Guest Post: Finland's Gold

Submitted by Alasdair Macleod of GoldMoney.com,

On Wednesday Finland gave in to public pressure and revealed where she stores her gold reserves. The statement followed a press release by the Bank of Sweden on similar lines released on Monday.

The totals (in tonnes) for these two Scandinavian countries are as follows:

Location Sweden Finland
Bank of England 61.4 25.0
Swedish Riksbank 15.1 9.8
New York Fed 13.2 8.8
Swiss National Bank 2.8 3.4
Bank of Finland 2.0
Bank of Canada 33.2
Total 125.7 49.0

So far, so good. But then the Head of Communications for the Bank of Finland added some more information in Finnish in a blog run on the Bank's website. It is not available in English, so I asked her for a translation, but I am still waiting.

Instead, a Finnish reader of my own blog and a Finnish journalist who has been following this topic have independently given me an English translation of a highly relevant and interesting paragraph, three from the end. This is the journalist's:

"Maximum half of the gold has been within investment activity over the years. Gold has been invested among other things in deposits similar to money market deposits and using gold interest rate swaps. Gold investment activity is common for central banks. The risks associated with gold investments are controlled using limits, investment diversification and limitations concerning duration."

And my reader's translation:

"Throughout these years no more than half of the gold has been invested. Gold has been invested in for example deposits similar to money market deposits and gold interest rate swap agreements. Gold investment activities are common for central banks. Risks related to gold investments are controlled with limits, decentralising investments and limits regarding run times."

Half Finland's gold is stored at the Bank of England, and "no more than half" is "invested". If any "investment" is to take place it would be in London. It is not immediately clear what is meant by invested, but presumably this is a result of translation of what has happened from English into Finnish plus explanation for a non-specialist readership. However if it has been invested, then by definition it is no longer in the possession of the Bank of Finland, and will most probably have been sold into the market in return for a promise to redeliver at a later date. This follows the Austrian National Bank's admission to a parliamentary committee a year ago that it had earned EUR300m by leasing its gold through London.

The evidence is mounting that Western central banks through the Bank of England have been feeding monetary gold into the market through leasing operations. Indeed, the Finnish blog says as much: "Gold investment activities are common for central banks".

This explains in part how the voracious appetite for gold by China, India and South-East Asia is being satisfied, without the gold price rising to reflect this demand. It is also consistent with my disclosure earlier this year of the discrepancy of up to 1,300 tonnes between the gold in custody as recorded in the Bank of England's Annual Report, dated 28th February 2013 and the amount recorded on the virtual tour on the Bank's website the following June.

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/mZLuE_Mkckw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Guest Post: Finland’s Gold

Submitted by Alasdair Macleod of GoldMoney.com,

On Wednesday Finland gave in to public pressure and revealed where she stores her gold reserves. The statement followed a press release by the Bank of Sweden on similar lines released on Monday.

The totals (in tonnes) for these two Scandinavian countries are as follows:

Location Sweden Finland
Bank of England 61.4 25.0
Swedish Riksbank 15.1 9.8
New York Fed 13.2 8.8
Swiss National Bank 2.8 3.4
Bank of Finland 2.0
Bank of Canada 33.2
Total 125.7 49.0

So far, so good. But then the Head of Communications for the Bank of Finland added some more information in Finnish in a blog run on the Bank's website. It is not available in English, so I asked her for a translation, but I am still waiting.

Instead, a Finnish reader of my own blog and a Finnish journalist who has been following this topic have independently given me an English translation of a highly relevant and interesting paragraph, three from the end. This is the journalist's:

"Maximum half of the gold has been within investment activity over the years. Gold has been invested among other things in deposits similar to money market deposits and using gold interest rate swaps. Gold investment activity is common for central banks. The risks associated with gold investments are controlled using limits, investment diversification and limitations concerning duration."

And my reader's translation:

"Throughout these years no more than half of the gold has been invested. Gold has been invested in for example deposits similar to money market deposits and gold interest rate swap agreements. Gold investment activities are common for central banks. Risks related to gold investments are controlled with limits, decentralising investments and limits regarding run times."

Half Finland's gold is stored at the Bank of England, and "no more than half" is "invested". If any "investment" is to take place it would be in London. It is not immediately clear what is meant by invested, but presumably this is a result of translation of what has happened from English into Finnish plus explanation for a non-specialist readership. However if it has been invested, then by definition it is no longer in the possession of the Bank of Finland, and will most probably have been sold into the market in return for a promise to redeliver at a later date. This follows the Austrian National Bank's admission to a parliamentary committee a year ago that it had earned EUR300m by leasing its gold through London.

The evidence is mounting that Western central banks through the Bank of England have been feeding monetary gold into the market through leasing operations. Indeed, the Finnish blog says as much: "Gold investment activities are common for central banks".

This explains in part how the voracious appetite for gold by China, India and South-East Asia is being satisfied, without the gold price rising to reflect this demand. It is also consistent with my disclosure earlier this year of the discrepancy of up to 1,300 tonnes between the gold in custody as recorded in the Bank of England's Annual Report, dated 28th February 2013 and the amount recorded on the virtual tour on the Bank's website the following June.

 


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/mZLuE_Mkckw/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Three Dimensions of the Investment Climate

There are three dimensions to the broader investment climate:  the trajectory of Fed tapering, the ECB’s response to the draining of excess liquidity and threat of deflation, and Chinese reforms to be unveiled at the Third Plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.  

 

There has been increased speculation that the Federal Reserve can begin tapering in December.  The FOMC statement dropped the reference to tighter financial conditions and the manufacturing ISM was stronger than expected, as was September industrial production.  

 

For the same reasons we did not think it very likely in September, we are skeptical of a December tapering.  First, the impact of the government shutdown will distort much of the data in the coming weeks, including the October employment report on November 8 (for which the ADP data was disappointing).   There has been a trend slowing of non-farm payroll growth, illustrated by the fact that the 3-month average is below the 6-month average, which is below the 12-month average.  

 

Second, measured inflation remains low.   The core PCE deflator for September will be released on November 8 as well and may tick up to 1.3%, after reaching two-year lows in July just above 1.1%.  As we have noted before, the core PCE deflator, the Fed’s preferred inflation measure, is lower now than in the early 2000s, when the then-Fed Governor Bernanke recognized the risk of deflation.  

 

Third, when the Fed revised lower its growth forecasts in September, it did not cut sufficiently, especially in light of the government shutdown.   It seems unreasonable to expect the Fed to taper at the same time as it reduces its growth forecasts.  The effectiveness of the Fed’s communication has again been questioned in light of its decision in September not to taper.  

 

Fourth, and while perhaps the least appreciated, it is also among the most compelling reasons for the Fed not to taper in December.  The credibility of the institution is clear better served by maximizing the degrees of freedom for the next Federal Reserve Chair.     Tapering in December would needlessly tie the hands of Bernanke’s successor and any anti-inflation chits to be earned would be wasted on the ongoing Bernanke, who will go down in history for the unorthodox policies adopted upon reaching the zero bound of nominal interest rates.  

 

This is particularly important because the Federal Reserve sits on the cusp of among the largest changes in personnel in the Fed’s history.  Consider there are two vacancies already on the Board of Governors and that is before a successor to Yellen is found, assuming her nomination is approved by the Senate.  Another Governor’s term expires at the end of January.  Another governor may choose to return to the university from which he is on leave.  

 

In addition, in the coming months, another governor may chose to leave, having long served on the Board and amid reports of philosophical (personal?) differences with Yellen.   Lastly, note that the fine print of Dodd-Frank also calls for the Board to have a second vice-chair to oversee the Fed’s regulatory duties.  

 

We think there is a strong possibility that Bernanke steps down early.  While the Senate Banking Committee might be able to vote on Yellen’s nomination later this month or early December, there may be some delay tactics when it comes to the entire Senate vote.  Recall Bernanke’s nomination for a second term by Obama (Bernanke was initially appointed by Bush-the-Lesser) passed the Senate by a 70-30 margin.  Yellen needs 60 votes to over-ride a filibuster than has been threatened.

 

In any event, shortly after Yellen is confirmed, it is reasonable to expect Bernanke to resign.  It serves no one’s interest to have two Federal Reserve Chairs.  That means Yellen is most likely to Chair the late Jan 2014 FOMC meeting that most expect to be Bernanke’s last.  What this implies too, is that our March tapering call does not require Yellen to announce such at her first meeting, but rather, the second she chairs.  

 

II

 

Europe seems poised to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.  It has been a particularly good year for EMU.  After initially blowing it, European officials managed to address the Cypriot crisis and although it retains capital controls, it remains in every other way a member of the monetary union.   The six quarter contraction ended.  Italian and Spanish stocks and bonds have rallied strongly, helping to ease their debt servicing costs and rebuilding investor confidence.     Target 2 imbalances have been reduced and banks have returned nearly 40% of the LTRO borrowings.  

 

Yet the repayment of the LTRO funds has seen the excess liquidity in the system fall.   Excess liquidity has fallen by about 470 bln euros to stand just below 150 bln.   Nearly 380 bln euros of LTRO borrowing has been returned, including what was announced before the weekend.   The remainder of the decline in excess reserves (~90 bln euros) is due to what the ECB calls autonomous factors. Without getting bogged down in the minutia, autonomous factors include items such as bank notes in circulation, government deposits) and the point is that they are not a function of the ECB itself.  

 

At the same time that excess liquidity is falling money supply growth is weak (M3 is up 2.1% year-over-year) and lending to businesses and households continues to shrink.  Many observers were still surprised to learn that EMU CPI fell to 0.7% in Oct from a year ago, drawing nearer the record low of 0.5% in 2009.  

 

With the traditional medicine of devaluation denied by the monetary union, the path of adjustment toward increased competitiveness requires inflation to be lower than Germany’s.  Germany’s ordo-liberalism requires low inflation.  This forces other countries to undershoot Germany’s low target. The surprise to many is that they are doing it.  Using EU harmonized calculations, German CPI stood at 1.3% in October.  Italy’s October CPI was 0.7% and Spain’s was -0.1%.  France’s September reading was 1.0%, while Greece’s was -1.0%.  

 

In order to respond to the tightening of financial conditions in the euro area and the increasing risk of deflation, the ECB needs to do something as bold as the OMT announced in mid-2012. Consider the limitation of its options.  Many observers are talking about a repo rate cut as early as this week. Yet such a move would be ineffective.  In the current environment, the key rate is the deposit rate, which is set at zero.  Overnight rates (EONIA) trade closer to the deposit rate than the repo rate (50 bp).  

 

The ECB says that it is technically prepared to cut the deposit rate below zero, but it is obviously reluctant to do so and for good reason.  No major central bank has done this and the issue is not only intended and unintended consequences but also foreseeable and unforeseeable effects.  It could further harm the fragile financial institutions.  It could unsettle the global capital markets.  

 

Many observers expect the ECB to provide another LTRO later this year or early next year.  We had thought so as well.  However, it has become clearer, and seems only right, that in stress testing banks, those that rely on ECB funds, should be penalized in some fashion.  This means that while the ECB may offer another LTRO, it may not meet widespread demand, and, there may in fact be a stigma attached to its use.   

 

The ECB is continues to sterilize the sovereign bonds purchased under Trichet’
s SMP program.  In theory, the ECB could refrain from doing so and thereby ease liquidity conditions.  Yet this would not doubt raise the hackles of the Bundesbank, which may still be hoping for a Constitutional Court ruling that finds elements of the OMT program to go against the Germany’s Constitution.   Remember, the former Bundesbank President and a German member of the Governing Council both resigned over the SMP program.  

 

Further dilution liberalization of collateral rules is beside the point, though incentives to strengthen the asset-backed securities market, may be a way to cope with the reluctance of banks to lend. If the ECB is going to lean against the deflationary forces and address tightening of monetary conditions, it does not have as many choices as it may appear.  One way to increase excess liquidity is to reduce the required liquidity (reserves).  A refi rate cut in conjunction would send a stronger signal.  While the sooner the better, given that the ECB had foreseen base effects and the decline in energy prices, so the low inflation number may not have been too surprising, December looks like a more likely time frame than this week’s meeting.    

 

It goes without saying, one would have thought, that Draghi will strike a dovish tone at the press conference following this week’s ECB meeting.  The real data has lagged behind the survey data that Draghi had previously pointed to and what had appeared to be improvements in the labor markets have been revised away.  Austerity among the debtors has not been offset by stimulus among the creditors. Although the citation of Germany in the US Treasury report on the foreign exchange market raised some eyebrows, got some chins wagging and keyboards clicking, there can be little doubt of the unspoken agreement throughout much of Europe. 

 

 

 

III 

 

At the end of next week (Nov 9-12), the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party holds its Third Plenary session.  The Third Plenary session has in the past been the platform from which important changes have been announced.  This one is similarly being promoted as having wide-ranging and substantial reforms.  

 

Chinese officials appear to recognize that reforms are needed or risk the middle-income trap, in which a country exhausts it resources in achieving middle income status.  There are three broad areas that reform is likely to be focused on:  improving the functioning of the market (including unified market for land), transform government by reducing red-tape and providing a basic social safety net for Chinese citizens, and fostering new private businesses and more competition.   The key take away point is that it is not a status quo government, but reformist.  

 

To be sure, despite being reform minded, the new Chinese government has shown little interest in addressing the contradiction that goes largely unspoken yet is ever present, between a modernizing and flexible economy and the archaic and rigid political superstructure.  Political reform and competition in that space is most unlikely to be forthcoming from the Third Plenary Session.  

 

The outcome of the session is unlikely to have much immediate impact on the global capital markets. Nevertheless, investors have a vested interest in the strategy of the world’s second largest economy. The rise of China since 1978 stands alongside the fall of a little more than a decade later as the two most important geopolitical events since the end of the World War. 

 

China has taken significant measures toward giving greater market influence over some interest rates.  It has removed the floor for lending rates, re-opened bond futures and introduced a prime rate.  This new prime rate is a weighted average of 9 domestic commercial banks lending rates to their best customers.  This supplements and, perhaps, will eventually supplant the PBOC’s current benchmark (1-year benchmark has been set at 6% since July 2012, last week the prime rate was 5.71%).    Further financial liberalization is expected in the coming months.  There are reports suggesting the Plenary Session may also take up calls for national deposit insurance.  

 

Chinese officials also appear to be preparing people for slower growth.  The emphasis is shifting toward quality of growth, which seems to emerge only as the quantity has slackened, even according to official data.   Although China’s manufacturing PMI improved, forward looking new orders and export orders were softer, keeping the near-term outlook less certain at best.  

 

The yuan has been resilient this year and rising to multi-year highs into late October, it spent last week on the defensive, as the US dollar rallied broadly.  If our constructive technical outlook for the dollar is correct, it suggest further gains against the yuan as well.  The CNY6.12 area may offer a near-term cap.  It denotes not only the Oct high but also the 100-day moving average.   Above there, the CNY6.15 area is also interesting.  It corresponds to a retracement objective of this year’s dollar decline and the 200-day moving average.  


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/75a7z0e5XSI/story01.htm Marc To Market

A “Frothy”, “Overbullish”, “Overbought”, “Overmargined” Market With “Not Enough Bears” – In Charts

Last week, Bank of America warned that “it’s getting frothy, man” based on the sheer surge of fund flows into equities. Here is the same firm with some other observations on what can simply be described as a “frothy”, “overbought”, “overmargined” market with “not enough bears.”

From Bank of America:

“Daily slow stochastic is generating an overbought sell signal.”

“Based on the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Bulls to Bears ratio investors are more bullish now than they were in late May and mid July. In terms of sentiment, this is a contrarian bearish condition. Since April, near-term peaks and troughs in AAII Bull/Bears have coincided w ith near-term market peaks and troughs.”

 

Bears drops to 16.5% = too few bears;  As of October 25, Investors Intelligence (II) % Bears extended deeper into contrarian bearish territory below the 20% level with a reading of 16.5%. This is down from 18.5% the prior week and the lowest level for II % Bears since April 2011 – this suggests too few bears among new sletter writers. II % Sentiment is an equity market risk and confirms the complacent readings for the 5-day put/call ratios.

NYSE margin debt at record high; confirms S&P 500 high; As of September 2013 NYSE margin debt stood at a new record high of $401.2b and exceeded the prior high from April of $384.4b. This confirms the new S&P 500 highs and negates the bearish 2013 set up that was similar to the bearish patterns seen at the prior highs from 2000 and 2007, where a peak in margin debt preceded important S&P 500 peaks.

Risk: Net free credit at $-111b & back at 2000 extremes; Net free credit is f ree credit balances in cash and margin accounts net of the debit balance in margin accounts. At $-111b, this measure of cash to meet margin calls is at an extreme low or negative reading not seen since the February 2000 low of $-129b. The risk is if the market drops and triggers margin calls, investors do not have cash and would be forced to sell stocks to meet the margin calls. This would exacerbate an equity market sell-off.

Then again, do any of these technicals matter? Of course not: only the size of the Fed’s balance sheet does.



    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/cjwzIXcsREs/story01.htm Tyler Durden

A "Frothy", "Overbullish", "Overbought", "Overmargined" Market With "Not Enough Bears" – In Charts

Last week, Bank of America warned that “it’s getting frothy, man” based on the sheer surge of fund flows into equities. Here is the same firm with some other observations on what can simply be described as a “frothy”, “overbought”, “overmargined” market with “not enough bears.”

From Bank of America:

“Daily slow stochastic is generating an overbought sell signal.”

“Based on the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Bulls to Bears ratio investors are more bullish now than they were in late May and mid July. In terms of sentiment, this is a contrarian bearish condition. Since April, near-term peaks and troughs in AAII Bull/Bears have coincided w ith near-term market peaks and troughs.”

 

Bears drops to 16.5% = too few bears;  As of October 25, Investors Intelligence (II) % Bears extended deeper into contrarian bearish territory below the 20% level with a reading of 16.5%. This is down from 18.5% the prior week and the lowest level for II % Bears since April 2011 – this suggests too few bears among new sletter writers. II % Sentiment is an equity market risk and confirms the complacent readings for the 5-day put/call ratios.

NYSE margin debt at record high; confirms S&P 500 high; As of September 2013 NYSE margin debt stood at a new record high of $401.2b and exceeded the prior high from April of $384.4b. This confirms the new S&P 500 highs and negates the bearish 2013 set up that was similar to the bearish patterns seen at the prior highs from 2000 and 2007, where a peak in margin debt preceded important S&P 500 peaks.

Risk: Net free credit at $-111b & back at 2000 extremes; Net free credit is f ree credit balances in cash and margin accounts net of the debit balance in margin accounts. At $-111b, this measure of cash to meet margin calls is at an extreme low or negative reading not seen since the February 2000 low of $-129b. The risk is if the market drops and triggers margin calls, investors do not have cash and would be forced to sell stocks to meet the margin calls. This would exacerbate an equity market sell-off.

Then again, do any of these technicals matter? Of course not: only the size of the Fed’s balance sheet does.



    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/cjwzIXcsREs/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Michael Woodford Warns "By Blinking [On Taper], [The Fed] Has Made A Negative Reaction More Likely"

Widely credited with being the seminal paper at the 2012 Jackson Hole conference and setting the scene for “threshold-based” policy, Michael Woodford discusses his views on the costs and benefits of “forward guidance” in this Goldman Sachs interview. The Columbia professor explains how he thinks about asset purchases versus forward guidance (it’s a mistake to think of asset purchases as a way to avoid having to talk about future policy intentions), and why the market and the Fed have seemed so disconnected at various points this year despite substantial attempts by the Fed to communicate more clearly (there were mistakes in communication, but that does not mean the situation would have been better if the Fed had instead kept its mouth shut, especially in such unprecedented times.) Ultimatley he warns, “by blinking when they did, I fear that they have made a negative reaction more likely in the future, because they are now back to square one, with people once again lacking a clear sense of how close the Fed is to tapering and thus vulnerable to surprise.”

 

Goldman Sachs’ Allison Nathan Interview with Michael Woodford,

Allison Nathan: Haven’t central banks always tried to influence interest rate expectations? What is so special about forward guidance today?

Michael Woodford: No, central banks have not tried to do things that were at all similar to this in the past. Until quite recently, all central banks were very reluctant to say things in advance about future policy decisions, and this reluctance remains to varying degrees at many banks. The forward guidance adopted by the Fed and other central banks, which tries to influence expectations by actually saying things about policy intentions, is therefore a new policy tool and indeed one that has become more important given the near-exhaustion of the most traditional policy tool – adjusting policy rates – as rates across the major economies already hover around their effective lower bound.

Allison Nathan: What are the benefits of forward guidance?

Michael Woodford: If policy expectations matter – and I think it is pretty clear that they are crucial to how longer-term assets end up getting priced – then there are two kinds of advantages of explicitly discussing future policy by the central bank. One advantage is that it can reduce misunderstandings about policy intentions, which, in turn, can reduce uncertainty for the central bank about the effect of its policy on the markets. In principle, talking directly about policy intentions would allow the use of more complex policies, which might not otherwise be pursued for fear that they would not be understood without explanation. The second general type of gain from explicitly talking about future policy is to help ensure that the policy committee itself will follow through with its commitments even though it may have motives to depart from them later on.

Both of these potential advantages are particularly clear when you reach an effective lower bound on policy rates. At that point, convincing people that the policy rate will remain “lower for longer” can help ease financial conditions today, providing additional stimulus to the economy when traditional tools no longer can. But talking about the intention of “lower for longer” is crucial because being at this lower bound is a very unusual situation, so there is little past experience that people can look to in order to anticipate how the central bank is going to respond. There is also a clear need for the central bank to commit itself in advance in order to achieve the stimulative benefit. That is because of course later – when the stimulus has worked and the economy is improving – the bank will have little motivation to actually keep rates low (the so-called “time inconsistency” problem) unless they committed to do so in advance. To overcome that problem, the central bank needs to make an explicit promise that would be difficult or embarrassing to just completely ignore later.

Allison Nathan: What are the dangers of forward guidance?

Michael Woodford: The most obvious danger, which has likely been the main reason for central banks’ reluctance to talk about future policy in the past, is the possibility that a policy commitment that looks sensible at some earlier time turns out to be unwise because things happen in the meantime that the central bank did not expect. Those costs can be reduced without losing all of the potential benefits of forward guidance if the central banks think carefully about what kind of commitments about future policy should be made. It makes sense to avoid unnecessary specificity about things that do not need to be specified too precisely in order to achieve the desired change in expectations. For example, in the case of a commitment to keep the federal funds rate low for longer in order to stimulate the economy today, the central bank could make a very specific commitment about the path of the policy rate over time. But there would be much more likelihood of embarrassment in that case than if the bank instead committed to keep rates low until certain economic conditions arise, whenever that may be.

Allison Nathan: The BOE and the ECB have said that the intention of their shift to forward guidance has been to clarify their policies rather than to commit to “lower for longer”. Will this approach negate the benefits of the guidance?

Michael Woodford: Yes, to some degree. In the case of the Bank of England, the structure of their statement – with several so-called “knock-out” provisions – as well as their insistence that the statement was nothing more than a clarification of the BOE’s normal reaction function, has given people little reason to change their prior beliefs about how soon the Bank would raise rates. Because of this, the statement does not seem to have moved market expectations much and in the way that the BOE thought it should. Similarly, the ECB has taken small steps towards doing something that you might think of as forward guidance, but has also done so quite hesitantly; they are also inclined to deny that they are committing themselves at all about future policy. Given the aversion to talking about policy intentions in the past, this hesitation is not surprising, nor is the fact that even central banks that have decided that they should experiment with the policy do it in a way that simultaneously denies that they would ever do it, because it goes against their instincts. But that to some extent defeats the purpose of the policy. Their approach is quite different from that of the Fed, which has more clearly embraced the policy of “lower for longer”.

Allison Nathan: Is the Fed’s shift to outcome-based or “threshold” guidance from “calendar” guidance a good thing?

Michael Woodford: Yes, because threshold guidance is ultimately more credible. The problem with calendar-based guidance is that if there is a real promise to keep rates at a certain level until a certain point in time no matter what happens, it would be a pretty reckless policy. And because the policy would be reckless, it would ultimately be hard to believe. That would be the case unless the central bank restricted itself to a short horizon over which there could not be many surprises. But if the horizon is too short, the impact on future expectations would be small. So I think the possibility of making a commitment
that extends far enough into the future for it to be news about future policy that would significantly matter to asset pricing is much more plausible if it is based on economic conditions rather than just based on a date.

Allison Nathan: There have been several instances when the use of forward guidance has had an opposite impact than the central banks intended – why?

Michael Woodford: The use of forward guidance is not some kind of magical tool where the mere fact that the central bank says something means that people will then think exactly that. A central bank needs to give people a reason to think something new or different about what it is going to do. A critical part of effective policy is therefore understanding what people will think they are learning about the bank’s policy. An example of this that I talked about in my Jackson Hole paper last year was the experience of the Swedish Riksbank in April 2009, when they cut their policy rate to 50 basis points and accompanied this with a statement and a published projected rate path that showed policy rates remaining at 50 basis points – the lowest level ever – until the beginning of 2011. To the Bank’s surprise, market forward rate expectations rose rather than fell following the announcement. Why? Because the big “news” of the statement was not the central bank’s lower projected rate path, which was in any case just a projection and not a commitment, but that the central bank was apparently regarding 50 basis points as a floor, which was higher than at least some market participants had previously guessed. That news shifted the markets’ most likely expected path of the future policy rate up rather than down.

Allison Nathan: How would you explain the violence of the bond market selloff in May/June, which came in response to a very small change in the Fed’s message?

Michael Woodford: I am inclined to think that it indicated some mistakes in Fed communication prior to May that led to two possible types of misinterpretation about the Fed’s intentions. First, some people may have interpreted the start of “taper talk” as a signal that the Fed was trying to withdraw accommodation more broadly, and was also preparing to start raising interest rates. That was a surprise to the FOMC; they didn’t think they were saying anything that would suggest they were preparing to raise rates. But they had left themselves open to that misinterpretation by failing to explain earlier the criteria that would determine the path of asset purchases in a way that sounded very different from the criteria that would determine the path of interest rates. The forward guidance about both asset purchases and interest rates focused on labor market conditions and sounded very closely related. I do not think that the Fed meant for the criteria to be the same, but they failed to sufficiently explain why they would not be. Second, there may have been a number of people who thought the purchases were going to continue at the current rate for a lot longer, and learned suddenly that they would not. If that was news to people, it was again a failure of communication because I doubt that the Fed had ever thought asset purchases would continue at the current rate beyond 2013. Despite these failures, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Fed should not have started speaking about tapering when it did; the problems would not have been avoided if the Fed had just kept its mouth shut, because the misinterpretations would still be there. And shutting your mouth is potentially setting you up for an even harder adjustment later when the misinterpretations must eventually be exposed.

Allison Nathan: Why was the market so surprised by the decision not to taper at the September FOMC?

Michael Woodford: It certainly seemed to me that during the summer the ground was being prepared for a slowing of the rate of purchases. As to why they did not actually do it, I think it was a reaction to the fact that the market had responded to those earlier hints more violently than expected. And there was evidently a decision that they could not risk a further unexpected negative reaction to an actual announcement of tapering. That was probably a mistake in judgment. By September, a modest reduction in purchases was widely expected, so I do not think there would have been a big negative reaction to that announcement. But, by blinking when they did, I fear that they have made a negative reaction more likely in the future, because they are now back to square one, with people once again lacking a clear sense of how close the Fed is to tapering and thus vulnerable to surprise.

Allison Nathan: Is there actually greater volatility and uncertainty in the markets as a function of this desire to communicate more, but not quite getting it right?

Michael Woodford: I don’t think so, because the question is: what would be people’s understanding of policy if the Fed had not tried to talk about it at all? There would be a lot of uncertainty if the Fed were adopting a policy of silence, especially given that we are in unprecedented territory. When conditions are unusual is exactly the time when trying to provide some explicit guidance is potentially most valuable, even if it is not a panacea.

Allison Nathan: How important are asset purchases as a signal of commitment to accommodative policy?

Michael Woodford: I think that a lot of the effects of asset purchases have been signaling effects. The advantage of purchases as a signal is that it is something that people see being done. It’s not just talk, so it grabs people’s attention. And the fact that action is being taken gives some indication of where the majority of the FOMC stands. But the likelihood that purchases have had some signaling effect does not necessarily mean that they are the most effective way of providing the signals that the central bank wants to send. There has at times been a temptation to view asset purchases and forward guidance as two alternative means to providing further stimulus, so that we can avoid having to say more about future policy if instead we are acting to make additional asset purchases, and I think that is a mistake. To the extent that the main goal of purchases is to give a signal, then you should think consciously about what signal you are trying to give and be comfortable delivering that signal. Thinking about asset purchases as part of a coherent and consistent attempt to give signals about future policy is one thing. But it’s very different from the idea that there will be a mechanical effect of purchases that allows you to avoid saying anything about future policy intentions.

Allison Nathan: What’s next for Fed communication?

Michael Woodford: It would be valuable for the Fed to provide more guidance about the process of policy normalization. When it is clear that they will begin slowing the rate of asset purchases — which I think will have to be fairly soon, although not necessarily this year given that they did not do it in September — the next obvious question will be how quickly the rest of the unusually easy policies will be unwound, and what the broader ‘exit strategy’ will look like. The last time they spoke about that was in 2011 and it’s pretty obvious that what they said then is no longer an operative strategy. They will need
to say something about that at least by the time that they start tapering, because at that point it will be very clear that we are no longer in a period of just staying the course.
But a likely reason not to make big statements right now is of course the imminent hand-off of the Chairmanship in January.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/g5wxoYSz324/story01.htm Tyler Durden

Michael Woodford Warns “By Blinking [On Taper], [The Fed] Has Made A Negative Reaction More Likely”

Widely credited with being the seminal paper at the 2012 Jackson Hole conference and setting the scene for “threshold-based” policy, Michael Woodford discusses his views on the costs and benefits of “forward guidance” in this Goldman Sachs interview. The Columbia professor explains how he thinks about asset purchases versus forward guidance (it’s a mistake to think of asset purchases as a way to avoid having to talk about future policy intentions), and why the market and the Fed have seemed so disconnected at various points this year despite substantial attempts by the Fed to communicate more clearly (there were mistakes in communication, but that does not mean the situation would have been better if the Fed had instead kept its mouth shut, especially in such unprecedented times.) Ultimatley he warns, “by blinking when they did, I fear that they have made a negative reaction more likely in the future, because they are now back to square one, with people once again lacking a clear sense of how close the Fed is to tapering and thus vulnerable to surprise.”

 

Goldman Sachs’ Allison Nathan Interview with Michael Woodford,

Allison Nathan: Haven’t central banks always tried to influence interest rate expectations? What is so special about forward guidance today?

Michael Woodford: No, central banks have not tried to do things that were at all similar to this in the past. Until quite recently, all central banks were very reluctant to say things in advance about future policy decisions, and this reluctance remains to varying degrees at many banks. The forward guidance adopted by the Fed and other central banks, which tries to influence expectations by actually saying things about policy intentions, is therefore a new policy tool and indeed one that has become more important given the near-exhaustion of the most traditional policy tool – adjusting policy rates – as rates across the major economies already hover around their effective lower bound.

Allison Nathan: What are the benefits of forward guidance?

Michael Woodford: If policy expectations matter – and I think it is pretty clear that they are crucial to how longer-term assets end up getting priced – then there are two kinds of advantages of explicitly discussing future policy by the central bank. One advantage is that it can reduce misunderstandings about policy intentions, which, in turn, can reduce uncertainty for the central bank about the effect of its policy on the markets. In principle, talking directly about policy intentions would allow the use of more complex policies, which might not otherwise be pursued for fear that they would not be understood without explanation. The second general type of gain from explicitly talking about future policy is to help ensure that the policy committee itself will follow through with its commitments even though it may have motives to depart from them later on.

Both of these potential advantages are particularly clear when you reach an effective lower bound on policy rates. At that point, convincing people that the policy rate will remain “lower for longer” can help ease financial conditions today, providing additional stimulus to the economy when traditional tools no longer can. But talking about the intention of “lower for longer” is crucial because being at this lower bound is a very unusual situation, so there is little past experience that people can look to in order to anticipate how the central bank is going to respond. There is also a clear need for the central bank to commit itself in advance in order to achieve the stimulative benefit. That is because of course later – when the stimulus has worked and the economy is improving – the bank will have little motivation to actually keep rates low (the so-called “time inconsistency” problem) unless they committed to do so in advance. To overcome that problem, the central bank needs to make an explicit promise that would be difficult or embarrassing to just completely ignore later.

Allison Nathan: What are the dangers of forward guidance?

Michael Woodford: The most obvious danger, which has likely been the main reason for central banks’ reluctance to talk about future policy in the past, is the possibility that a policy commitment that looks sensible at some earlier time turns out to be unwise because things happen in the meantime that the central bank did not expect. Those costs can be reduced without losing all of the potential benefits of forward guidance if the central banks think carefully about what kind of commitments about future policy should be made. It makes sense to avoid unnecessary specificity about things that do not need to be specified too precisely in order to achieve the desired change in expectations. For example, in the case of a commitment to keep the federal funds rate low for longer in order to stimulate the economy today, the central bank could make a very specific commitment about the path of the policy rate over time. But there would be much more likelihood of embarrassment in that case than if the bank instead committed to keep rates low until certain economic conditions arise, whenever that may be.

Allison Nathan: The BOE and the ECB have said that the intention of their shift to forward guidance has been to clarify their policies rather than to commit to “lower for longer”. Will this approach negate the benefits of the guidance?

Michael Woodford: Yes, to some degree. In the case of the Bank of England, the structure of their statement – with several so-called “knock-out” provisions – as well as their insistence that the statement was nothing more than a clarification of the BOE’s normal reaction function, has given people little reason to change their prior beliefs about how soon the Bank would raise rates. Because of this, the statement does not seem to have moved market expectations much and in the way that the BOE thought it should. Similarly, the ECB has taken small steps towards doing something that you might think of as forward guidance, but has also done so quite hesitantly; they are also inclined to deny that they are committing themselves at all about future policy. Given the aversion to talking about policy intentions in the past, this hesitation is not surprising, nor is the fact that even central banks that have decided that they should experiment with the policy do it in a way that simultaneously denies that they would ever do it, because it goes against their instincts. But that to some extent defeats the purpose of the policy. Their approach is quite different from that of the Fed, which has more clearly embraced the policy of “lower for longer”.

Allison Nathan: Is the Fed’s shift to outcome-based or “threshold” guidance from “calendar” guidance a good thing?

Michael Woodford: Yes, because threshold guidance is ultimately more credible. The problem with calendar-based guidance is that if there is a real promise to keep rates at a certain level until a certain point in time no matter what happens, it would be a pretty reckless policy. And because the policy would be reckless, it would ultimately be hard to believe. That would be the case unless the central bank restricted itself to a short horizon over which there could not be many surprises. But if the horizon is too short, the impact on future expectations would be small. So I think the possibility of making a commitment that extends far enough into the future for it to be news about future policy that would significantly matter to asset pricing is much more plausible if it is based on economic conditions rather than just based on a date.

Allison Nathan: There have been several instances when the use of forward guidance has had an opposite impact than the central banks intended – why?

Michael Woodford: The use of forward guidance is not some kind of magical tool where the mere fact that the central bank says something means that people will then think exactly that. A central bank needs to give people a reason to think something new or different about what it is going to do. A critical part of effective policy is therefore understanding what people will think they are learning about the bank’s policy. An example of this that I talked about in my Jackson Hole paper last year was the experience of the Swedish Riksbank in April 2009, when they cut their policy rate to 50 basis points and accompanied this with a statement and a published projected rate path that showed policy rates remaining at 50 basis points – the lowest level ever – until the beginning of 2011. To the Bank’s surprise, market forward rate expectations rose rather than fell following the announcement. Why? Because the big “news” of the statement was not the central bank’s lower projected rate path, which was in any case just a projection and not a commitment, but that the central bank was apparently regarding 50 basis points as a floor, which was higher than at least some market participants had previously guessed. That news shifted the markets’ most likely expected path of the future policy rate up rather than down.

Allison Nathan: How would you explain the violence of the bond market selloff in May/June, which came in response to a very small change in the Fed’s message?

Michael Woodford: I am inclined to think that it indicated some mistakes in Fed communication prior to May that led to two possible types of misinterpretation about the Fed’s intentions. First, some people may have interpreted the start of “taper talk” as a signal that the Fed was trying to withdraw accommodation more broadly, and was also preparing to start raising interest rates. That was a surprise to the FOMC; they didn’t think they were saying anything that would suggest they were preparing to raise rates. But they had left themselves open to that misinterpretation by failing to explain earlier the criteria that would determine the path of asset purchases in a way that sounded very different from the criteria that would determine the path of interest rates. The forward guidance about both asset purchases and interest rates focused on labor market conditions and sounded very closely related. I do not think that the Fed meant for the criteria to be the same, but they failed to sufficiently explain why they would not be. Second, there may have been a number of people who thought the purchases were going to continue at the current rate for a lot longer, and learned suddenly that they would not. If that was news to people, it was again a failure of communication because I doubt that the Fed had ever thought asset purchases would continue at the current rate beyond 2013. Despite these failures, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Fed should not have started speaking about tapering when it did; the problems would not have been avoided if the Fed had just kept its mouth shut, because the misinterpretations would still be there. And shutting your mouth is potentially setting you up for an even harder adjustment later when the misinterpretations must eventually be exposed.

Allison Nathan: Why was the market so surprised by the decision not to taper at the September FOMC?

Michael Woodford: It certainly seemed to me that during the summer the ground was being prepared for a slowing of the rate of purchases. As to why they did not actually do it, I think it was a reaction to the fact that the market had responded to those earlier hints more violently than expected. And there was evidently a decision that they could not risk a further unexpected negative reaction to an actual announcement of tapering. That was probably a mistake in judgment. By September, a modest reduction in purchases was widely expected, so I do not think there would have been a big negative reaction to that announcement. But, by blinking when they did, I fear that they have made a negative reaction more likely in the future, because they are now back to square one, with people once again lacking a clear sense of how close the Fed is to tapering and thus vulnerable to surprise.

Allison Nathan: Is there actually greater volatility and uncertainty in the markets as a function of this desire to communicate more, but not quite getting it right?

Michael Woodford: I don’t think so, because the question is: what would be people’s understanding of policy if the Fed had not tried to talk about it at all? There would be a lot of uncertainty if the Fed were adopting a policy of silence, especially given that we are in unprecedented territory. When conditions are unusual is exactly the time when trying to provide some explicit guidance is potentially most valuable, even if it is not a panacea.

Allison Nathan: How important are asset purchases as a signal of commitment to accommodative policy?

Michael Woodford: I think that a lot of the effects of asset purchases have been signaling effects. The advantage of purchases as a signal is that it is something that people see being done. It’s not just talk, so it grabs people’s attention. And the fact that action is being taken gives some indication of where the majority of the FOMC stands. But the likelihood that purchases have had some signaling effect does not necessarily mean that they are the most effective way of providing the signals that the central bank wants to send. There has at times been a temptation to view asset purchases and forward guidance as two alternative means to providing further stimulus, so that we can avoid having to say more about future policy if instead we are acting to make additional asset purchases, and I think that is a mistake. To the extent that the main goal of purchases is to give a signal, then you should think consciously about what signal you are trying to give and be comfortable delivering that signal. Thinking about asset purchases as part of a coherent and consistent attempt to give signals about future policy is one thing. But it’s very different from the idea that there will be a mechanical effect of purchases that allows you to avoid saying anything about future policy intentions.

Allison Nathan: What’s next for Fed communication?

Michael Woodford: It would be valuable for the Fed to provide more guidance about the process of policy normalization. When it is clear that they will begin slowing the rate of asset purchases — which I think will have to be fairly soon, although not necessarily this year given that they did not do it in September — the next obvious question will be how quickly the rest of the unusually easy policies will be unwound, and what the broader ‘exit strategy’ will look like. The last time they spoke about that was in 2011 and it’s pretty obvious that what they said then is no longer an operative strategy. They will need to say something about that at least by the time that they start tapering, because at that point it will be very clear that we are no longer in a period of just staying the course. But a likely reason not to make big statements right now is of course the imminent hand-off of the Chairmanship in January.


    



via Zero Hedge http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/zerohedge/feed/~3/g5wxoYSz324/story01.htm Tyler Durden

New: The War on Pot Is Over!

2013 is going to be remembered
as the year the drug war died as a political issue, writes Nick
Gillespie.

The headline of the latest Gallup Poll on the subject says it
all: “For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana.” Fully
58 percent of respondents agreed that “the use of marijuana should
be made legal.”
Not decriminalizedmedicalized, or any
other weasel-worded synonym to keep the squares and the cops and
the addiction-industry lobbyists from getting the vapors and
reaching for a legal chill pill. Legalized. This
year’s figure represents a massive, 10-point bounce from last year
and an even longer, stranger trip from 1969, the first year Gallup
popped the question, when just 12 percent said pot ought to be sold
like beer, wine, and alcohol…. A large majority of Americans
favor legalizing it and that’s not going to change. No politician
is going to ever again gain votes or win an election by talking
tough about pot.

View this article.

from Hit & Run http://reason.com/blog/2013/11/03/new-the-war-on-pot-is-over
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