Category: zerohedge

The Biggest Difference Between QE3 And QE2

Back in 2011, in an exclusive analysis, Zero Hedge showed how virtually all the reserves created as a result of QE2 ended up as cash on the balance sheets of foreign (mostly European) banks operating in the US. Some suggested that this was due to a change in FDIC rules which was being arbed by foreign banks which were able to engage in a mini carry trade affecting the Fed’s excess reserves. We disagreed, and suggested that this was nothing short of yet another way in which foreign banks abused the Fed’s “Bernanke Put” to bail themselves out at a time when the Eurozone and its currency seemed like they would implode any second.

QE2 came and went, and was replaced by QE3. And, having lasted nearly a year now, it has allowed us to observe the main way in which the Fed’s open-ended QE3 has so far differed from the QE2 of 2011.

Recall that while the Fed’s Quantiative Easing programs are largely determined by what securities the Fed monetizes: i.e. the sources of funds, what is always left unspoken is where the Fed’s created reserves end up, or the “uses” of funds, or rather, reserves. Luckily, as the chart below shows and as tracked by the Fed’s H.8 statement, there is a perfect correlation, and causation, between the Fed’s newly created reserves parked at banks, and the corresponding change in cash held on the books of either domestic (large and small) and foreign commercial banks operating in the US.

 

What may not be quite visible in the chart above is that during QE 2, virtually all the newly created cash ended up at foreign banks. This is shown far more clearly in the chart below showing the change in cash balances at large domestic commercial banks and foreign banks between the start and end of QE 2.

 

So while the Fed was explicitly pumping the deposit base of foreign banks in 2011 – and thanks to JPM and the entire deposit collateral pathway we now know that this cash was used to satisfy collateral requirements needed when purchasing risk assets, even if the banks never explicitly used the Fed’s cash to buy up risk – what has it been doing so far in 2013? The answer is shown below.

 

Surprisingly – if only to all those who claimed our assertion that the Fed was bailing out Europe’s banks was bunk due to “regulatory arbitrage” – entirely unlike during QE 2, this time around, virtually every dollar newly created by the Fed has landed on an equal basis at both large domestic commercial banks, and foreign banks operating in the US. But… but… whatever happened to the regulatory arbitrage of QE2?

To those still confused, here is the best visualization of the cash change in domestic vs foreign banks under the two QE regimes:

 

Indeed – a pretty clear summary of what the Fed’s deisgnated bailout audiences was under QE 2 (European banks) and QE 3 (everyone on an equal, pro rata basis).

The above, far more importantly than what the Fed is monetizing in order to build up its reserves, gives us a clear snapshot of the other part of the equation – where the Fed’s reserves end up.

 

All of this should perhaps once again spark the debate over just why has the Fed parked a record $1.3 trillion in cash not with US-based banks, but foreign ones, and just for whose benefit – since by now it is quite clear that QE is solely for the benefit of the 0.1% of the population and, of course, the banks – was QE designed.

Because it is one thing to bail out the rich, at least they are America’s rich. But when more than half of the proceeds of QE to date… 

…have ended up at foreign banks, perhaps at least a theatrical congressional hearing is in order?

Source: H.8


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/eghr5qKKH-4/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Ray Dalio's Bridgewater On The Fed's Dilemma: "We're Worried That There's No Gas Left In The QE Tank"

“The Fed’s real dilemma is that its policy is creating a financial market bubble that is large relative to the pickup in the economy that it is producing,” Bridgewater notes as the relationship between US equity markets and the Fed’s balance sheet (here and here for example) and “disconcerting disconnects” (here and here) indicate how the Fed is “trapped.” However, as the incoming Yellen faces up to her ‘tough’ decisions to taper or not, Ray Dalio’s team is concerned about something else – “we’re not worried about whether the Fed is going to hit or release the gas pedal, we’re worried about whether there’s much gas left in the tank and what will happen if there isn’t.”

 

Via Bridgewater,

In the old days central banks moved interest rates to run monetary policy. By watching the flows, we could see how lowering interest rates stimulated the economy by 1) reducing debt service burdens which improved cash flows and spending, 2) making it easier to buy items marked on credit because the monthly payments declined, which raised demand (initially for interest rate sensitive items like durable goods and housing) and 3) producing a positive wealth effect because the lower interest rate would raise the present value of most investment assets (and we saw how raising interest rates has had the opposite effect).

All that changed when interest rates hit 0%; “printing money” (QE) replaced interest-rate changes. Because central banks can only buy financial assets, quantitative easing drove up the prices of financial assets and did not have as broad of an effect on the economy. The Fed’s ability to stimulate the economy became increasingly reliant on those who experience the increased wealth trickling it down to spending and incomes, which happened in decreasing degrees (for logical reasons, given who owned the assets and their decreasing marginal propensities to consume).

As shown in the charts below, the marginal effects of wealth increases on economic activity have been declining significantly. The Fed’s dilemma is that its policy is creating a financial market bubble that is large relative to the pickup in the economy that it is producing. If it were targeting asset prices, it would tighten monetary policy to curtail the emerging bubble, whereas if it were targeting economic conditions, it would have a slight easing bias. In other words, 1) the Fed is faced with a difficult choice, and 2) it is losing its effectiveness.

We expect this limit to worsen. As the Fed pushes asset prices higher and prospective asset returns lower, and cash yields can’t decline, the spread between the prospective returns of risky assets and those of safe assets (i.e. risk premia) will shrink at the same time as the riskiness of risky assets will not decline, changing the reward-to-risk ratio in a way that will make it more difficult to push asset prices higher and create a wealth effect.

Said differently, at higher prices and lower expected returns the compensation for taking risk will be too small to get investors to bid prices up and drive prospective returns down further. If that were to happen, it would become difficult for the Fed to produce much more of a wealth effect. If that were the case at the same time as the trickling down of the wealth effect to spending continues to diminish, which seems likely, the Fed’s power to affect the economy would be greatly reduced.

…

…we think that US monetary policy is nearing a new test that will require wisdom and creativity along the lines of that which was required to deal with those problems. 

The basic issue is that quantitative easing is a much less effective tool when asset prices are high and thus have low expected returns than it is for managing financial crises.  That’s because QE stimulates the economy by (1) offsetting a panic by providing cash to the financial system when there’s a need for cash, and (2) by raising asset prices, and driving money from the assets they buy into demand and investment, creating a higher level of future economic activity.  So, the policy was particularly wise and most effective (in the sense of impact per dollar) at the height of the financial crisis when there was both a desperate need for cash and when extremely depressed asset prices were heavily weighing on demand and investment. 

Now, there is a flood of liquidity and asset prices are high relative to underlying fundamentals.  So the impact of additional asset price increases on demand is much less (as high asset prices and low future returns make assets more interchangeable with cash). 

Quantitative easing today is driving asset prices to unsustainable levels, without stimulating much additional activity.  That leaves a much clearer tradeoff between driving up asset prices today and lowering future returns (the price of which will be paid in the future).  During the crisis period, that was much less the case, because pulling forward returns from the future (i.e.,  raising prices) was then also creating future earnings growth (by helping to normalize the economy). 

The dilemma the Fed faces now is that the tools currently at its disposal are pretty much used up, in that interest rates are at zero and US asset prices have been driven up to levels that imply very low levels of returns relative to the risk, so there is very little ability to stimulate from here if needed.  So the Fed will either need to accept that outcome, or come up with new ideas to stimulate conditions.

We think the question around the effectiveness of continued QE (and not the tapering, which gets all the headlines) is the big deal.  Given the way the Fed has said it will act, any tapering will be in response to changes in US conditions, and any deterioration that occurs because of the Fed pulling back would just be met by a reacceleration of that stimulation.  So the degree and pace of tapering will for the most part be a reflection and not a driver of conditions, and won’t matter that much.  What will matter much more is the efficacy of Fed stimulation going forward. 

In other words, we’re not worried about whether the Fed is going to hit or release the gas pedal, we’re worried about whether there’s much gas left in the tank and what will happen if there isn’t.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/pyI2qcz7Feo/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Ray Dalio’s Bridgewater On The Fed’s Dilemma: “We’re Worried That There’s No Gas Left In The QE Tank”

“The Fed’s real dilemma is that its policy is creating a financial market bubble that is large relative to the pickup in the economy that it is producing,” Bridgewater notes as the relationship between US equity markets and the Fed’s balance sheet (here and here for example) and “disconcerting disconnects” (here and here) indicate how the Fed is “trapped.” However, as the incoming Yellen faces up to her ‘tough’ decisions to taper or not, Ray Dalio’s team is concerned about something else – “we’re not worried about whether the Fed is going to hit or release the gas pedal, we’re worried about whether there’s much gas left in the tank and what will happen if there isn’t.”

 

Via Bridgewater,

In the old days central banks moved interest rates to run monetary policy. By watching the flows, we could see how lowering interest rates stimulated the economy by 1) reducing debt service burdens which improved cash flows and spending, 2) making it easier to buy items marked on credit because the monthly payments declined, which raised demand (initially for interest rate sensitive items like durable goods and housing) and 3) producing a positive wealth effect because the lower interest rate would raise the present value of most investment assets (and we saw how raising interest rates has had the opposite effect).

All that changed when interest rates hit 0%; “printing money” (QE) replaced interest-rate changes. Because central banks can only buy financial assets, quantitative easing drove up the prices of financial assets and did not have as broad of an effect on the economy. The Fed’s ability to stimulate the economy became increasingly reliant on those who experience the increased wealth trickling it down to spending and incomes, which happened in decreasing degrees (for logical reasons, given who owned the assets and their decreasing marginal propensities to consume).

As shown in the charts below, the marginal effects of wealth increases on economic activity have been declining significantly. The Fed’s dilemma is that its policy is creating a financial market bubble that is large relative to the pickup in the economy that it is producing. If it were targeting asset prices, it would tighten monetary policy to curtail the emerging bubble, whereas if it were targeting economic conditions, it would have a slight easing bias. In other words, 1) the Fed is faced with a difficult choice, and 2) it is losing its effectiveness.

We expect this limit to worsen. As the Fed pushes asset prices higher and prospective asset returns lower, and cash yields can’t decline, the spread between the prospective returns of risky assets and those of safe assets (i.e. risk premia) will shrink at the same time as the riskiness of risky assets will not decline, changing the reward-to-risk ratio in a way that will make it more difficult to push asset prices higher and create a wealth effect.

Said differently, at higher prices and lower expected returns the compensation for taking risk will be too small to get investors to bid prices up and drive prospective returns down further. If that were to happen, it would become difficult for the Fed to produce much more of a wealth effect. If that were the case at the same time as the trickling down of the wealth effect to spending continues to diminish, which seems likely, the Fed’s power to affect the economy would be greatly reduced.

…

…we think that US monetary policy is nearing a new test that will require wisdom and creativity along the lines of that which was required to deal with those problems. 

The basic issue is that quantitative easing is a much less effective tool when asset prices are high and thus have low expected returns than it is for managing financial crises.  That’s because QE stimulates the economy by (1) offsetting a panic by providing cash to the financial system when there’s a need for cash, and (2) by raising asset prices, and driving money from the assets they buy into demand and investment, creating a higher level of future economic activity.  So, the policy was particularly wise and most effective (in the sense of impact per dollar) at the height of the financial crisis when there was both a desperate need for cash and when extremely depressed asset prices were heavily weighing on demand and investment. 

Now, there is a flood of liquidity and asset prices are high relative to underlying fundamentals.  So the impact of additional asset price increases on demand is much less (as high asset prices and low future returns make assets more interchangeable with cash). 

Quantitative easing today is driving asset prices to unsustainable levels, without stimulating much additional activity.  That leaves a much clearer tradeoff between driving up asset prices today and lowering future returns (the price of which will be paid in the future).  During the crisis period, that was much less the case, because pulling forward returns from the future (i.e.,  raising prices) was then also creating future earnings growth (by helping to normalize the economy). 

The dilemma the Fed faces now is that the tools currently at its disposal are pretty much used up, in that interest rates are at zero and US asset prices have been driven up to levels that imply very low levels of returns relative to the risk, so there is very little ability to stimulate from here if needed.  So the Fed will either need to accept that outcome, or come up with new ideas to stimulate conditions.

We think the question around the effectiveness of continued QE (and not the tapering, which gets all the headlines) is the big deal.  Given the way the Fed has said it will act, any tapering will be in response to changes in US conditions, and any deterioration that occurs because of the Fed pulling back would just be met by a reacceleration of that stimulation.  So the degree and pace of tapering will for the most part be a reflection and not a driver of conditions, and won’t matter that much.  What will matter much more is the efficacy of Fed stimulation going forward. 

In other words, we’re not worried about whether the Fed is going to hit or release the gas pedal, we’re worried about whether there’s much gas left in the tank and what will happen if there isn’t.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/pyI2qcz7Feo/story01.htm Tyler Durden

There's A Liquidity Crunch Developing

Submitted by Alasdair Macleod of GoldMoney.com,

This week an article in Euromoney points out that liquidity in bond markets is drying up. The blame is laid at the door of regulations designed to increase banks’ capital relative to their balance sheets. Furthermore, the article informs us, new regulations restricting the gearing on repo transactions are likely to make things worse, not only reducing bond market liquidity further, but also affecting credit markets. The reason this will be so is that in a repurchase agreement a bank supplies credit to non-banks for the period of the repo.

One could take another equally valid point of view: the reason for deteriorating liquidity in bond markets is due in part to yields being unnaturally low. If you price bonds too highly, which amounts to the same thing, few investors want to buy them without the unconditional support of the central bank as a ready buyer. This, after all, is why just the hint of tapering recently was enough to derail the markets. So here again we come up against the same choice: if the Fed insists on mispricing the market with its interventions and zero interest rate policy it must fully support the market with both QE and also twist applied to the yield curve to maintain market liquidity.

For the investment analysts and commentators that still expect tapering this must come as something of a surprise. The underlying point they have missed is that once a central bank embarks on a policy of printing money as a cure-all, it is impossible to stop, or even to just taper without risking a liquidity crisis. Increasingly illiquid markets are now telling us that QE should be increased.

The point was rammed home this week by the ECB’s decision to lower interest rates. The move was sold to the financial press as designed to stimulate inflation and reduce the risk of deflation. However, central to the deflation argument is the need to stimulate liquidity in the secondary markets, which according to the Euromoney article “are now close to breakdown”.

At least the ECB rate cut should defuse tapering expectations in US markets, making it easier for the Fed to back down from its failed experiment. The Fed now needs to plant the suggestion that QE will have to be increased, or a similar mechanism designed to boost liquidity introduced.

This will not be difficult in the prevailing economic conditions. Even though GDP remains a positive figure, concerns over deflation abound and are preoccupying more and more analysts. These are concerns which analysts can readily accept as an immediate and greater risk than inflation.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/AYODrMtNJws/story01.htm Tyler Durden

There’s A Liquidity Crunch Developing

Submitted by Alasdair Macleod of GoldMoney.com,

This week an article in Euromoney points out that liquidity in bond markets is drying up. The blame is laid at the door of regulations designed to increase banks’ capital relative to their balance sheets. Furthermore, the article informs us, new regulations restricting the gearing on repo transactions are likely to make things worse, not only reducing bond market liquidity further, but also affecting credit markets. The reason this will be so is that in a repurchase agreement a bank supplies credit to non-banks for the period of the repo.

One could take another equally valid point of view: the reason for deteriorating liquidity in bond markets is due in part to yields being unnaturally low. If you price bonds too highly, which amounts to the same thing, few investors want to buy them without the unconditional support of the central bank as a ready buyer. This, after all, is why just the hint of tapering recently was enough to derail the markets. So here again we come up against the same choice: if the Fed insists on mispricing the market with its interventions and zero interest rate policy it must fully support the market with both QE and also twist applied to the yield curve to maintain market liquidity.

For the investment analysts and commentators that still expect tapering this must come as something of a surprise. The underlying point they have missed is that once a central bank embarks on a policy of printing money as a cure-all, it is impossible to stop, or even to just taper without risking a liquidity crisis. Increasingly illiquid markets are now telling us that QE should be increased.

The point was rammed home this week by the ECB’s decision to lower interest rates. The move was sold to the financial press as designed to stimulate inflation and reduce the risk of deflation. However, central to the deflation argument is the need to stimulate liquidity in the secondary markets, which according to the Euromoney article “are now close to breakdown”.

At least the ECB rate cut should defuse tapering expectations in US markets, making it easier for the Fed to back down from its failed experiment. The Fed now needs to plant the suggestion that QE will have to be increased, or a similar mechanism designed to boost liquidity introduced.

This will not be difficult in the prevailing economic conditions. Even though GDP remains a positive figure, concerns over deflation abound and are preoccupying more and more analysts. These are concerns which analysts can readily accept as an immediate and greater risk than inflation.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/AYODrMtNJws/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Once Again, Retail Investors Are Piling Into a Bubble Near the Top

 

One of the primary themes for this letter over the last few months has been the potential of a major market top forming. We now have what I can only call “numerous bells” ringing.

 

First and foremost, I want to alert you to a disturbing trend in stock mania. That trend pertains to money inflows to stock mutual funds.

 

One of the best means of gauging investor sentiment for individual investors pertains to how they move their money in and out of mutual funds.

 

For example, from 2007 until the end of 2012, investors pulled over $405 billion out of stock based mutual funds. Over $90 billion of this was pulled in 2012 alone: the largest withdrawal since 2008.

 

In contrast, over the same time period, investors put over $1.14 trillion into bond funds. They brought in $317 billion in 2012: again, this was the most since 2008.

 

This marks quite a reversal of asset class fund flows: before 2008, stock funds usually took in $2 for every $1 investors allocated to bond funds.

 

However, this trend reversed back to normal in 2013. The Fed finally succeeded in inducing investors to move into stocks again. And they have done so in a big way. Thus far in 2013, investors have put $277 billion into stock mutual funds.

 

This is the single largest allocation of investor capital to stock based mutual funds since 2000: at the height of the Tech bubble. That year, investors put $324 billion into stocks. We might actually match that inflow this year as we still have two months left in 2013.

 

Indeed, investors are reaching a type of mania for stocks. They put $45.5 billion into stock based mutual funds in the first five weeks of October. If they maintain even half of that pace ($22.75 billion) for November and December, we’ll virtually tie the all-time record for stock fund inflows in a single year.

 

That record, again, occurred in 2000. At that time the NASDAQ had just staged a massive bubble rally.

 

 

What followed was one of the worst market collapses of all time:

 

 

 

Be forewarned.

 

For a FREE Special Report outlining how to protect your portfolio a market collapse, swing by: http://phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/special-reports.html

 

Best Regards,

 

Phoenix Capital Research

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/AcsHxETW5Og/story01.htm Phoenix Capital Research