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From Judge Gail Weilheimer (E.D. Pa.) Thursday in Cultivatr, Inc. v. Peterson; the analysis strikes me as quite correct:
Cultivatr, Inc. and Sproutr, LLC … ask this Court to seal portions of the transcript of a bench trial held before the Court, claiming that publication will do harm to their business interests. Because this Court finds that they have not made a showing strong enough to outweigh the public interest in open proceedings, the Motion is denied….
This matter was commenced by Counterclaim Defendants Cultivatr and Sproutr as declaratory judgment Plaintiffs, with Nora Peterson filing a breach of contract counterclaim. The dispute centered around a verbal promise made by Cultivatr’s principals to Ms. Peterson to grant equity in Cultivatr in exchange for Ms. Peterson’s agreeing to join Sproutr as an executive. After a three-day bench trial, this Court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately holding that Cultivatr indeed breached an enforceable verbal agreement when it failed to provide Ms. Peterson with the shares it owed her….
[T]he Cultivatr Parties ask this Court to seal portions of the bench trial transcript which deal with an investment into Sproutr made by a third party (the “Investor”). The Cultivatr Parties ask this Court to redact every mention of the name of the third party…. [T]he Cultivatr Parties also seek to redact large swaths of testimony and argument which discusses the investment, and particularly: (1) the amount of money invested; (2) the percentage of Sproutr acquired; and (3) the different options explored for treating the money as a matter of accounting….
This information was not merely contextual to the matter at trial, nor was it inconsequential or collateral. To the contrary, this Court found this investment was a motivating factor in the decisions by the principals of Cultivatr to welch on their promise to deliver equity to Nora Peterson…. “At base, this Court concludes that this is a case where [Cultivatr’s Principal], perhaps a bit overeager and bit inexperienced, rushed in and made a firm offer which was giving up more than she appreciated at the time. When a later investment made that offer much more expensive to live up to, she had buyer’s remorse and wishes she had included all sorts of bells and whistles that she did not.” … Further, the amount and nature of the investment provided the Court with the best available evidence from which it could make a reasonable calculation of the value of the shares which went undelivered at the time they reneged on their promise….
[T]he right to attend civil trials is protected by the First Amendment, and while the right is not absolute, “as a First Amendment right it is to be accorded the due process protection that other fundamental rights enjoy.” … Even the agreement of the parties does not bind our courts; indeed courts can deny sealing sua sponte or on motion of a third party….
Enforcement sua sponte makes good sense. It is certainly true that our system of justice relies heavily on the adversarial system to present important issues to the Court. But sometimes, where the issue involves the interest of the public or of the Court itself, the interests of the adversarial party may not align strongly enough with those other interests to reliably ensure the issue will be zealously litigated, or even litigated at all.
Indeed, the Court’s extensive experience with litigation has shown time and again that parties often “go along to get along” when it comes to confidentiality. Where that party does not particularly care about the publicity of a given case, it is often easier to just accept confidentiality designations than to spend their own money challenging them. Similarly, where a party knows they need certain sensitive documents to prove their case, they often will simply agree to a confidentiality designation to take the path of least resistance. These are entirely reasonable litigation decisions from a private party seeking to vindicate its own private interests. But given the powerful societal interest in the openness of our courthouses, it does create a gap which courts must diligently maintain….
The Cultivatr Parties … argue that the terms of the Investor’s investment are not public and not intended for public view. But that cannot carry the day. Many an embarrassing series of text messages or damaging private admission regularly are aired out in our courtrooms. In fact, that is largely what a courtroom is for. The fact that there was an intention that the nature of this investment be kept a secret does not mean that it gets to stay that way once implicated in federal litigation.
Next the Cultivatr Parties argue that the confidentiality agreement between them and the Investor supports sealing the transcript. But the private contractual relationship between Sproutr and the Investor does nothing to bind the court, and Ms. Peterson’s agreement to honor it is similarly without impact. There may well be collateral consequences to Sproutr as a result of these documents becoming relevant in this litigation. But that is a consideration to weigh before (not after) committing to a course of conduct likely to lead to litigation.
Notably, it was the Cultivatr Parties themselves who commenced this litigation as a declaratory action. Regardless of the outcome of this case, Cultivatr and Sproutr, in electing not to give Ms. Peterson the shares, put themselves on a set of tracks aimed squarely at litigation. The disclosure of information related to equity in the companies is a natural consequence of that decision, which should have been weighed at that time, or at various points in settlement discussions. They cannot now unilaterally impose the terms and conditions of their contract with the Investor upon the public.
The Cultivatr Parties next argue, with no factual support, that disclosure of this information could permit others to take advantage of them or the Investor. Given that there is no factual information presented by the Cultivatr Parties that this is so, the Court could reject that out of hand. But, addressing the merits, this does not strike the court as particularly credible. This involves a completed transaction from more than two years ago. How the terms of an investment agreement could possibly cause Sproutr or the Investor to lose customers is mystifying. At any rate, it is surely the sort of vague and non-specific argument that this Court is precluded from assigning weight under In re Avandia [the key Third Circuit precedent], and therefore this Court disregards it….
Any business in America would rather not have their internal documents out in the public. But that does not mean that litigants have a right to hide them from the public once they are implicated in court proceedings. It takes something more than the desire for secrecy to exclude information from the docket. A party seeking to seal needs articulated facts with specific examples. The Cultivatr Parties do not come close….
To the extent this ruling seems harsh, this Court will address three further points which are worth noting here. The first is that we are here, in Court, because the Cultivatr Parties filed a lawsuit. While the standard is not different for plaintiffs and defendants, the Cultivatr Parties can hardly claim to be surprised to find that documents related to equity ownership in Sproutr have come to public view in litigation over an equity dispute with a former employee.
More importantly, however, as Ms. Peterson observed in her opposition, the Cultivatr Parties publicly filed, as an attachment to their Complaint, the name of the Investor they seek to seal and the exact amount of that investment. So, too, does the Court refer to the Investor, the amount of the investment, and the discussions regarding the accounting consequences of that investment repeatedly in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. There has been no motion to seal those filings…. [T]he identity of the Investor has been no secret to any diligent court watcher since the very first filing in this case.
Finally, the Court is sympathetic to the possibility that the Cultivatr Parties may rather not have tried the case at all, had they known the Investor’s name would be made public. If that were the case, however, they could have gotten this determination before trial and strategized accordingly. They could have moved before trial to seal the courtroom, but they did not, or made some other pretrial motion as to maintaining confidentiality designations for trial purposes.
For the same reasons articulated here, this Court would, in all likelihood, have denied the motion. But at least the Cultivatr Parties would have had the lay of the land, and understand what proceeding to trial meant. But they did not, and are left with the consequences of the string of choices which brought them to this point….
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2/7/1870: Hepburn v. Griswold decided.
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Twice in the past two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard landmark cases involving protectionist alcohol laws, and twice the Court has made it clear that when states discriminate against out-of-state alcohol businesses, they are running afoul of the U.S. Constitution. But so far, many lower courts have refused to listen. Now, the Supreme Court may be poised to step in and clarify once and for all that, when it comes to alcohol, regulators cannot simply ignore the Constitution.
The latest case arises out of Arizona, where several wine enthusiasts have brought a legal challenge to the state’s requirement that all wine retailers must have an in-state physical storefront in order to ship wine directly to Arizona consumers. The challengers argue that this physical presence requirement violates the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause, which forbids states from unduly interfering with interstate commerce by discriminating against out-of-state economic interests.
Requiring in-state storefronts puts a damper on what’s known as direct-to-consumer alcohol shipping, whereby out-of-state wine retailers could ship their products right to the doorsteps of Arizona customers. Since it is financially impossible for most out-of-state wine shops to open up brick-and-mortar storefronts in Arizona, the rule effectively locks out-of-state competitors out of the wine shipping market in the state.
The Supreme Court has grappled with similar questions before. In the 2005 case Granholm v. Heald, the Supreme Court struck down in-state physical presence requirements for wineries (but not wine retailers), thereby freeing up out-of-state wineries to ship across state lines directly to consumers. In 2019, the Court stepped into the fray again, striking down a Tennessee law that required liquor store owners to be residents of the state for multiple years before they were eligible to receive a retailing license.
The import of these landmark cases is clear: States cannot enact protectionist alcohol laws that discriminate against out-of-state economic interests unless they can show that such rules promote legitimate, nonprotectionist interests such as public health and safety. Instead of following these straightforward holdings, numerous lower courts have continued to narrowly interpret them or create manufactured loopholes to evade them.
Leading the charge is the infamous 9th Circuit, which has adopted what’s known as the “essential feature” test for evaluating alcohol laws like Arizona’s. Under this test, the 9th Circuit held that because Arizona’s in-state physical presence mandate was an “essential feature” of the state’s three-tier system of alcohol regulation, the law was immunized from a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
In the 9th Circuit’s view, the three-tier system—which requires that alcohol producers, wholesalers, and retailers all be legally distinct entities—is vital to the regulation of alcohol in America today. Therefore, if out-of-state wine retailers were allowed to ship directly to Arizona residents without an in-state physical storefront, they’d be bypassing the wholesaling and retailing tiers in Arizona.
Under the framing of the “essential feature” test, courts are simply able to deem discrete alcohol laws to be “essential” to the three-tier system, which in turn creates a get-out-of-jail-free card that inoculates these protectionist laws from constitutional scrutiny. Not only is the 9th Circuit’s test an obvious and willful evasion of past Supreme Court holdings, but it doesn’t even make sense on its own merits.
Alcohol delivery has exploded since COVID-19, as the vast majority of states have implemented some form of pro-delivery reform for booze. Regulating this delivery wave has proven relatively straightforward, with states using simple licensing and permitting rules.
Just like a brewery, winery, bar, or liquor store needs to obtain a license in order to operate, alcohol delivery likewise requires a license. If a retail shop proceeds to deliver or ship alcohol in a shady or dangerous way, the license can simply be revoked—just like a bar that is caught in a sting for serving underage patrons.
Requiring in-state storefronts is as non-essential a feature of the alcohol regulatory system as one can imagine. Moreover, 13 states plus Washington, D.C., already allow out-of-state wine retail shops to ship their products directly to in-state residents. All of these states have a three-tier system just like Arizona, further underscoring that in-state physical storefronts are entirely non-essential.
Given this backdrop, it’s clear that the 9th Circuit’s “essential feature” test is detached from the on-the-ground reality of how alcohol regulation actually works. Simply allowing states to deem parts of their alcohol regulatory code as “essential,” and thus magically escape a constitutional challenge, is an obvious sidestepping of the Supreme Court’s past decisions.
The Manhattan Institute and Reason Foundation have filed an amicus brief in support of petitioners in the Arizona case. Perhaps the third time this goes to the Supreme Court will be the charm.
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“Good luck forgetting about presidential politics when the president has the power to shape what our health insurance covers or unilaterally forgive student loans, the ability to launch a trade war from his couch or a shooting war with Iran. You may not want to be interested in the presidency, but the presidency is interested in you. After Trump, the office will still be invested with more power than any single, fallible human being can safely be trusted with. Unless and until we start taking that power back, it’s only a matter of time before politics gets all too interesting once again.”
Gene Healy
“Trump Wasn‘t a Dictator, but He Played One on TV”
“The weight of evidence through history is that concentrated government power in the best case leads to incompetence and waste, while in the worst case it degenerates quickly into tyranny. Whether your main concern is material enrichment or the protection of human rights, limited government has been shown on the proving grounds of experience to be the best available means to that end.”
Stephanie Slade
“Is There a Future for Fusionism?”
“Clearly, any court that is asked to impose [medical] treatment decisions should move cautiously. The presumption should be in favor of the values and choices of the individual or family. There are surely cases where well-meaning religious devotees choose unwisely and thereby endanger the health of their children. But often cases that give rise to charges of this sort are far more complex than the legal system can easily resolve. Controversies that are depicted as conflicts between science and faith may in fact be conflicts between two kinds of faith—one of them the unquestioned belief that medicine knows best how to handle any problem.”
Stanton Peele and Archie Brodsky
“What‘s Up to Doc?”
“Washington is poised to sidetrack Eastern Europe’s opportunity for a true free market by joining the World Bank and related organizations in promoting a variety of rear-guard socialist planning efforts…..During international negotiations over the creation of the European Bank in early 1990, U.S. Treasury officials portrayed the institution as a new and improved development bank. They suggested that the bank will play an important role in Eastern Europe’s privatization efforts. Yet multilateral development banks have never linked significant amounts of assistance to privatization of bloated, money-losing state enterprises. The World Bank’s emphasis remains rehabilitation, not privatization. Despite its market-oriented rhetoric, it continues to tinker with socialism and central planning.”
Melanie Tammen
“Planning for Capitalism”
“For the citizen confronted by Special Agents of the IRS, there is only one course of action to follow: Keep your mouth shut! Be polite about it, but don’t invite them in and don’t answer their questions. And don’t worry about making them suspicious. Things are already way beyond that stage. Just shut up; and when they’re gone, call your lawyer—not your accountant, but your lawyer. This is not a bookkeeping problem you’re involved in—it’s the real thing.”
Warren Salomon
“When the IRS Comes Knocking”
“My opposition to gun control stems from a basic libertarian view of man and society. I oppose gun control for the same reason that I oppose censorship, antimarijuana legislation, or any other victimless crime laws. Government should protect individuals from the initiation of force. Otherwise, what a person does with his life and property is no concern of the State. Neither individual freedom nor individual responsibility is compatible with laws which seek to protect people from themselves. Gun control, however, is far more dangerous than other forms of prohibition. It is a direct, and rather substantial, assault on the right to life itself. For in our violent society guns have become an increasingly necessary instrument of survival, just as they were in frontier days. Gun control, which seeks to ultimately ban these survival tools, will leave the peaceable individual totally vulnerable to the criminal element.”
Donald Feder
“A Libertarian Look at Gun Control”
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From Nat’l Ass’n of Diversity Officers in Higher Ed. v. Trump, decided today by Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Albert Diaz, joined by Judges Pamela Harris and Allison Rushing:
In the first days of his second term, President Donald J. Trump issued two Executive Orders [“Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing” and “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity”] that directed executive agencies to end “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (“DEI”) programs within federal grant and contract processes…. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, but we stayed it pending appeal. We now vacate the district court’s injunction and remand….
[1.] The court rejected a Due Process Clause vagueness challenge to the “Termination Provision” of the first executive order, which directed “all [federal] agencies, departments, and commissions to”:
terminate, to the maximum extent allowed by law, all DEI, DEIA, and “environmental justice” offices and positions (including but not limited to “Chief Diversity Officer” positions); all “equity action plans,” “equity” actions, initiatives, or programs, “equity-related” grants or contracts; and all DEI or DEIA performance requirements for employees, contractors, or grantees.
The court reasoned:
Plaintiffs argue that the provision never defines “equity-related,” so there isn’t “any guidance as to which grants or contracts must be terminated.” Thus, “agencies are free to terminate grants and contracts as they please, even based on protected speech.”
But therein lies plaintiffs’ dilemma. The Termination Provision, on its face, doesn’t ask anything of them, nor does it regulate private conduct. Instead, it instructs the President’s subordinates to act, and then only “to the maximum extent allowed by law.” The Provision, at this stage at least, is nothing more than “an outward-facing” policy directive from the President to his agents…. “Any concerns of vagueness regarding exactly what authority an agency may have to terminate a grant are internal considerations for the agency itself.” …
The President may determine his policy priorities and instruct his agents to make funding decisions based on them. President Trump has decided that equity isn’t a priority in his administration and so has directed his subordinates to terminate funding that supports equity-related projects to the maximum extent allowed by law. Whether that’s sound policy or not isn’t our call. We ask only whether the policy is unconstitutionally vague for funding recipients.
The Supreme Court’s decision in NEA v. Finley provides the answer. There, the Court rejected a facial vagueness challenge to certain standards in the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act. Those standards directed the National Endowment for the Arts’ chairperson “to ensure that ‘artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.'”
The Court acknowledged that “[t]he terms of the provision are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a criminal statute or regulatory scheme, they could raise substantial vagueness concerns.” But it explained that, in the funding context, “when the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe.” “To accept [the] respondents’ vagueness argument,” continued the Court, “would be to call into question the constitutionality” of other government funding programs and awards based on “subjective criteria such as ‘excellence.'” …
[2.] The court rejected a Free Speech Clause challenge to the “Certification Provision” of the second order, which instructs “[t]he head of each agency [to] include in every contract or grant award,”
(A) A term requiring the contractual counterparty or grant recipient to agree that its compliance in all respects with all applicable Federal anti-discrimination laws is material to the government’s payment decisions for purposes of {the False Claims Act, which carries a civil penalty for knowingly making false statements}; and
(B) A term requiring such counterparty or recipient to certify that it does not operate any programs promoting DEI that violate any applicable Federal anti-discrimination laws.
The court reasoned:
[T]he Provision requires only that plaintiffs certify compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws, which the First Amendment doesn’t confer a right to violate. {The certification requirement also seemingly aligns with the Executive Order’s purpose: to enforce “[l]ongstanding Federal civil-rights laws [that] protect individual Americans from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”} … [P]laintiffs have no protectable speech interest in operating, and “no constitutional right to operate[,] DEI programs that violate federal antidiscrimination law.”
Indeed, existing federal law already demands such compliance, and plaintiffs have not challenged existing law as viewpoint-discriminatory or as over or underinclusive. Plaintiffs suggest that defendants view all DEI programs as illegal under existing antidiscrimination law. Perhaps, but the Certification Provision doesn’t say that.
What plaintiffs are really asking us to do is read subtext into the Provision’s text. And what they’re really challenging is how the Administration and its agency actors interpret antidiscrimination law in relation to plaintiffs’ DEI programming. Neither is fertile ground for a facial attack against the Certification Provision.
Instead, we’re bound by the text. If the President, his subordinates, or another grantor misinterprets federal antidiscrimination law, plaintiffs “can challenge that interpretation in a specific enforcement action.” But we can’t conclude today that a “substantial number of the [Certification Provision’s] applications” will be unconstitutional.
[3.] The court held plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the “Enforcement Threat Provision” of the second Executive Order, which
tasked the “heads of all agencies, with the assistance of the Attorney General” to prepare a report, within 120 days of the Order, identifying “[a] plan of specific steps or measures to deter DEI programs or principles (whether specifically denominated ‘DEI’ or otherwise) that constitute illegal discrimination or preferences.”
The court reasoned largely that the provision itself didn’t do anything to plaintiffs—it only ordered agencies to prepare a report with planned steps, steps that could themselves later be challenged once they are implemented.
[4.] Chief Judge Diaz filed a short concurrence:
We’re presented today with a facial challenge to two Executive Orders concerning certain DEI programming, not the legality or termination of any particular DEI program. That makes all the difference.
Defendants represented at oral argument that there is “absolutely” DEI activity that falls comfortably within the confines of the law. I hope that’s true. But the evidence cited by plaintiffs, their amici, and the district court suggests a more sinister story: important programs terminated by keyword; valuable grants gutted in the dark; worthy efforts to uplift and empower denigrated in social media posts.
{The Administration’s obsession over so called “woke” DEI programs appears to know no bounds. This past December, Secretary of State Marco Rubio—who also serves as Acting National Security Advisor and Acting Archivist of the United States—somehow found time to rail against the Calibri typeface previously approved for State Department use by his predecessor. I kid you not.
Secretary Rubio’s predecessor made the change to Calibri (a sans serif font) to help improve accessibility for those with dyslexia or other visual impairments. So why did Secretary Rubio decree otherwise? Primarily, for the entirely defensible reasons that (1) his preferred choice (Times New Roman 14, a classic serif font) presents a more professional and formal typography for diplomatic correspondence, and (2) use of the Calibri font had (at least in the State Department’s experience) not meaningfully improved reader accessibility.
Had the Secretary left it there, I would applaud him, particularly since our court favors his font choice. But leave it there, he couldn’t. Instead, the Secretary lashed out at his predecessor for imposing yet another “illegal, immoral, radical [and] wasteful [diversity initiative]” before ordering Calibri’s demise. Sigh.}
Cognizant of my oath, I’ve framed the limited question before us and answered it. And I’ve (reluctantly) left others for tomorrow.
For those disappointed by the outcome, I say this: Follow the law. Continue your critical work. Keep the faith. And depend on the Constitution, which remains a beacon amid the tumult.
[5.] Judge Allison Rushing concurred in part and in the judgment; she disagreed as to certain standing questions related to the certification provision—you can read her opinion, as well as more from the majority related to standing, here.
Jacob Moshe Roth argued for the government.
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The episode kicks off by unpacking this week’s Jeffrey Epstein witch hunt and why certain moral panics catch fire so fast. The conversation then turns to the comeback of the “r” word, how DoorDash culture is reshaping everyday life, and why accusations of fascism get tossed around so casually. Robby and Christian also dive into the latest pop-culture outrage over diversity casting in the upcoming Odyssey film. Finally, the episode closes with Billie Eilish’s “stolen land” speech at the Grammys and what it says about celebrity politics today.
00:00—The spirit of the Jeffrey Epstein witch hunt
28:08—The “r” word packs a certain punch.
33:45—DoorDash culture
45:14—Helen Andrews, fascism, and affirmative action
1:01:50—Helen of Troy outrage and diversity casting
1:13:05—Billie Eilish and stolen land
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President Donald Trump was reelected, in large part, because voters trusted he would improve the economy. Now public confidence in Trump’s economic plan is slipping.
In April 2025, an NPR/PBS News/Marist poll found that 55 percent of Americans disapproved of how Trump was handling the economy, while only 39 percent approved. The latest edition of the poll, published Thursday, found that 59 percent of Americans now disapprove of Trump’s economic policies, and 56 percent say his tariffs hurt the economy. The data are even more telling when broken down by partisan and educational demographics.
It comes as no surprise that a supermajority of Democrats (87 percent) consider tariffs harmful to the national economy—not only are they empirically correct, but they have partisan motives for believing their rival party’s policies are counterproductive. On the flip side, the finding that 66 percent of Republicans believe tariffs benefit the economy is also to be expected—they have partisan motives for denying the economic reality that tariffs have hurt the economy; inflation is high, and unemployment is up.
It’s with independents, who make up nearly half of all voters, that we begin to see just how unpopular Trump’s handling of the economy is. In April 2025, 59 percent of independents disapproved of Trump’s handling of the economy. Now, 66 percent disapprove. Even more telling is how white men without college degrees, a key voting constituency for Trump, feel about his economic policies. Last April, 52 percent of this demographic approved of his economic performance. Now, 51 percent either disapprove or are unsure.
Attitudes toward the president’s tariffs tell a more damning story for Trump and the GOP.
In April 2025, white men who are not college-educated were evenly split about Trump’s handling of tariffs, with 47 percent approving and 47 percent disapproving. In the latest survey, 46 percent of this demographic say that placing tariffs or fees on imported products hurts the U.S. economy, while only 41 percent say that doing so helps it.
Given Republicans’ razor-thin majority in the House of Representatives and how important lowering prices is to Americans, one would hope that these results would be enough to convince the GOP to stop supporting Trump’s economic plan. Political considerations aside, there are plenty of apolitical reasons why Republicans should rebuff Trump’s clearly unconstitutional and predictably harmful tariffs that have failed to achieve their stated goals.
Luckily for Americans, the Supreme Court could soon strike down the president’s trade policies. But even if that happens, it doesn’t change the fact that the GOP should never have supported them in the first place.
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When Donald Trump ran for president in 2024, he said he’d “restore law and order.” The White House is now taking a victory lap on this campaign promise.
On Thursday, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt touted a January report from the Council on Criminal Justice, which found “that the murder rate across America’s largest cities plummeted in 2025 to its lowest level since at least 1900,” according to Leavitt, who added that this was “the largest single-year drop in murders in recorded history.”
“This dramatic decline,” she said, “is what happens when a president secures the border, fully mobilizes federal law enforcement to arrest violent criminals and aggressively deport the worst of the worst illegal aliens from our country.”
The decline is noteworthy, but it is not especially surprising, given recent trends. “We’re seeing the largest one-year drop in murder for the third straight year in 2025,” crime data analyst Jeff Asher told Reason‘s Billy Binion earlier this week. “We’re seeing the murder rate at the lowest level that we’ve ever recorded it.”
While we won’t know the exact drop in the 2025 murder rate until official data come out in August or September of this year, Asher expects the decline to be “somewhere in the 18 to 20 percent range.” This would “supplant 2024, which supplanted 2023 as the largest one-year drop ever recorded.”
The exact reason for this decline is unknown. Some have theorized that trauma care at emergency rooms has improved, which has led to fewer casualties from shootings. That’s “a factor,” says Asher, but it doesn’t tell the whole story.
“We can show pretty convincingly with shooting data that murder has fallen the last years because shootings have fallen dramatically — not major improvements in trauma care,” Asher recently wrote on his Substack. “We can also show that shootings have not become less lethal over the last 10 to 15 years suggesting that any gains from better trauma care — which have undoubtedly occurred — may have been offset by changes in firearm availability.”
It’s not just the murder rate that is falling; crime as a whole is on the decline. As Our World in Data recently pointed out, violent crime rates in the U.S. “have more than halved,” since the early 1990s. In that time, property crimes have also fallen by about 60 percent.
These positive trends suggest that society is progressing and becoming safer. That may well be true, but the way we report and track crimes also matters. In cities like Washington, D.C., “crime is underreported,” says Asher. This includes about “a third of property crimes and about half of violent crimes other than murder.” There are myriad reasons for this, including how local and federal law enforcement agencies interact and share information, and personal preferences—sometimes people just don’t want to report a crime that’s happened to them.
Still, “there’s no reason to suspect that the overarching trends that we’re seeing are not accurate,” he says.
While it’s still too early to officially say, all signs indicate that 2025 will have the largest drop in murder rates in recorded history. The Trump administration will likely take credit for this feat, but this probably would have happened regardless of who was in the White House.
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