The Iowa Caucuses Have Always Been Terrible

On yesterday’s Reason Roundtable podcast, my colleague Matt Welch asked an open-ended question: What outcome do you hope for from the Iowa caucuses, however unrealistic? 

The answer I decided not to give because it seemed too glib was: It’s a shame they can’t all lose. 

Yet here we are. 

It’s the morning after the caucuses, and, thanks to a combination of rule changes and  (probably avoidable) technological foibles that resulted from a poorly tested, dysfunctional results-reporting app, there are still no official results.

The state Democratic Party, which took hours to even begin to explain the delay, has blamed vague “inconsistencies” in the reporting and offered precious little information about what actually happened. 

Several candidates gave not-quite-victory speeches of varying degrees of confidence, and campaign memos based on internal reporting made various arguments for victory. Former Vice President Joe Biden, meanwhile, who has a history of poor performance in Iowa, and who looked to be slipping in the polls in the final weeks before the vote, is now formally complaining that the reporting process had “considerable flaws.” 

Someone, probably Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.), actually won last night’s caucuses. But we may never know the actual result with total certainty.

And the delayed results mean that, at minimum, the process was useless to the candidates who spent millions of dollars and months of their lives (along with the time and effort of campaign staffers and volunteers) in hopes of winning the state, not so much for the tiny number of electoral delegates it provides but for the morning-after boost in momentum leading into next week’s New Hampshire primary. 

Last night’s election was an utter fiasco—a meltdown of small-d democracy—in which the system simply failed. As Eric Levitz wrote in New York magazine, the caucuses “effectively produced a five-hour-long infomercial for the Democratic Party’s administrative incompetence, broadcast across all of the major news networks.” And it wasn’t the first such failure either. 

Over the last several years, the Iowa caucuses have been the site of multiple systemic breakdowns. In the 2012 Republican caucuses, state officials initially declared Mitt Romney the winner; eventually, that decision was reversed, and Rick Santorum was belatedly granted the top slot. In 2016, an extremely close result between Democratic rivals Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders led to a series of rule changes and new reporting requirements that raised the hypothetical possibility that there could be multiple winners, each claiming victory based on a different metric. 

In a democracy, the point of an election system isn’t just to create a mechanism for casting and counting votes. It’s to confer broad-based legitimacy on the result, in which most people can generally agree that the system is transparent, functional, and fair. The consistent breakdowns in Iowa have instead done the opposite. Even after the final results are announced, it may be that the effective result is that no one really won. 

Breakdowns like this have broader cultural effects, and they contribute to the sense that important institutions simply don’t work, that they can’t be trusted to deliver accurate and impartial results. When you see national survey results showing that trust in government institutions is at an all-time low, this sort of high-stakes foul-up is why. 

Yet the problems with Iowa go much deeper than a broken app and voting rules so inscrutable they make Destiny 2‘s maddeningly complex leveling system look like a game of Go Fish. In its modern incarnation as the official start to presidential election season, which dates back to 1972, the Iowa caucuses have always been, in some sense, illegitimate.

It’s a small state that’s not demographically or culturally representative of the rest of the country, meaning that large blocs of voters, especially minorities, are underrepresented in a contest that helps shape the rest of the race. Iowa voters are disproportionately older, and the relatively high religiosity of Iowa voters and their discomfort with immigrants has, over the years, tilted national politics in a direction that, all else being equal, is more socially conservative and less immigrant-friendly. For years, the influence of the state’s corn farmers helped maintain political support for ethanol subsidies and fuel mandates, despite just about every economist and policy analyst agreeing that they were a lousy idea. 

Meanwhile, national political media would descend on Iowa every four years to lavish it with attention, using it as an early proxy for the overall state of the race. In recent years, journalists have become more alive to the ways that Iowa isn’t representative, but the frenzy of attention has nonetheless conferred a special status on the state and its opening electoral throwdown. Even with critical coverage, Iowa set the tone for the race to come, ensuring that it would represent the interests of a select and special few rather than the larger voting population. 

The best argument for Iowa’s primacy has always been its intimacy, the way that the manageable scale of the state might allow lesser-known candidates with less funding to connect in person with voters. (The small size no doubt helped journalists trying to cover the race too.) But in the age of social media politics and intimate-interview podcasts, in which politics—especially for younger voters—is increasingly conducted in online forums and virtual communities, this argument carries less and less weight. 

Meanwhile, even Iowans don’t seem all that excited about their caucuses: Overall turnout was middling, and first-time participation was down.

America doesn’t need Iowa to set the tone for its presidential elections. American politics doesn’t need Iowa to show up early and try to pick a winner. Iowa isn’t America, and America isn’t Iowa.

There are already rumblings about ending Iowa’s reign of terror, about replacing it with some other system that might be more demographically representative, less culturally conservative, less beholden to the narrow interests of corn farmers. Or, at the very least, that could accurately report an election result in a reasonable period of time. A system, in other words, that could confer some small measure of legitimacy, not to mention a reasonable night’s sleep.  

One can only hope. Everyone competing in last night’s caucuses may have lost, but if Iowa’s caucuses end up less influential in future presidential elections, we’ll all end up winners. 

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Dems Want to Run the Country, but They Can’t Even Run an Election in Iowa

No one knows which Democrat took top place in Iowa due to flawed new systems implemented by state party officials for the presidential caucuses yesterday. In addition to instituting complicated new caucus rules, Iowa Democrats also had precincts report final results using a new app that no one could figure out.

Making matters weirder, Pete Buttigieg went ahead and declared victory anyway.

Supporters of other Democratic candidates have been accusing the South Bend, Indiana mayor of trickery#MayorCheat is currently trending on Twitterafter it was reported that Buttigieg had made payments to Shadow, the company behind the broken app.

Shadow was launched by progressive organization ACRONYM, and has worked with multiple campaigns (including Joe Biden’s). In announcing Shadow last year, founder and CEO Tara McGowan complained about how 2016 election tech got buzz but with “little attention or resources paid to how these tools would be integrated.” She promised Shadow would be different.

With Shadow, we’re building a new model,” McGowan tweeted in 2019, stressing the company’s “deep focus on” helping Democrats “use the most effective new tools in smarter ways.”

That hasn’t gone so hot, judging by the ruckus out of Iowa. As of this morning, Buttigieg’s statement suggesting he won still stood while Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s (D–Mass.) campaign was claiming she’s in a three-way tie for winner Buttigieg and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.). Many are predicting this is the end of the Iowa caucuses’ importance as a bellwether for campaigns.

“It’s dead. The campaigns gave them millions of dollars. It’s dead,” an unnamed Democratic campaign adviser told Hunter Walker, YahooNews’ White House correspondent. 

Iowa Democrats had promised a better, more efficient tallying of voter results via Shadow. Instead, it’s turned into a prime case of technocratic progressive promises that don’t deliver.

Plenty of people reported concerns about the app before voting opened in Iowa on Monday.

According to NPR reporter Miles Parks, Iowa precinct leaders had their doubts. “One caucus organizer told me that of the 57 precincts he was overseeing, ‘about 20’ were having some sort of issue with the app before caucusing even began,” Parks tweeted early this morning.

“The caucus workers will use the app on their personal smartphones, which [University of Iowa computer science professor Douglas] Jones said could be vulnerable,” cautioned The Wall Street Journal on January 26.

Iowa Democratic Party Chairman Troy Price told the paper then: “We are confident in the security systems we have in place.”

To be clear, security concerns don’t seem to be the issue; officials aren’t suggesting the app was tampered with, nor that any underlying voting data was compromised.

If it comes down to it, Iowa caucus officials can manually count and then verbally report voting results (which some are now doing). And state leaders can trace everything and double-check their math if need be. It just takes a lot longer, hence the delay on knowing who really won in Iowa.

Overall, issues seem to be mainly of the mundane user-error and bad-bureaucratic-planning variety.

Still, this hasn’t stopped conspiracy theories about Buttigieg, Russians, and other alleged app-sabotaging culprits from popping up.

Amusingly, a lot of powerful Democrats have been scrambling to blame this on anyone but their own side. For instance, Andrew Yang chalked it up, in part, to a lack of technological prowess by the president.

Julián Castro called it a failure of some amorphous system to protect democracy:

The whole mess has created room for not only more intra-Democratic mudslinging but also accusations by Republicans that their opponents’ electoral process is rigged.

For his part, President Donald Trump chalked it up to ineptitude:

On the other side of the political spectrum, left-leaning Democrats are sounding just like Republicans, pointing fingers at their party’s establishment and arguing over whether bias or merely bad decisions are at play.

What all but the most partisan Democrats seem to agree is that the most moderate and charitable interpretation here is gross incompetence.

This morning, the Iowa Democratic Party said in a statement that “while the app was recording data accurately, it was reporting out only partial data. We have determined that this was due to a coding issue in the reporting system.” It said the “plan is to release results as soon as possible today.”

 

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Dems Want to Run the Country, but They Can’t Even Run an Election in Iowa

No one knows which Democrat took top place in Iowa due to flawed new systems implemented by state party officials for the presidential caucuses yesterday. In addition to instituting complicated new caucus rules, Iowa Democrats also had precincts report final results using a new app that no one could figure out.

Making matters weirder, Pete Buttigieg went ahead and declared victory anyway.

Supporters of other Democratic candidates have been accusing the South Bend, Indiana mayor of trickery#MayorCheat is currently trending on Twitterafter it was reported that Buttigieg had made payments to Shadow, the company behind the broken app.

Shadow was launched by progressive organization ACRONYM, and has worked with multiple campaigns (including Joe Biden’s). In announcing Shadow last year, founder and CEO Tara McGowan complained about how 2016 election tech got buzz but with “little attention or resources paid to how these tools would be integrated.” She promised Shadow would be different.

With Shadow, we’re building a new model,” McGowan tweeted in 2019, stressing the company’s “deep focus on” helping Democrats “use the most effective new tools in smarter ways.”

That hasn’t gone so hot, judging by the ruckus out of Iowa. As of this morning, Buttigieg’s statement suggesting he won still stood while Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s (D–Mass.) campaign was claiming she’s in a three-way tie for winner Buttigieg and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.). Many are predicting this is the end of the Iowa caucuses’ importance as a bellwether for campaigns.

“It’s dead. The campaigns gave them millions of dollars. It’s dead,” an unnamed Democratic campaign adviser told Hunter Walker, YahooNews’ White House correspondent. 

Iowa Democrats had promised a better, more efficient tallying of voter results via Shadow. Instead, it’s turned into a prime case of technocratic progressive promises that don’t deliver.

Plenty of people reported concerns about the app before voting opened in Iowa on Monday.

According to NPR reporter Miles Parks, Iowa precinct leaders had their doubts. “One caucus organizer told me that of the 57 precincts he was overseeing, ‘about 20’ were having some sort of issue with the app before caucusing even began,” Parks tweeted early this morning.

“The caucus workers will use the app on their personal smartphones, which [University of Iowa computer science professor Douglas] Jones said could be vulnerable,” cautioned The Wall Street Journal on January 26.

Iowa Democratic Party Chairman Troy Price told the paper then: “We are confident in the security systems we have in place.”

To be clear, security concerns don’t seem to be the issue; officials aren’t suggesting the app was tampered with, nor that any underlying voting data was compromised.

If it comes down to it, Iowa caucus officials can manually count and then verbally report voting results (which some are now doing). And state leaders can trace everything and double-check their math if need be. It just takes a lot longer, hence the delay on knowing who really won in Iowa.

Overall, issues seem to be mainly of the mundane user-error and bad-bureaucratic-planning variety.

Still, this hasn’t stopped conspiracy theories about Buttigieg, Russians, and other alleged app-sabotaging culprits from popping up.

Amusingly, a lot of powerful Democrats have been scrambling to blame this on anyone but their own side. For instance, Andrew Yang chalked it up, in part, to a lack of technological prowess by the president.

Julián Castro called it a failure of some amorphous system to protect democracy:

The whole mess has created room for not only more intra-Democratic mudslinging but also accusations by Republicans that their opponents’ electoral process is rigged.

For his part, President Donald Trump chalked it up to ineptitude:

On the other side of the political spectrum, left-leaning Democrats are sounding just like Republicans, pointing fingers at their party’s establishment and arguing over whether bias or merely bad decisions are at play.

What all but the most partisan Democrats seem to agree is that the most moderate and charitable interpretation here is gross incompetence.

This morning, the Iowa Democratic Party said in a statement that “while the app was recording data accurately, it was reporting out only partial data. We have determined that this was due to a coding issue in the reporting system.” It said the “plan is to release results as soon as possible today.”

 

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Do Right-to-Work Laws Work?

During my morning commute I used to pass an anti-“right to work” billboard. The specifics would vary, but the message was always the same: Right-to-work laws are bad. One message was the proposed “Workplace Freedom Act” was a “cancer” on the working class, another featured a hammer and sickle.

Right-to-work laws may well be bad for union leadership, but are they bad for unionized workers? A recent paper in the Journal of Law and Economics by Christos Andreas Makridis of MIT suggests not. Here’s the abstract:

This paper investigates the effects of state right-to-work (RTW) laws on individuals’ well-being and economic sentiment. Using licensed microdata from Gallup between 2008 and 2017, this paper finds that the adoption of RTW laws is associated with a .029 SD and a .041 SD increase in individuals’ life satisfaction and economic sentiment, respectively. A difference-in-differences estimator suggests that these improvements are concentrated among union workers. These results are robust to entropy balancing and border-pair approaches. Moreover, these improvements in well-being are consistent with an increase in competition among unions, which prompts them to provide higher-quality services that are valued by their members.

Interesting stuff to be sure.

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Do Right-to-Work Laws Work?

During my morning commute I used to pass an anti-“right to work” billboard. The specifics would vary, but the message was always the same: Right-to-work laws are bad. One message was the proposed “Workplace Freedom Act” was a “cancer” on the working class, another featured a hammer and sickle.

Right-to-work laws may well be bad for union leadership, but are they bad for unionized workers? A recent paper in the Journal of Law and Economics by Christos Andreas Makridis of MIT suggests not. Here’s the abstract:

This paper investigates the effects of state right-to-work (RTW) laws on individuals’ well-being and economic sentiment. Using licensed microdata from Gallup between 2008 and 2017, this paper finds that the adoption of RTW laws is associated with a .029 SD and a .041 SD increase in individuals’ life satisfaction and economic sentiment, respectively. A difference-in-differences estimator suggests that these improvements are concentrated among union workers. These results are robust to entropy balancing and border-pair approaches. Moreover, these improvements in well-being are consistent with an increase in competition among unions, which prompts them to provide higher-quality services that are valued by their members.

Interesting stuff to be sure.

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Judge Orders Heavy Redaction of Motion to Recuse

Friday morning, I’ll be in Connecticut, arguing in Wheeler v. Cosgrove, an interesting unsealing case before the Connecticut Appellate Court. (Under Connecticut rules, motions to unseal generally go right up to the Appellate Court, rather than to the court that did the sealing.) Here’s the heart of my petition for review; no opposition has been filed, though it’s still possible that someone will appear to argue against me orally.

[* * *]

[I.] Brief History of the Case

[A.] On Jan. 15, 2020, a party moved to disqualify Judge Sheila Ozalis, who is presiding in this case. The same day, Judge Ozalis sealed the motion (Doc. 208.00) and accompanying brief (Doc. 209.00), apparently sua sponte, Tr. 51, reasoning (in Docs. 208.10 & 209.10, App. A024-A025) that:

(1) The document contains unnecessary, sensitive material that is entitled to remain confidential; and

(2) The individual’s privacy interest in the information in this document overrides the public’s interest in viewing the material.

(3) There is no reasonable alternative to protect the individual’s privacy interest.

[B.] On Jan. 17, 2020, Judge Robert E. Young issued a Notice Order to Show Cause (Doc. 212.00) ordering David S. Hardy, counsel for Interested Party Barbara Saggese, to appear and show cause on Jan. 21, 2020 “why he should not be disciplined” for filing the motion with “allegations of bias as well as personal and personally identifying information of Judge Sheila A. Ozalis.” In particular, the Order to Show Cause stated that,

the Court shall consider, in relation to the Rules of Professional Conduct listed above, whether attorney Hardy has made statements he knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge; violated or attempted to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assisted or induced another to do so, or did so [through] the acts of another; and/or engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in attempting to intimidate or harass a judge by posting her personal information on a website which is accessible to the public.

The initial Jan. 21, 2020 hearing took place while the motion to disqualify and the accompanying memorandum were still entirely sealed. (The hearing was continued to Jan. 27, 2020, but has since been taken off calendar, Doc. 224.00.)

On Jan. 17, 2020, Judge Ozalis also issued an order requiring Mr. Hardy to “submit a redacted copy of the document within 10 days of this order removing all photos, addresses, assessor’s cards and maps from the Motion and Memorandum” (Doc. 208.30, App. A027). The order was captioned “ORDER REGARDING: 01/15/2020 208.00 MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY PB 1-23,” and did not expressly cite the 209.00 memorandum; but it appears to have contemplated the filing of a redacted memorandum as well.

[C.] On Jan. 27, 2020, Mr. Hardy filed a redacted Motion to Disqualify and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Disqualify (Doc. 227.00, App. A028-A144).

[II.] Specific Facts Upon Which Petitioner Relies

Eugene Volokh is Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. He writes often on First Amendment law, both in law review articles and on his weblog, The Volokh Conspiracy, which is now published at the Reason Magazine site, https://ift.tt/2j2k2Kp. In particular, he often writes about sealing (see, e.g., https://ift.tt/397rlbv), sometimes about judicial disqualification (see, e.g., https://ift.tt/2OqHssQ), and sometimes about disciplinary charges brought against lawyers (see, e.g., https://ift.tt/2RUVy82). He would like to write about the controversy in this case, but he is unable to do so in an informed way, precisely because so much of the motion for disqualification and its supporting brief are sealed.

[III.] Legal Basis

“The rationale underlying the presumption [of public access to court documents] is straightforward: Public monitoring of the judicial process through open court proceedings and records enhances confidence in the judicial system by ensuring that justice is administered equitably and in accordance with established procedures.” Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 34-35 (2009). The rules providing for disqualification of judges likewise aim to protect “judicial integrity” and “confidence in the judiciary.” Joyner v. Comm’r of Correction, 55 Conn. App. 602, 612 (1999).

But the public cannot evaluate decisions about disqualification without understanding the basis for the motion for disqualification. Perhaps the motion in this case was unfounded, and even unethical—but the public cannot confidently accept the denial of the motion if key facts on which the motion relies are redacted. “The background, experience, and associations of the judge are important factors in any trial. When a judge’s impartiality is questioned it strengthens the judicial process for the public to be informed of how the issue is approached and decided.” Application of Nat’l Broadcasting, Inc., 828 F.2d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 1987).

[A.] The motion to disqualify, and the accompanying memorandum, are covered by the presumption of public access

“Except as otherwise provided by law, there shall be a presumption that documents filed with the court shall be available to the public.” PB § 11-20A(a). This extends to all “judicial documents, meaning any document filed with the court that the court reasonably could rely on in support of its adjudicatory function,” Rosado, 292 Conn. at 30—a “broad definition of judicial documents,” id. at 48. That definition covers documents seeking judicial disqualification, because the decision whether a judge should step aside is necessarily part of the court’s “adjudicatory function.” Indeed, that decision bears directly on all subsequent steps in the adjudicative process.

This presumption is also anchored in the First Amendment. There is a First Amendment right of access to certain kinds of motions and briefs filed in civil cases, and not just in criminal cases. E.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (cited favorably by State v. Komisarjevsky, 302 Conn. 162, 175 n.12 (2011), as showing how “federal courts” “determine whether a ‘qualified’ first amendment right to access exists”). Indeed, “‘[a]ccess to written documents filed in connection with pretrial motions is particularly important in the situation … where no hearing is held and the court’s ruling is based solely on the motion papers.'” Id. at 124 (citation omitted). This First Amendment right of access extends to “documents and records that pertain to a proceeding in which one or more parties seek to disqualify a judge for bias,” Application of Nat’l Broadcasting, Inc., 828 F.2d at 345, because “experience and logic” support such a right, id. at 344 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It likewise applies to civil cases, under the reasoning of Lugosch.

[B.] This presumption does not appear to be rebutted here

The presumption of public access can be “outweighed by countervailing considerations, such as certain privacy concerns,” Rosado, 292 Conn. at 35. Judge Ozalis appeared to be concerned about the privacy of information about real estate that she owns, and demanded the redaction of “photos, addresses, assessor’s cards and maps from the Motion and Memorandum.” Doc. 208.30.

But when a motion to disqualify is based on the judge’s ownership interest in certain real estate, the public must be able to learn the location of that property, so as to be able to effectively understand and investigate the merits of the motion. As it is, the redacted motion omits not just the property address but also the details (such as any caption or case number) for an earlier case that supposedly related to the property. Moreover, the Exhibits attached to Barbara Saggese’s affidavit, which had accompanied the Motion to Disqualify—about 80 pages in all, App. A049-A136—are almost entirely redacted. The redactions thus interfere with the public’s ability to understand the nature and magnitude of any alleged conflict.

Nor is this information the sort of highly private, personal information that would warrant sealing. “[A]ssessor’s cards and maps” seem likely to be public records, open to all for inspection. Indeed, Ms. Saggese stated that Exhibit A to her affidavit (one of the exhibits that has been entirely redacted) is a “publicly available assessor’s property card.” Aff. of Barbara J. Saggese at ¶ 2.a (attached to Doc. 227.00 exh. 1, App. A044).

Likewise, the caption of the litigation over that property seems almost certainly to be a matter of public record, as are the “judicial decisions and pleadings from the [redacted] case,” Saggese Aff. ¶ 2.c, App. A045 (stating that the now-redacted Exhibit C to the affidavit contained such documents). Even photographs of the property may be public information if they are posted online as advertisements for renting the property. See Saggese Aff. at ¶ 2.f, App. A045 (stating that the now-redacted Exhibit D to the affidavit contained an advertisement for the property). And even if the rental advertisements do not mention the owner’s name, that connection may be public if the advertisements mention the property address, and searching for the property address reveals the owner’s name.

The address of the property, and its link to Judge Ozalis, is likely also not confidential information. Mr. Hardy stated that Ms. Saggese got all her information from “the Internet” (Tr. of Jan. 15, 2020 Hearing, at 21); and, for better or worse, the addresses of property that people own are generally not secret, but are often available from free online copies of phone directories, as well as from many pay services.

Moreover, judges are high public officials; their privacy interests are necessarily reduced, especially when their private behavior is alleged to bear on their public duties—for instance, on whether they can fairly preside over a case. “‘There are inherent limitations of a unique and significant nature regarding any claim to the right of privacy on the part of … incumbent public officials.'” Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm’n, 255 Conn. 78, 100 (2000) (citing Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 294 (1974)); see also, e.g., McCall v. Oroville Mercury Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 805, 807 (1983) (“A government official … has usually been considered a ‘public figure’ who has waived much of his right to privacy.”); Lambert v. Belknap County Convention, 157 N.H. 375, 384 (2008) (“a candidate voluntarily seeking to fill an elected public office has a diminished privacy expectation in personal information relevant to that office,” reasoning applicable to sitting high-level appointed officials as well as candidates); Common Cause v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv., 628 F.2d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (taking the same view).

Indeed, the courts that have considered restrictions on the publication of home addresses of government officials, especially when the addresses are connected to disputes about government action, have generally held that the restrictions violate the First Amendment. See Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 237 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1020-21 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (preliminary injunction case) (home addresses of legislators); Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1247 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (home addresses of police officers); Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (home addresses of police officers). But see Bui v. Dangelas, 2019 WL 7341671 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2019) (nonprecedential) (upholding injunction ordering the removal of comments containing a private individual’s home address, because plaintiff showed “the probable risk of irreparable injury—in the form of physical violence—… in the context of active threats against [plaintiff] by others”). Such home and vacation home addresses should likewise not be viewed as confidential for sealing purposes, since the right of public access to court records is derived in part from the First Amendment (see Part III.A, supra); and that is especially so when, as here, the addresses are relevant to a dispute about whether the judge should be disqualified.

Conclusion

“‘People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.'” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (citation omitted). This observation is especially apt for disqualification decisions, where questions—well-founded or not—about a judge’s ability to fairly decide a case have already been raised. The petitioner therefore respectfully moves this Court to unseal the entirety of the motion to disqualify and the brief in support of the motion, or at least to minimize the amount of material that is redacted in those documents.

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Judge Orders Heavy Redaction of Motion to Recuse

Friday morning, I’ll be in Connecticut, arguing in Wheeler v. Cosgrove, an interesting unsealing case before the Connecticut Appellate Court. (Under Connecticut rules, motions to unseal generally go right up to the Appellate Court, rather than to the court that did the sealing.) Here’s the heart of my petition for review; no opposition has been filed, though it’s still possible that someone will appear to argue against me orally.

[* * *]

[I.] Brief History of the Case

[A.] On Jan. 15, 2020, a party moved to disqualify Judge Sheila Ozalis, who is presiding in this case. The same day, Judge Ozalis sealed the motion (Doc. 208.00) and accompanying brief (Doc. 209.00), apparently sua sponte, Tr. 51, reasoning (in Docs. 208.10 & 209.10, App. A024-A025) that:

(1) The document contains unnecessary, sensitive material that is entitled to remain confidential; and

(2) The individual’s privacy interest in the information in this document overrides the public’s interest in viewing the material.

(3) There is no reasonable alternative to protect the individual’s privacy interest.

[B.] On Jan. 17, 2020, Judge Robert E. Young issued a Notice Order to Show Cause (Doc. 212.00) ordering David S. Hardy, counsel for Interested Party Barbara Saggese, to appear and show cause on Jan. 21, 2020 “why he should not be disciplined” for filing the motion with “allegations of bias as well as personal and personally identifying information of Judge Sheila A. Ozalis.” In particular, the Order to Show Cause stated that,

the Court shall consider, in relation to the Rules of Professional Conduct listed above, whether attorney Hardy has made statements he knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge; violated or attempted to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assisted or induced another to do so, or did so [through] the acts of another; and/or engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in attempting to intimidate or harass a judge by posting her personal information on a website which is accessible to the public.

The initial Jan. 21, 2020 hearing took place while the motion to disqualify and the accompanying memorandum were still entirely sealed. (The hearing was continued to Jan. 27, 2020, but has since been taken off calendar, Doc. 224.00.)

On Jan. 17, 2020, Judge Ozalis also issued an order requiring Mr. Hardy to “submit a redacted copy of the document within 10 days of this order removing all photos, addresses, assessor’s cards and maps from the Motion and Memorandum” (Doc. 208.30, App. A027). The order was captioned “ORDER REGARDING: 01/15/2020 208.00 MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY PB 1-23,” and did not expressly cite the 209.00 memorandum; but it appears to have contemplated the filing of a redacted memorandum as well.

[C.] On Jan. 27, 2020, Mr. Hardy filed a redacted Motion to Disqualify and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Disqualify (Doc. 227.00, App. A028-A144).

[II.] Specific Facts Upon Which Petitioner Relies

Eugene Volokh is Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. He writes often on First Amendment law, both in law review articles and on his weblog, The Volokh Conspiracy, which is now published at the Reason Magazine site, https://ift.tt/2j2k2Kp. In particular, he often writes about sealing (see, e.g., https://ift.tt/397rlbv), sometimes about judicial disqualification (see, e.g., https://ift.tt/2OqHssQ), and sometimes about disciplinary charges brought against lawyers (see, e.g., https://ift.tt/2RUVy82). He would like to write about the controversy in this case, but he is unable to do so in an informed way, precisely because so much of the motion for disqualification and its supporting brief are sealed.

[III.] Legal Basis

“The rationale underlying the presumption [of public access to court documents] is straightforward: Public monitoring of the judicial process through open court proceedings and records enhances confidence in the judicial system by ensuring that justice is administered equitably and in accordance with established procedures.” Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 34-35 (2009). The rules providing for disqualification of judges likewise aim to protect “judicial integrity” and “confidence in the judiciary.” Joyner v. Comm’r of Correction, 55 Conn. App. 602, 612 (1999).

But the public cannot evaluate decisions about disqualification without understanding the basis for the motion for disqualification. Perhaps the motion in this case was unfounded, and even unethical—but the public cannot confidently accept the denial of the motion if key facts on which the motion relies are redacted. “The background, experience, and associations of the judge are important factors in any trial. When a judge’s impartiality is questioned it strengthens the judicial process for the public to be informed of how the issue is approached and decided.” Application of Nat’l Broadcasting, Inc., 828 F.2d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 1987).

[A.] The motion to disqualify, and the accompanying memorandum, are covered by the presumption of public access

“Except as otherwise provided by law, there shall be a presumption that documents filed with the court shall be available to the public.” PB § 11-20A(a). This extends to all “judicial documents, meaning any document filed with the court that the court reasonably could rely on in support of its adjudicatory function,” Rosado, 292 Conn. at 30—a “broad definition of judicial documents,” id. at 48. That definition covers documents seeking judicial disqualification, because the decision whether a judge should step aside is necessarily part of the court’s “adjudicatory function.” Indeed, that decision bears directly on all subsequent steps in the adjudicative process.

This presumption is also anchored in the First Amendment. There is a First Amendment right of access to certain kinds of motions and briefs filed in civil cases, and not just in criminal cases. E.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (cited favorably by State v. Komisarjevsky, 302 Conn. 162, 175 n.12 (2011), as showing how “federal courts” “determine whether a ‘qualified’ first amendment right to access exists”). Indeed, “‘[a]ccess to written documents filed in connection with pretrial motions is particularly important in the situation … where no hearing is held and the court’s ruling is based solely on the motion papers.'” Id. at 124 (citation omitted). This First Amendment right of access extends to “documents and records that pertain to a proceeding in which one or more parties seek to disqualify a judge for bias,” Application of Nat’l Broadcasting, Inc., 828 F.2d at 345, because “experience and logic” support such a right, id. at 344 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It likewise applies to civil cases, under the reasoning of Lugosch.

[B.] This presumption does not appear to be rebutted here

The presumption of public access can be “outweighed by countervailing considerations, such as certain privacy concerns,” Rosado, 292 Conn. at 35. Judge Ozalis appeared to be concerned about the privacy of information about real estate that she owns, and demanded the redaction of “photos, addresses, assessor’s cards and maps from the Motion and Memorandum.” Doc. 208.30.

But when a motion to disqualify is based on the judge’s ownership interest in certain real estate, the public must be able to learn the location of that property, so as to be able to effectively understand and investigate the merits of the motion. As it is, the redacted motion omits not just the property address but also the details (such as any caption or case number) for an earlier case that supposedly related to the property. Moreover, the Exhibits attached to Barbara Saggese’s affidavit, which had accompanied the Motion to Disqualify—about 80 pages in all, App. A049-A136—are almost entirely redacted. The redactions thus interfere with the public’s ability to understand the nature and magnitude of any alleged conflict.

Nor is this information the sort of highly private, personal information that would warrant sealing. “[A]ssessor’s cards and maps” seem likely to be public records, open to all for inspection. Indeed, Ms. Saggese stated that Exhibit A to her affidavit (one of the exhibits that has been entirely redacted) is a “publicly available assessor’s property card.” Aff. of Barbara J. Saggese at ¶ 2.a (attached to Doc. 227.00 exh. 1, App. A044).

Likewise, the caption of the litigation over that property seems almost certainly to be a matter of public record, as are the “judicial decisions and pleadings from the [redacted] case,” Saggese Aff. ¶ 2.c, App. A045 (stating that the now-redacted Exhibit C to the affidavit contained such documents). Even photographs of the property may be public information if they are posted online as advertisements for renting the property. See Saggese Aff. at ¶ 2.f, App. A045 (stating that the now-redacted Exhibit D to the affidavit contained an advertisement for the property). And even if the rental advertisements do not mention the owner’s name, that connection may be public if the advertisements mention the property address, and searching for the property address reveals the owner’s name.

The address of the property, and its link to Judge Ozalis, is likely also not confidential information. Mr. Hardy stated that Ms. Saggese got all her information from “the Internet” (Tr. of Jan. 15, 2020 Hearing, at 21); and, for better or worse, the addresses of property that people own are generally not secret, but are often available from free online copies of phone directories, as well as from many pay services.

Moreover, judges are high public officials; their privacy interests are necessarily reduced, especially when their private behavior is alleged to bear on their public duties—for instance, on whether they can fairly preside over a case. “‘There are inherent limitations of a unique and significant nature regarding any claim to the right of privacy on the part of … incumbent public officials.'” Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm’n, 255 Conn. 78, 100 (2000) (citing Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 294 (1974)); see also, e.g., McCall v. Oroville Mercury Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 805, 807 (1983) (“A government official … has usually been considered a ‘public figure’ who has waived much of his right to privacy.”); Lambert v. Belknap County Convention, 157 N.H. 375, 384 (2008) (“a candidate voluntarily seeking to fill an elected public office has a diminished privacy expectation in personal information relevant to that office,” reasoning applicable to sitting high-level appointed officials as well as candidates); Common Cause v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv., 628 F.2d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (taking the same view).

Indeed, the courts that have considered restrictions on the publication of home addresses of government officials, especially when the addresses are connected to disputes about government action, have generally held that the restrictions violate the First Amendment. See Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 237 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1020-21 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (preliminary injunction case) (home addresses of legislators); Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1247 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (home addresses of police officers); Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (home addresses of police officers). But see Bui v. Dangelas, 2019 WL 7341671 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2019) (nonprecedential) (upholding injunction ordering the removal of comments containing a private individual’s home address, because plaintiff showed “the probable risk of irreparable injury—in the form of physical violence—… in the context of active threats against [plaintiff] by others”). Such home and vacation home addresses should likewise not be viewed as confidential for sealing purposes, since the right of public access to court records is derived in part from the First Amendment (see Part III.A, supra); and that is especially so when, as here, the addresses are relevant to a dispute about whether the judge should be disqualified.

Conclusion

“‘People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.'” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (citation omitted). This observation is especially apt for disqualification decisions, where questions—well-founded or not—about a judge’s ability to fairly decide a case have already been raised. The petitioner therefore respectfully moves this Court to unseal the entirety of the motion to disqualify and the brief in support of the motion, or at least to minimize the amount of material that is redacted in those documents.

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A Twitter Thought Experiment

I previously announced my Twitter detente. So far so good. By signing off social media, I have reclaimed about 1 or 2 hours every day. I am not sure the exact amount, because I never really counted. But I think there is a way to quantify Twitter usage. Consider this thought experiment.

  • The average person reads between 200 words per minute. Most tweets are about 35 characters, which is roughly six words. Therefore, in a minute, you can scroll about thirty tweets. That ballpark figure lets you focus on each tweet for about 2 seconds. (That sounds about right).
  • According to one study, people typing on a phone with two thumbs were able to hit about 38 words per minute, roughly the same rate as people typing on a keyboard. (At my peak, I can break 100 words per minute.) A six-word tweet would then take about 3 or 4 seconds.

These rough numbers (all underestimates) should allow you to calculate, with some accuracy, how much time you spend on Twitter.

This thought experiment could be transformed into a research project. It should be easy enough to calculate how much a person writes: simply add up the characters in all of your tweets and replies. Calculating reading time is more complicated. Perhaps one measure is to add up the length of all the tweets you retweet, favorite, or reply to. Presumably, people will only engage with a tweet after reading it. I understand that presumption may not be accurate–lots of people will retweet something without actually reading it.

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A Twitter Thought Experiment

I previously announced my Twitter detente. So far so good. By signing off social media, I have reclaimed about 1 or 2 hours every day. I am not sure the exact amount, because I never really counted. But I think there is a way to quantify Twitter usage. Consider this thought experiment.

  • The average person reads between 200 words per minute. Most tweets are about 35 characters, which is roughly six words. Therefore, in a minute, you can scroll about thirty tweets. That ballpark figure lets you focus on each tweet for about 2 seconds. (That sounds about right).
  • According to one study, people typing on a phone with two thumbs were able to hit about 38 words per minute, roughly the same rate as people typing on a keyboard. (At my peak, I can break 100 words per minute.) A six-word tweet would then take about 3 or 4 seconds.

These rough numbers (all underestimates) should allow you to calculate, with some accuracy, how much time you spend on Twitter.

This thought experiment could be transformed into a research project. It should be easy enough to calculate how much a person writes: simply add up the characters in all of your tweets and replies. Calculating reading time is more complicated. Perhaps one measure is to add up the length of all the tweets you retweet, favorite, or reply to. Presumably, people will only engage with a tweet after reading it. I understand that presumption may not be accurate–lots of people will retweet something without actually reading it.

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China’s Coronavirus Censorship Hurts Public Health

Unsurprisingly, the Big Brother-ish Chinese government’s first response to the outbreak of a new and troubling variety of coronavirus was to try to muzzle anybody who publicly discussed that illness. But, accustomed to censorious authorities, Chinese citizens are responding with clever workarounds including using euphemisms for the outbreak in online discussions and leaking information to overseas outlets.

The result, as anybody could have predicted, is a steady trickle of news and rumors of uncertain quality. That’s inevitable when governments try to control information and the public fights back.

Not that you’d know by the mutual stroking among political officials. “The Committee welcomed the leadership and political commitment of the very highest levels of Chinese government, their commitment to transparency, and the efforts made to investigate and contain the current outbreak,” the World Health Organization (WHO) announced in a January 30 eye-roller of a statement.

OK, so WHO has to play nice if it wants the Chinese government to cooperate with international efforts to control the spread of what we can only hope gets a better name than 2019-nCoV. And if the 800-pound gorilla wants to be told it’s pretty, you tell it that it’s pretty.

But the reality is a little bit different—especially when it comes to “transparency.”

Early on, Chinese officials arrested eight people for “publishing or forwarding false information on the internet without verification” with regard to the 2019-nCoV outbreak. As it turned out, those eight people were all medical personnel, including at least one who contracted the virus himself, according to China Digital Times, a U.S.-based online operation which frequently republishes articles that Chinese authorities have ordered censored, as well as other information from sources inside the country.

“The doctor says that he had warned a WeChat group of former medical school classmates about seven patients from a local wet market, suffering from what he at first described erroneously as SARS. Despite his requests for discretion, screenshots were reposted on social media, and the doctor was summoned to a police station and forced to confess his error and pledge not to repeat it,” China Digital Times noted. “Soon afterwards, he fell ill after treating an infected patient, and was admitted to an isolation ward, where he awaited test results to support a formal diagnosis. He described his own symptoms, the situation in the hospital, and his parents’ less severe infections.”

The doctor’s “error” would appear to be releasing potentially important information about a new illness that Mayor Zhou Xianwang of Wuhan, where the outbreak began, himself admits should have been shared and the suppression of which he blames on Beijing’s heavy hand. Censoring the reports left Wuhan residents unaware that they could be carrying the virus with them as they traveled around the country for the Lunar New Year holiday.

“The Chinese government’s attempts to protect its image proved costly, because they undermined initial containment efforts,” Minxin Pei of Claremont McKenna College commented. “China’s initial mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak means that thousands will be infected, hundreds may die and the economy, already weakened by debt and the trade war, will take another hit.”

That kind of criticism of the Chinese government’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak, coming from a private citizen within the country, could result in a prison sentence. But after years of such official threats, the public appears accustomed to such threats and in finding creative workarounds to evade and overwhelm the censors.

Muzzling hundreds of millions of people is no easy task, and government algorithms and agents are generally stuck looking for forbidden key words or phrases. If you want to criticize Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s reaction to the outbreak, but you use “Trump” instead of his name, and “Chernobyl” instead of coronavirus, censors get stuck playing whack-a-mole with critics who are always one step ahead of them.

The Chernobyl reference must be especially galling for Chinese leaders since the 1986 nuclear disaster encapsulates everything you might want to say about a communist regime’s incompetent and authoritarian response to a crisis.

Using euphemisms for forbidden subjects is a well-established tactic in China. Three years ago, the government censored social media conversations about Winnie the Pooh after officials realized that the beloved character was a stand-in for pudgy Xi Jinping in exchanges criticizing government policy and mocking political leaders. The move left officials looking thin-skinned and ludicrous without depriving the population of its desire to sound off or of its access to a world of other potential euphemisms.

Clever workarounds become especially effective when public disdain for official policy simply overwhelms the most intrusive efforts of government censors.

“The sheer amount of criticism … have made it difficult for Beijing to control the message,” The New York Times reported last week. Officials can’t arrest everybody, especially when they’ve grown skilled at voicing their discontent without explicitly saying what they mean.

In this continuous information battle between officials and the people, writes Ian Johnson, who lives in Beijing and writes about the country, the government “knows the people don’t trust it in these cases and assume there has been a cover-up.”

Unfortunately, when censors battle the public, truth isn’t so much suppressed as muddled. You can search online and find any number of tweets, articles, and videos purporting to portray what’s “really going on” in Wuhan and elsewhere in China, but it’s difficult to verify many of the reports because of the government’s efforts to control information, as well as its draconian travel controls and quarantines.

Official reports have to be taken with a grain of salt given the Chinese government’s history of hiding the facts during the SARS scare.

Beijing has been “lying about the spread of the Wuhan flu virus from the start,” charges Peter Cordingley, who worked for WHO during the 2003 outbreak. “I say this because I was the WHO spokesman in Asia at the time of the 2003 Sars outbreak, and I’m seeing precisely the same reckless behaviour now.”

Far from salvaging its public image by suppressing criticism, discussion, and reports of a sensitive subject, the Chinese government has left much of its own population and the world beyond assuming it’s hiding the truth and that the 2019-nCoV outbreak is more serious than it probably is. It has also worsened the actual impact of the outbreak by trying to control the flow of information.

Chinese officials set out to control news about the latest coronavirus outbreak. Instead, as censors always do, they’ve bred distrust in their judgment and their official pronouncements. And rather than control the conversation, they’ve driven people to defy their efforts by sharing information from wherever they can find it, no matter how reliable it may be.

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