong conventional wisdom went until the summer of 2012 when theory became fact) is that they all thought they would never get caught, used communications that left a record visible from a mile away, and in the process described the criminal aspects, which lately it seems are the only ones left, of banking from the inside in greater detail than anyone else. Such as in the case of today’s Rabobank $1.1 billion Libor manipulation settlement which also cost the CEO, Piet Moerland, his job. It is there that we read just how the Libor criminals saw their daily transgression: “Don’t worry mate — there’s bigger crooks in the market than us guys!” There is (sic) indeed.

This is what one Rabobank yen Libor submitter, identified as Submitter-4 in the DOJ’s Statement of Fact filing, said in the September 21, 2007 e-mail, after agreeing to increase the daily yen rate by a percentage point.

Elsewhere, one Rabobank trader told a yen submitter that people were talking with each other to change the rates. The submitter said: “yes deffinite manipulation – always is tho to be honest mate… i always used to ask if anyone needed a favour and vise versa…a little unethical but always helps to have friends in mrkt.”

Then, another mid-level manager joked to a colleague seeking help rigging rates: “I am fast turning into your Libor bitch!!!” And so on.

To the manipulating cabal, it was a lucrative victimless crime. To everyone else, between this and all the other crimes conducted by bankers in the years before 2008, it became the biggest taxpayer funded bank bailout in history. So unfortunately, the joke was on everyone else. Twice.

Bloomberg has more:

On July 28, 2006, a Rabobank trader and rate submitter discussed moving one-month rates higher. Within 20 minutes, the submitter contacted a trader at another bank and said: “morning skipper will be setting an obscenely high lm again today,” according to the U.S. filing.

 

The other bank’s trader responded, “(K)…oh dear..my poor customers….hehehe!! manual input libors again today then!!!!”

 

The rate submissions by both Rabobank and the other bank, which isn’t named in the documents, moved up one basis point that day, from 0.37 to 0.38. Those submissions were the second highest of the contributor panel that day, according to the statement of facts.

To be sure, everyone was involved…

Mid-level managers at the bank, such as Rabobank’s global head of liquidity and finance in London, were aware of and participated in the internal manipulation of Libor submissions, according to the statement of facts.

 

“We were obviously struck by the extent of the misconduct,” Mythili Raman, acting assistant attorney general of the Justice Department’s criminal division, said in an interview.

 

She said the investigation found both internal and external agreements to manipulate rates and that the rate setter allowed swaps traders to have significant influence over the Libor setting process.

 

“What we’ve found across a number of our investigations whether it be in this case or others is that there is misconduct that banks need to be paying more attention to,” Raman said. “They should be paying attention to the fact that we’re paying attention and there’s more to come.”

… and not just at Rabo but everywhere else too.

The fines make Rabobank the fifth firm penalized over manipulation of the London interbank offered rate. Global investigations into banks’ attempts to manipulate the benchmarks for profit have led to fines and settlements for Barclays Plc (BARC), Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, UBS AG (UBSN) and ICAP Plc.

 

Thirty current and former employees of the Dutch lender were involved in rate rigging, Rabobank executive board member Sipko Schat said today. Five of them were fired, he said.

 

“We were startled by the amounts, which were higher than we had anticipated, taking into account regulators found no involvement from the bank’s management board or senior managers,”

And that, it goes without saying, is the biggest punchline of all. Because absolutely everyone in each of the Libor manipulating banks knew what was going on- from the lowliest mail boy, to the CEO. But it would not look good to the general public if the people at the very top of the banking industry were found to be common crooks like those overfilling every single US prison.

Full DOJ filing below.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/aieBKwYzSC8/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Having previously exposed the world to the "nominal stock market cheerleaders," it is clear that Kyle Bass sees things as only having got worse among developed nations. In fact, the following interview shows that he does not fear US losing its credibility since "developed western economies with the largest debt loads are all in the same boat." The discussion expands from the debt ceiling debacle to bonds and stocks, "given the lack of nominal yield in the bond market, all of the new money is going to continue into stocks. The interesting thing is it’s going to make the rich people richer and the middle and lower class won’t be any better off, which is the opposite of what the administration is trying to pull off," adding that being in stocks "is not your choice," thanks to Fed repression and that deficit contraction is all that can stop the Fed now.

 

As Bass warned previously,

he caveats that nominally bullish statement with a critical point, "Zimbabwe's stock market was the best performer this decade – but your entire portfolio now buys you 3 eggs" as purchasing power is crushed. Investors, he says, are "too focused on nominal prices" as the rate of growth of the monetary base is destroying true wealth.

Via Financial Sense Newshour:

Jim: Do you feel the debt ceiling debate and the political theater in Washington are hurting U.S. credibility and our capital markets in the long-run?

Kyle: No…the entire world is in the same position we are in one way or another. That’s painting the world with a broader brush, but when you look at the developed western economies (and, of course, we’ll exclude countries with no net debt like Australia and Canada that are natural resource heavy), but the developed western economies with the largest debt loads are all in the same boat. Whether or not they have debt ceilings in the U.S. or bank note agreements like they had in Japan until they recently abolished them, there are all of these potential glass ceilings that are put on the marketplace that always tend to move. I think since 1960 we’ve raised our debt something like 82 times.

Jim: Economists have often said—I’m thinking of “This Time Is Different” by Reinhart and Rogoff—when countries have debt-to-GDP ratios over 100%, they get into trouble; Japan’s is 230%. Why have they not had trouble up until now?

Kyle: When you think about what Reinhart and Rogoff’s book says, it kind of gets to an answer but it’s not the right way to look at things; there are many more variables to analyze the situation with. One is, of course, debt to central government tax revenues—that ratio. Another one is what percentage of your central government tax revenues do you spend on interest alone? Those barometers are much more impactful than just using a debt-to-GDP barometer. And then when you think about Reinhart and Rogoff’s work, if you’ve read all the white papers that they’ve written prior to writing the book, one of the other conclusions that they draw is when debt gets to be about 100% GDP it becomes problematic. Well, what that means is, typically—and, again, painting the world with a broad brush—central government tax revenues are roughly 20% of GDP. So what they’re telling you is when debt gets to be 5 times your revenue, that’s when you start to have a problem. Historically, the analysis that’s been done empirically by academics has focused on the countries that have fallen into a restructuring or a default as a result of this ratio that you and I are discussing. Historically, those have been emerging market economies that have higher borrowing costs. So, it actually makes complete sense that that number is too low when you’re talking about a developed market economy versus an emerging economy because, in theory, a developed economy can borrow at lower rates than an emerging economy can. That being said, in Japan, when the debts are 24 times their central government tax revenue, they are already completely insolvent—it’s just a question of when does it blow up.

Jim: I want to turn our attention to the stock market right now and your view of where you see the markets right now. They don’t seem overvalued when you compare them to 2000 or 2007, but they’re not cheap; and, where do you go in a market when the rate of return on cash or bonds is hardly anything?

Kyle: I think that as long as the Fed—for instance, the Fed is still buying $85 billion a month; almost a trillion a year—you could argue that the Fed is being more stimulative today than they were a year or year and a half ago. When we were running a trillion to a trillion and a half deficits, the Fed, at a trillion dollars in a deficit, was buying every bond that was issued. Today, you have a scenario where the fiscal deficit in the U.S., we think, is somewhere around 650 to 700 billion dollars. So, in theory, the Fed is actually adding more money to the economy today than it was a year ago because the deficit is lower and they’re still buying the same number of bonds. So what I’m saying is the monetary base continues to expand. What the economists are saying is velocity continues to drop at a faster rate than the base is expanding. Well, velocity, I believe, is a coincident indicator at best—possibly a lagging indicator. So, when the v [velocity] turns around that’s when inflation shows up, but for now–you’re asking about stocks…I think, given the lack of nominal yield in the bond market, all of the new money is going to continue into stocks. The interesting thing is it’s going to make the rich people richer and the middle and lower class won’t be any better off, which is the opposite of what the administration is trying to pull off.  

Jim: What is your outlook on when the Fed will taper or, eventually, raise interest rates?

Kyle: I personally think that what enables the Fed to taper, again, is a contraction in the fiscal deficit. Now, part of that equation will be remedied by higher tax collections; unfortunately, the other side of that equation is, of course, lesser spending, which isn’t going to happen. So, I believe they can taper to the extent that the fiscal deficit has contracted. I don’t think that they’ll be able to raise the Fed funds rate any time in the foreseeable future—3 to 5 years.

Jim: So, that would argue that stocks would be a better play.

Kyle: Unfortunately…because it feels like they’re making it the only game in town. It’s not your choice, but it’s the only answer though. [End transcript]

In the rest of this must-listen interview, legendary hedge fund manager Kyle Bass gives investors his most recent views on Japan, the impact and outlook for shale gas in the U.S., and a wide range of other topics.

If you would like to hear this full must-listen interview with Kyle Bass airing this Wednesday, CLICK HERE to subscr
ibe.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/MS7BSkzUXJU/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Having previously exposed the world to the "nominal stock market cheerleaders," it is clear that Kyle Bass sees things as only having got worse among developed nations. In fact, the following interview shows that he does not fear US losing its credibility since "developed western economies with the largest debt loads are all in the same boat." The discussion expands from the debt ceiling debacle to bonds and stocks, "given the lack of nominal yield in the bond market, all of the new money is going to continue into stocks. The interesting thing is it’s going to make the rich people richer and the middle and lower class won’t be any better off, which is the opposite of what the administration is trying to pull off," adding that being in stocks "is not your choice," thanks to Fed repression and that deficit contraction is all that can stop the Fed now.

 

As Bass warned previously,

he caveats that nominally bullish statement with a critical point, "Zimbabwe's stock market was the best performer this decade – but your entire portfolio now buys you 3 eggs" as purchasing power is crushed. Investors, he says, are "too focused on nominal prices" as the rate of growth of the monetary base is destroying true wealth.

Via Financial Sense Newshour:

Jim: Do you feel the debt ceiling debate and the political theater in Washington are hurting U.S. credibility and our capital markets in the long-run?

Kyle: No…the entire world is in the same position we are in one way or another. That’s painting the world with a broader brush, but when you look at the developed western economies (and, of course, we’ll exclude countries with no net debt like Australia and Canada that are natural resource heavy), but the developed western economies with the largest debt loads are all in the same boat. Whether or not they have debt ceilings in the U.S. or bank note agreements like they had in Japan until they recently abolished them, there are all of these potential glass ceilings that are put on the marketplace that always tend to move. I think since 1960 we’ve raised our debt something like 82 times.

Jim: Economists have often said—I’m thinking of “This Time Is Different” by Reinhart and Rogoff—when countries have debt-to-GDP ratios over 100%, they get into trouble; Japan’s is 230%. Why have they not had trouble up until now?

Kyle: When you think about what Reinhart and Rogoff’s book says, it kind of gets to an answer but it’s not the right way to look at things; there are many more variables to analyze the situation with. One is, of course, debt to central government tax revenues—that ratio. Another one is what percentage of your central government tax revenues do you spend on interest alone? Those barometers are much more impactful than just using a debt-to-GDP barometer. And then when you think about Reinhart and Rogoff’s work, if you’ve read all the white papers that they’ve written prior to writing the book, one of the other conclusions that they draw is when debt gets to be about 100% GDP it becomes problematic. Well, what that means is, typically—and, again, painting the world with a broad brush—central government tax revenues are roughly 20% of GDP. So what they’re telling you is when debt gets to be 5 times your revenue, that’s when you start to have a problem. Historically, the analysis that’s been done empirically by academics has focused on the countries that have fallen into a restructuring or a default as a result of this ratio that you and I are discussing. Historically, those have been emerging market economies that have higher borrowing costs. So, it actually makes complete sense that that number is too low when you’re talking about a developed market economy versus an emerging economy because, in theory, a developed economy can borrow at lower rates than an emerging economy can. That being said, in Japan, when the debts are 24 times their central government tax revenue, they are already completely insolvent—it’s just a question of when does it blow up.

Jim: I want to turn our attention to the stock market right now and your view of where you see the markets right now. They don’t seem overvalued when you compare them to 2000 or 2007, but they’re not cheap; and, where do you go in a market when the rate of return on cash or bonds is hardly anything?

Kyle: I think that as long as the Fed—for instance, the Fed is still buying $85 billion a month; almost a trillion a year—you could argue that the Fed is being more stimulative today than they were a year or year and a half ago. When we were running a trillion to a trillion and a half deficits, the Fed, at a trillion dollars in a deficit, was buying every bond that was issued. Today, you have a scenario where the fiscal deficit in the U.S., we think, is somewhere around 650 to 700 billion dollars. So, in theory, the Fed is actually adding more money to the economy today than it was a year ago because the deficit is lower and they’re still buying the same number of bonds. So what I’m saying is the monetary base continues to expand. What the economists are saying is velocity continues to drop at a faster rate than the base is expanding. Well, velocity, I believe, is a coincident indicator at best—possibly a lagging indicator. So, when the v [velocity] turns around that’s when inflation shows up, but for now–you’re asking about stocks…I think, given the lack of nominal yield in the bond market, all of the new money is going to continue into stocks. The interesting thing is it’s going to make the rich people richer and the middle and lower class won’t be any better off, which is the opposite of what the administration is trying to pull off.  

Jim: What is your outlook on when the Fed will taper or, eventually, raise interest rates?

Kyle: I personally think that what enables the Fed to taper, again, is a contraction in the fiscal deficit. Now, part of that equation will be remedied by higher tax collections; unfortunately, the other side of that equation is, of course, lesser spending, which isn’t going to happen. So, I believe they can taper to the extent that the fiscal deficit has contracted. I don’t think that they’ll be able to raise the Fed funds rate any time in the foreseeable future—3 to 5 years.

Jim: So, that would argue that stocks would be a better play.

Kyle: Unfortunately…because it feels like they’re making it the only game in town. It’s not your choice, but it’s the only answer though. [End transcript]

In the rest of this must-listen interview, legendary hedge fund manager Kyle Bass gives investors his most recent views on Japan, the impact and outlook for shale gas in the U.S., and a wide range of other topics.

If you would like to hear this full must-listen interview with Kyle Bass airing this Wednesday, CLICK HERE to subscribe.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/MS7BSkzUXJU/story01.htm Tyler Durden

For all your, well just one really, New Normal daytrading needs.

courtesy of @Not_Jim_Cramer

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/vhab-9dB35w/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Authored by John Taylor, originally posted at WSJ.com,

It is a common view that the shutdown, the debt-limit debacle and the repeated failure to enact entitlement and pro-growth tax reform reflect increased political polarization. I believe this gets the causality backward. Today’s governance failures are closely connected to economic policy changes, particularly those growing out of the 2008 financial crisis.

The crisis did not reflect some inherent defect of the market system that needed to be corrected, as many Americans have been led to believe. Rather it grew out of faulty government policies.

In the years leading up to the panic, mainly 2003-05, the Federal Reserve held interest rates excessively low compared with the monetary policy strategy of the 1980s and ’90s—a monetary strategy that had kept recessions mild. The Fed’s interest-rate policies exacerbated the housing boom and thus the ensuing bust. More generally, extremely low interest rates led individual and institutional investors to search for yield and to engage in excessive risk taking, as Geert Bekaert of Columbia University and his colleagues showed in a study published by the European Central Bank in July.

Meanwhile, regulators who were supposed to supervise large financial institutions, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, allowed large deviations from existing safety and soundness rules. In particular, regulators permitted high leverage ratios and investments in risky, mortgage-backed securities that also fed the housing boom.

After the housing bubble burst the value of mortgage-backed securities plummeted, putting the solvency of the many banks and other financial institutions at risk. The government stepped in, but its ad hoc bailout policy was on balance destabilizing.

Whether or not it was appropriate for the Federal Reserve to bail out the creditors of Bear Stearns in March 2008, it was a mistake not to lay out a framework for future interventions. Instead, investors assumed that the creditors of Lehman Brothers also would be bailed out—and when they weren’t and Lehman declared bankruptcy in September, it was a big surprise, raising grave uncertainty about government policy going forward.

The government then passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program which was supposed to prop up banks by purchasing some of their problematic assets. The purchase plan was viewed as unworkable and financial markets continued to plummet—the Dow fell by 2,399 points in the first eight trading days of October—until the plan was radically changed into a capital injection program. Former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, appearing last month on CNBC on the fifth anniversary of the Lehman bankruptcy, argued that TARP saved us. Former Wells Fargo CEO Dick Kovacevich, appearing later on the same show, argued that TARP significantly worsened the crisis by creating even more uncertainty.

In any case, the crisis ended, but rather than simply winding down its short-term liquidity facilities the Fed continued to intervene through massive asset purchases—commonly called quantitative easing. Many outside and inside the Fed are unconvinced quantitative easing is meeting its objective of spurring economic growth. Yet there is a growing worry about the Fed’s ability to reduce its asset purchases without market disruption. Bond and mortgage markets were roiled earlier this year by Chairman Ben Bernanke’s mere hint that the Fed might unwind.

The crisis ushered in the 2009 fiscal stimulus package and other interventions such as cash for clunkers and subsidies for first-time home buyers, which have not led to a sustained recovery. Crucially, the actions taken during the immediate crisis set a precedent for giving the federal government more power to intervene and regulate, which has added to uncertainty.

The Dodd-Frank Act, meant to promote financial stability, has called for hundreds of new rules and regulations, many still unwritten. The law was supposed to protect taxpayers from bailouts. Three years later it remains unclear how large complex financial institutions operating in many different countries will be “resolved” in a crisis. Any fear in the markets about whether a troubled big bank can be handled through Dodd-Frank’s orderly resolution authority can easily drive the U.S. Treasury to resort to another large-scale bailout.

Regulations and interventions also increased in other industries, most significantly in health care. The mandates at the core of the Affordable Care Act represent an unprecedented degree of control by the federal government of the activities of businesses and individuals, adversely affecting incentives to hire and work and eventually worsening the federal-budget outlook.

Federal debt held by the public has increased to 73% of GDP this year from 41% in 2008—and according to the Congressional Budget Office, it will rise to more than 250% without a change in policy. This raises uncertainty about how the debt can be brought under control.

Despite a massive onslaught of legislation and regulation designed to foster prosperity, economic growth remains low and unemployment remains high. Rhetoric aside, many both inside and outside the government quite reasonably seek to return to the kinds of policies that worked well in the not-so-distant past. Claiming that one political party has been hijacked by extremists misses this key point, and prevents a serious discussion of the fundamental changes in economic policies in recent years, and their effects.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/zN-oCk2HCjY/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Earlier this afternoon, it was Steve Cohen’s final fall from grace. Now, Bloomberg reports that Brazil’s one time super billionaire, and now negativeworthaire, Eike Batista, whose sprawling petroleum empire was once valued in the tens of billions, is set to file for bankruptcy tomorrow.

• BRAZIL’S OGX SAID TO PLAN BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION FILING TOMORROW

We are confident that just like in Europe, there is no bank with any exposure to either OGX, Brazil, or whatever potential intercreditor avalanche will tear down many more Brazilian companies once this first insolvent domino finally tips over.

Those who missed the preface to this story, we repost it below.

When on October 1, fallen billionaire Eike Batista’s OGX Petroleo & Gas, missed a $45 million bond coupon payment, some were surprised but most  had seen the writing on the wall. After all, Brazil’s second largest oil company after Petrobras, and the crowning jewel of Batista’s EBX Group, had been under the microscope of investors and certainly creditors (and if it wasn’t it certainly should have been) after oil deposits that Batista had valued at $1 trillion turned out to be commercial failures. And so the countdown to the inevitable bankruptcy filing began. Overnight, Bloomberg reports that the wait should not be long (in fact it may coincide with the default of that other insolvent mega-creditor: the United States), and will mostly certainly take place before the end of the month, following the retention of bankruptcy specialist law firm Quinn Emanuel.

From Bloomberg:

Quinn Emanuel was hired to work on restructuring and potential litigation matters in the U.S. for Batista, said the people, who asked not to be named because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly.

 

OGX Petroleo & Gas Participacoes SA (OGXP3) is considering filing for bankruptcy protection by the end of this month, two people with direct knowledge of the matter said last week. The filing would be done in Rio de Janeiro where OGX is based, said the people, asking not to be identified as discussions are private. While Batista is negotiating with creditors to avoid the same process for shipbuilder OSX Brasil SA (OSXB3), the most likely outcome is that both companies will seek legal protection, they said.

Prior stakeholder representations by Quinn Emmanuel have been the bankruptcies of energy trader Enron Corp., futures trader Refco Inc. and oil-trader SemGroup LP, according to the firm’s website, so they are quite proficient at representing what is about to be Latin America’s largest energy-related bankruptcy in a long time.

And while it is unclear if the company will file concurrently in the US under Chapter 15, Batista’s creditors, awoken from their “all is well” slumber and scrambling, have decided to pull an Elliott management, and take possession of at least two ships used as collateral by another Batista company, shipbuilder OSX and sister company to OGX, whose assets may also be impaired as unknown cross-default provisions are triggered and a vicious intercreditor fight ensues.

Bloomberg reports that OSX Brasil bank creditors considering taking possession of 2 vessels used as collateral on loans to Batista’s shipbuilder, say 6 people with knowledge. The banks are talking to advisers and company officials to see if they should execute guarantees if OSX’s oil sister co. goes into  default, which would trigger cross-default clauses on OSX. Bloomberg adds that OSX already hired Credit Suisse to help sell OSX-1, OSX-2 platforms that guarantee loans.

One question is what the waterfall effects on local banks would be in the case of a bankruptcy filing, due to massive exposure to the company by both local and foreign financial firms – case in point OSX borrowed $1.27 billion from banks including Santander, DVB and others.  Naturally officials at neither DVB nor Santander commented.

Either way, the seemingly endless period of financial stability in Latin America, and particularly Brazil (where record consumer debt is a far greater issue), long seen as a derivative of China, is ending. Luckily, the next steps in the global overlevered soap opera are about to be unveiled. So sit back, grab the popcorn and watch as the world receives yet another Donald Trump, i.e., fallen billionaire angel, this time in Latin America, and all the associated entertainment, even if it is not quite as entertaining for the thousands of Brazilians who are about to lose their jobs as the debt tsunami finally rolls over.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/9CnS-zhMz_A/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Earlier this afternoon, it was Steve Cohen’s final fall from grace. Now, Bloomberg reports that Brazil’s one time super billionaire, and now negativeworthaire, Eike Batista, whose sprawling petroleum empire was once valued in the tens of billions, is set to file for bankruptcy tomorrow.

• BRAZIL’S OGX SAID TO PLAN BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION FILING TOMORROW

We are confident that just like in Europe, there is no bank with any exposure to either OGX, Brazil, or whatever potential intercreditor avalanche will tear down many more Brazilian companies once this first insolvent domino finally tips over.

Those who missed the preface to this story, we repost it below.

When on October 1, fallen billionaire Eike Batista’s OGX Petroleo & Gas, missed a $45 million bond coupon payment, some were surprised but most  had seen the writing on the wall. After all, Brazil’s second largest oil company after Petrobras, and the crowning jewel of Batista’s EBX Group, had been under the microscope of investors and certainly creditors (and if it wasn’t it certainly should have been) after oil deposits that Batista had valued at $1 trillion turned out to be commercial failures. And so the countdown to the inevitable bankruptcy filing began. Overnight, Bloomberg reports that the wait should not be long (in fact it may coincide with the default of that other insolvent mega-creditor: the United States), and will mostly certainly take place before the end of the month, following the retention of bankruptcy specialist law firm Quinn Emanuel.

From Bloomberg:

Quinn Emanuel was hired to work on restructuring and potential litigation matters in the U.S. for Batista, said the people, who asked not to be named because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly.

 

OGX Petroleo & Gas Participacoes SA (OGXP3) is considering filing for bankruptcy protection by the end of this month, two people with direct knowledge of the matter said last week. The filing would be done in Rio de Janeiro where OGX is based, said the people, asking not to be identified as discussions are private. While Batista is negotiating with creditors to avoid the same process for shipbuilder OSX Brasil SA (OSXB3), the most likely outcome is that both companies will seek legal protection, they said.

Prior stakeholder representations by Quinn Emmanuel have been the bankruptcies of energy trader Enron Corp., futures trader Refco Inc. and oil-trader SemGroup LP, according to the firm’s website, so they are quite proficient at representing what is about to be Latin America’s largest energy-related bankruptcy in a long time.

And while it is unclear if the company will file concurrently in the US under Chapter 15, Batista’s creditors, awoken from their “all is well” slumber and scrambling, have decided to pull an Elliott management, and take possession of at least two ships used as collateral by another Batista company, shipbuilder OSX and sister company to OGX, whose assets may also be impaired as unknown cross-default provisions are triggered and a vicious intercreditor fight ensues.

Bloomberg reports that OSX Brasil bank creditors considering taking possession of 2 vessels used as collateral on loans to Batista’s shipbuilder, say 6 people with knowledge. The banks are talking to advisers and company officials to see if they should execute guarantees if OSX’s oil sister co. goes into  default, which would trigger cross-default clauses on OSX. Bloomberg adds that OSX already hired Credit Suisse to help sell OSX-1, OSX-2 platforms that guarantee loans.

One question is what the waterfall effects on local banks would be in the case of a bankruptcy filing, due to massive exposure to the company by both local and foreign financial firms – case in point OSX borrowed $1.27 billion from banks including Santander, DVB and others.  Naturally officials at neither DVB nor Santander commented.

Either way, the seemingly endless period of financial stability in Latin America, and particularly Brazil (where record consumer debt is a far greater issue), long seen as a derivative of China, is ending. Luckily, the next steps in the global overlevered soap opera are about to be unveiled. So sit back, grab the popcorn and watch as the world receives yet another Donald Trump, i.e., fallen billionaire angel, this time in Latin America, and all the associated entertainment, even if it is not quite as entertaining for the thousands of Brazilians who are about to lose their jobs as the debt tsunami finally rolls over.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/9CnS-zhMz_A/story01.htm Tyler Durden