The Punch Line: The Complete Macroeconomic Summary And All The Chart To Go With It

From Abe Gulkowitz’ The Punch Line

Meager Growth but the Market Roars…

An interim deal on Iran’s nuclear program pushed oil prices lower and sent global equities higher as investors’ risk appetite rose on an easing of some Middle East tensions. As we close in to year-end and the start of a new year, one finds little evidence of serious inflationary concerns. Indeed, the opposite is feared.

Major economies face debilitating deflation pressures. In Europe, for example, the latest annual inflation statistics fell in twenty-three Member States, remained stable in one and rose in only four. The HSBC/Markit Flash China PMI came in at 50.4 in November, marking a two-month low and missing expectations. The survey still indicated that the Chinese economy is expanding but it also raised fears that growth may be tailing off in the fourth quarter. China will be lucky if it manages to hit its official target of 7.5% growth in 2013, a far cry from the double-digit rates that the country had come to expect in the 2000s.

Growth in India (around 5%), Brazil and Russia (around 2.5%) is barely half what it was at the height of the boom. In Europe, the Markit Flash Eurozone PMI fell from 51.9 to 51.5, the lowest reading for three months. The French index was particularly weak – the PMI was at its lowest level since June. Germany continued to improve but the rest of the eurozone seems to be languishing. Questions abound whether the EU risks following the path carved by the sluggish Japan in the 1990s. Yet financial assets point to a worrisome asset inflation environment. Many have written off the likelihood that the Federal Reserve would begin QE tapering this year.

As stocks hit new records and small investors—finally—return to the market, some analysts are getting worried. Risk assets have rallied to previous bubble conditions. Powered by unprecedented refinancing and recap activity, 2013 is now the most productive year ever for new-issue leveraged loans, for example. This has been great for corporations as financing and refinancing has put them on a stronger footing. Where M&A activity still lags the highs of the last boom, issuers have jumped into the opportunistic pool with both feet. And why not? Secondary prices are high and new-issue clearing yields remain low. Yet very inadequate movement has been evidenced on the hiring front.

And after all the improvement in ebitda, where do we go from here? Forward guidance will clearly be harder. One might argue that we are back in a Goldilocks fantasy world, where the economy is not so strong (as to cause inflation and trigger serious monetary tightening) or so weak (as to cause recession and a collapse in profits) but “just right”. Yet, it seems unlikely that issuers with weaker credit quality could find it so easy to sell debt without the excess liquidity created by the Fed and other central banks.

Weaning everyone off the “liquidity fix” may be tough!

The full Punchline including 17 pages of off the charts that’s fit to print below (pdf)


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/MlGZHzlhgNM/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The Top Ten Market Mysteries

To paraphrase Mark Twain, “It isn’t the stuff you don’t know that will kill you – it’s the stuff you’re sure about but is totally wrong that will do you real harm.”  As a corollary to this fateful phrase, Convergx’s Nick Colas has collected a list of market “knowledge” that is questionable at best and harmful at worst.

Via ConvergEx’s Nick Colas,
 
For years I had a pet theory about how your abilities improve over time in any given vocation.  My thought was that every year you work, you learn one critical aspect of the job. Over the first few years, the percentage improvement in your knowledge is quite impressive: 50% in the second year, 33% in the third, and so on as you pick up new and important insights.  And while years 15-20 might offer up slower growth, you also have less competition from your more junior peers.  They’ve figured out fewer points, after all.

A few examples of these critical lessons from my 20+ years analyzing stocks, markets, and the economy on both the buy side and sell side:

Rule #1: The marginal buyer and seller set prices for everything.  You may have point of view on value, but the actors setting the price don’t care about your opinion.  Seriously – they don’t.

 

Rule #2: If you don’t know what to do or say, don’t do or say anything.  Boredom is investor’s greatest enemy.  Thrashing around is for mosh pits and three year olds.

 

Rule #3: If you can’t explain your competitive advantage in three sentences, you don’t have one.  That’s true for analysts, portfolio managers, company executives, startup companies, writers, etc.

 

Rule #4: It is OK to be wrong.  Just don’t lie to yourself or anyone else about being wrong.

The second part of my imaginary rule set was that there were 20 questions that mattered to any job, so two decades of experience should get you to the end of the journey.  I can tell you that, with 22 years in the business of analyzing financial assets, this part is wrong.  And in keeping with Rule #4, I am fessing up.  The true count is probably more like 100, which is why only vampires have a shot of figuring everything out. Zombies would have a shot, too, if it weren’t for the whole mindless existence thing.

To be fair, part of the problem of harvesting those elusive 20 – 100 points from the sea of capital markets aphorisms and rules is that there are so many false leads.  At first they look useful, but like a poorly made tool they eventually shatter under heavy use.  Since I am prone to list-making, I have also kept a short collection of these false gods.

The balance of this report is a Top 10 list of those as well as a brief assessment of where and why they go off the rails. I use questions rather than statement to lead off each point.  After all, these are points that seem right but are – ultimately – misunderstood.

#1 – Why the fixation on price earnings multiples?  Say a stock trades for 10 times projected earnings.  Does that make it a better investment than one trading for 20 or 100 times?  The short answer is no.  Valuation is a three dimensional chess game of the returns a business can generate, its competitive position, and its growth prospects.  No matter how much you try to stuff the duffle bag that is P/E analysis with those bulky items, you simply aren’t going to get them all in.

 

#2 – Why do technical analysts use an arithmetic price axes instead of log scales?  Don’t get me wrong – I love good technicians. They are the shamans and storytellers of the capital markets, drawing pictures and relating price levels to events in the past. But look at the average technician’s work and you’ll see that all the price charts treat the move from $10 to $20 the same way as $90 to $100.  One is a double; the other is only an 11% move.  That could all be solved with a logarithmic scale for the Y-axis, but very few people do it that way.

 

#3 – Why do investors care about the price at which a company buys back its stock?  It isn’t the Chief Financial Officer’s job to figure out if his/her stock is over or undervalued.  That’s for investors to do; it’s pretty much the job description, actually.  Stock buybacks return money to shareholders rather than allowing the company to reinvest it in the business.  That’s it.  Now, if a company is going to blow a quarter, maybe the CFO should lighten up the repo and buy lower.  Fair enough.  But CFOs aren’t stock pickers.  So if the market tumbles and company with a repurchase plan in place happens to buy higher than current prices, don’t complain.  Stock picking is your job.

 

#4 – Why does the negative case for an investment always sound smarter than the positive one?  Remember that over the long term (really, really long term, anyway), most equities rise in value.  Short sellers therefore typically have to do more work to find the right ideas.  Their rap is, therefore, generally stronger than the “Sit tight, be right” crowd.  I think, however, that humans are generally wired to be scared by a negative story and it therefore holds our attention better.  It’s not always right, but our innate biases make us remember it.

 

#5 – Why is there a Nobel Prize in Economics?  There are only five “Real” Nobels, instituted by the old man himself: Peace, Chemistry, Physics, Medicine/Physiology, and Literature.  Alfred Nobel invented dynamite, among his +300 patents, and these prizes were essentially a way of being remembered for something other than arms dealing and the industrializing of human misery.  Unlike these awards, which started in 1901, the Economics “Nobel” is a newcomer, with the first prize given in 1969 by Swedish Central Bank.  Putting the social science of economics on par with either the hard sciences or human ideals such as peace or literature seems odd, at best.  At worst, it imbues the discipline with a notional precision that it can never attain.  If you need any further proof, consider this year’s award to Gene Fama and Robert Shiller.  One believes markets are efficient, one doesn’t.  Its sort of like the committee  is saying “You figure it out…”

 

#6 – Why is investor and social attention negatively correlated with stock market direction?  When the global equity markers were imploding in 2008-2009, cable business news channels enjoyed relatively high ratings.  Now that the U.S. equity market is hitting new highs, no one but Wall Street seems to tune in.  We’re used to equating social attention with value (the valuation of social media stocks is a great example), but with the stock market, the opposite is true.

 

#7 – What ever happened to “Growth” and “value” investing?  When I started in the business, mutual fund and other institutional managers differentiated themselves by these monikers.  The hedge funds came along, with much broader mandates.   After that, passive management with low fees and transparent trading through exchange traded funds became popular.  Managers still use the terms, to be sure, but the delineation is nowhere near as rigid as it used to be.  Most investors just want to find stock
s that go up.

 

#8 – Why does it take capital markets so long to embrace technological change in its own back yard?  Over the last 20 years, equity trading has moved from three exchanges to scores of virtual venues.  You can see the same process occurring throughout modern society.  Online shopping supplants old brick and mortar retailers.  Mobile apps replace singles bars.  You can play scrabble with a friend in another country on your smartphone.  Yet, somehow, the clever people in capital markets seem shocked that their jobs are subject to the same technological advances.  There’s no going back to the old days…  Sorry.

 

#9 – Why does anyone doubt the value of gold?  Humans have valued gold for 5,000 years. Some of the first money – coins minted in ancient Anatolia – was minted with the stuff.  The world functioned on a gold standard of sorts until 1971.  I think the reason some people dislike gold as an investment is because it reminds them that humans are the same across space and time.  We like to think we are “Better” than the ancient Romans with their gladiatorial spectacle and will never again need a portable method of transferring wealth like the European refugees of the 1940s and 1950s.  Gold was the fiscal anchor of the former and the salvation of the latter.  Are we so different?  Let’s see how the next 100 years turn out.

 

#10 – Why do humans always fight the last battle rather than focus on future challenges?  Put another way, would it be so bad if we banished the word “Bubble” from our collective consciousness for the next decade?  Humans are prone to herd behavior – we like the security of crowds.  If our ancestors had been rugged individualists they would have never made it out of Africa.  And if any of them were, they certainly succumbed to the local fauna. And their genes died with them.  Bubbles are as much a part of human behavior as breathing, and it will always be thus.  At the same time, not everything that rises quickly in value is a bubble.  Using that rubric and hearkening back to other asset price collapses is lazy, at best. 

Now – watch CNBC for an hour and check off how many of these ‘red flags’ you hear…


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/1azCbH8JNqE/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The Hidden Secrets Of Money Part 5: When Money Is Corrupted

Having exposed the “biggest scam in history” is Part 4 (following Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3), Mike Maloney’s fifth episode serves as an ideal primer for those waking up to the monetary matrix around them, as it clearly shows the history of true money and why it so important to our freedom. The quality of a society is directly proportional to the quality of its money. Debase a currency for long enough, and you end up with dangerous deficits, debt driven disasters, and eventually…delusional dictators. History proves this to be true.

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/XII_MohrkkE/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Kevin Warsh Exposes The Fed's Market-Based Dilemma In Under 90 Seconds

“The reality is,”Kevin Warsh exclaims, “QE policy favors those with big balance sheets, those with risk appetites, and access to free money,” while real people “are still looking around and saying what is fed policy doing for me.” The problem, he explains, is a disconnect between what markets are discounting about the future and the Fed’s credibility with regard their apparently divergent forecasts for unemployment, growth, and interest rates. In a little under 90 seconds, Warsh explains the dilemma and sums up the Fed perfectly, “they’re just talking, rather than acting.”

“The challenge for [The Fed] in December is to convince the markets that both their economic forecasts are right – that is the economy will be growing at 3.5% in 2016, the unemployment rate will be in the fives – and yet, interest rates still at zero.

 

My view is one of those has to give.

 

If the economy is roaring as much as they say, markets will not believe that the Federal Reserve will keep the Fed Funds rate at zero in that environment. The alternative is the economy is stuck at around 2% growth in which case it is possible that rates and yields stay quite low.”

90 Quick seconds of uncomfortable enlightenment…

 

 

His later comments did not entirely suggest confidence in the short-term future…

“Financial markets tend to test new chairmen. They did it to Paul Volcker. They did it to Alan Greenspan,” Warsh said. “They challenged Ben Bernanke and his new team eight years ago.”

 

I’ve got every bit of confidence that [Yellen] is going to realize that being chairman is frankly a very different set of responsibilities … where most of us get to sort of chatter from the cheap seats. She’s got to make the tough decisions.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/ahPbpPwkrJY/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Kevin Warsh Exposes The Fed’s Market-Based Dilemma In Under 90 Seconds

“The reality is,”Kevin Warsh exclaims, “QE policy favors those with big balance sheets, those with risk appetites, and access to free money,” while real people “are still looking around and saying what is fed policy doing for me.” The problem, he explains, is a disconnect between what markets are discounting about the future and the Fed’s credibility with regard their apparently divergent forecasts for unemployment, growth, and interest rates. In a little under 90 seconds, Warsh explains the dilemma and sums up the Fed perfectly, “they’re just talking, rather than acting.”

“The challenge for [The Fed] in December is to convince the markets that both their economic forecasts are right – that is the economy will be growing at 3.5% in 2016, the unemployment rate will be in the fives – and yet, interest rates still at zero.

 

My view is one of those has to give.

 

If the economy is roaring as much as they say, markets will not believe that the Federal Reserve will keep the Fed Funds rate at zero in that environment. The alternative is the economy is stuck at around 2% growth in which case it is possible that rates and yields stay quite low.”

90 Quick seconds of uncomfortable enlightenment…

 

 

His later comments did not entirely suggest confidence in the short-term future…

“Financial markets tend to test new chairmen. They did it to Paul Volcker. They did it to Alan Greenspan,” Warsh said. “They challenged Ben Bernanke and his new team eight years ago.”

 

I’ve got every bit of confidence that [Yellen] is going to realize that being chairman is frankly a very different set of responsibilities … where most of us get to sort of chatter from the cheap seats. She’s got to make the tough decisions.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/ahPbpPwkrJY/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: 3 Myth's About Rising Interest Rates

Submitted by Lance Roberts of STA Wealth Management,


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/GPSbAhAVL8Y/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: 3 Myth’s About Rising Interest Rates

Submitted by Lance Roberts of STA Wealth Management,


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/GPSbAhAVL8Y/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Bob Shiller Warns "It's Different Now, We Can't Trust Momentum"

"I just don't see evidence that people believe we are launching into a great new era" of home price appreciation,"that's what we had in the early 2000s." Simply put, he chides Faber and Cramer, "people are not so excited about the future," in spite of record high stock prices (and surging home prices) as it seems the Fed's plan was foiled again. In a fascinating to-and-fro, they note "we don't want to go back to 2005," even though "it would lift the economy" since "we know how that story ends." The hedge funds and 'investors' proclaim themselves long-term investors, but Shiller notes "they are not, what they have learned there is short-run momentum in the housing market," and will bail at the first sign of that ebbing, "it's different now, we can't trust momentum."

Some uncomfortable truths from the Nobel winner…

"Real homebuyers are not as excited about the housing market as the price increases seem to suggest…"

 

"It's more of an 'unusual' demand from investors that's driving the market now…"

 

"…the market is driven more by psychology than affordability"

 

The rental market demand 'excuse' for growth and long-term gains is obsequious as Shiller asks rhetorically, "how can these guys not notice how fast prices have been going up and historically momentum is a much better play in housing than it has been in the stock market." He adds, "I'm pretty sure [an exit] is on their minds," but as he warns, "they are not going to say this, of course."

"It looks like we are a little bubbly in the stock market,… if it keeps going up like this, the expected retrun on the stock market will fall below the TIPS yield."

 

 

Former Fed official Kevin Warsh didn't help:

"Housing and housing assets are going to give you one signal," Warsh said in a "Squawk Box" interview. "[But] there is a broader cross section of data from the consumer, from the business, from trade and from exports. So this preoccupation with housing strikes me as really quite dangerous."

 

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/mh_11-xQN9o/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Bob Shiller Warns “It’s Different Now, We Can’t Trust Momentum”

"I just don't see evidence that people believe we are launching into a great new era" of home price appreciation,"that's what we had in the early 2000s." Simply put, he chides Faber and Cramer, "people are not so excited about the future," in spite of record high stock prices (and surging home prices) as it seems the Fed's plan was foiled again. In a fascinating to-and-fro, they note "we don't want to go back to 2005," even though "it would lift the economy" since "we know how that story ends." The hedge funds and 'investors' proclaim themselves long-term investors, but Shiller notes "they are not, what they have learned there is short-run momentum in the housing market," and will bail at the first sign of that ebbing, "it's different now, we can't trust momentum."

Some uncomfortable truths from the Nobel winner…

"Real homebuyers are not as excited about the housing market as the price increases seem to suggest…"

 

"It's more of an 'unusual' demand from investors that's driving the market now…"

 

"…the market is driven more by psychology than affordability"

 

The rental market demand 'excuse' for growth and long-term gains is obsequious as Shiller asks rhetorically, "how can these guys not notice how fast prices have been going up and historically momentum is a much better play in housing than it has been in the stock market." He adds, "I'm pretty sure [an exit] is on their minds," but as he warns, "they are not going to say this, of course."

"It looks like we are a little bubbly in the stock market,… if it keeps going up like this, the expected retrun on the stock market will fall below the TIPS yield."

 

 

Former Fed official Kevin Warsh didn't help:

"Housing and housing assets are going to give you one signal," Warsh said in a "Squawk Box" interview. "[But] there is a broader cross section of data from the consumer, from the business, from trade and from exports. So this preoccupation with housing strikes me as really quite dangerous."

 

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/mh_11-xQN9o/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: Take The Money And Run: China's Ill-Gotten Wealth Flees Overseas

Submitted by Charles Hugh-Smith of OfTwoMinds blog,

The front door is covered with official pronouncements of "the China Dream" and blustery demands of hegemony, but the back door is choked with members of the financial/political Elite fleeing China and taking their wealth with them.

The first thing to understand about China is there is always a front door and a back door to everything. The front door is what's presented to the outside world; the back door is for everything that doesn't fit the PR image created by the front door.

The front door presents positive "face," the back door is for everything that would "lose face," so it's hidden and never discussed, except in private, and only with trusted family or friends.

A friend who once worked for the Chinese government recently returned home after several years absence, and found that all her bosses had moved to the West: Australia, Canada, etc. These were typical officials: their base salary was low but they managed to buy multiple homes, support mistresses, have upscale autos, and so on.

In a word, ill-gotten wealth. There are tens of thousands of these beneficiaries of China's boom in credit and corruption, and they have all either fled (with their ill-gotten wealth) to the West or "safe-haven" East (Singapore, for example). Those who haven't fled yet have passports to a safe haven, and cash and homes overseas awaiting their arrival.

It is common knowledge that the offspring of top officials all have passports and homes awaiting them in the West.

That every one of your political bosses has left China is an astounding revelation into the mindset of those who have benefited most from China's boom: they obviously fear that some upheaval could strip away their ill-gotten wealth, otherwise, why not simply move to some wealthy enclave in China?

The front door is covered with official pronouncements of the China Dream and blustery demands of hegemony, but the back door is choked with members of the financial/political Elite fleeing China and taking their wealth with them. All of this is well-known, yet it is spoken of in hushed tones, lest China lose face from this wholesale exodus of those who stripmined the nation with credit and corruption.

If the Elites had any faith in China's future, and in the security of their wealth, why would they be fleeing China in perhaps the greatest peacetime exodus of wealth the world has ever seen? Estimates of the money flowing out of China are merely guesses, of course, but the numbers run into the tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars.

Those in the political/financial Elites have the best information about conditions in China. What speaks louder, actions, or empty words? Actions, without a doubt. It's difficult to see how China can be as stable as advertised when its monied Elites all have back doors out of the country and homes awaiting them in the West. The most fearful (or guilty) aren't waiting around to risk the future in China; they're already long gone. What does that say about the front door pronouncements of hegemony and dreams? The inconvenient truth is the Chinese Dream is to live in Palo Alto:

Why Chinese People Buy So Many Homes in Palo Alto (The Atlantic)

Chinese Dream: To Become the Father of an American, by Jia Jia "When Bill Clinton visited China in 1998, a female student named Ma Nan at Peking University stood up and denounced the appalling human rights condition in the US. She was supposed to file a question, but she sounded more like she was delivering a lecture. Later on, she married an American man, gave birth to a son, became the mother of an American, and departed China for good."

Young, Gifted, and Chinese "Facing the future of housing, marriage, and job, why do our hearts beat not with expectations but fear?"

Fitch says China credit bubble unprecedented in modern world history

China in Revolution and War "Several serious problems in China could trigger a major crisis, potentially igniting either a domestic revolution or foreign war."

How will a slowing China cope with rapidly aging buildings?


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/nGN2arQ6njI/story01.htm Tyler Durden