Tag: news

Presented with no comment…

 

Source: Investors.com

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Lx1xxll-6ro/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Presented with no comment…

 

Source: Investors.com

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Lx1xxll-6ro/story01.htm Tyler Durden

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/NHrKtlwmZNU/story01.htm williambanzai7

It was in October 2012 when we explained how Iran evades the Western blockade (ostensibly with the implicit nod of none other than the US), and when we first defined the concept of PetroGold in the context of the Turkey-Dubai-Iran crude-for-gold triangle. For those who need a quick refresher, here it is:

In recent months there has been a lot of incorrect speculation that because Iran has been shut off from the petrodollar, SWIFT-mediated regime, its economy will implode as the country has no access to the all important greenback and can thus not conduct international trade – the driving factor behind the international sanctions that seek to topple the local government as Iran dies an economic death. And while there have been bouts of substantial inflation, which so far the local government appears to have managed to put a lid on by curbing gray market speculation, Iran continues to more or less operate on its merry ways with international trade most certainly taking place, especially with China, Russia and India as main trading partners. “How is this possible” those who support the Western-led embargo of all Iranian trade will ask? Simple – gold. Because while Iran may have no access to dollars, it has ample access to gold. This in itself is not new – we have reported in the past that Iran has imported substantial amounts of gold from Turkey, despite the Turkish government’s stern denials. Today, courtesy of Reuters, we learn precisely what the 21st century equivalent of the Great Silk Road looks like, and just how effective Iran has been as a lab rat in escaping the great petrodollar experiment, from which conventional wisdom tells us there is no escape. Presenting: petrogold.

One year later, following Iran’s unperturbed ability to exist in a world without US dollars, the blockade of Iran is a thing of the past, and the west has engaged in a full-blown detente with the country, much to the fury of both Israel and Saudi Arabia, in exchange for the symbolic gesture that Iran will limit its nuclear enrichment, lowering and in many cases outright eliminating Iran sanctions, which proved completely futile.

So a happy ending for Iran, if only for now thanks to the fact that despite all the status quo‘s lies gold is and always has been money and can substitute for dollars.

However, one country that has seen better days, whose government may be on the edge of collapse due to an unprecedented corruption scandal precisely for enabling said PetroGold scheme, and which has been in the news on a daily basis recently, is Turkey. As Turkey’s Today’s Zaman explains in “Iran’s Turkish Gold Rush“, the political crisis Turkey finds itself in may be nothing but a consequence of the PetroGold scheme conceived over a year ago, and in which Turkey played a crucial role. 

Here is how the Turkey-Dubai-Iran PetroGold triangle, or as the Zaman calls it, “gas for gold“, may soon result in the toppling of yet another government, simply because it showed that existence outside of the clutches of the ‘Petrodollar’ is perfectly possible…

* * *

From Iran’s Turkish Gold Rush, highlights ours:

Turkey’s Islamist government is being rocked by the most sweeping corruption scandal of its tenure. Roughly two dozen figures, including well-connected business tycoons and the sons of top government ministers, have been charged with a wide range of financial crimes. The charges ballooned into a full-blown crisis on Dec. 25 when three ministers implicated in the scandal resigned, with one making a dramatic call for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to step down as well. An exhausted-looking Erdogan subsequently appeared on television in the evening to announce a cabinet reshuffle that replaced a total of 10 ministers.

The drama surrounding two personalities are particularly eye-popping: Police reportedly discovered shoeboxes containing $4.5 million in the home of Süleyman Aslan, the CEO of state-owned Halkbank, and also arrested Reza Zarrab, an Iranian businessman who primarily deals in the gold trade, and who allegedly oversaw deals worth almost $10 billion last year alone.

The gold trade has long been at the center of controversial financial ties between Halkbank and Iran. Research conducted in May 2013 by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Roubini Global Economics revealed the bank exploited a “golden loophole” in the US-led financial sanctions regime designed to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Here’s how it worked: The Turks exported some $13 billion of gold to Tehran directly, or through the UAE, between March 2012 and July 2013. In return, the Turks received Iranian natural gas and oil. But because sanctions prevented Iran from getting paid in dollars or euros, the Turks allowed Tehran to buy gold with their Turkish lira — and that gold found its way back to Iranian coffers.

This “gas-for-gold” scheme allowed the Iranians to replenish their dwindling foreign exchange reserves, which had been hit hard by the international sanctions placed on their banking system. It was puzzling that Ankara allowed this to continue: The Turks — NATO allies who have assured Washington that they oppose Iran’s military-nuclear program — brazenly conducted these massive gold transactions even after the Obama administration tightened sanctions on Iran’s precious metals trade in July 2012.

Turkey, however, chose to exploit a loophole that technically permitted the transfer of billions of dollars of gold to so-called “private” entities in Iran. Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Ali Reza Bikdeli recently praised Halkbank for its “smart management decisions in recent years [that] have played an important role in Iranian-Turkish relations.” Halkbank insists that its role in these transactions was entirely legal.

The US Congress and President Obama closed this “golden loophole” in January 2013. At the time, the Obama administration could have taken action against state-owned Halkbank, which processed these sanctions-busting transactions, using the sanctions already in place to cut the bank off from the US financial system. Instead, the administration lobbied to make sure the legislation that closed this loophole did not take effect for six months — effectively ensuring that the gold transactions continued apace until July 1. That helped Iran accrue billions of dollars more in gold, further undermining the sanctions regime.

In defending its decision not to enforce its own sanctions, the Obama administration insisted that Turkey only transferred gold to private Iranian citizens. The administration argued that, as a result, this wasn’t an explicit violation of its executive order.

It’s possible that the Obama administration didn’t have compelling evidence of the role of the Iranian government in the gold trade. However, the president may have also simply sought to protect his relationship with Ankara and didn’t want to get into a diplomatic spat with Erdogan, who he considers a key regional ally.

If the administration di
dn’t feel that the sanctions in place at the time were sufficient to take action against Halkbank, after all, it could have easily shut down the gold trade by amending its executive order. But at the time, Turkey was also playing a pivotal role in US policy in Syria, which included efforts to strengthen the more moderate opposition factions fighting President Bashar Assad’s regime.

It’s also possible, however, that the Obama administration’s decision had less to do with Turkey, and more to do with coaxing Iran into signing a nuclear deal. In the one-year period between July 2012, when the executive order was issued, and July 2013, when the “golden loophole” was closed, the Obama administration’s non-enforcement of its own sanctions reportedly provided Iran with $6 billion worth of gold. That windfall may have been an American olive branch to Iran — extended via Turkey — to persuade its leaders to continue backchannel negotiations with the United States, which reportedly began as early as July 2012. It could also have been a significant sweetener to the interim nuclear deal eventually reached at Geneva, which provided Iran with another $7 billion in sanctions relief.

Indeed, why else would the administration have allowed the Turkish gold trade to continue for an extra six months, when Congress made clear its intent to shut it down?

This brings us back to the current corruption drama in Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been claiming that it is a victim of a vast conspiracy, blaming everyone from Washington to Israel to US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen for its woes. Some Turkish media have pointed a finger at David Cohen, the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, who happened to be in Turkey as the news began to break. Erdogan even raised the possibility of expelling the US ambassador to Ankara, Francis Ricciardone.

But if the charges stand against the panoply of well-connected figures fingered, the AKP will have only itself to blame. While the gas-for-gold scheme may have been technically legal before Congress finally shut it down in July, it appears to have exposed the Turkish political elite to a vast Iranian underworld. According to Today’s Zaman, suspicious transactions between Iran and Turkey could exceed $119 billion — nine times the total of gas-for-gold transactions reported.

Even if the Turkish-Iranian gold trade represents only a small part of the wider corruption probe, the ongoing investigation could provide a window into some nagging questions about the relationship between Ankara and Tehran. Perhaps we will finally learn why the Turkish government allowed Iran to stock up on gold while it was defiantly pursuing its illicit nuclear program — and whether the Obama administration could have done more to prevent it.

* * *

Bottom line: dare to mess with the Petrodollar and the wrath of the US government will hunt you down… sooner or later.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/CH0LeGBoLPI/story01.htm Tyler Durden

It was in October 2012 when we explained how Iran evades the Western blockade (ostensibly with the implicit nod of none other than the US), and when we first defined the concept of PetroGold in the context of the Turkey-Dubai-Iran crude-for-gold triangle. For those who need a quick refresher, here it is:

In recent months there has been a lot of incorrect speculation that because Iran has been shut off from the petrodollar, SWIFT-mediated regime, its economy will implode as the country has no access to the all important greenback and can thus not conduct international trade – the driving factor behind the international sanctions that seek to topple the local government as Iran dies an economic death. And while there have been bouts of substantial inflation, which so far the local government appears to have managed to put a lid on by curbing gray market speculation, Iran continues to more or less operate on its merry ways with international trade most certainly taking place, especially with China, Russia and India as main trading partners. “How is this possible” those who support the Western-led embargo of all Iranian trade will ask? Simple – gold. Because while Iran may have no access to dollars, it has ample access to gold. This in itself is not new – we have reported in the past that Iran has imported substantial amounts of gold from Turkey, despite the Turkish government’s stern denials. Today, courtesy of Reuters, we learn precisely what the 21st century equivalent of the Great Silk Road looks like, and just how effective Iran has been as a lab rat in escaping the great petrodollar experiment, from which conventional wisdom tells us there is no escape. Presenting: petrogold.

One year later, following Iran’s unperturbed ability to exist in a world without US dollars, the blockade of Iran is a thing of the past, and the west has engaged in a full-blown detente with the country, much to the fury of both Israel and Saudi Arabia, in exchange for the symbolic gesture that Iran will limit its nuclear enrichment, lowering and in many cases outright eliminating Iran sanctions, which proved completely futile.

So a happy ending for Iran, if only for now thanks to the fact that despite all the status quo‘s lies gold is and always has been money and can substitute for dollars.

However, one country that has seen better days, whose government may be on the edge of collapse due to an unprecedented corruption scandal precisely for enabling said PetroGold scheme, and which has been in the news on a daily basis recently, is Turkey. As Turkey’s Today’s Zaman explains in “Iran’s Turkish Gold Rush“, the political crisis Turkey finds itself in may be nothing but a consequence of the PetroGold scheme conceived over a year ago, and in which Turkey played a crucial role. 

Here is how the Turkey-Dubai-Iran PetroGold triangle, or as the Zaman calls it, “gas for gold“, may soon result in the toppling of yet another government, simply because it showed that existence outside of the clutches of the ‘Petrodollar’ is perfectly possible…

* * *

From Iran’s Turkish Gold Rush, highlights ours:

Turkey’s Islamist government is being rocked by the most sweeping corruption scandal of its tenure. Roughly two dozen figures, including well-connected business tycoons and the sons of top government ministers, have been charged with a wide range of financial crimes. The charges ballooned into a full-blown crisis on Dec. 25 when three ministers implicated in the scandal resigned, with one making a dramatic call for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to step down as well. An exhausted-looking Erdogan subsequently appeared on television in the evening to announce a cabinet reshuffle that replaced a total of 10 ministers.

The drama surrounding two personalities are particularly eye-popping: Police reportedly discovered shoeboxes containing $4.5 million in the home of Süleyman Aslan, the CEO of state-owned Halkbank, and also arrested Reza Zarrab, an Iranian businessman who primarily deals in the gold trade, and who allegedly oversaw deals worth almost $10 billion last year alone.

The gold trade has long been at the center of controversial financial ties between Halkbank and Iran. Research conducted in May 2013 by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Roubini Global Economics revealed the bank exploited a “golden loophole” in the US-led financial sanctions regime designed to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Here’s how it worked: The Turks exported some $13 billion of gold to Tehran directly, or through the UAE, between March 2012 and July 2013. In return, the Turks received Iranian natural gas and oil. But because sanctions prevented Iran from getting paid in dollars or euros, the Turks allowed Tehran to buy gold with their Turkish lira — and that gold found its way back to Iranian coffers.

This “gas-for-gold” scheme allowed the Iranians to replenish their dwindling foreign exchange reserves, which had been hit hard by the international sanctions placed on their banking system. It was puzzling that Ankara allowed this to continue: The Turks — NATO allies who have assured Washington that they oppose Iran’s military-nuclear program — brazenly conducted these massive gold transactions even after the Obama administration tightened sanctions on Iran’s precious metals trade in July 2012.

Turkey, however, chose to exploit a loophole that technically permitted the transfer of billions of dollars of gold to so-called “private” entities in Iran. Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Ali Reza Bikdeli recently praised Halkbank for its “smart management decisions in recent years [that] have played an important role in Iranian-Turkish relations.” Halkbank insists that its role in these transactions was entirely legal.

The US Congress and President Obama closed this “golden loophole” in January 2013. At the time, the Obama administration could have taken action against state-owned Halkbank, which processed these sanctions-busting transactions, using the sanctions already in place to cut the bank off from the US financial system. Instead, the administration lobbied to make sure the legislation that closed this loophole did not take effect for six months — effectively ensuring that the gold transactions continued apace until July 1. That helped Iran accrue billions of dollars more in gold, further undermining the sanctions regime.

In defending its decision not to enforce its own sanctions, the Obama administration insisted that Turkey only transferred gold to private Iranian citizens. The administration argued that, as a result, this wasn’t an explicit violation of its executive order.

It’s possible that the Obama administration didn’t have compelling evidence of the role of the Iranian government in the gold trade. However, the president may have also simply sought to protect his relationship with Ankara and didn’t want to get into a diplomatic spat with Erdogan, who he considers a key regional ally.

If the administration didn’t feel that the sanctions in place at the time were sufficient to take action against Halkbank, after all, it could have easily shut down the gold trade by amending its executive order. But at the time, Turkey was also playing a pivotal role in US policy in Syria, which included efforts to strengthen the more moderate opposition factions fighting President Bashar Assad’s regime.

It’s also possible, however, that the Obama administration’s decision had less to do with Turkey, and more to do with coaxing Iran into signing a nuclear deal. In the one-year period between July 2012, when the executive order was issued, and July 2013, when the “golden loophole” was closed, the Obama administration’s non-enforcement of its own sanctions reportedly provided Iran with $6 billion worth of gold. That windfall may have been an American olive branch to Iran — extended via Turkey — to persuade its leaders to continue backchannel negotiations with the United States, which reportedly began as early as July 2012. It could also have been a significant sweetener to the interim nuclear deal eventually reached at Geneva, which provided Iran with another $7 billion in sanctions relief.

Indeed, why else would the administration have allowed the Turkish gold trade to continue for an extra six months, when Congress made clear its intent to shut it down?

This brings us back to the current corruption drama in Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been claiming that it is a victim of a vast conspiracy, blaming everyone from Washington to Israel to US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen for its woes. Some Turkish media have pointed a finger at David Cohen, the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, who happened to be in Turkey as the news began to break. Erdogan even raised the possibility of expelling the US ambassador to Ankara, Francis Ricciardone.

But if the charges stand against the panoply of well-connected figures fingered, the AKP will have only itself to blame. While the gas-for-gold scheme may have been technically legal before Congress finally shut it down in July, it appears to have exposed the Turkish political elite to a vast Iranian underworld. According to Today’s Zaman, suspicious transactions between Iran and Turkey could exceed $119 billion — nine times the total of gas-for-gold transactions reported.

Even if the Turkish-Iranian gold trade represents only a small part of the wider corruption probe, the ongoing investigation could provide a window into some nagging questions about the relationship between Ankara and Tehran. Perhaps we will finally learn why the Turkish government allowed Iran to stock up on gold while it was defiantly pursuing its illicit nuclear program — and whether the Obama administration could have done more to prevent it.

* * *

Bottom line: dare to mess with the Petrodollar and the wrath of the US government will hunt you down… sooner or later.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/CH0LeGBoLPI/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The ongoing debacle of Italy’s Banca Monte dei Paschi (BMPS) took a turn for the worst today. The bank’s largest shareholders (MPS Foundation) approved (read – forced through) a delay in a EUR 3 billion capital raise, which the bank needs to avoid nationalization, until May. The delay (which will cost the bank EUR 120 million in interest) allows MPS more time to liquidate their 33.5% holding before their stake is massively diluted. Management is ‘considering’ resignation and is “very annoyed,” but the city Mayor is going Nationalist with his delay-supporting comments that “we cannot let the third biggest bank in this country fall prey to foreign interests.” So Europe is recovering but they can’t even raise a day’s worth of POMO to save the oldest bank in the world?

 

Via Reuters,

Italy’s third-biggest bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena was forced to delay a vital 3 billion euro ($4.1 billion) share sale to raise capital until mid-2014 because of shareholder opposition, plunging its turnaround plan into uncertainty.

 

The bank’s chairman and its chief executive may now resign after their plan to launch the cash call in January was defeated at an extraordinary shareholder meeting on Saturday due to the vote of Monte Paschi’s top shareholder.

 

The world’s oldest bank needs to tap investors for cash to pay back 4.1 billion euros in state aid it received earlier this year and avert nationalization

Simple game theory really – why would the largest shareholder “guarantee” losses now when it can try and liquidate more of its exposure over time?

But the cash-strapped Monte dei Paschi foundation – whose stake in the bank is big enough to veto any unwanted decision – forced a postponement until at least mid-May to win more time to sell down its 33.5 percent holding and repay its own debts.

 

…

 

Antonella Mansi, a feisty 39-year-old businesswoman recently appointed head of the Monte dei Paschi foundation, said her insistence on a cash call delay did not amount to a no-confidence vote in the bank’s management.

 

But she said that carrying out the capital increase in January would massively dilute the foundation’s holding, leaving it with virtually nothing to sell to reimburse debts of 340 million euros.

 

“We have a precise duty to ensure (the foundation’s) survival. You can’t ask us to let it collapse,” she said.

Management is “very annoyed”…

Chairman Alessandro Profumo, a strong-willed and internationally respected banker who was formerly the chief of UniCredit, said he and CEO Fabrizio Viola would decide in January whether to step down.

 

“These are decisions one takes in cold blood and in the right place,” Profumo said at the meeting.

 

“What I have on my mind is a 3 billion euro cash call because we need to pay back 4 billion euros to taxpayers. Today this is uncertain and at risk,” he told a press conference.

 

Viola, sitting at his side, told reporters he would do everything “so that the ship does not sink”, but that he could not take responsibility for mistakes made by others.

Of course, there is risk either way…

“It’s important to carry out the capital increase as early as possible,” said Roberto Lottici, fund manager at Ifigest. “The risk is that the bank finds itself rushing into a cash call later at a lower price than what it could achieve now.”

 

…

 

“It’s hard to think that the third largest Italian bank can’t find a pool of banks able to support the cash call after May 2014,” said Antonella Mansi, the president of the MPS foundation, at the shareholders’ meeting.

and given the number of jobs involved… local officials are now reacting in favor of the delay (hoping for domestic savior)…

But in Siena, where the bank is known as “Daddy Monte” and is the biggest employer, fears that the cash call might sever the umbilical cord between the lender and the city run high.

 

Siena mayor Bruno Valentini, whose city council is the top stakeholder in the Monte dei Paschi foundation, said on Friday a postponement might help keep the bank in Italian hands.

 

“We cannot let the third biggest bank in this country fall prey to foreign interests,” he said. “Monte dei Paschi is not just an issue in Siena, it is a big national issue.”

So, even after all the lqiuidty provision; yields and spreads on European debt back near record lows; calls from US asset managers that Europe is recovering and will be the growth engine; and hopes that Europe’s AQR stress test (and resolution mechanism) will be the gold standard for confidence in their banking system… they still can’t find a group of greater fools to pony up EUR3 billion in real (not rehypothecated) money to save the world’s oldest bank – that’s a day’s worth of Fed POMO!!!!

 

On an odd side note, we did note a major surge in ECB margin calls this week…

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/uoBDWm4s8tU/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The ongoing debacle of Italy’s Banca Monte dei Paschi (BMPS) took a turn for the worst today. The bank’s largest shareholders (MPS Foundation) approved (read – forced through) a delay in a EUR 3 billion capital raise, which the bank needs to avoid nationalization, until May. The delay (which will cost the bank EUR 120 million in interest) allows MPS more time to liquidate their 33.5% holding before their stake is massively diluted. Management is ‘considering’ resignation and is “very annoyed,” but the city Mayor is going Nationalist with his delay-supporting comments that “we cannot let the third biggest bank in this country fall prey to foreign interests.” So Europe is recovering but they can’t even raise a day’s worth of POMO to save the oldest bank in the world?

 

Via Reuters,

Italy’s third-biggest bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena was forced to delay a vital 3 billion euro ($4.1 billion) share sale to raise capital until mid-2014 because of shareholder opposition, plunging its turnaround plan into uncertainty.

 

The bank’s chairman and its chief executive may now resign after their plan to launch the cash call in January was defeated at an extraordinary shareholder meeting on Saturday due to the vote of Monte Paschi’s top shareholder.

 

The world’s oldest bank needs to tap investors for cash to pay back 4.1 billion euros in state aid it received earlier this year and avert nationalization

Simple game theory really – why would the largest shareholder “guarantee” losses now when it can try and liquidate more of its exposure over time?

But the cash-strapped Monte dei Paschi foundation – whose stake in the bank is big enough to veto any unwanted decision – forced a postponement until at least mid-May to win more time to sell down its 33.5 percent holding and repay its own debts.

 

…

 

Antonella Mansi, a feisty 39-year-old businesswoman recently appointed head of the Monte dei Paschi foundation, said her insistence on a cash call delay did not amount to a no-confidence vote in the bank’s management.

 

But she said that carrying out the capital increase in January would massively dilute the foundation’s holding, leaving it with virtually nothing to sell to reimburse debts of 340 million euros.

 

“We have a precise duty to ensure (the foundation’s) survival. You can’t ask us to let it collapse,” she said.

Management is “very annoyed”…

Chairman Alessandro Profumo, a strong-willed and internationally respected banker who was formerly the chief of UniCredit, said he and CEO Fabrizio Viola would decide in January whether to step down.

 

“These are decisions one takes in cold blood and in the right place,” Profumo said at the meeting.

 

“What I have on my mind is a 3 billion euro cash call because we need to pay back 4 billion euros to taxpayers. Today this is uncertain and at risk,” he told a press conference.

 

Viola, sitting at his side, told reporters he would do everything “so that the ship does not sink”, but that he could not take responsibility for mistakes made by others.

Of course, there is risk either way…

“It’s important to carry out the capital increase as early as possible,” said Roberto Lottici, fund manager at Ifigest. “The risk is that the bank finds itself rushing into a cash call later at a lower price than what it could achieve now.”

 

…

 

“It’s hard to think that the third largest Italian bank can’t find a pool of banks able to support the cash call after May 2014,” said Antonella Mansi, the president of the MPS foundation, at the shareholders’ meeting.

and given the number of jobs involved… local officials are now reacting in favor of the delay (hoping for domestic savior)…

But in Siena, where the bank is known as “Daddy Monte” and is the biggest employer, fears that the cash call might sever the umbilical cord between the lender and the city run high.

 

Siena mayor Bruno Valentini, whose city council is the top stakeholder in the Monte dei Paschi foundation, said on Friday a postponement might help keep the bank in Italian hands.

 

“We cannot let the third biggest bank in this country fall prey to foreign interests,” he said. “Monte dei Paschi is not just an issue in Siena, it is a big national issue.”

So, even after all the lqiuidty provision; yields and spreads on European debt back near record lows; calls from US asset managers that Europe is recovering and will be the growth engine; and hopes that Europe’s AQR stress test (and resolution mechanism) will be the gold standard for confidence in their banking system… they still can’t find a group of greater fools to pony up EUR3 billion in real (not rehypothecated) money to save the world’s oldest bank – that’s a day’s worth of Fed POMO!!!!

 

On an odd side note, we did note a major surge in ECB margin calls this week…

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/uoBDWm4s8tU/story01.htm Tyler Durden

With equity markets reacting enthusiastically to the Fed’s historic policy change announced last week, PIMCO’s Mohamed El-Erian notes many have rushed to declare victory. Whether in asserting investor comfort with the policy regime shift or in declaring the definitive end of dependence on quantitative easing (“QE”), they believe that the markets’ short-term reaction can indeed be extrapolated into the longer-term. While most Fed officials will welcome the markets’ favourable reaction – and especially so after the May-June shock – El-Erian suspects that they are much more cautious. Indeed, in this FT Op-Ed, he lays out four reasons why such caution is understandable.

Via The FT,

…

First, the impact of Fed policy remains overly dependent on using artificially-high asset prices to alter household and company economic behaviour. Other transmission mechanisms, including the credit channel and the deployment of cash in real economic investments, remain muted. Accordingly, concerns about financial soundness will persist until the Fed witnesses improving economic fundamentals that validate artificially-elevated asset prices.

Second, the Fed is entering a more uncertain policy phase due to its ongoing instrument pivot – namely, less reliance on a direct measure (monthly purchases) and greater reliance on an indirect one (impacting behaviour through forward policy signals). Issues regarding the degree of effectiveness and control could well come to the fore. Just witness the recent sharp upward moves in the 5-year US Treasury yields, along with other intermediate maturities.

Third, those at the Fed who follow closely market positioning will probably recognise that equity markets are currently in the grips of very favourable technicals; and, judging from history, such technicals can lead to price overshoots whose reversal can be quite disruptive.

Finally, the Fed is not the only central bank that has been active in maintaining economic and financial tranquility and, to this end, continuously bolstering asset prices; and it is not the only institution that has been forced to rely on imperfect instruments to fulfil this task.

The European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan are in the same boat. And they, too, face tricky policy issues ahead, with success also ultimately dependent on the overall ability of their economies to overcome the trio of inadequate aggregate demand, insufficient supply responsiveness and residual debt overhangs.

After a couple of false starts, Fed officials have impressively won the first big battle in implementing a gradual orderly exit from QE3, a highly-experimental measure whose longer-term consequences are not fully known as yet. They are yet to win the war.

Of course, a glance around the world – from Turkey to Thailand and even in credit and volatility markets in the last few days, and perhaps El-Erian’s caution is warranted.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/w10V7sbYqy8/story01.htm Tyler Durden

With equity markets reacting enthusiastically to the Fed’s historic policy change announced last week, PIMCO’s Mohamed El-Erian notes many have rushed to declare victory. Whether in asserting investor comfort with the policy regime shift or in declaring the definitive end of dependence on quantitative easing (“QE”), they believe that the markets’ short-term reaction can indeed be extrapolated into the longer-term. While most Fed officials will welcome the markets’ favourable reaction – and especially so after the May-June shock – El-Erian suspects that they are much more cautious. Indeed, in this FT Op-Ed, he lays out four reasons why such caution is understandable.

Via The FT,

…

First, the impact of Fed policy remains overly dependent on using artificially-high asset prices to alter household and company economic behaviour. Other transmission mechanisms, including the credit channel and the deployment of cash in real economic investments, remain muted. Accordingly, concerns about financial soundness will persist until the Fed witnesses improving economic fundamentals that validate artificially-elevated asset prices.

Second, the Fed is entering a more uncertain policy phase due to its ongoing instrument pivot – namely, less reliance on a direct measure (monthly purchases) and greater reliance on an indirect one (impacting behaviour through forward policy signals). Issues regarding the degree of effectiveness and control could well come to the fore. Just witness the recent sharp upward moves in the 5-year US Treasury yields, along with other intermediate maturities.

Third, those at the Fed who follow closely market positioning will probably recognise that equity markets are currently in the grips of very favourable technicals; and, judging from history, such technicals can lead to price overshoots whose reversal can be quite disruptive.

Finally, the Fed is not the only central bank that has been active in maintaining economic and financial tranquility and, to this end, continuously bolstering asset prices; and it is not the only institution that has been forced to rely on imperfect instruments to fulfil this task.

The European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan are in the same boat. And they, too, face tricky policy issues ahead, with success also ultimately dependent on the overall ability of their economies to overcome the trio of inadequate aggregate demand, insufficient supply responsiveness and residual debt overhangs.

After a couple of false starts, Fed officials have impressively won the first big battle in implementing a gradual orderly exit from QE3, a highly-experimental measure whose longer-term consequences are not fully known as yet. They are yet to win the war.

Of course, a glance around the world – from Turkey to Thailand and even in credit and volatility markets in the last few days, and perhaps El-Erian’s caution is warranted.

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/w10V7sbYqy8/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The holiday-thinned activity may have distorted the price action, but the general theme that has emerged in recent weeks remains very much intact. The US dollar’s weakness, which many observers and the media emphasize, is very narrow and largely confined to the euro and sterling (and a few currencies that move in their orbits).

 

Even in recent days, as the euro and sterling climbed to two-year high, the yen slumped to five-year lows, and Australian and Canadian dollars remain pinned near multi-year lows.  Eastern and central European currencies have been lifted against the dollar by the rising euro, but many of the larger accessible emerging market currencies, like the South African rand, the crisis-stricken Turkish lira, and Mexican peso have not performed well.   And over the past week, the Thai baht has lost almost as much as the Japanese yen.

 

It seems that the combination of the large current account surplus, aided by the re-balancing of the periphery, including Spain, portfolio capital inflows, and the ongoing de-leveraging of the financial sector is giving the euro greater legs than anticipated.  At the same time, despite the divergence in the trajectory of monetary policy, Dec Eurodollar-Euribor spread stands at an unimpressive 8 bp. Three-month Euribor was fixed higher than three-month Eurodollar (0.2735% vs 0.2466%).

 

The thin market conditions appear to have exacerbated the move that was already underway.  The move to almost $1.39 at the end of last week was exaggerated and some near-term backing and filling is likely.  Initial support is seen in the $1.3680-$1.3700 area and then $1.3600.   On the upside, there is increased focus on the trend line drawn off the record high in 2008 (~ $1.6040) and the May 2011 high (~$1.4940).   It comes in in January near $1.4050.

 

Sterling has convincingly violated a similar trend line.  It is drawn off the August 2009 high (~$1.7045) and the April 2011 high (~$1.6750).  It was approached several times since, including in January and July 2013.  Before the weekend, it recorded its highest close in 2 1/2 years.  Any backing and filling should be limited to the $1.6300-area.  Assuming that sterling pushed through the $1.66, the next important technical target is near $1.6750.

 

The losses in the Dollar Index have been mitigated by the dollar’s strength against the yen and Canadian dollar.  It rebounded quickly from the drop below the month’s previous lows, leaving it stuck between the uptrend drawn off the October 25 low (~79.00) and the December 18 low (~79.80) and the downtrend line drawn off the November 12 and 21 highs (~81.45 and 81.30) and the December 20 high (a little above 0.8080).  These converging trend lines are found near 80.00 and 80.65 at on January 3.

 

If the euro and sterling’s strength are a theme so is the yen’s weakness, making it difficult, as we have noted in talking about the dollar in general.    The dollar pushed through the JPY105 level after breaking JPY104 in the immediate response to the Fed’s tapering decision on December 18. The next important technical target comes near JPY110.

 

The euro has not looked back since breaking above JPY140 on December 6.  The next target is JPY150. Sterling surpassed JPY170 on the Fed’s tapering and this area was tested as support before bouncing higher in recent days.  There is potential, from a technical point of view toward JPY180 and possibly JPY184.

 

The broadly sideways price action in the Australian dollar failed to improve the technical picture.  Its bounce in the early part of the last week stalled just ahead of the lower end technical resistance we noted in the $0.8970 area.  It can be expected to test the $0.8800 in the days ahead. The next major objective is near $0.8550.

 

After the yen and Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar has been the third worst performer against the dollar over here in Q4.  Over the past week, the Canadian dollar was weaker than the Aussie. We look for the greenback to convincingly rise through the CAD1.07 level.  The next immediate technical target is around CAD1.08 and we look for a move toward CAD1.12-CAD1.14 in the coming months.

 

For seven consecutive sessions through the end of last week, the dollar recorded a higher low against the Mexican peso.  Nevertheless, the broad trading range of MXN12.80-MXN13.10, identified last week, has remained largely intact.  Technical indicators are not generating strong signals presently, but if this analysis is accurate and there is some backing and filling technical action in the near-term, we suspect the dollar is more likely to ease toward the lower end of this narrow range.

 

The CFTC’s Commitment of Traders Report for the most recent reporting period is not available.  

via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/knhZzgcxknI/story01.htm Marc To Market