New Orleans Mural Ordinance, Which Regulates “Works of Art,” Is Unconstitutionally Vague

In today’s Morris v. City of New Orleans (E.D. La.), U.S. District Judge Martin L.C. Feldman invalidated a New Orleans ordinance that regulated murals. The facts:

Neal Morris lives in Orleans Parish. He owns residential and commercial properties. He is perhaps not a fan of President Donald Trump. On November 4, 2017, Morris commissioned a local artist to paint a mural on a commercial property he owns at 3521 South Liberty Street. The mural quotes a controversial comment made by  President Trump that had been recorded in a 2005 “Access Hollywood” segment; the mural replaces with pictograms two vulgar words used by Trump.

Just a few days after the mural was painted, a local news outlet publicized a story about the mural and noted that murals “are typically regulated by the Historic District Landmarks Commission and the City Council.” The same day the news story was published, on November 8, 2017, the City of New Orleans Department of Safety and Permits sent Morris a letter advising him that the mural violated a zoning ordinance. Jennifer Cecil, the purported director of the City’s “One Stop for Permits and Licenses,” wrote that an inspection of the property on November 8 revealed a violation of Section 12.2.4(8) of the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, which, according to her letter, concerns “Prohibited Signs—Historic District.” …

Morris was instructed to remove the mural, and warned that his failure to do so by November 22, 2017 would cause the Department of Safety and Permits to initiate appropriate legal action to secure compliance. The penalty for failure to comply is a maximum fine or jail for each and every day the violation continues plus court cost as prescribed by law….

Morris uncovered several stark inaccuracies in the November 8 letter: Section 12.2.4(8) does not in fact exist; there is no section titled “Prohibited Signs—Historic District” in the CZO; nor does the CZO contain a blanket prohibition on murals in residentially zoned historic districts. On November 17, 2017, Morris politely wrote to the City requesting clarification in light of the inaccuracies in Ms. Cecil’s letter. Impolitely, apparently the City did not respond.

Morris sued, and the city then replaced the ordinance, with one that imposes lighter regulations, but that still specially regulates any noncommercial “work of art painted or otherwise applied to or affixed to an exterior surface,” but doesn’t regulate other noncommercial signs. But the lawsuit continued, with Morris requesting an injunction blocking the new ordinance as well, and the court agreed, holding that the rule was unconstitutionally vague:

Jennifer Cecil, Director of the New Orleans One Stop for Permits and Licenses, … could not even define the term [“work of art”]:

A: . . . the presentation of a permit request for a mural is an assertion that this is a work of art . . . .

Q: So you are saying that the applicant, by the mere fact of asking for a mural permit, is presuming that the subject is a work of art?

A: That’s my understanding of how it’s approached, yes. . . .

Q: So that’s what I am sort of getting at. I am trying to understand where the line is drawn.

A: If you tell me that it’s not a work of art when you come in, that you are just painting solid—that you are painting a house, there will be no permit required if you are not in a historic district.

Q: So if I don’t think it’s a work of art, I don’t need a permit?

A: If you don’t think it is a work of art and you are describing solid color painting to us, we would not tell you that, no. If you begin describing figurative painting or painting of words, we would suggest that you have it reviewed and you present an example of what that would look like.

Tellingly, the City fails to respond to the plaintiff’s arguments in this regard. In so doing, the City apparently concedes that the CZO’s failure to define “work of art” renders the definition of “mural” impermissibly vague. {Of course, if the City were to attempt to define “work of art,” this would unquestionably give rise to additional content-based distinctions. It appears the City has no choice but to step back and craft a broad, content neutral definition of sign that does not refer to “art,” “commercial speech,” or “non-commercial speech.” And if the City wishes to treat murals differently than signs, it could perhaps create subcategories based on physical characteristics alone, such as “wall sign” or “painted wall sign.” Compare Central Radio Co. Inc. v. City of Norfolk, Va., 811 F.3d 625, 628-29 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that sign ordinance exempting from regulation “works of art which in no way identify or specifically relate to a product or service” was a “content-based regulation that d[id] not survive strict scrutiny”) with Peterson v. Vill. of Downers Grove, 150 F. Supp. 3d 910, 919-23 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that sign ordinance’s ban on all painted wall signs was content neutral and “narrowly tailored to serve the Village’s interest in aesthetics.”).}

Because the CZO’s use of the indistinct, shapeless, and obscure phrases “work of art” … fails to provide “sufficient guidance such that a [person] of ordinary intelligence would understand” when a mural permit is required, Morris is entitled to summary judgment that the definition of “mural” is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court also seemed to hold that any ordinance that requires prescreening of signs to determine whether they contain commercial advertising must pass strict scrutiny as a content-based restriction (even if it ultimately doesn’t further distinguish within the category of speech that isn’t commercial advertising), even though a restriction on commercial advertising doesn’t need to pass strict scrutiny:

Because the City of necessity must determine whether a mural contains commercial speech, and, therefore, should be regulated as a sign, the ordinance is a prohibited free speech enemy and does not pass strict scrutiny, or even a more relaxed scrutiny test. The murals-permit scheme is unconstitutional insofar as it distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial artwork. Regulations of commercial speech (such as signs) are not subject to strict scrutiny. But the City has gone beyond signage regulation.

I’m not sure whether that’s quite right, but I do think the holding that “work of art” is unconstitutionally vague is correct.

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@RealDonaldTrump and Twitter: Public Forums and Private Architecture

In Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, the district court held that “the interactive space of a tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account constitutes a designated public forum.” The Second Circuit today affirmed.

The briefs focused heavily on whether or not Trump has been tweeting in his governmental, not personal, capacity. The district and circuit courts answered in the affirmative, and I think I am persuaded. The briefs don’t spend as much time on a doctrinal awkwardness, which is that in every case I can think of (and I freely confess that I have not canvassed the case law in the hours since the opinion came down) the rules governing a public forum were created by the government itself. As the name suggests, a designated public forum generally arises when the government designates a forum for open discourse: the government creates rules that allow anyone to speak, and it thereby creates a designated public forum.

In this case, though, it was Twitter’s own rules that defined the forum, and those rules played a huge role: because the interactive space didn’t allow Trump to, e.g., moderate comments, it was a designated public forum. And because of those same Twitter-created rules, the government couldn’t say that the commenters were engaged in government speech: if the government has the ability to approve or disapprove speech, then it can be government speech (as in Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, in which the Supreme Court found that Texas license plate designs are government speech even though created by private parties). But if the government has no such authority, it is hard to say that there is any government speech.

A brief back-and-forth in the briefs touched on this. The Knight Foundation brief in the Second Circuit said (on page 29):

Defendants have opened this forum to speech by the general public. The comment threads are accessible to anyone with a Twitter account without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting criteria. Defendants have not published any rule or policy purporting to restrict, by form or subject matter, the speech of those who participate in the forum.

And the government replied (on page 17 of its reply brief):

Plaintiffs argue that defendants “have not published any rule or policy purporting to restrict, by form or subject matter, the speech of those who participate in the forum,” and that they have not “sought to limit the forum to specific classes of speakers based on their status.” Br. 29. But these are not choices available to Donald Trump in maintaining his personal Twitter account. He has chosen to make his account public, which allows anyone with or without a Twitter account to view his tweets. This is entirely consistent with the fact that he uses the @realDonaldTrump account to broadcast his own speech. But Twitter establishes the rules by which he may engage with others on the platform. Twitter does not allow its users to disable or delete replies or comments, or to confine them to particular topics. It allows them only to pick and choose who they want to interact with on the platform, and how they wish to interact with them.

Neither side pursued the unusual aspect that private rules governed the public forum, and neither came up with an example of any other designated public forum in which the relevant rules were privately created.

There is a reasonable argument that when Trump decided to make official announcements via Twitter, he accepted the Twitter-created rules and thus effectively transformed the interactive space for his Twitter feed from a private Twitter-created forum (which would be a designated forum if the government had created on a government platform the rules that Twitter created) into some sort of public forum. And, the argument might continue, if that makes for an awkward fit with our existing categories of public forums, so be it: we should not, on this argument, let a rigid conceptualization of these categories blind us to the facts that Trump is acting in his governmental capacity via Twitter and can’t come up with broad viewpoint-neutral rules to block those he doesn’t like (because he isn’t allowed to devise any rules for Twitter). Continuing in this vein, one could note that Trump could have chosen instead an option that would have allowed him to approve comments – say, a moderated blog – but instead chose to accept Twitter’s rules, and so is bound by them.

But there are counterarguments. Perhaps the fact that the government didn’t create these rules highlights that this isn’t really a government-designated public forum (which is what we mean by “designated public forum”, i.e., that the government is doing the designating). In Walker, the Court said that the “government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” And one might think that if the government doesn’t create the open-discourse rules, then the government hasn’t created anything.

In any event, this highlights the importance of Twitter’s private architecture. If Twitter had a different set of rules, or were to change its rules tomorrow, such that users could approve replies/likes/retweets or set up broad rules on the use of Twitter’s interactive space in their Twitter feeds, then presumably the interactive space would no longer be a designated public forum for politicians who chose to act in an official capacity on Twitter.

At least in this case, private rules rule.

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The Backlash Over The Little Mermaid Casting a Black Ariel Is Fake News

To all Little Mermaid fans who were disheartened to learn that Disney casting a black woman in the role of Princess Ariel had prompted a racist backlash, worry not: The #NotMyAriel controversy is mostly fake news.

Last week, Disney announced that Halle Bailey, a black actress, would portray the fictional mermaid princess in a live action remake. Allegedly, this infuriated some racists because Ariel is red-haired and white-skinned in the cartoon version. “Us white girls, who grew up with The Little Mermaid, deserved a true-to-color Ariel,” wrote one critic, Rebeccs, in a tweet that went viral. “Disney, you made a huge mistake by hiring Halle Bailey.”

Horrified? Don’t be. A troll account was responsible for the tweet, as Buzzfeed‘s Brandon Wall helpfully explained:

Moreover, there were a lot more people responding to the tweet and disagreeing with it than liking it.

It’s true that a few Twitter users seemed genuinely upset about the casting. But the overwhelming majority of people tweeting #NotMyAriel are doing so in support of Bailey, and expressing outrage that anyone would be offended by a black Ariel. Their fury is well intended but largely unnecessary.

Nevertheless, The Washington Post ran not one but two articles on Tuesday bemoaning the “uproar over a black Ariel.” (Articles appeared at other sites as well.) The only evidence of said uproar is a handful of tweets, which again, are more than cancelled out by all the other tweets. But try telling that to history professor Brooke Newman, who implies in The Post that there’s an Ursula-sized backlash to the casting, and it all has something to do with Trump.

On July 4, as Americans celebrated Independence Day with barbecue, fireworks and armored vehicles rolling through the streets of Washington, #NotMyAriel began trending on Twitter. The hashtag took off in response to the announcement that Disney had hired Halle Bailey, an African American actress and R&B singer, to star as Ariel in the upcoming live-action remake of the 1989 feature-length cartoon “The Little Mermaid.” …

The #NotMyAriel backlash is part of the wave of white nostalgia that Donald Trump used to win the presidency by appealing to white, working-class Americans who feel marginalized by the country’s growing diversity. In Trump’s America, it’s possible to return to a “simpler” past characterized by upward economic mobility and straight, white male cultural and political dominance.

#NotMyAriel was trending because a lot of people were tweeting that it’s stupid to be offended by a black Ariel. This is not evidence of a widespread backlash, but evidence against it. Mistakes like these are the result of taking social media too seriously and too literally.

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A Justin Amash Presidential Run Will Disrupt Donald Trump and the Democratic Party Equally

When Rep. Justin Amash (I-Mich.) consciously decoupled from the Republican Party on the 4th of July, he also left open the possibility that he might run for president in 2020 as either an independent or a Libertarian. If he chooses to do that, he will most definitely make it harder for either President Donald Trump or the eventual Democratic nominee to eke out victory. Obviously, the next president will be either a Republican or a Democrat, but his presence will make them work much harder for victory.

As Amash’s former policy adviser Kurt Couchman explains in a column at CNN’s website, the congressman presents an alluring policy profile that would certainly draw from both of the major parties:

As a constitutionalist, consistent proponent of liberty, devoted family man, and faithful Christian, the now-former Republican could easily attract votes from otherwise reluctant Trump voters. And in competitive states like Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and, of course, Michigan, small margins make a big difference. Also, he would draw votes from Democrats. He opposes corporate welfare and other forms of corruption, he vocally backs civil liberties against both parties’ leadership, he stands against global militarism, and he frequently engages bipartisan coalitions to advance reforms.

Recall that had Hillary Clinton pulled just 80,000 more votes in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, she would have beaten Donald Trump. Amash might have limited name recognition right now, but he’s definitely a known quantity in the Wolverine State and his appeal is going to be strongest in Midwestern states such as Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana (the western part of Pennsylvania is effectively part of that region too).

Yes, it’s early, but none of the Democratic candidates has anything approaching the charisma and upside potential of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, despite hitting a “career-high approval,” is still disliked by a majority of Americans. I think that Trump, absent a recession or a new scandal of immense proportions, is likely to win in 2020, but the race will be as razor thin as the one against Clinton. Having the heartland-resident Amash in the mix could easily swing things one way or another.

The Libertarian Party presidential candidate Gary Johnson pulled a record 4.5 million votes in 2016, the equivalent of 3.3 percent of the overall vote. There’s a strong argument that a character like Amash, especially if he’s running as a Libertarian with ballot access in all 50 states, will be able to replicate or even improve on those totals. He’s young (39 years old), charismatic, and articulate. Every bit as much as younger characters such as South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg (a a married, gay veteran) and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (a Latina democratic socialist), he represents a new generation of outspoken idealists who are bringing new identities to national politics.

Amash is the child of Syrian and Palestinian parents, an Orthodox Christian, and unabashedly libertarian. Even if you believe (wrongly, in my opinion) that libertarians make up at most 4 percent of the vote, the winner in 2020 is going to need every vote he or she can scrounge (for a better estimate of the proper size of the libertarian electorate, read this). Amash’s presence will change how all of that sorts out.

Amash talked with Reason a year ago. Take a look below.

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After Marijuana Is Legalized, a New Study Finds, Adolescent Use Declines

Notwithstanding fears that legalizing marijuana for adults would lead to an increase in underage consumption, a new analysis of survey data finds that legalization is associated with a decline in cannabis use by high school students. While it is too early to draw firm conclusions, the results, which were reported online yesterday in JAMA Pediatrics, are reassuring, especially when combined with prior research on medical marijuana laws and state surveys finding no increase in adolescent pot smoking following general legalization.

Based on numbers from the National Youth Risk Behavior Survey for the years 1993 through 2017, Montana State economist D. Mark Anderson and three other researchers found that medical marijuana laws were not associated with increases or decreases in underage use. But when they looked at states that have legalized recreational use, they found that the odds of recent cannabis consumption (i.e., within the previous 30 days) fell by 8 percent, while the odds of frequent use (i.e., use on 10 or more of the previous 30 days) fell by 9 percent.

“Consistent with the results of previous researchers,” Anderson et al. write, “there was no evidence that the legalization of medical marijuana encourages marijuana use among youth. Moreover, the estimates…showed that marijuana use among youth may actually decline after legalization for recreational purposes.” They say “this latter result is consistent with” the results of a 2018 study that looked at adolescent marijuana use in Washington and with “the argument that it is more difficult for teenagers to obtain marijuana as drug dealers are replaced by licensed dispensaries that require proof of age.”

While that much is true, it still seems plausible that easier access to marijuana by adults would indirectly facilitate access by minors. Teenagers, after all, have parents, older siblings, and various acquaintances who are 21 or older and could become their suppliers, wittingly or not. But seven years after Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize recreational marijuana, that phenomenon does not seem common enough to outweigh the impact of an enforceable purchase age, possibly combined with erosion of the “forbidden fruit” effect.

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Government-Run Fora on Private Platforms, in the @RealDonaldTrump User Blocking Controversy

Some readers have asked how it can be that Twitter can restrict tweets, and ban users for tweets it sufficiently dislikes, but @RealDonaldTrump can’t.

That’s because Twitter is a private entity, which isn’t bound by the First Amendment. (Whether Congress could constitutionally impose some sort of constraints on Twitter’s banning users is a separate matter; so far, Congress hasn’t.) President Trump is a government official, and his actions are potentially constrained by the First Amendment.

One can argue that he’s running the account in his individual capacity; but once the court concludes that he’s acting as an official, and not just as a politician, the First Amendment does apply to him. And if the blocking were done on a government entity’s account, such as an account run by a school board, a police department, or a city council, then the First Amendment would even more clearly apply.

Nor should it matter that President Trump is using private property for his speech. A city council, for instance, is barred by the First Amendment from kicking speakers out of an open comment period based on their viewpoints. (It has no constitutional obligation to set up such a period, but many city councils choose to.) And that remains so even if the city council decides to meet in a privately owned building that the owner has let it use for the occasion.

Likewise, a public university can’t have a policy saying, “we’ll issue all students university e-mail accounts, but we’ll delete the account of any student who uses the account to say something offensive based on race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation.” And that’s true even if the university-issued e-mail accounts are hosted on Microsoft or Google computers.

Whether the First Amendment applies to a speech restriction generally depends on who is imposing the restriction. If the government is imposing the restriction, then the First Amendment does apply, whether or not the speech is on private property. Likewise, if a private entity is imposing the restriction, then the First Amendment doesn’t apply, whether or not the speech is on government property. (If, for instance, I hit you because of an offensive message that you’re wearing on a city sidewalk, I’m guilty of a crime and a tort, but not a First Amendment violation, unless I’m acting in my capacity as an agent for the government. If your private employer fires you because it learns of your having said something offensive on a city sidewalk, then in many states it wouldn’t be guilty of anything, and in any event not of a First Amendment violation.)

So, again, one can argue that @RealDonaldTrump is run by President Trump in his personal capacity, not his official capacity; but once the court rejected that view, then it doesn’t matter that @RealDonaldTrump is a forum set up on a private company’s computers.

 

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2nd Circuit Agrees That Trump Cannot Constitutionally Block Critics on Twitter

Today a federal appeals court panel unanimously ruled that Donald Trump’s habit of blocking critics on Twitter violates the First Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit agreed with U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald, who last year ruled that Trump had created a public forum by using his Twitter account for official purposes and opening the “interactive space” associated with it to the general public, making it unconstitutional for him to exclude people whose opinions annoy him.

“The public presentation of the Account and the webpage associated with it
bear all the trappings of an official, state‐run account,” the appeals court says. It notes that the account identifies Trump as the “45th President of the United States of America” in “Washington, D.C.” and features photographs of Trump “engaged in the performance of his official duties such as signing executive orders, delivering remarks at the White House, and meeting with the Pope, heads of state, and other foreign dignitaries.”

Trump routinely uses his Twitter account to announce his decisions, defend his policies, promote his legislative agenda, communicate with foreign leaders, and complain about press coverage he views as unfair to his administration. The president has used his account to announce important developments such as his nomination of a new FBI director, his replacement of his chief of staff, and his ban on transgender people in the military. Trump “also used the Account to inform the public about his discussions with the South Korean president concerning North Korea’s nuclear program and about his decision to sell sophisticated military hardware to Japan and South Korea.” The White House has said Trump’s tweets are “official statements by the President of the United States,” and the National Archives deems them official presidential records.

As for the “interactive space,” Trump’s account has 62 million followers, and his tweets produce “an extraordinarily high level of public engagement, typically generating thousands of replies, some of which, in turn, generate hundreds of thousands of additional replies.” By making it difficult for the critics he blocks to participate in that public debate with their own likes, retweets, and replies, the 2nd Circuit says, Trump engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination.

While Trump unblocked the plaintiffs and other critics in response to Buchwald’s ruling, he also appealed her decision, arguing that the account is private, that it is not controlled by the government, that the discussion it invites does not qualify as a public forum, and that the burdens imposed by blocking certain users are not constitutionally significant. The appeals court rejected all of those arguments.

“Once the President has chosen a platform and opened up its interactive space to millions of users and participants, he may not selectively exclude those whose views he disagrees with,” the court says. “Once it is established that the President is a government actor with respect to his use of the Account, viewpoint discrimination violates the First Amendment….While he is certainly not required to listen, once he opens up the interactive features of his account to the public at large he is not entitled to censor selected users because they express views with which he disagrees….We hold that the President violated the First Amendment when he used the blocking function to exclude the Individual Plaintiffs because of their disfavored speech.”

The 2nd Circuit notes that its decision does not mean any government official with a Twitter account has to let all users follow him, regardless of how irksome they are. “Whether First Amendment concerns are triggered when a public official uses his account in ways that differ from those presented on this appeal will in most instances be a fact‐specific inquiry,” it says. “The outcome of that inquiry will be informed by how the official describes and uses the account; to whom features of the account are made available; and how others, including government officials and agencies, regard and treat the account.” Here are some tips for politicians with social media accounts who don’t want to face First Amendment lawsuits.

Nor does this decision imply that social media companies have to worry about violating the Constitution when they decide how to regulate speech on their platforms. They are private actors to whom the First Amendment does not apply.

As the court notes, “the fact that government control over property is temporary, or that the government does not ‘own’ the property in the sense that it holds title to the property, is not determinative of whether the property is, in fact, sufficiently controlled by the government to make it a forum for First Amendment purposes.” Twitter’s role in this case is analogous to that of a landlord who rents an auditorium for government use. If the government held public meetings in that auditorium, it would be unconstitutional to exclude people from the meetings based on their views. That does not mean the landlord himself, or any private parties who might rent his space, are constrained by the First Amendment.

The lawsuit that led to this decision, which was filed by Columbia University’s Knight First Amendment Institute and seven blocked Twitter users, prompted a considerable amount of dismay and criticism. But the 2nd Circuit’s ruling seems like a pretty straightforward application of First Amendment principles that constrain the government’s actions when it uses a physical space for official purposes and invites public participation. The decision leaves social media platforms free to regulate content and leaves social media users (including government officials, as long as they are acting in their private capacity) free to exclude anyone they don’t like from their Twitter accounts or Facebook pages. It simply means that public officials like Trump, in light of the First Amendment, have special obligations when they use social media for official purposes.

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California Lawmakers Pass Bill Limiting Police Use of Deadly Force

A bill requiring police to be more careful when applying deadly force against citizens has passed the California legislature and is now heading to the governor’s desk.

AB 392, first introduced by California Assemblymember Shirley Weber (D–San Diego), changes how police across the state are expected to evaluate conditions and dangers before resorting to deadly force. Currently, the state requires that police have a “reasonable fear” that they were in danger. Thus, police can argue that the use of deadly force is justified based on what they think might happen, even if it turns out that they were mistaken and there was no actual threat.

Under AB 392, these rules will change. In the text of the bill, a killing by a police officer will be considered justified when:

“the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that deadly force is necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person, or to apprehend a fleeing person for a felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless the person is immediately apprehended.”

In other words, the police officer has to be able to argue that there is an actual imminent threat in order to justify using deadly force.

The bill was originally introduced in the wake of Stephon Clark’s killing by Sacramento Police in March 2018. Police, responding to 911 calls about vehicle break-ins, identified Clark as a suspect, and chased him into a backyard. There, two officers apparently mistook Clark’s cellphone for a gun and opened fire on Clark, shooting him eight times and killing him.

The incident was captured on officers’ body cameras, but the Sacramento District Attorney’s office ultimately decided not to charge the officers, taking the position that the two officers genuinely feared that Clark actually had a gun, and therefore the shooting was justified and the officers “acted lawfully.”

Clark’s death prompted outrage and calls for reform in the state’s rules on police deadly force. AB 392 passed the state’s Assembly in May and finally passed the state Senate on Monday by a vote of 34-3.

The bill has been watered down significantly in order to overcome resistance by law enforcement groups. The bill once had an objective definition of what it meant when it called deadly force “necessary” (that a reasonable police officer in the same situation would objectively conclude there was no alternative) that has been removed, leaving it for prosecutors and juries to determine. The bill has been amended to make it clear that officers do not have a duty to retreat when faced with a confrontation, nor do they lose the right to claim self-defense when using reasonable force to arrest somebody or to prevent them from escaping. It does, however, explain that retreating does not mean “tactical repositioning or other de-escalation tactics.” In the Clark case, the officers were in a position where they could have safely backed away from him and would have likely realized quickly he did not have a gun.

The bill now heads to the desk of Gov. Gavin Newsom, a Democrat. He praised the bill in May and is expected to sign it into law.

Use of force incidents by police in California is on the decline across the state, and perhaps AB 392 will help. A new report released last week shows a 20 percent drop in instances of use for force from 2016, declining from 782 incidents in a year to 628. In one-third of the 2018 cases, civilians were shot, and 146 were killed.

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Be Skeptical About Bernie Sanders’ Financial Transactions Tax

Taxing financial transactions is a popular proposal among Democrats to fund new government programs—but some on the center-left have called into question how much revenue such a tax would generate.

Democratic presidential candidates Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) and Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D–N.Y.), along with several other members of Congress, have introduced a bill that would tax financial transactions. It would levy a tax of 0.5 percent on stock trades, 0.1 percent on bond trades, and 0.005 percent on derivatives trades. Sanders promises that this new tax will raise $2.4 trillion over the next decade, citing a study from University of Massachusetts economists; he plans to use that revenue to fund free college, student loan debt forgiveness, expanded Pell Grants, support for historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and increased investment in K-12 education. 

Sanders says the bill will help “rein in the recklessness of Wall Street billionaires and build an economy that works for all Americans.”

But even if you buy that premise, there are plenty of questions about how effective a financial transactions tax would be in raising revenue. 

As senior fellow Howard Gleckman of the center-left Tax Policy Center wrote recently, Sanders proposed a similar financial transactions tax (FTT) in 2016, and some economists promised it would generate almost $3 trillion in tax revenue over a decade. Meanwhile, the Tax Policy Center found that the tax would raise only $400 billion over ten years. Why the difference? The Tax Policy Center estimated that the tax would dramatically reduce the number of transactions on financial markets, reducing both the FTT’s tax base and revenue from taxes on realized capital gains. By raising transaction costs, fewer investors will sell stocks, which means less taxable capital gains income.

The Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) analysis mirrors the Tax Policy Center’s, estimating that a FTT similar to the one Sanders proposed would raise under $800 billion over a decade. The CBO has also reported that FTTs pose a threat for public finances of federal, state, and local governments, by reducing liquidity in the bond market and increasing costs faced by pension programs.  

Other countries’ experiences with FTTs suggest that it is right to be skeptical about Sanders’ claims. When Sweden implemented the tax, 60 percent of transactions on Sweden’s stock market moved to other countries, and as a result, overall tax revenue actually went down. Not only did the FTT not raise as much revenue as hoped, but moving stock market transactions to other countries and increasing transaction costs also reduced revenue from taxes on capital gains.

This debate, between firebrand progressives and the more moderate center-left, mirrors a recent back-and-forth about fellow presidential contender Elizabeth Warren’s wealth tax.

Both the wealth tax and the financial transactions tax are appealing revenue sources to progressives, as they both target clear villains: wealthy heirs and greedy Wall Street traders. Both taxes seem deceptively modest, with a seemingly low tax rate: Warren often calls her wealth tax proposal “the two-cent tax” on the “tippy-top.” 

But the problem with this framing in the case of the FTT, as Nicole Kaeding, the nonpartisan Tax Foundation’s vice president of federal projects, points out, is that a very low tax rate that promises to raise a lot of revenue is probably a result of “tax pyramiding,” or the taxation of the same money over and over again.

As Reason’s Peter Suderman wrote, to pay for their extravagant spending proposals, Democratic presidential candidates wouldn’t be able to rely on these targeted tax hikes on the super-rich. Instead, they’d have to tax like Scandinavia, which would mean major tax increases across the middle class. Bernie himself admitted that the middle-class would have to pay higher taxes at the most recent Democratic debate.

It’s worth noting, too, that the FTT wouldn’t just hit Wall Street traders. It would hit middle-class retirement savings and local pension programs. By raising the cost of investment, it could reduce long-run economic growth. All that, and it would probably fall short of raising the promised revenue, too.

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Second Circuit: Unconstitutional for @RealDonaldTrump to Block Twitter Users Based on Viewpoint

From today’s opinion in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump: written by Judge Barrington D. Parker and joined by Judges Peter W. Hall and Christopher F. Droney:

[A.] The President contends that [his @RealDonaldTrump Twitter] Account is exclusively a vehicle for his own speech to which the Individual Plaintiffs have no right of access and to which the First Amendment does not apply.

Secondarily, he argues that, in any event, the Account is not a public forum and that even if the Account were a public forum, blocking the Individual Plaintiffs did not prevent them from accessing the forum.

The President further argues that, to the extent the Account is government‐controlled, posts on it are government speech to which the First Amendment does not apply.

We are not persuaded. We conclude that the evidence of the official nature of the Account is overwhelming. We also conclude that once the President has chosen a platform and opened up its interactive space to millions of users and participants, he may not selectively exclude those whose views he disagrees with.

[B.] The President concedes that he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs because they posted tweets that criticized him or his policies. He also concedes that such criticism is protected speech.

The issue then for this Court to resolve is whether, in blocking the Individual Plaintiffs from the interactive features of the Account, the President acted in a governmental capacity or as a private The President maintains that Twitter is a privately owned and operated social media platform that he has used since 2009 to share his opinions on popular culture, world affairs, and politics.

Since he became President, he contends, the private nature of the Account has not changed. In his view, the Account is not a space owned or controlled by the government. Rather, it is a platform for his own private speech and not one for the private expression of others. Because the Account is private, he argues, First Amendment issues and forum analysis are not implicated. Although Twitter facilitates robust public debate on the Account, the President contends that it is simply the means through which he participates in a forum and not a public forum in and of itself.

No one disputes that the First Amendment restricts government regulation of private speech but does not regulate purely private speech. If, in blocking, the President were acting in a governmental capacity, then he may not discriminate based on viewpoint among the private speech occurring in the Account’s interactive space.

As noted, the government argues first that the Account is the President’s private property because he opened it in 2009 as a personal account and he will retain personal control over the Account after his presidency. However, the fact that government control over property is temporary, or that the government does not “own” the property in the sense that it holds title to the property, is not determinative of whether the property is, in fact, sufficiently controlled by the government to make it a forum for First Amendment purposes. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547‐52 (1975) (holding privately‐owned theater leased to and operated by city was public forum). {5 See also Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (plurality opinion) (stating that “public forums are places that the government has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity” (internal quotation marks omitted)); S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (considering “question of whether a particular piece of personal or real property owned or controlled by the government” is a public forum (emphasis added)).} Temporary control by the government can still be control for First Amendment purposes.

The government’s contention that the President’s use of the Account during his presidency is private founders in the face of the uncontested evidence in the record of substantial and pervasive government involvement with, and control over, the Account. First, the Account is presented by the President and the White House staff as belonging to, and operated by, the President. The Account is registered to “Donald J. Trump, ’45th President of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.'” App’x at 54. The President has described his use of the Account as “MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL.” The White House social media director has described the Account as a channel through which “President Donald J. Trump . . . [c]ommunicat[es] directly with you, the American people!” The @WhiteHouse account, an undoubtedly official Twitter account run by the government, “directs Twitter users to ‘Follow for the latest from @POTUS @realDonaldTrump and his Administration.” Further, the @POTUS account frequently republishes tweets from the Account…. [A]ccording to the National Archives and Records Administration, the President’s tweets from the Account “are official records that must be preserved under the Presidential Records Act.”

Second, since becoming President he has used the Account on almost a daily basis “as a channel for communicating and interacting with the public about his administration.” The President utilizes White House staff to post tweets and to maintain the Account. He uses the Account to announce “matters related to official government business,” including high‐level White House and cabinet‐level staff changes as well as changes to major national policies. He uses the Account to engage with foreign leaders and to announce foreign policy decisions and initiatives.

Finally, he uses the “like,” “retweet,” “reply,” and other functions of the Account to understand and to evaluate the public’s reaction to what he says and does. In sum, since he took office, the President has consistently used the Account as an important tool of governance and executive outreach. For these reasons, we conclude that the factors pointing to the public, non‐private nature of the Account and its interactive features are

The government’s response is that the President is not acting in his official capacity when he blocks users because that function is available to all users, not only to government officials. However, the fact that any Twitter user can block another account does not mean that the President somehow becomes a private person when he does so. Because the President, as we have seen, acts in an official capacity when he tweets, we conclude that he acts in the same capacity when he blocks those who disagree with him.

Here, a public official and his subordinates hold out and use a social media account open to the public as an official account for conducting official business. That account has interactive features open to the public, making public interaction a prominent feature of the account. These factors mean that the account is not private. Accordingly, the President excluded the Individual Plaintiffs from government‐controlled property when he used the blocking function of the Account to exclude disfavored

Of course, not every social media account operated by a public official is a government account. Whether First Amendment concerns are triggered when a public official uses his account in ways that differ from those presented on this appeal will in most instances be a fact‐specific inquiry. The outcome of that inquiry will be informed by how the official describes and uses the account; to whom features of the account are made available; and how others, including government officials and agencies, regard and treat the account.

But these are concerns for other cases and other days and are ones we are not required to consider or resolve on this Once it is established that the President is a government actor with respect to his use of the Account, viewpoint discrimination violates the First Amendment.

[C.] The government makes two responses. First, it argues that the Account is not a public forum and that, even if it were a public forum, the Individual Plaintiffs were not excluded from it. Second, the government argues that the Account, if controlled by the government, is government speech not subject to First Amendment …

[1.] To determine whether a public forum has been created, courts look “to the policy and practice of the government” as well as “the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the government’s ” Opening an instrumentality of communication “for indiscriminate use by the general public” creates a public forum. The Account was intentionally opened for public discussion when the President, upon assuming office, repeatedly used the Account as an official vehicle for governance and made its interactive features accessible to the public without limitation. We hold that this conduct created a public forum.

If the Account is a forum—public or otherwise—viewpoint discrimination is not permitted. A blocked account is prevented from viewing any of the President’s tweets, replying to those tweets, retweeting them, or liking them. Replying, retweeting, and liking are all expressive conduct that blocking inhibits. Replying and retweeting are messages that a user broadcasts, and, as such, undeniably are speech. Liking a tweet conveys approval or acknowledgment of a tweet and is therefore a symbolic message with expressive content.

Significantly, the parties agree that all of this expressive conduct is communicated to the thousands of users who interact with the Account. By blocking the Individual Plaintiffs and preventing them from viewing, retweeting, replying to, and liking his tweets, the President excluded the Individual Plaintiffs from a public forum, something the First Amendment

[2.] The government … argues that blocking did not ban or burden anyone’s speech. Specifically, the government contends that the Individual Plaintiffs were not prevented from speaking because “the only material impact that blocking has on the individual plaintiffs’ ability to express themselves on Twitter is that it prevents them from speaking directly to Donald Trump by replying to his tweets on the @realDonaldTrump web “

That assertion is not well‐grounded in the facts presented to us. The government is correct that the Individual Plaintiffs have no right to require the President to listen to their speech. However, the speech restrictions at issue burden the Individual Plaintiffs’ ability to converse on Twitter with others who may be speaking to or about the President. {If, for example, the President had merely prevented the Individual Plaintiffs from sending him direct messages, his argument would have more force.} President Trump is only one of thousands of recipients of the messages the Individual Plaintiffs seek to communicate. While he is certainly not required to listen, once he opens up the interactive features of his account to the public at large he is not entitled to censor selected users because they express views with which he

{The government extends this argument to suggest that the Individual Plaintiffs are claiming a right to “amplify” their speech by being able to reply directly to the President’s tweets. The government can choose to “amplify” the speech of certain individuals without violating the rights of others by choosing to listen or not listen…. That is not what occurred here; the Individual Plaintiffs were not simply ignored by the President, their ability to speak to the rest of the public users of the Account was burdened. In any event, the government is not permitted to “amplify” favored speech by banning or burdening viewpoints with which it disagrees.}

The government’s reply is that the Individual Plaintiffs are not censored because they can engage in various “workarounds” such as creating new accounts, logging out to view the President’s tweets, and using Twitter’s search functions to find tweets about the President posted by other users with which they can

Tellingly, the government concedes that these “workarounds” burden the Individual Plaintiffs’ speech. And burdens to speech as well as outright bans run afoul of the First Amendment. When the government has discriminated against a speaker based on the speaker’s viewpoint, the ability to engage in other speech does not cure that constitutional shortcoming.

Similarly, the fact that the Individual Plaintiffs retain some ability to “work around” the blocking does not cure the constitutional violation. Neither does the fact that the Individual Plaintiffs can post messages elsewhere on Accordingly, we hold that the President violated the First Amendment when he used the blocking function to exclude the Individual Plaintiffs because of their disfavored speech.

[3.] Finally, the government argues that to the extent the Account is controlled by the government, it is government speech. Under the government speech doctrine, “[t]he Free Speech Clause does not require government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak” about governmental endeavors. For example, when the government wishes to promote a war effort, it is not required by the First Amendment to also distribute messages discouraging that effort.

It is clear that if President Trump were engaging in government speech when he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs, he would not have been violating the First Amendment. Everyone concedes that the President’s initial tweets (meaning those that he produces himself) are government speech.

But this case does not turn on the President’s initial tweets; it turns on his supervision of the interactive features of the Account. The government has conceded that the Account “is generally accessible to the public at large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting criteria,” and the President has not attempted to limit the Account’s interactive feature to his own speech.

Considering the interactive features, the speech in question is that of multiple individuals, not just the President or that of the government. When a Twitter user posts a reply to one of the President’s tweets, the message is identified as coming from that user, not from the President.

There is no record evidence, and the government does not argue, that the President has attempted to exercise any control over the messages of others, except to the extent he has blocked some persons expressing viewpoints he finds distasteful. The contents of retweets, replies, likes, and mentions are controlled by the user who generates them and not by the President, except to the extent he attempts to do so by blocking. Accordingly, while the President’s tweets can accurately be described as government speech, the retweets, replies, and likes of other users in response to his tweets are not government speech under any formulation….

I had earlier expressed some skepticism about this position, because I thought that there was a good argument that @RealDonaldTrump—which was created well before President Trump was elected—was Trump’s personal account, even if it was used to announce governmental decisions (just as an official’s campaign speech is the politician’s own speech, even if it announces some important decisions). But I think the Second Circuit’s analysis is quite persuasive, especially since “The President operates the Account with the assistance of defendant Daniel Scavino, the White House Director of Social Media and Assistant to the President” (a matter the court notes but doesn’t rely on); this, I think, helps distinguish the account from campaign speech, which federal law generally says must be created without the help of government employees.

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