“Money For Nothing” And The Survival Of The Fattest

It is perhaps a testament to the ability of the oligarchy (that 1% which owns some 50% of all US assets) to distract and distort newsflow from what really matters, that a century after the creation of the Federal Reserve, the vast majority of Americans are still unfamiliar with the most important institution in the history of the US – an institution that unlike the government is not accountable to the people (if only as prescribed on a piece of rapidly amortizing paper), but merely to a few banker stakeholders as Bernanke’s actions over the past five years have demonstrated beyond any doubt. It is for their benefit that Jim Bruce’s groundbreaking movie “Money for Nothing” is a must see, although we would urge everyone else, including those frequent Zero Hedge readers well-versed in the inner workings of the Fed, to take the two hours and recall just who the real enemy of the people truly is.

A quick note on producer, director and writer Jim Bruce. While Jim has been a student of financial markets for over a decade, and began writing a newsletter in 2006 warning about the oncoming financial crisis, what is perhaps most notable is that it was his short trades in 2007 and 2008 that helped finance a significant portion of Money For Nothing’s budget.

However, most impressive is Bruce’s ability to bring together such a broad and insightful cast which includes both current and former Fed members, as well as some of the most outspoken Fed critics, among which:

  • Paul Volcker
  • Janet Yellen
  • Alice Rivlin
  • Alan Blinder
  • Richard Fisher
  • Thomas Hoenig
  • Jeffrey Lacker
  • Jim Grant
  • Allan Meltzer
  • Raghuram Rajan
  • Charles Plosser
  • Tony Boeckh
  • Jeremy Grantham
  • Todd Harrison

… and many others.

From the film’s official website:

MONEY FOR NOTHING is a feature-length documentary about the Federal Reserve – made by a Team of AFI, Sundance, and Academy Award winners – that seeks to unveil America’s central bank and its impact on our economy and our society.

 

Current and former top economists, financial historians, and investors and traders provide unprecedented access and take viewers behind the curtain to debate the future of the world’s most powerful financial institution.

 

Digging beneath the surface of the 2008 crisis, Money For Nothing is the first film to ask why so many facets of our financial system seemed to self-destruct at the same time. For many economists and senior Fed officials, the answer is clear: the same Fed that put out 2008’s raging financial fire actually helped light the match years before.

 

As the global financial system continues to falter, the Federal Reserve finds itself at a crossroads. The choices it makes will greatly influence the kind of world our children and grandchildren inherit. How can the Federal Reserve steer our nation toward a more sustainable path? How can the American people – who the Fed was created to serve – influence an institution whose inner workings they may not understand?

 

The key tenet underlying Money For Nothing is our belief that a more fully and accurately informed public will promote greater accountability and more effective policies from our central bank – no matter the conclusions any individual draws from the film.

Sadly this is where we differ, for it is Zero Hedge’s opinion that not only is it now far too late to promote any type of change at the top, but the best policy is to urge the Fed on in its ludicrous policies, in order to lead to the catastrophic culmination of 100 years of disastrous wealth-transfer policies, which unfortunately is the only possible way a cleansing systemic reset – one that would finally eradicate the scourge of central-planning – can be unleashed upon a broken and malfunctioning system in its final throes of status quo existence.

Then again, perhaps there is a chance.

Enjoy the trailer and see the movie either on Blu-Ray or in the theater:

 

Finally, as an added bonus, here are some thoughts from the creator and that supreme beneficiary of the Fed’s wealth transfer protocols, billionaire David Tepper, on how Ben Bernanke managed to, temporarily, circumvent Darwin’s laws and how it is not the fittest but the fattest that survive.


    



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Another German Steps Down From The ECB As Joerg Asmussen Leaves For Deputy Labor Minister Post

One of the more vocal members of the ECB’s governing council and executive board, 47-year old German Joerg Asmussen, surprisingly announced this morning that he is stepping down for “purely private family reasons.” Concurrently, the German who has been a less tenuous version of his far more outspoken and hawkish compatriot Jens Weidmann, announced that he would accept a job as Deputy Labour Ministry job in the new German
government. What is surprising is that the German was not appointed finance minister in Merkel’s new cabinet, although with Schrodinger Schauble determined to keep his position it is explainable. What is more surprising is that Asmussen replaced none other than Juergen Stark, who once was said to be Trichet’s successor, and who dramatically quit the ECB over disagreements on the bank’s bond monetization program. One wonders: is Joerg’s untimely departure just the latest indication that the ECB is finally preparing to unroll a blanket quantitative easing program, just as BNP predicted it would, in its desperate, last-ditch attempt to defeat Europe’s slide into outright deflation and credit-creation collapse? Certainly, if Weidmann were to quietly leave next, then whatever you do, don’t stand below the Euro.

The full details from Reuters:

Asmussen, a member of the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD), was a highly regarded deputy Finance Minister in Berlin between 2008 and 2011 before being appointed to the ECB Executive Board by Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2012.

He has since become a well-recognised face in European financial circles, giving speeches from Athens to Madrid. His surprise return to Berlin and inclusion in the government adds a dash of international flair to the right-left coalition that takes office on Tuesday.

Asmussen said he wanted to move back from the ECB headquarters in Frankfurt – and accept what is ostensibly a lesser job – in order to spend more time with his young family.

“This wasn’t an easy decision for me,” the 47-year-old said in a statement to Reuters after the appointment was announced by Labour Minister Andrea Nahles.

“I’ll be stepping down soon as a member of the ECB Executive Board. The reasons for this step are purely private, having to do with my family situation.”

He added: “It’s just not possible in the long run to reconcile having a position based in Frankfurt, with frequent business trips, and having my family and especially my two very young children in Berlin. There is definitely no other reason.”

Asmussen succeeded Juergen Stark, who stepped down from the ECB board in a row over its bond-buying programme.

Alongside Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, but with perhaps less tenacity, Asmussen at times criticised the ECB’s expansive policies. Both defended the ECB’s last interest rate cut in November as justified, however.

ECB President Mario Draghi said Asmussen will be missed.

“Joerg Asmussen has been a tremendous help in shaping the monetary policy in the past two years while successfully addressing many other challenges,” Draghi said in a statement. “I will personally miss him.”

Merkel said she was looking forward to working with Asmussen again, and that Germany would propose a successor at the ECB.

Among the top candidates are Bundesbank vice president Sabine Lautenschlaeger, BaFin head Elke Koenig and the head of the Halle institute for economic research, Claudia Buch – all women.

Asmussen’s name had been mentioned in recent months as a possible candidate for Finance Minister if the SPD took control of the ministry that it held in the last “grand coalition” from 2005 to 2009, when Asmussen was a deputy to Peer Steinbrueck.

But Asmussen had been consistently non-committal on the issue, saying he planned to fulfil his contract as an executive board member at the ECB that ran until end of 2019.

In the end, Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) retained control of the Finance Ministry with veteran Wolfgang Schaeuble, 71, staying in charge.

While Asmussen has enjoyed a sterling reputation with the SPD’s conservative wing and across the aisle in Merkel’s CDU, he was viewed with suspicion by the SPD left – which is informally led by Nahles.

Asmussen’s move to the ministry could help improve his standing on the left in the long term. Nahles told Reuters she was looking forward to working with Asmussen as her deputy.

“I’m delighted that Joerg Asmussen will be a state secretary in the Labour Ministry and bring his great executive experience and full engagement into this key ministry,” she said.


    



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The IMF Disagrees With Zero Hedge

On Thursday, after we presented an article by Simon Black in which the author suggested that the IMF was implicitly proposing a 71% tax-rate on Americans, by “suggesting that the US government could maximize its tax revenue by increasing tax brackets to as high as 71%”, the IMF took offense to this characterization, and tweeted out the following:

Naturally, the IMF has a right to its opinion, be it retroactive revisionism, or proactive humorous predictions about the future, which incidentally we have charted in the past showing just how “accurate” the IMF’s forecasting track record has been in recent years…

… but since the topic of taxation, be it on wealth (something we warned about in September 2011, which as depositors in Cyprus banks learned about the hard way in March of this year), or income is far less humorous, we leave it up to readers to decide just what the IMF is “proposing”, using only the IMF’s own words.

Below we present the key passage from the IMF’s October 2013 Fiscal Monitor report titled “Taxing Times.”

Whether those with the highest incomes could or should pay more has become a contentious political issue in many countries. Several, given large consolidation needs, have bucked the decades-long trend by increasing top personal income tax rates quite substantially: since 2008, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom have all done so, on average by more than 8 percentage points.

 

Assessing whether there is untapped revenue potential at the top of the income distribution requires comparing today’s top marginal income tax rate with the marginal tax rate that would maximize the amount of tax paid by top income earners. The latter depends on two things: first, how responsive their taxable income is to that marginal rate—which in turn depends on both “real” decisions (on labor supply efforts and the like) and “paper” avoidance activities; and second, the distribution of income within that upper group. Ranges of revenue-maximizing top income tax rates can be calculated by combining existing estimates of the elasticity of taxable income with the data on income distribution used above. The average is about 60 percent. In several cases, current top marginal rates are toward the lower end of the range (Figure 17), implying that it might indeed be possible to raise more from those with the highest incomes.

 

How much more? The implied revenue gain if top rates on only the top 1 percent were returned to their levels in the 1980s averages about 0.20 percent of GDP (Figure 18), but the gain could in some cases, such as that of the United States, be more significant. This would not make much of a dent in aggregate inequality, for which, if that is the objective, more dramatic change would be needed.

Figure 17:

Some additional commentary from the WSJ from before our article, picking up where we left off in September 2011 with “The Coming Global Wealth Tax“, and curiously a piece the IMF had no problems with:

What the IMF calls “revenue-maximizing top income tax rates” may be a good indication of how much further those rates could rise: As the IMF calculates, the average revenue-maximizing rate for the main Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries is around 60%, way above existing levels.

 

For the U.S., it is 56% to 71%—far more than the current 45% paid in federal, state and local taxes by those in the top tax bracket. The IMF singles out the U.S. as the country where raising top rates toward 70% (where they were before the Reagan tax cuts) would yield the most revenue—around 1.25% of GDP. And with a chilling candor, the IMF admits that its revenue-maximizing approach takes no account of the well-being of top earners (or their businesses).

 

 

Of course these measures won’t return the world’s top economies to sustainable levels of debt. That could be achieved only through significant economic growth (the good way) or, as the IMF puts it, “by repudiating public debt or inflating it away” (the bad way). In October the IMF floated a bold idea that didn’t get the attention it deserved: lowering sovereign debt levels through a one-off tax on private wealth.

 

As applied to the euro zone, the IMF claims that a 10% levy on households’ positive net worth would bring public debt levels back to pre-financial crisis levels. Such a tax sounds crazy, but recall what happened in euro-zone country Cyprus this year: Holders of bank accounts larger than 100,000 euros had to incur losses of up to 100% on their savings above that threshold, in order to “bail-in” the bankrupt Mediterranean state. Japanese households, sitting on one of the world’s largest pools of savings, have particular reason to worry about their assets: At 240% of GDP, their country’s public debt ratio is more than twice that of Cyprus when it defaulted.

 

 

From New York to London, Paris and beyond, powerful economic players are deciding that with an ever-deteriorating global fiscal outlook, conventional levels and methods of taxation will no longer suffice. That makes weapons of mass wealth destruction—such as the IMF’s one-off capital levy, Cyprus’s bank deposit confiscation, or outright sovereign defaults—likelier by the day.

Finally, here is the IMF on the prospect of a “one-off” financial asset tax:

A One-Off Capital Levy?

 

The sharp deterioration of the public finances in many countries has revived interest in a “capital levy”— a one-off tax on private wealth—as an exceptional measure to restore debt sustainability. The appeal is that such a tax, if it is implemented before avoidance is possible and there is a belief that it will never be repeated, does not distort behavior (and ma
y be seen by some as fair). There have been illustrious supporters, including Pigou, Ricardo, Schumpeter, and—until he changed his mind—Keynes. The conditions for success are strong, but also need to be weighed against the risks of the alternatives, which include repudiating public debt or inflating it away (these, in turn, are a particular form of wealth tax—on bondholders—that also falls on nonresidents).

 

There is a surprisingly large amount of experience to draw on, as such levies were widely adopted in Europe after World War I and in Germany and Japan after World War II. Reviewed in Eichengreen (1990), this experience suggests that more notable than any loss of credibility was a simple failure to achieve debt reduction, largely because the delay in introduction gave space for extensive avoidance and capital flight—in turn spurring inflation.

 

The tax rates needed to bring down public debt to precrisis levels, moreover, are sizable: reducing debt ratios to end-2007 levels would require (for a sample of 15 euro area countries) a tax rate of about 10 percent on households with positive net wealth

… which promptly resulted in this “IMF Statement on Taxation” clarification.

So is Zero Hedge wrong as the IMF broadly trumpets? We’ll let readers decide. However, we just wanted to set the record straight – after all the last thing we want is for the IMF to admit it is wrong once again as it did in early 2013 with the whole “fiscal multipliers” fiasco (about which incidentally the IMF would be absolutely correct if instead of “austerity” the IMF were to use the proper term in its calculations: “corruption, gross government incompetence and epic capital misallocation“).


    



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As Bitcoin Transaction Volume Triples Since October, Europe Prepares To Regulate, Tax The Digital Currency

Representing numbers that would put the adoption curve of Obamacare to shame, the Bitcoin equivalents of Paypal, BitPay, announced last week that it has now processed over $100 million in BTC transactions in 2013, has increased its merchant base to over 15,500 approved merchants in over 200 countries, but most importantly, has seen a surge in the number of merchants using its BTC payment pricing plan, by 50% since October while the volume of transactions has tripled. While the surge in the currency adoption has matched the explosive rise in the USD-value of the currency, the news should comfort any lingering doubts whether Bitcoin is a credible payment system.

From the BitPay press release:

BitPay Inc, the world leader in business solutions for virtual currencies, announces it has processed over $100 million in transactions this year, and has increased its merchant base to over 15,500 approved merchants in 200 countries. Since the announcement of the new All Inclusive Pricing Plan in October, along with the integration with Shopify in November, the number of new merchants has increased over 50% and the transaction volume has tripled.

 

“This year, the 2013 holiday season was Adafruit’s biggest ever. We are delighted to offer bitcoin payments via BitPay to our community and customers. It was fast and easy, hundreds of orders and happy customers getting educational electronics, using bitcoin!” shared Limor Fried, Founder and Engineer with Adafruit.

 

Bitcoin has “clear potential for growth and could become a major means of payment for online transactions” a Bank of America analyst told CNBC. As the number of Bitcoin users continues to increase, merchants such as Adafruit, BTCTrip, Alliance Virtual Offices, and Clearly Canadian, see the value of working with BitPay to help expand their business.

Which explains why Europe, which over a year was the first entity to cry foul about Bitcoin (recall from November 2012: “The ECB Explains What A Ponzi Scheme Is; Awkward Silence Follows“) when the USD-price of one BTC was still in the double digits, is doubling down in its fight against the fiat alternative, this time as the European Union’s top banking regulator is preparing to actively supervise the virtual currency. From Bloomberg:

Trading Bitcoins could bleed you dry, the European Union’s top banking regulator said as it weighs whether to regulate virtual currencies. Thefts from digital wallets have exceeded $1 million in some cases and traders aren’t protected against losses if their virtual exchange collapses, the European Banking Authority said today in a report warning consumers about the risks of cybermoney.

 

Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin have come under increased scrutiny from regulators and prosecutors around the globe. China’s central bank barred financial institutions from handling Bitcoin transactions last week and German police arrested two suspects in a fraud probe into illegally generated Bitcoins worth 700,000 euros ($963,000).

 

“The technology is still relatively immature and lacks the infrastructure, regulation and understanding of the risks that are taken for granted in conventional financial systems,” Matt Rees, assistant director at Ernst & Young LLP, said in an e-mail. “It is not surprising then that thefts, frauds and other deceptions are currently commonplace.”

 

Since Bitcoins exist as software, the virtual currency isn’t controlled by any government or central bank. The digital money emerged in 2008, designed by a programmer or group of programmers going under the name of Satoshi Nakamoto, whose real identity remains unknown.

 

The virtual currency gained credibility last month after law enforcement and securities agencies said in U.S. Senate hearings that it could be a legitimate means of exchange. The price of Bitcoins topped $1,000 as speculators anticipated broader use of digital money.

Because, you see, it is the possibility of theft that has regulators worried, not that alternative currencies could undermine the fiat system (especially in Europe where the artificially common currency is not exactly the world’s most admired construct) the world is so hooked on.

So what does Europe propose? Simple: do more of what it truly excels at: tax stuff.

People holding virtual currencies may be subject to value-added or capital gains taxes, the EBA said.

 

The government of Norway, Scandinavia’s richest nation, said it would treat Bitcoins as an asset and levy capital gains tax on them.

 

“Bitcoins don’t fall under the usual definition of money or currency,” Hans Christian Holte, director general of taxation in Norway, said in an interview.

 

For virtual currencies to be regulated in the EU, the EBA would have to get approval from the European Commission, the 28-nation bloc’s executive arm.

 

We “support the EBA warning to consumers on the risks associated with virtual currencies,” Michel Barnier, the EU’s financial services commissioner, said in an e-mail.

In other words, it is only a matter of time before Europe does all it can to make the use of Bitcoin even more prohibitive, which in a Europe that is flooded with bad debt, with a banking sector whose credibility is non-existent resulting in loan “creation” plunging at a record pace, and a banking union “resolution mechanism” that is as improbable now as it has ever been, means more deposit bail-ins in a form that “fall under the usual definition of money” are just a matter of time.


    



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China Slams Abe's "Malicious Slander"; Warns Japan Is "Doomed To Failure"

Overnight rhetoric in Asia became increasingly heated when China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed "strong dissastisfaction" at the slanderous actions of Abe's Japanese government over the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and the "theft and embezzlement" of the Diaoyu Islands. "Japan's attempt is doomed to failure," China warned ominously and as we highlight below, a reflection on the possible rational reasons for China and Japan to go to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands highlights the seriousness of the ongoing brinksmanship in the East China Sea. If a war is fought over these long-contested islands, it will have an eminently rational explanation underlying all the historical mistrust and nationalism on the surface. War in the East China Sea is possible, despite the economic costs.

 

The 'triangle' of doom in the East China Sea…

 

 

Via Google Translate,

Q: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held in Japan recently – especially during the ASEAN summit, accusing China to unilaterally change the status of the East China Sea, East China Sea, said China's air defense identification zone designation is improper for the high seas against the freedom of overflight, asked China to revoke the measure. What is your comment?

 

A: We have made some Japanese leaders use international slanderous remarks China expresses strong dissatisfaction.

 

Diaoyu Islands are China's inherent territory. Japan over the Diaoyu Islands theft and embezzlement have always been illegal and invalid. Since last year, the Japanese deliberately provoked the Diaoyu Islands dispute, unilaterally change the status quo of the Diaoyu Islands issue is none other than the Japanese themselves. In this regard, the Chinese law to take the necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial fully justified, blameless.

 

East China's air defense identification zone designation is intended to protect national defense aviation security measures, consistent with international law and international practice, do not affect the countries of aircraft overflight freedoms enjoyed under international law. Deliberate on this issue in Japan to China to launch an attack, an attempt to tamper with the concept, the implementation of double standards, mislead international public opinion, Japan's attempt is doomed to failure.

 

"Rationalist Explanations For War" In The East China Sea

Submitted by Ankit Panda of The Diplomat,

Events in the East China Sea since 2009 have thrust to the forefront the following frightening question: will China and Japan imminently go to war? Conventional answers in the affirmative point to the deep level of historical mistrust and a certain level of “unfinished business” in East Asian international politics, stemming from the heyday of Showa Japan’s imperialism across Asia. Those on the negative often point to the astronomical economic costs that would follow from a war that pinned the world’s first and third largest economies against its second in a fight over a few measly islands, undersea hydrocarbon reserves be damned.

I can’t pretend to arbitrate between these two camps but I find that far too many observers sympathize with the second camp based on rational impulse. Of course China and Japan wouldn’t fight a war! That’d ruin their economies! I sympathize with the Clausewtizean notion of war being a continuation of politics “by other means,” and the problems caused by information asymmetries (effectively handicapping rational decision-making), but the situation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands can result in war even if the top leaders in Tokyo and Beijing are eminently rational.

Political scientist James D. Fearon’s path-breaking article “Rationalist Explanations for War” provides a still-relevant schema that’s wonderfully applicable to the contemporary situation between China and Japan in the East China Sea. Fearon’s paper was initially relevant because it challenged the overly simplistic rationalist’s dogma: if war is so costly, then there has to be some sort of diplomatic solution that is preferable to all parties involved — barring information asymmetries and communication deficits, such an agreement should and will be signed.

Of course, this doesn’t correspond to reality where we know that many incredibly costly wars have been fought (from the first World War to the Iran-Iraq War). So, if wars are costly — as one over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is likely to be — why do they still occur? Well, the answer isn’t Japanese imperialism or because states just sometimes irrationally dislike each other (as the affirmative camp would argue). It’s more subtle.

Fearon’s “bargaining model” assumes a few dictums about state knowledge, behavior and expectations ex ante. I’ll cast the remainder of the model in terms of Japan and China since they’re our subjects of interest (and to avoid floating off into academic abstractions).

First, China and Japan both know that there is an actual probability distribution of the likely outcomes of the war. They don’t know what the actual distribution is, but they can estimate what is likely in terms of the costs and outcomes of going to war. For example, Japan can predict that it would suffer relatively low naval losses and would strengthen its administrative control of the islands; China could predict the same outcome, or it could interpret things in its favor. In essence, they acknowledge that war is predictable in its unpredictability.

Second, China and Japan want to limit risk or are neutral to risk, but definitely do not crave risk. War is fundamentally risky so this is tantamount to an acknowledgement that war is costlier than maintaining peace or negotiating an ex ante diplomatic solution.

The third assumption is a little dressed up in academic jargon: there can be no “issue indivisibility.” In plain English, this essentially means that whatever the states are fighting over (usually territory, but it could be a pot of gold) can be divided between them in an infinite number of ways on a line going from zero to one. Imagine that zero is Japan’s ideal preference (total Japanese control of the Senkakus and acknowledgement as such by China) and one is China’s ideal preference (total Chinese con
trol of Diaoyu and acknowledgement by Japan). Fearon’s assumption requires that there exist points like 0.23 and 0.83 (and so forth) which set up some sort sharing between the warring parties. Even solutions, such as one proposed by Zheng Wang here at The Diplomat to establish a “peace zone,” could sit on this line.

If the third assumption sounds the shakiest to you that’s probably because it is. “Issue indivisibility” is a nasty problem and a subject of quite some research. It usually is at the heart of wars that seek to decide which state should control a territory such as a Holy City (the intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict is said to be plagued by indivisible issues).

So, is the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu fundamentally indivisible? Probably in the sense of splitting sovereignty over the islands, but probably not in the sense of some ex ante bargain similar to what Zheng proposed. Even if the set of solutions isn’t infinitely divisible, whatever finite solutions exist might not fall within whatever range of solutions either Japan or China is willing to tolerate — leading to war.

Fearon actually doesn’t buy the indivisibility-leading-to-war theory himself. He reasons that generally almost every issue is complex enough to be divisible to a degree acceptable by each party (undermining the infinite divisibility requirement), and that states can link issues and offer payments to offset any asymmetrical outcome. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu case, this would mean a solution could hinge upon Japan making a broader apology for its aggression against China in the 20th century or China taking a harsher stance on North Korea (both unlikely).

Relevant to the Air Defense Identification Zone is Fearon’s description of war arising between rational states due to incentives to misrepresent capabilities. China and Japan’s leaders know more about their country’s actual willingness to go to war than anyone else, and it benefits to signal strong resolve on the issue to extract more concessions in any potential deal. Japan announcing its willingness to shoot down Chinese drones earlier this year and its most recent defense plans are example of this, and China’s ADIZ is probably the archetype of such a signal. Instead of extracting a good deal, what such declarations can do is force rational hands to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Fearon’s final explanation — regarding commitment problems leading to war — is slightly ancillary to the core discussion about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands given Japan’s constitutional restraints on the use of force (rendering preemptive, preventative, and offensive wars largely irrelevant in the Japanese case). Regardless, the point remains that even if the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands might seem like a terribly silly thing for the world’s second and third largest economies to go to war over, war can still be likely.

As I observe events in the East China Sea, I mostly recall Fearon’s warnings on certain types of signals leading to brinksmanship (the divisibility issue is far murkier). Both Japan and China don’t seem to be relenting on these sorts of deleterious signals. Additionally, given that Chinese and Japanese diplomats haven’t had high-level contact in fourteen months, even the more primitive rationalist’s explanation, that war occurs because a lack of communication leads to rational miscalculations, becomes plausible.

A reflection on the possible rational reasons for China and Japan to go to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands highlights the seriousness of the ongoing brinksmanship in the East China Sea. If a war is fought over these long-contested islands, it will have an eminently rational explanation underlying all the historical mistrust and nationalism on the surface. War in the East China Sea is possible, despite the economic costs.

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Y1ytMiDqgLs/story01.htm Tyler Durden

China Slams Abe’s “Malicious Slander”; Warns Japan Is “Doomed To Failure”

Overnight rhetoric in Asia became increasingly heated when China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed "strong dissastisfaction" at the slanderous actions of Abe's Japanese government over the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and the "theft and embezzlement" of the Diaoyu Islands. "Japan's attempt is doomed to failure," China warned ominously and as we highlight below, a reflection on the possible rational reasons for China and Japan to go to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands highlights the seriousness of the ongoing brinksmanship in the East China Sea. If a war is fought over these long-contested islands, it will have an eminently rational explanation underlying all the historical mistrust and nationalism on the surface. War in the East China Sea is possible, despite the economic costs.

 

The 'triangle' of doom in the East China Sea…

 

 

Via Google Translate,

Q: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held in Japan recently – especially during the ASEAN summit, accusing China to unilaterally change the status of the East China Sea, East China Sea, said China's air defense identification zone designation is improper for the high seas against the freedom of overflight, asked China to revoke the measure. What is your comment?

 

A: We have made some Japanese leaders use international slanderous remarks China expresses strong dissatisfaction.

 

Diaoyu Islands are China's inherent territory. Japan over the Diaoyu Islands theft and embezzlement have always been illegal and invalid. Since last year, the Japanese deliberately provoked the Diaoyu Islands dispute, unilaterally change the status quo of the Diaoyu Islands issue is none other than the Japanese themselves. In this regard, the Chinese law to take the necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial fully justified, blameless.

 

East China's air defense identification zone designation is intended to protect national defense aviation security measures, consistent with international law and international practice, do not affect the countries of aircraft overflight freedoms enjoyed under international law. Deliberate on this issue in Japan to China to launch an attack, an attempt to tamper with the concept, the implementation of double standards, mislead international public opinion, Japan's attempt is doomed to failure.

 

"Rationalist Explanations For War" In The East China Sea

Submitted by Ankit Panda of The Diplomat,

Events in the East China Sea since 2009 have thrust to the forefront the following frightening question: will China and Japan imminently go to war? Conventional answers in the affirmative point to the deep level of historical mistrust and a certain level of “unfinished business” in East Asian international politics, stemming from the heyday of Showa Japan’s imperialism across Asia. Those on the negative often point to the astronomical economic costs that would follow from a war that pinned the world’s first and third largest economies against its second in a fight over a few measly islands, undersea hydrocarbon reserves be damned.

I can’t pretend to arbitrate between these two camps but I find that far too many observers sympathize with the second camp based on rational impulse. Of course China and Japan wouldn’t fight a war! That’d ruin their economies! I sympathize with the Clausewtizean notion of war being a continuation of politics “by other means,” and the problems caused by information asymmetries (effectively handicapping rational decision-making), but the situation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands can result in war even if the top leaders in Tokyo and Beijing are eminently rational.

Political scientist James D. Fearon’s path-breaking article “Rationalist Explanations for War” provides a still-relevant schema that’s wonderfully applicable to the contemporary situation between China and Japan in the East China Sea. Fearon’s paper was initially relevant because it challenged the overly simplistic rationalist’s dogma: if war is so costly, then there has to be some sort of diplomatic solution that is preferable to all parties involved — barring information asymmetries and communication deficits, such an agreement should and will be signed.

Of course, this doesn’t correspond to reality where we know that many incredibly costly wars have been fought (from the first World War to the Iran-Iraq War). So, if wars are costly — as one over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is likely to be — why do they still occur? Well, the answer isn’t Japanese imperialism or because states just sometimes irrationally dislike each other (as the affirmative camp would argue). It’s more subtle.

Fearon’s “bargaining model” assumes a few dictums about state knowledge, behavior and expectations ex ante. I’ll cast the remainder of the model in terms of Japan and China since they’re our subjects of interest (and to avoid floating off into academic abstractions).

First, China and Japan both know that there is an actual probability distribution of the likely outcomes of the war. They don’t know what the actual distribution is, but they can estimate what is likely in terms of the costs and outcomes of going to war. For example, Japan can predict that it would suffer relatively low naval losses and would strengthen its administrative control of the islands; China could predict the same outcome, or it could interpret things in its favor. In essence, they acknowledge that war is predictable in its unpredictability.

Second, China and Japan want to limit risk or are neutral to risk, but definitely do not crave risk. War is fundamentally risky so this is tantamount to an acknowledgement that war is costlier than maintaining peace or negotiating an ex ante diplomatic solution.

The third assumption is a little dressed up in academic jargon: there can be no “issue indivisibility.” In plain English, this essentially means that whatever the states are fighting over (usually territory, but it could be a pot of gold) can be divided between them in an infinite number of ways on a line going from zero to one. Imagine that zero is Japan’s ideal preference (total Japanese control of the Senkakus and acknowledgement as such by China) and one is China’s ideal preference (total Chinese control of Diaoyu and acknowledgement by Japan). Fearon’s assumption requires that there exist points like 0.23 and 0.83 (and so forth) which set up some sort sharing between the warring parties. Even solutions, such as one proposed by Zheng Wang here at The Diplomat to establish a “peace zone,” could sit on this line.

If the third assumption sounds the shakiest to you that’s probably because it is. “Issue indivisibility” is a nasty problem and a subject of quite some research. It usually is at the heart of wars that seek to decide which state should control a territory such as a Holy City (the intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict is said to be plagued by indivisible issues).

So, is the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu fundamentally indivisible? Probably in the sense of splitting sovereignty over the islands, but probably not in the sense of some ex ante bargain similar to what Zheng proposed. Even if the set of solutions isn’t infinitely divisible, whatever finite solutions exist might not fall within whatever range of solutions either Japan or China is willing to tolerate — leading to war.

Fearon actually doesn’t buy the indivisibility-leading-to-war theory himself. He reasons that generally almost every issue is complex enough to be divisible to a degree acceptable by each party (undermining the infinite divisibility requirement), and that states can link issues and offer payments to offset any asymmetrical outcome. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu case, this would mean a solution could hinge upon Japan making a broader apology for its aggression against China in the 20th century or China taking a harsher stance on North Korea (both unlikely).

Relevant to the Air Defense Identification Zone is Fearon’s description of war arising between rational states due to incentives to misrepresent capabilities. China and Japan’s leaders know more about their country’s actual willingness to go to war than anyone else, and it benefits to signal strong resolve on the issue to extract more concessions in any potential deal. Japan announcing its willingness to shoot down Chinese drones earlier this year and its most recent defense plans are example of this, and China’s ADIZ is probably the archetype of such a signal. Instead of extracting a good deal, what such declarations can do is force rational hands to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Fearon’s final explanation — regarding commitment problems leading to war — is slightly ancillary to the core discussion about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands given Japan’s constitutional restraints on the use of force (rendering preemptive, preventative, and offensive wars largely irrelevant in the Japanese case). Regardless, the point remains that even if the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands might seem like a terribly silly thing for the world’s second and third largest economies to go to war over, war can still be likely.

As I observe events in the East China Sea, I mostly recall Fearon’s warnings on certain types of signals leading to brinksmanship (the divisibility issue is far murkier). Both Japan and China don’t seem to be relenting on these sorts of deleterious signals. Additionally, given that Chinese and Japanese diplomats haven’t had high-level contact in fourteen months, even the more primitive rationalist’s explanation, that war occurs because a lack of communication leads to rational miscalculations, becomes plausible.

A reflection on the possible rational reasons for China and Japan to go to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands highlights the seriousness of the ongoing brinksmanship in the East China Sea. If a war is fought over these long-contested islands, it will have an eminently rational explanation underlying all the historical mistrust and nationalism on the surface. War in the East China Sea is possible, despite the economic costs.

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Y1ytMiDqgLs/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Investing in 2014

2013 is ready for the history books as an exceptional year on the financial markets in many regards. For the first time in five years there were no signs of a big financial crisis anywhere in the world. At a certain point it felt like Japan was going to be next in line to be hit by an implosion, but the swift actions from the Bank of Japan squashed the possibility. A party ensued on the Japanese stock market, which took away the prize for ‘best market in 2013’ with a rounded return of 50%!

The stock markets fared well this year. But the global economy stabilized all over too, with a modest growth of 1 to 2 percent for Western economies and 4 to 7 percent for the emerging markets. Of course, we have the extremely accommodative monetary policy from the central bankers to thank for this. They were again quite busy in 2013. The Federal Reserve for example, coupled its stimulus package to economic targets for the first time. More specifically an unemployment rate of less than 6.5 percent and an inflation rate of more than 2 percent. In the aftermath of these decisions, the Fed adjusted their monthly debt buyback program upward, to 85 billion dollars.

It is not about fighting of crises anymore, but about supporting balance sheets of banks, financing government spending and keeping the bond markets in check. Meanwhile, the core of the problem from a few years back – a huge pile of debt – is far from solved. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to understand that sooner or later this will have its effect, which is when the financial markets will be challenged once more. The only sustainable solution for the debt problem is economic growth, but at this stage it is practically impossible for Western societies like the US or Europe to grow its way out of debt. The gap between income and spending has become too large and it is increasing exponentially.

One day we will have another Big Bang. The question of ‘when’ is extremely hard to answer, however. Because until that time, the current trends will remain intact. That is why we are keeping an ‘open mind’ over at Sprout Money. Do not get caught up with one asset class or another. Make sure you have a decent mix of different assets in your portfolio. Be alert, but nimble. Ensure you respect your cash position as you never know what tomorrow might bring. New opportunities might present themselves fairly quickly. And although we do not have a crystal ball, we do want to share a few scenarios with you based on our decades of experience in the markets. As always, we are focusing on our specialties: stocks and commodities.

Stocks

This past year presented new highs for stocks. The Western markets are trading 20 to 30 percent higher, and the most important indices put historical records on the board. That is an important sign if we look at the big picture. Stocks practically broke free from the crisis period as you can see on the Bank of America chart below, which depicts the S&P 500 since 1927.

Generational lows stock market 100y

Not only did we just experience a similar crisis period as we did in the ‘30s and ‘70s of the last century, but the recent breakthrough also fits the mould well. However, we do expect that this breakthrough will be tested. Technical analysis would say that the last resistance level should become the new support level. For the S&P 500 that line lies somewhere around 1,550 to 1,600 points. That is why we do see the markets continuing the race in the first months of 2014, but the rally will meet resistance at some point, probably around symbolic barriers. If we have to make an estimation: the S&P 500 can go to 2,000 points, the Dow Jones could jump to 18,000 and the Nasdaq will have to meet its historical resistance at 5,000 points. Indeed, the technology sector is not in record territory yet!

Investing however, is looking ahead. Stock markets are trading 6 months ahead of the real economy. Those who want to predict the evolution of the markets in 2014, has to predict in one way or another the developments in 2015. As the expectations of corporate profits keeping growing at a decent pace, we foresee some ‘fear of heights’ among investors by that time. That will translate into a more turbulent year for the markets next year, possibly even before the summer. Although we are far from negative, we do predict that the stock market will not repeat its amazing 2013 performance. We expect a modest but higher close at the end of 2014 (around 7 percent) for the traditional markets. Investors will have to search for profit growth (technology stocks) and laggards – the emerging markets – to realize an above average return next year.

Commodities

2013 was as exciting for the stock market, but it was quiet for most commodity markets. Important (economically relevant) commodities barely made the news. While oil is closing off the year modestly higher, the copper price is now a little bit lower. Also in the agricultural sector there were mixed results between the grains and the softs. For real fireworks however, precious metals where the place to be, but in a negative way. We had predicted last year that the stock market could become a party pooper for gold and silver. And that scenario is exactly what happened.

Gold 10y chart 2013

As you can see on the above chart, the gold market blew off a lot of steam in 2013. The market sentiment however, felt like gold is done for. Nothing is further from the truth! Although the gold price almost had a 30 percent correction this year, it is still 3X higher than ten years ago. The secular bull market is more than intact. We are not giving up on the precious metal just like that.

We have seen movements like this before in the ‘70s. Things actually were a lot worse then, as the market had a correction of almost 50 percent, with all the doom and gloom at the time. Afterwards, the gold price made a full 180 and shot up at a ratio of 8X in the four years after. We are not saying that the next four years are going to be the same, but the gold rally is far from over. For 2014, we do expect a stabilization and a first ‘recovery’ for gold. If you look at the fundamentals, you cannot ignore the enormous demand for the precious metal. China bought most of the gold production of 2013, while the supply could possibly decrease because of the lower gold price. If we have to make an estimation for next year, we do see gold coming close to its historical record price. For gold’s ‘little brother’, silver, we expect a similar recovery, although a new record price might be a bridge too far.

We also foresee upward pressure for other commodities. The structurally higher prices of years past will continue their trend. Not only as a consequence of the increasing global demand, but also because of monetary measures taken by central bankers. The inflationary pressure will sooner or later have its effect within the commodity complex.

In summary we are keeping an open mind for 2014, with the current trend leading the charge. Increased turbulence, however, will most likely cause changes along the way. That is why flexibility, in the form of a decent cash position, is a must for every investor in the new year. New opportunities and challenges may present themselves at any given time. Our sights are mostly set on technology stocks, Chinese s
tocks, and gold and silver mining stocks.

Prepare for 2014 & Download our Free ‘Guide to Gold’

Sprout Money offers a fresh look at investing. We analyze long lasting cycles, coupled with a collection of strategic investments and concrete tips for different types of assets. The methods and strategies from Sprout Money are transformed into the Gold & Silver Report and the Technology Report.

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via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/QgXcSK0-6rI/story01.htm Sprout Money

Yet Another Massive Nail In The Dollar's Coffin

Two years ago, the CME announced USD/CNH futures trading enabling speculation (and hedging or risk transfer) of offshore Chinese Renminbi. On the other side of the world this week, a couple of gentlemen that few people have ever heard of signed an agreement that has massive consequences for the global financial system. It was a Memorandum of Understanding signed by representatives of the Singapore Exchange and Hong Kong Exchange. Their aim – to combine their forces in rolling out more financial products denominated in Chinese renminbi. This is huge…

 

Submitted by Simon Black via Sovereign Man blog,

Hong Kong and Singapore are THE two dominant financial centers in Asia. For years they’ve been locked in competition with one another, much like New York and London. So their public partnership is a very big deal… indicative of the clear objective they have in front of them.

Bottom line – finance executives in Asia see the writing on the wall. They can see that the dollar is in a period of terminal decline, and it’s clear that the Chinese renminbi is going to take tremendous market share away from the dollar. They want a big piece of the action.

The renminbi has already surpassed the euro to become the #2 most-used currency in the world when it comes to trade settlement, according to a report released yesterday by the Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).

Right now the renminbi has about an 8.6% share of the global market for trade settlement. Granted, the dollar has the lion’s share of trade settlement at more than 80%.

But just look at how quickly the renminbi has grown; in January 2012, its share of the global market was just 1.9%. So it’s grown by nearly a factor of 5x in less than two years.

With today’s agreement between Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s financial exchanges, that growth will likely accelerate.

As we’ve discussed before, the dollar is in a unique position simply because it is the world’s dominant reserve currency.

This means that when a rice distributor in Vietnam does business with a Brazilian merchant, they’ll close the deal by trading US dollars with each other… even though neither nation actually uses the dollar.

It’s been this way since World War II, simply because there has been such a long tradition of trust in the United States, and a steady supply of dollars throughout the world.

But this confidence is fading rapidly as merchants and banks around the world have been seeking alternatives, primarily the Chinese renminbi.

As the dollar’s market share in international trade decreases, it will mean the end of US financial privilege. No longer will the US be able to print money without repercussions.

And as so many other nations have learned the hard way, when you print money with wanton abandon and indebt your nation to the hilt, there are severe consequences to pay.

Last week’s move between Hong Kong and Singapore gives us a glimpse into this future.

We’ll soon see more financial products– oil, gold, Fortune 500 corporate bonds, etc. denominated in renminbi and traded in Asia.

And as trade in these renminbi products grows, the dollar will be closer and closer to its reckoning day.

Years from now when this has played out, it’s going to seem so obvious.

Just like the post-Lehman crash in 2008, people will scratch their heads and wonder– ‘why didn’t I see that coming? Why didn’t I recognize that it was a bad idea to loan millions of dollars to unemployed / dead people?’

Duh. Same thing. People will look back in the future and wonder why they didn’t see the dollar collapse coming… why they didn’t recognize that it was a bad idea for the greatest debtor nation in the history of the world to simultaneously control the global reserve currency…

The warning signs are all in front of us. And last week’s agreement between Hong Kong and Singapore is one of the strongest signs yet.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/HxQnR5RYAyw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Yet Another Massive Nail In The Dollar’s Coffin

Two years ago, the CME announced USD/CNH futures trading enabling speculation (and hedging or risk transfer) of offshore Chinese Renminbi. On the other side of the world this week, a couple of gentlemen that few people have ever heard of signed an agreement that has massive consequences for the global financial system. It was a Memorandum of Understanding signed by representatives of the Singapore Exchange and Hong Kong Exchange. Their aim – to combine their forces in rolling out more financial products denominated in Chinese renminbi. This is huge…

 

Submitted by Simon Black via Sovereign Man blog,

Hong Kong and Singapore are THE two dominant financial centers in Asia. For years they’ve been locked in competition with one another, much like New York and London. So their public partnership is a very big deal… indicative of the clear objective they have in front of them.

Bottom line – finance executives in Asia see the writing on the wall. They can see that the dollar is in a period of terminal decline, and it’s clear that the Chinese renminbi is going to take tremendous market share away from the dollar. They want a big piece of the action.

The renminbi has already surpassed the euro to become the #2 most-used currency in the world when it comes to trade settlement, according to a report released yesterday by the Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).

Right now the renminbi has about an 8.6% share of the global market for trade settlement. Granted, the dollar has the lion’s share of trade settlement at more than 80%.

But just look at how quickly the renminbi has grown; in January 2012, its share of the global market was just 1.9%. So it’s grown by nearly a factor of 5x in less than two years.

With today’s agreement between Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s financial exchanges, that growth will likely accelerate.

As we’ve discussed before, the dollar is in a unique position simply because it is the world’s dominant reserve currency.

This means that when a rice distributor in Vietnam does business with a Brazilian merchant, they’ll close the deal by trading US dollars with each other… even though neither nation actually uses the dollar.

It’s been this way since World War II, simply because there has been such a long tradition of trust in the United States, and a steady supply of dollars throughout the world.

But this confidence is fading rapidly as merchants and banks around the world have been seeking alternatives, primarily the Chinese renminbi.

As the dollar’s market share in international trade decreases, it will mean the end of US financial privilege. No longer will the US be able to print money without repercussions.

And as so many other nations have learned the hard way, when you print money with wanton abandon and indebt your nation to the hilt, there are severe consequences to pay.

Last week’s move between Hong Kong and Singapore gives us a glimpse into this future.

We’ll soon see more financial products– oil, gold, Fortune 500 corporate bonds, etc. denominated in renminbi and traded in Asia.

And as trade in these renminbi products grows, the dollar will be closer and closer to its reckoning day.

Years from now when this has played out, it’s going to seem so obvious.

Just like the post-Lehman crash in 2008, people will scratch their heads and wonder– ‘why didn’t I see that coming? Why didn’t I recognize that it was a bad idea to loan millions of dollars to unemployed / dead people?’

Duh. Same thing. People will look back in the future and wonder why they didn’t see the dollar collapse coming… why they didn’t recognize that it was a bad idea for the greatest debtor nation in the history of the world to simultaneously control the global reserve currency…

The warning signs are all in front of us. And last week’s agreement between Hong Kong and Singapore is one of the strongest signs yet.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/HxQnR5RYAyw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The Definitive History Of Bitcoin

In 2008, the aftermath of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis created the perfect storm for the emergence of Bitcoin. Here is the definitive history of the famous crypto-currency. From the pseudonymous “Satoshi Nakamoto”‘s founding to the innovation of block chains to the “genesis block”, buying pizzas, Sandiches, Teslas, and now houses… Bitcoin has come a long way (and where it goes is anyone’s guess)…

 

(click image for massive legible version)


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/kYVnzdMudWI/story01.htm Tyler Durden