One Step Closer to Kidney Transplants From Pigs


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Nearly 107,000 Americans are waiting for a lifesaving organ transplant; 90,000 of them are hoping for a kidney. The demand for organs clearly exceeds the supply.

In October, transplant surgeons at New York University (NYU) took a small but significant step toward addressing this shortage with organs from other species. They transplanted a kidney from a pig that had been genetically modified to not express the carbohydrate alpha-gal, which occurs in all mammals except humans and other primates. Because infants develop antibodies to alpha-gal in response to gut microbiota, transplants from other mammals provoke a devastating immune rejection.

The NYU surgeons attached the modified pig kidney to blood vessels in a deceased woman’s upper leg (with the permission of her family). Her bodily functions were maintained with a ventilator. Researchers observed the kidney for 54 hours. It functioned normally, producing urine and waste products like creatinine, with no signs of immune rejection.

In July 2021, a Massachusetts General Hospital transplant team reported the results of an experiment involving kidneys from pigs that had been genetically modified even more extensively. These pigs do not express alpha-gal or two other carbohydrates attacked by the human system, and they carry several human genes that regulate immune response and blood coagulation. The researchers transplanted kidneys from the pigs into macaque monkeys. While one died after two days, three others lived 135, 265, and 316 days.

These researchers are trying to overcome a problem that has long plagued attempts at xenotransplantation, or procedures involving human recipients but nonhuman tissues or organs. In the early 1960s, for example, Tulane University surgeon Keith Reemtsma transplanted chimpanzee kidneys into 13 patients. Most failed within four to eight weeks, although one lasted for nine months before the patient died. In 1985, Loma Linda University Medical Center heart surgeon Leonard Bailey transplanted a baboon heart into “Baby Fae,” who had been born prematurely with a fatal heart defect. Acute immune rejection caused the heart to fail after 20 days.

University of Alabama transplant surgeons David Cooper and Hidetaka Hara suggested in a September EBioMedicine article that “patients who are unlikely to live long enough to receive a kidney from a deceased human donor would benefit from the opportunity of a period of dialysis-free support by a pig kidney.” That would help perfect the use of animal organs for transplantation.

In 1995, Cambridge University transplant surgeon Roy Calne suggested that xenotransplantation “is just around the corner, but it may be a very long corner.” The NYU results suggest scientists are getting closer to rounding it.

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Brickbat: Pay as You Go


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Quebec Premier François Legault said those who are not vaccinated against COVID-19 will have to pay a special health tax. Legault did not say when the tax will start nor how much it will be. But he said it will be more than $50 or $100 ($40 or $80 U.S.) and would give people an incentive to get the vaccine.

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No First Amendment Violation in Removal of Billboard After S.F. Mayor Had Criticized It

From Zhou v. Breed, decided Friday by the Ninth Circuit (Judges John Owens and Michelle Friedland, and visiting Sixth Circuit Judge Danny Boggs):

Appellants allege that both [S.F. Mayor London] Breed and Clear Channel violated their First Amendment right to free speech. To the extent that Appellants argue that Breed, or any public official, violated their First Amendment rights simply by speaking critically of a billboard or calling for its removal, that theory is squarely foreclosed by precedent.

We have previously joined a “host of other circuits” in holding that “public officials may criticize practices that they would have no constitutional ability to regulate, so long as there is no actual or threatened imposition of government power or sanction.” Am. Fam. Ass’n, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2002); see also id. (“[L]etters which encouraged but did not threaten or intimidate landowner to terminate lease with billboard owner did not violate billboard owner’s First Amendment rights.” (citing R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New Hope (3d Cir. 1984))). Appellants have not alleged that, in criticizing one of Appellants’ billboards, Breed or any public official made any threats of government sanction against Zhou, AAFPAC, Clear Channel, Outfront Media, Inc. …, or anyone.

Appellants’ argument that their First Amendment rights were violated when Clear Channel, a private company, removed one of their billboards also fails. “A threshold requirement of any constitutional claim is the presence of state action.” We “start with the presumption that private conduct does not constitute governmental action.” Appellants do not allege any facts or put forward any plausible legal theory that would support treating Clear Channel as a state actor in this case.

The mere fact that Breed or other public officials criticized a billboard or called for its removal, without coercion or threat of government sanction, does not make that billboard’s subsequent removal by a private party state action. See also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan (1999) (“Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.”). Nor does the fact that companies that own billboards might be subject to some government regulations convert Clear Channel’s decision to take down the billboard following public officials’ criticism into state action. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck (2019) (“Put simply, being regulated by the State does not make one a state actor.”); Mathis v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]hat PG & E is a public utility subject to extensive state regulation … without more, is insufficient to infuse its conduct with state action.”). Because Appellants have failed to allege state action, the district court properly dismissed their First Amendment claim.

{Appellants argue that, even if their allegations could not support a coercion theory of state action or a regulation theory of state action when those theories are analyzed separately, their allegations could support a finding of state action if those theories were analyzed together. That argument also fails.} …

The district court correctly struck, pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Appellants’ claims against Breed for inducing breach of contract and intentional interference with a contractual relationship….

Appellants do not have a sufficient legal basis for either of their tort claims asserted against Breed. To succeed on their claim for inducing a breach of contract, Appellants must show that a contract “was in fact breached.” Because … Appellants cannot show that Clear Channel breached its contract [given that the contract allowed Clear Channel to terminate it], Appellants’ claim against Breed for inducing a breach of contract necessarily fails.

To succeed on their claim for intentional interference with a contractual relationship, Appellants must show that Breed knew of Appellants’ billboard contracts and that she engaged in “intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship.” Other than threadbare recitals of some of the elements of this cause of action, Appellants do not allege that Breed knew of their contracts with Clear Channel or Outfront, or that any of Breed’s actions were intentionally designed to disrupt Appellants’ contractual relationships with those companies. Indeed, the only specific action Appellants allege that Breed took was speaking critically about one of the billboards during a television interview. It is not possible to infer from that allegation that Breed’s aim was to interfere with any of Appellants’ contractual relationships. Consequently, Appellants failed to satisfy their burden of showing a sufficient probability of success on the merits of their tort claims against Breed, and those claims were properly struck.

The state action analysis is indeed consistent with the circuit court precedents (see this post). The interference with contract analysis strikes me as odd: Surely someone criticizing a billboard must be aware that the billboard was up under a contract, and it at least seems plausible that criticizing a billboard is intended to cause a “disruption” of a contractual relationship (even if not a breach), by being intended to urge the billboard company to remove it. Nonetheless, the claim should fail for another reason: Under California law, intentional interference with business relations (short of intentional inducement of an actual breach) is generally actionable only if it’s otherwise unlawful (e.g., involves a threat of violence or some other illegal conduct).

Here’s the factual backstory about the content of the billboards, from the decision below, though the content isn’t legally relevant:

October 2019, plaintiffs Ellen Lee Zhou and the Asian American Freedom Political Action Committee (“AAFPAC”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) posted two billboard advertisements in support of Zhou’s campaign for mayor of the City and County of San Francisco….

One of AAFPAC’s billboards showed Breed driving a red bus with the text “Werewolves of London Tours” near cars with smashed windows. Additional text read, “Vote Nov. 5 for Super Mayor Ellen Lee Zhou!”

Clear Channel and OutFront posted the billboards in October 2019. Soon after, Breed and her allies “began a concerted effort” to pressure Clear Channel and OutFront to remove the billboards by denouncing them as offensive, racist, and divisive. Breed’s campaign publicized an October 21, 2019 press conference in front of the OutFront billboard, although Breed did not attend it. Those present, including State Assemblyman David Chiu and members of the Board of Supervisors, denounced the content of the billboard and called for its removal. News outlets reported various individuals describing the contents of the billboard as racist, misogynistic, and sexist, and opining that it had no place in San Francisco. Breed gave a media interview in which she said, “‘[The billboard] is hurtful, it’s disrespectful and it is no place [sic], I think in San Francisco for that kind of divisiveness.'” …

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Martin Luther King on the Ethics of Resistance to State Authority


MLK
Martin Luther King, Jr.

 

Today is Martin Luther King Day, an appropriate time to honor and examine King’s legacy. One of the things King was most famous for was his advocacy of civil disobedience, and – more generally – the idea that disobeying laws enacted by governments is sometimes justified.

Georgetown philosophy Prof. Jason Brennan, himself the author of an important book on the morality of resistance to government power, has a useful summary of King’s views on these issues. As Brennan points out, King believed that disobedience to unjust laws is often entirely justified, even the laws in question were enacted by democratic governments:

Many people assume that we almost always have a duty to obey the law, even unjust laws. King argued that unjust laws are no laws at all. Or, more precisely, he argued that if a law is unjust, there is no obligation to obey it and no right to enforce it.

He argued there could be all sorts of reasons why a law lacks legitimacy and authority. King denied that something evil could be rendered permissible if a democracy voted for it. He thought we had genuine rights and these rights are not created by government fiat or social agreement.

He also thought laws could lack legitimacy and authority because they were passed by an unfair procedure. For instance, many countries in Southern states were even majority Black, but only the white minority could vote.

I think King was right about this, and that, for many unjust laws, we have no obligation to obey. I outlined some of the reasons why in this 2014 piece about why most undocumented immigrants have no moral obligation to obey laws denying them the right to move to another country (see also follow-up post here). The same reasoning applies to many other unjust laws, at least those that inflict great harm on their victims.

Brennan is also right to note that, on King’s view, justified disobedience to unjust laws does not always require accepting punishment. He favored such acceptance, in some cases, for largely tactical reasons:

Let’s distinguish between two different kinds of reasons for accepting punishment. One reason could be that you deserve punishment for breaking an authoritative law. But, as King makes clear in his writings, he generally thought the laws he broke lacked authority. Breaking these laws was not merely permissible, but heroic and good.

So, a second possible reason to accept punishment is strategic; by accepting punishment, a person can engage in a public act of protest. They can show that they did not break the law out of convenience or criminal intent, but from concern for justice. Accepting punishment could also induce the public to sympathize with the victims of the law.

Civil disobedience is a public act in which a person not only breaks the law, but makes sure others see them doing it. The point of civil disobedience is to change that law.

Sometimes, the goal of disobedience is not to effect a change in law (which, may, for political reasons, be impossible at the time), but simply to prevent injustice in that particular case. For example, many of the people who violated the Fugitive Slave Acts in the 19th century did not turn themselves into the authorities and accept punishment. And they were entirely justified in so doing. Accepting punishment would, among other things, have impeded their efforts to help escaped slaves. At least for a long time, they had little hope of getting Congress to repeal the Fugitive Slave Acts. But they could and did help individual slaves escape their reach.

Brennan also points out, contrary to much conventional wisdom, that King was not an advocate of absolute non-violence, but merely supported it as a strategy for the civil rights movement on tactical grounds:

King was not a pacifist. He believed violence in self-defense and in defense of others is permissible. He owned firearms for self-protection and even tried to get a concealed carry permit. And, as we saw, he needed those firearms because he received constant death threats and was in fact murdered.

King defended nonviolence on strategic grounds for the purpose of changing the law. He argued that if activists fought back against the police–even if they thought the police had it coming–by returning violence for violence, the public would probably side with the police and the government against the people. He thought the public would condemn the activists and their cause. In contrast, but refusing to fight back, the victims of injustice could win the public’s support and possibly even the sympathy (or “friendship,” King says) of those attacking them.

While King was not, on principle opposed to all violent resistance to injustice, it is important to emphasize that he did oppose violence targeting innocent civilians, including that caused by rioting. In 1968, he warned that “riots are socially destructive and self-defeating” and that, “[e]very time a riot develops, it helps George Wallace.” He opposed the riots of his own time on both moral and instrumental grounds. While we cannot know for sure, it seems likely he would have felt the same way about the last year’s riots in the wake of the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police.

The obvious criticism of views like King’s is that many people may have poor judgment about which laws are unjust. For example, the people who stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021 likely believed that enforcement of the laws against doing so would be unjust, because (in their view) Donald Trump had a right to stay in power. Similarly, terrorists often believe they are justified in violating laws against murder and assault.

But the risk that individual citizens may be mistaken about matters of justice has to be balanced against the danger that government can be wrong about such things, as well. Even in democratic societies, there is a long and awful history of the latter.  Throughout American history, many more people have been killed and oppressed by unjust exercises of government power than by individuals acting on mistaken assumptions about which laws are morally defensible. The toll of slavery and segregation (both imposed by law) alone easily outweighs that of all morally motivated private disobedience to law combined. The extent to which people should defer to the government’s judgment on questions of justice depends heavily on how good that judgment is. All too often, the answer is that it is, at best, highly unreliable.

Even when governments are acting unjustly, there should nonetheless – for reasons well-articulated by King’s critique of riots – be a very strong presumption against violent action that might harm innocents. But the threshold for defensible peaceful disobedience is much lower.

King’s views on the ethics of disobeying laws do not definitively settle the debate over this age-old question. Even a great historic icon like King was not infallible, and could be wrong on some issues. Still, his positions are well-worth exploring, and have obvious continuing relevance, even many years after his tragic death.

 

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Claim that “Certificate of Need” Law Lacks a Rational Basis Can Go Forward

From Slaughter v. Dobbs, decided Thursday by Judge Carlton Reeves (S.D. Miss.):

This case is a constitutional challenge to Mississippi’s Certificate of Need (“CON”) program. Under consideration are a set of laws that require health care facilities to apply and receive a state-issued CON before opening, expanding, relocating, changing ownership, or even acquiring major medical equipment. Also at stake are 40-year-old moratoria which bar the issuance of CONs to certain new health care facilities, particularly those that offer at-home health care services.

From 1985, three years after the creation of the moratorium, to 2014, the Mississippi State Department of Health reports that demand for at-home health services tripled. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, agencies offering these services have taken on critical importance as many of us seek alternatives to hospitals, nursing homes, and other care facilities that increase the risk of exposure to the virus. To protect ourselves and our loved ones, and in our collective effort to stop the spread, some of us turned to agencies like those at issue in this case.

Plaintiff Charles Slaughter alleges that the CON regime, including the moratoria, violates the equal protection and substantive due process clauses of the United States and Mississippi Constitutions. Specifically, he claims that the regime harms Mississippians, protects monopolies, and worsens the very goals it claims to advance. For support, he relies on 40 years’ worth of research finding that CON laws stifle innovation in the health care industry and merely protect established companies from competition….

By way of background, CONs were a national phenomenon of the 1970’s. The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 conditioned federal funding upon states adopting CON programs that met federal guidelines. In 1979 the Mississippi legislature, like many other states, adopted CON laws. By 1982, every state except for Louisiana had implemented some version of a CON program. See National Conference of State Legislatures.

In 1987, however, Congress repealed the law. Since then, widespread scholarly and government research has admitted that the experiment was misguided. See Complaint at 70 n.1 (collecting research). Specifically, CONs are ineffective in achieving the desired outcome: less expensive, more accessible, and better-quality health care. Still, today 35 states retain CON laws.

The Board and Health Department, the agencies that administer the CON program, disagree with the research consensus. Citing the State Health Plan, they claim the CON regime is designed to “prevent unnecessary duplication of health resources; provide cost containment; improve the health of Mississippi residents; and increase the accessibility, acceptability, continuity and quality of health services.” They review the CON program annually and have recommended it continue….

[T]he CON application and approval process is helpful … is lengthy and costly, and ultimately the process can result in what is essentially a trial with attorneys, consultants, exhibits, and written motions. Any “affected persons,” including current home health providers, can oppose the application. After the proceeding, the Board and Health Department evaluate whether the applicant has demonstrated need based on several factors, including 16 criteria (e.g., “economic viability,” “consistency with the state health plan,” and “access by health professional schools”) as well as a regional formula to define “need.”

Even so, there is a categorical ban on certain new facilities applying for CONs at all. In 1982, the predecessor to the Health Department determined that no new home health care agencies were needed and issued an administrative moratorium on their licensure. During the subsequent legislative session, the administrative moratorium was codified into state statute. It was expanded in 1986. This moratorium, or some version of it, has remained in place for 40 years. Four decades! And, since this moratorium was imposed, the number of home health patients has increased by at least 194 percent. Now, one can only enter the market if a current operator is willing to sell their CON….

Plaintiff’s federal due process and equal protection claims are subject to rational-basis scrutiny. Under this standard, Mississippi is afforded great deference. Those attacking the rationality of a legislative decision have the burden of negating “every conceivable basis which might support it.”

That is not to say that rational-basis review is a rubber stamp. “Between 1970 to 2000, applying rational-basis review, the Supreme Court struck down at least a dozen economic laws as violating either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause.” Tiwari v. Friedlander (W.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2020) (collecting cases). The Fifth Circuit and district courts in this Circuit have also struck down laws applying the same. E.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille (5th Cir. 2013).

In a recent application of rational-basis scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit held that courts need not take a state’s justifications at face value where they seem implausible or impermissible. “[T]he great deference due state economic regulation does not demand judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of its adoption nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical explanations for regulation.” A state’s rationale for economic protection of a favored industry is categorically not a legitimate interest. Accordingly, where seemingly implausible rationales or illegitimate purposes are at play, the Court may delve into evidence of irrationality….

The critical inquiry today is whether the Complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plausibly alleges that CON laws and the moratoria do not rationally relate to any legitimate state interests. To that end, plaintiff claims that the laws do not reduce costs, increase access, or improve the quality of home health care, as the State contends. Plaintiff argues that the laws undermine each of these purported goals and instead, protect incumbent health care facilities from competition.

The Complaint is replete with factual support including legislative history, case law, and a substantial body of peer-reviewed studies, publications, and government-backed research. For example, as to costs, the Complaint shows that Congress repealed its CON incentive explicitly because “the evidence showed that certificate-of-need programs resulted in increased health care costs.” In 1988, 2004, 2016, and 2020, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice agreed, stating “CON programs are not successful in containing health care costs, and that they pose serious anticompetitive risks that usually outweigh their purported economic benefits.” The agencies later added that their position is premised on research showing that CON programs are associated with “fewer hospitals, higher costs, lower quality of services, and increased mortality.” The FTC re-urged its concerns considering the COVID-19 pandemic. Numerous peer-reviewed articles and journals bolster these claims.

Plaintiff refers the Court to a recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky that analyzed whether CON laws encourage or discourage health care accessibility. That court cited a study by George Mason University finding that “while the average state has 362 hospital beds per 100,000 population, this number falls to 263 per 100,000 in states with [CON] programs.” Tiwari v. Friedlander (W.D. Ky. 2020) (citing Thomas Stratmann & Jake Russ, Do Certificate-of-Need Laws Increase Indigent Care? 11-12 (Mercatus Center, George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-20, 2014)). That court credited allegations that CON regimes generally reduce access and denied Kentucky’s motion to dismiss the challenge to its CON laws.

Finally, regarding quality, plaintiff cites substantial research showing that “stringent Certificate of Need programs decrease the quality of care in many settings.” The Tiwari court came to the same conclusion at the pleadings stage.

Taken as true, as the Court must, the allegations reveal that CON laws result in more costly, less accessible, and worse quality health care. What’s more, plaintiff claims that the basis for CON laws and the moratoria is pure economic protectionism—an illegitimate government interest. “By perpetually shielding the existing home health monopolies from competition and allowing them to continually expand their staffing and capacity within their service areas, Mississippi ensures that the formula it uses will never show a need for a new home health agency,” says Slaughter. Startups have no chance. “It is impossible for startups to enter the market, and because nothing prevents incumbents from expanding their staffing and capacity, Mississippi’s formula will likewise never show a need.”

It is no secret that significant financial interests are at stake when it comes to CON laws. The Tiwari court refers to the interplay of interests as “rent-seeking”—”rents” referring to monopoly profits.

Rent-seeking businesses make a sort-of “extra-legal” contract with politicians: money and votes for the politicians, regulations that ensure a monopoly for the interest group. Mean-while, consumers lose out. Without the market competition that normally regulates businesses’ behavior, the monopoly can charge otherwise unsustainably high prices for otherwise unsustainably mediocre products.

The FTC and DOJ similarly warn that “incumbent firms seeking to thwart or delay entry or expansion by new or existing competitors may use CON laws to achieve that end.” In practice, plaintiff alleges, current operators do exactly that: expand their offerings to absorb any purported “need,” and eliminate the opportunity for any new competitors to enter the market.

In sum, plaintiff has set forth allegations negating the State’s purported bases for the laws. At this stage, plaintiff’s claims are plausible, particularly within the home health care context. The due process claim may proceed.

The court also concluded the same under the Equal Protection Clause (unsurprising, since the rational basis test applies both to equal protection and substantive due process)….

It is worth noting that several courts have evaluated the constitutionality of various CON programs and come to different results. The Eight and Fourth Circuits have determined that they are indeed constitutional. See Colon Health Centers of America, LLC v. Hazel (4th Cir. 2013); Birchansky v. Clabaugh (8th Cir. 2020). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has found that CON programs may be unconstitutional to the extent they burden interstate commerce, Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health (9th Cir. 2011), and the Eastern District of Kentucky has found them unconstitutional. Bruner v. Zawacki (E.D. Ky. 2014).

This case is different. First, to this Court’s knowledge, none of the previous challenges to CON laws involve categorical bans on start-ups in certain facilities. Mississippi’s 40-year-old moratoria is an outlier. Second, this case involves artificial limitations on at-home health care during the height of a global pandemic. This unprecedented context is highly relevant.

That said, today’s Order only speaks to the sufficiency of the Complaint. How plaintiff’s allegations will fare at the merits stage is a separate matter. But at this juncture, like the courts in Tiwari, Birchansky v. Clabaugh (S.D. Iowa 2018), and Bruner, this Court will deny the pending motions so that the parties may develop an evidentiary record and proceed to the merits.

{Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s administrative moratorium challenge is moot because the administrative moratorium ended in 1982, when the statutory moratorium went into effect. Plaintiff rebuts that the Miss. Admin. Code still includes an administrative moratorium on the books. This Court finds that it is unclear whether the administrative moratorium was ever repealed and thus, the challenge against the administrative moratorium may proceed.}

Again, note that it’s not clear that plaintiff will prevail on the merits; and, even if he does, it’s not clear that he’ll win on an appeal—the rational basis test is indeed (rightly or wrongly) highly deferential, and, as the court notes, two circuit courts have upheld similar (though not identical) laws under that test. Still, the decision struck me as important and worth noting. Congratulations to the Mississippi Justice Institute / Mississippi Center for Public Policy on the victory.

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The Important Choice of Law Questions Lurking in Tomorrow’s Stolen-Pissarro Argument

Tomorrow the Supreme Court is supposed to hear argument in Cassirer v. Thyssen Bornemisza Collection Foundation. The facts are a somewhat dramatic story of a Pissarro painting looted by the Nazis that is now in a Spanish museum (here’s a case preview by Suzanna Sherry). But the legal question presented is a technical question of choice of law: “Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] must apply the forum state’s choice of law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.”

This implicates a classic federal choice-of-law case, Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing, that I’ve written a bit about, so I wanted to offer a few thoughts.

Three points of background: In diversity cases, the Supreme Court generally applies state law, pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act which says that “The laws of the several states … shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”

But where do they apply? This is answered by a field called choice of law, but what is the federal choice of law rule for these cases? In Klaxon, the Supreme Court said that “in diversity cases the federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states in which they sit.” I.e., the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California should apply whatever law a California state court law would apply. This might be California law or it might be another jurisdiction’s law. Meanwhile a federal district court for the District of Nevada would apply different law — the law selected by the choice of law rules of Nevada’s state courts — even though both are in the Ninth Circuit.

Finally, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which operates under federal question jurisdiction, says that a foreign state (Spain, here) “shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”

Hence, the QP of whether Klaxon, the diversity case, extends to the FSIA. Okay, now my thoughts:

1: I think the question presented is confused. It is framed as a choice between the “forum state’s choice of law rules” or a “federal common law” choice of law rule. But Klaxon, the source of the forum-state-choice-of-law doctrine, is itself a federal common law rule. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s version of “federal common law” was just the Second Restatement of Conflicts, even though it’s not at all obvious why the Second Restatement should be the federal common law rule if one does believe in a federal common law rule.

So the real question presented is apparently: since everybody seems to want to use federal common law to decide choice of law questions under the FSIA, which one should we use as the federal common law — the Klaxon rule or the Second Restatement?

2: As I argued in my article, there are often good reasons not to extend the Klaxon rule to federal question cases. In particular, under Klaxon you cannot know what the law is until a lawsuit is filed. This is a special kind of disaster for anybody who needs to apply the rule in advance of litigation, like the executive branch administering a federal statute. (It is not a coincidence that when the executive branch had to come up with a federal choice of law rule for federal statutes dealing with marriage, they didn’t use Klaxon.)

3: That said, those reasons might not be present here.

3a: The executive branch is not complaining about having to apply Klaxon under the FSIA (though somebody should ask them why not).

3b: And maybe more importantly, the text of the FSIA provides some argument for using Klaxon. Klaxon is the common-law choice of law rule that would currently apply to private parties in federal court, because they would be present on diversity jurisdiction. If that counts as “like circumstances,” then that’s a good reason to apply Klaxon to an FSIA defendant.

3c: So assuming that Klaxon is correct, it may be appropriate to extend it here.

4: But that doesn’t mean that it is always appropriate to use Klaxon in all federal question cases — that could be a disaster for executive administration of federal law. And it also doesn’t mean Klaxon is correct in the first place — indeed, as an ipse dixit application of federal common law that broke with historical practice, there is plenty to criticize about it. But figuring out whether Klaxon was right and if not what to do with it is a big and hard question that receives almost no attention in the briefs. So hopefully the Court will at least manage to do no harm on that front.

In sum, it may well be that the Ninth Circuit should be reversed, but I also hope that the Court will avoid saying things about the correctness of Klaxon or its applicability to all federal statutory cases that it might later come to regret.

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How North Dakota Is More Like Windows than UNIX

From a decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Yates (Jan. 6):

Shane Lance Yates and Amy Jo Yates petitioned the district court to change their respective names from “SHANE LANCE YATES” (in all uppercase letters) to “Shane Lance Yates” and “AMY JO YATES” (in all uppercase letters) to “Amy Jo Yates.” They requested the changes to “terminate the guardian-ward relationship and to distinguish from all other aliases, correct any mistakes, errors or identity confusion that exists in relation to the ALL CAPS STATE CREATED NAME.” The district court denied the petitions … [in part on the grounds that] they did not seek to change from one name to another and the requested change would not affect any action or legal proceeding or other right, title, or interest, as was the stated purpose….

[T]he district court concluded the Petitioners are not requesting a change from one name to another name. On this record, we agree. In effect, the Petitioners request a change in the capitalization of their names from all capital letters to initial capital letters followed by lowercase letters. Petitioners have offered no authority or reasoned argument that there is any legal significance to the capitalization of their names. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitions….

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Prof. Philip Hamburger (Columbia) on the Nondelegation Doctrine

Prof. Hamburger has a very interesting article on this, Nondelegation Blues; the abstract:

The nondelegation doctrine is in crisis. For approximately a century, it has been the Supreme Court’s answer to questions about transfers of legislative power. But as became evident in Gundy v. United States, those answers are wearing thin. So, it is time for a new approach.

This Article examines the Constitution’s treatment of the problem. Whereas other scholarship tends to focus narrowly on a single concept, whether delegation or vesting, this piece takes a more ecumenical approach. It uncovers layers of relevant concepts, showing how each contributes to the Constitution’s vision.

For example, it is necessary to consider the principles of consent, different powers, separation, and exclusivity before one gets to delegation. Although the Framers voted against permitting any congressional delegation, they did not rest content with delegation language. Instead, they drafted the Constitution in terms of vesting. But not just vesting, for Constitution says that its powers “shall be vested.” Far from merely a transfer of the powers, this was an express declaration of their mandatory location.

The Article thereby goes far beyond existing scholarship in showing how fundamental principles, drafting assumptions, and text were all aligned in barring transfers of power among the branches of government. Rarely in constitutional law does a conclusion about a highly contested question rest on such a powerful combination of underlying principles, framing assumptions, and text.

The Article also shows the refinement of the Constitution’s approach. The Constitution’s sophistication has not been much appreciated in the scholarly literature. But it will be seen that the Constitution was anything but crude in barring transfers of powers. For example, it adopted the separation of powers not in an absolute way, but as a default principle.

While it precluded the transfer of legislative power, it left much room for executive rulemaking. Even though its powers were externally exclusive, they were not always exclusive internally—that is, some of them could be subdelegated within the branches of government. And the eternally exclusive powers permitted much nonexclusive authority to be exercised under those powers. Wherever one stands on the transfer of legislative power, these distinctions are important and need to be recognized as qualifying the larger point about the location of legislative power.

Not merely a technical doctrinal question about the distribution of powers, the problem here is bound up with more visceral social and political values. Judges and academics tend to discuss it if it were merely a matter of doctrine, unconnected to larger questions of expanded suffrage and untainted by unwholesome animosities. But this fails to acknowledge the underlying legacy of prejudice and the enduring reality of discrimination and disenfranchisement.

The post Prof. Philip Hamburger (Columbia) on the Nondelegation Doctrine appeared first on Reason.com.

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Today in Supreme Court History: January 17, 1973 and January 17, 1996

Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) and United States v. Virginia (1996) were argued on the same day, twenty-three years apart. Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the former case, and wrote the majority opinion in the latter case.

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You Can’t Solve Homelessness by Making It a Crime


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A man’s car is his castle. So declared the Washington Supreme Court, more or less, when it ruled last August that the city of Seattle could not impound a homeless man’s truck and require him to pay nearly $550 in towing and storage costs. Nor could the city sell the man’s truck, his sole source of shelter, at auction to pay off his debts.

The justices held that Seattle’s practice violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines and fees. It was one of the first times a state high court had applied the Excessive Fines Clause since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2019 that it constrains the states.

The ruling was significant not just for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence but also for the rights of homeless people. The court found that the plaintiff’s truck qualified as his homestead.

According to the court’s opinion, there are nearly 12,000 homeless people in Washington’s King County, more than 2,000 of whom live in vehicles. Cities across the country have been trying to deal with the public nuisance of tent camps and people living in their cars. But their solutions have amounted to little more than rousting indigent people from one spot to another.

The Justice Department announced in August that it was launching an investigation into potential civil rights abuses by the Phoenix Police Department. Among other complaints, it will look into allegations that Phoenix cops unlawfully seize or dispose of homeless people’s belongings.

In October, the Miami City Commission enacted a ban on public camping. After facing criticism that they were criminalizing homelessness, the commissioners approved a sarcastic “adopt-the-homeless” program, offering support to Miami residents who want to help solve the problem by providing space in their homes. “If there are as many kindhearted people out there as some claim to be out there,” Commissioner Joe Carollo said, “I would expect them to step up.”

Cities don’t make it easy for private charities to step up, however. In October the town of Brookings, Oregon, decreed that churches in residential zones—meaning every church in Brookings—would be allowed to serve food to the homeless just two days a week. The restriction was a response to neighbors’ complaints about a local Episcopal church. The county has no homeless shelters, and the church was the only place offering hot meals seven days a week.

Cities have a legitimate interest in maintaining safety and livability. But that can’t come at the expense of religious charity or respect for the dignity and rights of homeless people.

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