Tag: in-the-news

In my last post on the VC, I would like to say a bit about so-called “hate speech” (which I address in the last chapter of my book, arguing that it should be constitutionally protected in public schools). I say “so-called,” because it might be better to drop the term “hate speech” insofar as it implies an extreme aversion to a particular group. However, in this post, I will use the term for convenience.

No single legal definition of hate speech exists. The term is notoriously difficult to define with sufficient precision. As a result, those who support anti-hate speech codes on college campuses, for example, must say more about what to do about invariable vagueness and overbreadth problems than they usually do. That hate speech is constitutionally protected in the U.S. has not stopped university administrators to try to make it much harder for students to express certain ideas with impunity.

I doubt that any anti-hate speech code at a public school could be formulated and applied in a way that would not ban or chill speech that ought to be constitutionally protected. Such codes would be ripe for overreach and misapplication, apart from allowing viewpoint discrimination. It is important to understand that even if a particular word—like a racial slur—has little, if any free speech value most of the time, the fundamental problem is that if the government can ban that word, then it also has the authority to ban other words, regardless of the context and the intent of the speaker or writer.

In the late 1980s and 1990s, lower courts struck down a variety of speech codes on college campuses. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia invalidated a Minneapolis anti-hate speech ordinance on the ground that it was underinclusive. For him, the law in question invited government to engage in viewpoint discrimination inasmuch as people could be prosecuted for expressing racist views but not for expressing racially egalitarian views or homophobic views.

In Scalia’s view, government must remain neutral towards all viewpoints, even racist ones, so that the “fight” is fair. No viewpoint is better or worse than another from the standpoint of the First Amendment, and it is up to the public to decide which ideas they will embrace and reject. There is no way to regulate hate speech without also censoring ideas. Doctrinally, that fact presents an enormous problem for those who want to alter the constitutional state quo by creating a new category of unprotected speech. It is not evident how to balance the importance of free speech against the importance of protecting victims of hate speech from some sort of harm. Reasonable people disagree about how harmful it is likely to be, which is situational and can vary from person to person, and what can or should be done about it.

Progressives should not be so eager to embrace bans on hate speech when their own chickens could come home to roost. Recently, some European countries have curbed pro-Palestinian protests designed to raise awareness about the violence in Gaza. This response is problematic for a few reasons, including the importance of the expression of the viewpoint that the Israeli conduct is unjust (regardless of whether this proposition is true) so that the public can decide for itself which side, if any, to take.

This generation of college students is more inclined to suppress speech that offends minorities, makes them feel uncomfortable, or undermines their equality. This inclination comes from the right place but the implementation of such a speech code would have a high cost: trying to protect vulnerable students from hurtful ideas, school officials would be able to engage in viewpoint discrimination and punish students who express their sincere beliefs, which of course, may be wrong.

Additionally, censorship may reduce the likelihood that uncomfortable conversations will take place that will enlighten white students who may be racially illiterate. A number of years ago, I was taken aback when I realized how many of my students, who had grown up in this county, did not know why people burn crosses. When a white student wears blackface to school as part of a Halloween costume, school officials and teachers have an opportunity to educate students about the historical meaning of minstrel shows and its present-day implications. Understandable anger or outrage should not replace the need to explain why such a costume is problematic; it is not as if all or even many junior high and high school students (or adults for that matter) know why that is so. At minimum, all students must become used to encountering unwelcome ideas, even the worst ones.

Few people will want to talk about race openly and honestly if what they say could be considered racist speech under an amorphous anti-hate speech code. A few years ago, at the Georgetown Law Center, Professor Ilya Shapiro was investigated (and eventually cleared after several months before he resigned), for making an offensive comment on Twitter about then-U.S. Supreme Court nominee Ketanji Brown-Jackson and her being a “lesser black woman.” Regardless of whether Shapiro was right or whether he phrased his comment well, he meant that President Joseph Biden should not have promised to put a black woman on the Court during his presidential campaign in 2020. Apparently in Shapiro’s mind, Biden should have picked from a much wider pool of qualified applicants. Surely at law schools and elsewhere, there is a public discussion worth having about the meaning of merit, the judicial selection process, its political dimensions, and the lack of sex and racial diversity on the federal bench. This incident also illustrates why the threat of punishment is the wrong approach in dealing with speech that is offensive or racist. Frequently, people – students included – do not choose their words carefully when they speak extemporaneously, use social media, or blurt out something in the heat of the moment. Any sensible theory of free speech must take people as they are –error-prone, emotional, uninformed, insensitive, and thoughtless– and not how we wish them to be.

As Matthew Kramer observes in Freedom of Expression as Self-Restraint, anti-hate speech laws are “designed to control people’s thoughts.” Although that may be an overstatement, Kramer is right that if we are genuinely committed to respect for the autonomy of each student, then they will make racist remarks and use racial epithets, unfortunately. They will also make mistakes that they may regret. That is the price of letting them come to her their conclusions for better or for worse. A speech code on campus is a blunt instrument. Alternative remedies must be considered before the state engages in censorship. Other non-censorious countermeasures could be equally or more effective (and much more respectful of student autonomy).

One of the most difficult challenges is to figure out exactly what to do about such speech, especially when laws proscribing it will not make it disappear, may be hard to enforce, and may have unintended consequences. It is not evident that the hate speech problem in the United States, because such speech is constitutionally protected, is worse than that of European countries in which such speech is prohibited (although that result may be due to under-enforcement). In terms of reducing hate speech, a ban on it on a high school campus may help to mitigate it, and racial and ethnic minority students may be less likely to directly experience it, but it will not disappear. At most, students who use such language are more likely to be more careful about who may overhear them or with whom they share their real beliefs.

There may be more tactful ways of expressing racist sentiments but doing so in a more “civil” manner is not necessarily much of an improvement. Doctrinally, people are allowed to express pernicious stereotypes and make outrageous claims; it is not the role of government to censor them. Alternatively, “good” speech can counteract “bad” speech, with good or bad often being in the eye of the beholder.

Students may want to engage in such speech yet do not do so for fear of being suspended or expelled. We should not necessarily want a racist student punished for what they say or write; we should want them refuted. The expression of racist ideas can have some educational value, then, when educators can turn an incident into a teachable moment. So, yes, to answer one VC reader’s query in the comments section, a student should be able to use the “n” word without the possibility of being disciplined. But that is not to say that they should use the word. To have a legal or constitutional right to do this or that does not entail that it is fine to exercise such a right whenever they happen to want to do so. It is to say that it is their choice and that others are free to respond with their own counter speech.

The post Hate Speech at a High School appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/QIcoB68
via IFTTT

A short excerpt from the long opinion in Does v. Democratic People’s Republic of N. Korea, decided yesterday by Judge Timothy Kelly (D.D.C.):

In January 1968, North Korea chased down and captured the U.S.S. Pueblo in international waters, killing one of the ship’s crew and taking the rest hostage. For the next eleven months, North Korea beat, starved, interrogated, and tortured the survivors to extract false confessions from them. Before the year was up, North Korea got the admission and the apology that it wanted from the United States for supposedly violating North Korean territorial waters. And the hostages, having served their purpose, were released.

This case is the latest of several in which some of the Pueblo’s crew members, their families, and their estates sued North Korea under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and state tort law. North Korea failed to appear, and Plaintiffs moved for default judgment. For the reasons below, the Court will grant their motion and award long-overdue compensation to these victims of state-sponsored terrorism.

As to the statute of limitations, the opinion says this:

The FSIA’s statute of limitations imposes a cut-off date for lawsuits: the later of (1) 10 years after April 24, 1996, and 10 years after “the cause of action arose.” This timing provision is not jurisdictional, so it does not implicate the Court’s power to decide the case. And “by defaulting” and failing to “raise [this] affirmative defense in responding to a pleading,” North Korea has forfeited this timing-based defense. Moreover, district courts lack “authority to raise sua sponte the FSIA terrorism exception’s statute of limitations when it has been forfeited by a defendant” like North Korea “who is entirely absent from the proceedings.” So even though Plaintiffs’ complaint, filed in January 2023, might struggle to overcome the FSIA’s statute of limitations were the issue raised, the issue has not been raised, and the Court will not—cannot—address it unprompted.

The awards, which amount to $404.55M, are listed in this order; I don’t know whether there are any North Korean assets that plaintiffs could access to collect on the awards.

The post Court Awards $400M Default Judgment Against North Korea to Victims of 1968 Attack on U.S.S. Pueblo appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/qu7s3rS
via IFTTT

In a normal, pre-Donald-Trump political world—you know, when pastors didn’t pray around golden statues of political leaders and presidents didn’t plaster their names and faces on public buildings, passports, and currency like in a tin-pot dictatorship—lawmakers could agree on some basic parameters of decent behavior. Democrats and Republicans may fight about everything, but they could unite in their opposition to self-dealing outrages.

That’s no longer true. There is seemingly nothing Donald Trump or his family could do that would spark denunciations from the GOP. That’s especially obvious after Trump exacted vengeance in Tuesday’s primaries on the handful of Republicans who would sometimes raise concerns about the administration’s threats to the Constitution. I still remember when sucking up was a loathsome character trait, but now it’s a Republican art form.

In pre-Trump days, Republicans would laugh at Bagdad Bob-style third-world toadyism. Yet this week, Republican Gov. Jeff Landry went to Greenland as Trump’s special envoy. “Greenland was not on a map, until Donald Trump put it on a map,” he gushed. Ick. I also remember when Louisiana governors, however ill-behaved, were independent-minded and clever. Edwin Edwards on a foe: “He’s so slow that it takes him an hour and a half to watch 60 Minutes.”

While derriere-kissing behavior is embarrassing, the latest news from Washington, D.C., is shocking. Trump had sued the IRS for $10 billion for the leak of his tax returns, and now the agency that he runs has settled with the president and his family. The terms of the agreement are not surprisingly tilted heavily in Trump’s favor and should make any self-styled advocate for limited government blush, but you know that isn’t the case.

As The Dispatch‘s Jonah Goldberg explained, “Realizing that the courts might find this too cute to countenance, the Justice Department and IRS—both, again, run by Trump—compromised by creating a $1,776,000,000 fund (that “1776” before all the zeros is a play on the country’s 250th birthday) that Trump will control. Its primary function would be to compensate the January 6 rioters, all of whom he has already pardoned.” Trump isn’t particularly smart, but he is cunning. (And you thought it was self-dealing when unions negotiate for pay deals with the politicians that they elected to office.)

Further details of this “anti-weaponization” deal are more brazen. As the BBC noted, the deal “blocks the IRS from reviewing tax filings that Trump, his family and his businesses made in the past.” It’s a self-pardon for any financial problems and, as others have noted, largely puts the Trump family above the nation’s tax laws. In free societies, no one is above the law, whereas in despotisms the despot and his cronies can do pretty much anything they choose. As a Peruvian dictator once said, “For my friends everything, for my enemies the law.”

So where are Republican lawmakers? Some of them feigned ignorance of the details of any of this well-reported deal. Others expressed some concern, per the Deseret News, with Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R–S.D.) saying that he’s “not a big fan” of a slush fund that could pay millions of dollars to people who attacked the Capitol and its police officers. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R–S.C.) says he wants to ask more questions. It won’t be long before all elected Republicans—including those now expressing “concern”—become big fans of the deal.

Already, per the news report, Sen. Chuck Grassley (R–Iowa) is doing the whataboutism thing by comparing it to a deal made under the Biden administration—a laughably weak comparison. The case he references involves a $2 million settlement the administration made with former FBI officials, not to a president who “negotiated” a $1.8-billion slush fund with get-out-of-jail-free passes for his family.

One writer referred to Trump’s governance as “patrimonialism,” meaning that he treats the United States and its government as his personal property. That certainly helps explain Trump’s desecration of the White House and other D.C. monuments, as he imposes his Early Saddam Hussein style on everything largely free from congressional oversight. But that’s an overly generous description.

The key to Trump’s success is that he throws so much stuff against the wall that it leaves his opponents constantly flat-footed. Consider this doozy of a news story that, in that long-forgotten sane world, would be intolerable. From The New Republic: “At least two companies tied to Don Jr. and Eric Trump have won large government contracts.”

Why do Republicans roll over? “One of the saddest lessons of history is this: If we’ve been bamboozled long enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle,” wrote Carl Sagan. “It’s simply too painful to acknowledge, even to ourselves, that we’ve been taken. Once you give a charlatan power over you, you almost never get it back.” And now the nation will probably never get back to normal because a spineless GOP can never admit that it’s been conned.

The post Republicans Shrug at Trump's Outrageous Corruption appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/CvpNthO
via IFTTT

From H.C. v. Contreras, decided yesterday by California Court of Appeal Justice Mark Snauffer, joined by Justices Bert Levy and Donald Franson:

Bethany G. sought a protective order protecting H. C., her minor son, from H. C.’s father, Rudy C. Numerous witnesses testified at a hotly contested hearing after which the parties filed closing briefs. Rudy’s brief, submitted by counsel, contained fictitious caselaw and misstated the law. Counsel for Bethany directly and swiftly pointed the errors out to the trial court.

The trial court declined to issue the requested order, but its ruling erroneously relied on a nonexistent case and a serious legal misstatement—the very same shortcomings Bethany had already noted. As explained below, we reverse for further proceedings….

After the evidence was presented, but before the trial court ruled, Rudy’s counsel filed a closing brief. Most pertinent here, the brief contains the following portions:

“2) Insufficient Evidence of Harassment or Disturbing the Peace

“Under Family Code § 6320, abuse can include harassment or disturbing the peace of the other party. However, California courts have held that the behavior must be persistent, egregious, and intended to disturb the victim’s peace. In Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2005) 15 Cal.App.5th 788, the court emphasized that disturbing the peace should be understood as conduct that ‘destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.’

“In this case, the alleged incidents presented by Bethany do not rise to the level of severe, ongoing behavior required to meet the standard of ‘harassment’ or ‘disturbing the peace.’ The incidents presented lack the frequency, intensity, or impact required under the statutory definition and supporting case law, rendering them insufficient to constitute harassment or disturbing the peace.

“3) Failure to Demonstrate Reasonable Fear of Immediate Harm

“Family Code § 6203 also requires that abuse must place the petitioner in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any legitimate, immediate fear of bodily harm that is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.”

Bethany, also through counsel, replied to the brief, pointing out the citation to Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2005) 15 Cal.App.5th 788 did not exist. {Bethany’s counsel has identified a case, Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, which involved a father’s request to modify a custody order and is otherwise inapplicable to the present case.} Counsel also noted Family Code section 6203 did not require proving “legitimate, immediate fear of bodily harm that is objectively reasonable” before a restraining order may issue.

The trial court {Judge Irene A. Luna} issued a written ruling in Rudy’s favor. It contains the following pertinent portion [which is nearly identical to the brief submitted on Rudy’s behalf -EV] ….

Here, in our view, the trial court committed at least two clear legal errors. First, the trial court cited and relied on a fictitious case, i.e., Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2005) 15 Cal.App.5th 788. The error is underscored by the fact Bethany brought the fictitious citation to the court’s attention. The court ignored Bethany’s warning, and relied on it in its ruling. The trial court clearly incorporated this part of Rudy’s brief into its ruling because the ruling is a verbatim reproduction—save for changing “Bethany” to “Mother”—including a spacing typo.

Second, the trial court’s ruling reproducing Rudy’s brief misstated section 6203, the section defining abuse under the DVPA. Section 6203, subdivision (a) provides four independent circumstances constituting abuse:

“(1) To intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury.

“(2) Sexual assault.

“(3) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another.

“(4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.”

The trial court nonetheless ruled section 6203 “requires that abuse must place the petitioner in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury.”

The ruling misstates the law. Section 6203 is written in the alternative and not the conjunctive. Each subsection alone can constitute abuse. Immediate bodily injury is not a prerequisite to issuing a protective order.

“We have no difficulty concluding that it is an abuse of discretion for a court to rely in material part on fictional case authorities in rendering a decision or making an order. Reliance on fake cases is fundamentally incompatible with an informed exercise of discretion controlled by genuine principles of law. It seriously undermines the integrity of the outcome and erodes public confidence in our judicial system. It can also hinder meaningful appellate review.” …

When faced with nonexistent case law and misconstrued statutes brought to its attention, the court incorporated the objectionable material into its final ruling. The court’s ruling is without doubt an abuse of discretion and our confidence in the outcome is sufficiently undermined to justify reversal. For all future proceedings in this matter, we direct the matter be assigned to a new trial judge.

With respect to Rudy’s counsel’s actions, “Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (d), states it is the duty of an attorney ‘[t]o employ … those means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.’ California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.3(a)(1) and (2), prohibit an attorney from ‘knowingly mak[ing] a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail[ing] to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer’ or ‘knowingly misquot[ing] to a tribunal the language of a book, statute, decision or other authority.’ A person’s knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.”

The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion….

Amanda G. Hebesha, John P. Kinsey, and Stephanie Hosman (Wanger Jones Helsley PC) represent Bethany G.

The post California Judge "Cited and Relied on a Fictitious Case" Submitted by Lawyer, Even Though … appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/e6MOrxt
via IFTTT

Robby Soave and Christian Britschgi discuss the brewing Texas showdown between Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton and Democratic Senate candidate James Talarico. Then, they break down Rep. Nancy Mace’s (R–S.C.) proposal to give boomers a property tax break and Pope Leo XIV’s latest encyclical on artificial intelligence. Finally, they wrap up with some lighter debates over The Legend of Zelda, Nicolas Cage movies, retro-futurism, Jill Biden’s latest remarks, and whether President Donald Trump’s political influence will ever fade.

0:00—Heretics and hypocrites in Texas

14:30—Talarico takes back his former wokeness

19:10—If you can’t take it, don’t dish it

32:25—Coal mines are cool?

34:00—Mace’s boomer luxury communism

39:20—The pope’s views on AI

47:40—Why does anyone play video games?

58:59—Nicolas Cage is a good actor

1:05:57—Retro-futurism

1:10:26—Jill Biden’s latest remarks

1:18:36—Will Trump’s influence ever fade?

The post James Talarico vs. Ken Paxton, the Pope on AI, and Caves appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/NY6pBwU
via IFTTT

The event is free, but you need to register at the event page. From the page:

On June 2 at the Library of Congress, Eugene Volokh, one of the country’s preeminent First Amendment scholars and a Federalist Society member; Emerson Sykes, a staff attorney at the ACLU who focuses on free speech; and Mary Anne Franks, professor at the George Washington University Law School and a leading thinker on the relationship between free expression and equality—in conversation with moderator David Lat, founder of Above the Law and Original Jurisdiction—will dig into the questions that the headlines have missed.

If you’re in D.C. Tuesday, please do come by; should be a lot of fun.

The post Panel on Free Speech at the Library of Congress This Tuesday (June 2), 5:30 to 7:30 pm (Moderated by David Lat) appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/TZjJXrz
via IFTTT

The U.S. government has made it illegal to pay Iran a toll to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. On Thursday, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority, forbidding anyone who deals in U.S. dollars from doing business with the Iranian government body collecting the payments.

“The U.S. Treasury will aggressively target any actors involved—directly or indirectly—in facilitating tolls for the Strait and any willing partners will be penalized,” Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent declared. “All nations should reject outright any efforts by Iran to disrupt the free flow of commerce.”

It’s easy to miss it, but this action is a dramatic and strange inversion of Washington’s economic strategy. OFAC’s usual job is to stop the free flow of commerce by enforcing trade embargoes and financial sanctions on foreign enemies. The Trump administration in particular has gotten fond of using sanctions (and tariffs) to pressure friends and foes alike. 

U.S. sanctions were historically so effective because almost all of the world’s trade touches the U.S. financial system, directly or indirectly. Even non-American banks would refuse to deal with sanctioned customers for fear of being sanctioned themselves. In recent months, the Trump administration escalated from paper sanctions to physical attacks on Venezuelan and Iranian shipping. But the message was the same: Trading with these nations is not worth the risk. Making an example out of one business would scare the others into compliance.

Now Iran is playing this game in reverse. After the U.S.-Israeli attack in February, the Iranian navy declared the Strait of Hormuz closed and began attacking foreign ships in the Persian Gulf. Throughout the war, the Iranian government developed more systematic control over the waterway, banning ships from hostile nations, charging others ransom to cross through a mine-free safe lane, and cutting side deals with friendly nations.

Proponents of U.S. sanctions often liked to say that they were forcing international business to choose between Iranian markets and the U.S. dollar. With the tollbooth, Iran is presenting foreign countries with their own choice between U.S. support and petrochemical supply chains.

And the U.S. Treasury is reacting in the way that foreigners have historically reacted to U.S. sanctions. In the 1990s, the European Union passed a “blocking statute” that banned its companies from obeying non-European sanctions. (The rule turned out to be basically unenforceable.) China passed its own blocking statute in 2021, and invoked it for the first time this month, ordering refineries to continue buying Iranian oil in the face of U.S. sanctions. The ban on paying Hormuz tolls is in the same vein.

Bessent said that the sanctions were a warning aimed “in particular” at Oman, the Arab monarchy that sits opposite Iran on the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has publicly offered Oman a share in the Hormuz tollbooth, and Omani officials were privately in talks over implementation, The New York Times reported last week. The “toll” would be renamed a “fee for services” to be less provocative, according to the Times.

The Trump administration wasn’t buying the rebranded toll. “Oman will behave like everybody else or we’ll have to blow them up,” President Donald Trump warned at a Wednesday cabinet session. After Bessent and Trump’s threats, Bessent told reporters that Oman has “no plans for tolling the strait.”

Trump threatening Oman with physical violence in response to a trade restriction is another ironic echo of the U.S.-Iranian conflict. Iran has demanded U.S. sanctions relief—specifically, access to Iranian dollars currently frozen in foreign bank accounts—as a condition of ending the war. More than the paltry revenue it generates, the Hormuz tollbooth is valuable to Iran because it allows the country to forcibly undermine the U.S. sanctions regime. Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said last month that the toll scheme would make foreign sanctions “practically ineffective.”

That is the future of economic sanctions. They were once a game of cat-and-mouse between U.S. regulators, who scoured the banking system for forbidden transactions, and foreign merchants, who tried to hide their trade behind increasingly complex layers of paperwork. Now sanctions are a direct extension of warfare—and U.S. opponents are learning to manipulate business risk to their advantage. The future for free global trade looks bleak.

The post Iran Is Turning America's Sanctions Playbook Against It appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/Lyg1eM5
via IFTTT

The boy who cried we have a deal to open the Strait of Hormuz: We’ve done this over and over again, but maybe this time, it’s real. Anonymous sources within the government are telling news outlets that they’ve drafted up a “memorandum of understanding” with Iran (which still needs approval from President Donald Trump) that would deal with reopening the Strait of Hormuz and extend the ceasefire.

“Should an agreement be finalized, it could give Mr. Trump an off-ramp from a war that has driven up oil prices and grown deeply unpopular at home,” reports The New York Times. “It could also eventually allow Iran to regain access to frozen overseas assets and provide a route for Tehran to get billions of dollars of oil revenue flowing again.”

Vice President J.D. Vance confirms that the administration is “very close” to a deal; one sticking point appears to be that Trump wants Iran to get rid of its enriched uranium, which might not end up happening. Mediators have, over the past few weeks, struggled to agree on a lasting deal, with ceasefires happening in tiny spurts and tensions flaring back up again. It doesn’t help that the entire region’s been running hot, so mediators sometimes struggle to figure out whether an agreement between the U.S. and Iran should also attempt to cover tensions between Israel and Lebanon (which have flared back up again this week with an attack on Beirut).

Russia hit Romania: The Russian war on Ukraine has now spilled over into Galati, Romania, with a drone hitting an apartment building there, injuring two people and starting a fire.

“The episode comes amid heightened fears that Russia might seek to expand the war beyond Ukraine to target a member of the NATO security alliance,” reports The New York Times. (Romania is part of NATO.)

Romanian President Nicusor Dan said he would “order proportionate measures in relation to the Russian Federation” in consultation with his national defense team. “The unprecedented nature of the event demands a firm, coordinated, and appropriate response—at the national, allied, and international levels.…What happened today in Galați is the direct consequence of Russia’s war of aggression unleashed against Ukraine, the irresponsible and indiscriminate manner in which Moscow operates these weapon systems in the immediate vicinity of NATO borders, as well as the systematic disregard for international law. There is no ambiguity regarding the perpetrator or the cause of this aggression.”

“Russian drones have strayed across Romania’s border a number of times during the four-year war with Ukraine,” reports the BBC, “but it is the first time citizens from the Nato member state have been hurt.”

---

Scenes from New York: This strikes me as something that is not going to make government efficient in the slightest.

This morning we are introducing COGE — the Commission on Government Efficiency.⁰⁰This Commission will find ways for our city to work smarter, faster, and more effectively for working people. ⁰⁰New Yorkers deserve a city government as careful with their money as they are.

— Mayor Zohran Kwame Mamdani (@NYCMayor) May 28, 2026

But I appreciate this dose of optimism/useful input:

I'm eager to see what comes from COGE. If the commission reflects a wide range of perspectives, and doesn't rule out approaches that have worked well elsewhere on ideological or partisan grounds, this commission could do an enormous amount of good.

One excellent place to… https://t.co/gYe5cS9hXl

— Reihan Salam (@reihan) May 28, 2026

---

QUICK HITS

• “After more than a year of teasing the idea, Governor Ron DeSantis on Wednesday floated a plan that could eventually eliminate property taxes for more than 90% of Florida residents who own their homes, shifting the bulk of the tax burden onto the state’s wealthiest homeowners,” reports Bloomberg. “The Republican governor’s proposal would initially increase the state’s homestead exemption, which shields a portion of the value of a primary residence from property tax, from $50,000 to $250,000, and then eventually double it to $500,000. DeSantis called a special legislative session for next week to get the idea on the ballot in November.” This strikes me as a pretty blatantly populist move to curry favor with his base (DeSantis ends his term as Florida governor in 2026, but it’s very possible he’ll go for the presidential nomination at some point, in which case those voters might come in handy). And I can’t exactly be opposed to people having greater ability to shield themselves from taxes, but it is rather unfair to the wealthy. (Unironically: Won’t someone think of the Florida multimillionaires and billionaires?)
• A related response, by Reason‘s Eric Boehm, to Rep. Nancy Mace’s (R–S.C.) almost trollish proposal: “Stop Giving Property Tax Breaks to Senior Citizens.” A sampling: “Specialized tax breaks for people within certain age brackets make very little sense—and they don’t actually lower taxes. If the government does not reduce the cost of public services, then a special tax break for one group merely forces everyone else to pick up the slack. A special tax break targeted specifically to senior citizens is worse. The median household headed by someone over age 65 had a net worth of more than $400,000 in 2022, according to Federal Reserve data. For those under age 35, the average was $39,000. However you look at it, elderly homeowners are plainly not a demographic that is desperately in need of tax relief—and giving property tax breaks to the old means pushing the entire property tax burden onto relatively poorer households.”
• A Blue Origin rocket exploded during launch.
• This is straight-up insane:

Biden's own wife thought he was having a stroke. Two NY Times columnists insisted he'd fought Trump to a draw. https://t.co/7dMB96H4Tk pic.twitter.com/5SvGRCipb3

— Dan McLaughlin (@baseballcrank) May 29, 2026

• A bubble house with a bomb shelter—a relic from a bygone era—is for sale in California, the last of its kind.
• Interesting differences so far between New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s and former Mayor Eric Adams’ administrations:

Advocates for crime are angry that Zohran Mamdani, who they hoped might legalize crime, instead opposes crime and is even sending police officers to fine and arrest *more* people who commit crimes. https://t.co/6hrckPdaOu pic.twitter.com/ka4MetYa9n

— Josh Barro (@jbarro) May 28, 2026

The post Maybe This Time appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/nY9rekg
via IFTTT

Following up my earlier post about the truly outrageous so-called “Settlement Agreement” between the IRS and our President, thirty-five (!) retired federal judges have submitted a “Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order,” calling that Agreement “the product of collusion and a fraud on the Court.” Accordingly, they ask the Court to use its power under FRCP 60 to set aside its earlier judgment dismissing the case, re-open the case, and “commence an inquiry into whether the Court was deceived, including with respect to the existence of an underlying case or controversy and any purported arms-length negotiations undertaken to resolve it.”

The purported “settlement” that the parties never placed before this Court raises profound questions about the parties’ candor toward the Court and manipulation of the judicial system, which threatens to undermine confidence in the administration of justice. As former judges, Movants have an interest in bringing to the Court’s attention these concerns and the availability of relief under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the Court to set aside the judgment and reopen the case. . . .

The Court was deceived. Despite Plaintiffs not having mentioned any settlement in their Notice, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) publicly announced a “settlement” of this action shortly after Plaintiffs filed their dismissal. That “settlement” commandeers the contrived sum of $1.776 billion from the United States Treasury, to be handed out to recipients chosen by a commission effectively controlled by the President. The DOJ is calling this the “Anti-Weaponization Fund.” The day after the “settlement” containing the Anti-Weaponization Fund was announced, the DOJ announced that it had subsequently agreed to release “any and all claims . . . whether presently known or unknown, that—as of the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement—have been or could have been asserted by [the United States] against any of the Plaintiffs or related or affiliated individuals . . . or parties . . . by reason of, with respect to, in connection with, or which arise out of . . . any matters currently pending or that could be pending . . . before Defendants or other agencies or departments.” The plain language of this extremely broad provision sweeps in Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) audits of Plaintiffs’ tax returns and all other claims the United States might have against Plaintiffs—extraordinary benefits for which no consideration was provided to the government.

Movants submit that this “settlement” is a product of collusion and is itself a fraud on the Court. But the Court need not decide that ultimate issue now. At this juncture, Movants request only that the Court exercise its powers under Rule 60 to set aside its order ending the case based upon Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal. That will allow the Court to commence an inquiry into commence an inquiry into whether the Court was deceived, including with respect to the existence of an underlying case or controversy and any purported arms-length negotiations undertaken to resolve it.

As set forth below, this Court has the power under Rule 60 to determine whether there has been a “corruption of the judicial process itself,” and may set aside a judgment and reopen a case under Rule 60(d)(3), as well as other subsections of Rule 60, whether by this motion or sua sponte. Doing so will allow judicial review of the extraordinary—and historically unprecedented—circumstances presented by this litigation and by the collusive “settlement” that invokes this litigation as the legal justification for its terms. [Emphases not really necessary, but added anyway]

To be continued (I hope).  If this “Settlement” is allowed to stand, we have truly lost our way.

The post The Art of the Deal, cont'd appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/EBjkr5D
via IFTTT

From Judge Mark Kearney (E.D. Pa.) yesterday in Doe v. Trustees of the Univ. of Penn.(for more on the quote in the title of this post, see here):

A white non-Jewish male sues the University of Pennsylvania for denying him admission to its Wharton business school master’s program because he is not Jewish…. He claims widespread animus in the business community to non-Jewish men and disclosing his name will subject him to physical harm because of “Jewish agencies” ability to harm non-Jewish men. He does not show reasonable fear of severe harm resulting from litigating without a pseudonym. And even if he did, his reasonable fear of severe harm does not outweigh the public’s interest in open litigation examining his claims an internationally known business school denies admission of white men because they are not Jewish….

Mr. Doe identifies three harms if he discloses his name: (1) “permanent professional disbarment”; (2) “social stigma”; and (3) “threat of physical violence.” Mr. Doe claims in his unidentified “industry,” the human resources department are “led and disproportionately staffed by Jewish women” who “already discriminate against non-Jewish White males such as [himself.]” He alleges twenty-five of his co-workers with “Jewish names” received early promotions.

He further argues “many high level managers at large employers have publicly stated their organizations [sic] policies prohibit the hiring of White males;” “some” of these unidentified employers “implement policies” to allow for the hiring of a white male only if an “‘exception’ were granted,” and to Mr. Doe’s knowledge these “exceptions” are “given exclusively to Jews;” and the “willingness of [Human Relations] Jews to discriminate against non-Jewish White males” makes it reasonable to conclude he “would be completely debarred from traditional employment” if his name is revealed in his lawsuit against the University for “favoring treatment of Jews” in admissions. Mr. Doe also alleges he “considered establishing his own firm as a work-around to discrimination,” but he would need an investment from venture capitalists which are “run by [Venture Capitalist] Jews” who “usually don’t invest in firms owned by non-Jewish White males.”

Mr. Doe suggests a threat of physical violence to him because Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad murdered President John F. Kennedy nearly sixty-three years ago (and “possibly [President Kennedy’s] family members”) to obstruct President Kennedy’s opposition to the interests of “Jewish Supremacists.” He claims Mossad is “still active and apparently very powerful” in the United States because of some nebulous connection to the Jeffrey Epstein scandal. Mr. Doe argues litigating under a pseudonym would deter “Jewish agencies” from “murdering” him and he “may have already survived an assassination attempt” through a romantic liaison with a Jewish woman who allegedly attempted to poison him….

We start with the fundamental principle judicial proceedings should be public. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires litigants to identify themselves in their pleadings. As explained by our Court of Appeals, “[i]dentifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The people have a right to know who is using their courts.” Defendants “have a right to confront their accusers” and a plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym “runs afoul of the public’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings.” … Our Court of Appeals allow parties to proceed anonymously only in “exceptional cases” ….

Mr. Doe does not offer a reasonable fear of severe harm [that would make this case exceptional -EV]. Mr. Doe offers, at best, generalized and speculative personal opinions asserting every human resources department in businesses across the country are run by Jewish women and any investment he may possibly require from venture capitalists in some possible future business deal are run by “Venture Capitalist Jews” and revealing his name would somehow cause “severe harm” in the form of “permanent professional debarment” requiring anonymity. Economic harm is not sufficient ….

Our Court of Appeals recently rejected a similar argument brought by a Jane Doe against the University of Pennsylvania. Ms. Doe sued the University under Title VI alleging a professor discriminated against her on the basis of her race and, after she reported the discrimination, the University suspended her from a pre-med baccalaureate program. Ms. Doe moved to proceed under a pseudonym …. Judge Rufe rejected Ms. Doe’s argument the disclosure of her identity would associate her with the University’s suspension and may hinder her chances of acceptance into medical school or her ability to pursue future career opportunities. Judge Rufe concluded Ms. Doe’s argument her anonymity is necessary to prevent possible embarrassment and economic harm is insufficient to justify the use of a pseudonym under Megless. Judge Rufe also noted two decisions in this District holding diminished chances of acceptance into professional schools does not warrant anonymity. Our Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Rufe’s decision finding allegations of possible harm in acceptance to medical school or to secure future employment in the medical profession constitute embarrassment and economic harm insufficient to proceed under a pseudonym….

We conclude the type of harm alleged by Mr. Doe—possible discrimination by unidentified human resources specialists at unidentified employers and unidentified venture capitalists—constitutes embarrassment and economic harm and does not rise to extraordinary cause required by our Court of Appeals to allow Mr. Doe to proceed anonymously.

Mr. Doe next argues disclosure of his name will cause “social stigma” constituting severe harm …. Mr. Doe relies solely on Doe v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company to support his “social stigma” argument. In Hartford Life, Judge Linares allowed a John Doe plaintiff (an attorney with mental illness concerns) to proceed in pseudonym in claims against a long term disability plan for denial of benefits. The claimant-lawyer suffered from bipolar disorder and sought to proceed under a pseudonym, asserting damage which might result to his professional career as an attorney if his medical condition became public knowledge. Judge Linares reasoned almost twenty years ago mental illness then carried a stigma which “society may not yet understand or accept,” and analogized the stigma of mental illness to a woman seeking an abortion or “a homosexual fired from his job because of his sexual orientation” justifying anonymity.

Mr. Doe argues the social stigma he faces is “markedly more severe” than the attorney before Judge Linares with a mental health diagnosis. Mr. Doe candidly characterizes his complaint as making “inflammatory claims” and “[p]eople who mak[e] such claims face enormous social stigma, commonly being branded as ‘antisemitic,’ ‘Nazi,’ ‘racist,’ ‘misogynist,’ ‘homophobic,’ ‘crackpot,’ or ‘unpatriotic.'” He claims being called an “antisemite” and “Nazi” in “contemporary times” means “the pinnacle of evil” subjecting him, and other plaintiffs like him, to a “dehumanizing stigma.”

Mr. Doe does not offer legal authority supporting his argument social and reputational fears created by his allegations he candidly describes as “inflammatory” constitute a reasonable fear of severe harm. Our study further confirmed social stigmatization is insufficient to support a request for anonymity. For example, in Doe v. Rider University, Judge Bongiovanni denied an expelled college student’s request to proceed under a pseudonym. The expelled student Doe asserted federal and state law claims against his university arising from a disciplinary hearing charging him with sexual assault of a female student. Mr. Doe alleged the university’s flawed disciplinary process resulted in his expulsion. He sought to proceed under a pseudonym arguing if he is forced to proceed publicly, he will suffer from the severe social stigma attached to accused sex offenders making it difficult for him to be admitted to other colleges and obtain employment.

Judge Bongiovanni concluded the social stigma attached to accused sex offenders is insufficient to support anonymity. She reasoned whether Mr. Doe committed sexual assault is not the issue; the issue is whether the university subjected him to an unfair disciplinary hearing. We are persuaded by Judge Bongiovanni’s reasoning as applied to Mr. Doe’s unwillingness to disclose his name. The issue is not whether Mr. Doe is an antisemite based on the words he chose to include in his complaint; the issue is whether the University denied him admission to its business school because of his race and “non-Jewish heritage.”

Mr. Doe lastly identifies the threat to his physical safety based on Mossad’s role in the United States and a claimed risk of poison from a romantic partner as a reasonable fear of severe harm if required to litigate without a pseudonym. We again are not persuaded.

There must be a legitimate threat of physical harm, not “perceived threats or mere frustration voiced by the public.” We are persuaded by our colleagues rejecting similar allegations of perceived harm. For example, in B.L. v. Fetherman, a parent sued the school district alleging its curriculum discriminated against white students. The parent moved to proceed under a pseudonym, claiming his portrayal within the community as a “villain” for challenging the school’s curriculum and citing threats including a third-party message on LinkedIn making “alarming comments” about his professional life, media outlets identifying the parent and his spouse and where they live and perhaps encouraging vandalism at his home, and an online post purporting to identify the parent’s then-college-aged child encouraging people to contact the college to pressure the school to rescind its offer of acceptance. Judge Allen found the parent’s “vague reference” to some members of the public’s anger with him for filing the lawsuit “amounts to mere frustration rather than a credible risk of harm” because the parent only referred to a “vague possibility of physical harm” and found “a lack of any credible threats of harm based on [parent’s] general statements … and does not provide any reasonable basis for his fear.”

In Doe v. Felician University, relied on by Judge Allen, a Muslim woman of Palestinian descent sued Felician University claiming it discriminated against her because of her creed, ancestry, and national origin. Ms. Doe moved to proceed anonymously alleging stalking, cyberbullying, derogatory blog posts, and threats of physical harm by students and faculty at the university. Judge Mannion found “disapproval and frustration voiced by some members of the public on the blog post do not amount to threats” and while the “blog post and comments are filled with hate speech and offensive comments, … none of the language create a risk of retaliatory harm and do not threaten Ms. Doe.” Judge Mannion concluded Ms. Doe’s allegations the specific blog promoted violence against Muslims did not contain promotion of violence either towards all Muslims or Ms. Doe individually and a blog comment “if anyone knows Ms. Doe’s identity, [the blogger] will post it on the blog does not qualify as a substantial threat warranting protection.” Judge Mannion found no specific credible threat leading him to deny the motion to proceed anonymously….

The court also noted:

Mr. Doe publicly accuses the University of discriminatory conduct. The University would be prejudiced by requiring it to defend itself publicly against serious accusations of discrimination asserted by Mr. Doe “from behind a cloak of anonymity.” …

{In Doe v. Shakur (S.D.N.Y. 1996), plaintiff victim of sexual assault sued Tupac Shakur and Charles Fuller for damages. Plaintiff sought to proceed anonymously. Judge Chin denied the motion…. Judge Chin recognized plaintiff understandably did not want to be publicly identified but concluded her legitimate privacy concerns did not outweigh the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. Judge Chin reasoned proceeding anonymously would place Defendant Shakur “at a serious disadvantage, for he would be required to defend himself publicly while plaintiff could make her accusations from behind a cloak of anonymity.”

Our colleagues within this District and Circuit have adopted Judge Chin’s reasoning in denying motions to proceed anonymously. In Doe v. Court of Common Pleas of Butler Cnty. (W.D. Pa. 2017), Judge Bissoon denied plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym where plaintiff alleged a Pennsylvania state court judge offered her a position as a probation officer in exchange for an ongoing sexual relationship. Plaintiff argued disclosure of her identity would expose her and her family to unwanted media attention and potential violence by parolees she supervised. Judge Bissoon reasoned Ms. Doe “is not the only party exposed to public humiliation,” finding the public claims can “cast a shadow over the defendant’s reputation,” “may cause damage to their good names and reputation,” “‘basic fairness generally dictates that plaintiffs who publicly accuse defendants in civil suits ‘must [sue] under their real names,'” and defendants should not be made to defend themselves publicly while the plaintiff is “behind a cloak of anonymity.”

Judge Bongiovanni similarly reasoned fundamental fairness generally requires plaintiffs to make accusations publicly and it is unfair to allow a plaintiff to accuse a defendant from “behind a cloak of anonymity.” And Judge Marston in Doe v. Main Line Hospitals, Inc. (E.D. Pa. 2020), similarly reasoned Main Line Hospitals would be placed at “a serious disadvantage” by having to defend itself publicly while the plaintiff nurse, who alleged the Hospital fired her after learning of her drug addiction in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, “could make her accusations behind a cloak of anonymity.”

The court ordered that the plaintiff’s name, which he filed under seal without first getting leave of court to file it under seal, would be unsealed June 10, presumably to give plaintiff the opportunity to appeal if he so chooses.

The post No Pseudonymity for Plaintiff Allegedly "Enticed by an Attractive, Busty Jewess" appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/3V0MnGg
via IFTTT