Month: January 2021

Sixth Circuit Declares Closure of Religious Schools in Toledo Violates Free Exercise Clause

On December 31, the Sixth Circuit decided another COVID-19 free exercise case on the appellate shadow docket. The panel (Kethledge, Bush, Nalbandian) answered the question that the Supreme Court skirted in Danville Christian Academy: can the government shut down religious schools while leaving secular businesses open? The panel said no in Monclova Christian Academy v. Toledo-Lucas County Health Department.

The Toledo-Lucas County Health Department in Ohio shut down “every school in the county—public, private, and more to the point here, parochial . . . to slow the spread of COVID-19.” However, the county allowed many secular businesses to remain open, including “gyms, tanning salons, office buildings, and a large casino.” Nine Christian schools challenged the constitutionality of this measure. The District Court found that the policy “was a neutral law of general application, as defined by the Supreme Court’s precedents.” The Sixth Circuit reversed, and granted an injunction pending appeal. This post will be a tad long, as the panel raises a number of important issues that are not fully developed.

As a threshold matter, the panel considered whether the order was “of general application.” The court stated, “A rule of general application, in this sense, is one that restricts religious conduct the same way that ‘analogous non-religious conduct'” is restricted.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546. The reference to “analogous non-religious conduct” from Lukumi does not accurately capture the Court’s framework to determine general applicability.

Let’s consider the structure of Lukumi. Part II.A of the opinion concluded that the Hialeah ordinances targeted the Santeria faith. Based on this finding of targeting, Part II.B concluded that the law was not a “requirement of general applicability.” Part III, which begins on page 546, explains that a “law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.” Next, the court reviewed the ordinances with strict scrutiny. The strict scrutiny analysis in Part III began by discussing narrow tailoring. Here, the Court found that “all four ordinances are overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects.” Specifically, “[t]he proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous non-religious conduct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree.” (Here is the key language the Sixth Circuit panel cited). Justice Kennedy concluded, “the absence of narrow tailoring suffices to establish the invalidity of the ordinances.”

The Sixth Circuit panel plucked the phrase “analogous non-religious conduct” from the strict scrutiny analysis, and used it to determine whether strict scrutiny was warranted in the first place. The panel put the cart before the horse. The question of narrow tailoring becomes relevant only after the Court determines that the law is not one of general applicability. But the Sixth Circuit used the narrow tailoring analysis to find the law was not one of general applicability. Now Part II-B of Lukumi, which considered whether the ordinances were generally applicable, did consider underinlusivenes and overinclusiveness. Yet, that section lacked the magic words “analogous non-religious conduct.”

In any event, I think this citation was in error, and fails to account for the structure of Lukumi. Like with NFIB v. Sebelius, Supreme Court decisions must be read from top to bottom. It is risky to quote language from later in the opinion to support positions established earlier.

The Sixth Circuit finds further support for its position in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion from Roman Catholic Diocese. The panel explains, “the Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee better treatment for religious actors than for secular ones; instead, the Clause ‘prohibits government officials from treating religious exercises worse than comparable secular activities[.]'” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 69 (2020) (Gorsuch, J. concurring). Now, Justice Gorsuch cited the same page from Lukumi that the panel cited. Gorsuch’s citation is more defensible, because he collapsed the entire Free Exercise inquiry into a single sentence. He didn’t look to that page of Lukumi to determine whether the law was itself one of general applicability.

I realize I am splitting hairs here. But I jumped when I saw how the panel used the “analogous non-religious conduct” phrase from Lukumi. I’ve read and reread Smith and Lukumi more times than I can count over the past eleventh months. I have desperately tried to find any hints about how the comparator approach fits into the test of general applicability. And I never factored that language into the general applicability framework. I am in the process of revising my Harvard JLPP piece, and I am trying to track down the origins of the “comparator” approach as a way to determine whether a law was generally applicable. I’ve read and re-read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lukumi, and it is not there. Indeed, Lukumi declined to “define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application.” As best as I can tell, judges began to intuit this framework in the early days of the COVID litigation. Alas, the Sixth Circuit tried to fit that intuition in language that cannot support it.

So far, I have been critical of the panel. The remainder of the opinion, however, is worthy of praise. It attempts, with admirable clarity, to explain how the comparator approach should be used. Indeed, the panel approaches the issue in much the same way I had been thinking about this question in recent weeks.

First, the panel explains that assessing “[w]hether conduct is analogous (or ‘comparable’) for purposes of this rule does not depend on whether the religious and secular conduct involve similar forms of activity.” I agree, emphatically. So many courts have crudely analogized churches to concerts because people are sitting around and singing in both places. That comparison is inapt. Instead, the courts must compare the risks that houses of worship pose to the risks that other secular businesses pose. You compare the risks from the activities, not the activities themselves.

The Sixth Circuit explains, “comparability is measured against the interests the State offers in support of its restrictions on conduct.” Here, the panel accurately quotes from Lukumi. In that case, the city asserted “two interests: protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals.” Justice Kennedy found that Hialeah’s ordinances were “underinclusive” because “they fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.” The Sixth Circuit panel explains that “comparability depends on whether the secular conduct ‘endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than’ the religious conduct does.” In the context of the pandemic, courts would ask whether a casino, for example, “endangers” public safety “in a similar or greater degree than” does a church.

Second, the panel cites Roman Catholic Diocese to support its analysis: “In Cuomo, for example, the Court said that activities at ‘acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages,’ and retail stores were comparable to ‘attendance at houses of worship’—precisely because that secular conduct presented a ‘more serious health risk’ than the religious conduct did. 141 S. Ct. at 66-67. This citation presents some difficulties. I am generally skeptical of citations that pluck quotes from different paragraphs stretched over two pages. My skepticism was warranted here. This citation include three separate quoted sections. The first two quotations are from the same paragraph. The Court said that there was “disparate treatment” between “essential” businesses like “acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages” and “attendance at house of worship.” But that paragraph did not discuss the comparative health risks. At that juncture, the Court had not yet determined whether the law was generally applicable. Indeed, the per curiam opinion, much to my consternation, did not really explain why the law was not generally applicable.

Later in the opinion, the Court found that the rule was not generally applicable. And then the Court begins its strict scrutiny analysis. At that point, the Court included the other quoted language: “more serious health risk.” Here, the Court was considering whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored. The opinion stated, “It is hard to believe that admitting more than 10 people to a 1,000–seat church or 400–seat synagogue would create a more serious health risk than the many other activities that the State allows.”

In short, the Court did not factor in the comparative health risks into the general applicability analysis. The Court considered the comparative health risks as part of the strict scrutiny narrow tailoring analysis. Ultimately, I think the Sixth Circuit was correct to incorporate the comparative health risks analysis. But to remain consistent with Smith and Lukumi, these steps need to be separated.

Third, the panel quotes further from Diocese: “Mitigation of that risk, of course, was the State’s asserted interest in support of its restrictions on attendance at religious services; the State did not extend those restrictions to comparable secular conduct; and thus, the Court held, ‘the challenged restrictions’ were not ‘of ‘general applicability[.]” Diocese at 67 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546). Here, the Supreme Court concluded that the New York orders were not generally applicable. From here on out, the Court reviewed the order with strict scrutiny.

I think the panel made the same mistake in two contexts. It quoted language from the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny analysis from Lukumi and Diocese in order to determine whether the Toledo law was generally applicable. I hope other judges can take notice of the errors in this opinion. I would much rather clear things up here, then let Justice Kagan tear apart a fragile, majority opinion.

Fourth, the panel found that the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision in Danville Christian Academy, Inc. v. Beshear did not decide “whether an order closing public and parochial schools violates the Clause if it leaves other comparable secular actors less restricted than the closed parochial schools.” And, the Supreme Court punted on this issue based on the timing of Governor Beshear’s order. Therefore, the panel would “consider the broader question presented here.” And what was that question: “whether we may consider only the secular actors (namely, other schools) regulated by the specific provision here in determining whether the plaintiffs’ schools are treated less favorably than comparable secular actors are.”

Fifth, the panel found “no support for that proposition in the relevant Supreme Court caselaw.” The panel continues: “the issue as to neutrality there was whether the City had targeted the plaintiff’s practice of ritual animal sacrifice; but a similarly broad inquiry could just as easily reveal disparate treatment of religious and secular conduct for purposes of the ‘general application’ inquiry.” Here, the panel–I think–acknowledges that Lukumi does not speak directly to this issue. To be frank, I don’t fully understand this sentence. I’ve read it several times, and it still eludes me. The panel was trying to do too much in a single sentence, and failed to show its work. There are missing steps here that are unexplained.

Next, the panel stated. “And the Court’s test for identifying comparable secular conduct for purposes of that inquiry routinely identifies as comparable, as shown above, activities that are in other ways very different—attendance at church services and patronizing ‘acupuncture facilities[,]’ for example. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. at 66-67.” Routinely? I don’t think the Court has ever had to make this sort of decision before. And I’m not even convinced a per curiam shadow docket ruling is precedential.

Sixth, the panel addresses what I have started to call the “denominator” question. What exactly can you compare the burdened religious activity to? As a threshold matter, the courts cannot consider the restriction on worship in isolation. “A myopic focus solely on the provision that regulates religious conduct would thus allow for easy evasion of the Free Exercise guarantee of equal treatment.” Rather, the panel says, the courts should review “state law as a whole.” (This approach reminds me of Justice Brandeis’s “parcel as a whole” analysis from Penn Coal.) Specifically, the “relevant inquiry should therefore simply be whether the ‘government, in pursuit of legitimate interests,’ has imposed greater burdens on religious conduct than on analogous secular conduct. Lukumi at 543. Again, I don’t think that test follows from Lukumi, but I agree as a matter of first principles.

Seventh, the panel finally determines that the county’s restrictions are not generally applicable. The panel observes, “In Lucas County, the plaintiffs’ schools are closed, while gyms, tanning salons, office buildings, and the Hollywood Casino remain open.” And, the panel states, “Cuomo makes clear that those secular facilities are ‘comparable’ for purposes of spreading COVID-19.” Again, I don’t think Roman Catholic Diocese adopted this reasoning. But this reasoning flows from the Court’s decision.

Eighth, the panel concludes that the order must be reviewed with strict scrutiny. And the government “does not argue that its action can survive that scrutiny.” And the panel states, without any analysis “Nor do we see any reason why it would.” In the end the court grants a preliminary injunction.

***

There is much to praise about this opinion. The panel attempts to explain how to perform the Diocese comparator approach. Yet, the panel does not recognize that the Supreme Court’s precedents do not provide an answer. I see this decision as a natural outgrowth of Diocese. And I hope the Supreme Court follows this lead.

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Sixth Circuit Declares Closure of Religious Schools in Toledo Violates Free Exercise Clause

On December 31, the Sixth Circuit decided another COVID-19 free exercise case on the appellate shadow docket. The panel (Kethledge, Bush, Nalbandian) answered the question that the Supreme Court skirted in Danville Christian Academy: can the government shut down religious schools while leaving secular businesses open? The panel said no in Monclova Christian Academy v. Toledo-Lucas County Health Department.

The Toledo-Lucas County Health Department in Ohio shut down “every school in the county—public, private, and more to the point here, parochial . . . to slow the spread of COVID-19.” However, the county allowed many secular businesses to remain open, including “gyms, tanning salons, office buildings, and a large casino.” Nine Christian schools challenged the constitutionality of this measure. The District Court found that the policy “was a neutral law of general application, as defined by the Supreme Court’s precedents.” The Sixth Circuit reversed, and granted an injunction pending appeal. This post will be a tad long, as the panel raises a number of important issues that are not fully developed.

As a threshold matter, the panel considered whether the order was “of general application.” The court stated, “A rule of general application, in this sense, is one that restricts religious conduct the same way that ‘analogous non-religious conduct'” is restricted.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546. The reference to “analogous non-religious conduct” from Lukumi does not accurately capture the Court’s framework to determine general applicability.

Let’s consider the structure of Lukumi. Part II.A of the opinion concluded that the Hialeah ordinances targeted the Santeria faith. Based on this finding of targeting, Part II.B concluded that the law was not a “requirement of general applicability.” Part III, which begins on page 546, explains that a “law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.” Next, the court reviewed the ordinances with strict scrutiny. The strict scrutiny analysis in Part III began by discussing narrow tailoring. Here, the Court found that “all four ordinances are overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects.” Specifically, “[t]he proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous non-religious conduct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree.” (Here is the key language the Sixth Circuit panel cited). Justice Kennedy concluded, “the absence of narrow tailoring suffices to establish the invalidity of the ordinances.”

The Sixth Circuit panel plucked the phrase “analogous non-religious conduct” from the strict scrutiny analysis, and used it to determine whether strict scrutiny was warranted in the first place. The panel put the cart before the horse. The question of narrow tailoring becomes relevant only after the Court determines that the law is not one of general applicability. But the Sixth Circuit used the narrow tailoring analysis to find the law was not one of general applicability. Now Part II-B of Lukumi, which considered whether the ordinances were generally applicable, did consider underinlusivenes and overinclusiveness. Yet, that section lacked the magic words “analogous non-religious conduct.”

In any event, I think this citation was in error, and fails to account for the structure of Lukumi. Like with NFIB v. Sebelius, Supreme Court decisions must be read from top to bottom. It is risky to quote language from later in the opinion to support positions established earlier.

The Sixth Circuit finds further support for its position in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion from Roman Catholic Diocese. The panel explains, “the Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee better treatment for religious actors than for secular ones; instead, the Clause ‘prohibits government officials from treating religious exercises worse than comparable secular activities[.]'” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 69 (2020) (Gorsuch, J. concurring). Now, Justice Gorsuch cited the same page from Lukumi that the panel cited. Gorsuch’s citation is more defensible, because he collapsed the entire Free Exercise inquiry into a single sentence. He didn’t look to that page of Lukumi to determine whether the law was itself one of general applicability.

I realize I am splitting hairs here. But I jumped when I saw how the panel used the “analogous non-religious conduct” phrase from Lukumi. I’ve read and reread Smith and Lukumi more times than I can count over the past eleventh months. I have desperately tried to find any hints about how the comparator approach fits into the test of general applicability. And I never factored that language into the general applicability framework. I am in the process of revising my Harvard JLPP piece, and I am trying to track down the origins of the “comparator” approach as a way to determine whether a law was generally applicable. I’ve read and re-read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lukumi, and it is not there. Indeed, Lukumi declined to “define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application.” As best as I can tell, judges began to intuit this framework in the early days of the COVID litigation. Alas, the Sixth Circuit tried to fit that intuition in language that cannot support it.

So far, I have been critical of the panel. The remainder of the opinion, however, is worthy of praise. It attempts, with admirable clarity, to explain how the comparator approach should be used. Indeed, the panel approaches the issue in much the same way I had been thinking about this question in recent weeks.

First, the panel explains that assessing “[w]hether conduct is analogous (or ‘comparable’) for purposes of this rule does not depend on whether the religious and secular conduct involve similar forms of activity.” I agree, emphatically. So many courts have crudely analogized churches to concerts because people are sitting around and singing in both places. That comparison is inapt. Instead, the courts must compare the risks that houses of worship pose to the risks that other secular businesses pose. You compare the risks from the activities, not the activities themselves.

The Sixth Circuit explains, “comparability is measured against the interests the State offers in support of its restrictions on conduct.” Here, the panel accurately quotes from Lukumi. In that case, the city asserted “two interests: protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals.” Justice Kennedy found that Hialeah’s ordinances were “underinclusive” because “they fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.” The Sixth Circuit panel explains that “comparability depends on whether the secular conduct ‘endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than’ the religious conduct does.” In the context of the pandemic, courts would ask whether a casino, for example, “endangers” public safety “in a similar or greater degree than” does a church.

Second, the panel cites Roman Catholic Diocese to support its analysis: “In Cuomo, for example, the Court said that activities at ‘acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages,’ and retail stores were comparable to ‘attendance at houses of worship’—precisely because that secular conduct presented a ‘more serious health risk’ than the religious conduct did. 141 S. Ct. at 66-67. This citation presents some difficulties. I am generally skeptical of citations that pluck quotes from different paragraphs stretched over two pages. My skepticism was warranted here. This citation include three separate quoted sections. The first two quotations are from the same paragraph. The Court said that there was “disparate treatment” between “essential” businesses like “acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages” and “attendance at house of worship.” But that paragraph did not discuss the comparative health risks. At that juncture, the Court had not yet determined whether the law was generally applicable. Indeed, the per curiam opinion, much to my consternation, did not really explain why the law was not generally applicable.

Later in the opinion, the Court found that the rule was not generally applicable. And then the Court begins its strict scrutiny analysis. At that point, the Court included the other quoted language: “more serious health risk.” Here, the Court was considering whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored. The opinion stated, “It is hard to believe that admitting more than 10 people to a 1,000–seat church or 400–seat synagogue would create a more serious health risk than the many other activities that the State allows.”

In short, the Court did not factor in the comparative health risks into the general applicability analysis. The Court considered the comparative health risks as part of the strict scrutiny narrow tailoring analysis. Ultimately, I think the Sixth Circuit was correct to incorporate the comparative health risks analysis. But to remain consistent with Smith and Lukumi, these steps need to be separated.

Third, the panel quotes further from Diocese: “Mitigation of that risk, of course, was the State’s asserted interest in support of its restrictions on attendance at religious services; the State did not extend those restrictions to comparable secular conduct; and thus, the Court held, ‘the challenged restrictions’ were not ‘of ‘general applicability[.]” Diocese at 67 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546). Here, the Supreme Court concluded that the New York orders were not generally applicable. From here on out, the Court reviewed the order with strict scrutiny.

I think the panel made the same mistake in two contexts. It quoted language from the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny analysis from Lukumi and Diocese in order to determine whether the Toledo law was generally applicable. I hope other judges can take notice of the errors in this opinion. I would much rather clear things up here, then let Justice Kagan tear apart a fragile, majority opinion.

Fourth, the panel found that the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision in Danville Christian Academy, Inc. v. Beshear did not decide “whether an order closing public and parochial schools violates the Clause if it leaves other comparable secular actors less restricted than the closed parochial schools.” And, the Supreme Court punted on this issue based on the timing of Governor Beshear’s order. Therefore, the panel would “consider the broader question presented here.” And what was that question: “whether we may consider only the secular actors (namely, other schools) regulated by the specific provision here in determining whether the plaintiffs’ schools are treated less favorably than comparable secular actors are.”

Fifth, the panel found “no support for that proposition in the relevant Supreme Court caselaw.” The panel continues: “the issue as to neutrality there was whether the City had targeted the plaintiff’s practice of ritual animal sacrifice; but a similarly broad inquiry could just as easily reveal disparate treatment of religious and secular conduct for purposes of the ‘general application’ inquiry.” Here, the panel–I think–acknowledges that Lukumi does not speak directly to this issue. To be frank, I don’t fully understand this sentence. I’ve read it several times, and it still eludes me. The panel was trying to do too much in a single sentence, and failed to show its work. There are missing steps here that are unexplained.

Next, the panel stated. “And the Court’s test for identifying comparable secular conduct for purposes of that inquiry routinely identifies as comparable, as shown above, activities that are in other ways very different—attendance at church services and patronizing ‘acupuncture facilities[,]’ for example. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. at 66-67.” Routinely? I don’t think the Court has ever had to make this sort of decision before. And I’m not even convinced a per curiam shadow docket ruling is precedential.

Sixth, the panel addresses what I have started to call the “denominator” question. What exactly can you compare the burdened religious activity to? As a threshold matter, the courts cannot consider the restriction on worship in isolation. “A myopic focus solely on the provision that regulates religious conduct would thus allow for easy evasion of the Free Exercise guarantee of equal treatment.” Rather, the panel says, the courts should review “state law as a whole.” (This approach reminds me of Justice Brandeis’s “parcel as a whole” analysis from Penn Coal.) Specifically, the “relevant inquiry should therefore simply be whether the ‘government, in pursuit of legitimate interests,’ has imposed greater burdens on religious conduct than on analogous secular conduct. Lukumi at 543. Again, I don’t think that test follows from Lukumi, but I agree as a matter of first principles.

Seventh, the panel finally determines that the county’s restrictions are not generally applicable. The panel observes, “In Lucas County, the plaintiffs’ schools are closed, while gyms, tanning salons, office buildings, and the Hollywood Casino remain open.” And, the panel states, “Cuomo makes clear that those secular facilities are ‘comparable’ for purposes of spreading COVID-19.” Again, I don’t think Roman Catholic Diocese adopted this reasoning. But this reasoning flows from the Court’s decision.

Eighth, the panel concludes that the order must be reviewed with strict scrutiny. And the government “does not argue that its action can survive that scrutiny.” And the panel states, without any analysis “Nor do we see any reason why it would.” In the end the court grants a preliminary injunction.

***

There is much to praise about this opinion. The panel attempts to explain how to perform the Diocese comparator approach. Yet, the panel does not recognize that the Supreme Court’s precedents do not provide an answer. I see this decision as a natural outgrowth of Diocese. And I hope the Supreme Court follows this lead.

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How To Make Loans Scarce In Three Words: Cap Interest Rates

How To Make Loans Scarce In Three Words: Cap Interest Rates

Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk,

Here’s a perfect free-market example of what not to do about allegedly high interest rates.

Interest Rate Caps

Reuters reports Peru Passes Law Allowing Central Bank to Cap Interest Rates on Bank Loans.

Peru’s Congress approved on Wednesday a law that will allow policymakers to cap interest rates on loans granted by banks, a controversial measure that has been deeply critiqued by the Andean nation’s government and financial institutions.  

The law empowers the country’s central bank to set maximum and minimum interest rates every six months in order to regulate the loan market, a measure lawmakers said is necessary to protect Peruvians from abusive lending practices.

Loophole

The loophole in the bill is that it “allows” rather than “requires” the Central Bank to cap rates on bank loans.

Regardless, this is a horrible idea.

If the Central Bank or government set rates that are too low, loans will dry up. 

This is similar to Venezuela setting the price of gasoline at 10 cents a gallon. That’s the official price but the supply at that price is zero.

The government set the price of gasoline but it cannot secure the supply. 

The result is a huge black market. 

What About the Fed?

The Fed does not set bank loan rates directly, but it does influence them. 

For example, mortgages loan rates are generally tied to interest rates on 10-year US Treasuries that the Fed does manipulate.

Interest Rate Floors and Subsidies

Unlike the setup in Venezuela, the Fed can indeed provide all the supply of dollars it wants. And as long as borrowers use the money for speculation, housing, and other items that do not show up in official inflation stats, the Fed can get away with it.

Low interest rates helped fuel the stock market bubble and other speculative activities. The result is three major bubbles in 20 years, with allegedly low inflation. 

Few see the current bubble only because it has not popped yet.

These are all good reasons to end the Fed and let the market set rates.

Tyler Durden
Fri, 01/01/2021 – 18:10

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/3pED5dH Tyler Durden

US COVID Cases Top 20MM As California Deaths Hit New Record

US COVID Cases Top 20MM As California Deaths Hit New Record

Summary:

  • US cases top 20MM
  • California sees new death record
  • Russia new cases topped 27K
  • Portugal reports nearly 7K new cases

* * * 

Several US states have been plagued by reporting delays over the holiday, but with California expanding lockdowns around the state, and more cases of B.1.1.7, the mutant strain first discovered in the UK, Joe Biden, Dr. Fauci and others are stepping up their warnings about the worst of the outbreak lying ahead.

With hospitalizations – supposedly the most reliable indicator of the outbreak’s trajectory, according to the COVID Tracking Project – still close to record levels, hospitals in LA County and elsewhere have struggled to accept new patients.

One year after Beijing first notified the WHO about the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 in the central city of Wuhan, the US has just seen its total number of confirmed cases top 20MM.

The 20MM number is almost 2x the 10.3MM tally from India, the second-worst-hit country. New York state’s infections remained high, with 16.5K new cases recorded over the last 24 hours, just below the record set Wednesday, as the positivity rate for NYC climbed toward 10%.

California, meanwhile, saw its fatalities reach a new record. In a single day, the Golden State added 585 new deaths, bringing the total to just under 26K. The state also reported 47.2K new cases, pushing its total to 2.3MM.

The pandemic entered 2021 with no signs of slowing down. Global daily deaths reached record highs this week. Countries from Germany to Japan to South Africa ended 2020 with record daily cases. Turkey, China and Brazil became the latest to report infections of the new, highly transmissible virus strain.

Globally, the tally of confirmed cases neared 84MM, while deaths neared 2MM.

Offering hope that the global pace of vaccinations might pick up in the new year, the WHO announced Friday tthat it has issued its first emergency-use designation for a Covid-19 vaccine, making the Pfizer/BioNtech the first immunization to receive a green light from the Geneva-based body.

Here’s a rundown of more COVID-19 news from overnight:

Italy registered 22,211 virus cases on Friday, from 23,477 the day before. Daily deaths declined too, with 462 fatalities reported, compared with 555 on Thursday.

Portugal reported 6,951 new confirmed cases, below the record of 7,627 announced the previous day, taking the total to 420,629. The number of hospitalized cases fell by 34 to 2,806.

Russia recorded 27,039 new cases of Covid-19 over the past 24 hours, taking the total number to 3.186 million, according to the country’s task force for combating the pandemic.

* * *

Over in Japan, authorities are seeing their stance on emergency measures shift, as Tokyo’s metropolitan government is considering a request to declare a state of emergency. According to reports from Japanese national broadaster NHK, Yasutoshi Nishimura, the minister in charge of Japan’s coronavirus response, said Wednesday that the country could consider an emergency if infections continue at the current rate. This follows several other comments and reports from officials, including a top official in Tokyo about the prospect of pursuing other

Tyler Durden
Fri, 01/01/2021 – 17:45

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1984? Twitter Mob Cancels English Literature

1984? Twitter Mob Cancels English Literature

Authored by Simon Black via SovereignMan.com,

Are you ready for this week’s absurdity? Here’s our Friday roll-up of the most ridiculous stories from around the world that are threats to your liberty, risks to your prosperity… and on occasion, inspiring poetic justice.

San Francisco Drug Overdoses Outpace COVID Deaths

San Francisco is a city that implemented some of the more strict COVID lockdowns in 2020, inside a state that may have been the most draconian in the US.

And while San Francisco has only seen 173 COVID-19 deaths in 2020, the city has watched as 621 people died of drug overdoses.

In 2019 there were 441 San Francisco deaths from drug overdose in San Francisco; so even just the INCREASE in drug overdose deaths from 2019 to 2020 (an increase of 180) is greater than the number of COVID-19 deaths in San Francisco.

This echoes other unintended consequences from lockdown isolation, such as Japan’s spiking suicide rate.

Click here to read the full story.

*  *  *

Twitter Mob Takes Aim at Classic Novels Taught in Schools

Under the hashtag #DisruptTexts, English and Literature teachers across the United States are banding together to censor dangerous classic novels.

For example, a teacher in Lawrence Massachusetts said that the organization #DisruptTexts helped her school district remove Homer’s The Odyssey from the curriculum.

Others have done away with the “slut-shaming” classic, The Scarlet Letter, as well as Shakespeare for his works written “at a time when hate-ridden sentiments prevailed.”

The idea is that anything written too long ago will reflect the bias and prejudice of the past, and fail to properly indoctrinate students into the correct way of thinking, according to the woke Twitter mobsters.

Instead the organization has partnered with Penguin Publishing to suggest teachers use titles such as Antiracist Baby a “picture book that empowers parents and children to uproot racism in our society and in ourselves… to help readers recognize and reflect on bias in their daily lives.”

Click here if you want to see the #DisruptTexts website for yourself.

*  *  *

High School Student Sues Over Woke Curriculum

A high school student from Nevada, William Clark, has filed suit against his high school for forcing its woke curriculum on him.

Clark has a white father and black mother; his father is deceased and he is growing up in a predominantly black household with two black siblings.

But given that he has a white biological father, Clark is “regarded by his peers as white”. And that’s enough for him to be guilty.

According to the lawsuit, Clark’s high school is forcing him to “unlearn the basic Judeo-Christian principles” from his upbringing.

These values include “the proposition that every person is unique and equal before the eyes of God and will be judged by the content of their character rather than the color of their skin.”

But Clark’s public school doesn’t believe in such principles.

To them, whiteness is oppressive. And despite Clark being half black (i.e. just as black as Barack Obama), he is deemed to be an oppressor by school officials.

The lawsuit alleges that school officials deliberately misled parents about the curriculum and did not inform anyone that their children would be indoctrinated into Critical Race Theory and other woke principles.

In one class in particular, a mandatory ‘Sociology of Change’ course required for all students, the teacher greets students in the morning with “Hello my wonderful social justice warriors!”

Students are expected to label and identify themselves based exclusively on gender, race, sexuality, and religion and then determine if your identity is associated with oppression or privilege.

(The study material makes it easy by pre-determining for the students which identities are oppressors, and which are victims.)

Those with oppressor identities would then be forced to submit themselves for ridicule by the rest of the class.

Clark chose not to participate in the exercises. And for his resistance, he received failing grades, which will prevent him from graduating and threaten his college prospects.

Click here to read the full lawsuit.

*  *  *

Sheriff’s Office Makes List of Innocent Kids Susceptible to “fall into a life of crime”

Pasco County Florida thinks it can predict which kids will grow up to be criminals. So it keeps a detailed list of these innocent children.

Factors which land kids on the list include getting bad grades in school, witnessing or being the victim of violence at home, and even “a juvenile’s social network,” which the Sheriff’s office tracks.

Other factors which have landed 420 children on the list of potential criminals include “hanging around in public”.

This is all described in the Sheriff’s office’s own manual, in a section on crime prevention.

Deputies do engage some of the at-risk youth. But the main objective seems to be spying and intelligence gathering to aid in investigations– not to innocently mentor youth.

Click here to read the manual.

*  *  *

UK Bans “Buy One Get One Free”

In the country’s quest to save people from themselves, the United Kingdom will ban “buy one get one free” offers, and other promotions, on unhealthy food items.

The rules which go into effect in April 2022 also forbid restaurants from giving free soda refills, and stop unhealthy items from being featured at the checkout.

The argument is that obesity related illness costs the socialized healthcare system of the UK 6 billion pounds per year.

Therefore the government has the right to dictate health standards to citizens and businesses alike.

Click here to read the full story.

*  *  *

On another note… We think gold could DOUBLE and silver could increase by up to 5 TIMES in the next few years. That’s why we published a new, 50-page long Ultimate Guide on Gold & Silver that you can download here.

Tyler Durden
Fri, 01/01/2021 – 17:20

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“I’m Choosing The Risk Of Getting COVID”: Over Half Of Health Care Workers At California Hospitals Refuse Vaccinations

“I’m Choosing The Risk Of Getting COVID”: Over Half Of Health Care Workers At California Hospitals Refuse Vaccinations

California’s health workers are refusing to take the new COVID-19 vaccines – with over half of frontline workers at one hospital unwilling to take it, and between 20% and 50% of workers at other facilities who feel the same, according to the Los Angeles Times.

New York nurse Sandra Lindsay becomes the first person in the US to become vaccinated

At St. Elizabeth Community Hospital in Tehama County, fewer than half of the 700 hospital workers eligible for the vaccine were willing to take the shot when it was first offered. At Providence Holy Cross Medical Center in Mission Hills, one in five frontline nurses and doctors have declined the shot. Roughly 20% to 40% of L.A. County’s frontline workers who were offered the vaccine did the same, according to county public health officials.

So many frontline workers in Riverside County have refused the vaccine — an estimated 50% — that hospital and public officials met to strategize how best to distribute the unused doses, Public Health Director Kim Saruwatari said. -LA Times

Yet, as the Times notes, vaccine doubts among healthcare workers have come as a surprise to researchers, ‘who assumed hospital staff would be among those most in tune with the scientific data backing the vaccines.’

Perhaps they were spooked by a viral video of a Tennessee nurse passing out on camera roughly 10 minutes after receiving her first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine – which she says was due to an ‘over-reactive vagal response’ and not related to the jab.

“I’m choosing the risk — the risk of having COVID, or the risk of the unknown of the vaccine,” said 31-year-old nurse April Lu of the Providence Holy Cross Medical Center in Los Angeles, who added that she refused to take the vaccine because she wasn’t convinced of its safety for pregnant woman. Lu is six months pregnant.

“I think I’m choosing the risk of COVID. I can control that and prevent it a little by wearing masks, although not 100% for sure,” she added. Lu isn’t alone, with several of her co-workers similarly refusing to take the vaccine.

“I feel people think, ‘I can still make it until this ends without getting the vaccine,’” she said.

The extent to which healthcare workers are refusing the vaccine is unclear, but reports of lower-than-expected participation rates are emerging around the country, raising concerns for epidemiologists who say the public health implications could be disastrous.

A recent survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that 29% of healthcare workers were “vaccine hesitant,” a figure slightly higher than the percentage of the general population, 27%.

“Even the name, Operation Warp Speed, draws some concern for people about the rush to push it through,” said Dr. Medell Briggs-Malonson, an emergency medicine physician at UCLA Health who has received the vaccine. Still, she urged her colleagues to do the same. -LA Times

Another healthcare worker, office assistant Nicholas Ruiz at Natividad Medical Center in Salinas, California says that while he interacts with nurses who deal with COVID-19 patients, he’s not taking the vaccine either.

“I feel like the perception of the public with healthcare workers is incorrect. They might think we’re all informed of all of this. They might think that because we work in this environment,” said Ruiz, adding “But I know there’s a lot of people that have the same mentality as the public where they’re still afraid of getting it.”

To try and convince health workers to take the jab, several hospitals are now showing employees instructional videos and interactive webinars showing staff happily getting vaccinated.

At Laguna Hospital and San Francisco, around 10% of the nursing staff have opted out of the vaccine. Meanwhile, UCLA health reports 7,300 personnel out of 37,000 had received it – with officials noting that “there may be vaccine hesitancy in our workforce.”

“We are not asking personnel to decide immediately whether to receive the vaccine. We want to give those offered vaccines adequate time to make a decision, and we hope that personnel will continue to understand that the benefits of vaccination clearly outweigh the risks,” the hospital said in a statement.

Read the rest of the report here.

Travis
Fri, 01/01/2021 – 16:55

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Congress Overrides Trump Veto of Defense Bill that Includes Tight Constraints on Use of “Emergency” Powers to Divert Military Construction Funds to the Border Wall and Other Projects

Border Wall 2

Earlier today, the Senate overwhelmingly voted to override President Trump’s veto of the National Defense Authorization Act, thus handing Trump the first veto override of of his term. Section 2801 of the Act  limits the president’s ability to use “emergency” declarations to divert military construction funds to no more than $100 million per year for construction within the United States. This largely closes the loophole Trump tried to use to fund parts of his border wall project, using an emergency declaration he issued in 2019, thereby laying claim to some $3.6 billion.

In my view, this part of Trump’s border wall funding diversion was already illegal for reasons described in a recent Ninth Circuit decision ruling against the administration on this issue. I also wrote about these issues here. The new NDAA doesn’t affect the ongoing litigation over Trump’s previous diversion of funds, because it only applies to newly appropriated funds, not those Trump has laid claim to from the previous NDAA. In addition, much of the funding Trump has tried to use does not rely on his emergency declaration, but rather on dubious manipulation of Section 8005 the 2019 NDAA. Lower courts have ruled against Trump on that diversion, as well, but the case is currently before the Supreme Court (though the litigation might not continue of President-elect Biden keeps his promise to immediately terminate the funding diversions and associated wall construction). Section 1001 of  the new NDAA  does, unfortunately, include language similar to that of Section 8005 in the 2019 one.

As a practical matter, this limitation in the new NDAA probaby won’t have much, if any, effect on Trump’s border wall project, because Biden is likely to terminate it soon, anyway. But it will make it harder for Biden—or another future president—to usurp Congress’ spending power and use “emergency” declarations to convert the military construction budget into a piggy bank for his personal pet projects.

More needs to be done to curb presidential abuse of “emergency” declarations, and usurpation of the spending power. Both have been serious problems under Trump, who declared a dubious emergency at the border in order to secure funding Congress had denied for his wall, repeatedly tried to circumvent Congress’ power of the purse for such purposes as attacking sanctuary cities and pressuring Ukraine to launch an investigation of Joe Biden and his son. It would be naive to imagine that future presidents won’t engage in similar shenanigans, if the opportunity arises. But though it is not a complete solution to these problems, Section 2801 of the new NDAA is at least a step in the right direction.

Obviously, the NDAA includes many other provisions. As with any large spending bill, there are many that I am not a fan of. But I’m still happy Congress overruled Trump’s veto, because his proposed changes—adding a repeal of Section 230 protection for website providers and subtracting a provision changing the names of military bases named after Confederate generals—would have made the bill worse, not better.

Section 230 repeal (an idea backed by many on both left and right) is a terrible idea for reasons well-summarized by Hannah Cox here. Eliminating monuments (and base names) honoring Confederate leaders is desirable for reasons I outlined here and here. It especially makes no sense for the US military to have major bases named after men who fought to break up the US for the profoundly evil purpose of perpetuating slavery.

That said, perhaps the soon-to-be renamed Fort Bragg should still includ some sort of commemoration General Braxton Bragg, widely considered to be one of the worst generals of the Civil War. His incompetence made a major contribution to Union cause! He did more to bring about Union victory in the West than any other general on either side, with the possible exceptions of Grant and Sherman. That, arguably, deserves some recognition.

 

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Adopting A Gold Standard Would Promote Fiscal Discipline

Adopting A Gold Standard Would Promote Fiscal Discipline

Authored by James Caton via The American Institute for Economic Research,

Many are surprised to learn that famed central banker Alan Greenspan has been a longtime supporter of the gold standard. But the record is clear. Greenspan published an essay in support of a gold standard with unregulated banking titled “Gold and Economic Freedom” in July 1966. He remained an advocate of the gold standard at the time of his appointment as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1987. And he has continued to wax about the gold standard in the time since leaving the Fed. 

Among other things, Greenspan recognizes that the gold standard constrains government spending – and borrowing.

Much such infrastructure would have to be funded with government debt. We are already in danger of seeing the ratio of federal debt to GDP edging toward triple digits. We would never have reached this position of extreme indebtedness were we on the gold standard, because the gold standard is a way of ensuring that fiscal policy never gets out of line.

By now, the level of indebtedness has exceeded the value of U.S. GDP by an additional 35 percent. And the annual budget does not appear to be on course to reverse this trend any time soon. Under a commodity standard, like the gold standard, maintaining this risky position would be difficult, if not impossible, for the federal government.

Unlike Greenspan, most economists today see the gold standard as an arcane relic. But what if Greenspan is correct? Is it possible to regain the advantages of a gold standard today?

The Modern Monetary System and Fiscal Discipline

As Greenspan explains in his ’66 essay, government borrowing is backed “only by the government’s promise to pay out future tax revenues.” The gold standard limited the extent to which a government can borrow because gold, unlike fiat money, cannot be printed. Governments are chastened for largess. Under a gold standard, money printing intended to support government borrowing quickly motivates investors to move gold to countries where it can earn a higher inflation-adjusted return. And the lost gold only returns after investors are compensated for the increased rate of inflation or the rate of inflation falls.

The modern monetary system, on the other hand, has developed in a manner that facilitates state borrowing. I do not mean to accuse any particular person of intentional mischief. I simply note that financial regulation and monetary policy have developed in a manner that increasingly supports fiscal expansion.

Consider the Basel Accords, which have charted the path of international financial regulation in recent decades. The guidelines provided by the Accords allow banks to hold supposedly safe debt – sovereign bonds – in lieu of reserves. Since these bonds typically earn a positive return and, even in the case of negative rates, tend to increase in value during a liquidity crisis, bank demand for sovereign debt has been practically insatiable. And this is only more true in an era where central banks dictate the value of short-term interest rates while also squeezing the yield curve by buying long-term bonds.

Figure 1

Figure 2

As Basel II/III was being implemented, Ben Bernanke radically transformed the Fed’s operating system. To avoid short-run inflation and expectation of it by investors, Bernanke preferred to increase the quantity of reserves in the system while simultaneously paying banks risk-free interest not to lend those reserves. The alternative for a central bank would be to choose the level of reserves circulating within the financial system while allowing the competitive market to determine the rate of interest. 

In this era of unprecedented control, the central bank has supported a massive expansion of federal borrowing. Since the Federal Reserve now sets the short-term rate, it can maintain historically low interest rates that support large fiscal deficits. Jerome Powell, the current chair, has even advocated for increases in federal spending in a wish to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. 

This system of monetary control suffers from massive tail risk. The value of the dollar depends upon the expectation that the government can repay its debts in the future. As Greenspan pointed out, the ability of a government to borrow depends on its convincing investors that the government will receive future taxes sufficient to repay the debt. With historically low rates set by the Federal Reserve, there is essentially no constraint on government spending except for the threat of default.

Gold and Fiscal Discipline

In light of the current fiscal position of the United States, there is a smattering of irony around the widespread disapproval of a gold standard among economists and policymakers. Perhaps more ironic, the gold standard failed not due to its natural functioning but due to an attempt by policymakers to circumvent the natural functioning of the gold standard so as to avoid the consequence of money printing in Great Britain during World War I. Such was the premise of the gold exchange standard where European central banks agreed – half-heartedly – to treat British pounds on par with their legal defined gold equivalent.

The system collapsed because it was politically unpopular. Those directing policy were unwilling to cooperate in a system that they felt did not benefit them. France withdrew its gold from England starting in 1927 and the system became inoperable. Growing demand for gold reserves by central banks led to plummeting asset prices and chaos in financial markets. The gold standard didn’t fail because of the nature of a commodity standard, but rather, due to a failed intervention that sought to insulate governments and investors from the effects of Europe’s departure from the gold standard during World War I.

As economist F.A. Hayek recognized in a 1935 interview with The Economist, it is unlikely that the world could return to a gold standard as it had functioned before World War I. To do so would require that major holders of gold reserves would be willing to reduce their holdings, essentially donating to central banks that arrived late to the gold standard. When the international gold standard was established during the 1870s, gold and silver circulated as money. Bank lending depended on holdings of these metals as reserves. To attempt to return to the classical gold standard today would likely face difficulties that would outweigh the benefits.

But actors in the financial system would be happy to treat commodities as money if the cost of doing so was sufficiently low. There is nothing stopping any of us from opening a money market mutual fund account and writing checks or using a debit card linked to the account. Technologically, there is little reason individuals could not hold accounts denominated in a commodity like gold or silver except that they would suffer short-term capital gains taxes, in addition to the cost of accounting, for their regular transactions. Even in a world where the dollar is legal tender, savings accounts could be denominated in gold and gold would, therefore, serve as money. 

We could allow for a de facto gold standard at little cost. And this standard would ensure that investors could discipline government for borrowing excessively. If citizens were allowed to save their income in gold-denominated accounts without extra costs of taxation and financial regulation, disciplining their government would be as easy as changing the form of one’s savings account. 

The lowest cost means of gaining the advantages from gold would be to remove all taxes and regulatory costs that inhibit citizens from treating commodities as money. In the case that citizens could keep their savings in a commodity ETF against which they could write checks or use a debit card, protecting one’s financial position from inflation would be as easy as opening a new account. The financial system would naturally encourage fiscal responsibility and could, perhaps, prevent a fiscal crisis that is growing more likely with every federal budget.

Tyler Durden
Fri, 01/01/2021 – 16:30

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2Ldhsm5 Tyler Durden

Congress Overrides Trump Veto of Defense Bill that Includes Tight Constraints on Use of “Emergency” Powers to Divert Military Construction Funds to the Border Wall and Other Projects

Border Wall 2

Earlier today, the Senate overwhelmingly voted to override President Trump’s veto of the National Defense Authorization Act, thus handing Trump the first veto override of of his term. Section 2801 of the Act  limits the president’s ability to use “emergency” declarations to divert military construction funds to no more than $100 million per year for construction within the United States. This largely closes the loophole Trump tried to use to fund parts of his border wall project, using an emergency declaration he issued in 2019, thereby laying claim to some $3.6 billion.

In my view, this part of Trump’s border wall funding diversion was already illegal for reasons described in a recent Ninth Circuit decision ruling against the administration on this issue. I also wrote about these issues here. The new NDAA doesn’t affect the ongoing litigation over Trump’s previous diversion of funds, because it only applies to newly appropriated funds, not those Trump has laid claim to from the previous NDAA. In addition, much of the funding Trump has tried to use does not rely on his emergency declaration, but rather on dubious manipulation of Section 8005 the 2019 NDAA. Lower courts have ruled against Trump on that diversion, as well, but the case is currently before the Supreme Court (though the litigation might not continue of President-elect Biden keeps his promise to immediately terminate the funding diversions and associated wall construction). Section 1001 of  the new NDAA  does, unfortunately, include language similar to that of Section 8005 in the 2019 one.

As a practical matter, this limitation in the new NDAA probaby won’t have much, if any, effect on Trump’s border wall project, because Biden is likely to terminate it soon, anyway. But it will make it harder for Biden—or another future president—to usurp Congress’ spending power and use “emergency” declarations to convert the military construction budget into a piggy bank for his personal pet projects.

More needs to be done to curb presidential abuse of “emergency” declarations, and usurpation of the spending power. Both have been serious problems under Trump, who declared a dubious emergency at the border in order to secure funding Congress had denied for his wall, repeatedly tried to circumvent Congress’ power of the purse for such purposes as attacking sanctuary cities and pressuring Ukraine to launch an investigation of Joe Biden and his son. It would be naive to imagine that future presidents won’t engage in similar shenanigans, if the opportunity arises. But though it is not a complete solution to these problems, Section 2801 of the new NDAA is at least a step in the right direction.

Obviously, the NDAA includes many other provisions. As with any large spending bill, there are many that I am not a fan of. But I’m still happy Congress overruled Trump’s veto, because his proposed changes—adding a repeal of Section 230 protection for website providers and subtracting a provision changing the names of military bases named after Confederate generals—would have made the bill worse, not better.

Section 230 repeal is a terrible idea for reasons well-summarized by Hannah Cox here. Eliminating monuments (and base names) honoring Confederate leaders is desirable for reasons I outlined here and here. It especially makes no sense for the US military to have major bases named after men who fought to break up the US for the profoundly evil purpose of perpetuating slavery.

That said, perhaps the soon-to-be renamed Fort Bragg should still includ some sort of commemoration General Braxton Bragg, widely considered to be one of the worst generals of the Civil War. His incompetence made a major contribution to Union cause! He did more to bring about Union victory in the West than any other general on either side, with the possible exceptions of Grant and Sherman. That, arguably, deserves some recognition.

 

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Here Are All The Banks That Paid Janet Yellen $7.3 Million In Speaking Fees In The Past 2 Years

Here Are All The Banks That Paid Janet Yellen $7.3 Million In Speaking Fees In The Past 2 Years

When openly bribing a politician, financier or any other power figure is too – how should e put it – illegal, there is a well-known loophole that has been used for decades and decades to circumvent the straight to jail hazard: the old “pay for speeches” shortcut, where otherwise boring, insipid and uninspirational figures who have nothing original or creative to say get paid $50,000, $100,000 or even much more for an hour of their time to “speak.” Of course, even five year olds realize that this arrangement, despite what it is called, is just a way to either buy future favors from said “speaker”, or pay them back for previous actions, while making them filthy rich in the process.

It certainly worked with the Clinton Foundation, where the tens of millions spent by foreign US adversaries, especially those in the Middle East, to fund such a “generous” and noble pursuit as a (fully tax-exempt) foundation generated amazing “returns” when Hillary Clinton’s ran the State Department. Of course, it wasn’t just rich petrostates that sought payback for their bribes donations: for all those who couldn’t afford a $5 million check to this Clinton Foundation initiative or that (where miraculously, the foundation kept around 90% of the donations to cover “overhead”), there was always the 2nd tier of influence peddling also known as paying for speeches, and as the following list of Hillary Clinton speeches delivered in the 2013-2015 period clearly shows, many were convinced that Hillary would replace Barack Obama in 2016 and be the next US “president for hire” to special interests and generous lobby groups.

Of course, when it comes to Hillary Clinton, it is hardly a secret that the former first lady would do anything to wave in some “influence cash.” What, however, may come as a surprise is that none other than arguably the most boring speaker of the 21st century, former Fed chair Janet Yellen – and future Secretary of the Treasury – who would send Red Bull stock limit up every time she spoke (or she would, if Red Bull wasn’t a private company) has been raking in millions from – you guessed it – speeches.

Janet Yellen speaks during an event to name President-elect Joe Biden’s economic team in Wilmington; she was probably not paid on this occasion.

According to Yellen’s financial disclosure document, the 74-year-old former Fed chair has raked in a whopping $7.3 million in speaking fees in just the past two years from Wall Street banks and large corporations including Citi, Goldman Sachs, Google, City National Bank, UBS, Citadel, Barclays, Credit Suisse, Salesforce. Did we mention Citadel? We did, but we should mention it again because for some odd reason the high frequency trading firm which was recently busted for frontrunning its own clients (and everyone knows what Citadel has been doing with Robinhood option orderflow) has been Janet Yellen’s biggest customer, paying her over $800,000 (!) for three speeches (in Oct 2019, Dec 2019, and again Oct 2010). And yes, this is the same Citadel where Yellen’s predecessor at the Fed, Ben Bernanke remains a “senior advisor” although how this man, who has never traded one share in his entire life, is advising hedge fund and trading giant like Citadel, remains a mystery. 

What isn’t a mystery is why all these Wall Street firms, on at least 57 occasions, decided to fork over on average $127,310 to listen to Janet Yellen’s confoundingly boring motone: the reason is simple – to buy influence from the one private sector individual that virtually everyone knew would soon return to “public service” under whatever administration followed Trump, and that’s precisely what happened now that Janet Yellen will not only be in charge of the Treasury, but effectively in charge of the Fed too thanks to recent quasi fusion between the two institutions, which was required to launch helicopter money/MMT. That alone explains why Citi almost $1 million listening to Yellen on at least nine occasions in the past two years.

The result: Yellen is now literally in the pocket, and  of virtually every Wall Street investment bank and trading firm.

The full breakdown of Yellen’s bribes speaking fees is shown below. What is also notable is that since March 2020, or around the time covid forced all conferences to be via zoom, Yellen has collected over $1.7 million in zoom appearances, not even “speeches”, on at least 24 occasions since March! 

Here is a full list of all the Wall Street companies that have paid Yellen since the start of 2019.

For those wondering if Yellen actually needs all this money, the answer is of course not: in addition to millions in various financial assets listed, including between $1 and $5 million in a “cash account”, Yellen also has a Stamp Collection worth between $15,001 and $50,000 or more than most Americans are worth. Oh, and Yellen also has some miracle investment in the Vanguard Short Term Bond Index Fund and the Vanguard European Stock Index Fund which has a value of “none” and yet generated over $115,000 in annual income.

As Politico notes, Yellen’s financial disclosure is one of three filed by the Biden team at the end of 2020 “that could become politically problematic with the left wing of the Democratic Party when confirmation hearings begin in January.”

We, however, doubt this will be an issue: with Wall Street now delighted that the person its bribed paid so generously for hours of intelligible and muffled stammering will now be Treasury Secretary, and quite happy to bail all Wall Street firms yet again after the next crash, we are confident that Wall Street – which just happens to be the puppetmaster controlling both the president and Congress – will steamroll all opposition and in a few weeks, Yellen will be signing all newly printed dollar bills until early 2022 of course when all fiat currency will be “printed” digitally by the Fed and distributed directly by the central bank to any and all Americans it deems worthy.

Tyler Durden
Fri, 01/01/2021 – 16:05

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/3rOxMdU Tyler Durden