Today’s Gubernatorial, Statehouse Races Will Set the Table for Redistricting Fights

dreamstime_xl_157667487

All elections are about power—and some shifts in political power are felt for years.

Such was the case 10 years ago, when Republicans rode an electoral tsunami that gave the party its largest share of state legislative seats since the 1920s. That election preceded the once-per-decade redrawing of legislative and congressional districts, and Republicans used their time in the catbird seat to carve out favorable political geography for themselves. Although some of those district maps were eventually overturned by courts and redrawn after yearslong legal battles, Republican gains at the state level in the 2010 election undeniably shaped the country’s political landscape for the past decade.

What the next decade looks like will be decided today.

There are 5,876 state legislative races being conducted on Tuesday—nearly 80 percent of all statehouse seats in the country—and 11 states will elect a governor as well. Beyond the redistricting power, there are significant policy stakes: the National Conference for State Legislature (NCSL), a nonpartisan group that tracks state political action, notes that Congress has passed 163 bills since January 2019 while states have enacted 15,000 new laws.

Democrats have clawed back some of what they lost in 2010, but NCSL data show that Republicans still hold 52 percent of America’s legislative seats and control 59 of the 98 partisan chambers in statehouses. (Nebraska has a unicameral legislature that is technically nonpartisan, but Republicans have an unofficial majority there too.)

A big night for Democrats could see them vault into power in some places where they haven’t had a majority for a long time. In Pennsylvania, the state that seems to be at the center of so much of this election, Democrats need to flip nine House seats and four Senate seats to take control of the legislature ahead of redistricting. Pennsylvania’s Senate hasn’t had a Democratic majority since 1980, making it a good marker for judging the strength of this year’s possible “blue wave.”

That’s the type of historical result Democrats will have to achieve if they want to match the Republican shellacking of 2010, when the GOP swung control of an incredible 21 legislative chambers.

Democrats are eyeing potential swings of power in both chambers in Arizona, where Republicans enter the election with a two-seat majority in the state House and a three-seat edge in the state Senate. Democrats haven’t held either chamber in Arizona in more than 40 years. Republicans are also playing defense in the Michigan state House, where they have a seven-seat advantage, and in the Minnesota state Senate, where they hold a three-seat majority.

A few gubernatorial contests could see power shift as well, though for the most part these races are less competitive this year. Incumbent Gov. Roy Cooper, a Democrat, is likely to face a close contest in North Carolina, and Missouri Gov. Mike Parson, a Republican, could too. Other than that, the only interesting race is Montana’s incumbent-less gubernatorial contest, which seems wide open.

But even if Democrats can match the Republican wave of 2010, their power to redraw districts will be blunted, in part, by Democratic-led efforts to rein-in partisan redistricting during the past decade.

At least 114 congressional seats will be subject to redistricting commissions in 2021, according to the Cook Political Report. Those commissions operate differently in various states and have a mixed record when it comes to thwarting partisan outcomes, but they certainly remove a degree of power from lawmakers’ hands. The number of congressional districts drawn by a commission could rise to 125 if Virginia voters approve a ballot initiative on Tuesday that would create such a commission.

There are another 58 congressional districts in three key states—Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania—where the next set of congressional maps will be subject to newly created standards set by state courts. And there are seven congressional districts that can’t be gerrymandered because they are at-large districts covering the whole state.

That still leaves 245 seats in Congress—a little more than half—for which state legislators will have outsized control. All eyes are understandably on the top-of-the-ticket race between President Donald Trump and former vice president Joe Biden, but the outcome of statehouse races might have more lasting consequences.

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Palestinian Authority Has Been In Talks With Biden Campaign, “Desperate” For Trump Exit

Palestinian Authority Has Been In Talks With Biden Campaign, “Desperate” For Trump Exit

Tyler Durden

Tue, 11/03/2020 – 14:30

At a moment that talks and formal relations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas and the White House have remained effectively frozen for years since the December 6, 2017 US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, an Israeli media report revealed early this week that the PA has been in quiet talks with the Joe Biden campaign in the lead-in to the election. 

The Jerusalem Post on Monday cited a US media outlet that exclusively covers the Middle East as follows: “Two senior Palestinian officials have confirmed to The Media Line that the Palestinian Authority is maintaining direct channels of communication with the campaign of US Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden.”

Then Vice President Joseph Biden Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas during a 2010 visit, via AP.

One PA official in the report said that “Having dialogue with the Democratic candidate is important to the leadership.”  

The unnamed sources added that “We want to let Mr. Biden know that we are willing and ready to talk.” The Palestinian public too is said to be “desperate” for a Biden win.

The irony is that if it were the Russians or Chinese reaching out to a presidential rival ahead of an election, it would be front page news and branded as ‘interference’ – however, in this case the story has barely made a blip in US coverage.

Despite the White House having supposedly invited the Palestinians to the negotiating table the PA has in past statements maintained that it was cut out of any substantive talks – instead officials have said Israeli got everything it wanted without any significant compromise. This includes plans which Netanyahu hasn’t acted on yet of annexing up to one-third of the West Bank, including the sprawling Jordan Valley area.

A second PA official privy to communications with the Biden campaign said the following as cited in the Jerusalem Post/Media Line reporting:

“We are sure that if he wins, he will reassert the US position on the two-state solution and order the PLO office in Washington reopened.”

The Palestinian side has long insisted it sees east Jerusalem, currently under Israeli occupation and administration, as crucial to a future Palestinian state’s future capital. 

One Palestinian political observer and commentator named Jihad Harb said Arabs in the region are overwhelmingly rooting for a Biden victory this week:

The Palestinians usually prefer the Democrats, and the Palestinian leadership prefers that the president be from the Democratic Party,” he said.

It’s also well-known that in other Mideast hotspots where President Trump has brought pressure to bear, such as in Iran, authorities and the population are seen as hoping for a Democrat victory in Tuesday’s election.

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Today’s Gubernatorial, Statehouse Races Will Set the Table for Redistricting Fights

dreamstime_xl_157667487

All elections are about power—and some shifts in political power are felt for years.

Such was the case 10 years ago, when Republicans rode an electoral tsunami that gave the party its largest share of state legislative seats since the 1920s. That election preceded the once-per-decade redrawing of legislative and congressional districts, and Republicans used their time in the catbird seat to carve out favorable political geography for themselves. Although some of those district maps were eventually overturned by courts and redrawn after yearslong legal battles, Republican gains at the state level in the 2010 election undeniably shaped the country’s political landscape for the past decade.

What the next decade looks like will be decided today.

There are 5,876 state legislative races being conducted on Tuesday—nearly 80 percent of all statehouse seats in the country—and 11 states will elect a governor as well. Beyond the redistricting power, there are significant policy stakes: the National Conference for State Legislature (NCSL), a nonpartisan group that tracks state political action, notes that Congress has passed 163 bills since January 2019 while states have enacted 15,000 new laws.

Democrats have clawed back some of what they lost in 2010, but NCSL data show that Republicans still hold 52 percent of America’s legislative seats and control 59 of the 98 partisan chambers in statehouses. (Nebraska has a unicameral legislature that is technically nonpartisan, but Republicans have an unofficial majority there too.)

A big night for Democrats could see them vault into power in some places where they haven’t had a majority for a long time. In Pennsylvania, the state that seems to be at the center of so much of this election, Democrats need to flip nine House seats and four Senate seats to take control of the legislature ahead of redistricting. Pennsylvania’s Senate hasn’t had a Democratic majority since 1980, making it a good marker for judging the strength of this year’s possible “blue wave.”

That’s the type of historical result Democrats will have to achieve if they want to match the Republican shellacking of 2010, when the GOP swung control of an incredible 21 legislative chambers.

Democrats are eyeing potential swings of power in both chambers in Arizona, where Republicans enter the election with a two-seat majority in the state House and a three-seat edge in the state Senate. Democrats haven’t held either chamber in Arizona in more than 40 years. Republicans are also playing defense in the Michigan state House, where they have a seven-seat advantage, and in the Minnesota state Senate, where they hold a three-seat majority.

A few gubernatorial contests could see power shift as well, though for the most part these races are less competitive this year. Incumbent Gov. Roy Cooper, a Democrat, is likely to face a close contest in North Carolina, and Missouri Gov. Mike Parson, a Republican, could too. Other than that, the only interesting race is Montana’s incumbent-less gubernatorial contest, which seems wide open.

But even if Democrats can match the Republican wave of 2010, their power to redraw districts will be blunted, in part, by Democratic-led efforts to rein-in partisan redistricting during the past decade.

At least 114 congressional seats will be subject to redistricting commissions in 2021, according to the Cook Political Report. Those commissions operate differently in various states and have a mixed record when it comes to thwarting partisan outcomes, but they certainly remove a degree of power from lawmakers’ hands. The number of congressional districts drawn by a commission could rise to 125 if Virginia voters approve a ballot initiative on Tuesday that would create such a commission.

There are another 58 congressional districts in three key states—Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania—where the next set of congressional maps will be subject to newly created standards set by state courts. And there are seven congressional districts that can’t be gerrymandered because they are at-large districts covering the whole state.

That still leaves 245 seats in Congress—a little more than half—for which state legislators will have outsized control. All eyes are understandably on the top-of-the-ticket race between President Donald Trump and former vice president Joe Biden, but the outcome of statehouse races might have more lasting consequences.

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Scarborough: We Will Not Air Any Trump Victory Speech Tuesday Night

Scarborough: We Will Not Air Any Trump Victory Speech Tuesday Night

Tyler Durden

Tue, 11/03/2020 – 14:15

Authored by Jonathan Turley,

There was an interesting moment on Monday as the hosts and guest on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” were discussing the coverage of the election. Willie Geist raised the possibility that President Trump could declare victory on election night before all the votes have been counted. Joe Scarborough responded that NBC would simply make a Twitter-like determination and not carry the speech.

It would not be treated as obvious news but rather “disinformation”… regardless of what has transpired on election day.

What is ironic is that Geist had just slammed Trump for making plans to send in lawyers  “no matter what happens.”  Without missing a beat, Scarborough then announced that no matter what happens on the election (like a surprise victory), Trump’s speech would be blocked for NBC viewers.

“We’ll be doing coverage on Peacock and we can assure you if Trump declares victory we’ll say, don’t take the feed. It’s not going to happen. We won’t be part of any disinformation campaign, we’ll be doing election coverage until midnight or whenever is over.

The point tracked a statement from Biden campaign manager Jen O’Malley Dillon who declared that “[u]nder no scenario will Donald Trump be declared a victor on election night, and that’s fundamentally how we want to approach tomorrow.” I can understand the mathematical point but the Biden campaign does not make such decision. Moreover, this appears only a bar on a Trump victory speech. Some Democrats like James Carville are predicting that they will know by 10 pm. I would find it difficult to see a scenario where an election night victory could be declared but we do not know what will occur today in terms of any surges or landslide.  More importantly, the issue raised on Morning Joe goes to the coverage not the claims on election night.

I happen to like and respect Scarborough. I have defended him and his co-host and wife Mika Brzezinski after personal attacks from President Trump. However, this statement was unnerving. I understand what he and Geist are saying about the need to count many votes sent in by mail.  The problem is that they are in the news business and NBC viewers tune in for news. This would be, by any measure, news.  Indeed, if premature or completely baseless, a victory speech would be even more significant news.

What concerns me is the relative ease with which news figures now state their role in protecting viewers from what they consider “disinformation.” It is precisely the slippery slope that took us to the expanding private censorship on sites like Twitter and Facebook, where a well-founded story in the New York Post is blocked for weeks.  Despite the tech companies admitting that the move was a mistake, Democratic Senators demanded more censorship from the companies in the recent hearing. What is missing is the original clarity of the free and open forum of the Internet.

Now a news program is pledging in advance to block its viewers from hearing the President directly if he claims victory on Tuesday night. Instead, they can expect the same formulaic, approved coverage that we now expect in the age of echo chamber journalism.  NBC recently was criticized for a bait-and-switch story on Hunter Biden where they debunked an obscure document rather than address the confirmed emails found on Biden’s laptop.

Obviously, viewers on NBC can switch over to Fox or another network to watch any presidential speech on election night. However, Scarborough was assuring the viewers that they would be protected from such news. Clearly he viewed promising to censor the President as a draw for NBC’s viewers — assuring viewers that they would be protected from the news like some journalistic safe space.  Protecting viewers from news was not a goal of NBC when I worked for the company many years ago. This would be news any way you cut it. It can be immediately followed by commentary pointing out that such a claim may be premature.  However, we do not know “what will happen” on Tuesday night anymore than President Trump does beyond one guarantee  . . . it will be news.

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Could This Election Be The Tipping Point To Genuine MMT?

Could This Election Be The Tipping Point To Genuine MMT?

Tyler Durden

Tue, 11/03/2020 – 13:50

In his “chart of the day”, DB credit strategist Jim Reid shows the three-day intraday move of 10-year treasuries and the US dollar between election day and the day after the results came through in Nov 2016.

He notes that between polls closing and 13:00 the day following the election, 10-year US treasuries sold off nearly 40bps as the market fear over a Trump victory turned exceptionally quickly to one of reflation. However, 10 days after the election they were +64bps higher than the intra-day Asian market lows on election night.

As Reid then writes, that we haven’t actually got inflation is an interesting postscript but then asks “could this election be the tipping point to genuine MMT?”

The point of the graph, as he strategist explains, is to indicate that very big moves can happen around such events. Back in 2016, during the Asian session following the elections S&P futures fell -5% overnight in the initial response to Trump’s victory, causing circuit breakers to pause trading, before sharply rallying to finish the day +6.1% higher than these lows.

Will we get a similar kneejerk reaction, followed by an even more dramatic reversal this time in either stocks or bonds? We’ll know – hopefully – in a few hours.

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Protests, Roadways, and Liability

Yesterday, the Supreme Court essentially sent the Mckesson v. Doe First Amendment litigation on a state-law detour down to the Louisiana Supreme Court; here are the facts, as recounted in yesterday’s opinion:

DeRay Mckesson organized a demonstration in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to protest a shooting by a local police officer. The protesters, allegedly at Mckesson’s direction, occupied the highway in front of the police headquarters. As officers began making arrests to clear the highway, an unknown individual threw a “piece of concrete or a similar rock-like object,” striking respondent Officer Doe in the face. Officer Doe suffered devastating injuries in the line of duty, including loss of teeth and brain trauma.

Doe sued, and the question before the Louisiana Supreme Court will be whether Mckesson could be held liable under the Louisiana tort law of negligence, “on the theory that he negligently staged the protest in a manner that caused the assault.” And of course there have been other incidents in recent years where protesters illegally blocked public streets, often keeping cars from going forward, sometimes surrounding them, and potentially causing accidents.

A couple of days ago, a group of drivers displaying Trump signs apparently surrounded a Biden campaign bus, allegedly slowed it down to 20 mph, and allegedly tried to stop it. There was apparently at least one minor collision between an SUV associated with the Biden campaign and one of the trucks displaying the Trump signs; from what I understand, no-one was injured, but someone certainly could have been.

What can we say about legal liability in such situations?

[1.] Certainly the individuals who themselves break the law (whether they are throwing rocks, driving unsafely, or simply blocking traffic as pedestrians) could be criminally prosecuted, and those who cause injury could be held civilly liable for their own actions.

To the extent that the people (whether surrounding a bus in trucks or surrounding a car on foot) threaten others, or wrongfully block them from leaving, they can be prosecuted or sued for that, too. This is true whether they deliberately surround a vehicle because it’s associated with a political campaign, or surround a vehicle for other reasons; both can be criminal or tortious, though there are sometimes also special criminal statutes that can be used when the targeting stems from the target’s political activity.

[2.] To the extent that a protest organizer is deliberately instigating a crime or a tort (whether the blocking of traffic, the throwing of rocks, or whatever else), the organizer can be prosecuted and sued for conspiring to commit a crime or tort, or for soliciting, ordering, or otherwise directing its commission.

[3.] But can a protest organizer be sued even for harms by protesters that he didn’t intend, on the theory that he negligently caused those harms, and the harms were foreseeable? The theory might be, “It’s foreseeable that when people deliberately block a street, the police will feel obligated to clear it, and then one of the protesters will attack and injure a police officer; your organizing the blocking of the street caused this foreseeably injury; and you acted unreasonably in creating this risk of harm by organizing the illegal blocking of the street.”

Or it might be, “It’s foreseeable that when drivers surround another vehicle as part of a political demonstration, someone is going to drive unsafely (follow too closely, drive too aggressively, or otherwise focus more on their highway theater project than on safe driving), and there may be an auto accident which will cause injury or property damage.”

[A.] It turns out that, as Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho noted in his early concurrence in the denial of en banc rehearing in Mckesson (see also this post of mine discussing the initial Fifth Circuit panel opinion) that the result may be different when a police officer is negligently injured. Under the “professional rescuer doctrine” (earlier called “the fireman’s rule”), which is recognized in most states (including Louisiana),

“[A] professional rescuer, such as a fireman or a policeman, who is injured in the performance of his duties, ‘assumes the risk’ of such an injury and is not entitled to damages”—particularly when the “risks arise from the very emergency that the professional rescuer was hired to remedy.”

So that means that, in Mckesson v. Doe, Doe would lose under this doctrine; likewise if a police officer were injured in an accident when trying to break up a drivers’ demonstration on a freeway. But this wouldn’t dispose of a lawsuit by someone else who was hit by a rock thrown by a protester (e.g., a bystander, a driver, a private security guard), hit by a car driven by a demonstrator, or more broadly someone else who was injured in a foreseeable consequence of the protest.

[B.] Once we set aside the professional rescuer question, there are two related state law questions. One is sometimes loosely called “duty”: Do people have a duty not to organize protests in ways that foreseeably and unreasonably cause physical harm, especially when they deliberately structure the protest that violates some other law (such as laws against blocking traffic)? I think that, as a general matter of negligence law, the answer is yes, because this is just a special case of the general duty not to do things that foreseeably and unreasonably cause physical harm:

An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm ….

Comment. An actor’s conduct creates a risk when the actor’s conduct or course of conduct results in greater risk to another than the other would have faced absent the conduct…. Conduct may … create risk by exposing another to the improper conduct of third parties.

It’s true that the law usually doesn’t impose a duty to protect others from physical harm that you didn’t cause. But it does impose a duty to act reasonably when your actions do create a risk.

There might be good reason to limit this duty in certain situations. (Consider, for instance, the “social host liability” rules, which in most states say that social hosts who affirmatively furnish alcohol to their guests aren’t liable when the guest gets drunk, drives away, and injures someone—a jury won’t even be asked whether the social hosts’ actions were negligent, because the social host doctrine limits the normal duty of reasonable care.) But such limitations on this duty of care.

A related question (sometimes labeled the “proximate cause” question) is: Can someone be held liable for doing things that increase the risk of a criminal act by another person? The general answer is yes, if that act is “foreseeable”:

An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal….

The conduct of a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with or permits the improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party….

Illustration. The employees of the A Railroad are on strike. They or their sympathizers have torn up tracks, misplaced switches, and otherwise attempted to wreck trains. A fails to guard its switches, and runs a train, which is derailed by an unguarded switch intentionally thrown by strikers for the purpose of wrecking the train…. C, a traveler upon an adjacent highway, [is] injured by the wreck. A Company may be found to be negligent toward … C.

Again, there are sometimes limitation on this proximate cause theory, but they are exceptions rather than the rule.

[C.] Finally, we get to the First Amendment question, which the Supreme Court avoided for now by sending the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court for a decision on whether state law authorizes such negligence claim in the first place: Does the First Amendment limit negligence liability in such situations? That’s a very interesting and complex question, which I think should turn on whether the negligence theory stems from the content of the speech: A claim that a film distributor is liable for crimes stemming from some viewers being inspired to act violently, for instance, is generally precluded. But a claim that someone was injured as (say) a result of a stampede at a concert, because the concert organizers let in more fans than was safe, would likely be allowed. I discuss this in much more detail in this post.

But in any event, I thought it would be helpful to think about these questions by viewing Mckesson (and other pedestrians-blocking-the-streets cases) and the Texas incident together, and seeing what rules would make sense for both of them.

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77% Of Americans Think Violence Will Break Out After The Election

77% Of Americans Think Violence Will Break Out After The Election

Tyler Durden

Tue, 11/03/2020 – 13:31

Authored by Paul Joseph Watson via Summit News,

A final poll of American voters has found that no less than 77% think violence will break out after today’s presidential election.

According to the Yahoo News/YouGov survey, 51% of voters think Trump will refuse to concede if he loses the election while 77% “worry that violence will break out in the coming days.”

Both sides are almost even when it comes to judging the reaction to either candidate winning.

59% of Trump supporters believe that if Trump loses it will be because “Democrats rigged the election,” while 58% of Biden supporters believe if the former Vice President loses it will be because “Republicans stole the election.”

With that kind of sentiment being so dominant, it’s almost impossible that there won’t be some form of disorder in the days following the vote.

Meanwhile, just 22% of registered voters expect to know the result on election night while only 28% believe the election will be “free and fair”.

As we highlighted yesterday, stores, restaurants and banks in major cities across the country are being boarded up in anticipation of major unrest.

However, should Trump lose and accept defeat, it won’t be Trump supporters rioting given what has unfolded over the last 5 months.

Gun stores across the country are also being cleaned out by new buyers who are afraid of major social dislocation, while Walmart has also removed firearms and ammunition from its shelves entirely.

*  *  *

New limited edition merch now available! Click here.

In the age of mass Silicon Valley censorship It is crucial that we stay in touch. I need you to sign up for my free newsletter here. Also, I urgently need your financial support here.

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Protests, Roadways, and Liability

Yesterday, the Supreme Court essentially sent the Mckesson v. Doe First Amendment litigation on a state-law detour down to the Louisiana Supreme Court; here are the facts, as recounted in yesterday’s opinion:

DeRay Mckesson organized a demonstration in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to protest a shooting by a local police officer. The protesters, allegedly at Mckesson’s direction, occupied the highway in front of the police headquarters. As officers began making arrests to clear the highway, an unknown individual threw a “piece of concrete or a similar rock-like object,” striking respondent Officer Doe in the face. Officer Doe suffered devastating injuries in the line of duty, including loss of teeth and brain trauma.

Doe sued, and the question before the Louisiana Supreme Court will be whether Mckesson could be held liable under the Louisiana tort law of negligence, “on the theory that he negligently staged the protest in a manner that caused the assault.” And of course there have been other incidents in recent years where protesters illegally blocked public streets, often keeping cars from going forward, sometimes surrounding them, and potentially causing accidents.

A couple of days ago, a group of drivers displaying Trump signs apparently surrounded a Biden campaign bus, allegedly slowed it down to 20 mph, and allegedly tried to stop it. There was apparently at least one minor collision between an SUV associated with the Biden campaign and one of the trucks displaying the Trump signs; from what I understand, no-one was injured, but someone certainly could have been.

What can we say about legal liability in such situations?

[1.] Certainly the individuals who themselves break the law (whether they are throwing rocks, driving unsafely, or simply blocking traffic as pedestrians) could be criminally prosecuted, and those who cause injury could be held civilly liable for their own actions.

To the extent that the people (whether surrounding a bus in trucks or surrounding a car on foot) threaten others, or wrongfully block them from leaving, they can be prosecuted or sued for that, too. This is true whether they deliberately surround a vehicle because it’s associated with a political campaign, or surround a vehicle for other reasons; both can be criminal or tortious, though there are sometimes also special criminal statutes that can be used when the targeting stems from the target’s political activity.

[2.] To the extent that a protest organizer is deliberately instigating a crime or a tort (whether the blocking of traffic, the throwing of rocks, or whatever else), the organizer can be prosecuted and sued for conspiring to commit a crime or tort, or for soliciting, ordering, or otherwise directing its commission.

[3.] But can a protest organizer be sued even for harms by protesters that he didn’t intend, on the theory that he negligently caused those harms, and the harms were foreseeable? The theory might be, “It’s foreseeable that when people deliberately block a street, the police will feel obligated to clear it, and then one of the protesters will attack and injure a police officer; your organizing the blocking of the street caused this foreseeably injury; and you acted unreasonably in creating this risk of harm by organizing the illegal blocking of the street.”

Or it might be, “It’s foreseeable that when drivers surround another vehicle as part of a political demonstration, someone is going to drive unsafely (follow too closely, drive too aggressively, or otherwise focus more on their highway theater project than on safe driving), and there may be an auto accident which will cause injury or property damage.”

[A.] It turns out that, as Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho noted in his early concurrence in the denial of en banc rehearing in Mckesson (see also this post of mine discussing the initial Fifth Circuit panel opinion) that the result may be different when a police officer is negligently injured. Under the “professional rescuer doctrine” (earlier called “the fireman’s rule”), which is recognized in most states (including Louisiana),

“[A] professional rescuer, such as a fireman or a policeman, who is injured in the performance of his duties, ‘assumes the risk’ of such an injury and is not entitled to damages”—particularly when the “risks arise from the very emergency that the professional rescuer was hired to remedy.”

So that means that, in Mckesson v. Doe, Doe would lose under this doctrine; likewise if a police officer were injured in an accident when trying to break up a drivers’ demonstration on a freeway. But this wouldn’t dispose of a lawsuit by someone else who was hit by a rock thrown by a protester (e.g., a bystander, a driver, a private security guard), hit by a car driven by a demonstrator, or more broadly someone else who was injured in a foreseeable consequence of the protest.

[B.] Once we set aside the professional rescuer question, there are two related state law questions. One is sometimes loosely called “duty”: Do people have a duty not to organize protests in ways that foreseeably and unreasonably cause physical harm, especially when they deliberately structure the protest that violates some other law (such as laws against blocking traffic)? I think that, as a general matter of negligence law, the answer is yes, because this is just a special case of the general duty not to do things that foreseeably and unreasonably cause physical harm:

An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm ….

Comment. An actor’s conduct creates a risk when the actor’s conduct or course of conduct results in greater risk to another than the other would have faced absent the conduct…. Conduct may … create risk by exposing another to the improper conduct of third parties.

It’s true that the law usually doesn’t impose a duty to protect others from physical harm that you didn’t cause. But it does impose a duty to act reasonably when your actions do create a risk.

There might be good reason to limit this duty in certain situations. (Consider, for instance, the “social host liability” rules, which in most states say that social hosts who affirmatively furnish alcohol to their guests aren’t liable when the guest gets drunk, drives away, and injures someone—a jury won’t even be asked whether the social hosts’ actions were negligent, because the social host doctrine limits the normal duty of reasonable care.) But such limitations on this duty of care.

A related question (sometimes labeled the “proximate cause” question) is: Can someone be held liable for doing things that increase the risk of a criminal act by another person? The general answer is yes, if that act is “foreseeable”:

An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal….

The conduct of a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with or permits the improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party….

Illustration. The employees of the A Railroad are on strike. They or their sympathizers have torn up tracks, misplaced switches, and otherwise attempted to wreck trains. A fails to guard its switches, and runs a train, which is derailed by an unguarded switch intentionally thrown by strikers for the purpose of wrecking the train…. C, a traveler upon an adjacent highway, [is] injured by the wreck. A Company may be found to be negligent toward … C.

Again, there are sometimes limitation on this proximate cause theory, but they are exceptions rather than the rule.

[C.] Finally, we get to the First Amendment question, which the Supreme Court avoided for now by sending the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court for a decision on whether state law authorizes such negligence claim in the first place: Does the First Amendment limit negligence liability in such situations? That’s a very interesting and complex question, which I think should turn on whether the negligence theory stems from the content of the speech: A claim that a film distributor is liable for crimes stemming from some viewers being inspired to act violently, for instance, is generally precluded. But a claim that someone was injured as (say) a result of a stampede at a concert, because the concert organizers let in more fans than was safe, would likely be allowed. I discuss this in much more detail in this post.

But in any event, I thought it would be helpful to think about these questions by viewing Mckesson (and other pedestrians-blocking-the-streets cases) and the Texas incident together, and seeing what rules would make sense for both of them.

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These States Hold The Key To Who Will Win The Presidency, Goldman Says

These States Hold The Key To Who Will Win The Presidency, Goldman Says

Tyler Durden

Tue, 11/03/2020 – 13:10

Last night, we brought back our election night cheat sheet, a helpful guide to the potential pitfalls of one of the most hotly anticipated races in American history (for the Dems, the campaign to take back the White House effectively started on Nov. 9, 2016).

As investors and observers try to figure out how long until the results are known, a team of researchers at Goldman has produced a comprehensive note breaking down the importance of swing states by region, and offering a guide for what to watch for as the results are streaming in – starting with the fact that most of the ‘key states’ that will ultimately decide the race should be decided by midnight.

According to Goldman, polling heading into election day suggests the “tipping point” state will be Arizona, Pennsylvania or Nevada.

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Most of the key states are likely to report meaningful results on election night. Among the presidential “battleground” states, Florida is likely to report the most quickly, with nearly all of its votes counted and reported on Tuesday night. Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, and Ohio also look likely to report most of their results on election night (or the very early hours of Nov. 4). As shown in Exhibit 1, former Vice President Biden has been polling ahead in several of those states. While the national polling margin has tightened somewhat, the polling in the likely tipping point states (at the moment polls imply this would be Arizona, Pennsylvania, or Nevada) has remained fairly steady, showing a Biden lead of around 5pp.

However, Michigan and Pennsylvania, in particular, are likely to take longer to report results, meaning that unless one candidate amasses a large lead, the results in those states might not be clear for a few days, or longer. That said, preliminary results will provide some insight. More complete results in closely correlated states (e.g., Ohio, Minnesota) compared with final pre-election polls might also shed some light on which way Michigan and Pennsylvania might lean. Exhibit 3 shows that in 2016, most Midwestern states had similar polling errors compared with the final result, while polling in the Southwest and Southeast was more accurate, on average.

Early results could be misleading, in both directions. In several states, the first-reported results might favor one party, with results later in the night tightening the margin or changing the result. In Arizona, Florida, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas, mail and early in-person votes are likely to be released first, which will likely boost Democrats early in the night. Election Day votes released later are likely to lean more Republican. By contrast, in Alaska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, the early results are more likely to reflect Election Day voting, which is likely to lean more Republican than the mail votes reported later.

States with mail ballot deadlines after Election Day could see a further shift. In the days following Election Day additional mail ballots look more likely to add to Democratic vote totals than Republican, though this will vary by state. This could be a factor in Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Nevada, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.

The margins in most of these states would need to be very close for these post-Election Day votes to be decisive. For example, in Pennsylvania, the remaining absentee ballots sent to voters but not yet returned amount to roughly 11% of the total 2016 vote; Democrats account for 6pp of this and Republicans for 4pp. Making the simple assumption that those voters vote for their party’s candidate, these ballots could boost the Democratic vote share by around 2pp, if all ballots are returned. The partisan gap in the remaining unreturned mail ballots is similar but slightly larger in North Carolina.

A Trump win could take longer to become apparent than a Biden win. The outcome in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina and Ohio is likely to be reasonably clear on election night. In light of the correlations between states and the Electoral College math President Trump faces, if Biden wins any of those states—and especially if he wins more than one—markets are likely to believe he will win the election. By contrast, if Trump wins all of those states, as he did in 2016, it becomes much less likely that the result becomes clear quickly, as Pennsylvania could decide the result.

The Senate majority is likely to become clear on election night, but not the exact margin. We have argued that the Senate majority is at least as important as the presidential election for fiscal policy in 2021, and that a larger Senate majority (e.g., 53 or 54 seats) could lead to more substantial changes as well as potential elimination of the filibuster. As shown in Exhibit 4, the seats where Republican incumbents are trailing or are tied happen to be in states that should report results quickly: Colorado, Arizona, North Carolina, Maine, Iowa, Georgia and Montana. There are a few races that are likely to take longer, however. Michigan (Democratic incumbent) could take a few days to become clear, and Alaska (Republican incumbent) won’t count ballots until more than a week after the election. In Georgia, the results might become clear fairly quickly but at least one of the two Senate races is likely to go to a January 5 run-off, assuming none of the candidates clears 50% of the vote.

Ultimately, how quickly the media calls the results will depend on how close the result in a state is. Exhibit 5 plots the eventual 2016 vote margin in a state with how long it took the Associated Press to call the state after the polls closed that year. While some states took longer to call simply because they were slower to get results out, on average it took around 4 hours after poll closing to call races where the margin was more than 0.5pp and less than mid-single digits. A notable exception was Arizona, where Trump won by 3.55pp but which the AP took two days to call. Where the margin was smaller than 0.5pp, in New Hampshire and Michigan, it took the AP several days to call the race.

Here’s a roundup of what to watch for on in order of when the polls close:

Like the team at Goldman, analysts at SocGen also see a strong chance – a combined 66% – that the final results will be known on Tuesday or Wednesday (Nov. 3 or Nov. 4).

Goldman added that Biden’s narrow lead in Arizona, Florida, Georgia and North Carolina mean that if he wins even one of these states, the electoral math will start to get very difficult for Trump.

If Trump sweeps the Sun Belt swing states, the focus will shift to PA, Wisconsin and Michigan. PA & Michigan likely won’t have their final results in until days later. Which means if it really does come down to Pennsylvania, traders better get ready for a long slog to the final count.

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Carbon Pricing Is a Possible Alternative to Partisan Bickering Over Climate Change

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In the closing days of a race that’s closer than expected, Sen. John Cornyn (R–Texas) has been accused of using manipulated footage to make his Democratic challenger, MJ Hegar, say that she “support[s] a carbon tax.”

In fossil fuel-rich Texas, of course, support for a tax on carbon is potentially disqualifying. Hegar’s actual position is somewhat unclear: She claims to support a carbon tax but also says she would not want it to hit middle-class families. Still, the last-minute tussle over carbon taxes in the Texas senate race is indicative of a greater problem in our national politics when it comes to fighting climate change: The politics often supersede the policy.

That’s certainly been true in this year’s presidential race.

Democratic nominee and former Vice President Joe Biden’s campaign website calls climate change “the greatest threat facing our country and our world.” He promises to invest $2 trillion dollars into infrastructure, manufacturing, and “environmental justice” to ensure that “communities who have suffered the most from pollution are first to benefit.”

Biden also plans to refit thousands of homes, even though the costs for that are significantly higher than the benefits. He pledges to reduce carbon emissions to zero, which Bjorn Lomborg, a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, projects would cost $5 trillion dollars. Overall, Biden’s plan would cost thousands of dollars per taxpayer every year, according to Lomborg.

Meanwhile, incumbent President Donald Trump’s environmental agenda consists primarily of hoping that climate change goes away. His campaign website describes his second-term agenda as promising to “Continue to Lead the World in Access to the Cleanest Drinking Water and Cleanest Air” and to “Partner with Other Nations to Clean Up our Planet’s Oceans”—admirable goals, sure—but does not mention climate change or outline any concrete plan for reducing carbon emissions.

Reducing carbon emissions requires recognizing that the market can do a better job than bureaucrats in Washington—but also that doing nothing isn’t a good option. Failing to act on climate change presents significant economic costs as well. According to the Congressional Research Service, even a small increase in global temperatures could lead to a 2 percent annual loss in gross domestic product, with that number increasing alongside the rate of warming.

A new study from the Niskanen Center, a centrist think tank, offers a middle ground that more politicians should be willing to consider: carbon pricing.

Joseph Majkut, director of climate policy, argues in a recently published report that carbon pricing could be an effective policy for curbing emissions while preserving markets. Under Majkut’s proposal, the federal government would price carbon at $50 per ton, and return that revenue to taxpayers. This would create a market incentive for corporations to implement clean energy plans. It would discourage investment in fossil fuels, and likely encourage firms to start the process of moving toward clean energy sources. But it wouldn’t cost trillions of dollars, nor would it absolutely destroy the American economy. There would be costs, just as with any tax—but not to the degree that Biden’s plan would entail.

It would not, Majkut notes, “entirely fix underinvestment in scientific research” nor “eliminate the cost premium and limited selection facing prospective buyers of electric vehicles.” But, he argues, it is a valuable first step that would still meaningfully contribute to working against climate change.

Corporate decarbonization can only come from regulatory predictability, and “regulatory predictability and market certainty come from a carbon price, not from continually changing command-and-control measures,” Majkut writes. It’s a plan that has support from stakeholders in the fossil fuels industry, including energy companies like ExxonMobil and BP, as well as automakers like General Motors and Ford.

The support by the energy sector for carbon pricing has led to some pushing back against it. According to Bloomberg, the projected $40-50 price for carbon may be too low to actually trigger changes in the marketplace. Bloomberg notes that climate activist groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council argue that carbon pricing would effectively price out coal, but would boost the market for natural gas.

Carbon pricing is a plan that relies on letting market mechanisms sort out the costs of pollution that affect the climate. Unfortunately, implementing it would be tough as it would require our politicians to admit they don’t have all the answers.

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