How COVID-19 Changed Alcohol Forever


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Since March 2020, Americans have had to embrace a seemingly endless number of unexpected changes to everyday life thanks to the pandemic. While in-person concerts and sporting events are back for the most part, more Zoom meetings and telehealth appointments seem like sure bets to stick around. Other surprising pandemic trends are also proving durable—namely, to-go and delivery alcohol went from a legal sideshow to one of the largest policy tidal waves in modern times.

New research demonstrates just how many states implemented delivery and to-go alcohol changes during COVID-19. All told, 32 out of 50 states (nearly 65 percent) have applied one or more changes to their to-go and delivery alcohol rules since the pandemic started.

To break it down further, 29 out of 50 states have extended or made permanent the ability of restaurants and bars to either sell to-go cocktails or to deliver those cocktails. Twenty of these states permanently enshrined to-go cocktails, while the rest extended to-go drinks at least through 2023. (This research did not count temporary emergency orders that will expire once the pandemic subsides.)

The COVID-19 alcohol reform wave is not just limited to to-go margaritas, either. During the pandemic, 10 states greenlighted the ability of groceries or liquor stores to deliver alcohol to our doors. That brings the total number of states allowing some form of store-to-consumer alcohol delivery to over 40.

Alcohol producers were also not left out of the reform party. While most states allowed wine to be shipped to consumers even before the pandemic, only a small handful of states permitted beer and distilled spirits to be locally delivered or shipped long distance. But during COVID-19, 13 states expanded the ability of breweries and distilleries to deliver everything from growlers to fifths of bourbon right to our doorsteps.

In an age when pretty much every single consumer product imaginable is part of the online, mail-order economy, alcohol remained largely on the sideline until COVID-19 came along. Even so, there are still limits when it comes to alcohol: It remains very difficult to ship alcohol across state lines, which shows that we are still a long way off from a truly national alcohol market.

There are strong policy justifications for expanding to-go and delivery of alcohol beyond the pandemic. Craft alcohol producers are some of the strongest proponents of expanding delivery options since doing so gives them direct market access to their consumer base—something that businesses in most other industries take for granted. Similarly, most restaurants and bars are independently owned entities that operate on notoriously thin profit margins, meaning that the ability to expand alcohol sales can be a vitally needed economic lifeline.

Consumers are also strongly in favor of more alcohol delivery. According to data from the Distilled Spirits Council, 80 percent of Americans want to be able to order distilled spirits directly from their favorite distillery and have it delivered to their doors. Consumer surveys on making to-go cocktails permanent also show overwhelming support.

To the extent some have expressed concerns over this unprecedented expansion of to-go and delivery alcohol, most of the arguments emphasize the intoxicating character of alcohol. This overlooks the fact that far more dangerous substances—such as pharmaceuticals, ammunition, and pesticides—have been part of the delivery economy for decades with little issue.

Other opponents have pointed to the potential for more underage drinking in a world where alcohol can be delivered or included in a takeout order. Once again, this misses the mark as state governments have made clear that the same robust ID-ing protocols that apply for alcohol sales at a store or restaurant also apply to takeout or delivery alcohol.

In the end, it is clear that to-go and delivery alcohol is here to stay. Over the last 18 months, America has witnessed one of the most immense and fast-moving policy tidal waves in modern history. And so far, there are few signs of it slowing down.

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Beautiful World, Where Are You


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Sally Rooney’s new novel, Beautiful World, Where Are You, is a follow-up to her internationally bestselling Normal People and Conversations With Friends. All three books mix moderately annoying Marxism with moderately depressing sex and produce results much better than you’d expect from those ingredients. This is thanks in part to Rooney’s accomplished prose, which is as translucent as the skin of a Dublin gal who has been good about applying sunscreen.

The semi-auto-fictional protagonists’ muddled yet deeply held views on politics, religion, and relationships sat better on the 20-somethings of Rooney’s previous works than they do on the 30-somethings of Beautiful World. And Rooney’s own politics have caused some real-life drama around a Hebrew translation of the novel. But as politics becomes an increasingly totalizing and consuming force, the book itself generously opens up space for the idea that there’s more to being human than mere ideology.

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Beautiful World, Where Are You


minisBeautifulWorld,WhereAreYou_Farrar,-Straus-and-Giroux

Sally Rooney’s new novel, Beautiful World, Where Are You, is a follow-up to her internationally bestselling Normal People and Conversations With Friends. All three books mix moderately annoying Marxism with moderately depressing sex and produce results much better than you’d expect from those ingredients. This is thanks in part to Rooney’s accomplished prose, which is as translucent as the skin of a Dublin gal who has been good about applying sunscreen.

The semi-auto-fictional protagonists’ muddled yet deeply held views on politics, religion, and relationships sat better on the 20-somethings of Rooney’s previous works than they do on the 30-somethings of Beautiful World. And Rooney’s own politics have caused some real-life drama around a Hebrew translation of the novel. But as politics becomes an increasingly totalizing and consuming force, the book itself generously opens up space for the idea that there’s more to being human than mere ideology.

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Brickbat: That’s Not Equality


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The Natural Science and Engineering Council of Canada rejected a grant request from Patanjali Kambhampati, professor chemistry at Montreal’s McGill University. The council told  Kambhampati “the Equity, Diversity and Inclusion considerations in the application were deemed insufficient.” He had another request for government funding turned down for similar reasons last year.  He wrote on the application, “We will hire the most qualified people based upon their skills and mutual interests.”  Both grants were rejected before they even had a chance to go to actual scientists to judge the scientific merits of the proposed research.

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Brickbat: That’s Not Equality


rejected_1161x653

The Natural Science and Engineering Council of Canada rejected a grant request from Patanjali Kambhampati, professor chemistry at Montreal’s McGill University. The council told  Kambhampati “the Equity, Diversity and Inclusion considerations in the application were deemed insufficient.” He had another request for government funding turned down for similar reasons last year.  He wrote on the application, “We will hire the most qualified people based upon their skills and mutual interests.”  Both grants were rejected before they even had a chance to go to actual scientists to judge the scientific merits of the proposed research.

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Yes, The Supreme Court Has Reversed A Precedent Based Entirely On Its Wrongness

During oral arguments in Dobbs, the Solicitor General had to hold a difficult line: the Supreme Court should not overrule a case simply because it was wrong. Justice Alito highlighted this position with a devastating line of questions.

JUSTICE ALITO: Is it your argument that a case can never be overruled simply because it was egregiously wrong?

GENERAL PRELOGAR: I think that at the very least, the state would have to come forward with some kind of materially changed circumstance or some kind of materially new argument, and Mississippi hasn’t done so in this case.

At this point, Justice Alito raised the obvious rejoinder:

JUSTICE ALITO: Really? So suppose Plessy versus Ferguson was re-argued in 1897, so nothing had changed. Would it not be sufficient to say that was an egregiously wrong decision on the day it was handed down and now it should be overruled?

The answer should be, of course it would be sufficient. But the SG could not take that position. Doing so would undermine the federal government’s insistence that wrongness is not sufficient to overrule a precedent.

GENERAL PRELOGAR: It certainly was egregiously wrong on the day that it was handed down, Plessy, but what the Court said in analyzing Plessy to Brown and Casey was that what had become clear is that the factual premise that underlay the decision, this idea that segregation didn’t create a badge of inferiority, had been entirely mistaken.

In other words, the grounds for overruling Plessy only became clear in the five decades after the case. Huh? Plessy concluded that segregation didn’t create badges of inferiority. But Jim Crow demonstrated that segregation did in fact create badges of inferiority. It took five decades, apparently, to demonstrate that separate was not equal. Much to my surprise, Justice Breyer also articulated this exact same perspective.

JUSTICE BREYER … Plessy was wrong when decided, but, just a minute, also remember Plessy said that separate but equal was a badge of inferiority. No, they said, it isn’t. Well, all you have to do is open your eyes and look at the south, my friend, and you will see whether it was or it wasn’t in 1954.

This position isn’t completely irrational. Brown was premised on social science research that was published in the twentieth century.

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority.  Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

In that regard, the Warren Court couldn’t reach its decision until the Doll Test was performed. Remember, Brown rejected any reliance on original meaning. Only through modern-day understandings of education could the Court make its ruling. And to be clear, Brown didn’t actually overrule Plessy. The Court simply concluded that “in the field of public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”

Prelogar and Breyer did not make this argument. Instead, the Solicitor General had to tap-dance around Alito’s questioning.

JUSTICE ALITO: So is it really . . . your answer that we needed all the experience from 1896 to 1954 to realize that Plessy was wrongly decided? Would you answer my question? Had it come before the Court in 1897, should it have been overruled or not?

GENERAL PRELOGAR: I think it should have been overruled, but I think that the factual premise was wrong in the moment it was decided, and the Court realized that and clarified that when it overruled in Brown.

I’ve read this sentence several times. I still don’t understand it. Neither did Justice Alito.

JUSTICE ALITO: But your answer is –I don’t –I still don’t understand –I still don’t have your answer clearly. Can a decision be overruled simply because it was erroneously wrong, even if nothing has changed between the time of that decision and the time when the Court is called upon to consider whether it should be overruled? Yes or no? Can you give me a yes or no answer on that?

Here, Justice Alito laid another trap. SG Prelogar should have hedged. But she didn’t. She gave an absolute, unequivocal answer.

GENERAL PRELOGAR: This Court, no, has never overruled in that situation just based on a conclusion that the decision was wrong. It has always applied the stare decisis factors and likewise found that they warrant overruling in that instance.

When I write, I try to avoid absolute words like “never” and “always.” Even a single instance can prove these assertions wrong. And indeed, there is one such case in which the Supreme Court overruled a precedent, based entirely on a conclusion the decisions was wrong, without regard to any new facts or new legal arguments.

In Hepburn v. Griswold (1870), the Court held that Congress lacked the power to require people to accept paper currency as legal tender. When Hepburn was argued in November 1869, there were only eight Justices on the bench. After arguments the vote was 5-3. The majority, per Chief Justice Chase, concluded that the Legal Tender Act was unconstitutional. However, in January 1870, Justice Grier resigned due to his poor health before the decision was formally announced. This vacancy made the final vote 4- 3. After Hepburn was decided, President Grant appointed Justices Strong and Bradley. They were known to support paper money as legal tender, which Grant also favored. Following their confirmations there were now five Justices who thought that the Legal Tender Act was constitutional. Sure enough, the Court reversed itself a year later. Knox v. Lee (1871) held that the Legal Tender Act was constitutional. Hepburn was now overturned by a 5- 4 vote.

In Knox, Chief Justice Chase’s dissent spoke to the Court’s approach to stare decisis:

A majority of the court, five to four, in the opinion which has just been read, reverses the judgment rendered by the former majority of five to three, in pursuance of an opinion formed after repeated arguments, at successive terms, and careful consideration; and declares the legal tender clause to be constitutional; that is to say, that an act of Congress making promises to pay dollars legal tender as coined dollars in payment of pre-existing debts is a means appropriate and plainly adapted to the exercise of powers expressly granted by the Constitution, and not prohibited itself by the Constitution but consistent with its letter and spirit. And this reversal, unprecedented in the history of the court, has been produced by no change in the opinions of those who concurred in the former judgment.. . . We adhere to the opinion pronounced in Hepburn v. Griswold. Reflection has only wrought a firmer belief in the soundness of the constitutional doctrines maintained, and in the importance of them to the country.

To paraphrase Justice Stevens in Citizens United, the only relevant thing that changed between Hepburn and Knox was the composition of the Court. Knox v. Lee is precisely the case that Justice Alito asked about: the Supreme Court reversed itself in the span of one year, based entirely on the conclusion that the prior decision was wrong.

Randy and I discuss both of these cases in 100 Cases. I’m surprised they didn’t come up in any of the Solicitor General’s moots.

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Yes, The Supreme Court Has Reversed A Precedent Based Entirely On Its Wrongness

During oral arguments in Dobbs, the Solicitor General had to hold a difficult line: the Supreme Court should not overrule a case simply because it was wrong. Justice Alito highlighted this position with a devastating line of questions.

JUSTICE ALITO: Is it your argument that a case can never be overruled simply because it was egregiously wrong?

GENERAL PRELOGAR: I think that at the very least, the state would have to come forward with some kind of materially changed circumstance or some kind of materially new argument, and Mississippi hasn’t done so in this case.

At this point, Justice Alito raised the obvious rejoinder:

JUSTICE ALITO: Really? So suppose Plessy versus Ferguson was re-argued in 1897, so nothing had changed. Would it not be sufficient to say that was an egregiously wrong decision on the day it was handed down and now it should be overruled?

The answer should be, of course it would be sufficient. But the SG could not take that position. Doing so would undermine the federal government’s insistence that wrongness is not sufficient to overrule a precedent.

GENERAL PRELOGAR: It certainly was egregiously wrong on the day that it was handed down, Plessy, but what the Court said in analyzing Plessy to Brown and Casey was that what had become clear is that the factual premise that underlay the decision, this idea that segregation didn’t create a badge of inferiority, had been entirely mistaken.

In other words, the grounds for overruling Plessy only became clear in the five decades after the case. Huh? Plessy concluded that segregation didn’t create badges of inferiority. But Jim Crow demonstrated that segregation did in fact create badges of inferiority. It took five decades, apparently, to demonstrate that separate was not equal. Much to my surprise, Justice Breyer also articulated this exact same perspective.

JUSTICE BREYER … Plessy was wrong when decided, but, just a minute, also remember Plessy said that separate but equal was a badge of inferiority. No, they said, it isn’t. Well, all you have to do is open your eyes and look at the south, my friend, and you will see whether it was or it wasn’t in 1954.

This position isn’t completely irrational. Brown was premised on social science research that was published in the twentieth century.

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority.  Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

In that regard, the Warren Court couldn’t reach its decision until the Doll Test was performed. Remember, Brown rejected any reliance on original meaning. Only through modern-day understandings of education could the Court make its ruling. And to be clear, Brown didn’t actually overrule Plessy. The Court simply concluded that “in the field of public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”

Prelogar and Breyer did not make this argument. Instead, the Solicitor General had to tap-dance around Alito’s questioning.

JUSTICE ALITO: So is it really . . . your answer that we needed all the experience from 1896 to 1954 to realize that Plessy was wrongly decided? Would you answer my question? Had it come before the Court in 1897, should it have been overruled or not?

GENERAL PRELOGAR: I think it should have been overruled, but I think that the factual premise was wrong in the moment it was decided, and the Court realized that and clarified that when it overruled in Brown.

I’ve read this sentence several times. I still don’t understand it. Neither did Justice Alito.

JUSTICE ALITO: But your answer is –I don’t –I still don’t understand –I still don’t have your answer clearly. Can a decision be overruled simply because it was erroneously wrong, even if nothing has changed between the time of that decision and the time when the Court is called upon to consider whether it should be overruled? Yes or no? Can you give me a yes or no answer on that?

Here, Justice Alito laid another trap. SG Prelogar should have hedged. But she didn’t. She gave an absolute, unequivocal answer.

GENERAL PRELOGAR: This Court, no, has never overruled in that situation just based on a conclusion that the decision was wrong. It has always applied the stare decisis factors and likewise found that they warrant overruling in that instance.

When I write, I try to avoid absolute words like “never” and “always.” Even a single instance can prove these assertions wrong. And indeed, there is one such case in which the Supreme Court overruled a precedent, based entirely on a conclusion the decisions was wrong, without regard to any new facts or new legal arguments.

In Hepburn v. Griswold (1870), the Court held that Congress lacked the power to require people to accept paper currency as legal tender. When Hepburn was argued in November 1869, there were only eight Justices on the bench. After arguments the vote was 5-3. The majority, per Chief Justice Chase, concluded that the Legal Tender Act was unconstitutional. However, in January 1870, Justice Grier resigned due to his poor health before the decision was formally announced. This vacancy made the final vote 4- 3. After Hepburn was decided, President Grant appointed Justices Strong and Bradley. They were known to support paper money as legal tender, which Grant also favored. Following their confirmations there were now five Justices who thought that the Legal Tender Act was constitutional. Sure enough, the Court reversed itself a year later. Knox v. Lee (1871) held that the Legal Tender Act was constitutional. Hepburn was now overturned by a 5- 4 vote.

In Knox, Chief Justice Chase’s dissent spoke to the Court’s approach to stare decisis:

A majority of the court, five to four, in the opinion which has just been read, reverses the judgment rendered by the former majority of five to three, in pursuance of an opinion formed after repeated arguments, at successive terms, and careful consideration; and declares the legal tender clause to be constitutional; that is to say, that an act of Congress making promises to pay dollars legal tender as coined dollars in payment of pre-existing debts is a means appropriate and plainly adapted to the exercise of powers expressly granted by the Constitution, and not prohibited itself by the Constitution but consistent with its letter and spirit. And this reversal, unprecedented in the history of the court, has been produced by no change in the opinions of those who concurred in the former judgment.. . . We adhere to the opinion pronounced in Hepburn v. Griswold. Reflection has only wrought a firmer belief in the soundness of the constitutional doctrines maintained, and in the importance of them to the country.

To paraphrase Justice Stevens in Citizens United, the only relevant thing that changed between Hepburn and Knox was the composition of the Court. Knox v. Lee is precisely the case that Justice Alito asked about: the Supreme Court reversed itself in the span of one year, based entirely on the conclusion that the prior decision was wrong.

Randy and I discuss both of these cases in 100 Cases. I’m surprised they didn’t come up in any of the Solicitor General’s moots.

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What’s going on with Dobbs and the S.B. 8 Cases?

When the Supreme Court placed the S.B. 8 cases on the rocket docket, I–and many others–predicted the Court would resolve the S.B. 8 cases before Dobbs was argued. No such luck. The Court faked us out last week with a water case. And no new opinions this week. Still no decisions in the Texas cases. What’s going on?

I suspect that the Justices realized that both opinions would be very, very difficult to write. If you rule for the private clinics, you have to modify, or perhaps even overrule Ex Parte Young. (That case was argued 115 years ago today). If you rule for the United States, you have to identify some limiting principle to prevent the federal government from hauling the states into court. There are so many pitfalls in both decisions. And writing these rulings in a time crunch could have destabilizing jurisprudential consequences for generations. Any inclinations to rule quickly for the clinics, or the United States, would have been quickly dashed. The Justices likely realized that rushing out a decision before December 1 one way or the other was impossible.

Now, given that Dobbs may realistically overrule Roe, the urgency to untangle Jonathan Mitchell’s genius brain-child is diminished. Once Roe is gone, S.B. 8 becomes irrelevant. At this point, the Court may simply hold both cases till Dobbs is decided, then DIG them. No muss, no fuss. I suggested this outcome the day after the Texas cases were argued.

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What’s going on with Dobbs and the S.B. 8 Cases?

When the Supreme Court placed the S.B. 8 cases on the rocket docket, I–and many others–predicted the Court would resolve the S.B. 8 cases before Dobbs was argued. No such luck. The Court faked us out last week with a water case. And no new opinions this week. Still no decisions in the Texas cases. What’s going on?

I suspect that the Justices realized that both opinions would be very, very difficult to write. If you rule for the private clinics, you have to modify, or perhaps even overrule Ex Parte Young. (That case was argued 115 years ago today). If you rule for the United States, you have to identify some limiting principle to prevent the federal government from hauling the states into court. There are so many pitfalls in both decisions. And writing these rulings in a time crunch could have destabilizing jurisprudential consequences for generations. Any inclinations to rule quickly for the clinics, or the United States, would have been quickly dashed. The Justices likely realized that rushing out a decision before December 1 one way or the other was impossible.

Now, given that Dobbs may realistically overrule Roe, the urgency to untangle Jonathan Mitchell’s genius brain-child is diminished. Once Roe is gone, S.B. 8 becomes irrelevant. At this point, the Court may simply hold both cases till Dobbs is decided, then DIG them. No muss, no fuss. I suggested this outcome the day after the Texas cases were argued.

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Stare Decisis in Obergefell and Dobbs

In recent years, Justice Kagan and her colleagues have repeatedly beat the same drum on stare decisis. No doubt, they were dreading the day when a majority of the Court would overrule Roe. But, on at least one occasion, the Court’s liberals threw that caution to the wind.

I speak, of course, about Obergefell v. Hodges. That decision overruled Baker v. Nelson, to say nothing about millennia of deeply-rooted traditions. Justice Kennedy overruled Baker without any discussion, whatsoever, of stare decisis.

The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them. Baker v. Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State laws challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.

That’s all folks. Justice Kennedy didn’t mention any of the Casey factors. Just one sentence. Reminds me how the Warren Court glibly overruled precedents in Mapp v. OhioGideon v. WainrightMiranda v. Arizona, Katz v. United States, and other cases. These decisions, which wrested power away from the states, hardly represented a return to scrupulous neutrality.

I’ve long thought that the Justices in the Obergefell majority were permanently estopped from professing fidelity to stare decisis. But, to paraphrase Justice Souter, the world is made brand new every morning.

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