Med School Professor Removed from Fellowship Director Post, Apparently for Publishing Anti-Affirmative-Action Journal Article

Hans Bader (Liberty Unyielding) reports (though you should read the whole thing):

The University of Pittsburgh has removed a program director at its medical center because he published a scholarly, peer-reviewed white paper discussing the pitfalls of affirmative action for black and Hispanic students. This violated the First Amendment, which protects even harsh criticism of affirmative action. The white paper was gentle in its criticism of racial preferences, merely arguing that lowering admissions standards for minorities can harm their prospect of academic success by putting them in a university they are not prepared to handle. It did not advocate discrimination against any minority group….

To my knowledge, Prof. Wang has not been removed from his faculty position, only from the administrative post; but public universities are generally not allowed to do even that, given the First Amendment, at least absent serious evidence that it would likely materially disrupt the functioning of the university. And if engaging in substantive academic criticism of race-based affirmative action—a matter that is the subject of a longstanding and substantive debate in the country and in universities—is indeed seen as so disruptive, then something is badly wrong with the University of Pittsburgh.

(I should note that a university could rightly insist that its employees follow legally permissible university policies, including race-based affirmative action programs, whether or not they agree with them; and they could ask their employees for assurances that they would indeed follow such policies. But here, as I understand it, Prof. Wang was removed from the post simply for his public criticism of race-based affirmative action, and not for any statement saying that he wouldn’t do his job.)

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The Looming Illegitimate Election of 2020

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It’s common in a democracy to worry that you’ll have to make peace with unpalatable election results. What’s new this year is the possibility that many Americans might refuse to make peace at all. It’s the logical extension of a moment in which the major presidential candidates seem to have been picked for their ability to accurately represent the pathetic conditions of their parties, the partisans of those parties agree on little other than mutual contempt, and the government over which they’re scrapping has become so intrusive and punitive that nobody can afford to lose control.

President Trump raised eyebrows last month when, asked whether he’d accept a loss in the presidential election, he refused to commit. “No, I’m not going to just say yes. I’m not going to say no,” Trump told Fox News’s Chris Wallace.

“I think mail-in voting is going to rig the election,” the president added, in his ongoing effort to cast doubt on the results of remote voting.

It would be nice to be able to treat Trump’s ambivalence about election results as an aberration, but it’s actually a continuation of the attitude he held during the 2016 election that he ultimately won. More importantly, Trump’s maybe-I will, maybe-I-won’t take on swallowing unwelcome election outcomes is shared by much of the American public.

“Our data shows that partisans are quite open to their preferred presidential candidate rejecting the legitimacy of the election if they claim credible evidence of illegal voting or foreign interference,” reports the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, a collaboration of analysts and scholars trying to get a handle on the evolving state of American politics.

“About three in 10 (29 percent) Republicans say it would be appropriate for President Trump to refuse to leave office because he claims that he has credible evidence of illegal voting,” the study group notes. “On the other hand, 57 percent of Democrats say that it would be appropriate for a Democratic candidate to call for a do-over election because they claim to have credible evidence of interference by a foreign government.”

Let’s emphasize the word “claim” in both of those scenarios. As the study group points out, “there is ample historical precedent for candidates to mislead the public about potential election interference in order to rally supporters against an electoral outcome with limited or no evidence.”

It’s also worth noting here that, despite justifiable concern about Trump’s respect for election outcomes and disturbing support among Republicans for him refusing to leave office if he makes claims of illegal voting, this poll finds even weaker respect for election results among Democrats. Not only would a majority favor a “do-over” in case of claims of foreign interference, but “38 percent of Democrats say it would be appropriate for a candidate to call for a do-over if they win the popular vote but lose the Electoral College.” That’s an outcome that is perfectly constitutional and has put several presidents—including the current one—in office.

Also concerning is that just over 20 percent of both Democratic and Republican respondents believe violence is at least somewhat justified if their side loses the election. That’s up from the 5 to 15 percent open to political violence in an earlier study by Nathan Kalmoe and Lilliana Mason, who also participate in the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group.

This all makes horrible sense in the context of a country largely divided into political factions that despise one another. Poll after poll finds that Democrats consider Republicans to be immoral, closed-minded, and racist. Republicans regard Democrats as immoral, unpatriotic, and socialist.

“The level of division and animosity – including negative sentiments among partisans toward the members of the opposing party – has only deepened” since 2016, according to Pew Research.

While partisans of the two major political parties really do agree on less by the year, they also work from distorted conceptions of who their opponents are and what they want. That’s hardly a shocker with many people concentrated in communities dominated by one point of view and intolerant of dissent.

“It’s hard to know exactly what’s going on,” commented Amanda Ripley, Rekha Tenjarla, and Angela Y. He in a 2019 piece for The Atlantic on the geography of partisan prejudice. “But what’s clear is that both sides are becoming more hostile toward one another.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, American participation in politics is now driven less by loyalty to one’s own side than by animosity toward the opposition.

Then again, rallying around your own party is a bit of a challenge when the standard-bearers show evidence of having been selected on a dare. Whatever the reality of their fitness to hold office, the two septuagenarian presidential hopefuls have taken to accusing each other of senility in what Politico calls “the dementia campaign.”

“Biden can’t put two sentences together,” Trump says of Biden. “They wheel him out. He goes up—he repeats—they ask him questions. He reads a teleprompter and then he goes back into his basement.”

“Look, all you gotta do is watch me, and I can hardly wait to compare my cognitive capability to the cognitive capability of the man I’m running against,” Biden shoots back.

It would be less sad if there was anybody in the country who would be the least bit surprised if it turned out that both major candidates are a little wobbly in terms of their mental faculties. And those are the leading contenders for the White House in a country struggling with a pandemic and with the economic devastation wrought by social distancing and especially by mandated limits on economic and other activity.

Those limits, arbitrarily defining “essential” businesses that can remain open and others that must close, restricting travel, imposing quarantines, mandating mask-wearing, and barring cross-border movements reach further into people’s lives than we’ve seen in living memory. Whether motivated by sincere public health concern, panic, or vindictiveness toward disfavored segments of society, they involved exercises of vast and dangerous authority over people’s lives.

They also breed stresses which contribute to the recent eruptions of protest and violence in reaction to decades of abusive, biased, and militarized policing. Those protests have yet to subside, and the issues they address as well as the divisions they represent are sure to play a large role as the election approaches.

And those elections may well be a hot mess. While the president exaggerates the potential for expanded fraud in mail-in elections—most Arizonans have voted by mail for years with little difficulty—learning curves seem to be especially steep for government officials. New York turned its June primary into a contentious train wreck through inexperience in dealing with mailed ballots. That might be an opportunity for Trump to push his claim that “mail-in voting is going to rig the election.”

Or maybe the Democrats will point their fingers, again, at Russia.

Whatever happens, there’s a good chance the election in November won’t resolve very much at all.

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Judge Throws Out Devin Nunes’ Libel Lawsuit Against Ryan Lizza

See Judge C.J. Williams’ opinion today in Nunes v. Lizza (N.D. Iowa), which seems generally correct to me. Lizza’s motion to dismiss was granted in its entirety as to the substance of the case. It was denied in part chiefly to the extent that it sought attorneys’ fees and costs under the California anti-SLAPP statute (the judge concluded that this state statute couldn’t apply in federal court, an important procedural  question on which federal courts are split).

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Ex-Wife Prosecuted for Violating Order That She “Shall Not Post Anything” About Ex-Husband

From Marin County (Cal.) Judge Roy O. Chernus’s decision last week in People v. Velyvis:

[T]he Family Law court granted petitioner John Velyvis’ application for a Family Code § 6218 Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO) against his former wife Melissanne Velyvis (Velyvis or defendant), finding that she “harassed” petitioner in violation of Family Code§ 6320(a) by posting a March 13, 2018 “blog” on WordPress.com, entitled: “Non­Fatal Strangulation Administered by Husband Dr., John H. Velyvis, from Victim to Survivor … The Untold Story 2018.”

Among the prohibitions, the court ordered Velyvis to remove “all social media, blogs and internet” postings regarding petitioner and his children and barred her from making any new social media postings about them[:] …

“The intent of this restraining order is to curtail ongoing posting and communications made by Melissanne Velyvis involving John Velyvis. While recognizing an individual’s freedom of expression, in connection with this dissolution and given the relationship qualifying for a domestic violence restraining order, the court has found the statements to have been made for the purpose of harassing Petitioner, damaging Petitioner’s reputation, interfering with Petitioner’s professional livelihood and damaging Petitioner’s personal relationships. Accordingly:

“Melissanne Velyvis shall remove any postings on social media/biogs/internet regarding Petitioner or his children. This includes direct and indirect postings (Example referring to Petitioner as [‘]former husband/person with fiduciary duty[‘] and then using Melissanne Velyvis as identification of author).

“Melissanne Velyvis shall not post anything on social media, biogs, and internet regarding Petitioner or his children.

“Melissanne Velyvis shall cease and desist from publishing any information concerning Petitioner and his children for the duration of this restraining order. This includes, but is not limited to providing defamatory statements and documents to third parties about Petitioner. Melissanne Velyvis shall refrain from interjection into custody proceedings involving or related to John Velyvis, directly or indirectly, absent a court order.

“Melissanne Velyvis shall remove John Velyvis’ likeness from her own social posting and remove any references indicating they are currently married ….”

Six months later, the Marin County District Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint against Velyvis .alleging one count of Penal Code§ 273.6; i.e., between July 19 to July 25, 2019 Velyvis “willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly” violated the DVPO “issued by Marin County Superior Court case number FL1603174.”

The complaint did not describe the offending activities. Defendant states, without contradiction, that she is charged with violating the “no speech” prohibition….

The court in the criminal case began by noting that, under California law, a criminal defendant who is being prosecuted for violating a court order can raise the unconstitutionality of the order as a defense. California thus rejects the “collateral bar” rule (which is applied in federal court for federal orders), under which the target of an order has to object to it by appealing it, and generally can’t just violate it and defend herself by arguing that the order is unconstitutional.

And the court then went on to conclude that the family court order was indeed unconstitutional (quite correctly, I think, for reasons given in this article):

Defendant asserts the broad language in the DVPO that directs: “Melissanne Velyvis shall not post anything on social media, biogs, and internet regarding Petitioner or his children” and “Melissanne Velyvis shall cease and desist from publishing any information concerning Petitioner and his children for the duration of this restraining order,” constitutes an invalid prior restraint that impermissibly infringes on her free speech rights …. Defendant contends this overbroad language of the DVPO unlawfully prevents her from sharing her life experiences and feelings she attributes to her marriage to petitioner with her family, friends and other adults willing to read her comments and criticisms ….

The People respond by asserting that the restraining order may lawfully limit speech that exhibits a pattern of conduct the court deems “abusive.” As proof of this pattern of abuse, the People rely on evidence presented at the hearing which showed, in addition to posting the blog, … defendant interjected herself into other family law matters involving her ex-husband: she made unsolicited comments to a custody evaluator during the current contested custody hearing involving petitioner and his first ex-wife; and defendant made disparaging remarks about petitioner during his current girlfriend’s divorce proceedings to another man. The People also cite defendant’s plans to file a complaint against petitioner with the California Medical Board….

In California, a court must find that “extraordinary circumstances” exist in order to restrain the defendant’s right to share independently obtained information about another adult with other willing adults. The fact the public sharing of these comments might be humiliating to the targeted adult, or cause emotional distress or even cause harm to the subject’s professional reputation, does not rise to the level of a compelling or extraordinary circumstance.

In In re Marriage of Candiotti (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 718, the court struck down a protective order which permitted the ex-wife’s (Debra) to share negative, independently obtained information about her ex-husband’s new wife during contentious child custody proceedings, only to a specific set of adults and professionals associated with the court proceedings.

The court held that while the state has a compelling interest to restrain Debra from disparaging the new wife to the divorced couple’s children or in the children’s presence, “the order here went further, actually impinging on a parent’s right to speak about another adult, outside the presence of the children. Such an order, under these circumstances, constitutes undue prior restraint of speech. It would prevent Debra from talking privately to her family, friends, coworkers, or perfect strangers about her dissatisfaction with her children’s living situation.”

In reaching this conclusion, the court in Candiotti recognized that the emotional discomfort or harm to reputation that disparaging comments may cause to the targeted adult do not constitute sufficiently compelling reasons to restrain them:

“Thus, while we agree that the court certainly has the power to prevent Debra from undermining Thomas’s parental relationship by alienating the children from Donna, the order here was much more far-reaching, aimed at conduct that might cause others, outside the immediate family, to think ill of Donna. Such remarks by Debra may be rude or unkind. They may be motivated by hostility. To the extent they are libelous, they may be actionable. But they are too attenuated from conduct directly affecting the children to support a prior restraint on Debra’s constitutional right to utter them.”

Likewise, in Gilbert v. National Enquirer, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1135, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting plaintiff actress Gilbert’s ex-husband Brinkman from disclosing any information regarding Gilbert’s drug or alcohol use or sexual relations with other men that Brinkman acquired before, during or after their marriage, to anyone (except as necessary to the current court proceedings).

The court held the preliminary injunction was an invalid prior restraint on Brinkman’s free speech rights and that Gilbert’s claimed emotional distress and reputational damage are not sufficiently compelling reasons to justify the prohibition….

Under circumstances similar to our case, the trial court in Molinaro v. Molinaro, supra, 33 Cal. App. 5th 824 issued a DVPO prohibiting the husband Michael from posting anything about his pending divorce from Bertha on Facebook. Bertha complained that Michael had physically obstructed her from moving out of the couple’s home and had physically intimidated her. At a contested hearing on her application for the DVPO, Bertha complained that Michael was posting everything about the divorce case on Facebook; he gave their children ages 18, 17 and 13 years old, copies of Bertha’s pleadings; he posted on Facebook false statements that Bertha ran away with $250,000 from the couple’s home equity line of credit and that she is crazy and has hallucinations; and she said his behavior was getting worse and she feared for her life and her children’s safety.

The DVPO issued by the court included a stay-away order and ordered Michael not “‘to post anything about the case on Facebook'” and “‘not to discuss the case with the children.'”

On appeal from the DVPO, the appellate court held that the portion of the restraining order barring Michael from “posting anything about the case on Facebook” was unconstitutionally overbroad and impermissibly infringed on his free speech rights. It found that his “posts were not specifically directed to the minor children, but in many cases invited comments from Michael’s adult friends and extended family,” and that most of his posts “expressed his apparent despair about the divorce and his separation from the children.” The court concluded, as did the court in Candiotti, that such comments were “‘too attenuated from conduct directly affecting the children to support a prior restraint on [Michael’s] constitutional right to utter them.'”

Our courts also recognize that a person has a constitutional right to repeat or comment upon public or private information, not previously found by a trial court to be defamatory. “‘The attempt to enjoin the initial distribution of a defamatory matter meets several barriers, the most impervious being the constitutional prohibitions against prior restraints on free speech and press….'” (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1158 [injunction may properly issue after a trial prohibiting the defendant from repeating specific statements found at trial to be defamatory]; accord. Evans, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169 [“[A] court may not constitutionally prevent a person from uttering a ‘defamatory’ statement before it has been determined at trial that the statement was defamatory.”].) There is nothing on the face of the complaint, or in the Family Court judge’s judicially­ noticed fmdings of fact to indicate any of defendant’s communications were previously found to be defamatory.

As stated in the DVPO, the Family Law judge found that defendant’s statements about Dr. Velyvis were intentionally harassing, damaged his reputation and interfered with his personal relationships.

Based on the authorities discussed above, these reasons are insufficient to justify such a broad prohibition. The court finds that the portion of the DVPO restraining defendant from posting on the internet or communicating any information about defendant’s ex-husband or his children is impermissibly overbroad and constitutes an invalid prior restraint under the federal and California constitutions. Violation of this portion of the DVPO, therefore, is not an actionable offense.

I’m particularly pleased to see the use of Molinaro; when that case was first handed down, it was as a nonprecedential opinion, but two groups and I filed letters asking that the First Amendment analysis be published—on the grounds that it would set a precedent that would be useful to future courts—and the Court of Appeal agreed. I’m pleased to see that this case justifies the predictions we had made.

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Judge Throws Out Devin Nunes’ Libel Lawsuit Against Ryan Lizza

See Judge C.J. Williams’ opinion today in Nunes v. Lizza (N.D. Iowa), which seems generally correct to me. Lizza’s motion to dismiss was granted in its entirety as to the substance of the case. It was denied in part chiefly to the extent that it sought attorneys’ fees and costs under the California anti-SLAPP statute (the judge concluded that this state statute couldn’t apply in federal court, an important procedural  question on which federal courts are split).

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Ex-Wife Prosecuted for Violating Order That She “Shall Not Post Anything” About Ex-Husband

From Marin County (Cal.) Judge Roy O. Chernus’s decision last week in People v. Velyvis:

[T]he Family Law court granted petitioner John Velyvis’ application for a Family Code § 6218 Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO) against his former wife Melissanne Velyvis (Velyvis or defendant), finding that she “harassed” petitioner in violation of Family Code§ 6320(a) by posting a March 13, 2018 “blog” on WordPress.com, entitled: “Non­Fatal Strangulation Administered by Husband Dr., John H. Velyvis, from Victim to Survivor … The Untold Story 2018.”

Among the prohibitions, the court ordered Velyvis to remove “all social media, blogs and internet” postings regarding petitioner and his children and barred her from making any new social media postings about them[:] …

“The intent of this restraining order is to curtail ongoing posting and communications made by Melissanne Velyvis involving John Velyvis. While recognizing an individual’s freedom of expression, in connection with this dissolution and given the relationship qualifying for a domestic violence restraining order, the court has found the statements to have been made for the purpose of harassing Petitioner, damaging Petitioner’s reputation, interfering with Petitioner’s professional livelihood and damaging Petitioner’s personal relationships. Accordingly:

“Melissanne Velyvis shall remove any postings on social media/biogs/internet regarding Petitioner or his children. This includes direct and indirect postings (Example referring to Petitioner as [‘]former husband/person with fiduciary duty[‘] and then using Melissanne Velyvis as identification of author).

“Melissanne Velyvis shall not post anything on social media, biogs, and internet regarding Petitioner or his children.

“Melissanne Velyvis shall cease and desist from publishing any information concerning Petitioner and his children for the duration of this restraining order. This includes, but is not limited to providing defamatory statements and documents to third parties about Petitioner. Melissanne Velyvis shall refrain from interjection into custody proceedings involving or related to John Velyvis, directly or indirectly, absent a court order.

“Melissanne Velyvis shall remove John Velyvis’ likeness from her own social posting and remove any references indicating they are currently married ….”

Six months later, the Marin County District Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint against Velyvis .alleging one count of Penal Code§ 273.6; i.e., between July 19 to July 25, 2019 Velyvis “willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly” violated the DVPO “issued by Marin County Superior Court case number FL1603174.”

The complaint did not describe the offending activities. Defendant states, without contradiction, that she is charged with violating the “no speech” prohibition….

The court in the criminal case began by noting that, under California law, a criminal defendant who is being prosecuted for violating a court order can raise the unconstitutionality of the order as a defense. California thus rejects the “collateral bar” rule (which is applied in federal court for federal orders), under which the target of an order has to object to it by appealing it, and generally can’t just violate it and defend herself by arguing that the order is unconstitutional.

And the court then went on to conclude that the family court order was indeed unconstitutional (quite correctly, I think, for reasons given in this article):

Defendant asserts the broad language in the DVPO that directs: “Melissanne Velyvis shall not post anything on social media, biogs, and internet regarding Petitioner or his children” and “Melissanne Velyvis shall cease and desist from publishing any information concerning Petitioner and his children for the duration of this restraining order,” constitutes an invalid prior restraint that impermissibly infringes on her free speech rights …. Defendant contends this overbroad language of the DVPO unlawfully prevents her from sharing her life experiences and feelings she attributes to her marriage to petitioner with her family, friends and other adults willing to read her comments and criticisms ….

The People respond by asserting that the restraining order may lawfully limit speech that exhibits a pattern of conduct the court deems “abusive.” As proof of this pattern of abuse, the People rely on evidence presented at the hearing which showed, in addition to posting the blog, … defendant interjected herself into other family law matters involving her ex-husband: she made unsolicited comments to a custody evaluator during the current contested custody hearing involving petitioner and his first ex-wife; and defendant made disparaging remarks about petitioner during his current girlfriend’s divorce proceedings to another man. The People also cite defendant’s plans to file a complaint against petitioner with the California Medical Board….

In California, a court must find that “extraordinary circumstances” exist in order to restrain the defendant’s right to share independently obtained information about another adult with other willing adults. The fact the public sharing of these comments might be humiliating to the targeted adult, or cause emotional distress or even cause harm to the subject’s professional reputation, does not rise to the level of a compelling or extraordinary circumstance.

In In re Marriage of Candiotti (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 718, the court struck down a protective order which permitted the ex-wife’s (Debra) to share negative, independently obtained information about her ex-husband’s new wife during contentious child custody proceedings, only to a specific set of adults and professionals associated with the court proceedings.

The court held that while the state has a compelling interest to restrain Debra from disparaging the new wife to the divorced couple’s children or in the children’s presence, “the order here went further, actually impinging on a parent’s right to speak about another adult, outside the presence of the children. Such an order, under these circumstances, constitutes undue prior restraint of speech. It would prevent Debra from talking privately to her family, friends, coworkers, or perfect strangers about her dissatisfaction with her children’s living situation.”

In reaching this conclusion, the court in Candiotti recognized that the emotional discomfort or harm to reputation that disparaging comments may cause to the targeted adult do not constitute sufficiently compelling reasons to restrain them:

“Thus, while we agree that the court certainly has the power to prevent Debra from undermining Thomas’s parental relationship by alienating the children from Donna, the order here was much more far-reaching, aimed at conduct that might cause others, outside the immediate family, to think ill of Donna. Such remarks by Debra may be rude or unkind. They may be motivated by hostility. To the extent they are libelous, they may be actionable. But they are too attenuated from conduct directly affecting the children to support a prior restraint on Debra’s constitutional right to utter them.”

Likewise, in Gilbert v. National Enquirer, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1135, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting plaintiff actress Gilbert’s ex-husband Brinkman from disclosing any information regarding Gilbert’s drug or alcohol use or sexual relations with other men that Brinkman acquired before, during or after their marriage, to anyone (except as necessary to the current court proceedings).

The court held the preliminary injunction was an invalid prior restraint on Brinkman’s free speech rights and that Gilbert’s claimed emotional distress and reputational damage are not sufficiently compelling reasons to justify the prohibition….

Under circumstances similar to our case, the trial court in Molinaro v. Molinaro, supra, 33 Cal. App. 5th 824 issued a DVPO prohibiting the husband Michael from posting anything about his pending divorce from Bertha on Facebook. Bertha complained that Michael had physically obstructed her from moving out of the couple’s home and had physically intimidated her. At a contested hearing on her application for the DVPO, Bertha complained that Michael was posting everything about the divorce case on Facebook; he gave their children ages 18, 17 and 13 years old, copies of Bertha’s pleadings; he posted on Facebook false statements that Bertha ran away with $250,000 from the couple’s home equity line of credit and that she is crazy and has hallucinations; and she said his behavior was getting worse and she feared for her life and her children’s safety.

The DVPO issued by the court included a stay-away order and ordered Michael not “‘to post anything about the case on Facebook'” and “‘not to discuss the case with the children.'”

On appeal from the DVPO, the appellate court held that the portion of the restraining order barring Michael from “posting anything about the case on Facebook” was unconstitutionally overbroad and impermissibly infringed on his free speech rights. It found that his “posts were not specifically directed to the minor children, but in many cases invited comments from Michael’s adult friends and extended family,” and that most of his posts “expressed his apparent despair about the divorce and his separation from the children.” The court concluded, as did the court in Candiotti, that such comments were “‘too attenuated from conduct directly affecting the children to support a prior restraint on [Michael’s] constitutional right to utter them.'”

Our courts also recognize that a person has a constitutional right to repeat or comment upon public or private information, not previously found by a trial court to be defamatory. “‘The attempt to enjoin the initial distribution of a defamatory matter meets several barriers, the most impervious being the constitutional prohibitions against prior restraints on free speech and press….'” (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1158 [injunction may properly issue after a trial prohibiting the defendant from repeating specific statements found at trial to be defamatory]; accord. Evans, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169 [“[A] court may not constitutionally prevent a person from uttering a ‘defamatory’ statement before it has been determined at trial that the statement was defamatory.”].) There is nothing on the face of the complaint, or in the Family Court judge’s judicially­ noticed fmdings of fact to indicate any of defendant’s communications were previously found to be defamatory.

As stated in the DVPO, the Family Law judge found that defendant’s statements about Dr. Velyvis were intentionally harassing, damaged his reputation and interfered with his personal relationships.

Based on the authorities discussed above, these reasons are insufficient to justify such a broad prohibition. The court finds that the portion of the DVPO restraining defendant from posting on the internet or communicating any information about defendant’s ex-husband or his children is impermissibly overbroad and constitutes an invalid prior restraint under the federal and California constitutions. Violation of this portion of the DVPO, therefore, is not an actionable offense.

I’m particularly pleased to see the use of Molinaro; when that case was first handed down, it was as a nonprecedential opinion, but two groups and I filed letters asking that the First Amendment analysis be published—on the grounds that it would set a precedent that would be useful to future courts—and the Court of Appeal agreed. I’m pleased to see that this case justifies the predictions we had made.

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Trump Serious About Using Executive Order To Extend Stimulus, Cut Dems Out Of Deal: Fox

Trump Serious About Using Executive Order To Extend Stimulus, Cut Dems Out Of Deal: Fox

Tyler Durden

Wed, 08/05/2020 – 13:27

In classic Trump Administration form, President Trump and his aides are trying to pressure Democrats into caving and supporting the White House’s trillion-dollar stimulus plan that would restore the additional $600 weekly unemployment benefit, by seeking to convince the leadership that they will try to cut them out of the deal entirely.

Yesterday afternoon, Politico reported that team Trump was looking into using an executive order to re-appropriate money already appropriated by Congress and instead redirect it toward restoring the federal money for the unemployed, as well as potentially restoring the federal moratorium on evictions. Last night, Trump told reporters that yes, all of this was true – except that the team was also considering a suspension of payroll taxes, something the president has long insisted upon, despite the fact that there’s almost no support for the proposal in Congress.

Prodded about all of this on Fox & Friends Wednesday morning, Trump again insisted that for all the help he was getting from the Democrats, he “may do it myself.”

“Well, I may do it myself,” Trump said in an interview with Fox & Friends on Wednesday. “I have the right to suspend it, and I may do it myself – I have the absolute right to suspend the payroll.”

And now, with the possibility of an executive order eliciting the typical “he can’t do that!” reaction from the mainstream press, Fox Business correspondent Charlie Gasparino – who we suddenly need to pay attention to again following his reports on TikTok last Friday – has just tweeted that not only is Trump 100% going for it with the executive order strategy (he’s seriously considering an executive order to extend the stimulus bill, but without any involvement from Congress), the president also thinks he can get Microsoft and TikTok to pay the US government as part of a deal.

Of course, every political pundit and constitutional law expert on the “rent-a-quote” rolls believes there’s no way Trump could ever pull off the executive order.

Here’s more from Yahoo Finance:

However, experts say his authority to do so is limited given that the president only can postpone the payment of the tax for workers but not to suspend it.

“Congress has to pass tax laws, not the president,” Seth Hanlon, a tax-policy expert at the Center for American Progress, told Yahoo Money. “He has limited authority to postpone tax filing and payment deadlines, in instances of disasters.”

The tax code allows the president to postpone the payroll tax, though doing so in this case would be “a real stretch of his authority,” according to Hanlon. Such provisions are intended for situations when people can’t file their taxes, like in the case of a natural disaster.

Plus, a cut to the payroll tax wouldn’t benefit employees so much as employers, these experts explained.

Seeing all of this, a joke published a few days ago by the Onion comes to mind.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/3kibHAk Tyler Durden

NYC Crime Spike Hits Ultra-Wealthy Neighborhood

NYC Crime Spike Hits Ultra-Wealthy Neighborhood

Tyler Durden

Wed, 08/05/2020 – 13:10

As gun violence and murders spiral out of control in New York City amid BLM riots and the decision to disband the NYPD’s plainclothes anti-crime units, the city’s crime spree has reached the Upper East Side – home to billionaires and mere multi-millionaires alike.

According to Fox News, the 19th Precinct – which oversees the Upper East Side between East 59th Street and East 96th Street – is “one of the most densely populated residential areas in Manhattan.”

And now, it appears The Purge has encroached on the upscale neighborhood – with robberies soaring 286% vs. the same period last year with 27 robberies – 20% of which were at gunpoint.

Three gunpoint robberies were reported over a one-hour period just last weekend – a group of four people struck on East 73rd Street, then downtown at East 65th Street before moving uptown to East 86th Street, police said. –Fox News

YTD the 19th Precinct had seen 14 robberies at gunpoint vs. just four in 2019.

According to Fox, a group of four teenagers hit several victims in the span of an hour on Saturday evening – with the first incident occurring at approximately 9:30 p.m. when the four approached a 45-year-old man near East 73rd Street and York Avenue, flashed a gun and robbed him of his cell phone before running away.

Approximately 40 minutes later the four robbed an 18-year-old man of his wallet approximately one mile, or 11 blocks, from the first victim in the area of East 65th Street and Lexington Avenue.

Minutes later, at 10:20 p.m., they struck again – this time accosting a man and a woman, both 22-years-old, who said they were robbed at gunpoint in the Central Park footpath near East 84th Street and Fifth Avenue. The woman’s cellphone was taken.

Three of the teenagers – two 16 and one 17-years-old, were arrested in connection with the spree and charged with first-degree robbery. A loaded gun was recovered from one of the suspects.

According to Fox News, billionaires John Paulson and Glenn Dubin “live just blocks, if not a block, from the East 84th Street robbery.”

Glenn Dubin, co-founder of Highbridge Capital Management LLC,  in New York, U.S., on Sept. 24, 2013. (Michael Nagle/Bloomberg via Getty Images)

Paulson, worth an estimated $4.2 billion, according to Forbes, founded hedge fund company Paulson & Co in the mid-90s. He is known for making his fortune betting against subprime mortgages as the American economy headed toward collapse in 2007.

Dubin, 63, co-founded Highbridge Capital Management in 1992 before selling to JP Morgan Chase 12 years later, according to Forbes, which reported that the hedge funder boasts an estimated net worth of $2 billion.

According to The Real Deal, Dubin coughed up $32 million in 2006 to buy a Fifth Avenue apartment previously owned by fellow billionaire David Koch. –Fox News

The 10pm Saturday robbery near East 65th Street and Lexington happened just one block from the home of Henry Kravis, a financier which Forbes estimates to be worth $6.5 billion.

Businessman Henry R. Kravis arrives for meeting with then-President-elect Donald Trump at Trump Tower in New York, on January 12, 2017. (REUTERS/Mike Segar)

And as Fox further points out , the spate of robberies happened fewer than 10 blocks from 740 Park Ave, known as the “world’s richest apartment building,” according to a 2006 book by Michael Gross.

Maybe the de Blasio administration will reconsider its actions to weaken law enforcement now that spiking violence is in the backyards of their very best friends.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2DgGo8G Tyler Durden

TikTok And America’s Last-Ditch Desperation For Social Mobility

TikTok And America’s Last-Ditch Desperation For Social Mobility

Tyler Durden

Wed, 08/05/2020 – 12:50

Authored by Charles Hugh Smith via OfTwoMinds blog,

Social media offers hope of achieving higher social status, something that is increasingly out of reach in our winner-take-most economy.

I’ve often addressed the decline of social mobility and the addictive nature of social media, for example, Why Is Social Media So Toxic?

I have long held that the decline of social mobility–broad-based opportunities to get ahead financially and socially–is part of a larger dynamic I call social depression: the social decay resulting from economic stagnation and the decline of social mobility and financial security. America’s Social Depression Is Accelerating.

Japan offers a real-world 30-year lab experiment in the negative social consequences of economic stagnation, a topic I’ve addressed since 2010: The Non-Financial Cost of Stagnation: “Social Recession” and Japan’s “Lost Generations”

The conventional explanation of social media’s addictive hold is that it activates the human brain’s reward circuits much like an addictive drug: in effect, we become addicted to being “liked” and to checking our phones hundreds of times a day to see if we received any “likes”.

FOMO, fear of missing out on some emotion-stimulating “news” or a “like” from someone in our network also feeds the addictiveness.

The innate addictive appeal of social media is pretty clear, but that’s not all that’s at work here. Being social animals, humans naturally seek to identify their status in the pecking order and improve their position by whatever means are available as a way of increasing their reproductive success and their relative share of resources.

Traditional societies were bifurcated into a small elite and a much larger mass of commoners. As a general rule, social mobility was limited to those extraordinary commoners who were especially valuable to the ruling elite as soldiers, scribes, etc.

From its inception in the early 1800s, the American Dream was to acquire the “good life” via mass produced luxury goods via conventional employment or entrepreneurial drive–two avenues available to the masses. This access to the social mobility of higher earnings enabling the purchase of status symbols that boosted one’s social status has been the mainstay of the modern consumer economy.

The downside of mass-produced luxury items (status symbols) is that in a credit-based economy, just about everyone can afford to own them. Thus just about anyone can qualify for a mobile phone plan that offers a status-symbol iPhone as part of the multi-year contract.

As a result, the upper classes have been forced to greater extremes in cost and scarcity to differentiate themselves from the masses. For example, now that exotic travel is a affordable to anyone with credit, travel has little status value, unless it’s extremely costly or difficult to duplicate.

The same is true of the arts and other cultural status markers, along with the traditional markers such as yachts and second (or third) homes.

As the underlying economy has stagnated, access to higher social states via earned income has decayed, and so commoners have been forced to find some other non-financial means to improve their social status.

Social media fits the bill perfectly: it’s essentially free (since everyone has to pay for Internet service anyway) and the only “investment” is in time: time snapping and posting photos on Instagram and Facebook, time posting comments and links designed to attract tribal “likes” and so on.

A commoner with essentially zero social status economically can with enough effort become a “big shot” in some social media platform.

The bar is low enough to attract millions of players: a few dozen “likes” is still a potent reward to most people, as are having a couple hundred followers / readers.

Social media superstars with millions of followers on YouTube have cult-like groupies and all the other social status rewards of recognition and fame.

Social media offers hope of achieving higher online social status without having to succeed financially in a winner-take-most economy or having any of the conventional attributes of becoming famous: physical beauty, extraordinary talent, etc. These attributes are of course helpful in attracting a social media following, but they are not essential.

As a result, everyone wonders “how did so-and-so get hundreds of thousands of followers?” The answer varies, of course: a viral video, a high level of marketing moxie, an engaging style, charismatic presence on camera, a knack for something others admire, etc.

If we understand social media as a new and accessible-to-everyone way to improve our social status, its tremendous grip becomes less of a mystery.

As Jesse explains in our Salon #15 podcast, Toxic Tech Platforms and Disposable Social Media Stars, TikTok’s explosive popularity is the direct result of its ease of access and promise of social mobility. TikTok’s model bypasses the laborious process of gaining social status via collecting masses of followers/friends and offers an instantly accessible version of semi-celebrity via the number of people viewing one’s videos– a semi-celebrity that can be monetized once the numbers get big enough.

Achieving social status through social media is the last-ditch desperation of a society that has lost all other meaningful social mobility ladders. Conventional wages have stagnated for decades and unconventional wages (gig economy, etc.) are generally low and insecure. Credential pathways that once led to secure, high paying, high-status jobs have crumbled; legions of PhDs who were told their years of sacrifice and effort would lead to tenure-track faculty positions or secure positions in government or industry are academic ronin, wandering from temporary position to temporary position, in effect highly credentialed gig-economy workers.

The rungs of the ladder of entrepreneurial drive have decayed as the costs and risks of starting a business have soared, crowding the get-rich-quick hopefuls into the insanely over-crowded casinos of venture-capital funded tech start-ups, all of whom hope to reach the pinnacle of going public and skimming instant wealth–the tech version of a kid dreaming of becoming an NBA star.

A winner-take-most economy is the only possible output of our corrupt financial/political system which has systematically stripmined all sources of social mobility, leaving the masses with little hope of escaping debt-serfdom / just getting by. In this bleak landscape in which the masses constantly lose ground, TikTok and other social media platforms offer a rare beacon of hope to those who have little chance of winning recognition or riches in our winner-take-most economy.

TikTok and other social media reflect the last-ditch desperation of a society stripped of economically meaningful social mobility and positive social roles. Unfortunately the social media platforms are toxic to both their enthralled users and society at large.

Of related interest:

What’s Behind the Erosion of Civil Society? November 2, 2018

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My recent books:

 

Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World ($13)
(Kindle $6.95, print $11.95) Read the first section for free (PDF).

 

Pathfinding our Destiny: Preventing the Final Fall of Our Democratic Republic ($6.95 (Kindle), $12 (print), $13.08 ( audiobook): Read the first section for free (PDF).

The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake $1.29 (Kindle), $8.95 (print); read the first chapters for free (PDF)

Money and Work Unchained $6.95 (Kindle), $15 (print) Read the first section for free (PDF).

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via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/3kbioV7 Tyler Durden

Joe Biden: ‘Why the Hell Would I Take a Test?…Are You a Junkie?’

bidenjunkie

Joe Biden enjoys a comfortable lead over President Donald Trump in most polls, but the former senator and vice president is famous for gaffes that worry his supporters virtually every time he opens his mouth, especially without a script.

In an interview earlier today with CBS’s Errol Barnett, Biden scoffed at the idea that because of his advanced age—he would be the oldest person ever to take office if elected in November—he should take a test to show he has his wits about him (a few weeks ago, Trump discussed taking a cognitive test on Fox News).

“Why the hell would I take a test?” he asked angrily before launching a rant:

That’s like saying, ‘You—before you got on this program you took a test where you’re taking cocaine or not, what do you think? Huh? Are you a junkie?’

The weirdness doesn’t end there. Throughout the exchange, Biden’s affect is exaggerated and he repeatedly stammers and cuts himself off, at one point stumbling repeatedly when announcing that he’s confident he will shine in any debate with Trump.

I am very willing to let the American public judge my physical and mental fil…my physical as well as my mental fil…and mental fitness…and to make a judgement about how I am.

Either Trump, who is 74, or Biden, who is 77, will be elected president come November. The behavior and speech of each have given rise to legitimate questions about their cognitive functioning at the exact moment when the United States is skewing younger (more than 50 percent of Americans are below the age of 40). The sort of display Biden put on today is only going to sharpen concerns about our gerontocracy. Based on their campaign plans and past performances in office, I don’t plan on voting for either Trump or Biden. But if they are going to wreck the country, it would be good to know that they at least knew what they were doing.

Click below for the 90-second clip. Go here for the full interview.

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