Sorry Russell 2000, The Caracas Stock Market Shows How It's Done

The corks are popping, new valuation metrics are confirming the buy signals, and everyone’s a stock-picking genius… that is the image projected by CNBC USA (and Europe) as the Russell 2000 is now up 30.6% year-to-date. However, we can only imagine the elation, exuberance, and ecstasy that would be seen day in and day out in at CNBC Venezuela as the Caracas Stock Index rises its most in a month to a new all-time record high and is now up 312.5% year-to-date…

 

 

Coming to another ‘banana republic’ soon…


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/zK4gtCAPO6I/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The corks are popping, new valuation metrics are confirming the buy signals, and everyone’s a stock-picking genius… that is the image projected by CNBC USA (and Europe) as the Russell 2000 is now up 30.6% year-to-date. However, we can only imagine the elation, exuberance, and ecstasy that would be seen day in and day out in at CNBC Venezuela as the Caracas Stock Index rises its most in a month to a new all-time record high and is now up 312.5% year-to-date…

 

 

Coming to another ‘banana republic’ soon…


    



Sorry Russell 2000, The Caracas Stock Market Shows How It’s Done

The corks are popping, new valuation metrics are confirming the buy signals, and everyone’s a stock-picking genius… that is the image projected by CNBC USA (and Europe) as the Russell 2000 is now up 30.6% year-to-date. However, we can only imagine the elation, exuberance, and ecstasy that would be seen day in and day out in at CNBC Venezuela as the Caracas Stock Index rises its most in a month to a new all-time record high and is now up 312.5% year-to-date…

 

 

Coming to another ‘banana republic’ soon…


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/zK4gtCAPO6I/story01.htm Tyler Durden

The corks are popping, new valuation metrics are confirming the buy signals, and everyone’s a stock-picking genius… that is the image projected by CNBC USA (and Europe) as the Russell 2000 is now up 30.6% year-to-date. However, we can only imagine the elation, exuberance, and ecstasy that would be seen day in and day out in at CNBC Venezuela as the Caracas Stock Index rises its most in a month to a new all-time record high and is now up 312.5% year-to-date…

 

 

Coming to another ‘banana republic’ soon…


    



SocGen: "Physical Gold Squeeze Returns"

We already highlighted the return of gold lease rates to subzero yesterday, during the dramatic spike in gold following Gartman’s latest sell recommendation. Now, it is time for the banks to also begin admitting that, as SocGen has just pointed out, the gold “physical squeeze returns.”

Why is this relevant? First, we present SocGen’s explanation of how in a world of ever greater quality asset scarcity, gold remains at the pinnacle (or bottom of Exter’s pyramid), central banks have had to forge agreements among themselves to constant lease and re-lease the gold in circulation to each other, to have backstops for when demand is so high that the actual underlying physical is simply not enough:

Western central banks have more than a decade-long history of gold Agreements with each other and with the private sector. The Central Bank Gold Agreement (also known as the Washington Agreement on Gold) was announced on September 26, 1999. It followed a period of increasing concern that uncoordinated central bank gold sales were destabilising the market, driving the gold price sharply down. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA3) currently in force covers the gold sales of the Eurosystem central banks, Sweden and Switzerland. Like the previous two Agreements, CBGA3  covers a five-year period, in this case from 27 September 2009 (immediately after the second Agreement expired) to 26 September 2014. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement reaffirmed that “gold remains an important element of global monetary reserves”, as was stated in the two previous Agreements.

 

In both the previous Agreements, signatories undertook not to increase their activities in the derivatives and lending markets above the levels of September 1999, when the first CBGA was signed. The new Agreement includes no similar commitment, although central bank activity in these fields has been very limited in recent years.

In other wodrs, despite all the posturing, gold is not only money, but the most important money central banks have access to for one simple reason: they can’t create it out of thin air. More importantly though, as part of a possible new Central Bank Gold Agreement, as SocGen notes, it appears gold derivative and lending activity is about to take off courtesy of the elimination of the Washington Agreement limitations.

So what may be included in the new agreement once the CBGA3 expires in September 2014? SocGen explains:

The CBGA is likely to be a topic of increasingly intense debate over the coming twelve months; we suspect that a renewal is on the cards, if only for the sake of best practice. The CBGA covers not only sales, but lending arrangements. With the gold hedge book now below 200 tonnes, there is clearly scope for the banks to start lending again should there be any requirements from the mining sector. There is increasing debate about the possible re-emergence of hedging in the next few years, but thus far there is little evidence of any great intent. As the gold price trends lower, gold producers become more likely to hedge in order to protect their declining margins.

But that’s some time in the future. As for the present, well – listening to 5 minutes of financial TV is enough to convince anyone that everyone hates gold: after all it’s lost its momentum. So what do to?

If anything is guaranteed to send the gold price higher it is likely to be the fact that the majority of delegates at the recent annual conference held by the London Bullion Market Association and the London Platinum & Palladium Market were bearish for gold in the short term. The general consensus was that the flurries of very strong private purchasing in April and again in June-September was now on the wane and that a degree of increasing confidence in the global economy pointed to reduced interest among professional investors.

As for central banks:

The official sector remains a buyer. The panel of central bankers that addressed the conference included The Banque de France, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Central Bank of Argentina. What was particularly interesting was that, when questioned, the representatives of both the Banque de France and the Bundesbank were uncommunicative about the prospects for a further Central Bank Gold Agreement (the third – known as CBGA-3 – expires on 26th September next year; see blue box below for further details). The Deputy Head of the Market Operations Division at the Bundesbank refrained from any comment on “this very sensitive issue”, while the Director of the Market Operations department at the Banque de France said that there were “many many issues” to be considered. Delegates, on the whole, were of the view that the Agreement should be rolled over, otherwise the markets could easily become unsettled, given the heavy holdings in the hands of a number of European banks in particular, notably those with legacy holdings from the days of the Gold Standard.

And of course, there is always China.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/WY9xiVdKs0Q/story01.htm Tyler Durden

We already highlighted the return of gold lease rates to subzero yesterday, during the dramatic spike in gold following Gartman’s latest sell recommendation. Now, it is time for the banks to also begin admitting that, as SocGen has just pointed out, the gold “physical squeeze returns.”

Why is this relevant? First, we present SocGen’s explanation of how in a world of ever greater quality asset scarcity, gold remains at the pinnacle (or bottom of Exter’s pyramid), central banks have had to forge agreements among themselves to constant lease and re-lease the gold in circulation to each other, to have backstops for when demand is so high that the actual underlying physical is simply not enough:

Western central banks have more than a decade-long history of gold Agreements with each other and with the private sector. The Central Bank Gold Agreement (also known as the Washington Agreement on Gold) was announced on September 26, 1999. It followed a period of increasing concern that uncoordinated central bank gold sales were destabilising the market, driving the gold price sharply down. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA3) currently in force covers the gold sales of the Eurosystem central banks, Sweden and Switzerland. Like the previous two Agreements, CBGA3  covers a five-year period, in this case from 27 September 2009 (immediately after the second Agreement expired) to 26 September 2014. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement reaffirmed that “gold remains an important element of global monetary reserves”, as was stated in the two previous Agreements.

 

In both the previous Agreements, signatories undertook not to increase their activities in the derivatives and lending markets above the levels of September 1999, when the first CBGA was signed. The new Agreement includes no similar commitment, although central bank activity in these fields has been very limited in recent years.

In other wodrs, despite all the posturing, gold is not only money, but the most important money central banks have access to for one simple reason: they can’t create it out of thin air. More importantly though, as part of a possible new Central Bank Gold Agreement, as SocGen notes, it appears gold derivative and lending activity is about to take off courtesy of the elimination of the Washington Agreement limitations.

So what may be included in the new agreement once the CBGA3 expires in September 2014? SocGen explains:

The CBGA is likely to be a topic of increasingly intense debate over the coming twelve months; we suspect that a renewal is on the cards, if only for the sake of best practice. The CBGA covers not only sales, but lending arrangements. With the gold hedge book now below 200 tonnes, there is clearly scope for the banks to start lending again should there be any requirements from the mining sector. There is increasing debate about the possible re-emergence of hedging in the next few years, but thus far there is little evidence of any great intent. As the gold price trends lower, gold producers become more likely to hedge in order to protect their declining margins.

But that’s some time in the future. As for the present, well – listening to 5 minutes of financial TV is enough to convince anyone that everyone hates gold: after all it’s lost its momentum. So what do to?

If anything is guaranteed to send the gold price higher it is likely to be the fact that the majority of delegates at the recent annual conference held by the London Bullion Market Association and the London Platinum & Palladium Market were bearish for gold in the short term. The general consensus was that the flurries of very strong private purchasing in April and again in June-September was now on the wane and that a degree of increasing confidence in the global economy pointed to reduced interest among professional investors.

As for central banks:

The official sector remains a buyer. The panel of central bankers that addressed the conference included The Banque de France, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Central Bank of Argentina. What was particularly interesting was that, when questioned, the representatives of both the Banque de France and the Bundesbank were uncommunicative about the prospects for a further Central Bank Gold Agreement (the third – known as CBGA-3 – expires on 26th September next year; see blue box below for further details). The Deputy Head of the Market Operations Division at the Bundesbank refrained from any comment on “this very sensitive issue”, while the Director of the Market Operations department at the Banque de France said that there were “many many issues” to be considered. Delegates, on the whole, were of the view that the Agreement should be rolled over, otherwise the markets could easily become unsettled, given the heavy holdings in the hands of a number of European banks in particular, notably those with legacy holdings from the days of the Gold Standard.

And of course, there is always China.


    



SocGen: “Physical Gold Squeeze Returns”

We already highlighted the return of gold lease rates to subzero yesterday, during the dramatic spike in gold following Gartman’s latest sell recommendation. Now, it is time for the banks to also begin admitting that, as SocGen has just pointed out, the gold “physical squeeze returns.”

Why is this relevant? First, we present SocGen’s explanation of how in a world of ever greater quality asset scarcity, gold remains at the pinnacle (or bottom of Exter’s pyramid), central banks have had to forge agreements among themselves to constant lease and re-lease the gold in circulation to each other, to have backstops for when demand is so high that the actual underlying physical is simply not enough:

Western central banks have more than a decade-long history of gold Agreements with each other and with the private sector. The Central Bank Gold Agreement (also known as the Washington Agreement on Gold) was announced on September 26, 1999. It followed a period of increasing concern that uncoordinated central bank gold sales were destabilising the market, driving the gold price sharply down. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA3) currently in force covers the gold sales of the Eurosystem central banks, Sweden and Switzerland. Like the previous two Agreements, CBGA3  covers a five-year period, in this case from 27 September 2009 (immediately after the second Agreement expired) to 26 September 2014. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement reaffirmed that “gold remains an important element of global monetary reserves”, as was stated in the two previous Agreements.

 

In both the previous Agreements, signatories undertook not to increase their activities in the derivatives and lending markets above the levels of September 1999, when the first CBGA was signed. The new Agreement includes no similar commitment, although central bank activity in these fields has been very limited in recent years.

In other wodrs, despite all the posturing, gold is not only money, but the most important money central banks have access to for one simple reason: they can’t create it out of thin air. More importantly though, as part of a possible new Central Bank Gold Agreement, as SocGen notes, it appears gold derivative and lending activity is about to take off courtesy of the elimination of the Washington Agreement limitations.

So what may be included in the new agreement once the CBGA3 expires in September 2014? SocGen explains:

The CBGA is likely to be a topic of increasingly intense debate over the coming twelve months; we suspect that a renewal is on the cards, if only for the sake of best practice. The CBGA covers not only sales, but lending arrangements. With the gold hedge book now below 200 tonnes, there is clearly scope for the banks to start lending again should there be any requirements from the mining sector. There is increasing debate about the possible re-emergence of hedging in the next few years, but thus far there is little evidence of any great intent. As the gold price trends lower, gold producers become more likely to hedge in order to protect their declining margins.

But that’s some time in the future. As for the present, well – listening to 5 minutes of financial TV is enough to convince anyone that everyone hates gold: after all it’s lost its momentum. So what do to?

If anything is guaranteed to send the gold price higher it is likely to be the fact that the majority of delegates at the recent annual conference held by the London Bullion Market Association and the London Platinum & Palladium Market were bearish for gold in the short term. The general consensus was that the flurries of very strong private purchasing in April and again in June-September was now on the wane and that a degree of increasing confidence in the global economy pointed to reduced interest among professional investors.

As for central banks:

The official sector remains a buyer. The panel of central bankers that addressed the conference included The Banque de France, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Central Bank of Argentina. What was particularly interesting was that, when questioned, the representatives of both the Banque de France and the Bundesbank were uncommunicative about the prospects for a further Central Bank Gold Agreement (the third – known as CBGA-3 – expires on 26th September next year; see blue box below for further details). The Deputy Head of the Market Operations Division at the Bundesbank refrained from any comment on “this very sensitive issue”, while the Director of the Market Operations department at the Banque de France said that there were “many many issues” to be considered. Delegates, on the whole, were of the view that the Agreement should be rolled over, otherwise the markets could easily become unsettled, given the heavy holdings in the hands of a number of European banks in particular, notably those with legacy holdings from the days of the Gold Standard.

And of course, there is always China.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/WY9xiVdKs0Q/story01.htm Tyler Durden

We already highlighted the return of gold lease rates to subzero yesterday, during the dramatic spike in gold following Gartman’s latest sell recommendation. Now, it is time for the banks to also begin admitting that, as SocGen has just pointed out, the gold “physical squeeze returns.”

Why is this relevant? First, we present SocGen’s explanation of how in a world of ever greater quality asset scarcity, gold remains at the pinnacle (or bottom of Exter’s pyramid), central banks have had to forge agreements among themselves to constant lease and re-lease the gold in circulation to each other, to have backstops for when demand is so high that the actual underlying physical is simply not enough:

Western central banks have more than a decade-long history of gold Agreements with each other and with the private sector. The Central Bank Gold Agreement (also known as the Washington Agreement on Gold) was announced on September 26, 1999. It followed a period of increasing concern that uncoordinated central bank gold sales were destabilising the market, driving the gold price sharply down. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA3) currently in force covers the gold sales of the Eurosystem central banks, Sweden and Switzerland. Like the previous two Agreements, CBGA3  covers a five-year period, in this case from 27 September 2009 (immediately after the second Agreement expired) to 26 September 2014. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement reaffirmed that “gold remains an important element of global monetary reserves”, as was stated in the two previous Agreements.

 

In both the previous Agreements, signatories undertook not to increase their activities in the derivatives and lending markets above the levels of September 1999, when the first CBGA was signed. The new Agreement includes no similar commitment, although central bank activity in these fields has been very limited in recent years.

In other wodrs, despite all the posturing, gold is not only money, but the most important money central banks have access to for one simple reason: they can’t create it out of thin air. More importantly though, as part of a possible new Central Bank Gold Agreement, as SocGen notes, it appears gold derivative and lending activity is about to take off courtesy of the elimination of the Washington Agreement limitations.

So what may be included in the new agreement once the CBGA3 expires in September 2014? SocGen explains:

The CBGA is likely to be a topic of increasingly intense debate over the coming twelve months; we suspect that a renewal is on the cards, if only for the sake of best practice. The CBGA covers not only sales, but lending arrangements. With the gold hedge book now below 200 tonnes, there is clearly scope for the banks to start lending again should there be any requirements from the mining sector. There is increasing debate about the possible re-emergence of hedging in the next few years, but thus far there is little evidence of any great intent. As the gold price trends lower, gold producers become more likely to hedge in order to protect their declining margins.

But that’s some time in the future. As for the present, well – listening to 5 minutes of financial TV is enough to convince anyone that everyone hates gold: after all it’s lost its momentum. So what do to?

If anything is guaranteed to send the gold price higher it is likely to be the fact that the majority of delegates at the recent annual conference held by the London Bullion Market Association and the London Platinum & Palladium Market were bearish for gold in the short term. The general consensus was that the flurries of very strong private purchasing in April and again in June-September was now on the wane and that a degree of increasing confidence in the global economy pointed to reduced interest among professional investors.

As for central banks:

The official sector remains a buyer. The panel of central bankers that addressed the conference included The Banque de France, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Central Bank of Argentina. What was particularly interesting was that, when questioned, the representatives of both the Banque de France and the Bundesbank were uncommunicative about the prospects for a further Central Bank Gold Agreement (the third – known as CBGA-3 – expires on 26th September next year; see blue box below for further details). The Deputy Head of the Market Operations Division at the Bundesbank refrained from any comment on “this very sensitive issue”, while the Director of the Market Operations department at the Banque de France said that there were “many many issues” to be considered. Delegates, on the whole, were of the view that the Agreement should be rolled over, otherwise the markets could easily become unsettled, given the heavy holdings in the hands of a number of European banks in particular, notably those with legacy holdings from the days of the Gold Standard.

And of course, there is always China.


    



The Carlyle Group’s Latest Investment… Trailer Parks

Submitted by Mike Krieger of Liberty Blitzkrieg blog,

Earlier this month, I highlighted the fact that the Carlyle Group was the latest in a series of “smart money” private equity firms to decide it was time to exit the suddenly extremely crowded “buy-to rent” residential real estate trade. At the time I noted that:

As it sells apartments, Carlyle is focusing investments in areas such as senior housing, self-storage units and manufactured homes, where demand tends to be driven by life changes such as retirement or marriages, and isn’t so closely tied to changes in employment and gross domestic product, Stuckey said.

Well it appears Carlyle has already started to make its move. As the Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday: Carlyle Jumps Into Niche Space – Private-Equity Firm Adds Trailer Parks to Its Diverse Portfolio. In case you can’t figure out what appears to be the key logic behind the shift in focus, try this line on for size:

Because the cost of relocating a home is expensive, residents are less likely to move away. “Our customers have no alternative shot at homeownership, nor do they [normally] even have the credit scores and quality to seek anything better,” Mr. Rolfe said. “They never leave the park they are in, and the revenues are unbelievably stable as a result.”

In neo-feudalistic America, always, always go long serfdom.

More from the WSJ:

Carlyle Group LP,  a private-equity firm that has interests in everything from an oil refinery to a vitamin maker, is adding trailer parks to its portfolio.

 

The Washington-based company has struck a deal to acquire two Florida communities for a total of $30.8 million. The sellers are two entities managed by Shamrock Holdings LLC, a Paradise Valley, Ariz., owner and operator of communities, said owner Patrick O’Malley. The deal is expected to close this month.

 

Carlyle declined to comment. But analysts said the deal is evidence that big investors are betting that the demand for low-cost manufactured housing, the latest generation of trailers or mobile homes, will rise as other housing alternatives become too expensive for a number of Americans, especially senior citizens.

 

Landlords like the steady income stream—tenants tend to stay put, especially retirees—and the low maintenance costs. Also, the communities are easy to run and typically stay full and see rents increase during market downturns.

 

Because the cost of relocating a home is expensive, residents are less likely to move away. “Our customers have no alternative shot at homeownership, nor do they [normally] even have the credit scores and quality to seek anything better,” Mr. Rolfe said. “They never leave the park they are in, and the revenues are unbelievably stable as a result.”

One thing is quite clear. Carlyle knows full well what the future of America looks like

Full article here.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/OH2Z-Sz8KKA/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Submitted by Mike Krieger of Liberty Blitzkrieg blog,

Earlier this month, I highlighted the fact that the Carlyle Group was the latest in a series of “smart money” private equity firms to decide it was time to exit the suddenly extremely crowded “buy-to rent” residential real estate trade. At the time I noted that:

As it sells apartments, Carlyle is focusing investments in areas such as senior housing, self-storage units and manufactured homes, where demand tends to be driven by life changes such as retirement or marriages, and isn’t so closely tied to changes in employment and gross domestic product, Stuckey said.

Well it appears Carlyle has already started to make its move. As the Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday: Carlyle Jumps Into Niche Space – Private-Equity Firm Adds Trailer Parks to Its Diverse Portfolio. In case you can’t figure out what appears to be the key logic behind the shift in focus, try this line on for size:

Because the cost of relocating a home is expensive, residents are less likely to move away. “Our customers have no alternative shot at homeownership, nor do they [normally] even have the credit scores and quality to seek anything better,” Mr. Rolfe said. “They never leave the park they are in, and the revenues are unbelievably stable as a result.”

In neo-feudalistic America, always, always go long serfdom.

More from the WSJ:

Carlyle Group LP,  a private-equity firm that has interests in everything from an oil refinery to a vitamin maker, is adding trailer parks to its portfolio.

 

The Washington-based company has struck a deal to acquire two Florida communities for a total of $30.8 million. The sellers are two entities managed by Shamrock Holdings LLC, a Paradise Valley, Ariz., owner and operator of communities, said owner Patrick O’Malley. The deal is expected to close this month.

 

Carlyle declined to comment. But analysts said the deal is evidence that big investors are betting that the demand for low-cost manufactured housing, the latest generation of trailers or mobile homes, will rise as other housing alternatives become too expensive for a number of Americans, especially senior citizens.

 

Landlords like the steady income stream—tenants tend to stay put, especially retirees—and the low maintenance costs. Also, the communities are easy to run and typically stay full and see rents increase during market downturns.

 

Because the cost of relocating a home is expensive, residents are less likely to move away. “Our customers have no alternative shot at homeownership, nor do they [normally] even have the credit scores and quality to seek anything better,” Mr. Rolfe said. “They never leave the park they are in, and the revenues are unbelievably stable as a result.”

One thing is quite clear. Carlyle knows full well what the future of America looks like

Full article here.


    



The "Crazy", "Deadender" Tea Party: The BusinessWeek Cover Does It Again

While Bloomberg’s BusinessWeek division is no stranger to provocative covers (here, here and here), it will be interesting to see what reactions among a growing segment of the US population, those that don’t believe that unsustainable, reserve currency-threatening spending like a drunken sailor is the equivalent of “wealth creation”, its latest cover (to the following story) will provoke: namely, the “crazy”, “deadender” tea party.

 

Those curious how this particular attention-grabbing cover was made, can find out here.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/wxNBk7yU1vQ/story01.htm Tyler Durden

While Bloomberg’s BusinessWeek division is no stranger to provocative covers (here, here and here), it will be interesting to see what reactions among a growing segment of the US population, those that don’t believe that unsustainable, reserve currency-threatening spending like a drunken sailor is the equivalent of “wealth creation”, its latest cover (to the following story) will provoke: namely, the “crazy”, “deadender” tea party.

 

Those curious how this particular attention-grabbing cover was made, can find out here.


    



The “Crazy”, “Deadender” Tea Party: The BusinessWeek Cover Does It Again

While Bloomberg’s BusinessWeek division is no stranger to provocative covers (here, here and here), it will be interesting to see what reactions among a growing segment of the US population, those that don’t believe that unsustainable, reserve currency-threatening spending like a drunken sailor is the equivalent of “wealth creation”, its latest cover (to the following story) will provoke: namely, the “crazy”, “deadender” tea party.

 

Those curious how this particular attention-grabbing cover was made, can find out here.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/wxNBk7yU1vQ/story01.htm Tyler Durden

While Bloomberg’s BusinessWeek division is no stranger to provocative covers (here, here and here), it will be interesting to see what reactions among a growing segment of the US population, those that don’t believe that unsustainable, reserve currency-threatening spending like a drunken sailor is the equivalent of “wealth creation”, its latest cover (to the following story) will provoke: namely, the “crazy”, “deadender” tea party.

 

Those curious how this particular attention-grabbing cover was made, can find out here.


    



Guest Post: Is A Large Wealth Grab On The Way?

Submitted by Pater Tenebrarum of Acting-Man blog,

IMF Discusses 'One-Off' Wealth Tax

It is undoubtedly nice to have a job with the World Bank or the IMF. One of the most enticing aspects for those employed at these organizations (which n.b. are entirely funded by tax payers), is no doubt that apart from receiving generous salaries and perks, they themselves don't have to pay any taxes. What a great gig! Since these organizations are so to speak 'extra-territorial', they are held to be outside the grasp of specific tax authorities.

This doesn't keep them from thinking up various ways of how to resolve the by now well-known problem of the looming insolvency of various welfare/warfare states. In fact, they have quite a strong incentive to come up with such ideas, since their own livelihood depends on the revenue streams continuing without a hitch. One recent proposal in particular has made waves lately (it can be found in this paper – pdf), mainly because it sounds precisely like the kind of thing many people expect desperate governments to resort to when push comes to shove, not least because they have taken similar measures repeatedly throughout history. 

The recent depositor haircut in Cyprus has also contributed to such expectations becoming more widespread. We believe is that it is far better to let shareholders, bondholders and depositors (in that order) take their lumps in the event of bank insolvencies rather than forcing the bill on unsuspecting tax payers via bailouts. What was odious about the Cypriot haircut was mainly that the government steadfastly lied to its citizens about what was coming and that certain classes of depositors, such as e.g. the president's relatives, got all their money out just a week or two prior to the bank holiday, by what we are assured was sheer coincidence (this unexpected twist of fate which proved so fortuitous to the president's clan increased the costs for remaining depositors).

Still, the entire escapade was a salutary event in many respects. It proved that government bonds are not a reliable store of value (it was mainly their holdings of Greek government bonds that got the Cypriot banks into hot water) and it was a reminder that fractionally reserved banks are inherently insolvent. In short, it has helped a bit to concentrate the minds of many of those who still remain whole and has sensitized them to other attempts of grabbing private wealth that may be coming down the pike.

This is probably also the reason why a paragraph in an IMF document that may otherwise not have received much scrutiny as it would have been considered too outlandish an idea, has created quite a stir. That such proposals are made from the comfortable environment of a tax free zone is quite ironic. Here is the paragraph in question:

 

“The sharp deterioration of the public finances in  many countries has revived interest in a “capital levy”—  a one-off tax on private wealth—as an exceptional  measure to restore debt sustainability. The appeal is that such a tax, if it is implemented before avoidance is possible and there is a belief that it will never be  repeated, does not distort behavior (and may be seen by some as fair). There have been illustrious supporters, including Pigou, Ricardo, Schumpeter, and—until he  changed his mind—Keynes. The conditions for success  are strong, but also need to be weighed against the risks  of the alternatives, which include repudiating public  debt or inflating it away (these, in turn, are a particular form of wealth tax—on bondholders—that also falls on nonresidents).

 

There is a surprisingly large amount of experience to draw on, as such levies were widely adopted in Europe after World War I and in Germany and Japan after World War II. Reviewed in Eichengreen (1990), this experience suggests that more notable than any loss of credibility was a simple failure to achieve debt reduction, largely because the delay in introduction gave space for extensive avoidance and capital flight—in turn spurring inflation.

 

The tax rates needed to bring down public debt to  precrisis levels, moreover, are sizable: reducing debt ratios to end-2007 levels would require (for a sample of 15 euro area countries) a tax rate of about 10 percent on households with positive net wealth.”

 

(emphasis added)

It is actually not a surprise that there is a 'wealth of experience to draw on'. Throughout history, governments have thought up all sorts of methods to get their hands on their subjects' wealth. It would have only been a surprise if there had been no 'experiences to draw on'. In fact, as wasteful and inefficient as the State is otherwise, this is one of the tasks in which it proves extremely resourceful, inventive and efficient. The extraction of citizens' wealth is an activity at which it excels.

Apparently the IMF judges that stealing 10% of all private wealth in one fell swoop is perfectly fine as long as 'some see it as fair'. Some of course would. There is however a crucial difference between imposing such a levy at gunpoint and letting bondholders take losses. The latter have taken the risk of not getting repaid voluntarily. No-one forced them to buy government bonds.

As to the pseudo-consolation that such a confiscation should be presented as a 'one off' event so as 'not to distort behavior', let's be serious. The moment  governments gets more loot in, they will start spending it with both hands and in no time at all will find themselves back at square one.

 


States and Taxation

As Franz Oppenheimer has pointed out, States are essentially the result of conquests by gangs of marauders who realized that operating a protection racket was far more profitable than simply grabbing everything that wasn't nailed down and making off with. In modern democracies it has become easier for citizens to join the ruling class (i.e., the more civilized version of these marauders), which has greatly increased acceptance of the State. Also, a large number of people has been bought off with 'free' goodies and all and sundry have had it drilled into them throughout their lives that the State is both inevitable and irreplaceable.

There are of course other advantages to be had in democracies, such as the fact that a market economy is allowed to exist (even if it is severely hampered) and that free speech is tolerated. One considerable drawback though is that taxation has historically never been higher than in the democratic order (and still these States are all teetering on the edge of bankruptcy anyway).

As an aside, conscription and the closely associated concept of 'total war' are also democratic 'achievements'. Whereas war was once largely confined to strictly localized battles between professionals, the French revolution and its aftermath was a pivot point that marked a change in thinking about war and ultimately paved the way for legitimizing the all-encompassing atrocities of the 20th century, with civilians suddenly regarded as fair game.

A little historical excursion: Under medieval kings there was at least occasionally a chance that a tax might actually be repealed, even if only temporarily. For instance, in 1012 the heregeld was introduced in England, an annual tax first assessed by King Ethelred the Unready (better: 'the Ill-Advised'). Its purpose was to help pay for mercenaries to fight the invasion of England by King Sweyn Forkbeard of Denmark.

Ethelred had been forced to pay a tribute to the Danes for many years, known as 'Danegeld'. In 1002 AD he apparently got fed up and in a fit of pique ordered the murder of all Danes in England, an event known as the St. Brice's Day Massacre. Not surprisingly, this incensed the Danes and Sweyn Forkbeard's invasion was the result. Sweyn seized the English throne in 1013, but died in 1014, upon which Ethelred was invited back by the nobles (under the condition that he 'rule more justly'). However, he soon died as well, which left Edmund Ironside in charge for a few months in 1016. Sweyn's son Knut eventually conquered England later in the same year. Knut simply continued to collect the heregeld tax after ascending to the throne. The heregeld was a land tax based on the number of 'hides' one owned (the hide is a medieval area measure, the precise extent of which is disputed among historians; one hide was once thought to be equivalent to 120 acres, but this is no longer considered certain). The tax was finally abolished by King Edward the Confessor in 1051 (Edward was Ethelred's seventh son and was later canonized. He was the last king of the House of Wessex). The tax relief unfortunately proved short-lived. Shortly after Edward's death in 1066, the Normans conquered England and 'hideage' was reintroduced.

 

Ethelred_the_Unready

 

Ethelred the Unready, inventor of the heregeld tax, holding an oversized sword. Although he is generally referred to as 'the Unready', this translation of his nickname is actually incorrect: rather, it should be 'ill-advised' or 'ill-prepared'. In the original old English “Æþelræd Unræd”, the term 'unread' is actually a pun on his name.  'Ethelred' means 'noble counsel' (in modern German: 'Edler Rat') – his nickname thus juxtaposes 'noble counsel' with 'no counsel' or 'evil counsel'.

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

Sweyn_Forkbeard

Ethelred's nemesis, the Danish King Sweyn Forkbeard, likewise holding an oversized sword

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

 

Edward_the_Confessor

The man who abolished the heregeld tax, St. Edward the Confessor. It is noteworthy that he is usually not depicted holding an oversized sword (he was however reportedly not inexperienced in military matters. When Welsh raiders attacked English lands in 1049, they soon had reason for regret. The head of one of their leaders, Rhys ap Rhydderch, was delivered to Edward in 1052. The head was no longer attached to the rest of Rhys). Edward is probably not mainly remembered for this, but he gave England fifteen glorious years free of hideage tax.

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

 

As Murray Rothbard writes in 'The Ethics of Liberty' on the State's monopoly of force and its power to extract revenue by coercion:

 

 

“But, above all, the crucial monopoly is the State’s control of the use of violence: of the police and armed services, and of the courts—the locus of ultimate decision-making power in disputes over crimes and contracts. Control of the police and the army is particularly important in enforcing and assuring all of the State’s other powers, including the all-important power to extract its revenue by coercion.

 

For there is one crucially important power inherent in
the nature of the State apparatus. All other persons and groups in society (except for acknowledged and sporadic criminals such as thieves and bank robbers) obtain their income voluntarily: either by selling goods and services to the consuming public, or by voluntary gift (e.g., membership in a club or association, bequest, or inheritance). Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion, by threatening dire penalties should the income not be forthcoming. That coercion is known as “taxation,” although in less regularized epochs it was often known as “tribute.” Taxation is theft, purely and simply even though it is theft on a grand and colossal scale which no acknowledged criminals could hope to match. It is a compulsory seizure of the property of the State’s inhabitants, or subjects.

 

It would be an instructive exercise for the skeptical reader to try to frame a definition of taxation which does not also include theft. Like the robber, the State demands money at the equivalent of gunpoint; if the taxpayer refuses to pay his assets are seized by force, and if he should resist such depredation, he will be arrested or shot if he should continue to resist. It is true that State apologists maintain that taxation is “really” voluntary; one simple but instructive refutation of this claim is to ponder what would happen if the government were to abolish taxation, and to confine itself to simple requests for voluntary contributions. Does anyone really believe that anything comparable to the current vast revenues of the State would continue to pour into its coffers? It is likely that even those theorists who claim that punishment never deters action would balk at such a claim. The great economist Joseph Schumpeter was correct when he acidly wrote that “the theory which construes taxes on the analogy of club dues or of the purchase of the services of, say, a doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences is from scientific habits of mind.”

 

(emphasis in original)

In the pages following this excerpt, Rothbard expertly demolishes numerous spurious arguments that have been forwarded in support of taxes by people claiming that they are somehow akin to voluntary contributions.

 

The Vote Changes Nothing

In the course of this disquisition Rothbard also discusses whether the democratic vote actually makes a difference in this context, whether, as he puts it, the “act of voting makes the government and all its works and powers truly “voluntary.”  On this topic he quotes from the observations of anarchist political philosopher Lysander Spooner, who wrote the following in 'No Treason:The Constitution of No Authority':

 

“In truth, in the case of individuals their actual voting is not to be taken as proof of consent. . . . On the contrary, it is to be considered that, without his consent having even been asked a man finds himself environed by a government that he cannot resist; a government that forces him to pay money renders service, and foregoes the exercise of many of his natural rights, under peril of weighty punishments.

He sees, too, that other men practice this tyranny over him by the use of the ballot. He sees further, that, if he will but use the ballot himself, he has some chance of relieving himself from this tyranny of others, by subjecting them to his own. In short, he finds himself, without his consent, so situated that, if he uses the ballot, he may become a master, if he does not use it, he must become a slave.

 

(emphasis added)

Discussing taxation in the same text, Spooner famously compares government to highwaymen. He is however not merely equating one with the other, but rather concludes that highwaymen are to be preferred. After all, neither are their activities attended by hypocrisy, nor are their demands without limit (we would add to this that no-one ever published learned papers advising them how to best go about grabbing more loot).

 

“It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other. . . .

 

But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: “Your money, or your life.” And many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat.

 

The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful.

The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a “protector,” and that he takes men’s money against their will, merely to enable him to “protect” those infatuated travelers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection.

 

He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road
, against your will; assuming to be your rightful “sovereign,” on account of the “protection” he affords you. He does not keep “protecting” you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without mercy if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villainies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave.”

 

(emphasis added)

Somehow we don't think that Mr. Spooner would have been a very big fan of the IMF and its ideas.

 

LysanderSpooner

Lysander Spooner had their number.

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

Conclusion:

The particular wealth tax proposal mentioned by the IMF en passant is odious in the extreme, especially as the wealth to be taxed has already been taxed at what are historically stratospheric rates.

It is noteworthy that the alternatives discussed by the IMF for heavily indebted states which are weighed down by the wasteful spending of yesterday appear to have been reduced to 'default' (either outright or via hyperinflation) or 'more confiscation'. How about rigorously cutting spending instead?

One must also keep in mind that any proposals concerning so-called 'tax fairness' are in the main about 'how can we get our hands on wealth that currently still eludes us'. People need to be aware that worsening the situation of one class of tax payers is never going to improve the situation of another. The IMF's publication is a case in point: in all its yammering about 'tax fairness', the possibility of lowering anyone's taxes is not mentioned once (not to mention that it seems quite hypocritical for people who are exempted from taxes to go on about imposing 'tax fairness' on others).

Lastly, a popular as well as populist target of the self-appointed arbiters of 'fairness' are loopholes, but as we have previously discussed, they are to paraphrase Mises 'what allows capitalism to breathe'. Closing them will in the end only lead to higher costs for consumers, less innovation, lower growth and considerable damage to retirement savings.

 

Loot_and_Extortion_-_geograph.org.uk_-_88390

Two apposite statues at Trago Mills, UK, dedicated to HM Inland Revenue – Loot & Extortion.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/DQl0wudiT2Q/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Submitted by Pater Tenebrarum of Acting-Man blog,

IMF Discusses 'One-Off' Wealth Tax

It is undoubtedly nice to have a job with the World Bank or the IMF. One of the most enticing aspects for those employed at these organizations (which n.b. are entirely funded by tax payers), is no doubt that apart from receiving generous salaries and perks, they themselves don't have to pay any taxes. What a great gig! Since these organizations are so to speak 'extra-territorial', they are held to be outside the grasp of specific tax authorities.

This doesn't keep them from thinking up various ways of how to resolve the by now well-known problem of the looming insolvency of various welfare/warfare states. In fact, they have quite a strong incentive to come up with such ideas, since their own livelihood depends on the revenue streams continuing without a hitch. One recent proposal in particular has made waves lately (it can be found in this paper – pdf), mainly because it sounds precisely like the kind of thing many people expect desperate governments to resort to when push comes to shove, not least because they have taken similar measures repeatedly throughout history. 

The recent depositor haircut in Cyprus has also contributed to such expectations becoming more widespread. We believe is that it is far better to let shareholders, bondholders and depositors (in that order) take their lumps in the event of bank insolvencies rather than forcing the bill on unsuspecting tax payers via bailouts. What was odious about the Cypriot haircut was mainly that the government steadfastly lied to its citizens about what was coming and that certain classes of depositors, such as e.g. the president's relatives, got all their money out just a week or two prior to the bank holiday, by what we are assured was sheer coincidence (this unexpected twist of fate which proved so fortuitous to the president's clan increased the costs for remaining depositors).

Still, the entire escapade was a salutary event in many respects. It proved that government bonds are not a reliable store of value (it was mainly their holdings of Greek government bonds that got the Cypriot banks into hot water) and it was a reminder that fractionally reserved banks are inherently insolvent. In short, it has helped a bit to concentrate the minds of many of those who still remain whole and has sensitized them to other attempts of grabbing private wealth that may be coming down the pike.

This is probably also the reason why a paragraph in an IMF document that may otherwise not have received much scrutiny as it would have been considered too outlandish an idea, has created quite a stir. That such proposals are made from the comfortable environment of a tax free zone is quite ironic. Here is the paragraph in question:

 

“The sharp deterioration of the public finances in  many countries has revived interest in a “capital levy”—  a one-off tax on private wealth—as an exceptional  measure to restore debt sustainability. The appeal is that such a tax, if it is implemented before avoidance is possible and there is a belief that it will never be  repeated, does not distort behavior (and may be seen by some as fair). There have been illustrious supporters, including Pigou, Ricardo, Schumpeter, and—until he  changed his mind—Keynes. The conditions for success  are strong, but also need to be weighed against the risks  of the alternatives, which include repudiating public  debt or inflating it away (these, in turn, are a particular form of wealth tax—on bondholders—that also falls on nonresidents).

 

There is a surprisingly large amount of experience to draw on, as such levies were widely adopted in Europe after World War I and in Germany and Japan after World War II. Reviewed in Eichengreen (1990), this experience suggests that more notable than any loss of credibility was a simple failure to achieve debt reduction, largely because the delay in introduction gave space for extensive avoidance and capital flight—in turn spurring inflation.

 

The tax rates needed to bring down public debt to  precrisis levels, moreover, are sizable: reducing debt ratios to end-2007 levels would require (for a sample of 15 euro area countries) a tax rate of about 10 percent on households with positive net wealth.”

 

(emphasis added)

It is actually not a surprise that there is a 'wealth of experience to draw on'. Throughout history, governments have thought up all sorts of methods to get their hands on their subjects' wealth. It would have only been a surprise if there had been no 'experiences to draw on'. In fact, as wasteful and inefficient as the State is otherwise, this is one of the tasks in which it proves extremely resourceful, inventive and efficient. The extraction of citizens' wealth is an activity at which it excels.

Apparently the IMF judges that stealing 10% of all private wealth in one fell swoop is perfectly fine as long as 'some see it as fair'. Some of course would. There is however a crucial difference between imposing such a levy at gunpoint and letting bondholders take losses. The latter have taken the risk of not getting repaid voluntarily. No-one forced them to buy government bonds.

As to the pseudo-consolation that such a confiscation should be presented as a 'one off' event so as 'not to distort behavior', let's be serious. The moment  governments gets more loot in, they will start spending it with both hands and in no time at all will find themselves back at square one.

 

States and Taxation

As Franz Oppenheimer has pointed out, States are essentially the result of conquests by gangs of marauders who realized that operating a protection racket was far more profitable than simply grabbing everything that wasn't nailed down and making off with. In modern democracies it has become easier for citizens to join the ruling class (i.e., the more civilized version of these marauders), which has greatly increased acceptance of the State. Also, a large number of people has been bought off with 'free' goodies and all and sundry have had it drilled into them throughout their lives that the State is both inevitable and irreplaceable.

There are of course other advantages to be had in democracies, such as the fact that a market economy is allowed to exist (even if it is severely hampered) and that free speech is tolerated. One considerable drawback though is that taxation has historically never been higher than in the democratic order (and still these States are all teetering on the edge of bankruptcy anyway).

As an aside, conscription and the closely associated concept of 'total war' are also democratic 'achievements'. Whereas war was once largely confined to strictly localized battles between professionals, the French revolution and its aftermath was a pivot point that marked a change in thinking about war and ultimately paved the way for legitimizing the all-encompassing atrocities of the 20th century, with civilians suddenly regarded as fair game.

A little historical excursion: Under medieval kings there was at least occasionally a chance that a tax might actually be repealed, even if only temporarily. For instance, in 1012 the heregeld was introduced in England, an annual tax first assessed by King Ethelred the Unready (better: 'the Ill-Advised'). Its purpose was to help pay for mercenaries to fight the invasion of England by King Sweyn Forkbeard of Denmark.

Ethelred had been forced to pay a tribute to the Danes for many years, known as 'Danegeld'. In 1002 AD he apparently got fed up and in a fit of pique ordered the murder of all Danes in England, an event known as the St. Brice's Day Massacre. Not surprisingly, this incensed the Danes and Sweyn Forkbeard's invasion was the result. Sweyn seized the English throne in 1013, but died in 1014, upon which Ethelred was invited back by the nobles (under the condition that he 'rule more justly'). However, he soon died as well, which left Edmund Ironside in charge for a few months in 1016. Sweyn's son Knut eventually conquered England later in the same year. Knut simply continued to collect the heregeld tax after ascending to the throne. The heregeld was a land tax based on the number of 'hides' one owned (the hide is a medieval area measure, the precise extent of which is disputed among historians; one hide was once thought to be equivalent to 120 acres, but this is no longer considered certain). The tax was finally abolished by King Edward the Confessor in 1051 (Edward was Ethelred's seventh son and was later canonized. He was the last king of the House of Wessex). The tax relief unfortunately proved short-lived. Shortly after Edward's death in 1066, the Normans conquered England and 'hideage' was reintroduced.

 

Ethelred_the_Unready

 

Ethelred the Unready, inventor of the heregeld tax, holding an oversized sword. Although he is generally referred to as 'the Unready', this translation of his nickname is actually incorrect: rather, it should be 'ill-advised' or 'ill-prepared'. In the original old English “Æþelræd Unræd”, the term 'unread' is actually a pun on his name.  'Ethelred' means 'noble counsel' (in modern German: 'Edler Rat') – his nickname thus juxtaposes 'noble counsel' with 'no counsel' or 'evil counsel'.

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

Sweyn_Forkbeard

Ethelred's nemesis, the Danish King Sweyn Forkbeard, likewise holding an oversized sword

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

 

Edward_the_Confessor

The man who abolished the heregeld tax, St. Edward the Confessor. It is noteworthy that he is usually not depicted holding an oversized sword (he was however reportedly not inexperienced in military matters. When Welsh raiders attacked English lands in 1049, they soon had reason for regret. The head of one of their leaders, Rhys ap Rhydderch, was delivered to Edward in 1052. The head was no longer attached to the rest of Rhys). Edward is probably not mainly remembered for this, but he gave England fifteen glorious years free of hideage tax.

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

 

As Murray Rothbard writes in 'The Ethics of Liberty' on the State's monopoly of force and its power to extract revenue by coercion:

 

 

“But, above all, the crucial monopoly is the State’s control of the use of violence: of the police and armed services, and of the courts—the locus of ultimate decision-making power in disputes over crimes and contracts. Control of the police and the army is particularly important in enforcing and assuring all of the State’s other powers, including the all-important power to extract its revenue by coercion.

 

For there is one crucially important power inherent in the nature of the State apparatus. All other persons and groups in society (except for acknowledged and sporadic criminals such as thieves and bank robbers) obtain their income voluntarily: either by selling goods and services to the consuming public, or by voluntary gift (e.g., membership in a club or association, bequest, or inheritance). Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion, by threatening dire penalties should the income not be forthcoming. That coercion is known as “taxation,” although in less regularized epochs it was often known as “tribute.” Taxation is theft, purely and simply even though it is theft on a grand and colossal scale which no acknowledged criminals could hope to match. It is a compulsory seizure of the property of the State’s inhabitants, or subjects.

 

It would be an instructive exercise for the skeptical reader to try to frame a definition of taxation which does not also include theft. Like the robber, the State demands money at the equivalent of gunpoint; if the taxpayer refuses to pay his assets are seized by force, and if he should resist such depredation, he will be arrested or shot if he should continue to resist. It is true that State apologists maintain that taxation is “really” voluntary; one simple but instructive refutation of this claim is to ponder what would happen if the government were to abolish taxation, and to confine itself to simple requests for voluntary contributions. Does anyone really believe that anything comparable to the current vast revenues of the State would continue to pour into its coffers? It is likely that even those theorists who claim that punishment never deters action would balk at such a claim. The great economist Joseph Schumpeter was correct when he acidly wrote that “the theory which construes taxes on the analogy of club dues or of the purchase of the services of, say, a doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences is from scientific habits of mind.”

 

(emphasis in original)

In the pages following this excerpt, Rothbard expertly demolishes numerous spurious arguments that have been forwarded in support of taxes by people claiming that they are somehow akin to voluntary contributions.

 

The Vote Changes Nothing

In the course of this disquisition Rothbard also discusses whether the democratic vote actually makes a difference in this context, whether, as he puts it, the “act of voting makes the government and all its works and powers truly “voluntary.”  On this topic he quotes from the observations of anarchist political philosopher Lysander Spooner, who wrote the following in 'No Treason:The Constitution of No Authority':

 

“In truth, in the case of individuals their actual voting is not to be taken as proof of consent. . . . On the contrary, it is to be considered that, without his consent having even been asked a man finds himself environed by a government that he cannot resist; a government that forces him to pay money renders service, and foregoes the exercise of many of his natural rights, under peril of weighty punishments.

He sees, too, that other men practice this tyranny over him by the use of the ballot. He sees further, that, if he will but use the ballot himself, he has some chance of relieving himself from this tyranny of others, by subjecting them to his own. In short, he finds himself, without his consent, so situated that, if he uses the ballot, he may become a master, if he does not use it, he must become a slave.

 

(emphasis added)

Discussing taxation in the same text, Spooner famously compares government to highwaymen. He is however not merely equating one with the other, but rather concludes that highwaymen are to be preferred. After all, neither are their activities attended by hypocrisy, nor are their demands without limit (we would add to this that no-one ever published learned papers advising them how to best go about grabbing more loot).

 

“It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other. . . .

 

But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: “Your money, or your life.” And many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat.

 

The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful.

The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a “protector,” and that he takes men’s money against their will, merely to enable him to “protect” those infatuated travelers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection.

 

He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you
, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful “sovereign,” on account of the “protection” he affords you. He does not keep “protecting” you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without mercy if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villainies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave.”

 

(emphasis added)

Somehow we don't think that Mr. Spooner would have been a very big fan of the IMF and its ideas.

 

LysanderSpooner

Lysander Spooner had their number.

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

Conclusion:

The particular wealth tax proposal mentioned by the IMF en passant is odious in the extreme, especially as the wealth to be taxed has already been taxed at what are historically stratospheric rates.

It is noteworthy that the alternatives discussed by the IMF for heavily indebted states which are weighed down by the wasteful spending of yesterday appear to have been reduced to 'default' (either outright or via hyperinflation) or 'more confiscation'. How about rigorously cutting spending instead?

One must also keep in mind that any proposals concerning so-called 'tax fairness' are in the main about 'how can we get our hands on wealth that currently still eludes us'. People need to be aware that worsening the situation of one class of tax payers is never going to improve the situation of another. The IMF's publication is a case in point: in all its yammering about 'tax fairness', the possibility of lowering anyone's taxes is not mentioned once (not to mention that it seems quite hypocritical for people who are exempted from taxes to go on about imposing 'tax fairness' on others).

Lastly, a popular as well as populist target of the self-appointed arbiters of 'fairness' are loopholes, but as we have previously discussed, they are to paraphrase Mises 'what allows capitalism to breathe'. Closing them will in the end only lead to higher costs for consumers, less innovation, lower growth and considerable damage to retirement savings.

 

Loot_and_Extortion_-_geograph.org.uk_-_88390

Two apposite statues at Trago Mills, UK, dedicated to HM Inland Revenue – Loot & Extortion.


    



Obama: "John, What Happened", Boehner: "I Got Overrun, That's What Happened"

Perhaps no (albeit brief) conversation sums up how the debacle of the last couple of weeks started than the following exchange that took place on October 2nd, according to Politico,

Obama: “John, What Happened”


Boehner: “I Got Overrun, That’s What Happened”

The question, prompted by the shutdown in the face of Boehner’s pledge to avoid it, set the scene for what Politico notes was a fiscal drama set on a series of complicated relationships – internicine Republican warfare and rare Democratic unity – as the House Republican confernce ran roughshod over Boehner.

 

Via Politico,

House Speaker John Boehner just wanted to sneak out of the White House for a smoke.

 

But President Barack Obama pulled him aside for a grilling. Obama wanted to know why they were in the second day of a government shutdown that the speaker had repeatedly and publicly pledged to avoid.

 

“John, what happened?” Obama asked, according to people briefed on the Oct. 2 conversation.

 

“I got overrun, that’s what happened,” Boehner said.

 

It may be the most concise explanation of a chaotic, 16-day standoff that prompted the first government shutdown in nearly two decades and ended only hours before the world’s largest economy nearly exhausted its ability to pay the bills. The fiscal drama turned on a series of complicated relationships, internecine Republican warfare and rare Democratic unity.

 

The House Republican conference ran roughshod over Boehner, a 22-year veteran of Washington who started the fight demanding to strip funds for Obamacare but settled in the end for the reaffirmation of a minor provision already in the law.

 

 

Republicans never believed Obama would hold firm on his refusal to negotiate and Democrats would maintain an unusual level of cohesion — united by a visceral desire to put the tea party in its place and an almost mama grizzly instinct to protect Obamacare.

 

“It was not a smart play,” McConnell said Thursday of the GOP’s Obamacare strategy. “It had no chance of success.”

 

Obama and Reid stuck together, emerging as the political victors. Their hard-ball tactics were designed to “break the fever” brought on by the tea party, but it also helped drive the country to the edge of default.

Republicans cycled through every option possible during the three-week standoff to save face.

Politico’s account of the behind-the-scenes drama was drawn from dozens of interviews with key players in Congress and at the White House. The look back reveals how Republicans waged a fight on Obamacare that their leaders knew they would probably lose but pushed anyways because many in their ranks truly believed that Democrats, like they’ve done so often before, would fold — especially under the threat of an historic default on U.S. debt.

As the Speaker himself summed it up…

“We fought the good fight,” Boehner told WLW radio on Wednesday. “We just didn’t win.”

 

Read more on the anatomy of a shutdown here


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Qi_nRziQ2Dg/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Perhaps no (albeit brief) conversation sums up how the debacle of the last couple of weeks started than the following exchange that took place on October 2nd, according to Politico,

Obama: “John, What Happened”


Boehner: “I Got Overrun, That’s What Happened”

The question, prompted by the shutdown in the face of Boehner’s pledge to avoid it, set the scene for what Politico notes was a fiscal drama set on a series of complicated relationships – internicine Republican warfare and rare Democratic unity – as the House Republican confernce ran roughshod over Boehner.

 

Via Politico,

House Speaker John Boehner just wanted to sneak out of the White House for a smoke.

 

But President Barack Obama pulled him aside for a grilling. Obama wanted to know why they were in the second day of a government shutdown that the speaker had repeatedly and publicly pledged to avoid.

 

“John, what happened?” Obama asked, according to people briefed on the Oct. 2 conversation.

 

“I got overrun, that’s what happened,” Boehner said.

 

It may be the most concise explanation of a chaotic, 16-day standoff that prompted the first government shutdown in nearly two decades and ended only hours before the world’s largest economy nearly exhausted its ability to pay the bills. The fiscal drama turned on a series of complicated relationships, internecine Republican warfare and rare Democratic unity.

 

The House Republican conference ran roughshod over Boehner, a 22-year veteran of Washington who started the fight demanding to strip funds for Obamacare but settled in the end for the reaffirmation of a minor provision already in the law.

 

 

Republicans never believed Obama would hold firm on his refusal to negotiate and Democrats would maintain an unusual level of cohesion — united by a visceral desire to put the tea party in its place and an almost mama grizzly instinct to protect Obamacare.

 

“It was not a smart play,” McConnell said Thursday of the GOP’s Obamacare strategy. “It had no chance of success.”

 

Obama and Reid stuck together, emerging as the political victors. Their hard-ball tactics were designed to “break the fever” brought on by the tea party, but it also helped drive the country to the edge of default.

Republicans cycled through every option possible during the three-week standoff to save face.

Politico’s account of the behind-the-scenes drama was drawn from dozens of interviews with key players in Congress and at the White House. The look back reveals how Republicans waged a fight on Obamacare that their leaders knew they would probably lose but pushed anyways because many in their ranks truly believed that Democrats, like they’ve done so often before, would fold — especially under the threat of an historic default on U.S. debt.

As the Speaker himself summed it up…

“We fought the good fight,” Boehner told WLW radio on Wednesday. “We just didn’t win.”

 

Read more on the anatomy of a shutdown here


    



Obama: “John, What Happened”, Boehner: “I Got Overrun, That’s What Happened”

Perhaps no (albeit brief) conversation sums up how the debacle of the last couple of weeks started than the following exchange that took place on October 2nd, according to Politico,

Obama: “John, What Happened”


Boehner: “I Got Overrun, That’s What Happened”

The question, prompted by the shutdown in the face of Boehner’s pledge to avoid it, set the scene for what Politico notes was a fiscal drama set on a series of complicated relationships – internicine Republican warfare and rare Democratic unity – as the House Republican confernce ran roughshod over Boehner.

 

Via Politico,

House Speaker John Boehner just wanted to sneak out of the White House for a smoke.

 

But President Barack Obama pulled him aside for a grilling. Obama wanted to know why they were in the second day of a government shutdown that the speaker had repeatedly and publicly pledged to avoid.

 

“John, what happened?” Obama asked, according to people briefed on the Oct. 2 conversation.

 

“I got overrun, that’s what happened,” Boehner said.

 

It may be the most concise explanation of a chaotic, 16-day standoff that prompted the first government shutdown in nearly two decades and ended only hours before the world’s largest economy nearly exhausted its ability to pay the bills. The fiscal drama turned on a series of complicated relationships, internecine Republican warfare and rare Democratic unity.

 

The House Republican conference ran roughshod over Boehner, a 22-year veteran of Washington who started the fight demanding to strip funds for Obamacare but settled in the end for the reaffirmation of a minor provision already in the law.

 

 

Republicans never believed Obama would hold firm on his refusal to negotiate and Democrats would maintain an unusual level of cohesion — united by a visceral desire to put the tea party in its place and an almost mama grizzly instinct to protect Obamacare.

 

“It was not a smart play,” McConnell said Thursday of the GOP’s Obamacare strategy. “It had no chance of success.”

 

Obama and Reid stuck together, emerging as the political victors. Their hard-ball tactics were designed to “break the fever” brought on by the tea party, but it also helped drive the country to the edge of default.

Republicans cycled through every option possible during the three-week standoff to save face.

Politico’s account of the behind-the-scenes drama was drawn from dozens of interviews with key players in Congress and at the White House. The look back reveals how Republicans waged a fight on Obamacare that their leaders knew they would probably lose but pushed anyways because many in their ranks truly believed that Democrats, like they’ve done so often before, would fold — especially under the threat of an historic default on U.S. debt.

As the Speaker himself summed it up…

“We fought the good fight,” Boehner told WLW radio on Wednesday. “We just didn’t win.”

 

Read more on the anatomy of a shutdown here


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/Qi_nRziQ2Dg/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Perhaps no (albeit brief) conversation sums up how the debacle of the last couple of weeks started than the following exchange that took place on October 2nd, according to Politico,

Obama: “John, What Happened”


Boehner: “I Got Overrun, That’s What Happened”

The question, prompted by the shutdown in the face of Boehner’s pledge to avoid it, set the scene for what Politico notes was a fiscal drama set on a series of complicated relationships – internicine Republican warfare and rare Democratic unity – as the House Republican confernce ran roughshod over Boehner.

 

Via Politico,

House Speaker John Boehner just wanted to sneak out of the White House for a smoke.

 

But President Barack Obama pulled him aside for a grilling. Obama wanted to know why they were in the second day of a government shutdown that the speaker had repeatedly and publicly pledged to avoid.

 

“John, what happened?” Obama asked, according to people briefed on the Oct. 2 conversation.

 

“I got overrun, that’s what happened,” Boehner said.

 

It may be the most concise explanation of a chaotic, 16-day standoff that prompted the first government shutdown in nearly two decades and ended only hours before the world’s largest economy nearly exhausted its ability to pay the bills. The fiscal drama turned on a series of complicated relationships, internecine Republican warfare and rare Democratic unity.

 

The House Republican conference ran roughshod over Boehner, a 22-year veteran of Washington who started the fight demanding to strip funds for Obamacare but settled in the end for the reaffirmation of a minor provision already in the law.

 

 

Republicans never believed Obama would hold firm on his refusal to negotiate and Democrats would maintain an unusual level of cohesion — united by a visceral desire to put the tea party in its place and an almost mama grizzly instinct to protect Obamacare.

 

“It was not a smart play,” McConnell said Thursday of the GOP’s Obamacare strategy. “It had no chance of success.”

 

Obama and Reid stuck together, emerging as the political victors. Their hard-ball tactics were designed to “break the fever” brought on by the tea party, but it also helped drive the country to the edge of default.

Republicans cycled through every option possible during the three-week standoff to save face.

Politico’s account of the behind-the-scenes drama was drawn from dozens of interviews with key players in Congress and at the White House. The look back reveals how Republicans waged a fight on Obamacare that their leaders knew they would probably lose but pushed anyways because many in their ranks truly believed that Democrats, like they’ve done so often before, would fold — especially under the threat of an historic default on U.S. debt.

As the Speaker himself summed it up…

“We fought the good fight,” Boehner told WLW radio on Wednesday. “We just didn’t win.”

 

Read more on the anatomy of a shutdown here