New Footage Of Sino-Indian Border Hand-To-Hand Clash Hits The Web As Tensions Soar

New Footage Of Sino-Indian Border Hand-To-Hand Clash Hits The Web As Tensions Soar

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 19:20

New dramatic video is circulating on Chinese social media purporting to show a recent fierce clash along the flashpoint Himalayan Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The video, which appears to show a major hand-to-hand combat incident between large groups of Chinese PLA and Indian soldiers, is of unknown date and origin but is being described as the “newest” among circulating border fight videos.

While nearly impossible to verify the precise location or authenticity of the video, it was reposted by Carl Zha, who Western media reports often describe as a Chinese-American Twitter user and “pro-Beijing influencer”.

The video may be months old, and is being circulated on the same day that China and India have each accused the other of firing shots across the LAC. The footage shows sticks and metal rods being used, and possibly the butts of rifles, given some of the soldiers appear to be armed, but no shots are fired in the clip.

Beijing charged India with a “severe military provocation” after it claimed Indian troops breached the LAC and entered the Chinese administered side. The Indian troops then “opened fire to threaten the Chinese border defense patrol officers,” according to the PLA charge on Tuesday.

Other videos showing intense border clashes, such as the one below posted to YouTube in early June, sometimes involve sticks and rocks, and other makeshift weapons.

The initial events of June 15 were what set off current soaring tensions, with both sides lately seeking to deescalate through a series of talks by each’s military high command.

The June 15 clash, considered the single deadliest border incident not involving firearms in the contested region’s history, saw the rival sides enter hand-to-hand combat, resulting in 20 Indian troop deaths and a presumed unknown number of PLA casualties. 

The Indian troops may have actually fallen to their deaths amid the high altitude nighttime melee, though details remain disputed and unclear. 

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The Trojan Donkey

The Trojan Donkey

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 19:00

Authored by Jeff Thomas via InternationalMan.com,

Since earning the nomination as the 2020 Democratic candidate for the presidency, Joe Biden has stated that he is a “transition candidate.”

This was an odd statement, especially for someone who has hardly begun his formal campaign. (He’s not even in office yet and he’s discussing being on the way out?)

Yet this was not just another one-off Biden gaff, as has been suggested by some. Since announcing his pick for vice president, he has stated, “Look, I view myself as a bridge, not as anything else.”

So what’s up here? The candidate is only a place-holder for the real, intended president?

Well, let’s have a look at that possibility.

Joe Biden, by any measure, is a poor candidate for the office. After almost half a century in politics, he’s had a career mostly as a political hack who would support any issue that seemed popular at the time. Similarly, his voting record in the Senate has been that of a man who supported whatever bill would please his peers and further his career.

Seemingly, he either has no inner core of belief, or he’s been willing to sacrifice it at a moment’s notice, if it might help his next election. After forty-seven years of elected office, he’s not regarded as having a commitment to… well, anything.

And yet he became the choice of the Democratic party as one candidate after another dropped out of the presidential race. Clearly this was a party that was not only leaderless, but couldn’t even seem to invent a leader for the sake of the election.

Kamala Harris, his presumptive vice president, dropped out of the presidential race in December 2019, when her popularity amongst democrats dropped to 3.4%. Since democrats make up roughly half of the population, this means that less than 2% of Americans would have wanted her as their president.

And yet, as stated above, candidate Biden announces, “Look, I view myself as a bridge, not as anything else.”

That’s quite curious. He apparently is stating that his only purpose is to win the election, then pass the baton to the next leader. Presumably, his vice president.

This has never occurred in US politics, although it is true that, at this point, Mr. Biden may well be too far gone to even begin to handle the job.

And that leads us to the possibility that the deal has already been brokered – that Mr. Biden would win the election, then have, let’s say, a “medical emergency,” at which point he would pass the reins to the new president – Kamala Harris.

Clearly, Ms. Harris could not have been elected on her own merit, as even democrats found her to be fundamentally lacking last December. Even the more radical elements of the party have sensed that she is untrustworthy and even dangerous.

At this point in America’s history, there’s much debate as to whether the president is the supreme leader, or whether he or she is merely the face presented by the Deep State, who run the country from the background and give the president his marching orders.

Either way, this eventuality would not bode well for the US. As supreme leader, Ms. Harris, based upon her reputation, would be an autocratic figure who behaved rather ruthlessly toward those who failed to comply with her edicts.

But as the figurehead for the Deep State, she would be a very powerful tool, implementing the loss of freedoms that were passed into law with the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act.

These two acts, taken together, essentially eliminate the US Constitution in practical terms. All that’s necessary to implement them would be for a highly demonstrative president to declare a national emergency. Both acts would then be in force.

It would not be difficult to imagine Ms. Harris in this role.

Presently, we’re watching a very odd set of events unfolding in the US.

Major cities have seen months of continual protests and even rioting, which apparently have been very organized and well-funded.

In a normal situation, the mayors and governors would call in the police to quell such riots.

Yet we’re seeing the opposite. Local political leaders are consistently hamstringing local police, making it impossible for them to do their jobs, thereby increasing the extent of devastation by rioters.

Rioters are routinely let off with a slap on the wrist, whilst those who defend their homes from rioters are arrested and charged.

This, of course, is the exact opposite of what the Rule of Law is meant to achieve.

There’s every reason to believe that this condition will continue to worsen well after the 2020 election, and at some point, Americans from both the right and left will find themselves begging for the federal government to step in – to return the US to a state of relative safety.

Central governments, of course, perennially dislike local policing, as local police tend to be loyal their own communities. However, federal troops have no such loyalty. They perform as their superiors dictate, regardless of where they are deployed.

But once the local police have been gotten out of the way, it would be quite easy for an authoritarian president to deploy federal troops to re-establish order, and initially, this would meet with the approval of worried Americans.

Historically, this has occurred countless times throughout the world. In every case, martial law is instituted as a “temporary measure,” to quell existing unrest. But, as Milton Friedman said,Nothing is so permanent as a temporary government program.”

If this development is in America’s future, as events indicate, it’s likely that the media will repeat the words, “public safety” endlessly as the situation unfolds. The words “martial law” and “police state” may be heard amongst some of the populace, but will be unlikely to dominate the news programmes.

Another word that’s unlikely to appear often in the media is “tyranny,” yet this will be precisely the result of the introduction of a police state.

But all the above is dependent upon a political leader who has the forceful demeanour to ensure that the job gets done with a minimum of dissent.

The American public are therefore left to ponder whether it may be that a vastly unpopular Trojan donkey may be closer to the presidency than she presently appears.

*  *  *

Disturbing economic, political, and social trends are already in motion and now accelerating at breathtaking speed. Most troubling of all, they cannot be stopped. There will likely be unprecedented volatility of every kind in the months and years ahead. That’s exactly why bestselling author Doug Casey and his team just released a free report with all the details on how to survive the crisis ahead. It will help you understand what is unfolding right before our eyes and what you should do so you don’t get caught in the crosshairs. Click here to download the PDF now.

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46-Year-Old Professor Collapses And Dies During Virtual Class After Succumbing To ‘Long-Haul’ COVID-19 Symptoms

46-Year-Old Professor Collapses And Dies During Virtual Class After Succumbing To ‘Long-Haul’ COVID-19 Symptoms

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 18:40

A history professor in Argentina who had been suffering from ‘persistent coronavirus symptoms’ for over a month collapsed and died while teaching a virtual lecture form her home, according to The Sun, citing Diari Mes.

Professor Paola De Simone, 46, was teaching a remote class via Zoom for the Universidad Argentina de la Epresa in Buenos Aires, when she complained that she was feeling unwell. Her condition worsened as students begged her to give them her home address so they could send an ambulance.

She reportedly gasped “I can’t,” before collapsing mid-lecture.

In the days leading up to the tragedy she had expressed concerns about her health.

The teacher had been suffering persistent coronavirus symptoms – including a cough – for more than a month.

Local media reported her husband, a doctor, found her dead when he arrived home. –The Sun

It is unknown if she had any comorbidities.

De Simone’s friends, colleagues and students paid tribute to her, describing her as an “unforgettable teacher.” She leaves behind a daughter, and had previously said that her husband was fighting the pandemic in Argentina – which has suffered 471,806 cases and 9,379 deaths, with approximately 10,000 daily infections since August.

At the end of august, De Simone tweeted “It is very complicated. I have been here [with the virus] for more than four weeks and the symptoms do not go away,” adding “My husband is exhausted from working so much at the moment.

Student Ana Breccia shared: “My classmates and I in class were the last ones she spoke to,” adding “She began by saying that she had pneumonia, we saw it was worse than in previous classes.”

“At one point she could not continue passing slides, nor speak and she became unbalanced.”

Another one of her students described Professor De Simone as an “excellent teacher, but above all an excellent person, loved and admired by all her students”.

The university confirmed her death in a statement, saying it had left the them with “deep pain”.

It added: “Paola was a passionate and dedicated teacher, and a great person, with more fifteen years of experience”. –The Sun

Another student commented that De Simone was an “Unforgettable teacher, one of those who give you a hand in everything, who make you love what you study, who go out of their way for their students. We are going to miss you a lot.”

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Magazine confiscation splits Third and Ninth Circuits

California and New Jersey have enacted laws to confiscate firearms magazines holding more than 10 rounds. On Aug. 14, a 2-1 panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled California’s confiscation unconstitutional, in Duncan v. Becerra. The Third Circuit, Sept. 1, upheld by 2-1 confiscation in New Jersey in Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs Inc v. Attorney General New Jersey (NJ Rifle II). In combination, Duncan and NJ Rifle II cases provide a good view of the state of the Second Amendment argument today.

Below is a summary and analysis of the opinions, and what might happen next. Because the history of magazines was important in both cases, this post also provides background on magazine history, including photos of historic guns holding at least 16 rounds. Such guns have been around since at least 1580. The Lewis & Clark expedition, 1803-06, carried one. Multishot guns were expensive when the Second Amendment was ratified, in 1791. By 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, they had become broadly affordable.

En banc? On August 28, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra filed a petition for rehearing en banc. All filings in the case are available at the excellent case page of Michel & Associates, the firm that won the case in district court and then before the three-judge panel.

In the past, every Ninth Circuit panel ruling in favor of the Second Amendment was later overturned en banc. That could still happen, but it’s no longer certain, thank to President Trump’s many judicial appointments. The Ninth Circuit has 27 judges on active status. (Senior status judges do not vote on or participate in en bancs.) A majority vote is needed to take up a case en banc. Here is a flow chart for the procedural steps towards a decision to take a case en banc; and here is a written description of procedures, by Michel & Associates.

Because the Ninth Circuit is so large, an en banc does not include all active judges. According to Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3, an en banc panel always includes the Chief Judge. The present Chief Judge, Sidney Thomas (Clinton, 1996), has been active in effectuating en banc reversals.  For the rest of the en banc panel, ten additional active judges are chosen at random, to create a panel of 11.  Active judges on the Ninth Circuit include 10 appointed by Donald Trump, 7 by Barack Obama, 3 by George W. Bush, and 9 by Bill Clinton. That’s a total of 16 appointed by Democrats versus 13 by Republicans.

At present, no announcement has been made about whether the New Jersey plaintiffs will file a petition for en banc review by the Third Circuit. The active judges on the court currently consist of two Clinton appointees, four Obama, four George W. Bush, and four Trump.

Supreme Court: If the panel decision in Duncan survives, or if an en banc Third Circuit reverses the panel, there would be a circuit split. Magazine bans have been upheld by the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits. In the latter three circuits there were strong dissents. The D.C. dissent, in the Heller II case, was written by then-Judge Kavanaugh.

A circuit split is, in itself, not necessarily sufficient to get the Supreme Court’s attention. Even a well-established circuit split may just be left as is. For example: If an adult passes a fingerprint-based background check and safety training, should the person be allowed to carry a concealed handgun, for lawful self-defense? The D.C. and Seventh Circuits have answered “yes.” Five other circuits have said that the right to bear arms may be denied unless the applicant shows a special need. (1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 9th Cirs.) In some states, such as Hawaii, special need is construed to be non-existent.

In May 2020, the Supreme Court denied cert. in ten cases involving the Second Amendment—including a New Jersey case, Rogers v. Grewal, that would have been perfect to examine the right to bear arms.

According to CNN journalist Joan Biskupic, “sources have told CNN that the justices on the right did not believe they could depend on a fifth vote from Roberts.” Joan Biskupic, Behind closed doors during one of John Roberts’ most surprising years on the Supreme Court, CNN.com, July 27, 2020.

Magazine bans in the Pacific: Hawaii bans handgun magazines over 10 rounds. A proposal to extend the ban to rifles was defeated in the 2020 legislature. If the Duncan panel decision remains good law, the Hawaii handgun magazine ban would have to fall.

Like Hawaii, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is part of the Ninth Circuit. The Commonwealth bans magazines over 10 rounds. That ban too would be invalid under Duncan.

The Third Circuit covers New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. None of the other jurisdictions in the Circuit have magazine bans. (Virgin Islands laws are here.)

Case histories. California in 2000 prohibited the manufacture, import, and sale of so-called “large capacity magazines,” defined as magazines holding more than 10 rounds. A 2013 revision forbade purchase or receipt of such magazines. In 2016, the California legislature outlawed mere possession. Magazine owners must remove the magazines from  the  state,  sell  them  to  a  firearms  dealer,  or  surrender  them to law enforcement for destruction. There are exemptions for police, retired police, government use, and film-making. Cal. Penal Code sect. 32310.

In Duncan, the federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against confiscation. That decision was upheld by a 2-1 panel in the Ninth Circuit, which emphasized district judges’ broad discretion to issue a preliminary injunction, or not. The panel discussed some of the pro/con evidence that had been introduced thus far; in the majority view, the district judge’s weighing and interpretation of the evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 742 F. Appx. 218 (9th Cir. 2018). I filed an Amicus brief in support of upholding the preliminary injunction. I wrote about the Ninth Circuit decision here.

While the preliminary injunction appeal was proceeding, the district court moved the case forward. In March 2019, U.S. District Judge Roger T. Benitez ruled in favor of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and held the confiscation statute unconstitutional. My analysis of the 86 page opinion is here.  Shortly after the district court decision, the California Attorney General sought and a Ninth Circuit motions panel granted a temporary stay. Under the stay, confiscation did not take place, but Californians were not allowed to acquire magazines over 10 rounds.  That status quo remains today, as explained in a FAQ from the California Rifle & Pistol Association.

New Jersey in 1990 enacted a 15 round limit, with a limited form of grandfathering for larger magazines. In 2018, the legislature reduced the limit to 10 rounds, and ordered the confiscation of magazines larger than 10 rounds.

The day the law went into effect, plaintiffs filed the case Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs (NJ Rifle I). The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. On expedited appeal in 2018, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the injunction by 2-1. 910 F.3d 106. When the case returned to the district court, the court declared that the Third Circuit panel opinion on the preliminary injunction had conclusively resolved all the legal merits in the case, and so the district court was bound to uphold the confiscation statute.

The district court’s decision in NJ Rifle II was appealed. I filed an amicus brief in the case, and wrote about the case here, along with a detailed history of magazines holding more than 10 rounds.

By 2-1, the Third Circuit in agreed that the prior panel decision, on the preliminary injunction, had conclusively resolved all the legal issues, and was binding. Accordingly, the majority did not address constitutional merits.

The dissent in NJ Rifle II disagreed that the preliminary injunction panel had been binding on the merits; the dissent presented arguments why the confiscation violates the Second Amendment under various standards of review.

The Duncan and Association opinions. The Duncan panel decision was written by Judge Kenneth K. Lee (Trump 2019, replacing Stephen Reinhardt), joined by Consuelo M. Callahan (G.W. Bush 2003). Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief Judge of the Northern District of Texas (Clinton 1999) sat on the panel by designation, and dissented.

The NJ Rifle II panel decision was written by Kent A. Jordan (G.W. Bush 2006) and joined by Jane R. Roth (G.H.W. Bush 2001, senior status 2006).  Judge Paul B. Matey (Trump 2018) dissented.

Here are some key differences and agreements among the judges in the two circuits–with the caveat that the NJ Rifle II majority did not address the merits.

Structure of Review. All circuits except the Eighth employ a two-part test for Second Amendment cases: “(1) whether the law burdens conduct protected by  the  Second  Amendment;  and  (2)  if  so,  what  level  of  scrutiny to apply to the regulation.”

The first part of the test asks whether the case involves a Second Amendment issue. In Heller, the Supreme Court said that “dangerous and unusual weapons” are not protected by the Second Amendment. So if someone brought a Second Amendment challenge against a statute the prohibited possession of sarin gas, a court would reject the challenge at part one, because sarin gas is not protected by the Second Amendment.

All the judges in Duncan and NJ Rifle I used the two-part test. Dissenting in NJ Rifle II, Judge Matey wrote that text, history, and tradition was the proper test under Heller, and the that confiscation law plainly failed the test. (For reasons discussed below.) Then-Judge Kavanaugh had used text, history, and tradition in his Heller II dissent. As Judge Matey explained, the two-part test has often devolved into judicial interest-balancing—which is precisely what the Heller majority had rejected, and which Justice Breyer had advocated in his Heller dissent. Like the NJ Rifle II dissent, the district court in Duncan did use the two part-test as one mode of analysis, but criticized it as excessively complicated compared to Heller‘s “simple test” of text, history, tradition. The Ninth Circuit panel in Duncan briefly noted the criticism, did not disagree with it, but stated that the panel was bound by Ninth Circuit precedent to use the test.

How common are the banned magazines, and how much does that matter? Magazines holding over 10 rounds number in the many tens of millions. They are nearly half of all magazines currently possessed in the United States. Magazines are integral to the operation of a firearm. All judges were in agreement on these facts.

According to some judges, the confiscation of property that is widely owned to exercise constitutional rights should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. According to other judges, magazines over 10 rounds aren’t important for lawful defense of self or others. So intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.

In terms of objective standards for what is useful for the lawful defense of self and others, it might be noted United States Marshals, who guard the federal courts, often carry .40 caliber Glock pistols. Their standard magazine is 15 rounds.  The standard arm of the New Jersey State Police is a handgun with a 15 round magazine. (NJ Rifle II, at 7).

Pursuant to Heller (which had brushed aside D.C.’s argument that long guns are adequate substitutes for handguns for defensive purposes), the Duncan majority wrote: “the Second Amendment limits the state’s ability to second-guess  a  citizen’s  choice  of  arms  if  it  imposes  a  substantial  burden on her right to self-defense.” “Simply  put,  any  law  that  comes  close to categorically banning the possession of arms that are commonly   used   for   self-defense   imposes   a   substantial   burden on the Second Amendment.” Moreover:

We would be looking through the wrong end  of  a  sight-glass  if  we  asked  whether  the  government  permits  the  people  to  retain  some  of  the  core  fundamental  and enumerated right. Instead, Heller counsels us to look at whether   the   government   regulation   restricts   the   core   fundamental right from the outset. In other words, we look to  what  a  restriction  takes  away  rather  than  what  it  leaves  behind. …Here,  the  state  effectively  intrudes  into  the  homes  of  law-abiding citizens to forcibly confiscate arms that they rely on for  self-defense…..When  the  government  bans  tens  of  millions  of  protected arms that are staples of self-defense and threatens to confiscate them from the homes of law-abiding citizens, that   imposes   a   substantial   burden   on   core   Second   Amendment rights.

As the Duncan dissent pointed out, magazines over 10 rounds might be common in the United States as a whole, but they are presumably not so common in California, thanks to the 2000 ban on sales. The Duncan majority retorted that a prohibition cannot be its own justification. In the Supreme Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller, the District had banned handguns, so lawful handguns were uncommon in the District. The Heller decision looked at how common handguns were in the United States, not just in a single jurisdiction.

Legal History. Heller had stated that certain “longstanding” laws were “presumptively” (but not conclusively) constitutional. As examples, the opinion listed bans on firearms possession by felons and the mentally ill; prohibitions against carrying firearms in schools and government buildings; and regulations on the commercial sale of firearms. The California magazine ban did not fit any of the presumptively constitutional categories.

Magazine bans have been the exception, not the norm, in American history. The current set of magazine bans in some states dates back only to 1990, with a New Jersey statute that banned the acquisition of magazines over 15 rounds.

During alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, a few states enacted firearms capacity laws, but none of those were was sweeping as the current California and New Jersey statutes. Nor was the capacity as low as 10. All of the alcohol prohibition state laws were later repealed, so they are not “longstanding.”

The above legal history was presented by the judges who found confiscation unconstitutional, and was not disputed by the other judges.

Not “dangerous and unusual.” According to Heller, arms that are “dangerous and unusual” are not protected by the Second Amendment. Magazines over 10 rounds are common, and therefore not unusual. Therefore, they cannot be dangerous and unusual. The Duncan majority cited evidence that there are 115 million such magazines in circulation. Whatever the exact numbers, such magazines number in the many tens of millions in the United States. Like handguns in Heller, magazines over 10 rounds are “commonly  owned  and  typically  possessed  for  lawful  purposes.” (Duncan, slightly paraphrasing Heller.) No judge in the United States has ever accepted the claim that magazines over 10 rounds are “dangerous and unusual.”

Applying strict scrutiny. The three judges who used strict scrutiny did so straightforwardly. Under strict scrutiny, the government’s restriction on a right must be “narrowly  tailored.” It must be “the least restrictive means of achieving” the government’s interests. Confiscation was just the opposite: “a statewide   blanket ban on possession everywhere and for nearly everyone.” (Duncan). As Judge Matey pointed out in NJ Rifle II, the state had produced no evidence that magazine bans save lives, and no justification why a 15 round limit was alright in 1990 but confiscation of everything over 10 was necessary in 2020.

Applying intermediate scrutiny. All judges who addressed the merits examined the statute under intermediate scrutiny, at least as an alternative approach.

Intermediate scrutiny looks for “a  reasonable  fit  between  the  challenged  regulation and the asserted objective.”

According to the Duncan majority, a blanket ban for everyone “is excessive and sloppy.”

It applies  to  rural  and  urban  areas,  in  places  with  low  crime  rates  and  high  crime  rates,  areas  where  law  enforcement  response  times  may  be  significant,  to  those  who  may  have  high degrees of proficiency in their use for self-defense, and to  vulnerable  groups  who  are  in  the  greatest  need  of  self-defense. The law also prohibits possession outright. And it applies  to  all  firearms,  including  handguns  that  are  the  “quintessential   self-defense   weapon.” (citing Heller)…. The  state  could  ban  virtually  anything  if  the  test  is  merely  whether  something  causes  social  ills  when  someone  other  than its  lawful  owner  misuses  it.  Adopting  such  a  radical  position would give the government carte blanche to restrict the people’s liberties under the guise of protecting them.

Under either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny, the government bears the burden of proof. Yet the California Attorney General’s evidence was “thin.” A survey of mass shootings in California found that only 3 of 17 involved a magazine over 10 rounds. None of these magazines were legally obtained in California. So the rationale for confiscating all such magazines from legal owners in California was unsupported.

Dissenting in Duncan, Judge Lynn was agnostic about whether magazine confiscation burdened Second Amendment conduct at all (Part 1 of the two-part test.) But she was sure that the confiscation passed intermediate scrutiny. The Attorney General had presented some evidence that magazine bans were effective, and that was sufficient; at least, the case should not have been decided at the summary judgment stage.

In NJ Rifle II, the state had argued that that that time needed to replace an empty magazine (2-4 seconds) allowed some victims of a mass shooting to escape or to counter-attack the shooter. But this was just speculation, replied dissenting Judge Matey. The evidence showed that that large majority of mass shooters use more than one gun. Moreover, the average interval between shots in a mass shooting is more than 2-4 seconds, so a magazine could be switched without missing a beat. The N.J. Attorney General had not met the intermediate scrutiny standard of “reasonable inferences based   on substantial evidence.”

Material history: Heller stated that the Second Amendment, like the First Amendment, is not limited to the technology that existed in 1791.

However, as the Ninth Circuit and Judge Matey detailed, firearms holding more than ten rounds predate the Second Amendment by two centuries. No judge in the United States has disputed the accuracy of the history detailed by the Duncan majority and the N.J. Rifle II dissent.

The Duncan opinion provided three pages of gun technology history, from the sixteenth century to the present. Judge Matey’s NJ Rifle II dissent also surveyed material history.

Below is a photo of a 16-shot wheel-lock firearm, built sometime before the 1600. (Photo by Michael Ives, for an article in America’s 1st Freedom.)

16-Shot Wheel Lock

When the user pulled the trigger, all sixteen shots would fire in sequence. By the 1700s, gun designers had figured out how to let the user fire one shot at a time.

At the time the Second Amendment was ratified, the state of the art was the 22 shot Girandoni air rifle. Carried on the Lewis & Clark expedition, it was ballistically equal to a powder gun. (This photo and ones below are used courtesy of NRA Museums.)

Although the Lewis and Clark expedition, consisting of a few dozen people, was often outnumbered, they made a point of demonstrating the Girandoni when encountering a new group. As a result, they were rarely molested. (For details, see the video by NRA Museum Senior Curator Phil Schrier, at the bottom of the NRA Museum page on the Girandoni.)

That is one of the purposes of magazines with adequate ammunition capacity: to allow self-defense by someone who is outnumbered. The Duncan opinion addressed anti-mob utility in detail, explaining how repeating rifles were used to deter lynch mobs during Jim Crow.

Such guns were expensive in the eighteenth, seventeenth, and sixteenth centuries. By 1866, when Congress sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the States for ratification, improved manufacturing techniques (such as interchangeable parts) had made such guns broadly affordable. Examples include the Winchester Model 66, below. The Winchester’s  capacity was up to 18 rounds, depending on caliber.

Before the turn of the 20th century, semi-automatic handguns with detachable magazines were being produced. The picture below is a Luger pistol with its optional 32-round snail drum magazine. (Picture of a 1914 exemplar.)

Since then, handguns haven’t changed all that much, other than in better quality. Improvements in machine tools mean that parts are better made these days. Plastic polymers were introduced to firearms manufacturing in the 1950s, so many guns today use plastic for some of the parts. (While adhering to federal law, 18 U.S.C. 922(r), that a firearm must have at least 4 1/2 ounces of metal, in the silhouette of a gun.) The invention of double-stack magazines made magazines more compact, so in the Glock 17 pistol below (invented early 1980s), the 17 round magazine fits entirely inside the grip.

For more on magazine history, see my article The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions, 78 Albany Law Review 849 (2015), and see also Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Pistols, Crime, and Public: Safety In Early America, 44 Willamette L. Rev. 699 (2008). Both articles were cited in Duncan, and the first article was cited by the dissent in NJ Rifle II.

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NCLA Challenges CDC’s Eviction Moratorium

Last week, Ilya Somin and I blogged about the Trump Administration’s new eviction moratorium. The New Civil Liberties Alliance has challenged the policy, and sought a temporary restraining order in the Northern District of Georgia. The Plaintiff is from Virginia, but the CDC is based in Atlanta.

From the introduction:

Mr. Brown upheld his end of the bargain. He provided a habitable home to his tenant and continues to pay for maintenance, utilities and other expenses. When Mr. Brown’s tenant breached her agreement, he should have been able to follow the lawful process laid down by the Virginia General Assembly for retaking possession of his home.

Mr. Brown failed to anticipate, however that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, a federal agency, would issue a sweeping unilateral order suspending state law under the flimsy premise that doing so was “necessary” to control the COVID- 19 pandemic. CDC’s actions are not authorized by statute or regulation. But even if they were, they are unprecedented in our history and are an affront to core constitutional limits on federal power. If allowed, the order would abrogate the right to access the courts, violate limits on the Supremacy Clause, implicate the nondelegation doctrine, and traduce anti-commandeering principles. CDC’s effort to seize control of state law on such an insupportable basis must be rejected.

This case presents a kitchen sink of constitutional claims. Count I alleges a violation of the APA. Count II alleges a violation of the right to access courts. Count III alleges a violation of the Supremacy Clause–the moratorium is not a law. Count IV raise a Contracts Clause claim. Count IV raises commandeering arguments with respect to the state courts. (The brief argues that the CDC cannot “Strip state courts of jurisdiction to process eviction cases”; I wrote about this issue here.) Count VI raises the non-delegation doctrine. Count VII argues that the order suspends state law (this argument is connected to the Suspension Clause).

It’s got everything.

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Partisan Taint in the Trump-Russia Investigation

It’s been four years since the FBI began its national security investigation of the Trump campaign, and Americans remain deeply divided over the probe. Democrats think the investigation was more than warranted by the number of suspicious contacts between Team Trump and the Russian government. Republicans think the investigation was a partisan hit job on an anti-establishment candidate.

They’re both right.

It would have been national security malpractice not to investigate possible Russian influence over the Trump campaign. Hostile foreign governments will always be tempted to use the openness of American presidential contests to boost their favored candidates or sabotage others. More such investigations will be needed in the future. After spending four years advertising the success of Russia’s interference campaign, the U.S. should not be surprised if other countries get the message and launch their own. Given the risks, national security agencies can’t be gun-shy about probing foreign government efforts to infiltrate the U.S. political system.

At the same time, there is a lot more evidence than many people realize that the 2016 investigation was pervasively tainted by hostility to Donald Trump. In part, that comes with the territory. Any time government officials order national security surveillance of people who want to kick them out of office, they will be suspected of partisan motives. Put charitably, the Obama administration bungled this dimension; it failed to recognize just how partisan its investigation of a political rival would look, and it did far too little to avoid the appearance of partisanship. Less charitably, there is reason to believe that the Obama administration milked the investigation for partisan advantage.

That less charitable view deserves respect. First because it’s backed by considerable evidence. And second because it’s unpersuasive to tell half the country that their suspicions are mere conspiracy theories that they should just get over. The U.S. needs a national security system that the whole country has confidence in.

Especially now. The United States has spent nearly 50 years guarding against one kind of intelligence abuse—the government turning its intelligence machinery against individual rights and unpopular minorities. It hasn’t had to worry much about a different kind of abuse—employing national security surveillance to achieve partisan political ends.

It’s not that it can’t happen here, as anyone would know who studied J. Edgar Hoover’s collection of dirt on politicians—or his willingness to share that dirt with presidents when they felt the need. The United States has been lucky in recent decades. Divided government and a narrow range of political differences discouraged incumbents from using intelligence capabilities against the opposition.

Now, not so much. If it sees members of the other party not just as wrong but as borderline treasonous, why wouldn’t the party in power use national security authorities against them? As that temptation grows, institutional reforms are needed to keep officials from yielding to it and, just as important, to show skeptics that the reforms actually worked.

The Obama administration clearly flunked the second requirement. They quite possibly flunked the first one too. Here are the most salient facts in support of that view—a much more detailed accounting of which is available, complete with footnotes, in my forthcoming testimony to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

The DNC and the Steele “Dossier”

A major part of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and the public disclosures it produced was the “dossier” created by Christopher Steele. We all now know that it was a salacious and unverifiable hit job assembled not by a network of intelligence sources but by a mix of Steele’s friends, their drinking buddies, and probably a few disinformation specialists from GRU (Russia’s military intelligence agency). Worse, Steele assembled that hit piece as a subcontractor to the Democratic National Committee, and judging by his conduct, he thought his role was to lobby the FBI to use its formidable national security powers against the Republican campaign—and to leak both the investigation and the now “FBI-validated” dossier in hopes of ruining Trump’s candidacy.

There are reasons to suspect that, despite its denials, the DNC intended that outcome: It hid its ties to Steele behind multiple cutouts and a dubious claim of attorney-client privilege, then falsely denied its connection to Steele for months after the story broke. In the end, Steele’s work didn’t pay off for Democrats until after the election. But during the transition it stoked the Russia collusion narrative that put a cloud of illegitimacy over the first two years of the Trump administration. That is a remarkable, if unseemly, achievement for a partisan hit job. Other political actors will learn the lesson and can be expected to use cutouts in the future to lobby the national security agencies against their domestic enemies.

Partisan Bias and the Carter Page FISA Application

The one really detailed examination of how the Crossfire Hurricane investigators treated the evidence against the Trump campaign is the inspector general’s dissection of the Carter Page wiretap application. That story does not exactly rebut the suspicion that partisanship tainted the probe. The application was full of errors and omissions, and all of them cut against Page and the Trump administration. Almost no one in the Justice Department or FBI stopped to ask if it was wise to pursue a surveillance order against a prominent member of the opposing party without taking a hard look at the evidence. As a result, the investigators left out—or even lied about—a raft of information that would have raised doubts about whether Page was a legitimate surveillance target.

For a while, it was possible to put these errors down to a different cause—not partisanship but a complete collapse in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) fact-gathering process. That comforting line of thinking rested on two findings by Inspector General Michael Horowitz—first that he found no evidence of bias and second that he found pervasive errors in 29 unrelated FISA applications. On closer examination, neither of those findings offers much support to the “FISA is broken” hypothesis.

First, on partisan motivation in Crossfire Hurricane, what the inspector general actually found was that no one at the FBI was foolish enough to say in writing or in testimony that they or others at the FBI were operating with a partisan bias. As the inspector general acknowledged in his Senate testimony, the absence of bias evidence didn’t prove an absence of bias. In fact, the inspector general did find written evidence of bias—in the texts of Peter Strzok, which are full of animus toward Trump. Strzok had great influence over the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, but the inspector general decided that Strzok’s bias didn’t count because Strzok never acted completely alone in the investigation. Really, that’s it. If I’m ever accused of a crime, I want Michael Horowitz on my jury.

Second, the errors he found in 29 other FISA applications evaporated on a closer look. They were, it turns out, almost all failures to properly footnote the FBI’s sources. When the FISA court ordered a review of all 29, the Justice Department found only two material errors, and neither of them cast doubt on the issuance of the wiretap order. That contrasts starkly with the Carter Page application, where the department has admitted that the errors were so serious that at least two and perhaps all four FISA orders should never have been issued.

In short, the only FISA application that targeted a partisan opponent of the administration was corrupted by numerous material omissions and errors and at least one false statement, one of the most influential investigators was a voluble Trump hater, and others may have harbored a bias against Trump that they were too prudent to articulate. Since the FISA process in general now seems to be careful and accurate, if not perfect, the deviation from norm in the case of Carter Page strongly supports the view that anti-Trump bias was at work.

A Conveyor Belt from Press Reports to Surveillance

Actually, there’s more. The inspector general passed over in silence the remarkable reliance of the Page application on media reporting. Fully a third of the core FISA case against Page consists of summaries of news stories. By itself, relying on media reports was a likely source of bias against anyone associated with Trump. (If you want to argue about that, all I can say is that I want you on my jury too.) But we don’t have to argue about media bias in the abstract. It can be found in the Page application itself, which relies on a Washington Post opinion piece, without disclosing to the court either the source or the fact that it isn’t, strictly speaking, a news report at all. Almost as bad, the opinion piece claims that the Trump campaign diluted the GOP platform on Ukraine in ways that favored Russia. (In fact, the campaign accepted a mildly diluted version of an amendment offered by a Ted Cruz delegate, which is a lot more accommodation than delegates for defeated candidates usually get at conventions.) The claim has been investigated extensively, including by Robert Mueller and the Senate Intelligence Committee, without finding any wrongdoing. The nicest thing you can say about the article in retrospect is that it was slanted to take the worst view of the Trump operation. An equally fair summary would be that the story became part of an FBI conveyor belt for turning media bias into a wiretap order. If that doesn’t worry you, imagine today’s Justice Department obtaining a FISA order against Biden campaign advisers by relying on an article from Breitbart, and simply telling the court, as the Page application does, that the information comes from “an identified news source.”

Targeting Michael Flynn

That’s not the worst of it. Viewed from the standpoint of partisan abuse, the Michael Flynn story is especially troubling. He had been investigated and cleared by the FBI on Jan. 3, 2017. But two days later, on Jan. 5, the White House obtained a wiretap of Flynn talking to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia’s response to the Obama administration’s recent sanctions. The wiretap of Flynn’s remarks was legal, because the “target” of the tap was Kislyak not Flynn. But the legality of the collection does not fully resolve what you might call an analytical reverse-targeting after the fact. That’s because the White House was only really interested in Flynn’s side of the call.

After an Oval Office meeting about Flynn’s remarks, Obama administration officials began a concerted campaign to use those remarks against him. Within three weeks, he’d face leaks accusing him of violating the criminal Logan Act, he’d be reinvestigated under an implausible counterintelligence theory, and he’d find himself ambushed by the FBI in a perjury-trap interview. He’d also become the first American to have a FISA-tapped conversation leaked to the press by political rivals. Within four weeks, he’d be gone from government, disgraced and facing criminal prosecution.

By any measure, this was a political use of a FISA wiretap that targeted an American. It may have been a lawful political use of a FISA tap, but that’s not something people should be comfortable with. The Obama administration, however, had gotten comfortable with it a few years earlier. When Israel was fighting Obama’s Iran nuclear deal in Washington, it worked closely with Hill Republicans. The U.S. apparently tapped the Israelis, again legally, since they were foreign government officials. And the taps may have offered some national security insights; any time a government, however friendly, lobbies Congress against the American president, we ought to know what it’s up to. But the foreign intelligence value of understanding what the Israelis were saying paled next to the political value of getting real-time intelligence on the GOP’s Hill strategy for stopping the Iran deal. The unfortunate lesson the Obama administration learned in that battle was that the president can use FISA taps against his political enemies as long as he checks the right legal boxes. If it worked against the congressional Republicans, why wouldn’t it work against Team Trump?

But turning FISA into just another partisan weapon means it’s going to be used like one. If it hurts the other side, it’s going to be leaked. Which is what happened with Flynn’s conversation. The leak was unprecedented in national security circles, but in Washington politics, it was just another Thursday. More than 40 years had elapsed before the first FISA tap of an American was leaked to the press. I doubt it’ll be that long before the second.

The Need for Reform

To be clear, apart from the Flynn leak, none of this was plainly illegal, and no one should want the government to ignore indications that a prominent political figure is working with a hostile government. But the Republicans who were on the receiving end of these intelligence operations have every reason to doubt the good faith of the administration that carried them out. And that in itself will prove fatal to the bipartisan support the intelligence community needs as it responds to foreign influence operations. What’s needed are reforms that will prevent future administrations from using the intelligence community against the opposition in this way.

Unfortunately, most of the reform proposals are warmed-up leftovers beloved of individual rights advocates—more paperwork and audits and amici curiae for all FISA applications, not just the ones that pose partisan risk. Others could make things worse, such as the measures to require that the attorney general be briefed on FISA taps with partisan risk. Is there anyone on the GOP side who would be relieved to hear that the Flynn matter was overseen by Sally Yates, who chose partisanship over Justice Department tradition in refusing to defend the new administration’s immigration policy in court? Is there anyone on Team Biden who’ll be comforted to hear that William Barr will decide whether to investigate the former vice president for ties to Ukraine or China? It’s fine for the case to get high-level review; top officials often have better instincts than those in the ranks. But it’s not enough. We need to create a career position for a nonpartisan FBI agent or lawyer to challenge the FISA application and every other stage of the investigation. (The attorney general’s supplemental reforms memo of Aug. 31, 2020, takes a good step in this direction by requiring that politically sensitive surveillance and search applications be reviewed by a special agent from a field office not involved in the investigation.) The career official should also take the lead in reporting on the investigation to majority and minority congressional leadership, not after the fact but as it proceeds.

And when an operation has both political and national security value, the intelligence it produces needs special and far more limited handling, especially when it goes to political appointees. Every one of them should be required to sign a receipt explaining why he or she needs to read it, and the intelligence community should routinely include tags on some reports that will disclose which one was leaked.

Other measures are simple. The FBI should offer media reports to the FISA court only rarely, and it should disclose their source and any credible claims of bias that have been leveled against the news outlet. Anyone who pays a third party—directly or indirectly—to try to influence the FBI or other national security agency should disclose that fact, just as lobbyists trying to influence Congress or political appointees must.

There’s plenty of room to argue about which safeguards will best limit the partisan misuse of the United States’s security machinery. I hope that this piece—and my longer testimony to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board—are at least sufficient to establish that, without new safeguards, the United States will slowly lose its ability to respond as it must to foreign influence operations.

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NCLA Challenges CDC’s Eviction Moratorium

Last week, Ilya Somin and I blogged about the Trump Administration’s new eviction moratorium. The New Civil Liberties Alliance has challenged the policy, and sought a temporary restraining order in the Northern District of Georgia. The Plaintiff is from Virginia, but the CDC is based in Atlanta.

From the introduction:

Mr. Brown upheld his end of the bargain. He provided a habitable home to his tenant and continues to pay for maintenance, utilities and other expenses. When Mr. Brown’s tenant breached her agreement, he should have been able to follow the lawful process laid down by the Virginia General Assembly for retaking possession of his home.

Mr. Brown failed to anticipate, however that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, a federal agency, would issue a sweeping unilateral order suspending state law under the flimsy premise that doing so was “necessary” to control the COVID- 19 pandemic. CDC’s actions are not authorized by statute or regulation. But even if they were, they are unprecedented in our history and are an affront to core constitutional limits on federal power. If allowed, the order would abrogate the right to access the courts, violate limits on the Supremacy Clause, implicate the nondelegation doctrine, and traduce anti-commandeering principles. CDC’s effort to seize control of state law on such an insupportable basis must be rejected.

This case presents a kitchen sink of constitutional claims. Count I alleges a violation of the APA. Count II alleges a violation of the right to access courts. Count III alleges a violation of the Supremacy Clause–the moratorium is not a law. Count IV raise a Contracts Clause claim. Count IV raises commandeering arguments with respect to the state courts. (The brief argues that the CDC cannot “Strip state courts of jurisdiction to process eviction cases”; I wrote about this issue here.) Count VI raises the non-delegation doctrine. Count VII argues that the order suspends state law (this argument is connected to the Suspension Clause).

It’s got everything.

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Partisan Taint in the Trump-Russia Investigation

It’s been four years since the FBI began its national security investigation of the Trump campaign, and Americans remain deeply divided over the probe. Democrats think the investigation was more than warranted by the number of suspicious contacts between Team Trump and the Russian government. Republicans think the investigation was a partisan hit job on an anti-establishment candidate.

They’re both right.

It would have been national security malpractice not to investigate possible Russian influence over the Trump campaign. Hostile foreign governments will always be tempted to use the openness of American presidential contests to boost their favored candidates or sabotage others. More such investigations will be needed in the future. After spending four years advertising the success of Russia’s interference campaign, the U.S. should not be surprised if other countries get the message and launch their own. Given the risks, national security agencies can’t be gun-shy about probing foreign government efforts to infiltrate the U.S. political system.

At the same time, there is a lot more evidence than many people realize that the 2016 investigation was pervasively tainted by hostility to Donald Trump. In part, that comes with the territory. Any time government officials order national security surveillance of people who want to kick them out of office, they will be suspected of partisan motives. Put charitably, the Obama administration bungled this dimension; it failed to recognize just how partisan its investigation of a political rival would look, and it did far too little to avoid the appearance of partisanship. Less charitably, there is reason to believe that the Obama administration milked the investigation for partisan advantage.

That less charitable view deserves respect. First because it’s backed by considerable evidence. And second because it’s unpersuasive to tell half the country that their suspicions are mere conspiracy theories that they should just get over. The U.S. needs a national security system that the whole country has confidence in.

Especially now. The United States has spent nearly 50 years guarding against one kind of intelligence abuse—the government turning its intelligence machinery against individual rights and unpopular minorities. It hasn’t had to worry much about a different kind of abuse—employing national security surveillance to achieve partisan political ends.

It’s not that it can’t happen here, as anyone would know who studied J. Edgar Hoover’s collection of dirt on politicians—or his willingness to share that dirt with presidents when they felt the need. The United States has been lucky in recent decades. Divided government and a narrow range of political differences discouraged incumbents from using intelligence capabilities against the opposition.

Now, not so much. If it sees members of the other party not just as wrong but as borderline treasonous, why wouldn’t the party in power use national security authorities against them? As that temptation grows, institutional reforms are needed to keep officials from yielding to it and, just as important, to show skeptics that the reforms actually worked.

The Obama administration clearly flunked the second requirement. They quite possibly flunked the first one too. Here are the most salient facts in support of that view—a much more detailed accounting of which is available, complete with footnotes, in my forthcoming testimony to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

The DNC and the Steele “Dossier”

A major part of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and the public disclosures it produced was the “dossier” created by Christopher Steele. We all now know that it was a salacious and unverifiable hit job assembled not by a network of intelligence sources but by a mix of Steele’s friends, their drinking buddies, and probably a few disinformation specialists from GRU (Russia’s military intelligence agency). Worse, Steele assembled that hit piece as a subcontractor to the Democratic National Committee, and judging by his conduct, he thought his role was to lobby the FBI to use its formidable national security powers against the Republican campaign—and to leak both the investigation and the now “FBI-validated” dossier in hopes of ruining Trump’s candidacy.

There are reasons to suspect that, despite its denials, the DNC intended that outcome: It hid its ties to Steele behind multiple cutouts and a dubious claim of attorney-client privilege, then falsely denied its connection to Steele for months after the story broke. In the end, Steele’s work didn’t pay off for Democrats until after the election. But during the transition it stoked the Russia collusion narrative that put a cloud of illegitimacy over the first two years of the Trump administration. That is a remarkable, if unseemly, achievement for a partisan hit job. Other political actors will learn the lesson and can be expected to use cutouts in the future to lobby the national security agencies against their domestic enemies.

Partisan Bias and the Carter Page FISA Application

The one really detailed examination of how the Crossfire Hurricane investigators treated the evidence against the Trump campaign is the inspector general’s dissection of the Carter Page wiretap application. That story does not exactly rebut the suspicion that partisanship tainted the probe. The application was full of errors and omissions, and all of them cut against Page and the Trump administration. Almost no one in the Justice Department or FBI stopped to ask if it was wise to pursue a surveillance order against a prominent member of the opposing party without taking a hard look at the evidence. As a result, the investigators left out—or even lied about—a raft of information that would have raised doubts about whether Page was a legitimate surveillance target.

For a while, it was possible to put these errors down to a different cause—not partisanship but a complete collapse in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) fact-gathering process. That comforting line of thinking rested on two findings by Inspector General Michael Horowitz—first that he found no evidence of bias and second that he found pervasive errors in 29 unrelated FISA applications. On closer examination, neither of those findings offers much support to the “FISA is broken” hypothesis.

First, on partisan motivation in Crossfire Hurricane, what the inspector general actually found was that no one at the FBI was foolish enough to say in writing or in testimony that they or others at the FBI were operating with a partisan bias. As the inspector general acknowledged in his Senate testimony, the absence of bias evidence didn’t prove an absence of bias. In fact, the inspector general did find written evidence of bias—in the texts of Peter Strzok, which are full of animus toward Trump. Strzok had great influence over the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, but the inspector general decided that Strzok’s bias didn’t count because Strzok never acted completely alone in the investigation. Really, that’s it. If I’m ever accused of a crime, I want Michael Horowitz on my jury.

Second, the errors he found in 29 other FISA applications evaporated on a closer look. They were, it turns out, almost all failures to properly footnote the FBI’s sources. When the FISA court ordered a review of all 29, the Justice Department found only two material errors, and neither of them cast doubt on the issuance of the wiretap order. That contrasts starkly with the Carter Page application, where the department has admitted that the errors were so serious that at least two and perhaps all four FISA orders should never have been issued.

In short, the only FISA application that targeted a partisan opponent of the administration was corrupted by numerous material omissions and errors and at least one false statement, one of the most influential investigators was a voluble Trump hater, and others may have harbored a bias against Trump that they were too prudent to articulate. Since the FISA process in general now seems to be careful and accurate, if not perfect, the deviation from norm in the case of Carter Page strongly supports the view that anti-Trump bias was at work.

A Conveyor Belt from Press Reports to Surveillance

Actually, there’s more. The inspector general passed over in silence the remarkable reliance of the Page application on media reporting. Fully a third of the core FISA case against Page consists of summaries of news stories. By itself, relying on media reports was a likely source of bias against anyone associated with Trump. (If you want to argue about that, all I can say is that I want you on my jury too.) But we don’t have to argue about media bias in the abstract. It can be found in the Page application itself, which relies on a Washington Post opinion piece, without disclosing to the court either the source or the fact that it isn’t, strictly speaking, a news report at all. Almost as bad, the opinion piece claims that the Trump campaign diluted the GOP platform on Ukraine in ways that favored Russia. (In fact, the campaign accepted a mildly diluted version of an amendment offered by a Ted Cruz delegate, which is a lot more accommodation than delegates for defeated candidates usually get at conventions.) The claim has been investigated extensively, including by Robert Mueller and the Senate Intelligence Committee, without finding any wrongdoing. The nicest thing you can say about the article in retrospect is that it was slanted to take the worst view of the Trump operation. An equally fair summary would be that the story became part of an FBI conveyor belt for turning media bias into a wiretap order. If that doesn’t worry you, imagine today’s Justice Department obtaining a FISA order against Biden campaign advisers by relying on an article from Breitbart, and simply telling the court, as the Page application does, that the information comes from “an identified news source.”

Targeting Michael Flynn

That’s not the worst of it. Viewed from the standpoint of partisan abuse, the Michael Flynn story is especially troubling. He had been investigated and cleared by the FBI on Jan. 3, 2017. But two days later, on Jan. 5, the White House obtained a wiretap of Flynn talking to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia’s response to the Obama administration’s recent sanctions. The wiretap of Flynn’s remarks was legal, because the “target” of the tap was Kislyak not Flynn. But the legality of the collection does not fully resolve what you might call an analytical reverse-targeting after the fact. That’s because the White House was only really interested in Flynn’s side of the call.

After an Oval Office meeting about Flynn’s remarks, Obama administration officials began a concerted campaign to use those remarks against him. Within three weeks, he’d face leaks accusing him of violating the criminal Logan Act, he’d be reinvestigated under an implausible counterintelligence theory, and he’d find himself ambushed by the FBI in a perjury-trap interview. He’d also become the first American to have a FISA-tapped conversation leaked to the press by political rivals. Within four weeks, he’d be gone from government, disgraced and facing criminal prosecution.

By any measure, this was a political use of a FISA wiretap that targeted an American. It may have been a lawful political use of a FISA tap, but that’s not something people should be comfortable with. The Obama administration, however, had gotten comfortable with it a few years earlier. When Israel was fighting Obama’s Iran nuclear deal in Washington, it worked closely with Hill Republicans. The U.S. apparently tapped the Israelis, again legally, since they were foreign government officials. And the taps may have offered some national security insights; any time a government, however friendly, lobbies Congress against the American president, we ought to know what it’s up to. But the foreign intelligence value of understanding what the Israelis were saying paled next to the political value of getting real-time intelligence on the GOP’s Hill strategy for stopping the Iran deal. The unfortunate lesson the Obama administration learned in that battle was that the president can use FISA taps against his political enemies as long as he checks the right legal boxes. If it worked against the congressional Republicans, why wouldn’t it work against Team Trump?

But turning FISA into just another partisan weapon means it’s going to be used like one. If it hurts the other side, it’s going to be leaked. Which is what happened with Flynn’s conversation. The leak was unprecedented in national security circles, but in Washington politics, it was just another Thursday. More than 40 years had elapsed before the first FISA tap of an American was leaked to the press. I doubt it’ll be that long before the second.

The Need for Reform

To be clear, apart from the Flynn leak, none of this was plainly illegal, and no one should want the government to ignore indications that a prominent political figure is working with a hostile government. But the Republicans who were on the receiving end of these intelligence operations have every reason to doubt the good faith of the administration that carried them out. And that in itself will prove fatal to the bipartisan support the intelligence community needs as it responds to foreign influence operations. What’s needed are reforms that will prevent future administrations from using the intelligence community against the opposition in this way.

Unfortunately, most of the reform proposals are warmed-up leftovers beloved of individual rights advocates—more paperwork and audits and amici curiae for all FISA applications, not just the ones that pose partisan risk. Others could make things worse, such as the measures to require that the attorney general be briefed on FISA taps with partisan risk. Is there anyone on the GOP side who would be relieved to hear that the Flynn matter was overseen by Sally Yates, who chose partisanship over Justice Department tradition in refusing to defend the new administration’s immigration policy in court? Is there anyone on Team Biden who’ll be comforted to hear that William Barr will decide whether to investigate the former vice president for ties to Ukraine or China? It’s fine for the case to get high-level review; top officials often have better instincts than those in the ranks. But it’s not enough. We need to create a career position for a nonpartisan FBI agent or lawyer to challenge the FISA application and every other stage of the investigation. (The attorney general’s supplemental reforms memo of Aug. 31, 2020, takes a good step in this direction by requiring that politically sensitive surveillance and search applications be reviewed by a special agent from a field office not involved in the investigation.) The career official should also take the lead in reporting on the investigation to majority and minority congressional leadership, not after the fact but as it proceeds.

And when an operation has both political and national security value, the intelligence it produces needs special and far more limited handling, especially when it goes to political appointees. Every one of them should be required to sign a receipt explaining why he or she needs to read it, and the intelligence community should routinely include tags on some reports that will disclose which one was leaked.

Other measures are simple. The FBI should offer media reports to the FISA court only rarely, and it should disclose their source and any credible claims of bias that have been leveled against the news outlet. Anyone who pays a third party—directly or indirectly—to try to influence the FBI or other national security agency should disclose that fact, just as lobbyists trying to influence Congress or political appointees must.

There’s plenty of room to argue about which safeguards will best limit the partisan misuse of the United States’s security machinery. I hope that this piece—and my longer testimony to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board—are at least sufficient to establish that, without new safeguards, the United States will slowly lose its ability to respond as it must to foreign influence operations.

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Cryptocurrencies Rarely Used To Launder Money, Fiat Preferred

Cryptocurrencies Rarely Used To Launder Money, Fiat Preferred

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 18:20

Authored by Shaurya Malwa via Decrypt.io,

Traditional channels continue to dominate the estimated $2 trillion global money laundering racket instead of cryptocurrencies, a report says.

In brief

  • Money laundering via cryptocurrencies is not a preferred tool for criminals, a report said.

  • Traditional methods like mules, cash businesses, and drug trade remain at the forefront.

  • However, private cryptocurrencies and online marketplaces are an upcoming threat.

According to a report by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the role of cryptocurrencies in money laundering is overstated and unfounded, with fiat money still the most used method for such illicit purposes.

Money laundering remains a grave concern globally. Research from the intergovernmental organization United Nations suggests anything from $800 billion to $2 trillion is laundered via fiat channels each year. But cryptocurrencies are only a small part of the picture.

“Identified cases of laundering through cryptocurrencies remain relatively small compared to the volumes of cash laundered through traditional methods,” said SWIFT last week.

The firm provides a communication tool for banks to relay transactional information to each other and is used to conduct billions of dollars in transfers daily.

SWIFT said traditional methods like using mules, hawala (using intermediaries), front companies, cash businesses, and crimes like drug trade remain at the forefront of money laundering. In contrast, the use of cryptocurrencies is minimal, with even cybercriminal usage of digital money being “few and far between.”

That said, there are still some takers for criminal crypto. SWIFT singled out the infamous Lazarus Group – allegedly run by North Korean hackers to steal money, convert to cryptocurrencies, and route it back to the country – as a major hacker group that continues to use cryptocurrencies over fiat.

Other such cases are unidentified hacker groups in Europe that use stolen funds to purchase prepaid cryptocurrency debit cards, a special type of card that stores crypto and converts to fiat during a transaction, added the messaging provider.

Concerns around cryptocurrencies remain

SWIFT said, however, that the use of cryptocurrency for laundering stolen bank funds will rise in the future.

“Favorable factors include the growing number of altcoins (alternative cryptocurrencies) that have recently launched and which focus on providing full transaction anonymity,” it noted.

Services like mixers and tumblers – online tools that mix up cryptocurrency transactions with legitimate transactions to cover tracks – also represent an upcoming threat. Similar to these is the rise of privacy-centric cryptocurrencies like Monero, which obfuscate transactional addresses and are hence difficult to track.

Another potential money laundering tool is the emergence of specialized online marketplaces that only require an email address to signup, which could then be used to convert illegal crypto gains to real-world assets like property and watches, SWIFT added.

But for now, the real problems lie with fiat currency.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/35duZSy Tyler Durden

Daily Briefing – September 8, 2020

Daily Briefing – September 8, 2020


Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 18:10

Real Vision senior editor Ash Bennington is joined by Jared Dillian, editor of The Daily Dirtnap, to discuss the dramatic turmoil playing out in equity markets. Dillian discusses how the speculative bets in derivatives markets affect price action, and provides greater clarity on Softbank’s role in the ongoing saga. Dillian and Bennington also discuss Tesla’s selloff, the upcoming Canadian election, and the U.S. dollar. In the intro, Jack Farley explores the true effect of Softbank’s call-buying.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2R6Ff6N Tyler Durden