An “Austrian” Bill Gross Warns: “The Days Of Getting Rich Quickly Are Over… Getting Rich Slowly May Be As Well”

If readers ignore the rest from the latest monthly insight from Bill Gross of PIMCO, they should at least read the following insight which we agree with wholeheartedly: “our PIMCO word of the month is to be “careful.” Bull markets are either caused by or accompanied by credit expansion. With credit growth slowing due in part to lower government deficits, and QE now tapering which will slow velocity, the U.S. and other similarly credit-based economies may find that future growth is not as robust as the IMF and other model-driven forecasters might assume. Perhaps the whisper word of “deflation” at Davos these past few weeks was a reflection of that…. don’t be a pig in today’s or any day’s future asset markets. The days of getting rich quickly are over, and the days of getting rich slowly may be as well. Most medieval, perhaps.” Where have we read this recently? Why in An “Austrian View” Approach To Equity Prices in particular and the bulk of Austrian economics in general. Which means that following the TBAC, i.e. the committee that really runs the US, none other than the manager of the world’s largest bond fund has now moved over to the Austrian side. Welcome.

From PIMCO

Most ‘Medieval’

In days of old
when knights were bold
and ladies most beholden
straw seemed like silk
and water, milk
and silver almost golden

Not so sure about that limerick – it was probably a cruel world – those days of old. Yet much of it was fascinating and in some cases surreal. The relationship of “man” and God, for instance. Or better yet … “man,” animals and God. Unlike today, when most believe that animals were put on this Earth for humanity’s pleasure or utility, most people in the Middle Ages believed that God granted free will to Adam, Eve and all of His creatures. Animals were responsible in some strange way for their own actions and therefore should be held accountable for them.

Accountable? Well yes, animals were actually put on trial for their misdeeds. They might actually be considered “evil.” Beetles that munched on church pews, pigs that dined off of late evening drunkards, locusts that ravaged harvest wheat – all were viewed in a similar fashion much like their human counterparts – thieves, adulterers and murderers alike. Sometimes the animal would be brought before an actual court, sometimes (as with insects) tried in absentia. In the case of ravaging pigs, for instance, there might be a full judicial hearing with a prosecutor, defense and a robed judge who could order a range of punishments, including probation or even excommunication. No bad little piggies went to heaven, it seems. Often, there would be an actual execution with a hog being hanged by the neck until it was dead. The pork chops followed shortly thereafter, I assume. There was no Humane Society in 1500. Somehow I thought those “medieval” times needed a more reality-based ditty than the one cited above, so here’s a modern-day “Chaucer’s” attempt:

In days of old when pigs were bold
and people very prayerful
a locust might be canonized
and drunkards had to be careful.

Now on to the world of investing, me Lords and Ladies, which by the way is full of little piggies feeding at the trough, scaredy “cats” afraid of their own shadow, and ostriches sticking their heads in the sand. And too, history will record that capitalism and its markets are a dog-eat-dog world. If so, we’ve currently got a menagerie to rival anything in those “days of old.” But let’s stick with the piggies for the following Investment Outlook. Hopefully the prose will be better than the previous poetry.

I find it fascinating the number of ways that investors approach the “value” of securities and other investments such as commercial real estate or homes. Many of them are legitimate and form a solid foundation in academic research or even common sense. “Natural” interest rates, P/E ratios, cap rates, risk and liquidity premiums, and even real estate’s “location, location, location” are ways to fundamentally price an asset. Add to that the emotional influence of human nature and you have a pretty good idea as to why prices go up and down; not necessarily a pretty good idea as to when they will go up and down, but at least the why part is partially visible.

But lost in this rather complex maze of why is the function of credit and credit expansion in a modern, financial-based economy that it dominates. Asset prices are dependent on credit expansion or in some cases credit contraction, and as credit goes, so go the markets, one might legitimately say, and I do most emphatically say that! What exactly do I mean by “credit?” Well, money in all its multiple forms. Cash is a form of credit in my definition because you can use it to buy things. Bonds are credit. Stocks are credit. Houses and real estate can be considered credit when they are securitized and sold to investors in mortgage pools. In our modern financial economy, credit is anything that can be transferred on a wire or a computer from one account to another and ultimately be used as the basis for spending money on things such as groceries or airplane tickets.

And so when an investor tries to think about “prices” for these various forms of credit, it is necessary to get behind the winds of credit itself, to see what causes credit to behave like a mild South Seas breeze or a destructive typhoon in the China Sea. Credit creation or credit destruction is really the fundamental force that changes P/Es, risk premiums, natural interest rates, etc. For most investors that may be hard to understand, but that is where the little piggies come in.

Imagine you are on that South Sea island with only two people. Each of you owns half of the island, grows your own food and has four little piggies for bacon and chops and all of the good stuff that people like to eat. Things are copasetic; the local “economy” is doing fine, but one day your other buddy figures out a way to make a new crop that you don’t have. She’s the island’s entrepreneur, so to speak. Well, being jealous and perhaps a tad greedy, your previous buddy refuses to share the secret. But she will offer you a future share of her harvest for one of your little pigs – there being no money, credit or anything of the sort on the island. You love that bacon, but the lady is living higher on the hog, so to speak, with that new “crop,” so you agree on a deal – one pig for one year’s harvest of her future “crop.” Despite the lack of a “stock market,” “crops” are now trading at a P/E of 1 X pigs. One pig equals one future year’s worth of your ex-buddy’s bountiful harvest. Well the months roll by and one thing leads to another, and for some reason you want some more of your neighbor’s “crop.” Maybe it’s marijuana and the island has just legalized it for medicinal purposes. Let’s just say. And let’s say you’re willing to part with another pig for another share of medicinal “weed.” Neighbor, sensing enthusiasm, says, “No, it’ll cost you three pigs,” which is all you have, but you’re feeling high and certainly very hungry so you say OK. This funny smelling “grass” now sells at 3 X pigs, or a pigs-to-“grass” P/E ratio of 3/1 and everybody’s happy. Until … well … to get back to the real world, those piggies have really been credit or cash substitutes all along, and now in order to keep this system going you need more pigs or more credit in order to continue. But you’re out of pigs. A funny thing now happens in this capitalistic South Sea island and mainly to the price of marijuana. It traded last year at 3 pigs to 1, but since you’re out of pigs and credit, the price collapses. Grass goes to zero because there is no more credit; you have no more pigs to pay for it.

So for those of you who don’t live in Washington State or Colorado or others who are a little miffed at this example, let’s just put it this way. P/Es of 3 or P/Es of 15 or P/Es of 0 are intimately connected to the amount of available credit. So are interest rates. If there was only one dollar to lend and someone was desperate to have it, the interest rate would be usurious. If there was one trillion dollars of credit and no one was eager to borrow for some reason or another, then the rate would be .01% like it is today and for the past five years in my personal money market account. The amount of credit and its growth rate are critical to asset prices, and of course asset prices in our modern economy are critical to growth and job creation and future prospects for investment. We have a fiat/credit/debt-based economy that depends on the continuous creation of more and more credit in order to thrive and some would say – even survive. We need those pigs and more of them. And they need to circulate and be traded – what some would call “velocity” – in order to keep the economy growing. Our South Sea island economy never did change until the new crop was discovered, but concurrently, not until the pigs started to be traded for it.

And so? Well, to use the U.S. as an example, we officially have 57 trillion dollars’ worth of credit (stocks not being part of the Fed’s official definition) and probably 20 trillion more in what has come to be known as the “shadow” system. But call it 57 trillion because the Fed and Chart 1 do.

 

It used to grow pre-Lehman at 8–10% a year, but now it only grows at 3–4%. Part of that growth is due to the government itself with recent deficit spending. A deficit of one trillion dollars in 2009–2010 equaled a 2% growth rate of credit by itself. But despite that, other borrowers such as households/businesses/local and foreign governments/financial institutions have been less than eager to pick up the slack. With the deficit now down to $600 billion or so, the Treasury is fading as a source of credit growth. Many consider that as a good thing but short term, the ability of the economy to expand and P/Es to grow is actually negatively impacted, unless the private sector steps up to the plate to borrow/invest/buy new houses, etc. Credit over the past 12 months has grown at a snail’s 3.5% pace, barely enough to sustain nominal GDP growth of the same amount.

Is there a one-for-one relationship between credit growth and GDP? Certainly not. That is where velocity complicates the picture and velocity is influenced by interest rates and the price of credit. But with QE beginning its taper, and interest/mortgage rates 150 basis points higher than they were in July of 2012, velocity may now negatively impact the equation. MV=PT or money X velocity = GDP is how economists explain it in old model textbooks. Actually the new model should read CV=PT or credit X velocity = GDP but most economists are classically trained to the Friedman model, which viewed money in a much narrower sense.

So our PIMCO word of the month is to be “careful.” Bull markets are either caused by or accompanied by credit expansion. With credit growth slowing due in part to lower government deficits, and QE now tapering which will slow velocity, the U.S. and other similarly credit-based economies may find that future growth is not as robust as the IMF and other model-driven forecasters might assume. Perhaps the whisper word of “deflation” at Davos these past few weeks was a reflection of that. If so, high quality bonds will continue to be well bid and risk assets may lose some luster. In any case, don’t be a pig in today’s or any day’s future asset markets. The days of getting rich quickly are over, and the days of getting rich slowly may be as well. Most medieval, perhaps.

And too, stick with PIMCO. Believe me when I say, we are a better team at this moment than we were before. I/we take the future challenge faced by all asset managers with close to a sacred trust. Not the one that the ancients granted to animals, but a more modern one embraced by the relationship of client/fiduciary and the need to be held accountable, sort of like the pigs and locusts in days of old when knights were bold.

Most ‘Medieval’ Speed Read

1) Asset prices depend on credit creation and expansion.

2) The U.S. and other countries create less credit from the public standpoint as their deficits decline.

3) 3–4% credit expansion in the U.S. may not be enough to maintain
3% growth, especially if asset prices go down and velocity is affected.

4) Don’t be a pig in a highly levered global marketplace.

There is risk out there.


    



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The Countdown To The Nationalization Of Retirement Savings Has Begun

Submitted by Nick Giambruno via Casey Research's International Man,

Simply put, the new myRA program put forward by Obama is at best a sucker's deal… or worse, it's a first step toward the nationalization of private retirement savings. (Note: If you haven't yet heard of myRA, I'd strongly suggest you read this excellent overview by my colleague Dan Steinhart.)

Even before the new myRA program was announced, there had been whispers about the need for the US government to assume some risk for US retirement accounts. That's code for forced conversion of private retirement assets into government bonds.

With foreigners not buying as many Treasuries and the Fed tapering, the US government has been searching for new buyers of its unwanted debt. And this is where the new myRA program comes in.

In short, it's ostensibly a new way for people to save for retirement. Of course, you can only invest in government-approved investments—like Treasuries—which probably won't even come close to keeping up with the real rate of inflation. It's like Jim Grant says: "return-free risk."

In reality, a myRA doesn't really provide any significant new benefits over existing options. To me it just looks like a way for the US government to pass the hot potato on to unsuspecting Americans in exchange for their retirement savings.

The net effect is the funneling of more capital to Treasury securities and thus helping the US government finance itself.

You'd be much better off using a precious metals IRA to save for retirement than participating in the government's latest Ponzi scheme.

There are other protective strategies as well, such as internationalizing your retirement savings into assets that are hard, if not impossible, to confiscate on a whim—like foreign real estate and physical gold held abroad. More on that below.

Retirement Savings Are Always Juicy Targets

As bad as it is to deceive naïve Americans into trading their hard-earned retirement savings for garbage (i.e., Treasury securities), the myRA program potentially represents something far worse… the first step toward the nationalization of existing private retirement accounts.

I believe myRA is a way to nudge the American people into gradually becoming more accustomed to government involvement in their private retirement savings.

It's incorrect to assume nationalization couldn't happen in the US or your home country. History shows us that it's standard operating procedure for a government in dire financial straits.

In just the past six years, it's happened in some form in Argentina, Poland, Portugal, Hungary, and numerous other countries.

To me it's self-evident that most Western governments (including the US) have current debt loads and future spending commitments that all but guarantee that eventually—and likely someday soon—they will try to unscrupulously grab as much wealth as they can.

And retirement savings are a juicy target—low-hanging fruit for a desperate government.

Naturally, politicians will try to slickly sell the idea to the public as something "for their own good" or as "protection from market instability." This is how similar programs were sold to skeptical publics in the past.

In reality, governments take these actions not to "reduce the risk" to your retirement savings or whatever propaganda they happen to come up with, but rather to obtain financing—by forcefully dumping their unwanted debt onto seniors and savers.

Below are several ways it has happened or could happen. Of course, there could always be some sort of new, creative proposal that was previously unthinkable. No matter the method, however, the end result is always the same—the siphoning off of purchasing power from your retirement savings.

New Contribution Mandate: The government could mandate, for example, that 50% of new contributions to private retirement accounts must consist of "safe," government-approved investments, like Treasury securities.

Forced Conversions: This is where a government will forcibly convert existing assets held in retirement accounts into so-called "safer" assets, such as government bonds. For example, if the US government forcibly converted 20% of the estimated $20 trillion in retirement assets (401k plans, IRAs, defined benefit and contribution plans, etc.), it would net them $4 trillion. Not a bad score, considering the national debt is north of $17 trillion.

Special Taxes: The government could look into levying special taxes on distributions from retirement, especially those deemed to be "excessively large."

In order to be more effective, forced conversations probably wouldn't happen until after official capital controls have been instituted. Once in place, capital controls would make it very difficult, if not impossible, for you to avoid the wealth confiscation that is sure to follow… like a sheep that has just been penned in for a shearing.

Since FATCA and other regulatory burdens already amount to a soft form of capital controls, it's absolutely essential that you start implementing protective measures now.

It's like I have always said: internationalization is your ultimate insurance against the measures of a desperate government. In the case that the government makes a grab for retirement savings, it's much better to be a year or two early rather than a minute too late.

Internationalize Your Retirement Savings

It's much more difficult for the government to convert your retirement assets if they're outside of its immediate reach. If you have a standard IRA from a large US financial institution, it would only take a decree from the US government and Poof!: your dividend-paying stocks and corporate bonds could instantly be transformed into government bonds.

Obviously, this is much harder for the government to do if your retirement assets are sufficiently internationalized.

For example, you can structure your IRA to invest in foreign real estate, open an offshore bank or brokerage account, own certain types of physical gold stored abroad, and invest in other foreign and nontraditional assets.

In my view, owning an apartment in Switzerland and some physical gold coins stored in a safe deposit box in Singapore beats the cookie-cutter mutual funds shoved down your throat by traditional IRA custodians any day.

If and when there's some sort of decree to convert or otherwise confiscate the assets in your retirement account, your internationalized assets ensure that your savings won't vanish at the stroke of a pen.

There are important details and a couple of restrictions that you'll need to be aware of, but they amount to minor issues, especially when weighed against the risk of leaving your retirement savings within the immediate reach of a government desperate for cash.

After placing a juicy steak in front of a salivating German shepherd, it's only a matter of time before he makes a grab for it. The US government with its $17 trillion debt load is the salivating German shepherd, and the $20 trillion in retirement savings is the juicy steak.

Internationalizing your IRA has always been a prudent and pragmatic thing to do. And now that the US government has now officially set its sights on retirement savings, it's truly urgent.

You'll find all the details on how it to get set up, along with trusted professionals who specialize in internationalizing IRAs in our Going Global publication.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1c4eC54 Tyler Durden

CBO Says Obamacare’s Bailouts Might Make the Government Money. Here’s Why CBO Might Be Wrong

Several weeks ago,
Sen. Marco Rubio
(R-Fl.) and
Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer
took aim
at a little known provision within Obamacare known as risk
corridors, dubbing the mechanism a bailout of insurers and calling
for repeal.

The risk corridors are a temporary program designed to share the
financial risk of health plans offered through Obamacare’s
exchanges between insurers and the federal government. In theory,
the sharing is symmetrical: If insurer expenses within those plans
are lower than expected, then insurers pay the federal government a
percentage of the difference between their expected target and
actual spending. If insurer costs turn out to be higher than
expected, because members are sicker and use more expensive medical
care than predicted, the federal government picks up a chunk of the
tab.

The bigger the difference between insurer costs and
expectations, the more that the federal government pays out. When
the law was written, the goal of the provision was to entice
insurers to offer plans in the exchanges by limiting their risk
exposure.

This illustration from the American Academy of Actuaries shows
how it works:

The provision was generally expected to have no budgetary
effect. Some insurers would end up with higher than expected costs.
Some would end up lower than estimated. The payments would balance
each other out.

But while budget neutrality was expected, it wasn’t mandatory.
If insurers paid in more than they received, it was possible that
the government could actually come out ahead. But if all
participating insurers ended up with higher than expected costs
(say because the plan members skewed older and sicker than
projected), then the result would be that taxpayers would simply be
covering a chunk of insurer losses—hence, a bailout.

That possibility began to look more likely as the administration
reported fewer young people signing up than hoped and as insurers
indicated that exchange plans were more adverse than
expected
and could
result in losses
.     

Republicans ran with the idea of ending the program,
talking up the possibility of attaching it to a debt limit
hike
. Health insurers got nervous,
issuing talking points
suggesting that repealing the provision
might result in insurer insolvency.

That’s the backstory. But yesterday, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) added another plot point. The nonpartisan budget
analysts estimated that the federal government would end up paying
out about $8 billion through the program. But insurers would pay
about $16 billion into the government for a net public revenue gain
of $8 billion—hardly a bailout, if accurate.

So why does the CBO now believe that the risk corridor program
will essentially make money for the government? Because
that’s what happened with Medicare Part D
, the federal
prescription drug program for seniors, which also relied on a risk
corridor program to entice insurers to offer plans. The
structure was slightly different
, but in broad strokes it
worked the same way, with insurers paying the government when costs
came in lower than expected, and being paid when costs came in
higher.

What CBO is saying, then, is that if Medicare Part D’s
experience with risk corridors is any indication, the government
will ultimately be paid more from the program than it pays out.

So the question we need to ask is whether Medicare Part D
provides a useful guide to what we can expect from Obamacare. And I
think there are a few reasons to be skeptical about the notion that
it does.

When the Part D prescription drug benefit began in 2006,
insurers had a pretty good idea of who was going to participate.
The population of seniors who might be interested in the program’s
drug coverage was pretty well defined, and there wasn’t much reason
to be concerned about high-cost individuals ditching their old
plans for new ones sold through Part D. In fact, as John Goodman of
the National Center for Policy Analysis pointed out in
congressional testimony today
, Part D actually offered
subsidies to employers for maintaining existing drug insurance
programs in order to keep that from happening.

Meanwhile, formerly sky-high prescription drug spending was in
the midst of a significant
slowdown
that started just before Medicare Part D went into
effect. Fewer blockbuster drugs came onto the market. The use of
generics
became more common
. Seniors turned out to be quite
value-focused when choosing drug plans.

The result was that insurers operating in Part D had relatively
predictable sign-ups, and lower than expected costs. Consequently,
they paid far more money back to the government through the risk
corridors program than they were paid.

Is that what we should expect from insurers selling plans
through Obamacare? With Huamana saying in an SEC filing
that the demographic mix in its exchange plans is “more adverse”
than expected, Cigna’s CEO warning
that his company might take a loss on the exchange plans, and
Aetna’s CEO bringing up
the possibility
that the company might eventually pull out of
the exchanges? The gloomy financial outlook for exchange plans is
an industry-wide phenomenon. When Moody’s
cut its outlook for health insurers from stable to negative to
negative last month
, it cited “uncertainty over the
demographics of those enrolling in individual products through the
exchanges” as a “key factor.”

We won’t know how this will work out until it does. But right
now, there are a lot of bad signals. It seems at least plausible
that the future of Obamacare’s exchanges could look less like
Medicare Part D and
more like the health law’s high risk pools
, which ended up with
a smaller, sicker, and more costly (on a per-beneficiary basis)
pool of enrollees than initially projected.

CBO’s score of the risk corridors relied heavily on Medicare
Part D’s history because the federal government doesn’t have a
whole lot of experience with risk corridors in the health insurance
market. That’s understandable, especially given the budget office’s
cautious nature. But it may not actually tell us all that much
about the practical reality of the provision and its probable
costs. As yesterday’s report noted, “the government has only
limited experience with this type of program, and there are many
uncertainties about how the market for health insurance will
function under the ACA and how various outcomes would affect the
government’s costs or savings for the risk corridor program.” An
experience similar to Medicare Part D’s is one possible outcome.
But I’m not sure it’s the most likely one. 

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Highlighting the LLC IRA – Own Gold, Silver or Bitcoins for Your Retirement

I have brought the guys at Perpetual Assets to your attention once before, following my meeting them at the Liberty Masterminds conference in Dallas (check out my speech here)( this past summer. While these guys sell bullion, they do a lot more than just that. In fact, what separates them from others relates to the innovative products they bring to the table for precious metals holders and others who merely want to take control of their individual financial destiny.

One of these which I have highlighted in the past is the company’s LLC IRA product, which allows you to truly be your own asset manager for your retirement. You know, kind of the way it should be. With this product you can hold almost anything you can imagine in your retirement account. From gold and silver, to Bitcoin. In fact, they will even accept payment in Bitcoin to get the whole thing set up.

Ever since Barry O came out with his latest used car salesman gimmick, the MyRA, the guys at Perpetual Assets have told me interest and sign ups for their LLC IRA product have exploded.

Click on the banner below for more information and definitely feel free to get in touch with them. They’ll be happy to walk your through the whole process.

In Liberty,
Michael Krieger

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Highlighting the LLC IRA – Own Gold, Silver or Bitcoins for Your Retirement originally appeared on A Lightning War for Liberty on February 5, 2014.

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WTF Chart Of The Day: Spanish "Recovery" Edition

The following chart of Spain’s housing market really speaks for itself, and certainly conflicts with Rajoy’s promises that not only is the recession in the country over but it is recovering.

 

And for those unconvinced, here are some additional thoughts from SocGen:

Since the housing bubble burst in late 2007, housing prices in Spain have fallen by almost 40%. Six years later, the debate is about whether the bottom has been reached. Our view is that there is still room for a correction in 2014, despite the encouraging macro economic conditions. Pressure on prices will continue due to the current level of household income, household debt servicing and the oversupply of housing stock. We foresee equilibrium reached at an additional 10% to 15% drop in housing prices. Despite the ease in financial markets, we do not expect household access to funding to improve massively. We therefore expect construction to be a drag on growth in 2014 as the sector is far from recovering.

Demand for dwellings in Spain is frozen

The supply/demand gap in the housing market has been widening for the last five years. Considering the current level of real wages and the high level of unemployment, household income is not expected to see any significant growth. Combined with current house prices, the aforementioned conditions should translate into low demand in the housing market. In addition, hikes in home purchase taxes began in 2013 and will not end until 2015 at best. The Spanish housing rental market suffers from a lack of experience and represents less than 8% of total stock, despite the government’s efforts to boost it, so there is no real potential for absorbing excess stock in housing.

Quest for a fair price: prices likely to drop further

A normalisation process still has to take place in the housing market before prices stabilise. Demand is mild at the moment; however, bids are lower than asking prices.A report prepared by one of the major real estate portals in Spain (idealista.com) notes that of a sample of 0.5m bids since 2010, the prices offered were 24% lower than the bids (as of August 2013). As anecdotal as this might sound, the key message behind the statistic is that Spanish households are indeed waiting for a correction in prices.

Household solvency has been negatively impacted by the worsening labour market in recent years. We also note deterioration in household housing wealth due to falling house prices.

Looking at the price to income ratio in chart 5, we see that Spanish prices must fall 12.6% to return to their long-term average, which coupled with the oversupply in stock, points to further corrections. The price to rent ratio is also a harbinger of the same overvaluation vs the longterm average of 20%. We believe that the same  scenario has been happening in Ireland, which compared to Spain, has a more severe ongoing price correction.

Average household income no longer reflects a household’s ability to acquire a house at current prices. Our baseline scenario for Spain assumes little to no growth in real wages this year, further undermining the ability of households to access funding.

Demand is not expected to increase massively for the current year, as real wages are not expected to grow – despite the positive economic outlook. The debt burden on households is around 15% due to income contraction, which is high compared to other countries that have lived through a housing crisis.

All in all, should the economic recovery in Spain follow its current trend, our estimates indicate that housing prices should fall by another 10% to 15% before they stabilise. The IMF’s latest report on Spain indicated 15% overvaluation, in line with our estimate. Evidently, if the market were to endure any further shock, this time frame for correction would expand. Recovery in the housing sector in Spain hinges on an improvement in employment and access to credit, both of which are prey to uncertainty.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1jg2Axt Tyler Durden

WTF Chart Of The Day: Spanish “Recovery” Edition

The following chart of Spain’s housing market really speaks for itself, and certainly conflicts with Rajoy’s promises that not only is the recession in the country over but it is recovering.

 

And for those unconvinced, here are some additional thoughts from SocGen:

Since the housing bubble burst in late 2007, housing prices in Spain have fallen by almost 40%. Six years later, the debate is about whether the bottom has been reached. Our view is that there is still room for a correction in 2014, despite the encouraging macro economic conditions. Pressure on prices will continue due to the current level of household income, household debt servicing and the oversupply of housing stock. We foresee equilibrium reached at an additional 10% to 15% drop in housing prices. Despite the ease in financial markets, we do not expect household access to funding to improve massively. We therefore expect construction to be a drag on growth in 2014 as the sector is far from recovering.

Demand for dwellings in Spain is frozen

The supply/demand gap in the housing market has been widening for the last five years. Considering the current level of real wages and the high level of unemployment, household income is not expected to see any significant growth. Combined with current house prices, the aforementioned conditions should translate into low demand in the housing market. In addition, hikes in home purchase taxes began in 2013 and will not end until 2015 at best. The Spanish housing rental market suffers from a lack of experience and represents less than 8% of total stock, despite the government’s efforts to boost it, so there is no real potential for absorbing excess stock in housing.

Quest for a fair price: prices likely to drop further

A normalisation process still has to take place in the housing market before prices stabilise. Demand is mild at the moment; however, bids are lower than asking prices.A report prepared by one of the major real estate portals in Spain (idealista.com) notes that of a sample of 0.5m bids since 2010, the prices offered were 24% lower than the bids (as of August 2013). As anecdotal as this might sound, the key message behind the statistic is that Spanish households are indeed waiting for a correction in prices.

Household solvency has been negatively impacted by the worsening labour market in recent years. We also note deterioration in household housing wealth due to falling house prices.

Looking at the price to income ratio in chart 5, we see that Spanish prices must fall 12.6% to return to their long-term average, which coupled with the oversupply in stock, points to further corrections. The price to rent ratio is also a harbinger of the same overvaluation vs the longterm average of 20%. We believe that the same  scenario has been happening in Ireland, which compared to Spain, has a more severe ongoing price correction.

Average household income no longer reflects a household’s ability to acquire a house at current prices. Our baseline scenario for Spain assumes little to no growth in real wages this year, further undermining the ability of households to access funding.

Demand is not expected to increase massively for the current year, as real wages are not expected to grow – despite the positive economic outlook. The debt burden on households is around 15% due to income contraction, which is high compared to other countries that have lived through a housing crisis.

All in all, should the economic recovery in Spain follow its current trend, our estimates indicate that housing prices should fall by another 10% to 15% before they stabilise. The IMF’s latest report on Spain indicated 15% overvaluation, in line with our estimate. Evidently, if the market were to endure any further shock, this time frame for correction would expand. Recovery in the housing sector in Spain hinges on an improvement in employment and access to credit, both of which are prey to uncertainty.


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1jg2Axt Tyler Durden

How The Rest Of The World Sells Its Government Bonds

The Primary-dealer intermediated US Treasury issuance model is well-known to virtually everyone (and if it isn’t, today the TBAC has released a convenient presentation explaining all the nuances for those who may not be familiar with all the aspects of just how the US Treasury auctions off bonds). But how does the rest of the developed world fund its budgeting needs? The following table from the TBAC presentation provides all the answers.

More from TBAC:

  • Most countries with PDs have anywhere from 5 to 25 PDs at any one time. 5 PDs appears to be a minimum number to ensure competition among PDs and to avoid collusion or moral hazard. A large number of PDs can dilute the benefits that accrue to PDs; benefits that are critical in inducing PDs to perform the responsibilities. Countries with large borrowing needs and/or high debt-GDP balances can generally support a larger number of PDs.
  • The PD system in the U.S. appears well-suited to the mix of securities now being auctioned by Treasury. Other G-7 countries use syndications to sell less conventional securities like foreign-denominated bonds and ultra-long instruments. If Treasury decides to issue unconventional securities to further diversify their investor base, then syndications should be considered.
  • Syndicated deals in the EU are typically timed for periods when institutions tend to be cash rich. Since Treasury is a frequent borrower and auction statistics tend to be consistent over time, seasonal syndicated deals do not appear necessary in the current environment.
  • Most EU countries come with 1-3 syndicated deals per year. Since Treasury likes to be a consistent and reliable borrower, periodic and/or opportunistic syndicated deals would not fit Treasury’s stated goals.
  • The UK supplements gilt auction sales with other distribution methods such as syndications (long-dated gilts and index-linked gilts), mini-tenders (to supplement shortfalls in syndications) and their Post Auction Option Facility or PAOF (which allows auction bidders to acquire up to an additional 10% of their auction allocation within a 2 hour period after each auction). Treasury often adjusts T-Bill issuance to changing cash flow needs so such ‘top-up’ schemes are generally not needed.
  • In Japan most JGB’s are sold via competitive price auctions; the last syndicated JGB deal was in the 1990’s. Some JGB auctions are non-competitive and designed for retail investors (minimum of JPY 10,000 and no upper limit) and Japan also has an OTC sales system for 2yr, 5yr and 10yr maturities where the price is set by the MOF and where there is a maximum allotment of JPY100 mln per individual application.

And the full TBAC presentation highlighting the “The U.S. Primary Dealer debt distribution model: benefits and challenges” (pdf)


    



via Zero Hedge http://ift.tt/1kd94Nu Tyler Durden

State tornado drill pushed to Friday at 9 a.m.

Schools, hospitals and businesses encouraged to participate

Officials have moved the statewide tornado drill, originally scheduled for this morning, to Friday at 9 a.m.

The drill was moved due to the potential for inclement weather that would require the attention of the National Weather Service office in Peachtree City, which will sound the alert to start the drill.

Fayette residents may also hear the county’s severe weather warning sirens go off around 9 a.m. as well, which is a planned part of the drill.

read more

via The Citizen http://ift.tt/1atnyWv

John Stossel on Your Food's Reputation vs. Government Regulation

Do you like to cook? Throw dinner
parties? Many people enjoy that, but paying for the food, plus
accessories, is expensive. Would you host more often if you could
get your guests to cover the costs? Or suppose you’d like
to go to a dinner party to meet new people in
your neighborhood. Or maybe when you travel, instead of eating at
restaurants, you’d like to see how the locals live. Good news!
Today both cooks and diners can get what they want. A new Internet
business brings them together. The bad news, as John Stossel
writes, is that bureaucrats and the media worry that the dinner
parties are not regulated.

View this article.

from Hit & Run http://ift.tt/1kTHov1
via IFTTT

John Stossel on Your Food’s Reputation vs. Government Regulation

Do you like to cook? Throw dinner
parties? Many people enjoy that, but paying for the food, plus
accessories, is expensive. Would you host more often if you could
get your guests to cover the costs? Or suppose you’d like
to go to a dinner party to meet new people in
your neighborhood. Or maybe when you travel, instead of eating at
restaurants, you’d like to see how the locals live. Good news!
Today both cooks and diners can get what they want. A new Internet
business brings them together. The bad news, as John Stossel
writes, is that bureaucrats and the media worry that the dinner
parties are not regulated.

View this article.

from Hit & Run http://ift.tt/1kTHov1
via IFTTT