How to Invest Gold In Your Pension Plan

Today’s AM fix was USD 1,283.75, EUR 957.81 and GBP 801.54 per ounce.             
Friday’s AM fix was USD 1,309.00, EUR 975.12 and GBP 814.16 per ounce.

Gold dropped $19.30 or 1.48% Friday, closing at $1,287.40/oz. Silver slipped $0.15 or 0.69% closing at $21.45. Platinum dipped $9.26 or 0.6% to $1,439.49/oz, while palladium fell $3.25 or 0.4% to $755.47/oz. Gold and silver fell 2.08% and 1.79% for the week respectively.

Gold dropped for its third day in a row after the U.S. non farm payrolls data on Friday showed that more jobs were added than expected, which increased speculation that the U.S. Fed will begin to taper its stimulus program. Friday’s rallying of U.S. equities and an elevated  U.S. dollar sent gold to a three week low. The next U.S. Fed meeting is December 17 & 18th.

How to Invest Gold In Your Pension Plan – Part 1
When the time arrives for you to retire, how will your pension fund reward you?  For many people, the entire process is entrusted to a pension broker or pensions company to manage on their behalf, with yearly statements to appraise of your pensions’ performance. Most of these funds are heavily weighted towards equities and property funds and as such, are not adequately diversified.

Gold is one such diversification opportunity to consider and despite the recent price retrenchment, has outperformed the both Irish bank deposit rates and the ISEQ (Irish stock exchange) over the past 10 years (see figure 1 below.) The analysis below examines the performance of constant monthly investment over ten years, net of fees and adjusted for inflation.


Figure1: How a constant monthly investment compares in value from November 2003 to October 2013. ©GoldCore

Irish citizens can invest in gold bullion in their pension funds since 2007 when the Irish Revenue Commissioners approved investments in gold in Self-Administered Pension Schemes via the Perth Mint Certificate Programme.

The approval came after an extensive review which included consultation with the Association of Pensioneer Trustees in Ireland (APTI), senior executives of the Perth Mint of Western Australia and GoldCore Limited.

Many investors are increasingly looking for an effective way to manage the macroeconomic, monetary and geopolitical risks in their retirement portfolios. By diversifying into gold in your pension, you can mitigate some of these risks.

Gold has outperformed most asset classes over the past ten years due to uncertainty regarding the global economy and in the mainstream asset classes such as equities, bonds and property.

Click here for our guide to Putting Gold In Your Pension Plan in Ireland.

Tomorrow, we will cover Putting Gold In your Pension Plan in the UK, and on Wednesday, the USA.

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via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/RhQMoh8Xj5Y/story01.htm GoldCore

Busted! HFT Algo Goes Wild in Nasdaq Futures Moments Before Job Number Hits

In the minute preceding last week's highly anticipated payrolls report, Nanex exposes the appearance of a High Frequency Trading (HFT) algo in both the December 2013 Nasdaq (NQ) Futures and the QQQs (an ETF). When it was active, it caused prices to gyrate wildly over a few seconds of time. This is the brief period that also saw Treasury Futures halted (and gold prices jumping) and looking closer at the charts, it appears this HFT algo caused wild price oscillations in the futures in a way that enable it to establish a short position in QQQs. We are sure the regulatory world is already on this blatant manipulation (or simple front-running on information received)…

 

1. December 2013 Nasdaq 100 (NQ) Futures trades (blue squares) and quote spread (red shading).
The circled area is when the algo ran.



2. Same as Chart 1 above, but showing quote spread and quote rate.
Note the explosion of trade (chart above) and quote activity (this chart). There were more quotes during this period of quiet time than during the release of the Employment report! No other futures contracts or stocks showed any significant activity during this time, which means this was not news driven. The activity appears to have been caused solely by the HFT algo.



3. NQ Futures, Zooming to the area circled in Chart 1.
Compare this chart to the one below it: while price rises in NQ futures (this chart), they hit a wall in QQQ (chart 4 below).



4. QQQ Trades color coded by reporting exchange and NBBO.
Compare to chart above – notice how prices fail to rise in QQQ (this chart) when they do in futures (chart 3 above). Someone is selling QQQ's regardless of the futures. Is the algo causing the price oscillations in futures also selling QQQ's at the peak?



5. NQ Futures – showing just the quote spread over 2 seconds so you can appreciate the magnitude and speed of price oscillations.
This is pretty crazy.



6. QQQ best bids/asks color coded by exchange and NBBO over the same 2 second period as chart above.



 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/xGgboy3rVNU/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Mystery Behind Spanish Banks' Extend-And-Pretend "Bad Debt Miracle" Revealed

One of the mysteries surrounding the insolvent, and already once bailed out Spanish banking sector, has been why are reported bad loans – sharply rising as they may be – still as low as they are currently. Courtesy of the just completed bank earnings season, and a WSJ report, we now know why: it turns out that for the past several years, instead of accurately designating non-performing loans, banks would constantly “refinance” bad loans making them appear viable even though banks have known full well there would be zero recoveries on those loans. In fact, as the story below describes, banks would even go so far as making additional loans whose proceeds would be just to pay interest on the existing NPLs – a morbid debt pyramid scheme, which when it collapses, no amount of EFSF, ESM or any other acronym-based bailout, will be able to make the country’s irreparably damaged banks appear even remotely viable.

WSJ has more:

It has puzzled Spanish bank analysts for years: Why did the country’s mortgage delinquency rate rise so slowly even as unemployment soared above 26%?

 

A big part of the answer—revealed by a spate of bank earnings reports in recent days—is that Spanish lenders had been making their loan books look healthier than they really were by refinancing big numbers of loans to struggling homeowners and businesses.

 

The lower interest rates and easier terms of refinancing helped hundreds of thousands of Spaniards like Juan Carlos Díaz, who stopped making mortgage payments more than a year ago, remain in their homes and keep their businesses afloat longer than otherwise would have been possible. It has also helped banks bury a growing risk in their credit portfolios and avoid recognizing losses on debts they are unlikely to recover.

Yet even with this ridiculous “extend and pretend” gimmick, NPLs just hit a new record high as a % of all loans according to the Bank of Spain.

One dreads to even contemplate just how worse this ratio would be if banks were honest in marking loans anywhere close to realistic recovery prospects. One may however soon find out, because new “more stringent disclosure guidelines from Spanish banking authorities are bringing these risks into the open. Partly as a result, mortgage delinquency is rising fast—a trend that could damp recent investor enthusiasm for a bailed-out banking industry rebounding from a property-market crash.

The Bank of Spain, the country’s central bank, began forcing banks in April to re-evaluate and disclose their refinanced loan books out of concern that some lenders had been taking advantage of relatively loose guidelines to mask the deteriorating creditworthiness of their clients. As Spain’s economic slump deepened, the Bank of Spain said at the time, “Difficulties considered to be temporary in many cases have become structural.”

Which is the story of the New Normal in a nutshell: temporary issues revealed to be structural, and in fact worsened by ongoing, relentless central bank intervention which prevents the liquidation and cleansing of tens of trillions in bad debt from the global system. What is worse is that alongside that revelation, it is also about to be revealed that, surprise, Spain is not even close to recovery. Which will kill the only thing that matters in that insolvent continent: the latest dose of confidence.

It does, however, explain why the ECB shocked 98% of economists with its rate cut – recall that it was the soaring NPLs in Cyprus that led to the wholesale confiscation of uninsured deposits in order to preserve the domestic banking sector.

So back to Spain, and the clash of reality with can kicking:

For years following the real estate crash in 2008, analysts say, lenders applied an “extend-and-pretend” approach by refinancing ailing real-estate developers. Ultimately, banks were forced to recognize those losses, spurring last year’s €41 billion European Union bailout of Spain’s banking system….  It also raises questions about whether banks have continued to sweep
under the rug loan losses lurking on their balance sheets, a concern
that has dogged the sector since the start of Spain’s economic crisis
.

The answer, incidentally, is a resounding yes. Continuing:

Refinancing struggling homeowners “only pushes the problem forward without finding long-lasting solutions because in the end, the debts only grow while the borrower’s capacity to repay doesn’t improve,” said Carlos Baños, chairman of AFES, an association that advises mortgage holders who have trouble paying their debts. “These days it’s hard to see things getting better unless you win the lottery.”

So how exactly have banks been sweeping reality under the rug for over 5 years? Meet Mr. Diaz:

For Mr. Díaz, a 49-year-old account manager at a company that makes chemical pumps, the extend-and-pretend approach worked for a while. In 2007, he took out a €600,000 mortgage on a suburban Madrid home. At the time, his wife’s fast-food restaurant in southeastern Madrid was going gangbusters, selling roasted chicken whole and in sandwiches to construction workers during a big housing bubble.

 

In 2008, the bubble burst, leaving her business with few customers. Her take-home pay dwindled, and paying the mortgage starting eating up most of the household’s monthly income.

 

In 2010, Mr. Díaz asked his bank, Caixabank SA, CABK.MC for help. The bank agreed to refinance the mortgage, allowing him to lower his monthly payments by paying only interest during four years. The lender also furnished him with a second mortgage, for €32,000, to pay off credit card and other bills.

 

By 2012, the family’s finances were stretched so thin that Mr. Díaz began drawing from savings to keep his wife, two children and himself in their home.

 

In July last year, he stopped paying the mortgages, rebuffing his bank’s offer for an additional grace period that would further lower his monthly payments.

 

Mr. Díaz said he has few good options. “I realized paying the mortgage was like having bread for today and going hungry tomorrow.” He said: “Whatever happens now, let it come.”

Which is ironic, and funny, because ever more people are saying exactly the same thing about the entire global economy and capital markets.

The reason: everyone – from the lowliest unemployed worker to some of the most respected fund managers – is so tired of the central banks’ only remaining scam of asset price manipulating “extend and pretend” that they would rather take the pain now, and force “whatever happens now”, instead of live with the reality that “going hungry tomorrow” is an assured outcome for the members of what was once
the now extinct global middle class.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Ngolddupv1s/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Mystery Behind Spanish Banks’ Extend-And-Pretend “Bad Debt Miracle” Revealed

One of the mysteries surrounding the insolvent, and already once bailed out Spanish banking sector, has been why are reported bad loans – sharply rising as they may be – still as low as they are currently. Courtesy of the just completed bank earnings season, and a WSJ report, we now know why: it turns out that for the past several years, instead of accurately designating non-performing loans, banks would constantly “refinance” bad loans making them appear viable even though banks have known full well there would be zero recoveries on those loans. In fact, as the story below describes, banks would even go so far as making additional loans whose proceeds would be just to pay interest on the existing NPLs – a morbid debt pyramid scheme, which when it collapses, no amount of EFSF, ESM or any other acronym-based bailout, will be able to make the country’s irreparably damaged banks appear even remotely viable.

WSJ has more:

It has puzzled Spanish bank analysts for years: Why did the country’s mortgage delinquency rate rise so slowly even as unemployment soared above 26%?

 

A big part of the answer—revealed by a spate of bank earnings reports in recent days—is that Spanish lenders had been making their loan books look healthier than they really were by refinancing big numbers of loans to struggling homeowners and businesses.

 

The lower interest rates and easier terms of refinancing helped hundreds of thousands of Spaniards like Juan Carlos Díaz, who stopped making mortgage payments more than a year ago, remain in their homes and keep their businesses afloat longer than otherwise would have been possible. It has also helped banks bury a growing risk in their credit portfolios and avoid recognizing losses on debts they are unlikely to recover.

Yet even with this ridiculous “extend and pretend” gimmick, NPLs just hit a new record high as a % of all loans according to the Bank of Spain.

One dreads to even contemplate just how worse this ratio would be if banks were honest in marking loans anywhere close to realistic recovery prospects. One may however soon find out, because new “more stringent disclosure guidelines from Spanish banking authorities are bringing these risks into the open. Partly as a result, mortgage delinquency is rising fast—a trend that could damp recent investor enthusiasm for a bailed-out banking industry rebounding from a property-market crash.

The Bank of Spain, the country’s central bank, began forcing banks in April to re-evaluate and disclose their refinanced loan books out of concern that some lenders had been taking advantage of relatively loose guidelines to mask the deteriorating creditworthiness of their clients. As Spain’s economic slump deepened, the Bank of Spain said at the time, “Difficulties considered to be temporary in many cases have become structural.”

Which is the story of the New Normal in a nutshell: temporary issues revealed to be structural, and in fact worsened by ongoing, relentless central bank intervention which prevents the liquidation and cleansing of tens of trillions in bad debt from the global system. What is worse is that alongside that revelation, it is also about to be revealed that, surprise, Spain is not even close to recovery. Which will kill the only thing that matters in that insolvent continent: the latest dose of confidence.

It does, however, explain why the ECB shocked 98% of economists with its rate cut – recall that it was the soaring NPLs in Cyprus that led to the wholesale confiscation of uninsured deposits in order to preserve the domestic banking sector.

So back to Spain, and the clash of reality with can kicking:

For years following the real estate crash in 2008, analysts say, lenders applied an “extend-and-pretend” approach by refinancing ailing real-estate developers. Ultimately, banks were forced to recognize those losses, spurring last year’s €41 billion European Union bailout of Spain’s banking system….  It also raises questions about whether banks have continued to sweep
under the rug loan losses lurking on their balance sheets, a concern
that has dogged the sector since the start of Spain’s economic crisis
.

The answer, incidentally, is a resounding yes. Continuing:

Refinancing struggling homeowners “only pushes the problem forward without finding long-lasting solutions because in the end, the debts only grow while the borrower’s capacity to repay doesn’t improve,” said Carlos Baños, chairman of AFES, an association that advises mortgage holders who have trouble paying their debts. “These days it’s hard to see things getting better unless you win the lottery.”

So how exactly have banks been sweeping reality under the rug for over 5 years? Meet Mr. Diaz:

For Mr. Díaz, a 49-year-old account manager at a company that makes chemical pumps, the extend-and-pretend approach worked for a while. In 2007, he took out a €600,000 mortgage on a suburban Madrid home. At the time, his wife’s fast-food restaurant in southeastern Madrid was going gangbusters, selling roasted chicken whole and in sandwiches to construction workers during a big housing bubble.

 

In 2008, the bubble burst, leaving her business with few customers. Her take-home pay dwindled, and paying the mortgage starting eating up most of the household’s monthly income.

 

In 2010, Mr. Díaz asked his bank, Caixabank SA, CABK.MC for help. The bank agreed to refinance the mortgage, allowing him to lower his monthly payments by paying only interest during four years. The lender also furnished him with a second mortgage, for €32,000, to pay off credit card and other bills.

 

By 2012, the family’s finances were stretched so thin that Mr. Díaz began drawing from savings to keep his wife, two children and himself in their home.

 

In July last year, he stopped paying the mortgages, rebuffing his bank’s offer for an additional grace period that would further lower his monthly payments.

 

Mr. Díaz said he has few good options. “I realized paying the mortgage was like having bread for today and going hungry tomorrow.” He said: “Whatever happens now, let it come.”

Which is ironic, and funny, because ever more people are saying exactly the same thing about the entire global economy and capital markets.

The reason: everyone – from the lowliest unemployed worker to some of the most respected fund managers – is so tired of the central banks’ only remaining scam of asset price manipulating “extend and pretend” that they would rather take the pain now, and force “whatever happens now”, instead of live with the reality that “going hungry tomorrow” is an assured outcome for the members of what was once the now extinct global middle class.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Ngolddupv1s/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Monday Humor: Top 5 Traders Under 5

As we are desperate not to miss the boat on the “Top XX Under YY” meme that is dominating social media clickbaiters currently, the following image – spotted in the playroom at a Hong Kong pre-school – sums up the ‘world’ in which we live so perfectly. And yes, e*Trade nailed it with their “baby” commercials.

 

 

Courtesy of @Sanchanta


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/jqu0vs6GbwA/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The 0.01% Have Never Had It Better

Over the years, as the WSJ notes, the only way inequality has really mattered to professional investors is ‘if the rich are getting richer, companies that cater to them have better prospects’. Lately, though, some big investors have worried increasing income and wealth gaps threaten the economy’s ability to expand (discussed here and here most recently.) One reason U.S. corporate profit margins are at records is the share of revenue going to wages is so low. An economy where income and wealth disparities are smaller might be healthier; but it would also leave less money flowing to the bottom line, something that is increasingly grabbing fund managers’ attention.

 

Via WSJ,

 

Over the years, the only way inequality has really mattered to investors has been as a factor when considering stocks. If the rich are getting richer, companies that cater to them have better prospects. Goldman Sachs Group, for example, recently conducted a survey that showed optimism among high-income consumers relative to low-income ones at a high and pointed investors toward companies like department-store operator Nordstrom and luxury-bag maker Tumi Holdings.

 

 

Lately, though, some big investors have worried increasing income and wealth gaps threaten the economy’s ability to expand. They also fret that public anger over it

 

 

Former Morgan Stanley equity strategist Gerard Minack notes the U.S. Gini index, a gauge of income disparities that is also at a record, tracks with measures of political polarization. So he worries inequality could give rise to more political dysfunction that risks damaging the economy.

 

Another concern is that rising inequality creates financial instability. Raghuram Rajan, the economist now heading India’s central bank, has posited that the credit bubble in the early part of the last decade was a consequence of inequality.

 

 

But if inequality has risen to a point in which investors need to be worried, any reversal might also hurt.

 

One reason U.S. corporate profit margins are at records is the share of revenue going to wages is so low. Another is companies are paying a smaller share of profits on taxes. An economy where income and wealth disparities are smaller might be healthier. It would also leave less money flowing to the bottom line, something that will grab fund managers’ attention.

 

So the dilemma is – any “attempt” to ‘narrow’ the inequality gap will be necessarily restructive of the factors that are juicing stock prices and exaggerating the inequality gap BUT if stock prices take a hit, with ZIRP, firms will simply relever more, layoff (cut costs) more, and re-iterate dividend/buyback programs… A vicious circle with only one outcome – aptly described by Kynikos Associates founder James Chanos, who worried people have less incentive to participate in the economy if they have concluded “the game isn’t fair.”


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/pSRU9ss1g9Q/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: China's "383" Reform Roadmap

Reforms are the only way to avoid systemic crisis, rebalance the economy, and unleash growth potential. Barclays notes that government, SOE, factor price and fiscal reform are most needed, though progress is likely to be faster on financial, tax and social security reform. Hopes are high, raising the risk of disappointment, but most think the government will try to meet expectations. History shows that economic growth tends to be lower after major third plenum meetings. This is because structural reforms, while good in the longer term, tend to slow growth in the near term. In advance of its release, the Development Research Center of the State Council, China’s official think tank, presented its own reform proposal – the so-called “383 plan” – which offers a glimpse of the direction that the reforms will take.

 

 

Authored by Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng, originally posted at Project Synidcate,

At the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, currently under way in Beijing, President Xi Jinping is unveiling China’s reform blueprint for the next decade. In advance of its release, the Development Research Center of the State Council, China’s official think tank, presented its own reform proposal – the so-called “383 plan” – which offers a glimpse of the direction that the reforms will take.

The need for reform in China is well documented. In order to escape the so-called “middle-income trap” – when a developing economy’s growth levels off, instead of advancing to high-income status (defined in July 2013 by the World Bank as per capita income of at least $12,616) – the underlying structural problems of China’s economy must be addressed.

And the pressure is on. With per capita income of more than $6,000, Chinese are becoming more demanding, insisting on safe food products, clean air, transparent government, affordable housing, quality education, social security, and equal opportunities. At the same time, international calls for China to assume the responsibilities of a major power – not only in areas like trade and investment, but also on issues like environmental protection and global governance – are growing louder.

But the kind of deep and comprehensive reforms that China needs are always difficult to implement, given that they necessarily affect vested interests. In order to win public support for reforms, thereby maximizing the chances of success, the government must offer clear, accessible explanations of its goals. (Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s bold economic-reform package, for example, is couched in terms of “three arrows” – namely, monetary and fiscal policy, and structural reform.)

The Research Center takes a holistic approach to the reform process, viewing it as both a systemic change and a change of mindset. Translating its proposals – which are as profound as Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms – into simple, straightforward terms is no easy feat, but one that the 383 plan handles with relative deftness.

The “383” is shorthand for the plan’s content. First, the proposal describes the relationships between the Chinese economy’s three main actors: government, business, and the market. Second, it identifies eight key areas of reform: governance, competition policy, land, finance, public finance, state assets, innovation, and liberalization of international trade and finance. Third, it highlights three correlated goals: easing external pressure for domestic policy changes, building social inclusiveness through a basic social-security scheme, and reducing inefficiency, inequality, and corruption through major rural land reform.

The plan recognizes that reforms must be comprehensive, consistent, and concrete, with clear objectives, executable programs, and effective implementation capacity. At the same time, it accounts for the fact that relationships and perceptions cannot be changed overnight, and that rapid, sweeping transformation is not realistic in a country of 1.3 billion people.

In this context, the new free-trade zone in Shanghai – China’s most international city, with the most experienced and internationalist officials – is a breakthrough experiment in administrative reform and liberalization. The free-trade zone regulates foreign investment by using a “negative list” approach that identifies the fields in which foreign investment is prohibited or restricted, and thus subject to special administrative measures. This scheme alone is almost revolutionary, because it will allow foreign actors to help shape the Chinese state’s relationship with the market.

China’s leadership clearly understands that the economy cannot reach its full potential with central and local bureaucracies serving as substitutes for the market. In fact, a culture of adaptive experimentation and learning from local and international experience is already embedded in the Chinese bureaucracy and built into the planning, piloting, evaluation, fine-tuning, and roll-out of reform projects and programs. Effective implementation is reinforced through executive training programs for officials at all levels.

In the last few years, case studies conducted by Chinese authorities, with the help of academics and think tanks, have shown that the interface between state and market lies primarily at the municipal level, especially in the key sectors of industry, services, land, infrastructure, and finance. The studies also reveal that 17 Chinese cities, each with populations of more than three million, have already reached high-income status. These cities’ combined population stands at 155 million (11.5% of China’s total population), and their GDP amounts to $2.1 trillion (29.1% of China’s total output).

With home-ownership rates running at 80% in urban areas, household wealth, particularly in landed property, already exceeds that of many middle-income economies. According to official price estimates (which are lower than market prices), the value of real estate in China has already reached 261% of GDP – similar to the ratio in the United States.

Clearly, China’s export-driven, manufacturing-based industrial revolution has enabled it to accumulate substantial domestic wealth. But, as China’s ongoing growth slowdown demonstrates, this model has its limits.

A successful transition to the next phase of wealth creation – driven by the services sector and knowledge-based industries – will require a more market-oriented approach, in which the state cedes some control over the economy and focuses instead on protecting property rights, administering welfare services, reducing pollution, and eliminating corruption. Improved governance, together with greater support for market-based innovation, is needed to sustain a thriving economy.

The Third Plenum aims to digest China’s experiences, as well as international best practices, in order to forge a consensus for a coherent reform strategy that fosters an inclusive, innovative, and sustainable growth order. As Xi himself has said, it is time for China to allow the market to work where the government cannot.


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via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/7Ncipu3Sw_M/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: China’s “383” Reform Roadmap

Reforms are the only way to avoid systemic crisis, rebalance the economy, and unleash growth potential. Barclays notes that government, SOE, factor price and fiscal reform are most needed, though progress is likely to be faster on financial, tax and social security reform. Hopes are high, raising the risk of disappointment, but most think the government will try to meet expectations. History shows that economic growth tends to be lower after major third plenum meetings. This is because structural reforms, while good in the longer term, tend to slow growth in the near term. In advance of its release, the Development Research Center of the State Council, China’s official think tank, presented its own reform proposal – the so-called “383 plan” – which offers a glimpse of the direction that the reforms will take.

 

 

Authored by Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng, originally posted at Project Synidcate,

At the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, currently under way in Beijing, President Xi Jinping is unveiling China’s reform blueprint for the next decade. In advance of its release, the Development Research Center of the State Council, China’s official think tank, presented its own reform proposal – the so-called “383 plan” – which offers a glimpse of the direction that the reforms will take.

The need for reform in China is well documented. In order to escape the so-called “middle-income trap” – when a developing economy’s growth levels off, instead of advancing to high-income status (defined in July 2013 by the World Bank as per capita income of at least $12,616) – the underlying structural problems of China’s economy must be addressed.

And the pressure is on. With per capita income of more than $6,000, Chinese are becoming more demanding, insisting on safe food products, clean air, transparent government, affordable housing, quality education, social security, and equal opportunities. At the same time, international calls for China to assume the responsibilities of a major power – not only in areas like trade and investment, but also on issues like environmental protection and global governance – are growing louder.

But the kind of deep and comprehensive reforms that China needs are always difficult to implement, given that they necessarily affect vested interests. In order to win public support for reforms, thereby maximizing the chances of success, the government must offer clear, accessible explanations of its goals. (Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s bold economic-reform package, for example, is couched in terms of “three arrows” – namely, monetary and fiscal policy, and structural reform.)

The Research Center takes a holistic approach to the reform process, viewing it as both a systemic change and a change of mindset. Translating its proposals – which are as profound as Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms – into simple, straightforward terms is no easy feat, but one that the 383 plan handles with relative deftness.

The “383” is shorthand for the plan’s content. First, the proposal describes the relationships between the Chinese economy’s three main actors: government, business, and the market. Second, it identifies eight key areas of reform: governance, competition policy, land, finance, public finance, state assets, innovation, and liberalization of international trade and finance. Third, it highlights three correlated goals: easing external pressure for domestic policy changes, building social inclusiveness through a basic social-security scheme, and reducing inefficiency, inequality, and corruption through major rural land reform.

The plan recognizes that reforms must be comprehensive, consistent, and concrete, with clear objectives, executable programs, and effective implementation capacity. At the same time, it accounts for the fact that relationships and perceptions cannot be changed overnight, and that rapid, sweeping transformation is not realistic in a country of 1.3 billion people.

In this context, the new free-trade zone in Shanghai – China’s most international city, with the most experienced and internationalist officials – is a breakthrough experiment in administrative reform and liberalization. The free-trade zone regulates foreign investment by using a “negative list” approach that identifies the fields in which foreign investment is prohibited or restricted, and thus subject to special administrative measures. This scheme alone is almost revolutionary, because it will allow foreign actors to help shape the Chinese state’s relationship with the market.

China’s leadership clearly understands that the economy cannot reach its full potential with central and local bureaucracies serving as substitutes for the market. In fact, a culture of adaptive experimentation and learning from local and international experience is already embedded in the Chinese bureaucracy and built into the planning, piloting, evaluation, fine-tuning, and roll-out of reform projects and programs. Effective implementation is reinforced through executive training programs for officials at all levels.

In the last few years, case studies conducted by Chinese authorities, with the help of academics and think tanks, have shown that the interface between state and market lies primarily at the municipal level, especially in the key sectors of industry, services, land, infrastructure, and finance. The studies also reveal that 17 Chinese cities, each with populations of more than three million, have already reached high-income status. These cities’ combined population stands at 155 million (11.5% of China’s total population), and their GDP amounts to $2.1 trillion (29.1% of China’s total output).

With home-ownership rates running at 80% in urban areas, household wealth, particularly in landed property, already exceeds that of many middle-income economies. According to official price estimates (which are lower than market prices), the value of real estate in China has already reached 261% of GDP – similar to the ratio in the United States.

Clearly, China’s export-driven, manufacturing-based industrial revolution has enabled it to accumulate substantial domestic wealth. But, as China’s ongoing growth slowdown demonstrates, this model has its limits.

A successful transition to the next phase of wealth creation – driven by the services sector and knowledge-based industries – will require a more market-oriented approach, in which the state cedes some control over the economy and focuses instead on protecting property rights, administering welfare services, reducing pollution, and eliminating corruption. Improved governance, together with greater support for market-based innovation, is needed to sustain a thriving economy.

The Third Plenum aims to digest China’s experiences, as well as international best practices, in order to forge a consensus for a coherent reform strategy that fosters an inclusive, innovative, and sustainable growth order. As Xi himself has said, it is time for China to allow the market to work where the government cannot.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/7Ncipu3Sw_M/story01.htm Tyler Durden

TWTR Enters Bear Market With 3 Handle on 3rd Day Of Trading

Mere days after the euphoria of Twitter’s IPO proclaimed by any and all as a great success, the bellwhether for all things Dot-Com-Bubble 2.0 has just entered its first bear market. Now down 20% from its $50.08 highs last week, Twitter now has a 3 handle ($39.99) as it seems the world wakes up to “unbelievable growth” that is ‘priced in’… Of course, with rumors that TWTR options trading starts later this week, it’s anyone’s guess where the machines take it next…

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/CZfHi9TxTpE/story01.htm Tyler Durden

"Beggar Thy Neighbor" Is Back: Goldman's Five Things To Watch As Currency Wars Return

We’re seeing a new era of currency wars,” Neil Mellor, a foreign-exchange strategist at Bank of New York Mellon in London. This is what Bloomberg reported today in a piece titled “Race to Bottom Resumes as Central Bankers Ease Anew.” It adds: “The global currency wars are heating up again as central banks embark on a new round of easing to combat a slowdown in growth.  The European Central Bank cut its key rate last week in a decision some investors say was intended in part to curb the euro after it soared to the strongest since 2011. The same day, Czech policy makers said they were intervening in the currency market for the first time in 11 years to weaken the koruna. New Zealand said it may delay rate increases to temper its dollar, and Australia warned the Aussie is “uncomfortably high.”

For the most part Bloomberg account is accurate, it has one fundamental flaw: currency wars never left, but were merely put on hiatus as the liquidity tsunami resulting from the BOJ’s mega easing lifted all boats for a few months. And now that the world has habituated to nearly $200 billion in new flow every month (and much more when adding China’s monthly new loan creation), the time to extract marginal gains from a world in which global trade continues to contract despite the ongoing surge in global liquidity, central banks are back to doing the one thing they can – printing more.

The moves threaten to spark a new round in what Brazil Finance Minister Guido Mantega in 2010 called a “currency war,” barely two months after the Group of 20 nations pledged to “refrain from competitive devaluation.”

 

“There are places in the world where economies are generally quite weak, where inflation is already low,” Alan Ruskin, global head of Group-of-10 foreign exchange in New York at Deutsche Bank AG, the world’s largest currency trader, said in a Nov. 8 phone interview. “Japan was in that mix for 20-odd years. Nobody wants to go there” and “the talk from Draghi shows they’re taking the disinflation story very seriously. The Czech Republic is the same story.”

 

Growth in global trade may slow to 2.5 percent in 2013, the new head of the World Trade Organization said after a Sept. 5-6 summit of G-20 nations in St. Petersburg, Russia, down from the organization’s previous estimate in April of 3.3 percent. Even so, the G-20 participants agreed to “refrain from competitive devaluation” and not “target our exchange rates for competitive purposes.”

It is indeed the bolded part that is the most disturbing one, and is why the most important revision in the IMF’s quarterly update of its flawed forecasts, is always the chart showing the collapse in real global trade, which in 2013 is now forecast to be 50% lower than preliminary estimates.

So what should one watch for now that even the MSM admits the currency wars are “back”? Goldman lists the 5 key areas to watch as central banks resume beggar thy neighbor policies with never before seen vigor.

  • Watch for Sudden Policy Shifts – In a regime where stability is achieved via offsetting forces, a sudden change in one of these forces will lead to potentially rapid moves. Changes often result from a major policy shift, as for example seen in Japan about a year ago. The period of Sterling weakness early in the year was another example, where a central bank suddenly increased the focus on the exchange rate. A policy shift that hurt EM deficit currencies this year, in particular, was the move towards Tapering by the Fed. Changes to one of the normally offsetting forces are quite similar to revaluation or devaluations in traditional exchange rate regimes.
  • Watch Genuine Appreciation Trends – In a world where every country wants to prevent its currency from strengthening, those who actually favour a stronger currency will not face many offsetting pressures. Obviously this is conditional on stronger underlying fundamentals. In order to control the speed of appreciation, frequent smoothing operations can be necessary. This may create a scenario of relatively slow appreciation, combined with very low volatility, which in turn would imply a high Sharpe Ratio. China’s steady Renminbi appreciation remains a case in point. And in recent times the Korean Won as well.
  • Watch Policy Constraints – There may also be countries that face continued appreciation pressures but operate under policy constraints that do not allow them to respond fully. In these situations policymakers may not be able to fully prevent appreciation. The constraints could appear in various forms. Would the ECB have been able to cut rates with higher inflation rates? A strict inflation mandate reduces the flexibility for policy makers to respond to currency movements, in particular when they reflect positive growth shocks. External policy pressures could be a constraint. The discussions at the G7 may have been a factor that limited Japan’s ability to weaken the JPY further and could become a constraint in case the JPY starts to strengthen again. The US Treasury report on currencies certainly hints in that direction.
  • Watch Carry – If policymakers aim at anchoring the exchange rate in nominal terms and succeed, this does not automatically imply that there are no return opportunities. As long as interest rates differentials persist there will be carry opportunities. And again relatively low volatility may be a welcome feature which raises Sharpe ratios. How long will the RBA be able to sustain an interest rate differential of more than 2% to most other developed economies in such a scenario?
  • Watch Quasi Currencies – Finally there is even an argument that competitive devaluations could boost precious metals. That view is based on the simplification that gold, for example, is a “homeless” currency without a central bank that tries to block its appreciation. Another way of saying the same is that many asset prices may rise in response to continued and competitive monetary easing, which is a key feature of such a non-collaborative exchange rate mechanism.

But most importantly, watch Yellen and the inflection point where the consensus that tapering may/will/should be just around the corner, makes way for the anathema, namely that $85 billion per month is nowhere near enough as the Fed doubles down on its own core prerogative for 2014: ramping inflation at all costs… even if it means a return to Yellen’s favorite topic: outright monetary finance.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/7HHq4eDBPUY/story01.htm Tyler Durden