Federal Court Rules Against Title 42 “Public Health” Expulsions of Migrants


Title 42

On Thursday, federal district court judge Emmet Sullivan issued a decision ruling that the Biden administration’s use of “Title 42” public health authority to expel migrants at the border (including those otherwise eligible for asylum) is illegal. While the ideological valence of the two cases is very different, the reasons why the Title 42 expulsions are illegal are very similar to those that recently led the Supreme Court to rule against the federal eviction moratorium. In both situations, the Centers for Disease Control—at the behest of first Trump and later Biden—claimed sweeping authority that legal precedent indicates it should not have without clear, specific authorization by Congress.

The Title 42 expulsion order, mandating immediate expulsion of most migrants coming from Canada or Mexico, was first adopted under the Trump administration in March 2020, and was later extended by Biden, most recently in August. The Biden administration did rescind the expulsion of unaccompanied minors,. Nonetheless, many thousands of people continue to be summarily expelled under the order, including those who would otherwise qualify for asylum.

The ostensible rationale for the expulsion order was to prevent the spread of the Covid-19 virus. I say “ostensible” because CDC public health experts warned the Trump administration that the policy would not actually do much to stem the spread of Covid. Many months of both Title 42 expulsions and other international travel restrictions amounting to the most restrictive immigration policy in the history of the United States, did little or nothing to prevent either the initial Covid virus or later variants (such as the Delta version), from becoming established in the United States.

It seems likely that the Trump administration used the Covid crisis as an excuse to pursue its longstanding anti-immigration agenda, and Biden has partially continued the restrictions for political reasons of his own (including, perhaps, looking tough on Covid, and avoiding attacks from the right for being too soft on border control).

The legal authority cited by both Trump and Biden to justify the Title 42 expulsions is 42 USC Section 265, which gives the CDC Director the following powers:

Whenever the Surgeon General determines that by reason of the existence of any communicable disease in a foreign country there is serious danger of the introduction of such disease into the United States, and that this danger is so increased by the introduction of persons or property from such country that a suspension of the right to introduce such persons and property is required in the interest of the public health, the Surgeon General, in accordance with regulations approved by the President, shall have the power to prohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction of persons and property from such countries or places as he shall designate in order to avert such danger, and for such period of time as he may deem necessary for such purpose.

In his recent ruling Judge Sullivan indicates that this statute does not grant the CDC the power to expel migrants, as opposed to exercise such less extreme measures as imposing quarantines:

As Plaintiffs point out, Section 265 simply contains no mention of the word “expel”—or any synonyms thereof—within its text…. The lack of express terms within the statute is significant: even “broad rulemaking power must be exercised within the bounds set by Congress,” Merck & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 385 F. Supp. 3d 81, 92, 94 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 962 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2020)…

Indeed, particularly where the statute in question regards such a “severe ‘penalty'” as deportation, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010)…. the [Supreme Court] Court is loathe to recognize an implied power of forced removal from the country, see Util. Air Reg. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324 (“We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.'”). Rather, as this Court explained in P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492, 512 (D.D.C. 2020), “when Congress wants to grant the power to expel individuals out of the United States, it does so plainly.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 512….

The Court also finds that the plain text of Section 265 is supported by the statutory context. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132-33 (2000) (“It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme….'” For example, in Section 271, Congress provided for specific “penalties” for those
37persons who or vessels that violated public health regulations prescribed under the relevant sections, including Section 265. 42 U.S.C. § 271. For individuals, Section 271 states that any violation “shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.” Id. § 271(a). Removal from the United States, however, is not included as a penalty. Moreover, Section 271 refers to the regulations prescribed under Section 265 and others as “quarantine laws,” further suggesting that the CDC’s powers were limited to quarantine and containment.

It is notable that Judge Sullivan relies the rule that courts “expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.'” This is exactly the same language from the exact same case that the Supreme Court cited in striking down the DC eviction moratorium. In both cases, the administration used potentially ambiguous statutory language to claim vast discretionary authority over a major area of economic and social policy.

In the eviction moratorium case, it was power amounting to the authority to shut down almost any activity that might spread disease. Here, it is the power to expel virtually any non-citizen at any time. After all, “communicable diseases” exist at all time times in every nation in the world. And the CDC can always claim there is “serious danger” that migrants might “introduce” them into the United States, especially since the statute does not require the agency to prove that such a danger actually exists, but merely to “determine” that it does so.

There is another flaw in the government’s position here that Judge Sullivan does not mention. It has to do with the passage in Section 265 indicating that the agency’s power is limited to measures that could prevent the “the introduction of such disease into the United States.” By now, it is impossible to prevent the “introduction” of Covid-19 into the United States for the simple reason that it is already here, and  already widespread. The most plausible interpretation of “introduction” is that it refers to the spread of a disease that is not already present, or at least not yet widely prevalent. I cannot meaningfully “introduce” a chemical into a substance where it is already present, nor “introduce” a person to someone she has already met.

Of course, it is also possible to argue “introduction” includes even the movement of additional carriers of a disease that is already widespread in the US. But that interpretation is both less linguistically plausible, and raises serious constitutional problems. By that standard, the CDC could use Section 265 to expel virtually any migrant from any country. Communicable diseases exist everywhere in the world, and every person could potentially be a carrier of one or more of them.

Such boundless delegation of deportation authority would clearly violate the nondelegation doctrine, a point emphasized by several of the lower court rulings striking down the eviction moratorium. At the very least, interpreting Section 265 in this way violates the longstanding rule that courts must, where at all possible, interpret federal statutes in a way that avoids raising serious constitutional problems. Adopting the narrower interpretation of “introduction” satisfies that rule, whereas the broad one does not.

If you thought the Trump and Biden administrations abused their powers when they adopted the eviction moratoria, and that the courts were right to rule against them, you should also oppose the Title 42 expulsion order for the same reason. Both are dangerous executive power grabs that undermine the separation of powers, and could easily be abused if left unchecked. As always, even if you trust a president of your own preferred party with such vast power, you probably don’t have the same faith in the other party.

Judge Sullivan’s ruling also includes a number of other issues, related to class certification and remedies. I will leave those to people expert on those topics. It is notable that Judge Sullivan has issued an injunction against the Title 42 policy, though he has temporarily stayed it for 14 days. The injunction will go into effect at that time, unless further stayed by a higher court.

The Biden administration has appealed the district court ruling to the DC Circuit, and perhaps eventually to the Supreme Court. This legal battle is far from over.

It’s unlikely the administration will listen to me. But I hope they reconsider the appeal, and instead simply accept the district court decision. Do they really want the next GOP president to have the power to use the CDC to expel virtually any migrants at any time he wants? For reasons discussed above, that is the likely result of an administration victory in this case. Such a legacy would be radically at odds with Biden’s promises to protect migrants and refugees, and reclaim “Americas values” as a “nation of immigrants.”

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Allegations in Complaint Against Real Agent Broadly Protected Against Libel Liability

From Williams v. Lazer, decided Thursday by the Nevada Supreme Court:

After respondent threatened to sue appellant over a text message that he perceived as defamatory, appellant filed a complaint with the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED), alleging that respondent acted unprofessionally and unethically in a real estate matter. Respondent filed the underlying tort complaint based on appellant’s NRED complaint.

Appellant, claiming that the anti-SLAPP statute and absolute litigation privilege protected her from liability, moved to dismiss…. [W]e conclude that appellant met the good faith standard under the anti-SLAPP framework because her statements were either opinions, were truthful, or were made without knowledge of their falsehood, as supported by her sworn affidavit. We further conclude that the absolute litigation privilege applies at the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis and that an NRED proceeding is quasi-judicial for purposes of the privilege….

Appellant Daphne Williams, an African-American woman, agreed to purchase a condominium that she was renting from the property owner. Respondent, Charles “Randy” Lazer, a licensed real estate professional, represented the seller in the sale, and Williams acted without an agent.

Williams and Lazer had communication problems during the transaction, and after delays in closing, Williams sent Lazer a text stating that she was contemplating filing a complaint with the NRED regarding what she perceived as Lazer’s racist, sexist, and unprofessional behavior. Lazer responded to the text by contacting NRED, the seller, Williams’s mortgage lender Bryan Jolly, an attorney, and another real estate professional to explain his perception of what occurred. Further, after the sale closed, Lazer sent a demand letter to Williams seeking several thousand dollars and an apology in exchange for not filing a tort action against her based on the text message she sent only to him.

Williams refused the demand and subsequently filed an NRED complaint, alleging that Lazer (1) “displayed unethical, unprofessional, racist and sexist behavior” during the transaction; (2) inappropriately shared confidential information with her about his personal relationship with the seller; (3) contacted the appraiser before the appraisal, which she believed was unethical based on a conversation she had with an NRED employee; (4) falsely claimed that Williams would not allow the seller’s movers to enter the condominium to remove the seller’s property and that Williams caused delays in closing; (5) failed to send her a fully executed copy of the signed purchase agreement; and (6) had the seller call Williams to encourage her to apologize to Lazer for her text message.

Lazer then filed the underlying complaint, alleging defamation, negligence, business disparagement, and intentional infliction of emotional distress….

[Williams’] statement that Lazer was racist, sexist, unprofessional, and unethical is a non-actionable opinion and that either her remaining factual statements are true or Lazer failed to provide evidence that Williams knew the statements were false when she made them….

In support of her anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, Williams provided a sworn declaration in which she described various problems she encountered in purchasing the condominium and working with Lazer. She stated that Lazer was consistently rude and unprofessional and she had “no doubt in [her] mind” that had she not been an African-American woman, Lazer would have treated her with greater respect and professionalism. She further stated her belief that every statement in her NRED complaint was either true or her reasoned opinion based on her experience with Lazer.

Lazer concedes that Williams’s allegations of racism and sexism are opinions, and although he challenges her generalized statements that he acted unethically and unprofessionally, those statements were likewise opinion-based.

As we have previously observed, opinion statements are incapable of being false, as “‘there is no such thing as a false idea.'” In Abrams v. Sanson, we affirmed a district court order granting the defendant’s anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, concluding that the challenged statements calling the attorney plaintiff unethical and criticizing her courtroom behavior and methods were expressions of the defendant’s personal views and thus opinions. We perceive no difference in Williams’s generalized statements here, especially in light of her sworn declaration affirming the statements as her own opinions based on her experience with Lazer. See also Stevens v. Tillman (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that neither general statements charging a person with being racist, unfair, or unjust, nor references to general discriminatory treatment, without more, constitute provably false assertions of fact); Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“We agree that general statements charging a person with being racist, unfair, or unjust … constitute mere name calling and do not contain a provably false assertion of fact.”). As Williams’s opinion-based statements cannot be knowingly false, we conclude that she satisfied her burden as to these statements under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP framework.

Turning to the remaining statements, Williams’s declaration explained that she believed every statement she made was true as well as the basis for that belief, which, under these circumstances, is sufficient to show that her statements were truthful or made without knowledge of their falsehood. While Lazer provided several declarations that allege some of Williams’s statements are factually wrong, such declarations do not constitute contrary evidence to refute Williams’s affidavit because they do not allege, much less show, that Williams knew any of the statements were false when she made them.

For example, Williams stated that she believed Lazer’s preappraisal contact with the appraiser was unethical based on a conversation she had with an NRED employee who told her that a seller’s agent is not supposed to make such contact. Although Lazer provided a declaration stating that such contact is permissible, that does not mean that Williams did not have a subjective belief that it was impermissible at the time she filed her NRED complaint. Moreover, the parties’ declarations support that the gist of some of Williams’s remaining statements, including that Lazer did not provide her with a copy of the fully executed purchase agreement and that he falsely claimed that she refused to allow the seller to remove property from the condo, were true, and thus made in good faith. Accordingly, we conclude that Williams met her burden of showing that she made the remaining statements in good faith and thus satisfied her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP framework….

Under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Lazer had the burden of showing that his claims had at least minimal merit in order to proceed with the litigation…. [We] hold that the absolute litigation privilege applies at the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because a plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on his claim if a privilege applies to preclude the defendant’s liability….

[T]he absolute litigation privilege extends “to quasi-judicial proceedings before executive officers, boards, and commissions.” A proceeding is quasi-judicial for purposes of the absolute litigation privilege if it “(1) provide[s] the opportunity to present and rebut evidence and witness testimony, (2) require[s] that such evidence and testimony be presented upon oath or affirmation, and (3) allow[s] opposing parties to cross-examine, impeach, or otherwise confront a witness.”

We conclude that an NRED proceeding initiated by a complaint from a party in a real estate transaction is quasi-judicial because it meets the criteria outlined in Spencer…. In order for the absolute litigation privilege to apply to statements made in the context of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, “(1) a judicial proceeding must be contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration, and (2) the communication must be related to the litigation.” Thus, “the privilege applies to communications made by either an attorney or a nonattorney that are related to ongoing litigation or future litigation contemplated in good faith.”

We conclude that Williams filed her NRED complaint in good faith and in relation to litigation. Because Williams’s NRED complaint is a complaint in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the absolute litigation privilege applies and protects Williams’s NRED complaint. Because all of Lazer’s claims derive from the allegedly defamatory statements contained in Williams’s NRED complaint, which is protected by the absolute litigation privilege, we hold that he cannot show by prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claims….

Williams’s statements either were opinions incapable of being knowingly false, were true, or were not knowingly false. Lazer’s declarations asserting that Williams’s statements were factually false are insufficient to show that she made the statements in bad faith because his declarations do not show that she knew the statements were false when she made them. The district court thus erred in determining that Williams did not meet her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Further, statements made in an NRED complaint are subject to the absolute litigation privilege, as proceedings before the real estate commission are quasi-judicial, and whether the privilege applies to particular statements is relevant to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because a plaintiff cannot prevail on defamation-based claims and related torts if the privilege applies. Under the facts here, the absolute litigation privilege protects Williams’s NRED complaint because the complaint itself initiated a quasi-judicial proceeding. Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that Lazer demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order denying Williams’s anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss and remand with instructions that the district court grant the motion….

Congratulations to Marc Randazza and Alex Shepard, who represented Ms. Williams.

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Allegations in Complaint Against Real Agent Broadly Protected Against Libel Liability

From Williams v. Lazer, decided Thursday by the Nevada Supreme Court:

After respondent threatened to sue appellant over a text message that he perceived as defamatory, appellant filed a complaint with the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED), alleging that respondent acted unprofessionally and unethically in a real estate matter. Respondent filed the underlying tort complaint based on appellant’s NRED complaint.

Appellant, claiming that the anti-SLAPP statute and absolute litigation privilege protected her from liability, moved to dismiss…. [W]e conclude that appellant met the good faith standard under the anti-SLAPP framework because her statements were either opinions, were truthful, or were made without knowledge of their falsehood, as supported by her sworn affidavit. We further conclude that the absolute litigation privilege applies at the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis and that an NRED proceeding is quasi-judicial for purposes of the privilege….

Appellant Daphne Williams, an African-American woman, agreed to purchase a condominium that she was renting from the property owner. Respondent, Charles “Randy” Lazer, a licensed real estate professional, represented the seller in the sale, and Williams acted without an agent.

Williams and Lazer had communication problems during the transaction, and after delays in closing, Williams sent Lazer a text stating that she was contemplating filing a complaint with the NRED regarding what she perceived as Lazer’s racist, sexist, and unprofessional behavior. Lazer responded to the text by contacting NRED, the seller, Williams’s mortgage lender Bryan Jolly, an attorney, and another real estate professional to explain his perception of what occurred. Further, after the sale closed, Lazer sent a demand letter to Williams seeking several thousand dollars and an apology in exchange for not filing a tort action against her based on the text message she sent only to him.

Williams refused the demand and subsequently filed an NRED complaint, alleging that Lazer (1) “displayed unethical, unprofessional, racist and sexist behavior” during the transaction; (2) inappropriately shared confidential information with her about his personal relationship with the seller; (3) contacted the appraiser before the appraisal, which she believed was unethical based on a conversation she had with an NRED employee; (4) falsely claimed that Williams would not allow the seller’s movers to enter the condominium to remove the seller’s property and that Williams caused delays in closing; (5) failed to send her a fully executed copy of the signed purchase agreement; and (6) had the seller call Williams to encourage her to apologize to Lazer for her text message.

Lazer then filed the underlying complaint, alleging defamation, negligence, business disparagement, and intentional infliction of emotional distress….

[Williams’] statement that Lazer was racist, sexist, unprofessional, and unethical is a non-actionable opinion and that either her remaining factual statements are true or Lazer failed to provide evidence that Williams knew the statements were false when she made them….

In support of her anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, Williams provided a sworn declaration in which she described various problems she encountered in purchasing the condominium and working with Lazer. She stated that Lazer was consistently rude and unprofessional and she had “no doubt in [her] mind” that had she not been an African-American woman, Lazer would have treated her with greater respect and professionalism. She further stated her belief that every statement in her NRED complaint was either true or her reasoned opinion based on her experience with Lazer.

Lazer concedes that Williams’s allegations of racism and sexism are opinions, and although he challenges her generalized statements that he acted unethically and unprofessionally, those statements were likewise opinion-based.

As we have previously observed, opinion statements are incapable of being false, as “‘there is no such thing as a false idea.'” In Abrams v. Sanson, we affirmed a district court order granting the defendant’s anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, concluding that the challenged statements calling the attorney plaintiff unethical and criticizing her courtroom behavior and methods were expressions of the defendant’s personal views and thus opinions. We perceive no difference in Williams’s generalized statements here, especially in light of her sworn declaration affirming the statements as her own opinions based on her experience with Lazer. See also Stevens v. Tillman (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that neither general statements charging a person with being racist, unfair, or unjust, nor references to general discriminatory treatment, without more, constitute provably false assertions of fact); Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“We agree that general statements charging a person with being racist, unfair, or unjust … constitute mere name calling and do not contain a provably false assertion of fact.”). As Williams’s opinion-based statements cannot be knowingly false, we conclude that she satisfied her burden as to these statements under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP framework.

Turning to the remaining statements, Williams’s declaration explained that she believed every statement she made was true as well as the basis for that belief, which, under these circumstances, is sufficient to show that her statements were truthful or made without knowledge of their falsehood. While Lazer provided several declarations that allege some of Williams’s statements are factually wrong, such declarations do not constitute contrary evidence to refute Williams’s affidavit because they do not allege, much less show, that Williams knew any of the statements were false when she made them.

For example, Williams stated that she believed Lazer’s preappraisal contact with the appraiser was unethical based on a conversation she had with an NRED employee who told her that a seller’s agent is not supposed to make such contact. Although Lazer provided a declaration stating that such contact is permissible, that does not mean that Williams did not have a subjective belief that it was impermissible at the time she filed her NRED complaint. Moreover, the parties’ declarations support that the gist of some of Williams’s remaining statements, including that Lazer did not provide her with a copy of the fully executed purchase agreement and that he falsely claimed that she refused to allow the seller to remove property from the condo, were true, and thus made in good faith. Accordingly, we conclude that Williams met her burden of showing that she made the remaining statements in good faith and thus satisfied her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP framework….

Under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Lazer had the burden of showing that his claims had at least minimal merit in order to proceed with the litigation…. [We] hold that the absolute litigation privilege applies at the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because a plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on his claim if a privilege applies to preclude the defendant’s liability….

[T]he absolute litigation privilege extends “to quasi-judicial proceedings before executive officers, boards, and commissions.” A proceeding is quasi-judicial for purposes of the absolute litigation privilege if it “(1) provide[s] the opportunity to present and rebut evidence and witness testimony, (2) require[s] that such evidence and testimony be presented upon oath or affirmation, and (3) allow[s] opposing parties to cross-examine, impeach, or otherwise confront a witness.”

We conclude that an NRED proceeding initiated by a complaint from a party in a real estate transaction is quasi-judicial because it meets the criteria outlined in Spencer…. In order for the absolute litigation privilege to apply to statements made in the context of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, “(1) a judicial proceeding must be contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration, and (2) the communication must be related to the litigation.” Thus, “the privilege applies to communications made by either an attorney or a nonattorney that are related to ongoing litigation or future litigation contemplated in good faith.”

We conclude that Williams filed her NRED complaint in good faith and in relation to litigation. Because Williams’s NRED complaint is a complaint in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the absolute litigation privilege applies and protects Williams’s NRED complaint. Because all of Lazer’s claims derive from the allegedly defamatory statements contained in Williams’s NRED complaint, which is protected by the absolute litigation privilege, we hold that he cannot show by prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claims….

Williams’s statements either were opinions incapable of being knowingly false, were true, or were not knowingly false. Lazer’s declarations asserting that Williams’s statements were factually false are insufficient to show that she made the statements in bad faith because his declarations do not show that she knew the statements were false when she made them. The district court thus erred in determining that Williams did not meet her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Further, statements made in an NRED complaint are subject to the absolute litigation privilege, as proceedings before the real estate commission are quasi-judicial, and whether the privilege applies to particular statements is relevant to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because a plaintiff cannot prevail on defamation-based claims and related torts if the privilege applies. Under the facts here, the absolute litigation privilege protects Williams’s NRED complaint because the complaint itself initiated a quasi-judicial proceeding. Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that Lazer demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order denying Williams’s anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss and remand with instructions that the district court grant the motion….

Congratulations to Marc Randazza and Alex Shepard, who represented Ms. Williams.

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Court Seals Name of Party, Orders Public Access Advocacy Group Not to Mention the Name

From the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus in Civil Beat Law Center for the Public Interest v. Chang, filed yesterday in the Hawaii Supreme Court:

Civil No. 05‑1‑863 has a “confidential” case designation, and thus nothing in the case (parties, judge, docket, filings) is publicly accessible. To understand whether a compelling reason existed for such comprehensive secrecy, Petitioner Civil Beat Law Center for the Public Interest (Law Center) asked the circuit court for public access to Civil No. 05‑1‑863.

Respondent Judge [Gary W.B. Chang] denied that request and then restrained the Law Center’s ability to discuss the case publicly under threat of sanctions for contempt….

In October 2020, the Judiciary provided the Law Center with a list of case numbers for civil cases flagged as “confidential” in the preceding 15 years. For cases flagged as “confidential”, the entire case file—including the docket and case name—is inaccessible to the public. In November 2020, the Law Center began requesting access to randomly selected “confidential” cases. To date, none of the cases that the Law Center challenged has met the constitutional standards for sealing the entire case file. Civil No. 05-1-863 was on the list of “confidential” cases provided to the Law Center in October 2020.

On June 29, 2021, the Law Center requested access to the case file in Civil No. 05‑1-863…. On July 29, a person purporting to be an out-of-state attorney representing the plaintiff contacted counsel for the Law Center to discuss the motion to unseal, revealing details about the parties and the nature of the allegations in the case. According to the circuit court’s subsequent orders, on August 4, the plaintiff … [filed a document with the court] requesting confidentiality for plaintiff’s identity.

On August 11, the circuit court held that the “Plaintiff showed good cause to maintain her identity sealed.” That decision ordered: “The above-entitled case shall be unsealed. However, individual documents that contain confidential or sensitive information, including the identity of the plaintiff, shall remain sealed and redacted copies of said documents will be made accessible to the public.”

The following day, on August 12, finding that the August 11 order “did not go far enough to satisfy the court’s intent to prevent the identities of the parties from disclosure,” the circuit court … granted the Law Center special access to the docket, but kept the docket sealed publicly and denied any other unsealing. The Law Center’s motion to unseal, however, had only requested access to the extent required by the constitutional standards for accessibility to court records for all members of the public. The Law Center has never requested special access to court records solely for itself in this case or any other. After the Court Administrator confirmed that the public would not have access to the docket, the Law Center declined to exercise the special access rights granted by Respondent Judge and thus has not seen the docket in Civil No. 05‑1‑863.

After granting the Law Center special access rights in the August 12 order, the circuit court then held:

In granting Petitioner leave to view the docket sheet herein, the court also prohibits Petitioner from disclosing, communicating, disseminating, publicizing, compromising or otherwise publishing the name or identity of any of the parties in the instant case. This Order shall apply to Petitioner and its agents, employees, associates, assignees, counsel, appointees, assistants, affiliates and any other person or entity operating in concert with, at the direction or request of, or with the knowledge of Petitioner. Any violation of this Order may be punishable by contempt of court….

The Law Center publishes on its website the filed motions and related documents and orders when it is involved in cases, including cases involving motions to unseal as a nonparty. As a result of the circuit court’s gag order and threat of contempt, the Law Center has not published anything about Civil No. 05‑1‑863….

[1.] The circuit court has hidden an entire case file from the public based on a secret rationale.

In the subsequently voided August 11 order, the circuit court’s only finding was conclusory: “Plaintiff showed good cause to maintain her identity sealed.” The August 12 order had no findings. As this Court has previously held, if a court overrides the presumptive right of public access to court records under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article 1, section 4 of the Hawai`i Constitution, the public deserves an explanation….

[2.] When individuals invoke the power and authority of the taxpayer-funded Judiciary by filing a lawsuit to resolve civil disputes, that process is public…. Accordingly, … numerous courts have held that docket sheets and complaints are protected by the constitutional right of public access.

The Judiciary’s “confidential” case designation, however, hides everything. No docket. No complaint. No explanation. The case disappears without any public accountability. Such expansive secrecy must be justified by harm to a compelling interest that cannot be protected through less restrictive means.

The circuit court, at best, only stated that the plaintiff’s identity needed to be protected. That conclusion does not articulate a compelling interest nor the irreparable harm to a compelling interest that must be avoided, so the public’s ability to suggest possible alternatives is limited. Nevertheless, redaction is an obviously less restrictive solution to protecting a plaintiff’s identity.

[3.] “Prior restraints are subject to strict scrutiny because of the peculiar dangers presented by such restraints.” … This Court has only previously addressed gag orders involving speech of litigants—an issue outlined by the Ninth Circuit in Levine v. United States District Court. The Ninth Circuit recognized, however, that the bar to justify prior restraint of nonparties is higher. As it concerns gag orders on nonparties, “[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity.” It is “one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence.” Few circumstances open the door to prior restraint of nonparties: “In order to be held lawful, respondents’ action, first, must fit within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints ….” …

[4.] As described above, the U.S. Supreme Court requires that prior restraint of a nonparty fall within a handful of limited exceptions, such as obscenity or incitements to violence. There is no expansive prior restraint exception for privacy. E.g., Org. for Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971) (“Designating the conduct as an invasion of privacy, the apparent basis for the injunction here, is not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of informational literature of the nature revealed by the record.”); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1350 (1st Cir. 1986) (“That publication would prove embarrassing or infringe Patriarca’s privacy rights is, however, an insufficient basis for issuing a prior restraint…. An individual’s right to protect his privacy from damage by private parties, although meriting great protection, is simply not of the same magnitude.”); Ass’n for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Los Angeles Times Commc’ns LLC, 239 Cal. App. 4th 808, 821-23 (2015) (privacy claims do not justify prior restraint); Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184, 244 (N.H. 2010) (“Mortgage Specialists’ interests in protecting its privacy and reputation do not justify the extraordinary remedy of prior restraint.”). Similar to this case, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected privacy of a juvenile as a constitutional basis for enjoining a nonparty’s publication of the minor’s name and picture. Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 308-12 (1977); accord WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420, 425-27 (6th Cir. 1981) (statute unconstitutional that prohibited publication of criminal defendant’s and victim’s name and details of the alleged conduct in sex offense cases).

Nothing about this case justifies prior restraint of the Law Center. The vague privacy concerns that seem to underlie the circuit court’s sealing are not sufficient to justify a gag order (or the comprehensive sealing). And there is an obvious less restrictive alternative to prior restraint: do not purport to give the Law Center special access to the docket—relief that it never sought nor used. The circuit court’s gag order should be lifted….

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From the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus in Civil Beat Law Center for the Public Interest v. Chang, filed yesterday in the Hawaii Supreme Court:

Civil No. 05‑1‑863 has a “confidential” case designation, and thus nothing in the case (parties, judge, docket, filings) is publicly accessible. To understand whether a compelling reason existed for such comprehensive secrecy, Petitioner Civil Beat Law Center for the Public Interest (Law Center) asked the circuit court for public access to Civil No. 05‑1‑863.

Respondent Judge [Gary W.B. Chang] denied that request and then restrained the Law Center’s ability to discuss the case publicly under threat of sanctions for contempt….

In October 2020, the Judiciary provided the Law Center with a list of case numbers for civil cases flagged as “confidential” in the preceding 15 years. For cases flagged as “confidential”, the entire case file—including the docket and case name—is inaccessible to the public. In November 2020, the Law Center began requesting access to randomly selected “confidential” cases. To date, none of the cases that the Law Center challenged has met the constitutional standards for sealing the entire case file. Civil No. 05-1-863 was on the list of “confidential” cases provided to the Law Center in October 2020.

On June 29, 2021, the Law Center requested access to the case file in Civil No. 05‑1-863…. On July 29, a person purporting to be an out-of-state attorney representing the plaintiff contacted counsel for the Law Center to discuss the motion to unseal, revealing details about the parties and the nature of the allegations in the case. According to the circuit court’s subsequent orders, on August 4, the plaintiff … [filed a document with the court] requesting confidentiality for plaintiff’s identity.

On August 11, the circuit court held that the “Plaintiff showed good cause to maintain her identity sealed.” That decision ordered: “The above-entitled case shall be unsealed. However, individual documents that contain confidential or sensitive information, including the identity of the plaintiff, shall remain sealed and redacted copies of said documents will be made accessible to the public.”

The following day, on August 12, finding that the August 11 order “did not go far enough to satisfy the court’s intent to prevent the identities of the parties from disclosure,” the circuit court … granted the Law Center special access to the docket, but kept the docket sealed publicly and denied any other unsealing. The Law Center’s motion to unseal, however, had only requested access to the extent required by the constitutional standards for accessibility to court records for all members of the public. The Law Center has never requested special access to court records solely for itself in this case or any other. After the Court Administrator confirmed that the public would not have access to the docket, the Law Center declined to exercise the special access rights granted by Respondent Judge and thus has not seen the docket in Civil No. 05‑1‑863.

After granting the Law Center special access rights in the August 12 order, the circuit court then held:

In granting Petitioner leave to view the docket sheet herein, the court also prohibits Petitioner from disclosing, communicating, disseminating, publicizing, compromising or otherwise publishing the name or identity of any of the parties in the instant case. This Order shall apply to Petitioner and its agents, employees, associates, assignees, counsel, appointees, assistants, affiliates and any other person or entity operating in concert with, at the direction or request of, or with the knowledge of Petitioner. Any violation of this Order may be punishable by contempt of court….

The Law Center publishes on its website the filed motions and related documents and orders when it is involved in cases, including cases involving motions to unseal as a nonparty. As a result of the circuit court’s gag order and threat of contempt, the Law Center has not published anything about Civil No. 05‑1‑863….

[1.] The circuit court has hidden an entire case file from the public based on a secret rationale.

In the subsequently voided August 11 order, the circuit court’s only finding was conclusory: “Plaintiff showed good cause to maintain her identity sealed.” The August 12 order had no findings. As this Court has previously held, if a court overrides the presumptive right of public access to court records under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article 1, section 4 of the Hawai`i Constitution, the public deserves an explanation….

[2.] When individuals invoke the power and authority of the taxpayer-funded Judiciary by filing a lawsuit to resolve civil disputes, that process is public…. Accordingly, … numerous courts have held that docket sheets and complaints are protected by the constitutional right of public access.

The Judiciary’s “confidential” case designation, however, hides everything. No docket. No complaint. No explanation. The case disappears without any public accountability. Such expansive secrecy must be justified by harm to a compelling interest that cannot be protected through less restrictive means.

The circuit court, at best, only stated that the plaintiff’s identity needed to be protected. That conclusion does not articulate a compelling interest nor the irreparable harm to a compelling interest that must be avoided, so the public’s ability to suggest possible alternatives is limited. Nevertheless, redaction is an obviously less restrictive solution to protecting a plaintiff’s identity.

[3.] “Prior restraints are subject to strict scrutiny because of the peculiar dangers presented by such restraints.” … This Court has only previously addressed gag orders involving speech of litigants—an issue outlined by the Ninth Circuit in Levine v. United States District Court. The Ninth Circuit recognized, however, that the bar to justify prior restraint of nonparties is higher. As it concerns gag orders on nonparties, “[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity.” It is “one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence.” Few circumstances open the door to prior restraint of nonparties: “In order to be held lawful, respondents’ action, first, must fit within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints ….” …

[4.] As described above, the U.S. Supreme Court requires that prior restraint of a nonparty fall within a handful of limited exceptions, such as obscenity or incitements to violence. There is no expansive prior restraint exception for privacy. E.g., Org. for Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971) (“Designating the conduct as an invasion of privacy, the apparent basis for the injunction here, is not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of informational literature of the nature revealed by the record.”); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1350 (1st Cir. 1986) (“That publication would prove embarrassing or infringe Patriarca’s privacy rights is, however, an insufficient basis for issuing a prior restraint…. An individual’s right to protect his privacy from damage by private parties, although meriting great protection, is simply not of the same magnitude.”); Ass’n for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Los Angeles Times Commc’ns LLC, 239 Cal. App. 4th 808, 821-23 (2015) (privacy claims do not justify prior restraint); Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184, 244 (N.H. 2010) (“Mortgage Specialists’ interests in protecting its privacy and reputation do not justify the extraordinary remedy of prior restraint.”). Similar to this case, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected privacy of a juvenile as a constitutional basis for enjoining a nonparty’s publication of the minor’s name and picture. Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 308-12 (1977); accord WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420, 425-27 (6th Cir. 1981) (statute unconstitutional that prohibited publication of criminal defendant’s and victim’s name and details of the alleged conduct in sex offense cases).

Nothing about this case justifies prior restraint of the Law Center. The vague privacy concerns that seem to underlie the circuit court’s sealing are not sufficient to justify a gag order (or the comprehensive sealing). And there is an obvious less restrictive alternative to prior restraint: do not purport to give the Law Center special access to the docket—relief that it never sought nor used. The circuit court’s gag order should be lifted….

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Environmentalists Pan Unintended Environmental Consequences of Flawed Agricultural Laws


farmland

Two unrelated food policies—one here in the United States and one in France—are drawing fire from environmentalists and sustainability advocates, who argue the approaches they mandate waste resources and money and don’t improve environmental quality.

A Politico piece last month took aim at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), a 35-year-old program the USDA explains “pays rural landowners to convert environmentally sensitive cropland to long-term grass, tree, and wetland covers.”

Under the CRP, Politico reports, “farmers agree to undertake conservation measures such as planting trees or grass that prevent soil erosion, improve water quality[,] or provide habitat for wildlife. In exchange, FSA pays farmers rent for the 10 to 15 years the land is enrolled and shares in the costs of making the conservation changes.

The premise behind the program seems simple enough. If growing crops typically requires soil, tillage, water, fertilizer, pesticides, fuel, and other inputs—which can lead to erosion, runoff, greenhouse emissions, and other negative externalities—then taking land out of production, in favor of planting trees or native grasses, will reduce or eliminate the need for those inputs and should eliminate the negative consequences of that land being used for farming.

So why isn’t the program working? A 2017 analysis of CRP by the Environmental Working Group found that the program was “failing to provide lasting protection for environmentally sensitive land” and “wasting of billions of taxpayer dollars.”

Low enrollment is one problem—and one with no clear solution in sight. When commodity prices fall, farmers are more amenable to taking some land out of production and seeking CRP money. That way they make more money. But when commodity prices are high—as they are now—farmers put more land into production and plant more crops. That way they make more money. 

There are other problems with CRP. For example, it’s been plagued with violations

This is why, even as Politico notes the Biden administration is pushing CRP enrollment “as a climate solution,” the environmentalists Politico spoke with for the article “don’t see it that way.” Many see CRP as I do—a wasteful program that’s not achieving its objectives.

In the other example I teased in the lede, a New York Times piece, published the same day as the article on CRP’s failures, detailed how France’s senseless 87-year-old ban on using imported grapevines is holding back not just the quality of the country’s wine but also the sustainability—and perhaps the future—of its vines and wines.

The Times report introduces renegade French vintner Hervé Garnier as the face of the “long-running struggle against the French wine establishment and its allies in Paris.” During a year when France’s wine production has been devastated by frost and disease, Garnier’s grapes, the Times notes, are flourishing. That’s because Garnier raises Jacquez grapes, an American hybrid variety that’s growing quite nicely despite the aforementioned challenges.

The problem? France banned the Jaquez hybrid in 1934, and has gone to insane lengths to uphold that ban.

“The French government has tried to rip the Jacquez and five other American vine varieties out of French soil for the past 87 years, arguing that they are bad for human physical and mental health—and produce bad wine,” the Times reports. How bad? In banning those American grapevines in the 1930s, French authorities claimed they could cause “madness and blindness,” the Times reports. (That clearly false claim, which the Times acknowledges as such, seems particularly French. As I detailed in a 2012 law review article, France once banned eating potatoes due to their “purported ability to cause ‘not only leprosy, but also syphilis, narcosis, scrofula, early death, sterility, and rampant sexuality'”—though, in the potato’s defense, not madness nor blindness.)

“There’s really no reason for its prohibition,” Mr. Garnier says. “Prohibited? I’d like to understand why, especially when you see the prohibition rests on nothing.”

Garnier is right. The American varieties—whether grafted onto or crossbred with native French vines—produce great wine, resist cold, drought, and pests, and could help France cut its reliance on pesticides.

I, for one, think it’s great that more publications, including the N.Y. Times and Politico, are reporting on food, agricultural, and environmental rules that are intended to boost sustainability but which don’t deliver on their expensive promises. Indeed, the premise of my 2016 book Biting the Hands that Feed Us: How Fewer, Smarter Laws Would Make Our Food System More Sustainable is that laws and regulations at every level of government tend to promote unsustainable outcomes while also handcuffing people such as Mr. Garnier who wish to engage in more sustainable practices. I’ll be discussing the CRP and France’s vine ban, along with examples from my book, later this month in a pair of Federalist Society-sponsored talks at Quinnipiac University Law School and New England School of Law.

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Environmentalists Pan Unintended Environmental Consequences of Flawed Agricultural Laws


farmland

Two unrelated food policies—one here in the United States and one in France—are drawing fire from environmentalists and sustainability advocates, who argue the approaches they mandate waste resources and money and don’t improve environmental quality.

A Politico piece last month took aim at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), a 35-year-old program the USDA explains “pays rural landowners to convert environmentally sensitive cropland to long-term grass, tree, and wetland covers.”

Under the CRP, Politico reports, “farmers agree to undertake conservation measures such as planting trees or grass that prevent soil erosion, improve water quality[,] or provide habitat for wildlife. In exchange, FSA pays farmers rent for the 10 to 15 years the land is enrolled and shares in the costs of making the conservation changes.

The premise behind the program seems simple enough. If growing crops typically requires soil, tillage, water, fertilizer, pesticides, fuel, and other inputs—which can lead to erosion, runoff, greenhouse emissions, and other negative externalities—then taking land out of production, in favor of planting trees or native grasses, will reduce or eliminate the need for those inputs and should eliminate the negative consequences of that land being used for farming.

So why isn’t the program working? A 2017 analysis of CRP by the Environmental Working Group found that the program was “failing to provide lasting protection for environmentally sensitive land” and “wasting of billions of taxpayer dollars.”

Low enrollment is one problem—and one with no clear solution in sight. When commodity prices fall, farmers are more amenable to taking some land out of production and seeking CRP money. That way they make more money. But when commodity prices are high—as they are now—farmers put more land into production and plant more crops. That way they make more money. 

There are other problems with CRP. For example, it’s been plagued with violations

This is why, even as Politico notes the Biden administration is pushing CRP enrollment “as a climate solution,” the environmentalists Politico spoke with for the article “don’t see it that way.” Many see CRP as I do—a wasteful program that’s not achieving its objectives.

In the other example I teased in the lede, a New York Times piece, published the same day as the article on CRP’s failures, detailed how France’s senseless 87-year-old ban on using imported grapevines is holding back not just the quality of the country’s wine but also the sustainability—and perhaps the future—of its vines and wines.

The Times report introduces renegade French vintner Hervé Garnier as the face of the “long-running struggle against the French wine establishment and its allies in Paris.” During a year when France’s wine production has been devastated by frost and disease, Garnier’s grapes, the Times notes, are flourishing. That’s because Garnier raises Jacquez grapes, an American hybrid variety that’s growing quite nicely despite the aforementioned challenges.

The problem? France banned the Jaquez hybrid in 1934, and has gone to insane lengths to uphold that ban.

“The French government has tried to rip the Jacquez and five other American vine varieties out of French soil for the past 87 years, arguing that they are bad for human physical and mental health—and produce bad wine,” the Times reports. How bad? In banning those American grapevines in the 1930s, French authorities claimed they could cause “madness and blindness,” the Times reports. (That clearly false claim, which the Times acknowledges as such, seems particularly French. As I detailed in a 2012 law review article, France once banned eating potatoes due to their “purported ability to cause ‘not only leprosy, but also syphilis, narcosis, scrofula, early death, sterility, and rampant sexuality'”—though, in the potato’s defense, not madness nor blindness.)

“There’s really no reason for its prohibition,” Mr. Garnier says. “Prohibited? I’d like to understand why, especially when you see the prohibition rests on nothing.”

Garnier is right. The American varieties—whether grafted onto or crossbred with native French vines—produce great wine, resist cold, drought, and pests, and could help France cut its reliance on pesticides.

I, for one, think it’s great that more publications, including the N.Y. Times and Politico, are reporting on food, agricultural, and environmental rules that are intended to boost sustainability but which don’t deliver on their expensive promises. Indeed, the premise of my 2016 book Biting the Hands that Feed Us: How Fewer, Smarter Laws Would Make Our Food System More Sustainable is that laws and regulations at every level of government tend to promote unsustainable outcomes while also handcuffing people such as Mr. Garnier who wish to engage in more sustainable practices. I’ll be discussing the CRP and France’s vine ban, along with examples from my book, later this month in a pair of Federalist Society-sponsored talks at Quinnipiac University Law School and New England School of Law.

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Cashed Out


featuresargeant

Revolving bail funds are the closest thing there is in activism to a perpetual motion machine. A bail fund steps in on behalf of a defendant to pay the bail bond set by a court. With bail paid,  arrestees can go home, keep their jobs, and resist pressure to accept a plea deal in order to leave jail. As long as the defendants show up for their trial dates, the bail money is returned to the fund and can be used again and again and again, as long as bail exists.

That last is the reason that the Brooklyn Community Bail Fund (BCBF) blew up its own successful model in 2019. The organization announced it would stop paying individual criminal bails (though it would continue to pay immigrant detention bonds). The new focus would be ending cash bail, not ameliorating its effects.

New York is the only state to explicitly recognize and regulate nonprofit bail funds. The 2012 Charitable Bail Act codified how such groups could interact with the criminal justice system. Bail payers must be licensed by the state as bail bond agents, passing background checks and licensing exams. They may pay up to $2,000 worth of bail for defendants and may only assist defendants charged with misdemeanors, not felonies.

That means bail funds could not have paid the full bail of Kalief Browder, a 16-year-old boy charged with stealing a backpack in 2010, whose bail was set at $3,000. Unable to pay, he spent three years at Rikers Island awaiting trial, approximately two years of it in solitary confinement. He committed suicide after his release.

In 2018, when I began interviewing BCBF employees about their work, I asked Peter Goldberg, then the executive director, whether he hoped to see the Charitable Bail Act expanded so the fund could assist a broader range of people. He said no: The goal wasn’t to pay more bails. “The worst thing we could do is to normalize the system,” he told me. “Bail funds are not a solution to cash bail. We’re working to put ourselves out of business.”

Still, the case for the basic function of paying bail was compelling. “Many donors understand that if their son or daughter found themselves in this position—there’s no chance they’d spend the night in jail,” says Melissa Benson, at the time the BCBF’s director of development. Bail funds even attracted attention and money from the effective altruist movement, a constellation of individual donors and grant-making institutions who try to maximize the impact of their charitable giving. Most effective altruist causes are focused on global health and poverty—it’s easiest to quantify the value of malaria nets or direct cash transfers. The more you focus on the poorest and most vulnerable, the more cheaply you can save lives.

The revolving structure of a bail fund was part of the appeal for these donors. The money they give doesn’t get used up. As the Open Philanthropy Project noted in 2015, “the vast majority…of dollars donated revolves to help multiple cases and lives.” The next year, the Open Philanthropy Project directed a $404,800 grant to the BCBF. Buy a malaria net and the money can’t be used again, but bail fund money keeps working, bailing out prisoner after prisoner.

The Brooklyn Community Bail Fund is one of many such funds across the country. The Minnesota Freedom Fund and similar organizations attracted national attention after the death of George Floyd in 2020, with politicians such as then–California Sen. Kamala Harris promoting them as a way to support protesters. (In practice, protesters were a small share of the people assisted by these funds, whose biggest impact was for people who were accused of committing unnewsworthy crimes.)

Bail funds had looked like a way of outsmarting the system: Courts could keep setting bail, but a bail fund operated as a kind of nullification of the prosecutor’s recommendation and the judge’s decision. The revolving money seemed to many bail fund donors, including me, like a way of turning tragedy into farce. But the BCBF team had come to believe they’d essentially been conscripted into the carceral system they wanted to dismantle.

‘You Can’t Let It Continue’

In the run-up to the 2019 passage of bail reform in New York, the BCBF’s Carl Hamad-Lipscombe was working as a public defender. He heard legislators argue that abolishing cash bail was unnecessary, because groups like the Brooklyn Community Bail Fund solved the problem of bail already. “We were a crutch, holding up this situation we don’t believe in,” he said. Bail funds let politicians get the softer outcome they wanted without having to put their names to an attempt to change the law. The BCBF’s solution was to force lawmakers to confront the costs of the current system.

Goldberg believes that New York already has the tools it needs to do away with cash bail. At least on paper, he says, “New York already has an incredibly progressive bail statute.” Judges are free to choose from nine different forms of bail, but overwhelmingly, they use only two: cash bail and insurance company bonds. Courts also have the option to impose nonmonetary restrictions such as electronic monitoring, pretrial support programs, or a requirement that defendants give up their access to guns. Switching to one of these options requires only political will, not statutory permission.

No matter what, courts are supposed to choose the least restrictive means required to get a defendant to return for trial. When the overwhelming majority of defendants whose bail is paid by a bail fund—and who thus have none of their own money at stake—show up at trial, it undermines the premise that cash bail was the least-restrictive option available. Those defendants didn’t need to have money on the line in order to come back.

The BCBF keeps track of what options are available through its CourtWatch program, overseen for a time by Hamad-Lipscombe, who served as the fund’s director of advocacy and policy before succeeding Goldberg as executive director in June 2021. In nonpandemic times, court watchers trained through the program sit in courtrooms and tabulate data on arraignments and bails. They show up in bright yellow shirts, a visible reminder of their presence to everyone in the courtroom.

The goal, as Angel Parker, the CourtWatch NYC program coordinator, explained it to a group of prospective volunteers in March 2021, is “to collect and publish data about prosecutor behavior and compare what’s happening in the courtroom with publicly announced [district attorney] policies.”

Court watchers record the demographic details of defendants, what they’re charged with, and what recommendation the prosecutor makes. If a defendant has bail set, they note the amount. They also keep track of whether anyone in the courtroom explicitly addresses whether the defendant is a flight risk, whether the bail is the least restrictive way to ensure the defendant will return to court, and whether the defendant can pay the bail without undue hardship.

In a July 2020 report, the CourtWatch team noted that prosecutors and judges relied heavily on cash bail, even though they were supposed to use less restrictive means when possible. Seventy percent of defendants whose alleged crimes qualified for bail had bail set. Only 13 percent were released on their own recognizance to await trial. When bail was set, the median amount was $10,000.

Since the 2019 reform went into effect, New York law has required that judges offer the option of a partially secured bond in addition to cash bail. A partially secured bond allows defendants to pay a portion of the total bail (capped at 10 percent) to go free while owing the full amount if they do not show up to court. The court watchers observed that judges followed the letter of the law while violating the spirit: Secured bonds were set much higher than the cash option, so that many defendants still faced impossible-to-meet charges.

With COVID came a shift in methods. Instead of visiting courts in person, volunteers looked up data in WebCrims, a state-run website that tracks cases. Since October 2020, the CourtWatch team has trained more than 50 digital court watchers, who have compiled data from nearly 6,000 arraignments. Tabulating data online comes with some advantages—the volunteers are no longer trying to guess the approximate age or other demographic data of the defendant. However, their absence in person may be felt by defendants and their attorneys. Those yellow shirts, in the opinion of one volunteer I spoke with, are a tangible pledge of support for inmates in a hostile environment.

The presence of court watchers can change the atmosphere of a courtroom, but the courtroom experience changes the court watchers as well. Just as body cameras changed the way people saw policing, physical presence changes the volunteers’ understanding of their government. It’s seldom that TV procedurals focus on arraignment and bail, but it’s this step of the criminal justice system that often determines the outcome.

Nationwide, only 2 percent of federal criminal defendants go to trial, according to a Pew Research Center analysis. In New York in 2017, the figure was 3 percent. Most cases are resolved through plea bargains, and defendants who are detained before trial are much more likely to plea out. When the BCBF was paying criminal bail, the group found that its clients were “three times as likely to have their criminal cases dismissed or resolved favorably compared with similarly situated individuals incarcerated pretrial on low amounts of bail.”

It was court watching, in fact, that spurred Goldberg to make bail reform his full-time job. He had been working at a white-shoe law firm, making time for pro bono projects. The Brooklyn Defenders, a well-known public defender organization, asked him for help setting up a bail fund, and as part of his research he began sitting in on arraignments. The visits galvanized him. “Once you see the system firsthand,” he says, “you can’t let it continue.” CourtWatch lets the system create its own critics.

Doing Good in a Moment of Crisis

From the earliest days of the BCBF, its work included a data-gathering component, even if it wasn’t explicitly part of the mission. The team members paying bails became experts on all the unwritten rules of the bail system. “A family member does this only once. We do this every day,” explains Ash Stephens, a senior bail associate at the fund.

The bail payers learned when to rush to post a bail before a shift change, because if they missed that unofficial deadline, the client might wind up stuck in jail overnight. They learned how the operation varied from borough to borough, which offices still relied on fax machines, which kinds of payment were accepted. They learned who to call to nag to get bail money back after a client appeared for their trial. “You have to be vigilant about it,” Stephens says.

Their experience observing the practices of for-profit bail bondsmen led the BCBF to partner with other organizations to form the Bail Bond Accountability Coalition (BBAC). They advocated for a Bail Bond Consumer Bill of Rights and other consumer protections that were eventually passed by the New York City Council in 2018. Bondsmen were required to provide potential clients with that bill of rights, which detailed maximum fee schedules, information on reclaiming collateral, and instructions for reporting a dishonest agent.

In some ways, this was the beginning of the bail fund’s incorporation into the system it wanted to dismantle. The criminal justice system is much larger than those who are officially employed by courts, prisons, and prosecutors and public defenders offices. The prison-industrial complex has delegated many jobs to private entities who aren’t directly accountable to voters.

Prisoners’ phone calls are administered by for-profit entities, for example. Their family visits are replaced by proprietary videoconferences. Even their mail is handled by a service that scans and digitizes it, eliminating the inmate’s opportunity to touch the crayon scribbles from a child or smell a partner’s perfume on the paper. In some cases, these companies provide services the prisoners would otherwise not have access to at all. But too often, they exploit what is typically a state-guaranteed monopoly over a literal captive audience to extract high fees for poor service—all with less theoretical accountability than their public sector counterparts.

Goldberg sees for-profit bail companies as part of this larger system. “We have outsourced an important function—ensuring people come to court,” he says. But defendants don’t have the same due-process protections in their interactions with private companies that they have with agents of the state. “Bondsmen can do things we don’t allow police to do,” says Goldberg—for example, entering your home without a warrant.

Technically, the defendant is the customer of the bail bondsman, but clients enter the relationship under heavy pressure. “If they’re using a bondsman, they’re in a point of absolute crisis,” Goldberg argues. People facing incarceration are no better prepared to be canny consumers than a heart attack victim trying to comparison shop hospitals from his ambulance gurney. The bondsmen become one more piece of what Goldberg calls the “user-funded criminal justice system.”

To the extent it could, the BCBF tried to use that moment of crisis as an opportunity to do good. When the fund was paying bail, it also operated a client services team that aimed to help with more than just the immediate problem of pending incarceration. “We have access to a person at a moment of maximum vulnerability,” says Benson, the group’s development director. Often, a client’s situation was already unstable; merely bailing them out leaves them at risk of repeated encounters with the legal system. “It’s a function of poverty that that person was in a position that led to arrest in the first place.”

The arrest offered the client services team a chance to intervene, but the team says it was important that they not overwhelm or dictate to clients in their moment of vulnerability. “It’s easier to say, ‘You’re homeless, go to a shelter,'” Goldberg says, “than to hear what they need.”

The client services team is staffed primarily by people who have themselves had brushes with the criminal justice system. They don’t funnel clients into a program or demand anything in exchange for paying bail.

The day prior to our 2018 interview, Derrick Cain, then the director of client services, had been supervising two relatively green interns. The client services team is supposed to respond only to a client’s self-identified needs, but when the interns sat down with the man they were supposed to help, they couldn’t contain themselves. The client entered the office in dusty, dirty clothes, and the interns were eager to show him to the clothing closet.

It wasn’t until Cain stepped in that the client had space to say he didn’t need clothes—he needed a hardhat. He was a construction worker, untroubled by the grime of the job, but he needed supplies to do his work and a MetroCard to cover his commute through the end of the week.

The clients’ culture clash begins at the front door. At the time I visited, the BCBF office was housed within a WeWork building. That company’s quirky yet sterile “airspace” aesthetic made it a strange fit for a bail fund. Décor featuring “gilded boxer dogs,” Goldberg says, hardly put clients at ease or made them feel welcome.

Cain saw it as part of his job to run interference with the WeWork staff. The week before our 2018 conversation, the lobby manager had called the police on one of the BCBF clients, one who Cain said struggled with “severe mental health issues.”

Before he left in 2020 to found Touchdown NYC, an organization that helps former inmates as they reenter society, Cain was a bridge to the office staff as well as to the clients. He preferred to avoid bringing up his own history of incarceration (24 years, second-degree murder), but there were people who come in with an ingrained distrust of organizations that claim to help. Cain had similar frustrations when he was reentering society, winding up in an employment program that he felt was focused only on getting bodies in a room to collect fees, not on providing real help. He would share his story when he thought it was necessary. “But I hate doing it,” he told me at the time.

Connecting to a client isn’t a guarantee the team can help. Some needs are simple—clients often need a cellphone so they can receive reminders about their court dates. Others need help getting an ID or finding employment opportunities. The team routinely hands out Connections, a thick paperback book published by the public library that acts as a switchboard of service organizations.

But some client-identified needs are much harder to meet. Addressing mental health issues or chemical dependency means going beyond the client services team. Housing in New York is hard to come by. Although the team can put clients in touch with navigators and advocates, “We’re not going to create the housing,” Benson says. Paying bails is more immediately solvable. “Housing isn’t a $500 dollar problem.”

‘The Cage as a Last Resort’

The shift from bail and client services to research and advocacy removes the excitement of having an impact right away. Donors who want to be part of keeping someone out of jail today can donate to other active bail funds. (BCBF donations still go to support immigration bond payments, which revolve much more slowly than ordinary bond payments and thus require a larger pool of reserves.) Those who stick with the BCBF are making an investment in an uncertain future.

Bail reform has the potential for a broad appeal. The more modestly it frames its goals, the more people may be sympathetic. It can be simply a form of better quality control—helping judges be smarter about which bail options they use, making sure the most dangerous defendants are held while letting others go free. This is the technocratic approach offered by recidivism prediction algorithms, which have come under criticism for racial disparities in their recommendations.

That’s not the tack Parker, the CourtWatch program coordinator, took when she led a seminar for CourtWatch volunteers in March 2021. Parker didn’t talk about patching the cracks of a flawed system—she positioned the program as part of the effort to begin dismantling the system. She was skeptical of incremental improvements, saying, “We don’t necessarily believe there is a progressive way to cage and torture people and separate them from their families.”

Hamad-Lipscombe knows that calling for a future without prisons is a controversial tack to take. But as he sees it, the status quo has already been proven not to work. At minimum, he wants to see an inversion of the current system, where incarceration is the default response to crime. Today, he says, “we start from a position of ‘let’s put someone in a cage and then figure out if something else could work,’ rather than seeing the cage as a last resort.”

It’s easier to point at what’s wrong with the current system than it is to offer a clear vision of an alternative. When district attorneys focus on conviction rates as a measure of their success, they imply that their goal is to achieve a guilty verdict every time. If instead the D.A. sees his or her role in the context of a truth-sifting adversarial system, it isn’t necessarily a defeat to lose a case. They make the strongest good-faith case they can in order to help the jurors weigh the evidence. Sometimes that will mean discovering that the defendant should not be convicted. It’s rare to hear a D.A. speak about cases he or she feels proud of losing.

Still, conviction rates are easy to tabulate. When I asked Hamad-Lipscombe what a better statistic would be to measure the effectiveness of a D.A., he pointed to holistic measures of the health of the community the D.A. serves. “A good goal is for communities to be safe without incarceration,” he says.

That may be the goal, but at that point the D.A.’s efforts are mingled and mixed with everyone else serving the community. The D.A. can do a good job but find it isn’t enough for a community mired in poverty. Hamad-Lipscombe’s framework reflects the fact that criminal justice can’t be neatly cleaved off from social policy, but it makes it hard to track what’s working and what’s not.

The balance is hard to strike. It takes careful, patient observation to muster evidence and prompt large-scale change. In the meantime, any individual inmate will need to turn to a different bail fund to get immediate help. When he was still with the BCBF, Cain saw his client services work as an act of resistance to the carceral system as well as a source of relief for the clients he worked with. Everywhere else, he explained, the system operated on mass principles: “You need bodies to fill up police cars; you need bodies to fill up Rikers Island.” With each personal conversation and individualized plan, Cain was testifying that the defendants he served weren’t part of an undifferentiated agglomeration.

The CourtWatch volunteers share Cain’s experience—they see the defendants pass by, individual by individual. They translate them into spreadsheets and charts, but it’s the moments of encounter that motivate them to push to change the patterns they’re tracking.

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